IUCN Commission on Environmental, Economic and Social Policy Policy Matters ISSUE 19 - APRIL 2014

RememberingHer Work and its Contribution to the ElinorTheory and Pra Ostromctice of Conservation and Sustainable Natural Resource Management IUCN Commission on Environmental, Economic and Social Policy Policy Matters ISSUE 19 – APRIL 2014

RememberingHer Work and its ElinorContributio Ostromn to the Theory and Practice of Conservation and Sustainable Natural Resource Management

James P. Robson IainEdited J. Davidson-Hunt by: Alyne Delaney Gabriela Lichtenstein Lapologang Magole Aroha Te Pareake Mead © 2014 International Union for Conservation of Nature

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This publication should be cited as: Robson, James P., Iain J. Davidson-Hunt, Alyne Delaney, Gabriela Lichtenstein, Lapologang Magole and Aroha Te Pareake Mead.Policy Matters2014. Remembering Elinor Ostrom: Her Work and Its Contribution to the Theory and Practice of Conservation and Sustainable Natural Resource Management. , Issue 19. CEESP and IUCN: Gland, CH.

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ISBN: 978-8317-1643-5 Table of Contents

5 Preface 7 Introduction 11 CHAPTER ONE

Harini Nagendra, Rucha Ghate, Jagdeesh Rao Governing India’s Commons: The Influence of Elinor Ostrom’s Ideas 23 CHAPTER TWO

TheRaul ImpactPacheco-Vega of Elinor Ostrom’s Scholarship on Commons Governance in Mexico: An Overview 35 CHAPTER THREE

RompiendoLeticia Merino paradigmas: Pérez Gobernanza de los bienes comunes y ciudadanía en las políticas forestal y de conservación Mexicanas 47 CHAPTER FOUR

AnBereket Assessment Tsehaye Haile of Community Management of Traditional Woodland Enclosures (Hiza’ti) in the Highlands of Eritrea 57 CHAPTER FIVE

GoverningElizabeth Gachenga the Commons Through Customary Law Systems of Water Governance: The Case of the Marakwet 69 CHAPTER SIX

ResearchingDerek Kauneckis Complex Governance Arrangements: Elinor Ostrom’s Legacy for Research Methods and the Analysis of Institutional Design 79 CHAPTER SEVEN

RosanneAdvancing Van Algonquin Schie Recognition and Participation in Forest Management in Québec, Canada 91 CHAPTER EIGHT

FromHijaba Theory Ykhanbai to and Practice: Ronnie AVernooy Decade of Co-managing Pasture and Other Natural Resources in Mongolia 103 CHAPTER NINE

RecognitionDiego Pacheco of the Role of Collective Action among Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities in the Convention on Biological Diversity 111 CHAPTER TEN

Arun Agrawal and Jesse Ribot Are Ostrom’s Design Principles Sufficient for Design? 117 CHAPTER ELEVEN

Caña Dulce y Caña Brava Un son para Lin Ostrom

POLICY MATTERS 2014: REMEMBERING ELINOR OSTROM

3 Acknowledgements

The publication of this special issue In addition to the chapter authors we thank emerged from discussions during the IUCN members of CEESP and IASC who agreed Commission on Environmental, Economic to act as peer reviewers for the chapters and Social Policy Steering Group meeting including Drs. David Bray, Catie Burlando, in January of 2013. Aroha Mead and Iain Nathan Deutsch, Rosie Cooney and Jose Davidson-Hunt approached the International Furtado along with some who preferred to Association for the Study of the Commons remain anonymous. We also thank Mr. Marcel who supported the vision and colleagues Jim Morin of Lost Art Cartography for reproducing Robson, Alyne Delaney, Gabriela Lichtenstein maps (pgs. 51, 52, 81, 96) for the volume and Lapologang Magole of the IASC came on and Ms. Patty Nelson of Nelson Architects board to complete the editorial team. As it for graphic design and layout. Along with turns out most of the editors are members photos provided by chapter authors we are of both CEESP and IASC and we thank both also grateful to those members of CEESP organizations for their support in making who responded to Aroha’s request to include this publication possible. A special thanks to photos of Lin in the volume. CEESP and IUCN for providing the funding to print the publication and make it available for the World Parks Congress and also as an ebook available through the IUCN website.

Plate 1: Elinor Ostrom with Aroha Mead, Grazia Borrini-Feyerabend and Taghi Farvar at the CEESP Sharing Power Conference, Whakatane, Aotearoa (New Zealand), January 2011. (Photo credit: CEESP)

POLICY MATTERS 2014: REMEMBERING ELINOR OSTROM

4 Preface

My lasting memory of Elinor Ostrom is of work that was instrumental in earning her the us sitting together at a picnic table outside 2009 Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences. We the shop/garage in Taneatua (Bay of Plenty, began trying to match the design principles New Zealand) waiting for a bus. This was to the situation of Maori in general and the in January 2011. Elinor had cut short her Tuhoe people in particular. I struggled to get time at the meeting of the International beyond the principle of having clearly defined Association for the Study of the Commons boundaries and the ability to exclude others. (IASC) in Hyderabad, India, an Association of The bus arrived and we both tucked our which she was a founding member, to travel discussion away. to Whakatane, New Zealand to participate in Our guides for the day were Tuhoe artist and another conference, Sharing Power: A New activist Tame Iti and actor and activist Patrick Vision for Development. The Sharing Power ‘Onion’ Orupe. From Taneatua we visited Conference was organised by the Ngati Awa tribe, Te Whare Wanangao Awanuirangi, and the burial place of the Maori prophet, faith the Commission on Environmental, Economic healer and land rights activist Rua Kenana & Social Policy (CEESP) of the International at Tupou Marae in Waimana and later drove Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN). through the blockade that had been put in Elinor was a founding member of the place to keep government officials out of the Commission’s Theme on Governance, Equity & Urewera National Park. The return of Urewera Rights. National Park to Tuhoe was part of the Treaty of Waitangi Settlement negotiation process By the time she travelled to New Zealand, that was currently underway. We stopped Elinor was already feeling poorly. Yet she and talked to the Tuhoe people guarding the insisted on joining the Conference participants blockade and as the bus drove away we passed for a field-trip as soon as she arrived after a number of police cars heading for a stand-off her long journey from Hyderabad. I therefore with the protestors—a day in the life of many had the task of picking her up at the airport indigenous peoples and part of the struggle to and driving to the Taneatua shops to wait for have those with power relate to communities the field-trip bus that was taking participants as fellow citizens rather than protestors or for a tour of the lands of the Tuhoe people in marginalised peoples (names used to diminish the heart of the Urewera ranges. The topic their status and integrity). We then visited Te of the day was ‘Sharing Power—indigenous Rewarewa Marae in Ruatoki to hear from a governance of conservation areas’ and the range of Tuhoe people about their plans and ‘shared power’ part of the discussion was aspirations post-Treaty settlement. centered around the ability or inability of those with power to transfer lands back to Throughout this time Elinor was quiet. She indigenous peoples unfettered. didn’t ask any questions in the open forum, she didn’t speak. After the Marae visit I drove her As we waited for the bus I briefed her on our back to the place where all of the conference tribal hosts for the day, Tuhoe, and mentioned participants converged for dinner after field- that of any tribe in New Zealand, they had the trips into four different tribal areas (Ngati best chance of having the lands of a National Awa, Te Arawa, Ngati Tuwharetoa and Tuhoe). Park located within their territories returned As soon as the car door closed we resumed our to them and that there was widespread discussion. support across New Zealand society for this to happen. In turn, Elinor spoke of her work Whereas I had thought the design principles and the eight “design principles” of collective for common pool resource management would action for commons management discussed in be problematic in the NZ Maori situation her 1990 book, Governing the Commons—the because of the fluid nature of many tribal POLICY MATTERS 2014: REMEMBERING ELINOR OSTROM

