A Cognitive Analysis of Confucian Self-Knowledge: According to TU Weiming’S Explanation

A Cognitive Analysis of Confucian Self-Knowledge: According to TU Weiming’s Explanation

∗ CHI Chienchih

I. Introduction

Modern science and democracy, which have dramatically changed human life- styles, have both developed from the Western philosophical approach. Based on the new developments of cognitive science, however, we can now consider what we can learn from the Chinese philosophical approach. We can see that there are at least two different ways to obtain knowledge. The first is theoretical: we learn through factual statements and rules, such as “the Earth is round.” We learn this by being told. This type of knowledge is easily organized into a logical system. Scientific (also called factual or theoretical) knowledge is based on these logical systems. The second is practical: we learn through practice. Through practice, we may acquire new experiences, and based on these new experiences, we know something new.1 These two approaches involve different cognitive processes; neither of them can be used to obtain both types of knowledge. However, we can still use a scientific view to analyze both cognitive processes.2 Unlike Western philosophy, Chinese philosophy mainly adopts the second approach to obtaining knowledge. One of the main concerns in Chinese philosophy is about the self: how to develop oneself, how to know oneself, and even how to perfect oneself. Practice, not logical reasoning, is the primary route for achieving these goals. In one respect, Confucianism is considered to be a theory

∗ Assistant Professor of Philosophy, Kao Yuan Institute of Technology, 1821 Chung Shun Road, Luchu, Kaohsiung County 821, Taiwan; e-mail: [email protected].

Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy June 2005, Vol. IV, No. 2, pp. 267-282. © 2005 by Global Scholarly Publications. All rights reserved. ______1 New experiences are not necessary for learning through practice. New connections between experiences may also make us learn something new. For example, a dog can learn a new thing by connecting the experience of seeing a red light and the experience of smelling food. However, in some sense, this kind of new connection can also be viewed as new experience. In this article, the term new experience is used to include this kind of new connection. 2 This distinction is known in computer science as the distinction between different ways to obtain declarative knowledge and procedural knowledge (see Miles and Moore) and in psychology as the distinction between explicit learning and implicit learning (see Reber). 268 Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy IV. 2 ______of self-perfection. For TU Weiming, self-knowledge is the Confucian way to make oneself perfect.3 He says, “To know oneself is simultaneously to perfect oneself ” (Tu 1985: 20). Without self-knowledge, one cannot perfect himself or herself. Tu says, “The possibility of perfecting oneself through the enlightenment of the mind without the mediating of carefully internalized methods of acquiring self-knowledge is limited” (Tu 1993: 105). According to this view, self-knowledge, or the process of coming to know oneself, can make one become a perfect or a profound person in the Confucian sense. How is this possible? From Tu’s point of view, to learn about the self is not only self-realization but also self-development: “Moral and spiritual self-development can be understood as a process toward an ever-deepening subjectivity” (Tu 1985: 27). This idea corresponds to an important paragraph in the first chapter of the Zhongyong, the Doctrine of the Mean: “What Heaven [Tian]) imparts to man is called human nature. To follow our nature is called the Way [Dao]. Cultivating the Way is called education” (Chan: 98). This passage is believed to describe a central Confucian thought. One of the main goals of Confucianism is to discover our nature. The learning process cultivates the Way that follows nature. As one discovers his or her nature, he or she becomes a profound (or a perfect) person.4 If we believe that there is this kind of self-knowledge that enables a person to become perfect, it is reasonable to believe that self-knowledge is not to be learned simply by being told. One of the main reasons is that a profound person, according to Confucianism, should be wise and virtuous; such a person knows how to do things properly in a certain situation. This ability can only be learned through (social) practice rather than through being told a set of facts and rules (see Dreyfus; Searle). Tu also claims that “one cannot simply convert to Confu- cianism and identify oneself as Confucian; one must become Confucian through self-transformation” (Tu, Hejtmanek, and Wachman: 10). The process of acquiring self-knowledge is thus also the process of self-development (or

3 Tu also uses personal knowledge to discuss Confucian teachings. For Tu, personal knowledge is different from self-knowledge. Personal knowledge is knowledge about a person not only about the self. Tu writes, “If I express the view that I know the person, I mean to suggest that I have some personal knowledge of what the person is” (Tu 1986: 19). Personal knowledge involves self-knowledge. To know a person requires some “know-how,” not just the art of human interaction, but also analogical thinking, empathetic appreciation, self-knowledge, and a host of other internalized skills (Tu 1986: 19). Self-knowledge is thus necessary to acquire personal knowledge and personal knowledge has more contents than self-knowledge. However, personal knowledge does not have to be knowledge about other people. We also possess our own personal knowledge. In this sense, personal knowledge is close to self-knowledge. However, in Confucianism, our own personal knowledge cannot be separated from our knowledge of others: “the quest for one’s own personal knowledge must be understood as an act of service to the community as well” (Tu 1993: 41). In addition, he says, “self-knowledge reveals not one’s own private desires, feelings, and thoughts but the uniqueness of being human, which is shared by all members of the human community” (Tu 1993: 93). In this sense, self-knowledge is much closer to personal knowledge. It is interesting to discuss the differences and similarities between self-knowledge and Confucian personal knowledge, but in order to avoid confusion I will only focus my discussion in this paper on self-knowledge, although some of Tu’s explanations of personal knowledge are helpful for the discussion of self-knowledge. 4 Like Buddha in Buddhism, a profound person is the highest status in Confucianism. A profound person is supposed to possess self-knowledge and bring people peaceful life.

