DOCSLIB.ORG

REVIEW Volume 10 Number 1 Spring 2007

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
REVIEW Volume 10 Number 1 Spring 2007 Royal Air Force A I R P O W E R REVIEW Volume 10 Number 1 Spring 2007 Relearning Air-Land Co-operation Wg Cdr Harv Smyth US Weaponization of Space Wg Cdr Johnny Stringer RAF Nuclear Deterrence in the Cold War Mr Paul Graham Legal and Moral Challenges for Today’s Air Commanders Wg Cdr Andy Myers Electronic Warfare and the Night Bomber Offensive Wg Cdr Rob O’Dell RAF Historic Book Review Gp Capt Neville Parton 96 97 Photo: RAF AHB A Boeing Fortress B Mk III electronic warfare aircraft of RAF Bomber Command To What Extent Did Royal Air Force Employment of Electronic Warfare Contribute to the Outcome of the Strategic Night Bomber Offensive of World War II? By Sqn Ldr Rob O’Dell RAF The war in the air is a technological war technical operations. In particular, the which cannot be won by a technologically night bomber offensive of World War II inferior fighting force, however high its moral saw the first intensive employment of or dauntless its resolution’ Electronic Warfare (EW), precipitating a (Luftwaffe 158 victory ace, race for technical supremacy arguably Colonel Johannes Steinhoff.2) unprecedented in the history of warfare. Introduction Many contemporary studies of the Royal During World War II offensive strategic Air Force (RAF) bomber offensive have air power evolved from principles little suggested that the campaign was of changed from the German Gotha raids little relevance to the final collapse of of World War I to highly complex and Germany. Indeed, RAF ‘area bombing’ 98 99 of German cities has sometimes been The campaign is examined in 4 stages. accused of undermining the moral Firstly, the period from September 1939 superiority of the Allies. Moreover, fuel to December 1941 saw extremely poor shortages and the loss of the Luftwaffe’s results from RAF night bombing due early warning network of radars and to unsuitable aircraft and navigation Command and Control (C2) facilities to methods, while German military advancing Allied land forces is generally expansion had emphasised offensive cited as the primary factor in the final rather than defensive operations. collapse of Germany’s night defences. Consequently, Luftwaffe night defences were ill-equipped to challenge early This essay offers an alternative RAF bomber sorties; however, the perspective that RAF employment of appointment of the inspirational EW was the most significant factor in Colonel Josef Kammhuber saw a the campaign. Bomber Command EW rapid expansion of the night-fighter allowed the RAF to limit the effects of force, enhanced by improved C2 increasingly advanced Luftwaffe C2 and Germany’s technological lead and fighter technologies, ultimately in early warning and gun-laying reducing German Air Defences (AD) to radars. Nevertheless, Britain retained virtual impotence. It is also suggested a lead in Airborne Interception (AI) that RAF navigational systems enabled technology which enabled RAF night- quantum leaps to be made in bombing fighters to challenge early Luftwaffe accuracy, given the conditions and intruder operations over Britain. technology available. Moreover, British AI radar contributed significantly to Britain’s development In reaching its conclusions, this essay of long range navigation capabilities. examines the impact of the principle Overall, the period was characterised RAF and Luftwaffe EW technologies by stalemate between the RAF and upon the strategic night bomber the Luftwaffe as they each struggled offensive against Europe during 1939- to overcome early technical and 45. The EW capabilities examined organisational limitations. include navigation, radar, passive detection, Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) The second phase, between January 1942 including Electronic Intelligence and July 1943, saw rapid developments (ELINT) and Communications by both sides. The Luftwaffe took an Intelligence (COMINT), and Radio increasing toll on RAF bombers as Counter Measures (RCM) jamming. The the so called ‘Kammhuber Line’ was significance of such systems is compared refined and Germany’s own AI radar with other factors in the campaign equipped night-fighters entered service. such as leadership, C2, and the wider