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Nomination of George J. Tenet to Be Director of Central Intelligence Hearing

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Nomination of George J. Tenet to Be Director of Central Intelligence Hearing S. HRG. 105-314 NOMINATION OF GEORGE J. TENET TO BE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE HEARING BEFORE THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE ONE HUNDRED FIFTH CONGRESS FIRST SESSION ON P NOMINATION OF GEORGE J. TENET TO BE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE TUESDAY, MAY 6, 1997 Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Intelligence U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 45-141 WASHINGTON: 1998 For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office Superintendent of Documents, Congressional Sales Office, Washington, DC 20402 ISBN 0-16-056075-6 A.C AI - Io SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE RICHARD C. SHELBY, Alabama, Chairman J. ROBERT KERREY, Nebraska, Vice Chairman JOHN H. CHAFEE, Rhode Island JOHN GLENN, Ohio RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana RICHARD H. BRYAN, Nevada MIKE DEWINE, Ohio BOB GRAHAM, Florida JON KYL, Arizona JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma MAX BAUCUS, Montana ORRIN G. HATCH, Utah CHARLES S. ROBB, Virginia PAT ROBERTS, Kansas FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey WAYNE ALLARD, Colorado CARL LEVIN, Michigan DAN COATS, Indiana TRENT LOTT, Mississippi, Ex Officio THOMAS A. DASCHLE, South Dakota, Ex Officio TAYLOR W. LAWRENCE, Staff Director CHRISTOPHER C. STRAuB, Minority Staff Director KATHLEEN P. MCGHEE, Chief Clerk (11) CONTENTS Page Hearing held in Washington, D.C.: Tuesday, May 6, 1997 ................. ............................................. 1 Statement of: Allard, Hon. Wayne, a U.S. Senator from the State of Colorado ................. 51 Baucus, Hon. Max, a U.S. Senator from the State of Montana .......... .......... 43 Boren, Hon. David L., a former U.S. Senator from the State of Oklahoma 40 Bryan, Hon. Richard H., a U.S. Senator from the State of Nevada ............. 45 Chafee, Hon. John H., a U.S. Senator from the State of Rhode Island ....... 49 D'Amato, Hon. Alphonse, a U.S. Senator from the State of New York ....... 37 DeWine, Hon. Mike, a U.S. Senator from the State of Ohio ........... .............. 97 Glenn, Hon. John, a U.S. Senator from the State of Ohio ............ ................ 48 Graham, Hon. Bob, a U.S. Senator from the State of Florida .......... ............ 45 Hatch, Hon. Orrin, a U.S. Senator from the State of Utah ........... ............... 93 Inhofe, Hon. James M., a U.S. Senator from the State of Oklahoma .......... 52 Kerrey, Hon. J. Robert, a U.S. Senator from the State of Nebraska ........... 35 Kyl, Hon. Jon, a U.S. Senator from the State of Arizona ............ ................. 47 Levin, Hon. Carl, a U.S. Senator from the State of Michigan .......... ............ 81 Lugar, Hon. Richard G., a U.S. Senator from the State of Indiana . Mikulski, Hon. Barbara, a U.S. Senator from the State of Maryland ......... 39 Moynihan, Hon. Daniel Patrick, a U.S. Senator from the State of New York .............................................................. 36 Robb, Hon. Charles S., a U.S. Senator from the Commonwealth of Vir- gima .............................................................. 44 Roberts, Hon. Pat, a U.S. Senator from the State of Kansas .......... ............. 99 Sarbanes, Hon. Paul, a.U.S. Senator from the State of Maryland ............... 38 Shelby, Hon. Richard C., a U.S. Senator from the State of Alabama .......... 1 Tenet, George J., Nominee to be Director of Central Intelligence ............... 52 Testimony of: Tenet, George J., Nominee to be Director of Central Intelligence ............... 57 Supplemental materials, letters, articles, etc.: Financial Disclosure Statement of George J. Tenet, Nominee to be Direc- tor of Central Intelligence ................................... ............................ 22 Potts, Stephen D., Director, Office of Government Ethics, letter to the Honorable Richard C. Shelby, Chairman, Select Committee on Intel- ligence, dated April 22, 1997 .............................................................. 34 Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Questionnaire for Completion by Presidential Nominees ............................... ................................ 