IAI WORKING PAPERS 15 | 49 - DECEMBER 2015 ISSN 2280-4331 | ISBN 978-88-98650-74-3 © 2015 IAI European Union |Migration |Africa and more beneficial for themigrants themselves. Process could bealtered tobecome politically more legitimate game-breaker, it makes suggestions for how the Khartoum initiative. While it finds thisconflict of interest tobe apotential states, particularly with regardtothepolitical attention of the conflicting interests between African and European partner the political economy of the Khartoum Process and finds establishing legal migration channels.Thisstudy discusses community. Furthermore, it does notinclude theaimof that areotherwiseconsidered outlaws intheinternational process, byintegrating regimessuch asEritrea andSudan African states. However, it differs substantially from its sister is inspiredbythe2005Rabat Process of theEUwith West concrete projects inthefield of migration. In its design, it States andcountries in theHorn of Africa region topursue The KhartoumProcess isaframework between EUMember ABSTRACT by Maximilian Stern Policy Recommendations Critical Assessment and The KhartoumProcess: keywords IAI WORKING PAPERS 15 | 49 - DECEMBER 2015 ISSN 2280-4331 | ISBN 978-88-98650-74-3 © 2015 IAI 2 http://www.unhcr.org/5592bd059.html. 96 (IAI Research Papers 22), http://www.iai.it/en/node/5702. Papers Research (IAI 96 in the Mediterranean Patterns Migration Changing (ed.), Kamel * 3 2 1 with nearly 80percent arriving inItaly andMalta byway of TunisiaandLibya. Europe bysea.Duringthat year 219,000 persons crossed theMediterranean Sea, Consequently, 2014marked anewrecord inrefugees and migrants arriving in on African soil. country, andat thesametimeLibya haslost its role asapartnertocontain migrants in 2012.Syria currently counts more than4million refugees who have fled the numbers of migrants andrefugees have increasedstaggeringly, with only adip are obvious. Since thebeginningof theuprisings inTunisiaat theendof 2010,the The role of theArab Spring andits consequences for migration intheMediterranean 1. Background by Maximilian Stern* Critical Assessment andPolicy Recommendations The KhartoumProcess: The KhartoumProcess: Critical Assessment andPolicy Recommendations . Internazionali (IAI). Risk_Analysis/Annual_Risk_Analysis_2015.pdf. each received around 68,000people. received more thantwo thirdsof all arrivals, sofarthisyear GreeceandItaly have Mediterranean also experienced ashiftinmigration routes: While in2014,Italy percent), followed by Eritreans (12 percent) and Afghans (11 percent). In 2015, the a newrecord high. Byfarthesingle largestgroup of all arrivals isSyrians (34 the Mediterranean, an 83 percent increase over the previous year, indicating Further, injustthefirstsixmonths of 2015,137,000migrants andrefugees crossed Paper prepared for the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI), December 2015. December (IAI), Internazionali Affari Istituto for the prepared Paper Maximilian Stern was Mercator Visiting Fellow (June-September 2015) at the Istituto Affari Affari Istituto at the Fellow 2015) Mercator (June-September Visiting was Stern Maximilian
UNHCR, UNHCR, Frontex, Frontex, Mattia Toaldo, “Migrations Through and From Libya: A Mediterranean Challenge”, in Lorenzo Challenge”, Lorenzo in AMediterranean Libya: From and Through Toaldo, “Migrations Mattia Annual Risk Analysis 2015 Analysis Risk Annual The sea route to Europe: The Mediterranean passage in the age of refugees passage route Mediterranean to sea Europe: The The 1 , April 2015, http://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Publications/ 2015, April , 3 , Roma, Nuova Cultura, 2015, p. 75- p. 2015, Nuova Cultura, , Roma, , 1 July 2015, , 1July 2015, 2
IAI WORKING PAPERS 15 | 49 - DECEMBER 2015 ISSN 2280-4331 | ISBN 978-88-98650-74-3 © 2015 IAI 3 research even suggests that thereisnoway toeffectively control migration, But themeansof European States torestrict migration arelimited. While some 4 death toll (about 1,800deaths sofarin2015) as favourable areaskingfor action intheMediterranean, having inmindthelarge migration, ifnottocurbit. But also political powers that seemigration generally economic crisis – put political pressureon European governments toacton shortages aretobeexpected,thesedevelopments –themigration crisisandthe Although long-term population projections for Europe indicate that labourmarket refugees arrive on European soil for thefirsttime. particularly affected bythiseconomic crisis,thesestates are also where most of the and economic growth is weak. The southern European Member States are not only end of World War II.Thestates areheavily indebted,unemployment numbers soar At thesametime,Europe isexperiencing themostdireeconomic crisissincethe The KhartoumProcess: Critical Assessment andPolicy Recommendations 6 173-185, p. http://ssrn.com/abstract=1607928. 2003, Books, Lexington , Lanham, Studies Migration Forced Convention AView from at Fifty. Refugee The (eds.), al. et Selm van Joanne Protection”, in 5 2015, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-5596_en.htm.2015, then, thirdly, critically assess the process and make some policy recommendations. secondly, closely look at its emergence,specifications andpolitical economy. It will Process. Although the latter is still in its development phase, this paper will, framework, the Rabat Process will be analyzed as a role model for the Khartoum (GAMM) which constitutes theEU’s overall framework on migration. Under this To thisend,it firstdescribes theEU’s Global Approach on Migration and Mobility strand –theso-called KhartoumProcess –andgives anassessment of its potential. This paper takes alook at themostrecent initiative of theEUwithin thisfourth would belegally entitled tosuch protection. European borders, theyalso effectively deny adequate protection to refugees who dilemma policymakers faceinthefourth strandisthat, bykeeping migrants outside root causes of migration, toholdbackmigrants andallow for readmission. The And finally, cooperation with transit countries andcountries of origin totackle the reform of theasylum system that wasput forward bytheEuropean Commission. and major world powers, diplomatic action toendthe Syrian civil war.Fourthly, a option designed toeliminate smuggling boats. Thirdly, incooperation with the UN deterrence bycreating less favourable conditions for migrants. Secondly, amilitary European policymakers have identified five general strands ofaction: Firstly, 2015, http://wp.me/p37aUp-6UJ.2015,