However, the RAF introduced a variety strategic context of the conflict. RAF of navigation and RCM systems which studies suggested that loss rates of improved bombing accuracy and 5% over a period of 3 months reduced enabled more effective penetrations of the effectiveness of a bomber force to Luftwaffe defences. Despite innovative unacceptable levels, whilst losses of 7% German technology, further RAF tactical made a force ineffective.3 Therefore, refinements, under the leadership of the for the analytical purposes of this essay, aggressive ‘Bomber’ Harris, led to RAF RAF losses exceeding 5% are considered ascendancy during this period which unacceptable whilst those exceeding 7% included the ‘Thousand Bomber Raids’. are classed as unsustainable. Nevertheless, RAF losses were barely 98 99 sustainable and at times threatened to the most significant single factor in curtail the entire campaign. RAF victory during the night bomber campaign. The third phase commenced in July 1943 with the Battle of Hamburg. September 1939 – December 1941: This was a pivotal operation in which Stalemate RAF employment of ‘Window’ EW jamming paralyzed existing methods …only 5% of aircraft getting within 15 of Luftwaffe C2. After a brief period miles of their targets…I don’t think it where RAF losses plummeted, Window would have surprised anyone who was precipitated an overhaul of German bombing in 1941. defences and the introduction of a Bomber Command Pilot4) wide range of innovative measures which allowed a rapid recovery by Faced with the threat of German the Luftwaffe. RAF losses reached aggression, Britain had emphasised unprecedented levels in early 1944 defensive measures during its pre-war and forced the withdrawal of a third expansion. Therefore, in 1939 Bomber of Harris’ bombers from operations. Command could muster a combined Ironically, much of the Luftwaffe’s daily average of just over 200 of its success was due to passive tracking principle aircraft types, the Whitley, 5 Part of the of the navigation and EW systems Wellington and Hampden. All 3 were Chain home upon which the British crews were characterised by inadequate performance, radar system increasingly reliant. Only continued payload and RAF RCM, diversionary tactics and defensive armament. expanding Allied aircrew training and Significantly, they aircraft manufacturing programmes also lacked any form prevented RAF failure. of accurate long- range navigational From April 1944 the RAF regained system beyond the initiative from the Luftwaffe. The dead reckoning invasion of Europe and decreasing navigation supported German fuel supplies were significant by radio fixes and factors in this reversal. However, it is astro-navigation. In suggested that omnipotent RAF EW contrast, Luftwaffe and, in particular, the formation of a doctrine emphasised dedicated Bomber Command RCM the offensive tactical and intruder force ultimately proved employment of air decisive. Despite continued German power in support of technological developments during the land forces.6 Indeed, last year of the War, Luftwaffe defences Germany considered and C2 were systematically disrupted the possibility of by this RAF EW supremacy. nocturnal attacks by bombers so remote it The primacy of EW was illustrated in possessed only small June 1945 when RAF and Luftwaffe numbers of obsolete personnel evaluated Bomber Command biplanes for night- tactics during trials against the largely fighting tasks in 1939.7 intact German C2 system in Denmark. The emerging EW It is suggested that these experiments, capabilities of each against an AD system unhindered by nation reflected these Allied land forces, proved that EW was priorities. 