Chi: A Cognitive Analysis of Confucian Self-Knowledge 269 ______self-transformation) which is learned through practice rather than simply through reading or hearing. In addition, since only the perfect person really knows himself or herself, self-knowledge is hidden from normal people. When we say that self-development or self-transformation is to acquire self-knowledge, the process of self-development or self-transformation is not a process of changing oneself, but a process of revealing one’s true self, which is supposed to be the deepest human nature. The goal of this article is to ask what kind of knowledge this is and how it possibly works. According to Tu’s explanation, I will analyze Confucian self-knowledge in its cognitive respect. Based on this analysis, I will discuss whether self-knowledge accurately describes our true self, as Tu suggests.

II. TU Weiming on Confucian Self-knowledge

Tu claims that the primary focus of Confucianism is self-knowledge, which is a way to make oneself a profound person. In his view, self-knowledge “is basically an understanding of one’s mental state and an appreciation of one’s inner feeling” (Tu 1985: 19). Because a profound person possesses wisdom and virtues that can be learned not simply by being told, but by a process of self-development through practice, we can say that self-knowledge is knowledge about one’s own mental states that is learned through practice. However, not all mental states are the self-knowledge that Tu indicates, because he emphasizes the true self that is hidden to most people. Only the knowledge of those mental states that reveal the true self can be properly called self-knowledge. We can thus say that Confu- cianism is a theory that can only be learned through a certain type of practice, by which we discover our true selves. Here, we find a fundamental difference between Confucianism and Western philosophy. The most important philosophical knowledge in Confucianism can only be learned through practice, rather than through arguments or theories. Although virtue ethics in Western philosophy, especially in Aristotle, also mentions practice (through practice to develop virtues), the knowledge that can only be learned through practice does not play a fundamental role in his theories and arguments. However, if we ignore self-knowledge in Confucianism, we lose sight of one of its essential element. What kind of knowledge could Confucian self-knowledge be? Why can it only be learned through practice? Tu suggests, “self-knowledge is neither knowing-that nor knowing-how; it is, in essence, an objectless awareness, a realization of the human possibility of intellectual intuition” (Tu 1985: 20). According to Tu, self-knowledge is a third kind of knowledge, which can be obtained through intellectual intuition. In order to understand the process of gaining self-knowledge, we must connect the concept intellectual intuition to the concept self-knowledge. In doing so, we need another concept, inner experience. Tu says, “self-knowledge is a form of inner experience” (Tu 1985: 23). Self-knowledge is thus knowledge about a sort of inner experience, which can be known through intellectual intuition that is developed through practice. According to Tu, this process of acquiring self-knowledge is also self-cultivation and when a person

270 Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy IV. 2 ______achieves total self-knowledge, he or she becomes a profound person.5 WANG Yangming thus states: “Knowledge is the beginning of action and action is the completion of knowledge. Learning to be a sage involves only one effort. Knowledge and action should not be separated” (Chan: 674). Since the knowledge Wang emphasizes is the awareness or introspection of our conscience, this knowledge tells us how to act. If one can focus one’s attention on one’s conscience, one will grow sensitive to it. Since this sensitivity will offer more information about one’s mental states, one will obtain more knowledge about one’s conscience and gradually combine one’s mind with one’s conscience. In so doing, one also develops himself/herself into a profound person. The whole cognitive process can be simply summarized as follows: Through a process of practice we obtain a kind of intellectual intuition and through this intellectual intuition we may obtain (or notice) some sort of inner experience, which reveals something about our true and hidden selves. The true self can be understood as the common and deepest nature of human beings. It is hidden because people normally do not know it. The understanding of our true selves is also self-development into a profound person. I agree with Tu that this is the proper description of the process of how we acquire self-knowledge. There are two main issues in analyzing self-knowledge: The first is to ask what sort of knowledge self-knowledge is if it is neither knowing-that nor knowing-how, as Tu claims; the second is to explain the cognitive process involved in acquiring self-knowledge.