François Crépeau, “The Fight Against Migrant Smuggling: Migration Containment Over Refugee Refugee Over Containment Migration Smuggling: Migrant Fight Against “The Crépeau, François Refugee Crisis: European Commission takes decisive action decisive takes Commission European Crisis: Refugee Commission, European Foreign Policy Journal Policy Foreign in Crisis”, Migration Mediterranean “The Hammond, G. Timothy 4 of theriskypassage. , 9 September , 9September , 19 May May , 19 6 5
IAI WORKING PAPERS 15 | 49 - DECEMBER 2015 ISSN 2280-4331 | ISBN 978-88-98650-74-3 © 2015 IAI 4 play.pdf. Analyses Global Networks Global in Mobility”, and Migration uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/142096.pdf. 8 7 of September2005,which cameasashocktotheEuropean public. migrants at the border fences of the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla at the end Process waslaunched in2006, asadirectconsequence of thefatal shootingof 11 differences andcommonalities inthedesign of thetwo initiatives. The Rabat this reason, it iscrucial tofirst look at the Rabat Process in order tounderstand we will seelater, thetwo processes varysubstantially insize andcharacter.For a sisterprocess totheRabat Process undertheGAMM framework. However, as Khartoum Process. In some ways theKhartoumProcess isdesigned tolook like The Rabat Process iscertainly the single mostimportant role modelfor the 2.1 TheRabat Process declaration of thefourth EU-Africa Summit of 2-3 April 2014 the continental level, it establishesadialogue with theAfrican Union through its With regardtoAfrica, GAMM comprises dialogue frameworks on threelevels: on migration. intends toaddress“pushfactors” byestablishingalinkbetweendevelopment and cooperation with third countries (origin and transit) on the other. Finally, it also human trafficking on the one hand, and to manage migration and asylum through a comprehensive andcoordinated strategy toaddressirregular migration and first in2005asthe Global Approach on Migration (GAM). It aims at presenting and Mobility (GAMM) istheEU’s overall framework on migration, implemented dimension of migration andasylum policy. TheEU’s Global Approach on Migration control, visagranting andasylum). However, theEUplays arole intheexternal immigration intheEUlies mainly intheresponsibility of its Member States (border While some actors in Europe currently call for more cooperation, thecontrol of 2. TheEU’s Global Approach on Migration andMobility (GAMM) The KhartoumProcess: Critical Assessment andPolicy Recommendations 11 10 9 convenes governments of 55countries inEurope andinNorth, West andCentral europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2014/04/pdf/Fourth-EU-AFRICA-Summit-ROADMAP-2014-2017. Nigeria include specific projects on topics of migration andmobility. Furthermore, several bilateral agreements with Morocco, Tunisia,Cape Verde and 2006), andtheeasternmigratory route, theKhartoumProcess (initiated in2014). the countries along thewesternmigratory route, theRabat Process Action Plan2014-17.
Statewatch Statewatch in of Play”, State The Mobility: and to Migration Approach Global “The Martin, Marie Fourth EU-Africa Summit Roadmap 2014-2017, Brussels, 2-3 2014-2017, http://www.consilium. 2014, Roadmap April Summit Brussels, EU-Africa Fourth Fourth EU-Africa Summit Declaration, Brussels, 2-3 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ 2014, April Brussels, Declaration, Summit EU-Africa Fourth Michael Collyer, “Migrants as Strategic Actors in the European Union’s to Approach Global European the in Actors Strategic as Collyer, “Migrants Michael For more information see the Rabat process’ website: http://www.processusderabat.net. process’ Rabat the see For more information , No. 06/13 (February 2013), http://www.statewatch.org/analyses/no-215-gamm-state-of- 2013), (February 06/13 No. , 7 9 Ontheregional level, theEUhasapolicy dialogue with , Vol. 12, No. 4 (October 2012), p. 506. p. 2012), No. 4(October , Vol. 12, 8 andtherespective 11 10 Theprocess (initiated in IAI WORKING PAPERS 15 | 49 - DECEMBER 2015 ISSN 2280-4331 | ISBN 978-88-98650-74-3 © 2015 IAI 5 lists 338projects on its website. of alargenumber of concrete projects andinitiatives. In total, theRabat Process icmpd.org/fileadmin/ICMPD-Website/Rabat_Process/Rabat-Process_2014.pdf. php/initiatives-in-the-region. International Migration International in Policy”, Complex 15 14 13 12 important intergovernmental forum The Rabat Process iscurrently inits fourth phase(2015-17) andisrecognisedasan agreements. Before theRabat Process, European external migration policy focused on bilateral constituted anewapproach totheexternal aspectof European migration policy. agenda andbyintegrating abroad rangeof partnercountries, theRabat Process By emphasising theimportance of practical projects, bysettingacomprehensive is noteworthy. of Sub-Saharan countries –andhencethecountries of origin of many migrants – comprehensive with regardtoparticipating countries. Specifically, theintegration connections betweenmigration anddevelopment. Also, theRabat Process is illegal migration, but also aims at improving legal migration andpromoting the Its design iscomprehensive inthat it notonly focuses on preventing andreducing consultation within which concrete and practical initiatives can beimplemented. The aimof theRabat Process istoestablishaframework for dialogue and Africa, The KhartoumProcess: Critical Assessment andPolicy Recommendations 17 16 Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo, Tunisia. Leone, Sierra Senegal, Niger, Nigeria, Morocco, Mauritania, Mali, Liberia, Coast, Ivory Guinea-Bissau, Guinea, Ghana, Gambia, Gabon, Guinea, Equatorial Congo, of the Republic Democratic Congo, Chad, Republic, African Central Verde, Cameroon, Cabo Faso, Burkina Benin, countries: African United Kingdom. Switzerland, Sweden, Spain, Slovenia, Slovakia, Romania, Portugal, Norway, Poland, Netherlands, Malta, Luxembourg, Lithuania, Italy, Ireland, Hungary, Latvia, Greece, France, Finland, Estonia, Germany, pdf. processusderabat.net/web/uploads/roadmap/Roadmap-monitoring---Final-report.compressed. border management. the Rabat Process from 2012-14) shows, however, afocus on projects relating to development measures). external migration ingeneral isdominated bysecurity measures(asopposed to the ECandECOWAS Commission. Belgium, Burkina Faso, Equatorial Guinea,France, Italy, Morocco, Senegal, Spain, of West African States (ECOWAS). Asteeringcommittee wassetup, composed of