100 101 Britain had developed the Chain Home but, lacking AI, the Bf109D proved AD radar and its associated C2 system, severely limited in the role.12 and led the world in airborne radar technology. In contrast, Germany had Following the German bombing of focused upon the offensive potential Rotterdam on 14 May 1940, Churchill of EW. The Knickebein (Crooked Leg) authorised attacks against point targets navigation system allowed accurate in mainland Germany. By 4 June 1940, ‘blind’ bombing through cloud cover. RAF bombers had flown some 1700 However, in September 1939 Germany night sorties over Germany for the loss also possessed small numbers of Freya of only 39 aircraft.13 However, without early warning and prototype Wurzburg navigation aids crews struggled to gun-laying radars, each developed in find their targets. One pilot describing complete secrecy.8 Freya had a range a bombing raid against a railway of 75 miles but could not measure an station in Dusseldorf stated that upon aircrafts altitude whilst Wurzburg reaching their target area German was a small radar with a range of 25 blackout procedures prevented them miles and an ability to plot an aircraft’s from locating the station. They then position and altitude to extremely fine conducted a fruitless ‘square search’ of limits.9 Yet despite German success the city before dropping their weapons in navigation and ground based into the darkness.14 This illustrates the radar, the Luftwaffe lagged behind problem of locating targets at night Britain in night-fighter AI technology without appropriate navigation systems and C2. German disregard of such and the impotence of German night defensive EW capabilities would later defences at the time. Furthermore,
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Royal Air Force Historical Society Journal 29
    ROYAL AIR FORCE HISTORICAL SOCIETY JOURNAL 29 2 The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the contributors concerned and are not necessarily those held by the Royal Air Force Historical Society. Copyright 2003: Royal Air Force Historical Society First published in the UK in 2003 by the Royal Air Force Historical Society All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical including photocopying, recording or by any information storage and retrieval system, without permission from the Publisher in writing. ISSN 1361-4231 Typeset by Creative Associates 115 Magdalen Road Oxford OX4 1RS Printed by Advance Book Printing Unit 9 Northmoor Park Church Road Northmoor OX29 5UH 3 CONTENTS BATTLE OF BRITAIN DAY. Address by Dr Alfred Price at the 5 AGM held on 12th June 2002 WHAT WAS THE IMPACT OF THE LUFTWAFFE’S ‘TIP 24 AND RUN’ BOMBING ATTACKS, MARCH 1942-JUNE 1943? A winning British Two Air Forces Award paper by Sqn Ldr Chris Goss SUMMARY OF THE MINUTES OF THE SIXTEENTH 52 ANNUAL GENERAL MEETING HELD IN THE ROYAL AIR FORCE CLUB ON 12th JUNE 2002 ON THE GROUND BUT ON THE AIR by Charles Mitchell 55 ST-OMER APPEAL UPDATE by Air Cdre Peter Dye 59 LIFE IN THE SHADOWS by Sqn Ldr Stanley Booker 62 THE MUNICIPAL LIAISON SCHEME by Wg Cdr C G Jefford 76 BOOK REVIEWS. 80 4 ROYAL AIR FORCE HISTORICAL SOCIETY President Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir Michael Beetham GCB CBE DFC AFC Vice-President Air Marshal Sir Frederick Sowrey KCB CBE AFC Committee Chairman Air Vice-Marshal
    [Show full text]
  • Nightfighter Scenario Book
    NIGHTFIGHTER 1 NIGHTFIGHTER Air Warfare in the Night Skies of World War Two SCENARIO BOOK Design by Lee Brimmicombe-Wood © 2011 GMT Games, LLC P.O. Box 1308, Hanford, CA 93232-1308, USA www.GMTGames.com © GMTGMT Games 1109 LLC, 2011 2 NIGHTFIGHTER CONTENTS SCENARIO 1: Cat’S EYE How to use this book 2 Background. September 1940. Early nightfighting relied on single-seat day fighters cruising the skies in the hope that they SCENARIO 1: Cat’S EYE 2 might find the enemy. Pilots needed “cat’s eyes” to pick out Scenario 1 Variant 2 bombers in the dark. In practice the technique resulted in SCENARIO 2: DUNAJA 3 few kills and more defending aircraft were lost due to night- flying accidents than enemy aircraft were shot down. Scenario 2 Variants 3 This scenario depicts a typical “cat’s eye” patrol during the SCENARIO 3: THE KAMMHUBER LINE 4 German Blitz on Britain. A lone Hurricane fighter is flying Scenario 3 Variants 4 over southern England on a moonlit night. SCENARIO 4: HIMMELBETT 5 Difficulty Level. Impossible. Game Length. The game ends when all bombers have exited Scenario 4 Variants 5 the map, or a bomber is shot down. SCENARIO 5: WILDE SAU 7 Sequence of Play. Ignore the Flak Phase, Radar Search Phase, Scenario 5 Variants 7 AI Search Phase and Searchlight Phase. SCENARIO 6: ZAHME SAU 8 Attacker Forces. (German) Scenario 6 Variants 8 Elements of KG 100, Luftwaffe. The attacker has three He111H bombers. SCENARIO 7: Serrate 11 Attacker Entry. One bomber enters on Turn 1, another on Scenario 7 Variants 11 Turn 5 and a final one on Turn 10.
