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Kant on the Nature of Desires 5 6 Gustavo Ortiz-Mill�N 7 8 9 1 1 2 3 4 Kant on the Nature of Desires 5 6 Gustavo Ortiz-Milln 7 8 9 1. 10 11 In this paper I analyze the idea of desire in Kant, and argue that it is based 12 on what I call a misconception of the nature of desires. I shall argue that 13 Kant’s concept of desire shows four characteristics that made him exclude 14 natural desires from moral motivation and reject the possibility of their 15 serving as a basis of moral obligations: (a) desire for Kant means a natural 16 empirical motive; it is an empirical causal force not only implying 17 determinism, but also essentially outside rational control; (b) desires are 18 subjective and contingent states, they provide an ill basis for moral 19 motivation and for objective and universal moral rules; (c) Kant’s concept 20 of desire is hedonistic: pleasure is “necessarily connected” with desires – 21 these always look for empirical or practical pleasure; as a result of this 22 follows (d) desires are self-interested, and any action motivated by desires 23 will be so. These four characteristics provide a notion of desire that is 24 sufficiently negative to lead Kant to reject their inclusion in the 25 grounding of moral obligations, but also into any account of moral 26 motivation – they take away any moral worth our actions may have. 27 Instead he will argue for the possibility of pure reason being practical, 28 that is, a form of rational motivation that works without the intervention 29 of any desire or empirical inclination.1 According to Kant, we can do 30 without the conative elements that were the main source of motivation in 31 32 previous theories; we have to, if we want to save the ideas of objectivity, 33 freedom of the will and autonomy. 34 In the second half of this paper, I shall try to provide some arguments 35 against the Kantian fear of including desires in the realm of moral 36 37 1 When talking about “desires” I am referring to “natural desires”, and to all the “propensities”, “instincts”, “passions” and “empirical inclinations”. For more on 38 Kant’s notion of desire and these distinctions, see Allen Wood, Kant’s Ethical 39 Thought (New York: 1999), chap. 8; see also Maria Borges, “What can Kant 40 Teach us About Emotions?”, The Journal of Philosophy 101 (2004). 322 Gustavo Ortiz-Milln 1 motivation. I shall reject the characterization of desires in hedonistic or 2 self-interested terms. Also, if we want to save the Kantian concern about 3 the possibility of objectivity and autonomy, we should not accept a 4 Humean notion of desires. I shall argue that we can provide a 5 characterization of desires in Kantian terms. My contention is that 6 Kant could have developed an adequate account of desires from some 7 ideas already present in his philosophy. I try to provide a redefinition of 8 the notion of desires in what I take to be a Kantian spirit. Basically, I 9 sketch the possibility that principles or norms of reason play a primary 10 role in the explanation of the formation of desires and preferences. I do 11 this by arguing that the understanding is already involved when desires 12 are brought about. However, even though I argue for the inclusion of 13 desires in a Kantian theory of motivation, this does not mean that moral 14 motivation and moral obligations should depend on desires. What is the 15 benefit of this inclusion, then? In my view, it would result in a more 16 realistic picture of our moral psychology – and hopefully, a more Kantian 17 one as well. 18 19 2. 20 21 In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant showed that freedom must 22 presuppose that we are free from empirical determination in order to 23 justify our sense of moral obligation and responsibility (A 547/B 575). 24 He also claimed that human beings must regard themselves as both 25 empirically determined and noumenally free, insofar as they see 26 themselves as moral agents. Reason and understanding, conceived as 27 noumenally free, are not part of the nexus of empirical causal relations; 28 they enable us to justify the attribution of freedom to the agent. Kant’s 29 free agent is a transcendent being, beyond the realm of natural causality. 