7 (III) NOMINATION OF GEORGE J. TENET TO BE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE TUESDAY, MAY 6, 1997 U.S. SENATE, SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, Washington, DC. The select committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in room SH-219, Hart Senate Office Building, Hon. Richard Shelby (chair- man of the committee) presiding. Present: Senators Shelby, Chafee, Lugar, DeWine, Kyl, Inhofe, Hatch, Roberts, Allard, Coats, Kerrey of Nebraska, Glenn, Bryan, Graham of Florida, Baucus, Robb, and Levin. Also present: Taylor Lawrence, staff director; Chris Straub, mi- 'nority staff director; Suzanne Spaulding, chief counsel; and Kath- leen McGhee, chief clerk. Chairman SHELBY. The committee will come to order. We're here today to receive testimony that relates to our consid- eration of President Clinton's nominee to become the next Director of Central Intelligence, Mr. George J. Tenet. His nomination was submitted to the Senate and forwarded to this committee on April 21, 1997. We're pleased today to have Mr. Tenet with us to discuss his qualifications for the job and his vision for the future of the intel- ligence community. I would.like to open with a few remarks about the importance of the position to which you have been nominated, Mr. Tenet. First, I will review some of the basic responsibilities of the Director of Central Intelligence. Then I will briefly discuss the reasons we need a strong leader with a bold vision who can- assume this posi- tion, a leader that can stay with the job so that the intelligence community is postured to face the many challenges in the 21st cen- tury. The National Security Act of 1947 gave the Director of Central Intelligence, or DCI, three primary responsibilities: One, to act as head of the intelligence community as a whole; two, to act as the principal adviser on intelligence matters related to the national se- curity; and three, to serve as head of the Central Intelligence Agen- cy. It is this committee's duty to report to the Senate as to Mr. Te- net's ability to carry out these important responsibilities. I believe the DCI must be able to lead the entire intelligence community. This is a community composed of over 80,000 intelligence profes- sionals in a wide variety of agencies that serve many consumers of intelligence. (1) 2 The community includes the Central Intelligence Agency, the De- fense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the Na- tional Imagery and Mapping Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, the Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office, and the intel- ligence organizations of the services, the State Department, the FBI, and the Departments of the Treasury and Energy. In this role, the DCI must develop and present to the President and the Congress the annual budget for the National Foreign Intel- ligence Program of the United States. The DCI must also partici- pate and consult with the Secretary of Defense in the preparation of the budgets for the Joint Military Intelligence Program and the Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities Program. And in so doing, the DCI sets the fiscal priorities for the intelligence commu- nity that must balance the competing budgetary pressures of collec- tion, exploitation, analysis, and dissemination. The DCI must also balance investments in advanced research and development, technical collection capabilities, and the intel- ligence community's most valuable asset, its people. The DCI must ensure that all consumers of intelligence are provided the most ac- curate information, at the right time, unvarnished, and free from any arbitrary bias. And the fiscal priorities that the DCI sets must also reflect changing geopolitical environment and the uncertainty in the post-cold-war era. The DCI must manage a comprehensive program that addresses some of the critical challenges of our time, such as countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, fighting and winning the war against the production and use of illicit drugs, anticipating and preventing acts of terrorism against our citizens at home and abroad, apprehending those within the ranks of the intelligence community that would harm our national security by divulging our most guarded secrets, and effectively using covert means to further our national interests. The DCI must be able to accurately and straightforwardly advise the President, the heads of the departments and agencies of the ex- ecutive branch, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and sen- ior military commanders, and the Congress on intelligence matters related to our national security. The DCI must also have unimpeachable integrity and forthright- ness in providing this information, and must never fall into the trap of biasing or underplaying intelligence to fit an administra- tion's policy. And finally, the DCI must be able to lead and to manage the Central Intelligence Agency at a time when the Agency seems to be under assault by those who question its very existence. I believe we need a DCI that can stand up for the vital mission the CIA plays in assuring this Nation's stance as the most powerful force for the preservation of democracy throughout the world today. The CIA is our eyes and ears around the world. The fine men and women who serve, without any public credit, in the most try- ing and dangerous of circumstances, need a leader that can guide them and stand up for the work that they do, and do well. The DCI must be a leader that can make the tough decisions associated with the business of espionage and ensure that this
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