5 boundaries, she saw this as a reinforcement sustainably over time. Elinor was also very of what truly constitutes common pool clear in her talks with me, and in the Keynote resources. What I mean by ‘fluid nature of presentation she delivered to the Sharing tribal boundaries’ is that while many tribes Power Conference the following day, that can and do confidently assert authority over there is no quick-fix panacea, there is no one their central territories, they tend to adopt a simple solution and nor is there one solution diplomatic inter-tribal relations approach to for all contexts throughout the world. Rather the outer boundaries they share with other the key to effective long-term sustainability tribes. It is not uncommon for neighbouring in using and managing natural resources is tribes to have common areas within their communication—treating nature as a shared respective tribal territories, each one claiming resource—sharing access, use and decision- the area as part of their own territory based making. In other words, sharing power. on a spiritual or cultural historical association. Elinor Ostrom was an accomplished, secure, As we explored the principles of defined positive and unassuming person who had territories, mechanisms of conflict resolution, great loyalty to the individuals and networks a graduated scale of sanctions for resource that helped form her perspectives and career. appropriators who violate community rules, It was a truly generous gesture on her part to self-determination recognised by higher travel to Whakatane, to be with CEESP, Ngati authorities and the opportunity for resource Awa and the other neighbouring tribes and appropriators to participate in decision- conference participants at the Sharing Power making, I questioned their applicability to Conference. CEESP members Janis Alcorn, Maori. Elinor on the other hand was more Grazia Borrini-Feyerabend, Taghi Farvar interested in what self-determination really and Michel Pimbert who knew and worked means for Maori. She wondered if there was with Elinor over a long period of time were a bottom line that guided Maori in their instrumental in securing Elinor’s visit to Treaty settlement negotiations. A line that New Zealand. It is with pleasure that IUCN’s they would never cross because to do so Commission on Environmental, Economic would significantly compromise their ability & Social Policy (CEESP) devotes this special to manage their heritage in the future as edition of the peer reviewed journal Policy commonly held and managed resources. Matters to the influence and legacy of her work. As one can imagine neither of us answered each other’s questions to a satisfactory level. Thank you Elinor for inspiring so many with We were both left with more questions than yourNo reira, ideas, haere, vision haere, and haerebelief ein te a rangatirajust world. answers. However, what I did gain from Haere ki te wa kainga our discussion was an understanding that Go to the home of all the design principles she identified are not Haere ki te kainga tuturu time meant to be interpreted literally but rather Hoki atu ki te Kaihanga Go to the true home expansively. “Defined territories” doesn’t Haere, haere, haere. Return to the creator have to mean fences and signposts. It can also be recognised through customary laws and practices that demonstrate the historical Aroha Te Pareake Mead and cultural association a community holds Ngati Awa, Ngati Porou, Chair with a place that continues to this day and IUCN Commission on Environmental, beyond. The principles, however, should Economic & Social Policy (CEESP) be understood within an overall context of Director, Maori Business, community self-determination and not be School of Management, co-opted to mean other things. Her ideas came Victoria University of Wellington from a place of optimism that people can and should work things out and that communities can successfully manage common resources

6 POLICY MATTERS 2014: REMEMBERING ELINOR OSTROM Remembering Elinor Ostrom Her Work and its Contribution to the Theory and Practice of Conservation and Sustainable Natural Resource Management James P. Robson1, Iain J. Davidson-Hunt2, Alyne Delaney3, Gabriela Lichtenstein4, Lapologang Magole5 and Aroha Te Pareake Mead6

The Commission on Environmental, Laerhoven and Ostrom 2007:19). Economic and Social Policy (CEESP)—Theme on Sustainable Livelihoods (TSL)—of the In recognition of her many achievements, International Union for Conservation of Nature we wanted to invite and publish a series (IUCN), in partnership with the International of commentaries that build upon her work Association for the Study of the Commons and, where possible, provide case studies demonstrating the practical application of her (IASC), is delighted to present this special theoretical contributions. A Call was sent out issue of Policy Matters, which focuses on the in late 2012, soliciting expressions of interest outreach and impact of Dr. Elinor Ostrom’s and abstracts from those keen to be involved. groundbreaking research on common Room was made for both traditional articles property (or commons) theory. Lin was a and more creative print presentations in any supporter and friend of CEESP and a founding of IUCN’s official languages (English, French, member of the IASC, and we were all deeply Spanish). We received an excellent response, saddened by her passing in 2012. and after embarking on a long peer-review Lin Ostrom’s work has been instrumental in and editing process, we were able to whittle shaping contemporary analyses of resource the submissions down to the collection of management and conservation, especially at research papers, essays, commentaries and a local level. A ‘commons’ can be considered songs that follow. any resource subject to forms of collective Encapsulating voices from academia, use, with the relationship between the indigenous communities, government resource and the human institutions that agencies, development agencies and non- mediate its use an essential component of governmental organizations (both local any management regime. While conventional and international), they all make clear the wisdom has long assumed that the sustainable connections between Lin’s work and the management of common resources is best authors’ own scholarship and/or practice. We achieved through centralized government or briefly introduce each in turn. private control, Lin led the way in challenging this assumption—showing how alternative Preceding our introduction was a preface by forms of property can work effectively if well CEESP Chair, Aroha Te Pareake Mead, who matched to the “attributes of the resource provided the impetus to develop this volume and users, and when the resulting rules are following Lin’s participation in the Sharing enforced, considered legitimate, and generate Power Conference of CEESP. Aroha provided long-term patterns of reciprocity” (van a personal testimony of Lin’s tireless efforts

1 4 Visiting Professor, Department of Environmental Studies, National Research Council of Argentina (CONICET), Instituto University of Redlands, United States of America and Nacional de Antropologia y Pensamiento Latinoamericano, member2 of IASC. Email [email protected] Buenos Aires, Argentina and member of IASC and SULi, CEESP/ Associate Professor, Natural Resources Institute, University SSC,5 IUCN member. Email [email protected] of Manitoba and Co-Chair, Theme on Sustainable Livelihoods, Okavango Research Institute, University of Botswana, Botswana CEESP, IUCN and member of IASC. Email davidso4@ and member of IASC and SULi, CEESP/SSC, IUCN. Email ad.umanitoba.ca3 [email protected] Associate Professor, Innovative Fisheries Management Chair, IUCN Commission on Environmental, Economic & Social Centre, Department of Development and Planning, Aalborg Policy and Director, Maori Business, School of Management, University, Denmark and Editor-in-Chief, Commons Digest, Victoria University of Wellington. Email [email protected] IADC. Email [email protected]