Daniel Wunderlich, “Towards Coherence of EU External Migration Policy? Implementing a Policy? Implementing Migration External of EU Coherence “Towards Wunderlich, Daniel For more information see the Rabat process’ website: http://processusderabat.net/web/index. process’ Rabat the see For more information Monitoring of the Dakar Strategy Roadmap. Final Report Final Roadmap. Monitoring Strategy of the Dakar Process, Rabat Euro-African Dialogue on Migration and on Development Migration Dialogue Euro-African Process, Rabat European countries: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Denmark, Republic, Czech Croatia, Cyprus, Bulgaria, Belgium, Austria, countries: European Michael Collyer, “Migrants as Strategic Actors …”, Actors 515. p. Strategic cit., as Collyer, “Migrants Michael 12 togetherwith theEuropean Commission andtheEconomic Community 16 Thisisinlinewith scientific findingsthat suggest theEU’s 17 15 An analysis of theDakarStrategy (thestrategy for 14 , Vol. 51, No. 6 (December 2013), p. 26-40. p. 2013), , Vol. No. 6(December 51, that indeed contributes to the implementation 13 , October 2013, http://www. 2013, , October , November 2014, http:// 2014, , November IAI WORKING PAPERS 15 | 49 - DECEMBER 2015 ISSN 2280-4331 | ISBN 978-88-98650-74-3 © 2015 IAI 6 September 2014, http://www.iom.int/node/53567. 2014, September http://www.esteri.it/mae/approfondimenti/2014/20141128_political_declaration.pdf. November 2014, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_STATEMENT-14-2251_en.htm. Process and the Khartoum Process for the on Rabat the conferences and Citizenship Home Affairs Policy, for Commissioner Migration, Avramopoulos, and Dimitris and Security 19 18 boat capsized nearMalta. the beginningof September,when around 500people were missingafteramigrant the central Mediterranean migratory route, one of the most dire having occurred at historical momentum. In 2014,several major migrant boat tragedies took placeon migratory route and initiate the Rabat Process, theKhartoumProcess had its own Just astheCeuta andMelilla incidents forced theEUtobecome active on its western 3. TheKhartoumProcess The KhartoumProcess: Critical Assessment andPolicy Recommendations 20 The short (five-page) declaration migration routes, aswell asthesituation incountries of origin. the KhartoumProcess issupposed totargettheeasternandcentral Mediterranean • • • • • • for cooperation betweentheEuropean andAfrican states: causes of irregular migration: poverty, conflicts, lack of resources.” countries of transition andtofight migrant smuggling. But [also] totackle the root of people who put theirlives at risktotryfind abetterfuture, to work with long-term strategy “totackle theemergencies, todeal with thedramatic conditions Initiative –also dubbed theKhartoumProcess. Theprocess aimedat establishinga and Norway gathered in Rome tolaunch theEU-Horn of Africa Migration Route development andtheEUHigh Representative, andobservers from Switzerland the European andAfrican Union Commissioners inchargeof migration and Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Djibouti, Kenya, Egypt andTunisia,aswell as On 28November 2014,Ministersof the28EUMember States andEritrea, Ethiopia, and prepareadeclaration on what wastobecome theKhartoumProcess. partner countries, holdasenior officials’ meetinginKhartoum on15October2014 2014. Within only two months, it managedtoreachout toEuropean andAfrican year andbyhosting the Rabat Process Ministerial Meeting inRome on 28 November the opportunity afforded by having the EU Presidency for the second half of the
IOM, IOM,
Remarks by Frederica Mogherini, EU High Representative on Foreign on Foreign High EU Representative Mogherini, byFrederica Remarks Commission, European Declaration of the Ministerial Conference of the Khartoum Process, Rome, 28 November 2014, 2014, November 28 Rome, Process, Khartoum of the Conference Ministerial of the Declaration Human Trafficking; and implementation of theProtocols againstSmuggling of Migrants and improving or establishingcriminal law frameworks andfostering theratification assisting inimproving identification andprosecution of criminal networks; smuggling of migrants; establishing national strategies toaddress trafficking in humanbeingsand setting up measurestoprevent irregular migration; building local capacities inthefield of migration management; tackling irregular migration andcriminal networks; IOM Investigates Reports of Deliberate Drowning of 500 Migrants in Migrants Mediterranean of 500 Drowning of Deliberate Reports IOM Investigates 18 TheItalian Ministryof Foreign Affairs decidedtoseize 20 produced bythemeetingnamestenkey areas 19 Thismeansthat , Rome, 28 28 , Rome, , 16 IAI WORKING PAPERS 15 | 49 - DECEMBER 2015 ISSN 2280-4331 | ISBN 978-88-98650-74-3 © 2015 IAI 7 April 2015, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-15-4832_en.htm.April 2015, 2015, http://statewatch.org/news/2015/sep/eu-council-khartoum-plan-of-action-04-2015.pdf. Process) Route Migration Initiative (Khartoum the EU-Horn of Africa and Security Policy, Avramopoulos… and Dimitris and Security 22 21 public servants. (the mostrecent one on 23-24 June 2015inSharm-el-Sheik)on thelevel of senior Until today, the KhartoumProcess has seen two steeringcommittee meetings the European External Action Service andtheAU Commission. (Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, South Sudan, Sudan) aswell astheEuropean Commission, EU Member States (Italy, France, Germany, Malta, theUK)andfive partnercountries The process isessentially moved forward byasteeringcommittee comprising five be human trafficking and smuggling of migrants. projects before implementing them.Key areasinafirst round of projects should then framework, but refers tothenecessarydialogue andtheidentification of such So far, the EU has not named concrete projects within the Khartoum Process the projects cancertainly beseenasindicating priorities