Untitled [Mario Del Pero on American Neoconservatism: the Politics And
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Jean-François Drolet. American Neoconservatism: The Politics and Culture of a Reactionary Idealism. New York: Columbia University Press, 2011. x + 306 pp. $30.00, cloth, ISBN 978-0-231-70228-7. Reviewed by Mario Del Pero Published on H-Diplo (May, 2012) Commissioned by Seth Offenbach (Bronx Community College, The City University of New York) In the last decade, “Neoconservativology” has conservatism was not liberal, but culturally “au‐ become a sort of interdisciplinary feld of re‐ thoritarian” and “ferociously predatory on liberal search in itself. Historians, political scientists, po‐ values--both in domestic and global politics” (p. 7). litical theorists, journalists, and the variegated The terrain of the power struggle in which they punditocracy dealing with U.S. politics and for‐ engaged was primarily cultural. For Drolet, U.S. eign relations have all discussed and dissected the neoconservatism was “heavily influenced by a roots, visions, ideologies, plans, and, sometimes, radical critique of liberalism and Enlightenment follies of American neoconservatism. Often domi‐ philosophy” which harked back to “the authori‐ nated by contemporary concerns and interests, tarian intellectual circles of Weimar Germany” this scholarship has produced many instant, and (pp. 11-12). The emphasis on culture allows Drolet eminently forgettable, books and articles, along to introduce the fgure of Leo Strauss, who is with some serious, and less sensational, historical claimed to have had “a crucial formative influ‐ and intellectual works.[1] Jean-François Drolet’s ence on many neoconservatives,” providing “the American Neoconservatism is a welcome addition movement with vital intellectual ammunitions to to the second camp. This is an original and sophis‐ fight the culture wars” of the 1960s and 1970s (p. ticated analysis of the philosophical, cultural, and 13). intellectual foundations of neoconservatism. The After a general, introductory chapter on the basic argument of the book is quite idiosyncratic evolution of post-World War II U.S. conservatism and challenges the common wisdom and main‐ and the rise of neoconservatism, Drolet dedicates stream literature about neoconservatism. Accord‐ his second, quite dense, chapter to Strauss and his ing to Drolet, U.S. neocons were not, as often “critique of the modern liberal democratic state” maintained, “the guardians of a ‘liberalism be‐ (p. 53). Strauss is convincingly linked to and read trayed’ by the events of the 1960s” (p. 5). Their through Carl Schmitt: precisely the kind of con‐ H-Net Reviews nection, Drolet argues, neocons have always been compact” (p. 96).[2] Hence, the search for an “ex‐ wary of, given Schmitt’s controversial works and tra-market moral anchor”--often found in reli‐ life. By focusing on the Schmitt-Strauss exchange gion--capable of balancing, or at least tempering, on Thomas Hobbes, Drolet discusses the Straus‐ materialist infatuations for rationalism, technolo‐ sian critique of the Enlightenment, the “self-de‐ gy, and consumerism (p. 99). As conservative pun‐ structive tendencies of modern rationalism” and dit and political theorist William Bennett put it, the moral void created in modern societies by a the return to religion in public discourse was nec‐ “doctrinal worship of reason” that has “led to a essary to counter “the new nihilism” and tame the world without any commanding truth, in which “basest appetites, passions and impulses” of the all opinions are deemed of equal worth and unin‐ citizenry (p. 101).[3] hibited individualism is the norm” (pp. 59, 58). Drolet then examines the neoconservative at‐ From here, Strauss moved progressively to an “in‐ tack on the post-1960s welfare policies, although tellectual recovery of the wisdom of the ancients,” this aspect is surprisingly marginal within his centered on the denunciation of the intellectual analysis. More detailed is the part on the neocon‐ crisis of modernity that began with Niccolo servative vision of international relations and the Machiavelli and Hobbes, and culminated in the role of the United States in world affairs. Here, “nihilism and value-relativist philosophy of Niet‐ Drolet does not break new ground, but clearly zsche and Heidegger” (p. 75). According to Drolet, sums up previous works, particularly on the neo‐ U.S. neoconservatives adopted, and somehow vul‐ conservatives’ emphasis on how “regime type” garized, “Strauss’s intellectualization of the crisis shapes both “domestic and world politics,” and of modernity,” deploying it in the cultural battles their critique of the “static interpretation of histo‐ of the 1960s, when new and fashionable intellec‐ ry” offered by classical realism (pp. 128, 127). The tual trends were portrayed by neocons as a form model of democracy the neocons saw ft, and tried of “intellectual leveling resulting from” an “as‐ to export, is described as “elitist” and “pol‐ sault on the establishment” (pp. 89, 88). yarchic,” based on a minimalist--that is, almost ex‐ The following chapters discuss, from different clusively