POLICY MATTERS 2014: REMEMBERING ELINOR OSTROM

7 to bridge the worlds of activism, policy Remaining with the academic research and academia—a mixture reflected in the community, we continue with a piece by Derek contributions. Kauneckis, a graduate of Lin’s program at Indiana University, who expertly traces how While Lin’s work has had an impact globally, her substantial body of work is informing it is through focusing on individual countries current efforts to develop research tools that one really begins to appreciate the and techniques of institutional analysis for depth of that impact. Nagendra, Ghate and understanding the governance of commons as Puppala, who represent the mélange of complex systems—concluding that her work academia, practice and activism that commons represents the beginning of a “new science of scholarship so readily evokes, report on governance” that others are working hard to the different ways in which Lin’s work has develop. impacted the governance of India’s extensive natural resource commons, taking in both Our final three papers move away from rural and urban environments. Similarly, the academia to focus on the applied nature two papers that follow, by Pacheco-Vega and of Lin’s work; how it is being used, in very Merino-Perez respectively, show how Mexico’s practical ways, to guide and inspire change commons scholars and practitioners, and in the way people relate to and manage their environmental and conservation policies, natural environments. They report on local, have been influenced by Lin’s thinking. national and global efforts respectively. First Pacheco-Vega looks at multiple resource types we head to the boreal forest of northern (water, forests, irrigation systems, small-scale Quebec, Canada, where Van Schie, Economic fisheries) to highlight the range of empirical Development Officer for Wolf Lake First research from Mexico that has drawn on Lin Nation, tells the story of the community’s fight Ostrom for inspiration. Merino Perez, current to ensure that forestry on their customary President of the IASC, provides a brilliant lands is not only environmentally sustainable analysis of how Lin’s work has challenged the but allows for their active involvement as way we view nature-society relationships, and part of a new forest commons framework. does so with an eye on changes to indigenous From Canada we shift focus to Central Asia, territorial management in the south of the where Ykhanbai and Vernooy talk about their country. experiences developing a co-management process in Mongolia that aims to improve While a number of the articles in this pasture management for that country’s Special Issue are written by senior scholars nomadic herders. Ten years in the making, and practitioners, as well as alumni of the it draws heavily upon Lin Ostrom’s work Workshop in Bloomington that Lin founded on commons institutions and institutional with her husband Vincent, we were also diversity. Lastly, we hear from Pablo Pacheco, keen to include contributions from recent current Head of the Bolivian delegation at students and younger scholars who represent the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), a new generation of researchers interested who shows how Lin’s scholarship inspired in the broad area of natural resources and Bolivia to argue (successfully) for local and environmental management. Two case indigenous collective action to be recognized studies from Africa—Bereket’s assessment by the CBD for the role it affords biodiversity of woodland conservation in the Eritrean conservation efforts – opening the door for highlands using the Design Principles from local-level commons institutions to become Ostrom’s seminal Governing the Commons, a more integral player as part of national and and Gachenga’s paper from Kenya that international policy processes. explores how Lin’s thinking on the commons meshes with customary law systems of natural We bring our Special Issue to a close with two resource governance—showcase nicely the pieces. The first, written by leading commons continued relevance of Lin’s work to those scholars Arun Agrawal and Jesse Ribot, builds beginning their careers as commons scholars. upon the lessons of our earlier contributions POLICY MATTERS 2014: REMEMBERING ELINOR OSTROM

8 to acknowledge the power of Ostrom’s these diverse contributions highlight, from analyses and the tools that she developed— her early PhD work to the final presentations which have helped us to better understand the she gave in 2012, Lin exhibited a quality of governance of shared resources. Yet, as with all thought, an ability to convey complex ideas in scholarly endeavours, the major advances that understandable and entertaining ways, and an Lin made are not without their limitations, optimism that enabled her ideas to make their and Agrawal and Ribot offer a most useful mark in classrooms, local communities, and critique of her design principles for commons on the most important of policy and legislative institutions so that a key area of her legacy can stages. Our current understanding of natural be carried forward and strengthened. resources management and conservation would not be what it is without her input, and The second is a song, written and performed the prospects for improving environmental by Caña Dulce y Caña Brava, a musical quartet policy at local, national and global levels that from the Tuxtepec region where the Mexican much poorer. states of Oaxaca and Veracruz meet. The group plays in the regional folk style known as We are very happy to be able to share in some Jarocho, and wrote this song in celebration of of her achievements with CEESP, IUCN and Lin’s life and work. They were able to perform IASC members. for her on her final visit to Mexico in 2012. It is Enjoy! a very fitting way to end this special issue. References In providing a platform for such a wide array of voices, and offering cases from so many different geographical and cultural contexts, van Laerhoeven, International Frank and Elinor journal Ostrom. of the this special issue of Policy Matters showcases Commons2007. “Traditions 1 and trends in the study of just how important and far-reaching Lin’s the commons”. work has been (and continues to be). As (1): 3-28.

POLICY MATTERS 2014: REMEMBERING ELINOR OSTROM

9

Governing India’s Commons The Influence of Elinor Ostrom’s Ideas

Harini Nagendra, Rucha1 Ghate, Jagdeesh Rao Governing India’s Commons The Influence of Elinor Ostrom’s Ideas

Harini Nagendra1 2, Rucha Ghate3 4, Jagdeesh Rao5

Abstract

Elinor1 Ostrom’s research on the commons has fundamental implications for the governance of commons in India. Research from the International Forestry Resources and Institutions (IFRI) network, coupled with remote sensing analyses conducted by Ostrom and colleagues, has been fundamental in demonstrating the importance of self-governance for the sustainable management of the commons in Indian forests and cities. Recent field experiments conducted in two predominantly tribal communities in central India further demonstrate that communities with strong previous traditions of shared norms and mutual trust, tend to be non-exploitative, non-commercial, and cooperate towards the sustainable harvest of forest resources. Forests and other commons form critical components that supplement and support rural communities dependent on agriculture, livestock, water and other types of natural resources in large parts of India, providing stability and security in an unpredictable environment. In addition to rural commons, urban commons such as lakes play a very important role in Indian cities. Recent studies on lakes in the rapidly growing incipient megapolis of Bangalore demonstrate the importance of polycentric arrangements, involving local citizen groups along with Government agencies in monitoring, restoration and protection. Yet, institutional apathy has led to the neglect of traditional institutional arrangements and the customary rights of people in the solutions proposed under different Government policies and programmes. Currently, common and public lands cover almost a fifth of the geographical spread of India. Such land, if brought under the ambit of local self-governance institutions, could contribute significantly to the rural economy, providing critical ecological functions besides meeting livelihood needs. Recent initiatives by the Supreme Court, coupled with State government and national policy changes are promising, but much remains to be done. Large scale changes are needed while keeping in mind the pillars of Ostrom’s vision—the need for self-governance of the commons at a local level that permits flexibility, adaptation and innovation, with the ultimate goal of ensuring equitable and sustainable access to the commons for all citizens. Keywords: Collective action, sustainable use, self-governance, rural and urban commons, India