III. Self-knowledge as Neither Knowing-that Nor Knowing-how

Tu claims that self-knowledge is neither knowing-that nor knowing-how; it is another kind of knowledge. Knowing-that (also called factual knowledge) always refers to knowledge that expresses facts (or fact-like statements) and rules, such as “Earth is round.” We learn this type of knowledge by being told. Know- ing-how (also called practical knowledge) often refers to knowledge of skills, such as knowing how to ride a bicycle. This type of knowledge is hardly de- scribable in language, so that we cannot learn this type of knowledge by being told. We learn it only through practice. So, what is self-knowledge? Tu explains, “It is basically an understanding of one’s mental state and an appreciation of one’s inner feeling” (Tu 1985: 19). In one respect self-knowledge should be like a kind of factual knowledge because the knowledge that is used to express a mental state can be described as a factual statement, for example, “I know I feel guilty now” or “If I do a certain thing I will feel guilty” or even “I have a conscience.” There are also examples in Zhongyong: “A profound person knows that human nature is imparted from Heaven and the Way is to follow that nature; the goal of education is to cultivate the Way” (Chan: 98). This kind of knowledge looks like factual knowledge. In addition to describing our mental feelings, Tu also believes that knowing oneself

5 Tu says, “although existentially human beings are not what they ought to be, they can be perfected through self-cultivation; and the reason that they can become fully realized is inherent in what they are” (Tu 1985: 25).

Chi: A Cognitive Analysis of Confucian Self-Knowledge 271 ______involves realizing the deeper principle inherent in one’s nature (Tu 1985: 32-33). Principles can also be expressed as factual knowledge, and so self-knowledge is similar to factual knowledge in this respect. However, we cannot categorize self-knowledge into factual knowledge because, unlike factual knowledge, self-knowledge cannot be learned or understood by being told. We must engage in a certain practice and then experience it in order to know what it is. From this point of view, self-knowledge is closer to practical knowledge because we can acquire the knowledge only through practice. For example, the only way to understand guilt is to do something wrong and then to experience the mental feeling that emerges after doing the wrong thing. Through practice, we learn whence guilt originates and how to avoid it. Although we can express self-knowledge in factual (or sentential) statements, we must acquire it through practice. This kind of knowledge is based on inner experiences, which can be learned only through practice. Through such experiences, one un- derstands what expressions of self-knowledge really indicate and then believes them. This means that if we learn this kind of knowledge only through language, we do not understand what it really means and then we do not really believe it, because we lack the fundamental practice-based inner experiences. Because self-knowledge has features of both sorts of knowledge, it cannot belong to either category. We may consider it as a third kind of knowledge, which is like factual knowledge that can be expressed by language, but can be learned only through practice.6 This kind of practice is not limited solely to bodily movement. We may learn practical knowledge only through repeated bodily practice. For example, in order to learn how to ride a bike or drive a car, one must perform this activity over and over. However, according to Tu, this method fails to give us self-knowledge. He argues that one cannot become a profound person by bodily model learning because the Way cannot be determined by a limited set of rules or divided into discrete stages in a unilinear fashion (Tu 1989: 31). Since Tu also argues that self-knowledge is about our own mental states, there is no way to understand our own mental states through bodily movements. In this case, what we can learn about our selves from bodily practice is not as important as what we can learn through mental practices. However, there is another type of knowing-how we need to consider. Fol- lowing Gilbert Ryle’s definition, knowing-how is not merely a type of knowledge about bodily skills, but also about intellectual skills. For example, Ryle says, “the chess-player must run over in his head all the relevant rules and tactical maxims of the game before he can make correct and skilful moves” (Ryle: 29). He adds that, to do something, thinking what one is doing is always to do two things: (1) to consider certain appropriate propositions, and (2) to put into practice what these propositions enjoin (Ryle: 29). Here, we see that Ryle also emphasizes the importance of mental practice. Knowing-how is also about knowing how to behave intellectually, so that the practice for learning how to behave intellectually

6 When discussing personal knowledge, Tu indicates that it is a combination of “knowing that” and “knowing how,” for it involves both verifiable information and acquired skill (Tu 1986: 19). Since self-knowledge can be considered as one type of personal knowledge, Tu’s explanation of personal knowledge can support this conclusion about self-knowledge. .

272 Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy IV. 2 ______demands mental practice. This type of knowing-how is often discussed in moral philosophy, especially in virtue ethics, as practical knowledge (see Simon; Wallace). Aristotle called it practical wisdom and explained that a man with practical wisdom knows how to properly do things in different situations and what he does are really virtuous actions (see Yu: 329-330). Because Confucianism can also be considered as a type of virtue ethics, can we use this practical wisdom to understand self-knowledge? There are two reasons that self-knowledge is not a type of practical wisdom. The first reason is, as YU Jiyuan indicates, that there is no Ar- istotelian notion of practical wisdom in Confucius’s thinking:

Confucius insists on the continuity and authenticity of tradition. It is out of this belief that Confucius devotes much of his life to the transmission of the ancient classics, which record the li or civilization of Zhou.... Confucius’s notion of yi seems to open the door for an Aristotelian practical wisdom, but he fails to work it out. He has a major virtue called “wisdom” (zhi), but it must also be based on conformity to li. (Yu: 330-331)