electoral--definition of democracy, which angles, these battles and how they contributed to Drolet believes was inspired by Joseph Schum‐ shape and refine the neoconservative vision. Fol‐ peter’s 1947 classic, Capitalism, Socialism and lowing a customary pattern, Drolet discusses the Democracy (p. 137). Resolutely hostile to liberal culture wars of the 1970s and ’80s, the clashes be‐ globalist projects aimed at consolidating and ex‐ tween the neocons and the New Left, and their tending the reach of multilateral institutions and hostility to the new postindustrial class (“universi‐ international law, neocons confronted head-on ty lecturers, lawyers, computer programmers and the problem of sovereignty and crisis of the West‐ bureaucrats of all sorts who make a living from phalian model. ideas and social criticism,” [pp. 106-107]). He of‐ Three solutions were offered to the potential fers intelligent and astute comments on the un‐ conundrum provoked by their resolute defense of easy relationship between neoconservatism and national sovereignty and the simultaneous rejec‐ neoliberalism, the market catalyzing some of tion of realism and cosmopolitan liberalism. The those degenerate, nihilistic processes the neocons first was to connect sovereignty to security and denounced and tried to reverse. “In spite of all the order: “in a nutshell,” Drolet writes, “the idea is praises for capitalism,” Drolet convincingly ar‐ that in the same way that the norms of sovereign‐ gues, “neoconservatives are profoundly anxious ty and non-intervention should be made condi‐ about the strains which market forces and corpo‐ tional upon a state’s capacity to ensure the basic rate culture tend to inflict on the American social 2 H-Net Reviews well-being and human rights of its citizens, a gov‐ sort of “political and historical void” (p. 153). ernment that directly or indirectly supports ter‐ Sometimes, however, his analysis seems to suffer rorism de facto forfeits its right to rule without from the same problem. Drolet does not engage external influence” (p. 149). The second--so clearly with the rich historiographical debate on the pe‐ outlined by Robert Kagan in some of his most fa‐ culiarities of U.S. nationalism and exceptionalism. mous works--is to replace the liberal chimeras of [5] The connection between the rise of the New global governance with the reality of a hegemonic Right and the transformation of U.S. political dis‐ power, the United States, willing and capable to course in the 1970s is read quite unilaterally “exclude itself unilaterally from the legal order so through the almost exclusive (and inevitably de‐ as to institute a new set of norms or protect exist‐ forming) prism offered by neocon writings. His‐ ing norms when the latter are under threat or torical reconstruction is lacking: some of the cru‐ have become inadequate” (p. 171).[4] The third, cial elements of the complex transition of the and last, is not to reject forms of interstate policy 1970s are overlooked or treated in a very scholas‐ coordination--as long as the United States is tic way; the absence of references to the political “granted special prerogatives and exemptions”-- father of U.S. neoconservatives, Senator Henry but instead to refuse interpretations of interna‐ Jackson (D-Washington), is baffling and surpris‐ tional law that transform it “from a mechanism ing; the scant attention paid to the new discourse regulating interstate relations to a regime of indi‐ of “human rights” and its influence on U.S. foreign vidual rights,” where the “state remains an impor‐ relations is hard to justify.[6] By focusing so much tant institution but ... ceases to be an end in itself” on the intellectual debate and the Straussian her‐ (p. 176). American neoconservatives consider itage, Drolet often leaves the history, evolution, such a postmodern view of the relationship be‐ and contradictions of U.S. neoconservatism far too tween law and rights contrary to both America’s much in the backstage. “republican constitutional tradition” and the as‐ Finally, by treating neoconservatism as a co‐ sumption that “the legitimacy of positive law is herent and unitary phenomenon--and stressing so derived frst and foremost from the fact that it ex‐ strongly the formative influence of Strauss--Drolet presses the will of an historical community” (pp. is compelled to some conceptual and semantic ac‐ 176, 177). The last part of the book is thus dedicat‐ robatics, which leaves this reader puzzled and ed to the neoconservative exceptionalist view of disoriented. The structure of the book itself is the American experience and of the position and sometimes disjointed, and the connection be‐ role of the United States in the international sys‐ tween the Strauss-Schmitt debate, anti-Enlighten‐ tem. Neocon “sovereigntism” and opposition to ment conservatism, modern international rela‐ global governance are tightly connected to such tions, and neoconservative foreign policy visions exceptionalism and the belief in both the unique‐ are often tenuous, if not forced and artificial. The ness of U.S. history and the necessity to preserve conclusions are, in this regard, quite telling.