1 Ashoka Trust for Research in Ecology and the Environment (ATREE), Royal Enclave, Srirampura, Jakkur P.O., Bangalore 560064, 2India, [email protected] Center for the Study of Institutions, Population, and Environmental Change (CIPEC), Indiana University, 408 N. Indiana Avenue, Bloomington3 IN 47408, USA. SHODH: The Institute for Research and Development, 106, K.T. Nagar, Katol Road Nagpur-440013, Maharashtra State, India; [email protected] International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development (ICIMOD), Khumaltar, Lalitpur G.P.O. Box 3226, Kathmandu, Nepal, [email protected];5 Foundation for Ecological Security, Post Bag 29, Anand, Gujarat, India, [email protected]

POLICY MATTERS 2014: REMEMBERING ELINOR OSTROM

12 GOVERNING THE COMMONS: ELINOR OSTROM’S IDEAS respected by external government authorities. Unless this is provided, any group—such as a polluting industry—who wants to break the Born in 1933, Elinor Awam Ostrom’s rules on sustainable use created by local user perspective of the world was shaped in an groups, only has to turn to the government era impacted by economic depression and to be able to bypass or overturn these global war, resulting in a life-long, deep community rules. awareness of the limited nature of the earth’s natural resources, as well as the capacity This Design Principle has profound of communities to come together in times implications for the long term sustainability of difficulty, to cooperate and provide a of Indian commons—as is obvious from the helping hand to those in need. These beliefs many recent clashes between industry and were purposeful in shaping a career of indigenous communities across the country, path-breaking research that demonstrated and discussions between the Indian Minister the importance of collective action for the of Environment and Forests and the Minister sustainable use of natural resources. of Finance about setting up a fast-track National Investment Board to provide rapid Ostrom strongly believed in the power of the clearances to mega-infrastructure projects, local. Yet her impact and influence was global. even in environmentally critical forests where She had a special attachment to South Asia, indigenous communities are located. working for decades on issues of irrigation and forest management in Nepal (personally Commons are of immense importance to conducting field work there), and on collective issues of environmental sustainability, equity action in urban and forest contexts in India and democracy in India. Currently, common (Plate 1). Her research on the commons has and public lands cover an estimated 45 to fundamental implications for the governance 60 million hectares—almost a fifth of the of common property resources in India. country’s geographical spread. Such land, if brought under the ambit of local self- Ostrom’s analysis of long-term local governance institutions, could contribute institutions for the commons was done with significantly to the rural economy, providing a view to identifying the conditions that critical ecological functions besides meeting shaped how “a community of citizens can various needs such as fodder, food, medicine, organize themselves to solve the problems firewood, etc. This would benefit large rural of institutional supply, commitment and populations. monitoring” (Ostrom 1990). Impatient In this article, we discuss a number of with a predominant focus that searched for applications of Ostrom’s research on Indian “simple” solutions, she argued for the need to commons, and the applications of her far- distinguish between complexity and chaos, sighted analyses to governance of those often pointing to the importance of complexity commons. in biological systems and challenging political OSTROM’S RESEARCH ON INDIAN scientists to go beyond the formulation of COMMONS simple, one-size-fits-all rules. Thus, rather than develop a set of rules that presumed to dictate how communities would respond in A key factor in Ostrom’s research was all contexts, she articulated her famous set the development of the Nepal Irrigation of Design Principles—both elegant in their Institutions and Systems (NIIS) database, simplicity and yet profound. For instance, which collated and organized information one design principle—often ignored by on farmer-managed irrigation systems in policy makers—states the importance for Nepal. Following a request from the Food and communities to have a “Minimal Recognition Agricultural Organisation (FAO) of the United of Rights to Organize”, i.e. to ensure that the Nations to prepare a similar database to study rule-making rights of a local community are forest governance, Ostrom and her colleagues POLICY MATTERS 2014: REMEMBERING ELINOR OSTROM

13 Plate 1: Elinor Ostrom at a community forest group meeting organized by the Foundation for Ecological Security in Karnataka State, India, in February 2012 (Photo credit: Harini Nagendra)

at The Workshop in Political Theory and context, where guards have to cover large Policy Analysis at Indiana University initiated areas, are lightly armed, and have to deal with the International Forestry Resources and social challenges that make it difficult for Institutions (IFRI) program, which would them to enforce rules. In fact, as Agrawal and provide over-time data on peopled forests Chhatre (2006) conclude from IFRI studies in to link information on socio-economic, India and elsewhere, government involvement institutional and ecological aspects. Now may be negatively associated with forest active in a number of countries across multiple condition in some contexts, while community continents, IFRI was founded and tested using managed forests may be better suited to cater a small set of sites that included locations to local needs (Agrawal and Chhatre 2006; in India and Nepal, and continues to contain Chhatre and Agrawal 2008).Thus, warning active programs in these two countries. against a mis-interpretation of the need for monitoring, Ostrom and Nagendra (2006, Research from IFRI locations in India has been 19230-19231) stated that “We do not advocate fundamental in demonstrating the importance using fences and guns to protect government of self-governance and local monitoring for forests… Unless one ensures the livelihoods the sustainable management of community of those living around or within a forest, a forests in critical wildlife habitats in central major investment in monitoring alone is not a India (Ghate 2004; Ostrom and Nagendra sufficient, long-run management strategy and 2006; Ghate, Ghate and Ostrom 2013) and may even be counterproductive”. the eastern Himalayas (Agrawal and Chhatre 2006). Local monitoring, sanctioning and Through a careful examination of forest enforcement of rules seem to be important change in the Tadoba Andhari Tiger Reserve predictors of forest condition in several in Maharashtra, the Mahananda Wildlife IFRI studies (Ghate and Nagendra 2006). A Sanctuary in West Bengal, and the Chitwan complete reliance on government monitoring National Park in Nepal, Ostrom and Nagendra through forest guards is difficult in the Indian (2006) found that the official designation POLICY MATTERS 2014: REMEMBERING ELINOR OSTROM