andfeasibility. establishment of reception centres in the region (point 10). The numerical order of most controversial proposals: areturnframework for theregion (point 9)andthe irregular migration through development aid(point 8).And finally, it namesthe from beingtreated ascriminals (point 7).It tackles theso-called “root causes” of 1-6). At thesametime,it wants toprevent migrants who make useof illegal transport the fight against illegal migration within thecountries of origin andtransit (points This list of key areas of action for the Khartoum Process shows a strong focus on • • • • The KhartoumProcess: Critical Assessment andPolicy Recommendations 24 23 stranded along themigration routes from EasternAfrica.” says: “We will financethefirst projects that will support migrants andrefugees cooperation between the European and African actors is working, rather than of migration toEurope). Theprojects will mainly serve asatestof how well the conventions) andinthefield of prevention (providing information on thedangers smuggling andhuman trafficking (training ofpolice units, implementation of were presented. Thesefirstprojects will mainly take placeinthe field of fighting were discussed.But also, first project proposals by European and African sponsors
The European Union’s cooperation with Africa on migration Union’s European Africa with The cooperation Commission, European The European Union’s cooperation with Africa on migration Union’s European Africa with The cooperation Commission, European Remarks by Frederica Mogherini, EU High Representative on Foreign on Foreign High EU Representative Mogherini, byFrederica Remarks Commission, European Sharm El Sheikh Plan of Action - Steering Committee meeting of meeting Committee -Steering of Action Sheikh Plan El Sharm Union, European the of Council centres, providing accesstoasylum processes. assisting theparticipating countries inestablishing andmanagingreception developing aregional framework for return; to addresstheroot causes of irregular migration; promoting sustainable development incountries of origin andtransit inorder promoting avictim-centred approach; 24 In thismeeting,rules of procedure andadministrative issues , cit. , 21 Commissioner Avramopoulos , Sharm El Sheikh, 23-24 April 23-24 April Sheikh, El , Sharm 22 23 , Brussels, 22 22 , Brussels, , cit. , IAI WORKING PAPERS 15 | 49 - DECEMBER 2015 ISSN 2280-4331 | ISBN 978-88-98650-74-3 © 2015 IAI 8 monitorpresse-fluechtlinge-100.html. DasErste.de in kooperieren…”, november-015-migration-valletta-conference-orientation-debate-10387-15.pdf. 11-12(Malta, 2015) November 26 25 • • • • when bringingit forward andpursuingits implementation: second semester of 2014.Four fundamental motives led the Italian authorities The KhartoumProcess wasacore initiative of theItalian EUpresidencyinthe then allows for anassessment of political opportunities of theKhartoumProcess. the diverse participating actors. Having understood incentives and perceived risks have setfor it, it iscritical toshedsome light on theunderlying motivations of In order toassesstheKhartoumProcess with respecttothegoals its architects 3.1 Thepolitical economy of theKhartoum Process Police Academy istobeestablished. “border management” should beimproved anda“trainingcentre” at theCairo Sudanese officials aretobetrainedin“migration management,” South Sudan’s documents” on theKhartoumProcess andquoted threeconcrete projects: On 27July 2015,theGermanbroadcaster ARD reported it possesses“negotiation expecting ahigh impact on migration. The KhartoumProcess: Critical Assessment andPolicy Recommendations 28 27 2015, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/11/12-valletta-final-docs.2015, be officially presented atthe Valletta summit on migration on11-12 November 2015. priorities specified inthedeclaration. It wasexpectedthat concrete projects would projects underconsideration. But thisselection would certainly go along with the actually beimplemented undertheKhartoumProcess andwhether thereareother be organised byend2015.” these documents within theKhartoumProcess werescheduled for ameeting“to plan wereagreedupon, afollow-up andconcrete stepson theimplementation of However, thosehopes werenotfulfilled. While apolitical declaration andanaction
COREPER Orientation Note - Valletta on Migration Orientation Conference COREPER Union, European the of Council Source: Officials entrusted with the Khartoum Process. Khartoum the with entrusted Officials Source: Andreas Thenhaus, “EU will bei Fluchtursachen intensiv mit afrikanischen Diktaturen Diktaturen afrikanischen mit intensiv Fluchtursachen bei will “EU Thenhaus, Andreas Action Plan -Valletta Plan Summit Action on Migration Union, European the of Council factors incountries of origin. a practical long-term motive: theKhartoumProcess also aimsat reducing push- toll associated with crossing it; reduce migration intheMediterranean andtherefore also toreduce thedeath a practical short-term motive: the Khartoum Process was designed to effectively responsibility with otherMember States; a political motive: moving theissue totheEuropean level meanssharing to prove its will andcapability toacton migration; a symbolical motive: for thedomestic audience, Italy could useanewinitiative , 30 June 2015, http://www.statewatch.org/news/2015/jul/eu-council- 2015, June 30 , , 23 July 2015, http://www1.wdr.de/daserste/monitor/extras/ July, 23 2015, 28 26 It issofarunclear whether thoseprojects will 25 , 11-12 November 27
IAI WORKING PAPERS 15 | 49 - DECEMBER 2015 ISSN 2280-4331 | ISBN 978-88-98650-74-3 © 2015 IAI 9 • 29 • • • To besure,European states also associate riskswith theKhartoumProcess: • • • interests: have astancesimilar tothat of Italy, otherMember States may have additional While othersouthern Member States, such asGreece,Spain andPortugal generally The KhartoumProcess: Critical Assessment andPolicy Recommendations 31 30 Daniel Wunderlich, “Towards Coherence of EU External Migration Policy?”, cit., p. 33. p. Policy?”, cit., Migration External of EU Coherence “Towards Wunderlich, Daniel Governance (MGSoG), June 2015, http://www.merit.unu.edu/publications/uploads/1436958842.pdf. http://www.merit.unu.edu/publications/uploads/1436958842.pdf. 2015, June (MGSoG), Governance Choices and Factors InfluencingDestination Migrants’ Ibid.