    [Show full text]
  • Reginald Victor Jones CH FRS (1911-1997)
    Catalogue of the papers and correspondence of Reginald Victor Jones CH FRS (1911-1997) by Alan Hayward NCUACS catalogue no. 95/8/00 R.V. Jones 1 NCUACS 95/8/00 Title: Catalogue of the papers and correspondence of Reginald Victor Jones CH FRS (1911-1997), physicist Compiled by: Alan Hayward Description level: Fonds Date of material: 1928-1998 Extent of material: 230 boxes, ca 5000 items Deposited in: Churchill Archives Centre, Churchill College, Cambridge CB3 0DS Reference code: GB 0014 2000 National Cataloguing Unit for the Archives of Contemporary Scientists, University of Bath. NCUACS catalogue no. 95/8/00 R.V. Jones 2 NCUACS 95/8/00 The work of the National Cataloguing Unit for the Archives of Contemporary Scientists, and the production of this catalogue, are made possible by the support of the Research Support Libraries Programme. R.V. Jones 3 NCUACS 95/8/00 NOT ALL THE MATERIAL IN THIS COLLECTION MAY YET BE AVAILABLE FOR CONSULTATION. ENQUIRIES SHOULD BE ADDRESSED IN THE FIRST INSTANCE TO: THE KEEPER OF THE ARCHIVES CHURCHILL ARCHIVES CENTRE CHURCHILL COLLEGE CAMBRIDGE R.V. Jones 4 NCUACS 95/8/00 LIST OF CONTENTS Items Page GENERAL INTRODUCTION 6 SECTION A BIOGRAPHICAL A.1 - A.302 12 SECTION B SECOND WORLD WAR B.1 - B.613 36 SECTION C UNIVERSITY OF ABERDEEN C.1 - C.282 95 SECTION D RESEARCH TOPICS AND SCIENCE INTERESTS D.1 - D.456 127 SECTION E DEFENCE AND INTELLIGENCE E.1 - E.256 180 SECTION F SCIENCE-RELATED INTERESTS F.1 - F.275 203 SECTION G VISITS AND CONFERENCES G.1 - G.448 238 SECTION H SOCIETIES AND ORGANISATIONS H.1 - H.922 284 SECTION J PUBLICATIONS J.1 - J.824 383 SECTION K LECTURES, SPEECHES AND BROADCASTS K.1 - K.495 450 SECTION L CORRESPONDENCE L.1 - L.140 495 R.V.
    [Show full text]
  • Heimatkrieg 1939 Bis 1945
    Wolfgang Paul Der Heimatkrieg 1939 bis 1945 Bechtermünz Verlag Die Karten der Abbildungen 1, 2, 4, 5 werden hier mit freundlicher Genehmigung des Bundesarchivs – Militärarchiv – Freiburg/ Br. ver- öffentlicht, die Karte auf Vor- und Nachsatz nach einer von dort freundlichst zur Verfügung gestellten Kartenvorlage. Abb. 3 ist der Wochenzeitung «Das Reich» vom 17.12.1943 entnommen. Genehmigte Lizenzausgabe für Weltbild Verlag GmbH, Augsburg 1999 Copyright © by Bechtle Verlag, Esslingen – München Umschlaggestaltung: Ka*Ba factory, Augsburg Umschlagmotiv: Hilmar Pabel, Volkssturmangehörige bei einer Übung in der Nähe von Potsdam / bildarchiv preussischer kulturbesitz, Berlin Gesamtherstellung: Bercker Graphischer Betrieb GmbH, Kevelaer Printed in Germany ISBN 3-8289-0326-6 Eingescannt mit ABBYY Fine Reader Inhalt 1. Stalingrad im Café Kranzler ............................................... 11 2. Der Blick nach innen .............................................................. 16 3. Dieses frühe Frühjahr .............................................................. 23 4. Eine Weisse Rose................................................................... 29 5. Der kürzeste Krieg ................................................................. 36 6. Der brennende Dornbusch ..................................................... 46 7. Verwöhnt durch Eroberungen und Siege ................................ 52 8. Nicht Krieg der Soldaten, sondern der Völker ................... 61 9. Das Innere Reich ...................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Hans Kammler, Hitler's Last Hope, in American Hands
    WORKING PAPER 91 Hans Kammler, Hitler’s Last Hope, in American Hands By Frank Döbert and Rainer Karlsch, August 2019 THE COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT WORKING PAPER SERIES Christian F. Ostermann and Charles Kraus, Series Editors This paper is one of a series of Working Papers published by the Cold War International History Project of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, D.C. Established in 1991 by a grant from the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, the Cold War International History Project (CWIHP) disseminates new information and perspectives on the history of the Cold War as it emerges from previously inaccessible sources from all sides of the post-World War II superpower rivalry. Among the activities undertaken by the Project to promote this aim are the Wilson Center's Digital Archive; a periodic Bulletin and other publications to disseminate new findings, views, and activities pertaining to Cold War history; a fellowship program for historians to conduct archival research and study Cold War history in the United States; and international scholarly meetings, conferences, and seminars. The CWIHP Working Paper series provides a speedy publication outlet for researchers who have gained access to newly-available archives and sources related to Cold War history and would like to share their results and analysis with a broad audience of academics, journalists, policymakers, and students. CWIHP especially welcomes submissions which use archival sources from outside of the United States; offer novel interpretations of well-known episodes in Cold War history; explore understudied events, issues, and personalities important to the Cold War; or improve understanding of the Cold War’s legacies and political relevance in the present day.