14 of a forest as government, community, or in predominantly tribal communities in the co-managed did not appear to impact forest Indian State of Maharashtra. From eight conservation as much as the legitimacy of experiments conducted in four forest/tribal ownership and degree of local monitoring. rich areas of the state, Ghate, Ghate and Corroborating this, data from 42 forests in Ostrom (forthcoming) found that communities multiple countries established that the type that have had strong previous traditions of of ownership did not have a statistically shared norms and mutual trust tend to be non- significant impact on forest quality as exploitative, non-commercial, and cooperate measured using assessments of tree density towards prioritising, planning,“Homo economicus” and sustainably or tree size. What emerged as most significant managing forest“Homo resources. reciprocans” Thus, human was the involvement of communities in “Homobeings arecooperatus” not always , regular monitoring, with this study concluding they can be and even that “when users are genuinely engaged in in the case of common- decisions regarding rules affecting their use, pool resources. The study confirms Ostrom’s the likelihood of them following the rules and (1998) observation that it is also possible for monitoring others is much greater than when individuals to achieve results that are “better an authority simply imposes rules.” (Ostrom than rational” in certain conditions. and Nagendra 2006, 19224). Local forest users can also provide reliable, low cost assessments Another study that used evolving field of changes in forest density that can be experiments (Ghate, Ghate and Ostrom significant inputs for monitoring ecological 2013) indicates that indigenous communities change (Nagendra and Ostrom 2011). can be trusted with forest management responsibilities, and policies such as Joint The research of Ostrom and colleagues holds Forest Management (JFM) and the FRA are great significance for Indian forest policy, in moving in the right direction. In one of the particular to the discussions of the Scheduled experiments, participants adopted plantations Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers of fast-growing trees for fuel wood and fodder, (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act (FRA) which, they argued, helped them protect of 2006, which provides traditional forest high-value timber trees. It was also clear by dwellers with rights over forest land that their behaviour during the experiments that is customarily used and managed by them. communities are able to address the issue Presently, debates around implementation of equity while sharing the benefits from of the FRA are centred on questions such collective forest protections measures. The as: Are communities capable of monitoring study concludes that if forests collectively and managing such a valuable resource? managed by communities are not degraded Will the transfer of authority result in large- below the critical minimum, communities scale deforestation? Are traditional norms of are capable of successfully protecting and sustainable harvesting and equitable benefit regenerating the resource. However, at least in FIELDsharing EXPERIMENTSeffective in traditional IN INDIGENOUS communities? the initial period, some failures of community INDIAN COMMUNITIES management should not be generalized, because “once altruist and reciprocal motivations are crowded out, it takes some time to re-establish trust and reciprocity” Generally assumed in these discussions RESEARCH(Vollan 2008: ON 563). URBAN INDIAN is the fact that access to markets and commercialisation has affected local COMMONS communities’ attitudes and behaviour regarding forests, making them less inclined to cooperate, and more likely to engage in Ostrom argued it was time to really pay destructive practices of over-harvesting. attention to urban commons. The Social- Ostrom and her colleagues examined this issue Ecological Systems (SES) Framework she in detail using field experiments conducted developed provides a useful common POLICY MATTERS 2014: REMEMBERING ELINOR OSTROM

15 language that can be used to understand the involvement of citizens (to closely the patterns of interactions and outcomes monitor and manage local challenges) and occurring in complex urban systems (Ostrom government organizations (to solve large 2007). Ostrom recommended that the SES scale technical problems and deal with framework be used as the initial organizing social challenges such as sanctioning major language by scholars, citizens, and officials polluters). Contrary to the trend of increased who are trying to understand a complex centralization in the country’s urban areas, system so as to achieve effective, fair, and a polycentric structure seems most effective sustainable policies over time (Ostrom for solving the numerous environmental 2009). This framework provides a common challenges plaguing Indian cities (Nagendra analytical language to identify the broad et al. 2012)—especially through the characteristics of a Resource System and explicit provision of opportunities for related Resource Units, a Governance System, local communities to work effectively with and Actors that together impact on the governmentalTRANSLATING agencies. OSTROM’S IDEAS ON structure of Action Situations, leading to THE COMMONS INTO PRACTICE: specific Interactions and Outcomes. During THE INDIAN CONTEXT the last year of Ostrom’s life, she and one of the authors of this paper (HN) had initiated research applying the SES framework to an urban context in the south Indian city of Though the Indian economy is growing at Bangalore, to examine the effects of diverse a rate of 9% annually, the geographies in structural variables on interactions and which this development is located and the outcomes achieved related to seven of the constituency it benefits, remain narrow. city’s lakes (Plate 2). Commons or common pool resources form critical components that supplement and Bangalore, a city in a semi-arid region of support rural communities dependent on south-central India, was formerly dependent agriculture, livestock and forests in large on numerous artificial lakes that have parts of India, but especially across dryland witnessed tremendous encroachment and and tribal areas. The role of land and water pollution in recent years (D’Souza and resources commons in strengthening the Nagendra 2011). Once managed as commons viability of the agro-pastoral production by local communities, these lakes are now systems and the resilience of household governed by a number of government livelihoods has been insufficiently recognized departments with overlapping jurisdictions. so far. While many lakes continue to be severely polluted, a few lakes have been effectively A recent study by the Foundation for restored in recent years and managed Ecological Security (2012) further collaboratively by local citizen groups documented the importance of the commons working with the city municipality (Nagendra for rural livelihood support. Conducted in 2010). Nagendra and Ostrom applied the SES seven states—Rajasthan, Gujarat, Madhya framework to investigate the conditions that Pradesh, Maharashtra, Karnataka, Andhra may shape the ecological and social outcomes Pradesh and Odisha—the study spanned associated with these lakes. Collective action 3000 households in 100 villages in arid, was high in six out of the seven lakes studied. semi-arid and sub-humid parts of the country. Yet, only in two of these lakes were citizens Dependence on the commons was very able to successfully translate collective action high, with 98% of households accessing the into positive ecological outcomes. commons for different types of use, with 69% using the commons for grazing, 30% for The Bangalore example highlights the fodder collection, 53% using the commons for challenge of protecting and cleaning up agriculture and 38% for food, 74% deriving urban lakes in a setting of continued fuelwood, and 38% collecting non-timber pollution, which is very difficult without forest products. In sub‐humid areas, people POLICY MATTERS 2014: REMEMBERING ELINOR OSTROM

16 Plate 2: Elinor Ostrom planting a jackfruit tree at the Kaikondrahalli lake in Bangalore in February 2012, surrounded by members of the local community closely involved in restoration and lake management (Photo credit: Harini Nagendra).

largely utilized the commons for meeting degradation, by assessing the actual extent agricultural needs, while in arid and semi- and status of resources that are generally arid regions, the commons were critical for considered as common pool in nature as well livestock grazing. Dependence on community as the nature of property rights governing the sources of water, such as tanks, ponds, rivers same. was also high, as was dependence on forests for timber, fuel wood and non-timber forest The studies described above clearly products. Resources from the commons demonstrate that continued access to the contributed to a substantial proportion of commons helps provide stability and security household income, about 25%—and an even in an unpredictable environment. Although higher proportion of 31% of net income for especially critical for landless households, the landless, who were highly dependent commons are also very important for large on fuel wood from the commons. This study rural land-owners. Yet, land use data from indicates that India needs to strengthen its Indian states demonstrates that common information databases on common land lands have seen an overall reduction in and water resources, along the lines of the area, with a marked decline in grazing lands databases developed by Ostrom and her and cultivable “wastelands”. The crisis is colleagues on forest, irrigation and marine a manifestation of institutional apathy, commons across the world. Such databases following neglect of traditional institutional could help to dispel myths related to their arrangements and the customary rights of ‘residual’ character and thereby their people in the institutional solutions proposed POLICY MATTERS 2014: REMEMBERING ELINOR OSTROM

