Demanding Dictatorship? US-Philippine Relations, 1946-1972. A thesis submitted to The University of Manchester for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Faculty of Humanities 2016 Ben Walker School of Arts, Languages and Cultures 2 Contents Abstract. 3 Declaration and Copyright Statement. 4 Acknowledgements. 5 Introduction. From Colony to Cold War Ally: The Philippines and American Foreign Policy, 1898-1972. 6 1. ‘What to do with the Philippines?’ Economic Forces and Political Strategy in the United States’ Colonial Foreign Policy. 28 2. A New World Cold War Order: ‘Philippine Independence’ and the Origins of a Neo-Colonial Partnership. 56 3. To Fill the Void: US-Philippine Relations after Magsaysay, 1957-1963. 87 4. The Philippines after Magsaysay: Domestic realities and Cold War Perceptions, 1957-1965. 111 5. The Fall of Democracy: the First Term of Ferdinand Marcos, the Cold War, and Anti-Americanism in the Philippines, 1966-1972. 139 Conclusion. ‘To sustain and defend our government’: the Declaration of Martial Law, and the Dissolution of the Third Republic of the Philippines. 168 Bibliography. 184 Word Count: 80, 938. 3 Abstract In 1898 the Philippines became a colony of the United States, the result of American economic expansion throughout the nineteenth century. Having been granted independence in 1946, the nominally sovereign Republic of the Philippines remained inextricably linked to the US through restrictive legislation, military bases, and decades of political and socio-economic patronage. In America’s closest developing world ally, and showcase of democratic values, Filipino President Ferdinand Marcos installed a brutal dictatorship in 1972, dramatically marking the end of democracy there. US foreign policy, from the inception of the US-Philippine partnership, failed to substantially resolve endemic poverty and elite political domination. During the Cold War, the discourse through which State Department policy was conceived helped perpetuate these unequal conditions, whilst also at times explicitly encouraging authoritarian solutions to domestic problems. As the Cold War escalated through the 1960s, especially in Vietnam, US officials insisted the Philippines provide military and ideological solidarity with US Cold War objectives at the expense of effectively addressing the roots of domestic instability. The Philippine example serves as the clearest case of the outcomes and impact of US foreign policy across the developing world, and thus must be considered an essential starting point when considering the United States’ Cold War experience. Based on extensive primary research from across the United Kingdom and the United States, this thesis re-examines and re-connects the historiography of colonialism, neo-colonialism, Southeast Asia, and Cold War studies. Nowhere did the US have such a long and intimate history of influence and partnerships than in the Philippines, and yet Marcos’s regime emerged there; this dissertation presents an analytical lens through which to measure the role of US foreign policy in creating a dictatorship. 4 Declaration No portion of the work referred to in the thesis has been submitted in support of an application for another degree or qualification of this or any other university or other institute of learning. Copyright Statement i. The author of this thesis (including any appendices and/or schedules to this thesis) owns certain copyright or related rights in it (the “Copyright”) and s/he has given The University of Manchester certain rights to use such Copyright, including for administrative purposes. ii. Copies of this thesis, either in full or in extracts and whether in hard or electronic copy, may be made only in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (as amended) and regulations issued under it or, where appropriate, in accordance with licensing agreements which the University has from time to time. This page must form part of any such copies made. iii. The ownership of certain Copyright, patents, designs, trade marks and other intellectual property (the “Intellectual Property”) and any reproductions of copyright works in the thesis, for example graphs and tables (“Reproductions”), which may be described in this thesis, may not be owned by the author and may be owned by third parties. Such Intellectual Property and Reproductions cannot and must not be made available for use without the prior written permission of the owner(s) of the relevant Intellectual Property and/or Reproductions. iv. Further information on the conditions under which disclosure, publication and commercialisation of this thesis, the Copyright and any Intellectual Property and/or Reproductions described in it may take place is available in the University IP Policy (see http://documents.manchester.ac.uk/DocuInfo.aspx?DocID=487), in any relevant Thesis restriction declarations deposited in the University Library, The University Library’s regulations (see http://www.manchester.ac.uk/library/aboutus/regulations) and in The University’s policy on Presentation of Theses. 