    [Show full text]
  • The Magazine of RAF 100 Group Association
    . The magazine of RAF 100 Group Association RAF 100 Group Association Chairman Roger Dobson: Tel: 01407 710384 RAF 100 Group Association Secretary Janine Bradley: Tel: 01723 512544 Email: [email protected] www.raf100groupassociation.org.uk Home to RAF 100 Group Association Memorabilia City of Norwich Aviation Museum Old Norwich Road, Horsham St Faith, Norwich, Norfolk NR10 3JF Telephone: 01603 893080 www.cnam.org.uk 2 Dearest Friends My heartfelt thanks to the kind and generous member who sent a gorgeous bouquet of flowers on one of my darkest days. Thank you so much! The card with them simply said: ‘ RAF 100 Group’ , and with the wealth of letters and cards which continue to arrive since the last magazine, I feel your love reaching across the miles. Thank you everyone for your support and encouragement during this difficult time. It has now passed the three month marker since reading that shocking email sent by Tony telling me he wasn’t coming home from London … ever ! I now know he has been leading a double life, and his relationship with another stretches back into the past. I have no idea what is truth and what is lies any more. To make it worse, they met up here in the north! There are times when I feel my heart can’t take any more … yet somehow, something happens to tell me I am still needed. My world has shrunk since I don’t have a car any more. Travel is restricted. But right here in Filey I now attend a Monday Lunch Club for my one hot meal of the week.
    [Show full text]
  • A Tribute to Bomber Command Cranwellians
    RAF COLLEGE CRANWELL “The Cranwellian Many” A Tribute to Bomber Command Cranwellians Version 1.0 dated 9 November 2020 IBM Steward 6GE In its electronic form, this document contains underlined, hypertext links to additional material, including alternative source data and archived video/audio clips. [To open these links in a separate browser tab and thus not lose your place in this e-document, press control+click (Windows) or command+click (Apple Mac) on the underlined word or image] Bomber Command - the Cranwellian Contribution RAF Bomber Command was formed in 1936 when the RAF was restructured into four Commands, the other three being Fighter, Coastal and Training Commands. At that time, it was a commonly held view that the “bomber will always get through” and without the assistance of radar, yet to be developed, fighters would have insufficient time to assemble a counter attack against bomber raids. In certain quarters, it was postulated that strategic bombing could determine the outcome of a war. The reality was to prove different as reflected by Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Harris - interviewed here by Air Vice-Marshal Professor Tony Mason - at a tremendous cost to Bomber Command aircrew. Bomber Command suffered nearly 57,000 losses during World War II. Of those, our research suggests that 490 Cranwellians (75 flight cadets and 415 SFTS aircrew) were killed in action on Bomber Command ops; their squadron badges are depicted on the last page of this tribute. The totals are based on a thorough analysis of a Roll of Honour issued in the RAF College Journal of 2006, archived flight cadet and SFTS trainee records, the definitive International Bomber Command Centre (IBCC) database and inputs from IBCC historian Dr Robert Owen in “Our Story, Your History”, and the data contained in WR Chorley’s “Bomber Command Losses of the Second World War, Volume 9”.