Irregular Migration Routes to Migration Europe Irregular Siegel, Melissa and deBresser Julia Kuschminder, Katie The EU Commission actually aims at expanding its competences in the field of migration. See See migration. of field the in competences its at expanding aims actually Commission EU The reluctance to engageinnew(legal) migration schemes. Fear of increasedlegal migration channels:scepticism hereisowing toa migrants. many EasternEuropean ones) tendtoprefer astrong national policy against in thisfield. another steptowards theallocation of more responsibility totheEuropean level the field of migration. Initiatives like theKhartoumProcess could beseenas the delegation of additional powers totheEuropean level isparticularly felt in Fear of increasedEUresponsibility for migration: thegeneral scepticism on the number of migrants on theWestern Mediterranean route. strong evidencefor its role model,theRabat Process, having effectively reduced Khartoum Process will beeffective with regardtothe stated aims.Thereisno Cost-benefit concerns: it isdifficult toassess whether projects underthe ready to take partinit. among domestic EUaudience andstakeholders, noEuropean country would be EU political support andlegitimacy for theseregimes.If thisperception prevails with human rights. Cooperation betweentheEU andtheseregimescould imply fact that it requirescooperation with autocratic regimesthat have serious issues Reputation: perhaps themostprecarious partof theKhartoumProcess isthe for refugees. from more serious collaboration, such asaEuropean redistribution mechanism in theareaof migration increase,theKhartoumProcess could divert attention Averting otheraction: while thevoices that askfor more European cooperation Process cancome inexchange for thesouth fulfilling its obligations. asylum requests, Dublin). Cooperation ininitiatives such astheKhartoum process of thesouth when it comes tothehandling of migration (fingerprints, Reliance on southern Member States: Northern Member States rely on due can serve asapolitical sign of solidarity. the migration sector arerecognised in theEU. Support for theKhartoumProcess Solidarity with southern Member States: ingeneral, theSouth’s challenges in unemployment andunexplored skills of resident populations beingable to Public opinion inEurope inthisregardisunfavourable. Thereisanotion of not scheduled intheKhartoumProcess, but theycould come at some point. 30 For domestic political reasons, some Member States (among them , Maastricht, Maastricht Graduate School of School Graduate Maastricht , Maastricht, 31 Granted, theseare 29 10 IAI WORKING PAPERS 15 | 49 - DECEMBER 2015 ISSN 2280-4331 | ISBN 978-88-98650-74-3 © 2015 IAI The International Spectator International The Third World Quarterly World Europe”, Third in European Journal of Migration and of Law Migration Journal European in Impasse”, Political 15-28. Migration International in Processes”, Policy and Rationale Political and Turkey”,and and of Law Migration Journal European in 35 34 33 32 • The KhartoumProcess: Critical Assessment andPolicy Recommendations 37 36 p. 76, https://zeitschrift-ip.dgap.org/de/article/getFullPDF/15346. Politik EU”,in Internationale in der Hochqualifizierter Anwerbung • • • positive side,four mainmotives for participating intheProcess canbeidentified: associated with theKhartoumProcess might bealittle more heterogeneous. Onthe As for theAfrican partnercountries, thedistribution of incentives andrisks •
Jean-Pierre Cassarino, “Informalising Readmission Agreements in the EU Neighbourhood”, EU in the in Agreements Readmission “Informalising Cassarino, Jean-Pierre Hein de Haas, “The Myth of Invasion: The Inconvenient Realities of African Migration to Migration of African Realities Inconvenient The of Invasion: Myth “The deHaas, Hein Annabelle Roig and Thomas Huddleston, “EC Readmission Agreements: ARe-Evaluation of the Agreements: Readmission “EC Huddleston, Thomas Roig and Annabelle Steffen Angenendt and Roderick Parkes, “Wanderer, kommst du nach Europa? Strategien zur zur Strategien Europa? nach “Wanderer,du kommst Parkes, and Roderick Angenendt Steffen Sarah Wolff, “The Politics of Negotiating EU Readmission Agreements: Insights from Morocco from Morocco Insights Agreements: EU Readmission of Negotiating Politics “The Wolff, Sarah Katharina Natter, “The Formation of Morocco’s Policy Towards Irregular Migration (2000-2007): (2000-2007): Migration Irregular Towards of Morocco’s Policy Formation Natter, “The Katharina transit countries, for example when readmitting third-country nationals countries insuch cooperations inorder toalleviate theburden of North African Italy andSpain, have realised thenecessity toinclude sub-Saharan source Participation of source countries: EUMember States, andinparticular France, freedom of travel andbusiness). (remittances) andtheirconstituencies (accesstotheEUlabourmarket, increased strategy of usinga“geographical rent” for increasedgeopolitical power. countries inmigration-related initiatives canalso fit into some transit countries’ Geopolitical benefit: as Natter shows for Morocco, integrating sub-Saharan present themselves asreliable, trustworthy partners. reputation. Cooperating with European states yields arareopportunity to but also South Sudan andEgypt –arekeen on improving theirinternational Legitimacy: some of theparticipating states –inparticular Eritrea andSudan, to theseprojects. that all of the participating states will benefit from financial inflows connected potential projects that canhave animpact on migration. It isalmost certain Financial support: the KhartoumProcess isaframework for abroad rangeof not include legal migration schemessofar. scepticism that theKhartoumProcess –asopposed totheRabat Process –does satisfy labourneeds. that action on themigration topic hasbeentaken. integrating source countries isaway todemonstrate tothedomestic audience are notvery popular with thedomestic audience. So,for transit countries, when keeping themwithin tightly controlled borders –botharepolicies that irregular migrants for cheap, unregulated labour. channels (perspective of visafacilitation) Perspective of legal migration channels:theestablishment of legal migration Khartoum Process, thiscould perhaps beavalid point for Egypt or Tunisia. , Vol. 42, No. 2 (June 2007), p. 190. p. No., Vol. 2(June 2007), 42, 32 And indeed,countries such asSpain andItaly tap into , Vol. 1305-1322. p. 29, No. 7(2008), 36 35 , Vol. No. 16, 1(2014), 74. p. isvery attractive tothesecountries , Vol. 374. p. 9, No. 3(2007), 33 , Vol. No. 4(July/August 65, 2010), It is probably due tothis , Vol. 52, No. 5 (October 2014), p. No. 5(October , Vol. 52, 34 In the 37 and 11 IAI WORKING PAPERS 15 | 49 - DECEMBER 2015 ISSN 2280-4331 | ISBN 978-88-98650-74-3 © 2015 IAI International Migration of Mali”, International in Case The Countries: de/daserste/monitor/sendungen/grenzen-dicht-100.html. DasErste.de