Although Confucius’ thinking lacks the Aristotelian notion of practical wisdom, we can still find the idea in his words, even though he does not express it in a philosophical manner. For example, in the Analects 2:17, Confucius says, “Yu, shall I teach you [the way to acquire] knowledge? To say that you know when you do know and say that you do not know when you do not know—that is [the way to acquire] knowledge” (Chan: 24); in the Analects 2:15, Confucius says, “he who learns but does not think is lost; he who thinks but does not learn is in danger” (Chan: 24). These paragraphs warrant the belief that Confucius may have had the idea of wisdom without having developed it, since self-reflecting and thinking are probably the most important ways of gaining wisdom. In addition, mere bodily modeling cannot change one into a profound person. If one can become a profound person merely through bodily modeling, then Confucianism is nothing but ritualism, while Tu makes it clear that “it is misleading to characterize Confucianism as a kind of ritualism” (Tu 1985: 22). Thus, merely following li cannot change one into a profound person. Tu claims that self-knowledge is the primary focus of Confucianism (Tu 1985: 19), and so this undeveloped idea of practical wisdom could not be the core foundation of Confucius’ thought. Hence, self-knowledge is neither Aristotelian practical wisdom nor a type of practical knowledge. The other reason to claim that self-knowledge is not practical wisdom is that Tu indicates that self-knowledge is knowledge about our inner feelings or mental states. We can describe our inner experiences by using factual statements, unlike Aristotelian practical wisdom, which cannot be clearly expressed through factual statements. Tu also emphasizes that self-knowledge is about the true self and the hidden self. The term hidden suggests that we are not aware of the inner experiences of our self, although we can experience them in our daily lives.7 Here, we must understand the term hidden in another way. It is possible that in our daily lives we experience self-knowledge without noticing it. Thus, we can only notice

7 Referring to the statement in Zhongyong that “to follow human nature is called the Way,” Tu argues that since Confucian self-knowledge reveals the Way and the Way is inseparable from our ordinary existence, Confucian self-knowledge should be found in our daily lives (Tu 1989: 6-7).

Chi: A Cognitive Analysis of Confucian Self-Knowledge 273 ______it through a certain process of practice. In other words, for most people, the experience of self-knowledge could be considered as a new experience, but it is possible that we have already experienced self-knowledge without noticing it. In the subsequent sections of this article, I will argue that there are several reasons to accept this explanation. However, if we do not experience self-knowledge in our daily life, it is not proper to call it self-knowledge, because it does not necessarily describe ourselves. A related question is whether self-knowledge shows the true self, as Tu suggests, or only a possible self. I will discuss these questions in detail.

IV. From Intellectual Intuition to Self-knowledge

Tu says, “Self-knowledge is nothing more than the manifestation of one’s real nature” (Tu 1985: 20). He also indicates that self-knowledge is, in essence, a realization of the human possibility of intellectual intuition and explains the idea of intellectual intuition as direct knowledge of reality without logical reasoning or inference (Tu 1985: 20). Thus, according to Tu, we can learn our real nature through self-knowledge and learn self-knowledge, which is a direct knowledge of reality, through intellectual intuition. What is intellectual intuition? At first, intellectual intuition in Tu seems a mystical capacity. However, he emphasizes that “it has very little to do with revelation” (Tu 1985: 20). Tu does not intend to make a mystical explanation of the process of acquiring self-knowledge. He suggests that “self-knowledge is a form of inner experience” (Tu 1985: 23). We can thus connect these important concepts, self-knowledge, inner experience, and intellectual intuition, in an explanation of a cognitive process as follows: through a series of practice, one obtains an ability that is intellectual intuition, which allows us to directly perceive an inner experience and this inner experience reveals the true self (self-knowledge). We can express this inner experience (a kind of mental state) through factual statements as self-knowledge. Based on this cognitive process, we find that this knowledge is only about the self, and not about other people, because all knowledge comes from personal inner experience. Tu agrees that all knowledge comes from personal inner experience, but he does not agree that all knowledge is only about the self. He says, “the experience that is considered truly personal is not at all private to the individual; self-knowledge is a form of inner experience precisely because it resonates with the inner experience of the others” (Tu 1985: 23). In addition, Tu indicates,

The quest for self-knowledge as a way of learning to be human cannot be a lonely search for private truths. Rather, it is a deepened appreciation of common humanity. Since, unlike mere intellectual reflection on abstract concepts, knowledge of this kind must manifest itself in concrete affairs, its usefulness is demonstrable either in the rectification of politics or in the transformation of society. (Tu 1993: 126)

This explanation points out a difference between Confucianism and other practice-based philosophies like Daoism and Buddhism. In order to make one’s own inner experiences resonate with the inner experiences of others in society, the practice of learning self-knowledge necessitates the inclusion of other people.

274 Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy IV. 2 ______This means that social practice is a required feature of Confucianism, but not of Daoism or Buddhism. Tu says, “Only Confucianism among the Three Teachings unequivocally asserts that society is both necessary and intrinsically valuable for self-realization” (Tu 1985: 26). Therefore, we may explain Tu’s view as follows:

One of the main goals of Confucianism is to acquire self-knowledge, which is the same as becoming a profound person. In order to reach this goal, a type of social practice is necessary, through which we can develop an intellectual intuition, which is the key to obtaining the inner experience of our true selves. Thus, social practice or intellectual intuition can help us directly obtain self-knowledge without logical reasoning.