    [Show full text]
  • Hidden in Plain Sight: the Secret History of Silicon Valley the Genesis of Silicon Valley Entrepreneurship
    Hidden in Plain Sight: The Secret History of Silicon Valley The Genesis of Silicon Valley Entrepreneurship Marc Andressen Internet Steve Jobs Personal Computers Gordon Moore Integrated Circuits Innovation Networks Hewlett & PackardDefense 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 Hidden in Plain Sight: The Secret History of Silicon Valley A few caveats • Not a professional historian • Some of this is probably wrong • All “secrets” are from open-source literature Hidden in Plain Sight: The Secret History of Silicon Valley Six Short Stories Hidden in Plain Sight: The Secret History of Silicon Valley Story 1: WWII The First Electronic War Hidden in Plain Sight: The Secret History of Silicon Valley Strategic Bombing of Germany The Combined Bomber Offensive • British bombed at Night – Area Bombing • Lancaster's • Halifax • Flew at 7 - 17 thousand feet • The American’s by Day – Precision Bombing • B-17’s • B-24’s • Flew at 15 - 25 thousand feet Hidden in Plain Sight: The Secret History of Silicon Valley British and American Air War in Europe 28,000 Active Combat Planes 40,000 planes lost or damaged beyond repair: 18,000 American and 22,000 British 79,265 Americans and 79,281 British killed Hidden in Plain Sight: The Secret History of Silicon Valley Hidden in Plain Sight: The Secret History of Silicon Valley The German Air Defense System The Kammhuber Line • Integrated Electronic air defense network – Covered France, the Low Countries, and into northern Germany • Protection from British/US bomber raids – Warn and Detect – Target and Aim – Destroy Hidden
    [Show full text]
  • Coventry: Thursday, 14 November 1940 Ebook, Epub
    COVENTRY: THURSDAY, 14 NOVEMBER 1940 PDF, EPUB, EBOOK Frederick Taylor | 368 pages | 10 Jan 2017 | Bloomsbury Publishing PLC | 9781408860281 | English | London, United Kingdom Coventry: Thursday, 14 November 1940 PDF Book Coventry Cathedral was left as a ruin, and is today still the principal reminder of the bombing. Historian Dr Henry Irving, an associate fellow at the Institute of English Studies, said: "What Harrisson describes is a psychological desperation and helplessness. Spence later knighted for this work insisted that instead of re-building the old cathedral it should be kept in ruins as a garden of remembrance and that the new cathedral should be built alongside, the two buildings together effectively forming one church. Retrieved 15 October He said: "The houses on both sides of the street were burning. Accessibility help Skip to navigation Skip to content Skip to footer. They state that while Churchill was indeed aware that a major bombing raid would take place, no one knew what the target would be. Preview — Coventry by Frederick Taylor. Teaching the Bible through popular culture and the arts. Aug 08, Luke Ryan rated it really liked it. The target was Coventry, a manufacturing city in the heart of England with a beautiful medieval centre. Given the intensity of the raid, casualties were limited by the fact that a large number of Coventrians "trekked" out of the city at night to sleep in nearby towns or villages following the earlier air raids. It also provided the push America needed to join Britain in the war. Scientist Reginald Victor Jones , who led the British side in the Battle of the Beams , wrote that "Enigma signals to the X-beam stations were not broken in time" and that he was unaware that Coventry was the intended target.
    [Show full text]
  • British Aircraft in Russia Bombers and Boats
    SPRING 2004 - Volume 51, Number 1 British Aircraft in Russia Viktor Kulikov 4 Bombers and Boats: SB-17 and SB-29 Combat Operations in Korea Forrest L. Marion 16 Were There Strategic Oil Targets in Japan in 1945? Emanuel Horowitz 26 General Bernard A. Schriever: Technological Visionary Jacob Neufeld 36 Touch and Go in Uniforms of the Past JackWaid 44 Book Reviews 48 Fleet Operations in a Mobile War: September 1950 – June 1951 by Joseph H. Alexander Reviewed by William A. Nardo 48 B–24 Liberator by Martin Bowman Reviewed by John S. Chilstrom 48 Bombers over Berlin: The RAF Offensive, November 1943-March 1944 by Alan W. Cooper Reviewed by John S. Chilstrom 48 The Politics of Coercion: Toward A Theory of Coercive Airpower for Post-Cold War Conflict by Lt. Col. Ellwood P. “Skip” Hinman IV Reviewed by William A. Nardo 49 Ending the Vietnam War: A History of America’s Involvement and Extrication from the Vietnam War by Henry Kissinger Reviewed by Lawrence R. Benson 50 The Dynamics of Military Revolution, 1300-2050 by MacGregor Knox and Williamson Murray, eds. Reviewed by James R. FitzSimonds 50 To Reach the High Frontier: A History of U.S. Launch Vehicles by Roger D. Launius and Dennis R. Jenkins, eds. Reviewed by David F. Crosby 51 History of Rocketry and Astronautics: Proceedings of the Thirtieth History Symposium of the International Academy of Astronautics, Beijing, China, 1996 by Hervé Moulin and Donald C. Elder, eds. Reviewed by Rick W. Sturdevant 52 Secret Empire: Eisenhower, the CIA, and the Hidden Story of America’s Space Espionage by Philip Taubman Reviewed by Lawrence R.
