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The Progress and Rationality of Philosophy As a Cognitive Enterprise

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THE PROGRESS Æ{D RATIONAIITY OF PHILOSOPHY AS A COGNITIVE ENTEBPRISE: AI{ ESSAY ON METAPHILOSOPHY Joseph l{ayne Srníth MA (Flin.) A thesis submitÈed for the degree of the Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of Philosophy, Èhe Universíty of Adelaide March,1985. Árr¿0.¡r r, Êl' /lultte,l ¡s 6Ø I (íí) CONTENTS Page TITLE (í) CONTENTS (ii) ABSTRACT (iií) DECLARATION (iv) ACKNOI.ILEDGEMENTS (v) I STATEMENT OF THE ARGIJMENT: IS PHILOSOPHY A DEGENERATING RESEARCH PROGRAMME? 1 2 DIALECTICS, CONTROVERSY AND PHILOSOPHICAL DISAGREEMENTS 34 3 THE PROBLEMS AND PARADOXES OF COGNITIVE PROGRESS 55 4 SCEPTICISM AND RELATIVISM, ANARCHISM AND NIHILISM IN METAPHILOSOPHY tr2 5. NATURALIZED EPISTEMOLOGY AND OBJECTIVIST RESPONSES 168 6. INTERNALIST RESPONSES 2A6 7. EROTETIC UNSOLVABILITY AND METAPHILOSOPHY 250 8 THE PROGRESS AND RATIONALITY OF PHILOSOPHY I: A DISSOTUTION OF THE PRINCIPAL PROBLEM 277 9 THE PROGRESS AND RATIONALITY OF PHILOSOPHY II: A THEORY OF COGNITIVE PROGRESS 305 10. THE PROGRESS AND RATIONALITY OF PHILOSOPHY III: A THEORY OF PHILOSOPHICAL RATIONALITY 32L 11. CONCLUSION: STATE OF THE ARCIIMENT 356 BIBLIOGRAPHY 358 (iii) AsSTRACT Throughout the history of phílosophy, philosophers have commented (often v/ith disnay), at the state of cognitive discord and lack of consensus which seenr-ingIy characterizes their di-sciplÍne. As David Hume observed: "There is nothing which is noÈ the subject of debate, and in which men of learníng are not of contrary opínions. The mosË trivíal questíon escapes not our controversy, and ín the most momentous \^re are not able to give any certain decisíon" (Hume, 1960, p.xviii). If Hume is right, then the question should be immediately asked: fis the trrlestern tradítion in philosophy a degenerating "research prograrune"?t Alternatively: thow can philosophy as a cognitíve enterprise be con- sidered to be both pz,ogressiue a¡d rational in the face of the problem of perenniaL phiLosophicaL dLsputes?' (Kekes,1980). The conflicting vÍews of the philosophers, formed part of tt'e rationes dubitandL of scepticism in antiquity (Rescher, L978, p.2L7). The scepticsmaintained on this basis, that philosophical knowledge was impossible. This view is held today ín a variety of forms (Rorty, L979), (Unger, 1984). It is the aím of this work to suggest a resolution to Èhe problem of perennial philosophieal disputes and show that philosophy ís both a rational and progressive enÈerprise. Unless this can be shown, then, as I have argued ín my book Reductionism øtd CuLtural Being (Srnith, l9B4), the rationality and progressiveness of a large portion of the social sciences is also threatened. (iv) DECLARATION I The thesis contains no materíal whích has been accepted I i for the award of any other degree or diploma in any l I University and thaÈ, to Ëhe best of the candidatets I knowledge and belief, the thesis contains no material previously published or r^rritten by another Person' except where due reference is made in the Èext of the Èhesis. 2 The author consents to the thesis being made available for photocopylng and loan if applicable, íf accepted for the award of the degree. (v) ACKNOI.ILEDGEMENTS I am grateful for the assistance in one \¡/ay or another of the following people, some of whom will disagree with many of the conclusions reached here and who are responsi-ble for nothing: Rodney A1len, David Bloor, Murray Brarm^rell , Max Charlesworth, Daniel Dennett, Derek Freeman, Ashok Ganguly, Anthony Giddens, Brian Goodwín, Sir Fred Hoyle' Eddy Hughes, Lis Jansson, John Kekes, David Lamb, Andrew Lyon-Reid, Hugh Mellor, Graham Nerlich, A1lan Patience, Graham Priest, Hilary Putnam, Nicolas Rescher, Richard Rorty, Richard Routley (now Richard Sylvan), Richard Swinburne, Sharyn tr{ard, Gerry l{ebsËer, Kevin trlhite and Carl üfíeland. I greatly appreciate the penetrating criticisms which Eddy Hughes has made of the drafts of both this work, the bulk of the journal articles which I wrote whílst in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Adelaide, and parts of Essays on ULtimate Questions (Gower, Hants, 1986). This thesis has also been accepted for publication by Gower Publications in an expanded form. L 1-. STATEMENT OF THE ARGUMENT: IS PHILOSOPHY A DEGENERATING RESEARCH PROGRAMME? 