There are two main issues in this cognitive process. The first is about inner experience. How can inner experiences reveal a real self or the real nature of human beings, and why can this only be found through a series of social practices? The second is about intellectual intuition. Does intellectual intuition really exist, and can it work as Tu expects? Through a cognitive analysis, I will discuss these issues in the following sections.

V. The New Inner Experience

After a series of practices, a new experience may occur. Having a new experience is not rare in our daily life. We often obtain new experiences through practice. For example, a person who cannot swim does not know what it feels like to swim in a river. After some practice, when he learns how to swim, he will have a new experience and know what it is like to swim in a river. It is no problem to claim that practice is helpful for learning and for acquiring new experiences. Based on the new experiences, we know something new. However, self-knowledge is knowledge about the self, not about skills. The achievement of this knowledge cannot only be done through bodily movements, but must be learned through introspection. Fortunately, we can improve our ability of introspection. Nagel agrees, stating that, “with suitable training, the range of our non-observational, introspective awareness can be extended” (Nagel: 452). Through the extension of the range of introspection, we obtain new experiences, which may enable us to know more about our (hidden and true) self. In addition, this new experience may also be the foundation for us to understand and believe something that is considered self-knowledge. Based on some psychological experiments, Pierre Vermersch argues that introspection is an act that can be improved through practice. He adds that we can at least practice the ability of describing our inner experiences and this ability is helpful for us to understand our inner experiences. Furthermore, this understanding can improve our next introspection (Vermersch: 22-23). Thus, we may also get new experiences about the self through an improved introspection by practice. However, the problem is how we can say that the new experience we obtain through improved introspection is a “hidden self,” not a “created self ” or a “possible self.” Even if we suppose that all our experiences are part of the self, we can only say that the new inner experience is a possible self or a created self, not a hidden self. When we say that an inner experience shows a hidden self, it

Chi: A Cognitive Analysis of Confucian Self-Knowledge 275 ______implies that the inner experience shows human nature, which is already in our minds from the beginning but hidden. Tu does not give an adequate explanation at this point. However, we can find some possible reasons to support that a new inner experience would be part of the hidden self: (1) The new inner experience is in fact not new, but since we previously ignored it, from the moment we clearly experience it, we experience it as a new one. However, because we are also aware of its already being there, we consider it as part of the hidden self; (2) the new inner experience is really a new one, but when we experience it, we intuitively believe that it is a hidden self; and (3) the method we used to get the inner experience makes us believe that it is a hidden self. Of course, there exist other possibilities. For example, we may say that this inner experience is a new one, but because we are taught to consider it as a true self, we then believe it to be a true self. I do not think that this kind of possibility is worth discussing, and so I would like to focus only on the three possibilities above. The first explanation seems to contradict itself. How is it possible that we know we always have the experience and still think that the experience is a new one? In order to explain this possibility, a good example to introduce is Hei- degger’s Dasein. Heidegger suggests that the essence of a human being is existence and he uses the term Dasein to describe this existential status and indicates that Dasein is “always already” situated in a world (Heidegger: 147). If we do not use Heidegger’s phenomenology to investigate our existential status, we may not find that Dasein is inseparable from the world. As a result, we may not figure out the fact that we are always already situated in the world. In other words, the experience of being-in-the-world is always there, but we ignore it. Through a series of practices, we begin to be aware of the experience. Although we know that we always have the experience with us, we still consider the experience a new one. Can we really call this kind of experience new experience? When we use the term new in this way to understand what a new experiences is, we do not need to emphasize that it is new in the second possible reason. We can rewrite these possible reasons as follows: (1) The new inner experience makes us understand that we always ignore it. From the moment we clearly experience it, because we are aware of its always already being there, we consider it as a hidden self; (2) When we experience the new inner experience, we intuitively believe that it is a hidden self; (3) The practical method we use to obtain the inner experience makes us believe that it is a hidden self. There are some documents that support the first possible reason. According to Zhongyong 《中庸》 , “it is due to our nature that enlightenment results from sincerity” (Chan: 107). The new experience comes from the enlightenment, which results from sincerity. The Chinese character cheng 誠 (sincerity) here normally refers to being sincere with oneself. Since the enlightenment brings us to see ourselves more clearly, and we also find that the experience of ourselves is in fact always there, we believe that we find our hidden self. In addition, because we get the new experience through sincerity, we may also infer that it is a hidden self. It also supports the third possibility. In addition, there are other reasons that support the third possibility as follows: (a) The process of practice does not try to change one’s nature; (b) The process of practice is letting inner experience show itself in itself.

