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Eth-50419-01.Pdf Research Collection Journal Issue Monuments of Memory Author(s): Shagoyan, Gayane; Gispert, Jürgen; Javakhishvili, Jana Publication Date: 2016-02-16 Permanent Link: https://doi.org/10.3929/ethz-a-010818727 Rights / License: In Copyright - Non-Commercial Use Permitted This page was generated automatically upon download from the ETH Zurich Research Collection. For more information please consult the Terms of use. ETH Library No. 80 16 February 2016 Abkhazia South Ossetia caucasus Adjara analytical digest Nagorno- Karabakh www.css.ethz.ch/en/ resourcesecurityinstitute.org www.laender-analysen.de publications/cad.html www.crrccenters.org MONUMENTS OF MEMORY Special Editor: Oliver Reisner ■■Between Memory and Memorial: Anastas Mikoyan and “Social Lustration” in Armenia 2 By Gayane Shagoyan, Yerevan ■■Armenian Khachkar as a Current Transformer of Collective Memory 5 By Jürgen Gispert, Leipzig ■■Stones Speaking: Reading Conflicting Discourses in the Urban Environment 8 By Jana Javakhishvili, Tbilisi ■■CHRONICLE 26 November 2015 – 16 February 2016 12 Institute for European, Russian, Research Centre Center Caucasus Research German Association for and Eurasian Studies for East European Studies for Security Studies The George Washington Resource Centers East European Studies University of Bremen ETH Zurich University The Caucasus Analytical Digest is supported by: CAUCASUS ANALYTICAL DIGEST No. 80, 16 February 2016 2 Between Memory and Memorial: Anastas Mikoyan and “Social Lustration” in Armenia By Gayane Shagoyan, Yerevan Abstract This article analyzes the public discourse on the Soviet history of Armenia provoked by the initiative to raise a monument to the Soviet political figure Anastas Mikoyan in a central park of Yerevan in 2014. Within this discourse some Soviet historical events have been included into, or excluded from, the “national narra- tives” by different groups both in Armenia and the Diaspora. This case exposes the complex interrelations between family memories about the Soviet functionary and different versions of the official historiography and non-official oral histories of former Soviet citizens and their post-Soviet descendants. Introduction: In the Beginning Was Family Memory vs. Public Memory a Monument Initiative The discourse on this monument initiative sheds light on When the Armenian Center of Ethnological Studies some mechanisms of memorializing the political lead- “Hazarashen” and the German organization DVV-inter- ers and constructing their glorious image. The Mikoyan national launched their project “Armenia Total(itar)is” monument case is interesting as an example of how the on Soviet repressions in Armenia in 2012, they did not family or communicative memory (in the terms of J. Ass- expect that the topic of the “Soviet past” could pro- man) could affect cultural memory. Mikoyan’s descen- voke hot public discussions only two years later.1 Espe- dants managed to form and spread a positive image of cially since fieldwork showed that memory of Soviet this Soviet functionary as the result of their high level repressions was rather shadowed. Otherwise, following positions and their “numerical strength”. The domina- J. Olick’s terminology, the memory of Soviet repres- tion of the family version of Mikoyan’s biography was sions in Armenia was rather ‘collected’ than ‘collective’. caused first of all by the political longevity of Mikoyan The situation crucially changed when the relatives of himself, which saved him from any criticism directed the high-level Soviet official Anastas Mikoyan decided against the Soviet regime in general. The second instru- to erect a monument to him in a public garden in the ment for making a family version of Mikoyan’s bright center of Yerevan. Mikoyan was born in Armenia and biography more legitimate are the autobiographies and rose to the highest communist government positions memoirs written both by himself and other members in the Kremlin, achieving the most political longevity of his family (in particular, by his son and daughter- in the Soviet government’s history. There were already in-law). Most of the documentaries, TV programs and four memorials dedicated to this communist bureaucrat even research concerning Mikoyan were composed on in different settlements in Armenia (outside of Yerevan) the base of consultations or with the participation of his before this initiative was started. However, they were family members. Even the suggestion to erect Mikoyan’s never a source of any arguments or debates. And nobody monument in Yerevan was initiated by one of Mikoyan’s questioned the municipality’s decision to name one of grandsons, Vladimir Mikoyan, who is the Regional Rep- Yerevan’s streets after Mikoyan in 2008. resentative in Eastern Europe of the Chamber of Com- We attempt to discuss how and why the Yerevan merce and Industry of the Russian Federation. municipal decision on erecting the next memorial to this Soviet political actor in 2014 caused a wide public Mikoyan’s Monument and a Discourse on response and, in fact, turned into