In the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
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Case: 15-30858 Document: 00514384758 Page: 1 Date Filed: 03/13/2018 IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit No. 15-30858 FILED March 13, 2018 KENNETH HALL, Lyle W. Cayce Clerk Plaintiff–Appellant, BYRON SHARPER, Intervenor Plaintiff–Appellant, v. STATE OF LOUISIANA; JOHN BEL EDWARDS, in his official capacity as Governor of the State of Louisiana; JEFF LANDRY, in his official capacity as Attorney General; TOM SCHEDLER, In his official capacity as the Louisiana Secretary of State; CITY OF BATON ROUGE; PARISH OF EAST BATON ROUGE; SHARON WESTON BROOME, Official Capacity as the Mayor- President of Baton Rouge, Defendants–Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana Before HIGGINBOTHAM, SMITH, and OWEN, Circuit Judges. PRISCILLA R. OWEN, Circuit Judge: Kenneth Hall and Byron Sharper appeal the district court’s denial of their Rule 60(b)(6) motion to vacate claims rendered moot by intervening legislation enacted after the court issued its judgment but before the time to appeal had expired. We affirm. Case: 15-30858 Document: 00514384758 Page: 2 Date Filed: 03/13/2018 No. 15-30858 I In 1993, the Louisiana Legislature enacted Act 609, which replaced Baton Rouge’s at-large electoral system with one that divided the city into two electoral sections, demarcated Election Section One and Election Section Two. The Legislature then subdivided the majority-black Election Section One into two electoral divisions (B and D) and the majority-white Election Section Two into three electoral divisions (A, C, and E). This electoral formulation is known as a “2-3” districting system. In this system, each division elects one judge to Baton Rouge City Court. After the enactment of Act 609, Baton Rouge elected two black judges to divisions B and D and three white judges to divisions A, C, and E in every election, resulting in a court that was constantly composed of two black judges and three white judges. During this time, Baton Rouge’s demographics shifted from 43.9% black and 53.9% white to 54.5% black and 39.4% white. In light of these facts, Hall initiated a suit, in which Sharper subsequently intervened, against the State of Louisiana, the City of Baton Rouge, the Parish of East Baton Rouge, and various state officials (collectively the Government). Hall and Sharper (collectively Hall) asserted claims under the Voting Rights Act, requesting declaratory and injunctive relief under the theory that the “2-3” districting system violated Section 2 of the Act and requested that the court declare the State of Louisiana subject to the Act pursuant to its Section 3(c). Also alleging that the “2-3” districting system contravened the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, Hall sought damages, inclusive of costs, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1986. After a bench trial, the district court rejected each of Hall’s claims. Two days after the district court issued its judgment, the Louisiana Legislature enrolled House Bill 76, which sought to replace the “2-3” districting 2 Case: 15-30858 Document: 00514384758 Page: 3 Date Filed: 03/13/2018 No. 15-30858 system with a “2-2-1” districting system. Under the new system, Election Sections One and Two elect two judges each, and the city as a whole elects one judge to an at-large seat. The Legislature enacted House Bill 76 as Act 374, which Governor Piyush “Bobby” Jindal signed into law on July 1, 2015, before Hall’s time to appeal had passed. Act 374, which took immediate effect, rendered Hall’s claims for injunctive and declaratory relief from the “2-3” districting system moot. Because these claims were moot, Hall lost the opportunity to appeal. Hall timely moved pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6) for the district court to vacate its judgment. Specifically, Hall maintained that because the passage of Act 374 was a circumstance outside of his control that eliminated his ability to appeal the district court’s judgment, the district court should vacate the portion of the judgment related to the mooted Voting Rights Act Section 2 claim. The district court denied Hall’s motion to vacate. The court reasoned that, although Hall’s claims for injunctive and declaratory relief under the Voting Rights Act were moot, vacatur is not an automatic right and Hall did not show that the balance of equities warranted such an “extraordinary remedy.”1 To reach its decision, the court assessed “twin considerations of fault and public interest.”2 Fault, the court held, weighed in favor of vacatur because Hall had not caused his claims to become moot. Nevertheless, the court determined that the public interest in preserving precedent and furthering judicial consistency, when combined with the judgment’s minimal effect on non-parties, was sufficient to offset Hall’s lack of fault, resulting in the denial of Hall’s Rule 60(b)(6) motion. 