276 Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy IV. 2 ______In Zhongyong, equilibrium and harmony are both emphasized. Equilibrium is the mental state before the feelings of pleasure, anger, sorrow, and joy are aroused, and harmony is a situation that, when those feeling are aroused, each and all attain due measure and degree. The way to reach this goal is to be watchful over ourselves when we are alone. The reason for this is that there is nothing more visible than what is hidden and nothing more manifest than what is subtle (Chan: 98). Based on this description, we can say that when one is alone, it is the time for the person to go into his or her true self. Confucians do not suggest any special practice to change oneself. However, they emphasize that we should let inner experience show itself in itself. Therefore, the man who experiences his inner experience through this method will tend to believe that what he experiences is his hidden self. Thus the first and the third possibilities can support each other. Since the method leads us to see deeper into ourselves, the processes can raise the feeling that what we experience is our own selves. However, these reasons can only make us tend to believe that the new inner experience shows our hidden selves, but it is still possible to be wrong. The new experience could be totally new but when we experience it we mistakenly believe that we had already possessed it. The way we intuitively believe that the new inner experience shows our hidden selves (the second possible reason) is the key to discover whether it really shows a hidden self. The first and third possibilities do not contradict the second one and there is no reason to think that Tu may disagree with the first and the third ones. Al- though Tu does not give an explanation of why the self we discover through self-knowledge is a true self rather than a created self, with his emphasis on intellectual intuition, it seems clear that Tu emphasizes the second reason. However, we may still accept all three of them as reasons to believe that inner experiences show hidden and true selves. Tu believes that the intellectual intuition he emphasizes is similar to the Buddhist idea of intuitive wisdom or nondual knowledge, which refers to an inalienable quality of the mind that manifests itself as the true Buddha nature in each person (Tu 1985: 25). In addition, Tu also believes that this intellectual intuition makes us believe not only that the inner experience is our hidden or true self, but also that our hidden or true selves are our human nature that is imparted from Heaven as indicated in Zhongyong (Chan: 98). In this situation, how are Buddhist and Confucianist self-knowledge different, if both of them refer to the true self? Since Confucianism emphasizes social practice but Buddhism does not, their different methods of practice may result in different intellectual intuitions. Therefore, through different intuitions, they may produce different self-knowledge. If this is true, we cannot consider self-knowledge as a description of our hidden and true self, but only a possible self. In order to clarify this, it is necessary to discuss the mechanism of intellectual intuition that is acquired through practice. As we have seen, Tu does not want to ascribe to the concept of intellectual intuition any mystical meaning. So, we supposedly can find out the mechanism of this intuition from a cognitive view, which I will discuss in the next section. Then, we will be in a better position to examine whether intellectual intuition can reveal a hidden or true self rather than a possible self.

Chi: A Cognitive Analysis of Confucian Self-Knowledge 277 ______VI. The Mechanism of Intellectual Intuition

In the Western philosophical tradition, especially from Plato to Kant, philoso- phers tried to find the ground of knowledge that is self-justifying or a priori. This tradition has received much critique, from a holistic point of view, which suggests that there is no fundamental ground of knowledge (see Quine; Blanshard). Thus, the grounded knowledge thought to be true through intuition is still problematic. Some other critiques are from a psychological point of view, which suggests that the mechanism of intuition is not a trustworthy means to obtain knowledge. However, the word intuition is not always used in the same sense. It is helpful to have a rough definition of it before discussing the mechanism of intellectual intuition. Since Tu does not offer a clear definition of the term intellectual intuition, I will follow a general definition that does not conflict with any of Tu’s explanations. Based on Gopnik and Schwitzgebel, we may call any judgment an intuitive judgment, or more briefly, an intuition, just in case that judgment is not made on the basis of some kind of explicit reasoning process that a person can consciously observe (see Gopnik & Schwitzgebel: 77). According to this definition, intuition is simply an emerging judgment or belief that does not have a conscious reasoning process. There are many critiques about this kind of cognitive process. Edward Wisniewski indicates that many of the judgments made through this process are not trustworthy. He says,

Based on research from cognitive and social psychology and observations about evolution, I describe the dangers of appealing to intuition as the sole methodology for obtaining knowledge. I begin by describing several salient examples of fairly basic intuitions that seem obviously true, but that are contradicted by the results of psychological studies. Such examples are not rare and the fact that strong intuitions sometimes turn out to be wrong should make one very cautious about trusting any intuition. (Wisniewski: 45)

There are examples that can support Wisniewski’s view. For example, some vision-trick pictures always delude people into making wrong intuitive judgments. However, we should ignore this kind of intuition in our discussion because not all types of intuition are the same and what Tu wants to emphasize is the intuition about the self or inner experience, not about the external world. George Bealer divides intuition into two categories, rational intuition and physical intuition. He explains what physical intuition is with this example: when we see that a house is undermined, we intuitively believe that it will fall. This belief may be wrong because the mechanism for us to believe that the house will fall is probably that we get used to seeing that things undermined will fall. However, there is no guarantee that this expectation must be right. The rational intuition is such that we intuitively believe if P then not not-P (see Bealer: 207). Following this distinction, intellectual intuition should belong to or be closer to rational intuition, rather than to physical intuition. Since they occur from different cognitive mechanisms, critiques about physical intuition do not necessarily apply to intellectual intuition. The main reason Wisniewski argues that many intuitive judgments are not trustworthy is that people do not always have conscious access to their thought processes, and they are sometimes unaware of factors that influence their