30 But human beings also participate in the empirical world where causally 31 determined relations take place. This is the realm of empirical causality 32 and determinism, but it is not possible to derive any notion of freedom 33 from it. Here is where Kant includes desires. Throughout his philosophy, 34 Kant always identifies desires as part of the empirical world, as subject to 35 the empirical causal relations that take place in it.2 36 37 38 2 Kant does not deny that intentional moral actions have causes, but he makes a 39 distinction between two different sorts of causation: the empirical causation of 40 actions involving desires, which is phenomenal, and actions involving only a Kant on the Nature of Desires 323 1 Desires are forces over which agents have no control; agents cannot 2 control the laws of nature, and these are the laws that regulate desires. No 3 one who acts from his own desires is a free, autonomous agent in Kant’s 4 sense. Desires make us passive and subject to heteronomy. Heteronomy is 5 dependence on external factors, the liability to be a plaything of the 6 natural world over which we are not sovereign. Desires are natural forces 7 that we passively endure; they control and “enslave” us. This is how Kant 8 sets forth this view: “Inclination is blind and servile, whether it is kindly or 9 not; and when morality is in question, reason must not play the part of 10 mere guardian to inclination but, disregarding it altogether, must attend 11 solely to its own interest as pure practical reason”.3 When it comes to 12 moral matters, reason must lift us above the world of empirical causality 13 and completely disregard inclinations. Freedom is based on reason and 14 this must not be restrained by forces over which we have no control, 15 forces that enslave and blind us. 16 If desires are to be understood as natural causal forces, if we accept 17 that we are moved by them and that they are not susceptible of being 18 rationally modified, the very idea of agency is in question. The agent 19 would be passive in the face of his own desires, and would regard them as 20 the result of the operation of natural forces on him; as Kant claims: “He 21 does not hold himself accountable for the former [inclinations and 22 impulses] or ascribe them to his proper self” (GMS, AA 04: 458). If all 23 24 we do is determined by existing natural circumstances, and our choices 25 play no role in determining our actions (or if they are determined by 26 nature as well), then they are not truly our own and we are not self- 27 governed. This is the core of the notion of autonomy, and this is a 28 necessary condition of moral agency. 29 Since desires are not subject to any rational constraints, they are, say, 30 “loose”: not susceptible to reasonable argument, and it would be very 31 difficult to reach any agreement on them. What Kant says about feelings 32 can be extended to desires: “It is impossible to reach a common 33 34 priori beliefs, where causation is noumenal. Both perspectives assert that 35 intentional actions are caused. 36 3 Critique of Practical Reason, trans. by Mary Gregor, in Practical Philosophy (New 37 York, 1996), AA 05:118, emphasis added. All subsequent references to this Critique (KpV), The Metaphysics of Morals (MS), and the Groundwork of the 38 Metaphysic of Morals (GMS), will be to this edition. For the Critique of the Power 39 of Judgment (KU), I use the translation by Paul Guyer and Eric Matthews (New 40 York: 2000). Page numbers refer to the Akademieausgabe. 324 Gustavo Ortiz-Milln 1 agreement on feelings, because feeling is by no means uniform”.4 Desires 2 are not uniform and vary from person to person. Feelings, desires and 3 empirical inclinations are contingent and do not provide an objective 4 basis for grounding moral obligations; the basis they provide is subjective 5 and contingent, and they cannot create moral obligations able to bind 6 everybody in a necessary way. This is why they would provide an ill basis 7 for moral obligation, if we want this to be objectively based and 8 universally binding. If we accept desires as the determination of our 9 moral obligations, their contingent nature may occasion variety in the 10 rules. As Kant tells us: 11 For then the will of all has not one and the same object but each has his own 12 (his own welfare), which can indeed happen to accord with the purposes of 13 others who are likewise pursuing their own but which is far from sufficing 14 for a law because the exceptions that one is warranted in making upon 15 occasion are endless and cannot be determinately embraced in a universal rule. (KpV, AA 05: 28) 16 17 18 3. 19 20 Kant shares the idea, already present in most of the psychological theories 21 of his time,5 that associates the concept of desire with the concept of 22 pleasure, in such a way that anything motivated by desire is connected 23 with pleasure.
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