Despoten”, mit in Pakt Europas dicht: “Grenzen Wiedl, political action that occurson theEuropean level. actually reduces accountability. National actors have more difficulties in overseeing of migration policy totheinternational or European level isproblematic, because it different levels. On the theoretical level, it is argued that shifting the responsibility With thiscaveat, public reception of theKhartoumProcess canbedivided into three unfinished (public) debate on thetopic. has also led toanincomplete knowledge on theintentions of theProcess andan with regimeslike thoseof Eritrea andSudan isnotwithout controversy. But it certainly intended bytheEuropean participating states, asinitiating cooperation 38 argue that readmission agreements could lead tomore countries beingincorrectly processes totheregion, fearing adeterioration of refugee protection. Finally, they trafficking instead of fighting them. Also,theywarnagainst movingasylum argue that stricter border controls aredrivers of irregular migration andhuman emphasis on legal migration channelsandintegration of migrants. Thesecritics border controls. Instead, acomprehensive approach on migration should put more criticised for beingoverly focused on restricting accesstoEurope andon tighter On thelevel of European external migration policy, GAMM ingeneral hasbeen the initiative hasreceived hardly any broad (media)attention. to thecontent of theirreaction totheKhartoumProcess, it must beestablishedthat governmental organisations (NGOs), the media and a critical public. Before turning A third set of actors, after European and African states, is constituted by non- • • • states: However, initiatives like theKhartoumProcess arealso seensceptically byAfrican The KhartoumProcess: Critical Assessment andPolicy Recommendations 40 39
An exception being the German state television’s critical report: Nikolaus Steiner, Charlotte Steiner, Charlotte Nikolaus report: critical television’s state German the being exception An Florian Trauner and Stephanie Deimel, “The Impact of EU Migration Policies on African on African Policies Migration of EU Impact “The Deimel, Stephanie and Trauner Florian See, for example, Michael Collyer, “Migrants as Strategic Actors …”, Actors Strategic cit. as Collyer, “Migrants Michael for example, See, the EU. population frequently benefits from remittances of migrants who have entered Less remittances: migration agreements are unpopular in countries where the popular with thedomestic population. of migrants could bestrandedintransit countries. Ofcourse,thisisnotvery take measuresthat keep migrants off the European continent, alarge number situated in restriction of migration. Since the EU expects transit countries to Lost intransit: thefocus of initiatives like theKhartoumProcess isclearly policies, it will soon become very unattractive for them. Khartoum Process is usedasaplatform for blamingthesecountries for bad are widely seen as one of the reasons for increased migration in Europe. If the Moral blaming:governments of countries like Eritrea, Sudan andSouth Sudan 38 , Vol. 51, No. 4 (August 2013), p. 20-32. p. 2013), , Vol. No. 4(August 51, 40 , 23 July 2015, http://www1.wdr. July, 23 2015, 39 Thislow profile was 12 IAI WORKING PAPERS 15 | 49 - DECEMBER 2015 ISSN 2280-4331 | ISBN 978-88-98650-74-3 © 2015 IAI 2015, http://bit.ly/1DiHuUV. 2015, Migration Policy Centre at theEuropean University Institute. for evidence-basedpolicy formulation,” asstated inapaper put forward bythe strong migration information systemsandnational migration profiles, asabasis step for aregional strategy on migration andmobility might bethedevelopment of is only scarcely available or notat all. Before designing aregional strategy, “a first Thirdly, thereisasevere lackof information on migration inthe region. Reliable data migrants seemstobefutile. country on boardtheinitiative, any attempt toreduce smuggling and trafficking of numbers of refugees aretakingtheroute through Libya into Europe. Without the is one of themostflourishing businessesinLibya thesedays. Consequently, huge 46 45 44 43 42 41 Process remainscompletely silent inthisregard. actually builds on legal migration channelsasone of four pillars, theKhartoum Fourth, thesameinstitution also criticises thefactthat, while theRabat Process effectively taking partinany international initiative. warring coalitions within thecountry, which iswhy it iscurrently notcapable of internationally recognisedgovernment remainsmarginalised among thediverse Process concerns the absence of Libya in the initiative. The war-torn country’s A second point of criticism that focuses on theefficacy oftheKhartoum legitimise theirrule. democratic governments. Firstly, cooperation with theseregimesmight actually A firstset of concerns regardsthefactthat theKhartoumProcess includes non- On thelevel of theKhartoumProcess itself, therearedifferent sets of concerns. deemed “safe.” The KhartoumProcess: Critical Assessment andPolicy Recommendations 48 47 PRIO Blogs Route PRIO in Initiative”, International Migration International in Policy”, and Research 2015/04 (March 2015), p. 8, http://hdl.handle.net/1814/35038. 8, p. 2015), (March 2015/04 Briefs Policy Centre Policy Migration in Approaches”, Policy Dual Require Flows Migration countries’ intent to develop a regional framework for return is seen as questionable. focus on legal migration. on concrete action inthisfield, although scientific research suggests astronger that produce asylum seekers. Khartoum Process were actually themselves responsible for creating circumstances June 2015, http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article55373.
Ibid. Marie Martin, “The Global Approach to Migration and Mobility: The State of Play”, cit. of Play”, State The Mobility: and to Migration Approach Global “The Martin, Marie Ibid., p. 7. p. Ibid., Cindy Horst and Maimuna Mohamud, “Unlikely Partners: The EU-Horn of Africa Migration Migration EU-Horn The of Africa Partners: “Unlikely Mohamud, Maimuna and Horst Cindy The Libyan Political Dialogue: An Libyan Incomplete Political Dialogue: Consensus The Group, Crisis International “European MP calls to support peace and democratic reform in Sudan”, Trubune Sudan in in reform democratic and peace to support calls MP “European Iván Martín and Sara Bonfanti, “Migration and Asylum Challenges in Eastern Africa: Mixed Mixed Africa: Eastern in Challenges Asylum and “Migration Bonfanti, Sara and Martín Iván See, for example, Hein de Haas, “The Migration and Development Pendulum: A Critical View on Pendulum: ACritical Development and Migration “The deHaas, Hein for example, See, 41 42 Secondly, many of theparticipating governments inthe 48 , 22 April 2015, http://blogs.prio.org/?p=1947. 