5 Acknowledgements I would like to thank my supervisors Dr. Aaron W. Moore and Dr. Thomas Tunstall Allcock for their academic guidance and unfaltering enthusiasm for this project. I am indebted to their steadfast commitment, encouragement, and patience they have shown, and for the time they have spent working with me. Thank you also to Dr. Pierre Fuller who read and commented on earlier drafts, as well as Professor Peter Gatrell for his advice throughout. My research has been supported by the School of Arts, Languages and Cultures at the University of Manchester and the Zochonis Special Enterprise Fund, to whom I am grateful. My appreciation also extends to Jenna de Graffenried at the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library & Museum, as well as Carol A. Leadenham at the Hoover Institution Archives, for their expertise and assistance, and for making my research trips so successful. Besides all my friends and family who have been continually supportive, special thanks must go to Emily Cooksey, Henry Lee, Imogen Nevard, and Robert Taylor for their proofreading. Above all, however, I am eternally grateful to my parents, without whom none of this would have happened. Mum and Dad, this is for you. 6 Introduction. From Colony to Cold War Ally: The Philippines and American Foreign Policy, 1898-1972. ‘Okay, Johnny, go ahead. Make it look good.’ The message was conveyed over the newly installed communication system, financed by US dollars, that connected all the key military officers to the Malacanang Presidential palace. Later that night the Philippine Secretary of Defense Juan Ponce Enrile’s motorcade was ambushed and shot at with high powered automatic rifles. The government response was swift and forceful. On the same evening, in smoke filled room 1701 at the Hilton Hotel in downtown Manila, Ninoy Aquino, the popular political opponent of President Ferdinand Marcos, was seized by armed troops. There was no evidence linking Aquino to the attack, and Marcos had promised the American Ambassador Henry Alfred Byroade that he would take no immediate action, but on Friday 22 September 1972, he declared martial law in the Philippines. Marcos would remain in the presidency for another fourteen years, while Aquino was jailed for eight years before being assassinated in 1983. The ambush of Johnny Enrile’s motorcade had been a set up.1 This, after half a century as a colonial possession of the United States, and twenty six years of nominal independence, is what the country had succumbed to: the American project in the Philippines had resulted in dictatorship. The 1960s was the last decade in which the US State Department policy makers could have collaborated with democratically elected Filipino leaders to effect socio-economic reform policies. Against the militarising backdrop of Southeast Asian geopolitics, most notably the Vietnam War, domestic Philippine concerns were deprioritised in Washington, simultaneous to the inauguration of the new Filipino President, and the future dictator, Ferdinand Marcos. Marcos manipulated President Lyndon Johnson, and US Cold War insecurities more broadly; Marcos managed to accrue personal wealth and material assistance, and gain influence for very little military commitment to the Vietnam War. Despite having a historic relationship with the Philippines, and many close Filipino partners, as well as having designed the independent political system for the archipelago, twenty six years after independence Philippine democracy gave way to a nationalistic dictatorship. 1 See William C. Rempel, Delusions of a Dictator: The Mind of Marcos as Revealed in his Secret Diaries (London, 1993), pp. 3-9. 7 Historians Gary Hess and Fredrik Logevall have called Philippine independence, inaugurated 4 July 1946, the result of the ‘irresistible impetus’ of the American post-war commitment to anti colonialism.2 Indeed, independence was long in the making, and understanding the construction of the post-independence Philippine state is foundational to the development of US-Philippine relations throughout the Cold War, and this partnership will be explored by utilising the wealth of primary material in the Lyndon Johnson Presidential Library, the National Archive of Records and Administration, and the Hoover Archive. These materials from the intelligence community, including declassified CIA documents, personal papers, the presidential files of Johnson and his personal correspondence, as well as State and Defence Department material