278 Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy IV. 2 ______thoughts and behavior (Wisniewski: 45). His argument can be used to defeat some philosophical theories that use a type of intuition. For example, Frederick Anderson defines intuition as the talent of judging right upon imperfect mate- rials, of making a wise choice between several possible views (Anderson: 365). Since this kind of intuition requires an unconscious thinking process, it will encounter the problem Wisniewski proposes. Obviously, Wisniewski’s argument about intuition is not suitable to Tu’s intellectual intuition. Wisniewski believes that some intuitive judgments come from an unconscious thinking process, which may result in mistakes. However, Tu would not agree that there is an unconscious thinking process in intellectual intuition because he believes that intellectual intuition is the process of letting the inner experience show itself in itself. It is just as I know I am in pain or I know I am experiencing something interesting. Intellectual intuition is probably closer to Heidegger’s phenomenology. Heidegger said, “the expression phenomenon signifies that which shows itself in itself, the manifest”; he added, the meaning of φαίνοµενα or phenomena is the totality of what lies in the light of day or can be brought to the light (Heidegger: 28). The similar description in Zhongyong emphasizes that we should be sincere with ourselves: “Given sincerity, there will be enlightenment, and given enlightenment, there will be sincerity” (Chan: 107). The true self may show itself in itself through the process of being sincere with oneself. However, their similarity is only in the cognitive process, not in the content. Tu’s intellectual intuition is into the true and hidden self. He believes that through a series of practices, our hidden self may show itself in itself to us and then we will obtain self-knowledge, which is the foundation of Confucianism. Without a doubt, through the practice of sincerity, we may clearly observe our own selves and the process of observation may bring us new inner experience, as Tu indicates. Therefore, the new experience will reveal self-knowledge to us. However, since the fundamental method is similar to Heidegger’s phenomenology—let a phenomenon show itself in itself—and Heidegger’s philosophy can never go outside phenomena, self-knowledge should never go outside inner experiences. If we have a belief that does not purely belong to inner experiences, then the belief is not learned purely through intellectual intuition. Unfortunately, some of the most important beliefs about self-knowledge in Confucianism are not purely descriptions of inner experiences, but statements about the external world and other minds as these examples show: (1) Human nature is imparted from Heaven; and (2) Everyone’s nature is similar. How can we learn these from our hidden selves through purely inner experiences? Tu points out that the practice for learning our own nature should include social practice. This means that interaction with other people is one of the main parts in the process of practice. From practice, we can even understand other people’s emotions as we experience them. Based on this kind of experience, we automatically form the intuition that all human beings have a similar nature. From the similar process of learning this self-knowledge, the other self-knowledge is also obtained. The Zhongyong states,

Only those who are absolutely sincere can fully develop their nature. If they can fully develop

Chi: A Cognitive Analysis of Confucian Self-Knowledge 279 ______their nature, they can then fully develop the nature of others. If they can fully develop the nature of others, they can then fully develop the nature of things. If they can fully develop the nature of things, they can then assist in the transforming and nourishing process of Heaven and Earth. If they can assist in the transforming and nourishing process of Heaven and Earth, they can thus form a trinity with Heaven and Earth. (Chan: 107-108).

This means that if the practice for learning self-knowledge is only about ourselves, then we can find the true nature about ourselves, but if it includes other people, we can also find the true self or true nature of ourselves and of others. If the practice also includes things or objects, then we can even find a more broad hidden self that includes things or objects. Furthermore, it can also include the transforming and nourishing process of Heaven and Earth. When our observation of our hidden self reaches this realm, we can form a trinity with Heaven and Earth and then find that our nature is in fact inseparable from Heaven. Thus, we will find that our nature is imparted from Heaven. This explanation may encounter a problem regarding whether this process of intellectual intuition is purely letting the hidden self show itself in itself. It seems strange that our hidden selves can tell us that all human nature is similar. Since this statement is not merely an expression about inner experiences but also a belief about the world and other people, it is hard to believe that this statement comes entirely from the hidden self or inner experiences. Except for an observation of our inner experiences, self-knowledge must also have a property of Anderson’s definition of making a wise choice between several possible views. Based on long-term interaction with other people, we may reasonably believe that others have similar hidden natures as ours. However, this belief can turn out to be wrong. We may simply use our own hidden selves as a model to understand and explain other people’s behavior, but it is not necessarily true. The belief comes from an unconscious reasoning process. While there is an unconscious thinking process, we must face Wisniewski’s critique that it may turn out to be wrong. An unconscious thinking process may still offer wise judgment, but there is no guarantee that it must be true. Therefore, the whole approach used for finding Confucian self-knowledge is in fact not as trustworthy as Tu may expect. Self-knowledge is not only a description about an inner experience, but also a judgment about the world. However, it does not imply that we must abandon this methodology to obtain beliefs. Wisniewski only suggests that we must be very careful when using it. If we find a kind of intuition whose mechanism is trustworthy, although not necessarily creating true belief, we can still use it to obtain reasonable knowledge. In discussing this sort of intuition, Petitmengin-Peugeot indicates that the history of the science is full of testimonies from scientists about how a new idea came to them in a sudden, unexpected manner, without any discursive activity (Petitmengin-Peugeot: 43). This kind of intuition is absolutely not only about inner experience, but about the world. In addition, we can reasonably believe that those scientific discoveries are correct. The mechanism that leads this kind of intuition to make a true statement should exist. The important thing we must do is to dig out the different unconscious thinking processes of intuition, and then to determine the degrees to which it is trustworthy. Petitmengin-Peugeot pre- sents a mechanism in detail to explain this kind of intuition. Through practice,