2015, April , 22 At thesametime,such channelswould beof particular 43 And thirdly, againstthisbackdrop theparticipating , Vol. No. 8-25. p. 3(June 50, 2012), 47 Even theRabat Process isshort 45 But smuggling of migrants 46 , 16 July , No. , 17 44 13 IAI WORKING PAPERS 15 | 49 - DECEMBER 2015 ISSN 2280-4331 | ISBN 978-88-98650-74-3 © 2015 IAI important afactor for migration thaneconomic development. and middle term. Furthermore, conflicts and bad governance seem to be far more proportions) will byfarbeoffset bythebenefit from closer political ties to European generated bytheKhartoumProcess (even ifit eventually will attain significant in thegeopolitical effects of such anagreement. Thepayoff oftheadditional aid Eritrea, South Sudan andpossibly also Egypt andTunisiaarefarmore interested compelling. But for some regimesinthe region it isonly ameanstoanend. Sudan, aid for tighter border control andpersecution of traffickers and smugglers sounds between theEuropean andtheAfrican side.In general, thedeal of development Secondly, thereisat least one potential game-breaker for conflicting interests they canoffset such imbalances ininterests among African countries. initiative like theKhartoumProcess, European participating states must make sure are rarely interested intakingthemback(less remittances). Therefore, inan nationals within their borders (conflict with resident population), source countries While transit countries do nothave anintrinsic motivation toholdthird-country different interests than source countries, particularly when it comes tomigration. governments, theinterests arefarmore heterogeneous. Transit countries have very be ameanstoavert common action such asrefugee quotas. As for theAfrican policy, this obstacle might be overcome. In fact, the Khartoum Process could even initiative andnot afirststeptowards adeepercommon migration andasylum long astheKhartoumProcess can make sureit isforemost anintergovernmental has significantly gainedimportance during thelastcouple of months. However, as different stancestowards acommunitarisation of migration policies –atopic that differing, if not conflicting interests. In the European case, this is mainly due to nor acoherent African position. BothAfrican andEuropean governments have Khartoum Process yields two insights: Firstly, thereisneither acoherent European, A first look at theinterest sets of European and African participants inthe 4. Political assessment to more migration, instead of the expected sinking numbers, politicians: OECD research showed already in 2007 that development actually leads research suggests that therelationship isnotassimple asisoften stated by Fifth, with regardtothelinkagebetweendevelopment andmigration, scientific in anagreement is obvious. escape of theirown population, thereluctance toinclude legal ways for migration numbers andtheregimes’political unwillingness tochangepolicies that lead tothe asylum inEurope once theyhave reachedit. Ontheotherhand,given the large importance, asmany of theregion’s refugees standagood chance of gaining The KhartoumProcess: Critical Assessment andPolicy Recommendations 49 coherence-for-development-2007-migration-and-developing-countries.htm. Countries
Policy Coherence for Development 2007. for Development Coherence and Policy Developing Migration Centre, Development OECD , November 2007, http://www.oecd.org/dev/migration-development/publications-policy- November , 49 at least in the short 14 IAI WORKING PAPERS 15 | 49 - DECEMBER 2015 ISSN 2280-4331 | ISBN 978-88-98650-74-3 © 2015 IAI of interest inthevery design of theKhartoumProcess. they might even seetheseoutcomes asunfavourable. Thus, thereisaclear conflict of safer migration routes do notfeature asapriority for theAfrican partnerstates – At thesametime,Europe’s goals of areduction of migration andtheestablishment system andtogainlegitimacy, for Europe thisisacollateral effect theytryto avoid. partner states seeit firstand foremost asaway tobeintegrated into theinternational Secondly, theKhartoum Process is apolitical high-risk game.While the African more dangerous andexpensive routes. seek refuge from, or theywill nevertheless trytoescape, beingforced towards ever Either refugees will bekept inplacesand underregimestheyrightfully intended to irregular migration inthisway canhave two outcomes that arebothunfavourable: and later theMediterranean. Without providing legal asylum channels,fighting in Europe), hiringasmuggler isactually the only way tocross theSaharadesert of therefugees intheregion (who have agood chanceof beinggranted asylum combating human trafficking and smuggling. However, for many, ifnotmost Sea. Theinitiative aimsat doing sobyfighting irregular migration, through its intended goal of reducing migration andthedeath toll intheMediterranean However, theKhartoum Process faces challenges intwo aspects.Thefirstconcerns seems tobeareasonable move. communication channelstotheheadsof state andgovernments intheregion routes iskey toEurope’s external migration policy. In this regard,establishing Also understandingSudan’s role asacentrepiece of several African migration share of refugees toEurope viatheMediterranean deserves special attention. Horn of Africa region. Particularly Eritrea ascountry of origin of thesecond largest It ishigh timethat Europe takes action on thelargenumbers of migrants from the Conclusion be implemented undertheinitiative. And thismight also give anideaof theefficacy ofthe projects that are supposed to financially. The administrations of the African countries will hardly be pleased. So, Europe isrestricted toplaying theKhartoumProcess at alow level, including would besuretofollow. from therooftops. If theyweretodo so,protest byNGOs andinthedomestic public regimes istheevil theyhave toaccept,but certainly theyarenotwilling toshout it other side,Europe cannotbewilling toprovide. For Europe, cooperation with these they needisinternational attention andrecognition –something that, on the if theyeventually overcome thelevel of technical development cooperation. What states. But these governments will only beable tocapitalise on thesepolitical ties The KhartoumProcess: Critical Assessment andPolicy Recommendations 15 IAI WORKING PAPERS 15 | 49 - DECEMBER 2015 ISSN 2280-4331 | ISBN 978-88-98650-74-3 © 2015 IAI • • • recommendations are meant toimprove theProcess inits mostcritical points: has its flaws andchallenges, it certainly makes sensetobuild on it. The following actually agreedtoparticipate inthisinitiative. And while theKhartoum Process is quite remarkable that countries such asEritrea, Sudan andSouth Sudan have dialogue on migration is–justlike theRabat Process –apromising one. Also, it The KhartoumProcess design of integrating source andtransit countries into a Recommendations inclusion of legal asylum channels. cooperative tools mentioned in the Ministerial Declaration, complemented by the The Process canonly besuccessful ifit actually covers thewhole spectrumof as the Khartoum Process ends there, much of the criticism is highly legitimate. cooperation in border