    [Show full text]
  • Nightfighter Rulebook
    NIGHTFIGHTER 1 NIGHTFIGHTER Air Warfare in the Night Skies of World War Two RULE BOOK Design by Lee Brimmicombe-Wood © 2011 GMT Games, LLC P.O. Box 1308, Hanford, CA 93232-1308, USA www.GMTGames.com © GMTGMT Games 1109 LLC, 2011 2 NIGHTFIGHTER CONTENTS 16.0 ADVANCED FOG OF WAR 13 1.0 Introduction 3 17.0 ADVANCED Combat 13 1.1 Rules 3 17.1 Firepower 13 1.2 Players 3 17.2 Experten 13 1.3 Scenarios 3 17.3 Aircraft Destruction 13 1.4 Scale 3 17.4 Bomber Response 14 1.5 Glossary 3 18.0 Altitude ADVantage 15 2.0 COMPONENTS 4 19.0 AI Radar 15 2.1 Maps 4 19.1 AI Radar Introduction 15 2.2 Counters 4 2.3 Play Aid Screen 5 20.0 OBLIQUE GUNS 16 2.4 Dice 5 20.1 Schräge Musik 16 3.0 SETTING UP PLAY 5 21.0 HIGH AND Low Altitudes 16 3.1 Set Up the Table 5 21.1 Low Altitude Operations 16 3.2 Scenarios 5 21.2 High Altitude Operations 16 3.3 Environment 6 22.0 FLAK 16 3.4 Scenario Setup 7 23.0 RADIO Beacon BOX 17 4.0 SEQUENCE OF PLAY 7 24.0 ADVANCED Electronics 17 4.1 End of Game 7 24.1 Special AI Radar 17 5.0 FOG OF WAR 7 24.2 Warning Devices 17 5.1 Map Information 7 24.3 Navigation Radars 17 6.0 AIRCRAFT Data Charts 8 24.4 Serrate 18 24.5 Jamming 18 7.0 MOVING BOMBERS 8 7.1 Bomber Facing 8 25.0 Ground Control INTERCEPT 18 7.2 Bomber Movement 8 25.1 GCI Search 18 25.2 MEW 19 8.0 ENTERING BOMBERS 9 8.1 Entry Chits 9 26.0 NAVAL ACTIONS 19 8.2 Bomber Entry 9 26.1 Task Forces 19 26.2 Flare Droppers 19 9.0 MOVING FIGHTERS 9 26.3 Torpedo Bombers 19 9.1 Movement Points 9 9.2 Moving 9 27.0 Intruders 20 27.1 Picking Intruders 20 10.0 BASIC TALLYING 10 27.2 Intruder
    [Show full text]
  • BNC Final Brief
    Succeeding in 21st Century Battle Network Competitions John Stillion and Bryan Clark Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments 1 • Battle Network (BN) definition: – A combination of distributed target acquisition sensors (finders and damage assessors), command and control (deciders), weapons (shooters), and the electronic communications linking them together. • Essential BN attributes: – Enable shooters to engage targets they cannot “see” far more effectively than would otherwise be possible – Enable finders to achieve much higher levels of effectiveness as a group than they possess organically – Enable deciders to coordinate and prioritize tactical engagements at a much higher level of efficiency to achieve the desired operational effects – Enable those assessing the results of these operations (damage assessors) to determine their relative success with far greater accuracy than would otherwise be possible • BNs first emerged about 100 years ago but were relatively rare until recently due in part to the high cost of transmitting and processing information – This limited the number of BNs and the instances of BN competition • Declining cost and increasing power of information transmission and processing systems will likely spur BN proliferation, and with it BN competition 2 • Network attributes depend heavily on operational metrics • Tempo of operations influences decision to exploit or disrupt opposing network • “Virtual Attrition” is often more cost-effective than platform destruction • Competitions accelerate and culminate, then jump to new mode • In some cases one side or the other is “saved by the bell” when a conflict ends just before a competition jumps to a new mode 3 • Submarines vs. ASW – Examine competition with focus on BMC2, multi- domain elements, success of networked vs.
    [Show full text]