1. THE PROBLEM Principles taken upon trust, consequences lane]y deduced from them, want of coherence in the parts, and of evidence in the whole, these are everlnvhere to be met with in the systems of the most eminent philosophers, and seems to have drawn disgrace upon philosophy itself . tElven the rabble without doors may judge from the noise and clamour, which they hear, that aII goes not well within. There is nothing which is the not subject of debate, and in which men of learning are not of contrary opinions. The most trivial question escapes not our controversy, and in the most momentous we are not able to give any certain decisions (Hume, 1960, PP. xvii-xviii). The first to present his case seems right, till another comes forward and questions him (Proverbs, 18:17) If Hume's description of the state of cognitive discord of the discipline of philosophy is correct, then the question shoul-d be immediately asked: ris the I¡lestern tradition in philosophy a degenerating research programme (or research tradition) (Laudan, 1-977)?' Alternatively: 'in the face of tlne pz,obLem of perenniaL phiLosophicaL disputes (PPPD), how can philosophy as a cognitive enterprise be considered to be botin progTessiÐe and rAtiOnA,L?t This is a major problem for anyone who understands philosophy as that discipline which attempts to formulate and justify WeLtanschquungs, that is, world views (Kekes, l-980), (Smith , Lg84).I Such WeLtanschauwl.gs attempt to give an account of the furniture of the universe, a view of human nature and an outline of the place of human beings in the scheme of the world. Philosophy unlike most literature and poetry, ïWSt support its conclusions by reasoned argument. It is not enough merely to describe the world, the description must be justified and shown to be more satisfaclory and preferable to other competing descriptions, with respect to various cognitive standards such as truth, consistency, 2 comprehensibility and simpticity, amonçt others (Rescher , L979 (a) ) . If philosophy is a rationat enterprise, it shoutd give us l"noULedqe' If philosophy is a cognitively progressive enterprise, it should give us increasingly more knowledge over time. Yet the existence of perennial philosophical disputes seems to indicate that in its 25oo year history, philosophy has produced no knowledge and not a single philosophical problem has been satisfactorily resolved. Not only does the history of phitosophy seem to be little more than the successive refutation of previous philosophical I'ÌeLtansehduungs, but in more recent times when the bulk of pr:blished basic research in philosophy has appeared in specialized journalsr it is not uncommon to find criticisms of an author who has published a paper in a particular journal, criticized in the very issue in which the target paper appeared' From an anthropological perspective, philosophy may be seen as a discipline torn by unending disputes, agonized by pluralism and unachieved consensus, and humiliated by the success of the natural sciences. The disagreements and failures of the past and presenl, shouLd weigh like a nightmare on the brains of the present generation of philosophers' The probtem of perennial philosophical disputes is almost as old as philosophy itself, being discussed very early in philosophy's history primarily by the Sceptics. Sextus tnpiricus in his OutLines of Pyz'z'honism (l-933, bk L¡ Sect.l-78) discussed the problem in antiquity, and the 'unreliability of philosophical opinion as indicated by the disagreements of the philosophersr, appears as the first tt'opoí of Agrippa's five z,ationes &,bitandi (Rescher, L978, p. 2]-7). For the Greek Acadernic Sceptics, (PPPD) indicated that the philosophical enterprise itself was bankrupt and that there was llo phitosophical knowledge; for the Pyrrhonists the assertion of even the bankruptcy of the philosophical enterpriser wâs itself a knowledge claim upon which judgement must be suspended, with the attainment of a blissful state of atatanía (Popkin, 1960). Almost 3 two thousand years later, Benson Mates (,1981-) has also argued that all of the major problems of philosophy are incapable of either solution or dissolution, si.nce the reasons given on both sides of, the debate can be equally good. But for Mates, this situation hardly leads to a blissful state of atarania¡ if anything it indicates the strong existential absurdity of the human condition. Problems such as of the nature of freedom, goodness and justice, questions of ttre teLos of the world (if any) and the structure and origin of the universe, must be solved if human life is to be rich, meaningful and fully flourishing. For Mates such problems cannot be solved by philosophy and human life is all Èhe poot.t.2 In these introductory remarks I cannot adequately explicate the notion of. phiLosophíeaL unsoLuabíLity (it is not crucial to the analysis at this point in any case), and so the topic is d,eferred for discussion until chapter 7. At this stage of the discussionr my account of perenniaL phíLosophieal disag?eements and the thesis that philosophy is a degenerating resedîch progrøwfle remains metaphorical, and whilst more detailed explica- tions are promised for later in the work, some further guiding remarks may be added here. My use of the term 'degenerating research programrner, whilst obviously taken from Lakatos' famous work (Lakatos , 1,970) is once more metaphorical; I could just as easily used Laudanrs term 'research tradition'. To be explicit however, in investigating the issue of whether or not philosophy is a degenerating research prograrune/tradition \^¡e are asking whether or not philosophy is a progressí,ue discipL'Lne in the sense of pnouíding a rap¿d soLution to pz,obLems uhieh the diseipLine ínuestigates.
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