management and fighting human trafficking. And as long hard toimaginehow theinitiative actually might go furtherthanits firststep of a by theKhartoumProcess inidentifying even its very firstprojects. That said, it is It isawalk on apolitical tightrope, afactthat isproven bythedifficulties encountered European partners,which will seriously harmtheeffectiveness of theprocess. the African states aredissatisfied with the low political attention theygetfrom their public attention thanintended andfacesstrong political opposition inEurope, or flawed, as it riskstwo highly plausible outcomes: Either theProcess gainsmore and give it aslittle public andpolitical attention aspossible. But thisstrategy is The European reaction tothisdilemma istokeep theinitiative at alow profile The KhartoumProcess: Critical Assessment andPolicy Recommendations dangerous andmore expensive ways toEurope. creating offshore processing, for example), it will force migrants toturnmore measures that allow for legal migration, particularly for refugees (byway of at restricting irregular migration. As long asthiselement isnotcoupled with themselves. TheKhartoumProcess isfocused toonarrowly on measuresaiming First andforemost, cooperation inthefield of migration should benefit migrants human rights standardsover aspecific amount of time. matters will only take place when a government adheres to a specified set of must make clear toall partnersandto the public that cooperation on migration While opening communication channelscanhappen unconditionally, theEU as observers. attention totheprocess would betointegrate international NGOs –for example initiative. Oneway toensuretransparencywithout yielding toomuch public the one that inspiredsome mediaattention inGermany arepoisonous for the Process low, it must make suretocommunicate it transparently. Leakslike Although politically theEUhasaninterest inkeeping attention on theKhartoum Updated 20December2015 16 IAI WORKING PAPERS 15 | 49 - DECEMBER 2015 ISSN 2280-4331 | ISBN 978-88-98650-74-3 © 2015 IAI Journal, 19May 2015,http://wp.me/p37aUp-6UJ Timothy G.Hammond, “TheMediterranean Migration Crisis”, inForeign Policy Publications/Risk_Analysis/Annual_Risk_Analysis_2015.pdf Frontex, Migration toEurope”, inThird World Quarterly, Vol. 29,No. 7(2008),p.1305-1322 Hein de Haas,“TheMyth of Invasion: TheInconvenient Realities of African Research andPolicy”, inInternational Migration, Vol. 50,No. 3(June 2012),p.8-25 Hein de Haas,“TheMigration andDevelopment Pendulum: ACritical View on 173-185, http://ssrn.com/abstract=1607928 at Fifty. A View from Forced Migration Studies , Lanham, Lexington Books, 2003, p. Over Refugee Protection”, inJoanne vanSelmetal. (eds.),TheRefugee Convention François Crépeau, “TheFight Against Migrant Smuggling: Migration Containment eu-council-khartoum-plan-of-action-04-2015.pdf Process), SharmElSheikh,23-24 April 2015,http://statewatch.org/news/2015/sep/ Committee meeting of theEU-Horn of Africa Migration Route Initiative (Khartoum Council of theEuropean Union, Sharm ElSheikh Plan of Action -Steering orientation-debate-10387-15.pdf org/news/2015/jul/eu-council-november-015-migration-valletta-conference- on Migration (Malta, 11-12 November 2015),30June 2015,http://www.statewatch. Council of theEuropean Union, COREPER Orientation Note -Valletta Conference press/press-releases/2015/11/12-valletta-final-docs Migration on Summit Council of the European Union, 2012), p.505-524 Approach toMigration andMobility”, inGlobal Networks, Vol. 12,No. 4(October Michael Collyer, “Migrants asStrategic Actors intheEuropean Union’s Global 196 Neighbourhood”, inTheInternational Spectator , Vol. 42,No. 2(June 2007),p.179- Jean-Pierre Cassarino,“Informalising Readmission Agreements intheEU getFullPDF/15346 Vol. 65,No. 4 (July/August 2010), p. 74-78, https://zeitschrift-ip.dgap.org/de/article/ Strategien zurAnwerbung Hochqualifizierter inderEU”, inInternationale Politik, Steffen Angenendt and Roderick Parkes, “Wanderer, kommst du nach Europa? 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Final Report, November Process_2014.pdf 2013, http://www.icmpd.org/fileadmin/ICMPD-Website/Rabat_Process/Rabat- Rabat Process, Euro-African Dialogue on Migration and Development, October and-developing-countries.htm development/publications-policy-coherence-for-development-2007-migration- and Developing Countries, November 2007,http://www.oecd.org/dev/migration- OECD Development Centre, Policy Coherencefor Development 2007.Migration Vol. 52,No. 5(October 2014),p.15-28 (2000-2007): Political Rationale andPolicy Processes”, inInternational Migration , Katharina Natter, “TheFormation of Morocco’s Policy Towards Irregular Migration analyses/no-215-gamm-state-of-play.pdf in Marie Martin,“TheGlobal Approach to Migration andMobility: TheState of Play”, Policy Briefs, No. 2015/04 (March 2015),http://hdl.handle.net/1814/35038 Mixed Migration Flows Require Dual Policy Approaches”, inMigration Policy Centre Iván MartínandSaraBonfanti, “Migration andAsylum Challenges inEasternAfrica: unu.edu/publications/uploads/1436958842.pdf Maastricht Graduate Schoolof Governance (MGSoG), June 2015,http://www.merit. to Europe and Factors Influencing Migrants’ Destination Choices, Maastricht, Katie Kuschminder, Julia deBresser andMelissa Siegel, Irregular Migration Routes 16 July 2015,http://bit.ly/1DiHuUV International CrisisGroup, TheLibyan Political Dialogue: An Incomplete Consensus, org/?p=1947 Africa Migration Route Initiative”, inPRIO Blogs, 22April 2015,http://blogs.prio. Cindy Horst andMaimuna Mohamud, “Unlikely Partners: TheEU-Horn of The KhartoumProcess: Critical Assessment andPolicy Recommendations Statewatch Analyses, No. 06/13(February 2013),http://www.statewatch.org/ 18 IAI WORKING PAPERS 15 | 49 - DECEMBER 2015 ISSN 2280-4331 | ISBN 978-88-98650-74-3 © 2015 IAI 2013), p.26-40 Implementing a Complex Policy”, Daniel Wunderlich, “Towards Coherence of EU External Migration Policy? 1 (2014),p.69-95 from Morocco andTurkey”, inEuropean Journal of Migration and Law, Vol. 16,No. Sarah Wolff, “The Politics of Negotiating EU Readmission Agreements: Insights 1 July 2015,http://www.unhcr.org/5592bd059.html UNHCR, (August 2013),p.20-32 African Countries: TheCaseof Mali”, inInternational Migration, Vol. 51,No. 4 Florian Trauner andStephanie Deimel,“TheImpact of EUMigration Policies on The KhartoumProcess: Critical Assessment andPolicy Recommendations The searoute toEurope: TheMediterranean passagein theageof refugees, International Migration, Vol. 51, No. 6 (December 19 IAI WORKING PAPERS 15 | 49 - DECEMBER 2015 ISSN 2280-4331 | ISBN 978-88-98650-74-3 © 2015 IAI Latest IAIWORKING PAPERS The KhartoumProcess: Critical Assessment andPolicy Recommendations www.iai.it [email protected] F +39 T +39 Via Angelo Brunetti, 9-I-00186 Rome, Italy and otherpapers’ series related toIAIresearch projects. 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