17 Ostrom under different landsGram stood Sabhas/Gram vested through Panchayats local laws in the Government of State, which handed over their management believed that India and State to . They were in a country policies and generally treated as inalienable in order that like India, programmes. their status as community land be preserved.” Programmes for with a federal decentralization, This ruling clearly recognizes the diversity of system of based on a Indian commons, a finding supported by Lin Ostrom’s deep appreciation of institutional governance, prescriptive top- down approach diversity (Ostrom and Nagendra 2011). polycentricity without Indeed, at a meeting in Delhi in early January, was critical understanding India’s then Minister of Environment and Forests, Jairam Ramesh singled out the for effective local social- cultural most powerful insight that he thought Lin’s management dynamics or research had to offer Indian policy—that of the the economic institutions are diverse, and that institutional and ecological monocultures are to be avoided (Foundation commons... conditions, have for Ecological Security 2011). failed to meet expectations. India has a rich diversityVan of traditional Panchayats, Although there gramyaand indigenous institutions for commonsVan has been a Panchayatsmanagement, including shift in the policy paradigm towards more jungles and community forestry. participatory forms of development and are long standing village forest natural resource management since the institutions in Uttaranchal, with a documented history of existence over a century, that have Panchayati1990s, as reflected Raj in the 73rd amendment of Constitution enabling a greater role for been very successfulGramya in the protection and Institutions, JFM arrangements, sustainable management of village forests in and recent Acts such as Mahatma Gandhi the Kumaon hills. jungles are village National Rural Employment Guarantee Act forest institutions recognized in the state (MGNREGA) and Forest Rights Act, several of Odisha, consisting of village forest areas challenges remain in the institutional arena managed for communal and developmental level in order to realize the potential of this purposes within the village boundary. shift. Similarly, there are a variety of long standing indigenous community institutions Mundari that have The Supreme Court of India, in a recent Khuntkattievolved locally to manage forests in different landmark ruling (Jagpal Singh and Others parts of the country, such as the vs State of Punjab and Others (Civil Appeal in Chotanagpur, indigenousDevara Kaadus No. 1132/2011 @ SLP (C) No. 3109/2011), CommunityGunda Thopus Forest Management in Odisha and recognized the importance of the commons, Maharashtra, sacred groves ( stating that “Since time immemorial there and ) in Karnataka. have been common lands inhering in the village communities in India…. These public In most instances, these indigenous utility lands in the villages were for centuries institutions have been insufficiently used for the common benefit of the villagers of recognized by formal administrative rights, the village such as ponds for various purposes with national programs largely focused on e.g. for their cattle to drink and bathe, for approaches such as JFM. For instance, in storing their harvested grain, as grazing parts of the Aravalli hills in north India, an ground for the cattle, threshing floor, maidan important ecoregion which harbours highly for playing by children, carnivals, circuses, biodiverse forests critical for ground water ramlila, cart stands, water bodies, passages, recharge, forests have been traditionally cremation ground or graveyards, etc. These protected by local communities through POLICY MATTERS 2014: REMEMBERING ELINOR OSTROM

18 their belief in sacred spirits and yet are for strengthening the efforts to conserve, now threatened by urbanization spreading develop and protect common lands through outwards from the Indian capital, Delhi. community involvement under the National Ostrom believed that in a country like Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme India, with a federal system of governance, (NREGS). The Government of Rajasthan polycentricity was critical for effective was the first to formulate state-specific management of the commons, combining commons legislation, ‘The Draft Rajasthan the greater fiscal and administrative Common Land Policy (2010)’, which it capacities of the government with the local followed up by developing ‘Operational knowledge and monitoring capacity of local Guidelines on the Implementation of Grazing communities (Narayanan 2012). Land Development under MGNREGA’, both with the involvement of the Foundation A major challenge for polycentricity in for Ecological Security. The Supreme Court India is that effective formal and informal of India, as a result of the Jagpal Singh institutions have not been crafted to protect, and Others vs State of Punjab and Others develop and manage common lands. For decisions mentioned previously, directed the instance, Joint Forest Management (JFM) state governments to has largely failed in providing access Panchayati Raj draw up schemes to Large scale to non-timber forest products for local evict encroachments changes are communities. Institutions on common lands have, on the whole, shown limited capacity Panchayats needed, whilst and restore them to manage and develop common lands Gram Sabhas to keeping in and to prioritize MGNREGA and other and developmental funds for restoration and mind the (village institutions). protection of the commons. At times, central pillar Following the apex these have also come into conflict with court’s direction, of Ostrom’s community-led initiatives. In Orissa, south there have been five Gujarat and south Rajasthan, for instance, vision— self- high court orders Foundation for Ecological Security (2012) governance of either admitting found that access to forest lands seems cases against the the commons to have improved as a result of informal taking over of claims and contestations with the forest at a local level village commons department, rather than through formal that permits or rescinding such institutional recognition. takeovers. Twenty- flexibility, In the Indian context, differences in policies nine judiciary adaptation and at the federal (national), state and local pronouncements innovation, levels are also critical, with land-related and twenty-nine policies strongly influenced by state government orders with the interventions. Further, even when state on commons have ultimate goal policies are in place, bridging the gap been issued since of ensuring between legal policies and field programmes the apex court order is critical to achieve actual impact on the last year (Mahapatra equitable and ground. The key, therefore, is to move 2012). The 12th sustainable from a piecemeal approach towards the Plan of the Planning access to the management of natural resources to long- Commission of term policy and programmatic action. India has also commons for Progress is slowly being made in a number recognized the all citizens. of states. A collaborative arrangement importance of the between the Rural Development Department commons, creating of Government of Andhra Pradesh and NGO a working group on networks has been established in 2009 ‘Natural Resources POLICY MATTERS 2014: REMEMBERING ELINOR OSTROM

19 Plate 3: Elinor Ostrom with the authors of this manuscript (and Harini Nagendra’s daughter) in Bangalore in February 2012, on the last day of her final visit to India (Photo credit: Venkatachalam Suri).

Management and Rainfed Farming’ and sub national level. In this context, a Model Common group on ‘Institutions and Commons’ for the Lands Bill or such like could provide important 12th Plan preparation, in which the need direction for State Governments. One approach for favourable land tenure arrangements, could include tethering the MGNREGA with a institutional design and programme ‘commons regime’, such that the institutional architecture was highlighted for effective dimensions currently found wanting would be governance and management of commons. filled. The right to employment and the right Following direction from the Lok Adalat over resources combined together can have (people’s court) of Karnataka, two districts a significant impact in protecting ecological in Karnataka have also embarked on a resources and creating robust institutional programme to improve their commons CONCLUDINGregimes. THOUGHTS management.

These new directions for commons regimes, while focusing to date on land, hold promise In conclusion, the ethics and value systems for other commons of importance to India espoused by Elinor Ostrom, and her such as fisheries, water (and ground water in pathbreaking insights into the commons, particular), genetic sources such as agricultural as well as her research on the principles seeds, and patenting of traditional knowledge governing their effective, equitable and systems, traditional health practices and sustainable management, has tremendous medicines. However, while the direction taken implications for the governance of shared by the Indian Supreme Court, the policy and resources in India. India is home to a grand programmatic level decisions of the Central diversity of common pool resources ranging Government, many State Governments, and the from forests to grazing lands, from fresh Planning Commission all provide ways forward, water to marine areas, with both rural and there remains a lack of integration in efforts to urban communities exhibiting widespread address the issue of commons governance at a dependence on these resources for meeting POLICY MATTERS 2014: REMEMBERING ELINOR OSTROM