1 U.S. Bancorp Mortg. Co. v. Bonner Mall P’ship, 513 U.S. 18, 26 (1994). 2 Valero Terrestrial Corp. v. Paige, 211 F.3d 112, 118 (4th Cir. 2000). 3 Case: 15-30858 Document: 00514384758 Page: 4 Date Filed: 03/13/2018 No. 15-30858 Hall appeals only the denial of his Rule 60(b)(6) motion to vacate his Voting Rights Act Section 2 claim. II We review the denial of a Rule 60(b)(6) motion for abuse of discretion.3 A court “abuses its discretion if it bases its decision on an erroneous view of the law or on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence.”4 Questions of law receive de novo review.5 Rule 60(b)(6) empowers a district court to “relieve a party . from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for . any . reason that justifies relief.”6 Rule 60(b) “merely prescribes the practice in proceedings to obtain relief” and “does not assume to define the substantive law as to the grounds for vacating judgments.”7 Courts have clarified that, although broadly stated, Rule 60(b)(6) justifies relief in only “extraordinary circumstances.”8 Hall contends there are three principal errors in the district court’s assessment of whether vacatur was appropriate. First, Hall asserts that the district court misapplied the Supreme Court’s decision in U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Company v. Bonner Mall Partnership9 and our court’s en banc decision in Staley v. Harris County, Texas.10 Second, Hall argues that the district court erroneously speculated that its judgment influenced the Louisiana legislature and erred in concluding that this influence weighed 3 Edward H. Bohlin Co. v. Banning Co., 6 F.3d 350, 353 (5th Cir. 1993). 4 Hesling v. CSX Transp., Inc. 396 F.3d 632, 638 (5th Cir. 2005) (quoting Kennedy v. Tex. Utils., 179 F.3d 258, 265 (5th Cir. 1999)). 5 Yesh Music v. Lakewood Church, 727 F.3d 356, 359 (5th Cir. 2013). 6 FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(6). 7 Id. advisory committee’s note to 1946 amendment; see also Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 863-64 (1988) (noting that Rule 60(b)(6) “does not particularize the factors that justify relief”). 8 Liljeberg, 486 U.S. at 864 (quoting Ackermann v. United States, 340 U.S. 193 (1950)). 9 513 U.S. 18 (1994). 10 485 F.3d 305 (5th Cir. 2007) (en banc). 4 Case: 15-30858 Document: 00514384758 Page: 5 Date Filed: 03/13/2018 No. 15-30858 against vacatur. Hall contends that “the key equitable consideration is whether the party seeking vacatur is responsible for the loss of its appeal rights.” He maintains that “[i]f an appeal is mooted by any circumstance beyond that party’s control,” then “equity favors vacatur.” Third, Hall argues that the district court erred in concluding that “it did not expect its judgment to have great effect on nonparties to the litigation.” Hall’s briefing relies on court decisions in which the controversy became moot while the case was on appeal, and an appellate court considered the question of whether to vacate the district court’s judgment and opinion or order.11 The source of a district court’s authority to vacate a judgment when a controversy has become moot is Rule 60(b),12 with exceptions regarding an injunction not relevant here.13 An appellate court’s authority to vacate a district court’s judgment when a pending appeal has become moot is 28 U.S.C. § 2106.14 We therefore examine, as an initial matter, whether the factors to be considered by a district court regarding vacatur in the context of a Rule 60(b)(6) motion differ from those to be considered by an appellate court under § 2106. United States v. Munsingwear, Inc.15 and Bancorp are two of the Supreme Court’s seminal decisions regarding the propriety of vacatur when a case is rendered moot. Both of these cases, and others applying them, 11 See, e.g., Bancorp, 513 U.S. 18; Staley, 485 F.3d 305. 12 See FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(6) (“Grounds for Relief from a Final Judgment, Order, or Proceeding. On motion and just terms, the court may relieve a party or its legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: . any other reason that justifies relief.”). 13 See Valero Terrestrial Corp. v. Paige, 211 F.3d 112, 121-22 (4th Cir. 2000). 14 See 28 U.S.C. § 2106 (“The Supreme Court or any other court of appellate jurisdiction may affirm, modify, vacate, set aside or reverse any judgment, decree, or order of a court lawfully brought before it for review, and may remand the cause and direct the entry of such appropriate judgment, decree, or order, or require such further proceedings to be had as may be just under the circumstances.”).