280 Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy IV. 2 ______we create practical knowledge and this knowledge may bring us a new experience, and then when we represent this experience into words, we suddenly (intuitively) get the idea. There are two major stages in this process. One is the process of practice to gain new experiences; the other is the process from experiences to language. This process is very similar to our discussion about obtaining self-knowledge. In fact, we can find a lot of examples in both processes in our daily life. We always learn new experiences through different practices, no matter whether it is physical, mental, social, or otherwise. Sometimes we have a feeling that something is wrong but cannot explain why. We might gain some abilities only on an experiential level, but not represent them in words. A famous example is the other mind problem. We may agree that we cannot make sure that others have a mind, but in fact, in our daily life, nobody really doubts it. The same case is the problem of the external world. The knowledge of other minds and the external world is neither from conscious reasoning nor from any a priori knowledge, but from practice. Through practice with other people and interactions with the external world, we obtain experiences about other minds and the external world. Before we think about the question of whether others have a mind, we have built an experience about others’ existence with a mind through social practice and then used the experience in our daily life to strengthen the experience or belief. Here, we can come back to our previous question of whether this process of getting self-knowledge is to find out a hidden self or to build a possible self. Tu states that “learning for the sake of others as a demonstration of altruism cannot be truly altruistic, unless it is built on the foundation of self-knowledge” (Tu 1985: 56). Through the practice of altruism, we may build an experience where altruistic virtue is our hidden nature, and then we will become altruistic. From this expression, we also find another explanation about our hidden nature. It means that we may also build our hidden nature through practice. If we can build something into our nature, can we still say that it is our hidden nature? If something is our hidden nature, should we need to build it? Tu does not seem to clearly distinguish between hidden nature and possible nature because he thinks that to understand self-knowledge is not only a process of self-realization, but also self-cultivation (Tu 1985: 7-8). For him self-knowledge is a realization of the human “possibility” of intellectual intuition (Tu 1985: 20). Thus, it seems that Tu does not want to distinguish them. Or, we might explain it by saying that the best possible self is also our true and hidden self. However, since we have no argument to support this point of view, it is only a possible explanation of Tu’s unclear ideas of true self and hidden self. Although practical knowledge about our daily life can be trained through practice to be more and more accurate, it still has its limitations. There is no guarantee that the way to obtain Confucian self-knowledge can lead us to the truth. We may consider both statements of the Confucian self-knowledge discussed above as not proper self-knowledge but reasonable presuppositions. In addition, if we consider that self-knowledge is about a possible self and we build it through practice, then we should consider it as built beliefs rather than a hidden self. The beliefs may not be true ontologically, but they are held as true for profound persons. In addition to the Confucian self-knowledge, there is still

Chi: A Cognitive Analysis of Confucian Self-Knowledge 281 ______other self-knowledge that purely describes our own inner experience and reveals our hidden nature or hidden self. However, at least two of the most important statements in Confucian self-knowledge, which is not purely a description about self but also about others or the world, cannot totally be built from an approach that can guarantee their truth. We can still consider them as reasonable presuppositions in Confucianism.

VII. Conclusion

The main goal of this essay is to discuss what Confucian self-knowledge is according to Tu’s explanation and give it a cognitive analysis, in order to see how much we can trust Confucian self-knowledge. Following Tu, I argue that self-knowledge can be expressed by using language, but can only be acquired through practice. As Tu indicates, self-knowledge is neither factual knowledge nor practical knowledge. It is a third kind of knowledge. The difference between self-knowledge and factual knowledge is that we can understand or believe self-knowledge only through practice. The difference between self-knowledge and practical knowledge is that self-knowledge is not only about skills, but also about beliefs that can be expressed through language. The process of attaining self-knowledge is a two-stage steps. Through a series of practices, we obtain a new inner experience and then turn the experience into words. I suggest that we can understand Tu’s intellectual intuition through this cognitive process. The reason to consider the process as a type of intuition is that during the practice we cannot be clearly aware of the change of our own mental states, but we gradually experience our deeper mental states. Then, when we suddenly turn the experience into words, we consciously find our own hidden self and obtain self-knowledge. This process corresponds to our general definition of intuition, as Gopnik and Schwitzgebel propose. This process of getting knowledge is different from the Western philosophical tradition, and as Tu indicates, this methodology is probably the main method in most of the Chinese philosophical traditions, especially in Confucianism, Daoism, and Buddhism. For their distinct methodologies, it is not proper to compare these two types of knowledge. However, we can still analyze them from a cognitive perspective to see whether they are trustworthy. There is no problem with this methodology for acquiring self-knowledge as discussed above when we adopt it to acquire knowledge about the self and it can only be reasonable (but cannot be certain) when we adopt it to acquire knowledge from inner experiences about other people and the world.

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