a detonator, which “Re-colonization” of Armenia triggered in contemporary Armenian society the need The suggestion was adopted unanimously by the Stand- to revise the history of Soviet Armenia. People perceive ing commission for culture, education and social issues a particular event as a new link in a successive chain of the Yerevan municipality. However, the decision of events and recall more of the personal details from had to be approved by the Council of Elders—the their experience by linking them to a “grand histor- elected representative body of the municipality. Haik ical event”. Demoyan, one of the Council representatives and the director of the Genocide museum-institute in Yerevan, said that he would vote against this proposal, because 1 A more detailed Russian version of this paper is in press (Pub- he is acquainted with archive documents which sustain lisher “Memorial” Center in Moscow). Mikoyan’s complicity in the repressions of thousands of CAUCASUS ANALYTICAL DIGEST No. 80, 16 February 2016 3 people. His speech influenced only some opposition rep- The support for the initiative revealed that many resentatives of the Council and the proposal to erect the functionaries valued Mikoyan because of his brilliant monument was adopted with 51 votes against 4 on 30 ability for bureaucratic survival and conformism, while April 2014. This session of the Council was widely cov- at the same time their attitude provoked a discussion ered in the mass media for several reasons. Firstly, it was about official and civic responsibilities under totalitarian an unprecedented situation when a representative elected circumstances. Summarizing the pro and contra argu- as a member of the Council of Elders on the dominant ments that have appeared in the mass media, the posi- party list (Haik Demoyan) announced that he did not tion of the supporters of the monument could be mainly agree with the mayor’s position. Secondly, the political defined as “it was not Mikoyan’s fault, it was the call of context (the association of Armenia with the Russia-led the times”, in response to this the new formula showed Customs Union instead of the European Union unex- up: “the time was so terrible because Mikoyan and Co. pectedly proclaimed by President Serzh Sargsyan on 3 made them like this”. September 2013) created a suitable space for hot dis- cussions on relations (historical or current) with Russia. National vs. Soviet: The Soviet Politician So, the proposal to erect Mikoyan’s monument became without Soviet History a part of the discourse on the “re-colonization” of Arme- One more important issue of this discussion concerned nia by Russia. From the first glance, this discussion could Mikoyan’s biography. The question was the content of be identified as a contest between “Westerners” and the biography, which should be considered official, as “Slavophiles”, with civic activists in the first group and the representatives of the Council asserted that the biog- the state power sector in the second. In this discussion raphy in the package submitted to the Council did not the contra group started to build a narrative describing include any discrediting information. For the Coun- Mikoyan as a “traitor of national interests” and a repres- cil representatives, the fact that Mikoyan occupied the sive functionary. However, besides Mikoyan’s person- highest power positions during the years of political ality, they discussed the system of values, appropriate repressions was not enough to reject the proposal to political models, and possible perspectives for Arme- erect the statue. It is interesting that in the package nia. In fact, it seems that the discussions surrounding submitted to the municipality, it was mentioned that the initiative to erect Mikoyan’s monument just woke Mikoyan was decorated by many USSR states. Using a sleeping dog. Of course, Mikoyan was associated with ‘state’ instead of the usual ‘Soviet republic’ the biogra- “Russian oriented way of development”, but at the same phy makers, on the one hand, seemed to raise the value time—because of his political longevity—his figure gave of the awards (one may think that they were from dif- a rare chance to provoke discussions concerning a lot ferent countries, though in fact they were from one sin- of silenced Soviet events and especially those related to gle state, the USSR), and on the other hand, tried to the history of Sovietization in Armenia. reduce the “Soviet vocabulary” as much as they could. By the way, in the municipality project, Mikoyan was Mikoyan’s Monument and the “Lustration” presented just as a “political figure” without mentioning Discourse “Soviet” or “communist”. This all demonstrates the urge The heated debates lasted more than two months and of the monument project initiators to keep Mikoyan seemed to explode across Armenia’s social networks. My out of the Soviet context and represent him out of his- colleagues and I counted more than 1,000 Facebook sta- torical time and even space. There was no mention of tuses on this topic during two months.
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