20 a range of economic, social, cultural and Foundation for Ecological Security (FES). spiritual needs. Ostrom’s theoretical and 2011. Dr. Elinor Ostrom and Shri Jairam empirical observations of the commons Ramesh’s Address at the Prof. Bharat Ram provide a framework for governance Memorial Lecture, New Delhi, January 5, 2011. that respects diversity and rights to local Accessed 14 May 2013. http://fes.org.in/ self-governance, while at the same time commons/wp-content/uploads/2011/01/Dr.- recognizing the need for multi-level Ostrom-Day-in-Delhi-Jan-5-11.pdf. governance that require governments to fulfil A Commons Story: In the Rain Shadow of Foundation for Ecological Security (FES). their social responsibilities towards equity Green Revolution 2012. and sustainability. India has a long standing . Anand, Gujarat: Foundation diversity of traditional common property for Ecological Security.Uncommons In The systems, with new forms of innovative Commons: Community-Initiated Forest Resource commons governance evolving in areas such Management.Ghate, Rucha. 2004. as patent rights, and in urban commons. Recent initiatives by the Supreme Court of New Delhi: Concept Publishing India, coupled with various Indian State Company. Government initiatives in some states, and the Ghate, Rucha and Harini Nagendra. 2006. “Role national policy changes brought about by the Conservationof monitoring and in institutional Society performance: Forest Rights Act, indicate signs of progress forest management in Maharashtra, India”. that are promising. Yet much remains to be 3: 509-532. done. Large scale changes are needed, whilst keeping in mind the central pillar of Ostrom’s Ghate, Rucha, Suresh Ghate and Elinor vision — self-governance of the commons at a Ostrom. 2013. “IndigenousInternational communities, Journal local level that permits flexibility, adaptation ofcommunication the Commons and cooperation: Taking and innovation, with the ultimate goal of experiments to the field.” ensuring equitable and sustainable access to 7(2): 498-520. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTSthe commons for all citizens. Ghate, Rucha, Suresh Ghate and ElinorEconomic Ostrom. and2013. Political “Can communities Weekly plan, grow and sustainably harvest from forests?” XLVIII: 59-67. HN acknowledges financial support from the Department of Science and Technology, Ghate, Rucha, Harini Nagendra and Government of India through a Ramanujan Deepshikha Mehra. 2012. “Is JFM really Fellowship. This article draws substantively on helping communities and forests? The a previous paper—H. Nagendra, R. Ghate and J. need to focus on institutionEnvironmental building”. In: Rao (2013). Governing the commons. Seminar Governance:Bandyopadhyay, Approaches, Jayant, Kanchan Imperatives, Chopra RIndiaeferences 641: 88-93. and MethodsNilanjan Ghosh (eds.), (pp. 163-189). New Delhi: Bloomsbury and Indian Society for Ecological Agrawal, Arun and Ashwini Chhatre. 2006. Economics. “Explaining success on the commons: Science World Development Hardin, Garret. 1968. “The tragedy of the Community forest governance in the Indian commons.” 162: 1243-1248. Himalaya”. 34: 149-166. Jodha, Narpat S. 1986. “Common property Chhatre, Ashwini and Arun Agrawal. 2008. Economic and Political Weekly resources and rural poor in dry regions of “Forest commons and local enforcement”. India”. 21: 1169- PNAS 105: 13286-13291. 1181. D’Souza, Rohan and Harini Nagendra. 2011. Down to Earth Mahapatra, Richard. 2012. “Uncommon swing “Changes in public commons as a consequence Environmental Management for commons”. , June 15. of urbanization: The Agara lake in Bangalore, India”. 47: 840-850. Nagendra, Harini. 2012. “Elinor Ostrom: 1933- POLICY MATTERS 2014: REMEMBERING ELINOR OSTROM

21 Current Science Understanding Institutional Diversity 2012”. 103: 433-434. Ostrom, Elinor. 2005. . Princeton, NJ: Princeton Nagendra, Harini and Elinor Ostrom. 2012. International Journal of the Commons University Press. “Polycentric governance of forest resources”. 6: 104- Ostrom, Elinor and Harini Nagendra. 2006. 133. “Insights on linking forests, trees, and people Ecology from the air, on the ground, and in the lab”. andNagendra, Society Harini and Elinor Ostrom. 2011. PNAS 103: 19224-19331. “The challenge of forest diagnostics.” 16: 20. [online] URL: http://www. Ostrom, Elinor and Harini Nagendra. ecologyandsociety.org/vol16/iss2/art20/. 2007. “Governing the commons in the new Seminar India millennium:Encyclopedia A diversity of Earth of institutions for Nagendra, Harini. 2010. “Maps, lakes and natural resource management”. In: Cutler, J. citizens”. 613: 19-23. (ed.), . Washington, D.C.: Nagendra, Harini, HS Sudhira, Madhusudhan Environmental Information Coalition, National Council for Science and the Environment. Katti, Maria Tengö and Maria Schwenius. 2012. Forests, People and Power: The Political “Urbanization, ecosystems and biodiversity: EcologySpringate-Baginski, of Reform in Oliver South andAsia Piers M. Blaikie. Assessments of India and Bangalore”. Released 2007. at the Cities for Life Summit, parallel to . London, UK: the eleventh meeting of the Conference of Earthscan. the Parties to the Convention on Biological Vollan, Bjørn. 2008. “Socio-ecological Diversity (CBD), Hyderabad, India, 15th explanations for crowding out effects from October. economic field experiments in southern Forbes India, Village Republics: Economic Narayanan, Dinesh. 2012. “Elinor Ostrom on Africa”. Ecological Economics 67: 560-573. Conditions for Collective Action in South India managing common property.” Wade, R., 1988. Governing the Commons: March 1. . The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Action.Ostrom, Elinor. 1990. Zagorski, Nick. 2006. “Profile of Elinor Cambridge. UK: Cambridge University Ostrom”. PNAS 103: 19221-19223. Press.

POLICY MATTERS 2014: REMEMBERING ELINOR OSTROM

22 The Impact of Elinor Ostrom’s Scholarship on Commons Governance in Mexico An Overview2

Raul Pacheco-Vega The Impact of Elinor Ostrom’s Scholarship on Commons Governance in Mexico An Overview

Raul Pacheco-Vega1

Abstract2

Professor Ostrom’s work has been extremely influential worldwide, and this includes important contributions to Mexican commons scholarship and governance. From water and forest stewardship to small-scale fisheries management, her institutional approach to analyzing commons problems and uncovering opportunities for self-organization, where solutions to complex resource issues are far from straightforward, has been successfully applied to case studies across the country. This paper summarizes lessons learned from such cases, which cover a broad range of resource areas and issues, and offers insight into the degree of impact that Ostrom’s work has had, and continues to have, on Mexico’s efforts to more sustainably manage its extensive natural resource commons. Keywords: Governance, Mexico, commons, neo-institutionalism, water governance, polycentricity, complex adaptive systems

Plate 1: Mountain Stream, humid montane forest, communal territory of Santiago Comaltepec, Oaxaca, Mexico. (Photo credit: James Robson)

1 Professor/Researcher, Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económica (CIDE), Aguas Calientes, México. Email: raul.pacheco-vega@ cide.edu

POLICY MATTERS 2014: REMEMBERING ELINOR OSTROM

24 INTRODUCTION OSTROM AND MEXICO

Professor Lin Ostrom’s work has been extremely Before delving into the application of Lin influential worldwide, and her scholarship Ostrom’s work to Mexican cases of shared has been applied across the sphere of Mexican resource management, it is worth outlining the commons governance. From forest stewardship intellectual history of her involvement with to water governance to small-scale fisheries the country’s scholarly endeavours in the field management, Lin’s institutional approach to of common pool resource theory. Lin came to analyzing commons problems and uncovering Mexico several times during her life, as her opportunities for self-organization, especially scholarly collaboration with Dr. Leticia Merino where solutions to complex resource issues are from UNAM’s Institute for Social Research (IIS- far from straightforward, has been successfully UNAM, Instituto de Investigaciones Sociales de applied to cases around the country. This la Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México) paper summarizes the lessons learned from blossomed. Professor Merino’s scholarship a number of Mexican studies, which cover a has been integral to how we view forest broad range of natural resource commons, in governance in Mexico (Merino Perez, 2004), order to highlight the influence of her work. I and Merino used Lin Ostrom’s work extensively begin by summarizing the intellectual history to document the institutional arrangements of Mexican interactions with Lin’s scholarship, that have enabled Mexico’s community-based before conducting a review of how her work has forest sector to develop, and flourish in some been used to research and better understand instances, and compare these with experiences multiple types of resource commons and their from other countries. management across the country. Using water governance as a major focus, I then describe Merino was also involved in some of the how Lin’s thinking has influenced policy and watershed moments that punctuate Lin offer a number of potential avenues for applied Ostrom’s influence on Mexican commons scholarly research to build on. scholars more broadly. In 2004, Professor Merino helped to organize, in addition to I may come across as a little biased in my chairing, the Tenth Biennial Conference of writing. There is a simple reason for that—I the International Association for the Study of had been an avid student of Lin’s and her Common Property (IASCP), held in Oaxaca in husband, Vincent, when they came to visit southern Mexico. This exposed many Mexican the University of British Columbia as Green scholars to Lin Ostrom’s scholarship, who then College Residential Visiting Professors. I spent applied the frameworks and theoretical lessons hours listening to their lectures and having of her work more readily to case studies around long scholarly conversations outside of the the country. As Robson and Lichtenstein’s lecture hall and cherished their subsequent (2013) recent study shows, the IASCP’s Oaxaca friendship, mentorship and guidance. It was conference led to a significant increase in Lin and Vincent who encouraged me to engage peer-reviewed published articles from both in water governance scholarship, and it is in Mexico and Latin America more generally. their memory that I now undertake scholarly Then, more recently in 2012, and just a few work on these issues in Mexico. While it was months before her passing, Lin was invited by those personal interactions with the Ostroms Dr. Lourdes Amaya Ventura to give a seminar that led me to the study of neo-institutionalism in Mexico City. On the back of this, a number of and commons governance theories, it has been additional events were organised, including one the applicability of their work that has kept me at the Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana in this field since then. Lin Ostrom’s research Cuajimalpa where numerous Mexican scholars has left an indelible mark on environmental presented draft conceptual and empirical policy, and I hope this article showcases some papers for Ostrom to provide feedback on. of the ways by which her thinking has advanced While limited space precludes a review of the our understanding of self-governing resource papers presented at the event, it was clear systems in a Mexican context. that interest in commons governance, neo- POLICY MATTERS 2014: REMEMBERING ELINOR OSTROM

25 institutionalism and polycentricity had risen Kastens, & Knieper, 2010). I have been among Agreatly REVIEW since OF Lin’s OSTROM’S earlier visits INFLUENCE to the country. ON the main proponents of IAD applications to MEXICAN COMMONS SCHOLARSHIP Mexican water governance, using the Lerma- Chapala river basin as the case study of choice (Pacheco-Vega & Vega 2008a, 2008b; Pacheco-Vega 2005, 2007a, 2007b, 2012a, There appear to be four broad categories of 2012b, 2012c). This work has found that scholarly output from Lin Ostrom that apply institutional reforms for water governance to Mexican commons governance. The first in Mexico such as river basin councils are not one is perhaps the most popular; the concept robust enough to facilitate proper sanitation of common pool resources (CPRs) and the policy. More recently, Briseño Ramírez idea that self-organizing communities can followed a similar strategy in undertaking an build institutions (understood as the rules and institutional analysis of water management in normsGoverning that regulate the Commonsagents’ interactions) for the metropolitan area of Guadalajara in Mexico resource self-governance. Taken from her 1990 (Briseño Ramírez 2012), finding that the book, , Ostrom’s Design structures of resource governance at the local, Principles for commons institutions have been state and regional levels are weak, and that the widely used as an analytical lens by which dilution of jurisdictional responsibilities lead Mexican scholars examine the robustness of to deficient institutional structures that further resource governance systems. undermine water management at the regional The second category concerns the framework level. These findings are consistent with my that evolved partially from Susan Kiser and frequent criticisms of the river basin council Elinor Ostrom’s grammar of institutions and as an arena for water management in Mexico partially from an evolutionary process of (Pacheco-Vega 2012b). understanding how institutions emerge: the The third category deals with Ostrom’s work Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) on polycentricity. Milman and Scott (2010) framework (Gibson, Andersson, Ostrom, & Ostrom’s used Ostrom’s work in this area to examine Shivakumar 2008; the shared Santa Cruz Aquifer that runs Design Olivares & Sandoval alongside the US-Mexico border. Their findings Principles 2008; Ostrom, confirm what we already knew thanks to Lin’s Gibson, Shivakumar, for commons research: that a non-polycentric approach & Andersson can lead to overlapping authority and blurred institutions 2001; Ostrom jurisdictional boundaries, thereby weakening have been 2011; Pacheco- resource governance regimes and limiting Vega 2005). IAD is widely used as proper binational groundwater management. both an analytical Yet by exploring the degree to which Mexican an analytical framework and a water governance is moving towards more lens by which set of heuristics that polycentric models (Pacheco-Vega 2013a, enable scholars to Mexican 2013b), my own work – comparing the study how resource geographies of wastewater in the central cities scholars governance systems of Leon and Aguascalientes and analyzing a examine the function, through dataset of 26 river basin councils in Mexico— the identification robustness finds that such governance arrangements in of structural Mexico are still in their infancy and remain of resource variables that poorly understood. affect institutional governance arrangements The fourth category concerns the broader systems. (Ostrom 2010, decentralization of natural resources 2011; Pacheco-Vega governance and how devolving decision- & Basurto 2008; making power to lower levels of organizational Pahl-Wostl, Holtz, structures can contribute to building better, POLICY MATTERS 2014: REMEMBERING ELINOR OSTROM

26 more robust rules for resource management. Mexican natural resource policy. Antinori A glut of recent work on Mexican resource and Bray (2005), for example, contributed management has been espousing the to our understanding of community-based effectiveness of a decentralized governance forest enterprises in Mexico, which drew model (Bravo Pérez, Castro Ramírez, & on insights from the common property Gutiérrez Andrade 2005; Caire Martínez 2004; literature with regards to self-organization Caldera Ortega 2012; Camacho, Aguilar, & and community engagement. Ostrom´s work Cercantes 2012; Cortez Lara 2005; Domínguez has also demonstrated that strong cooperation 2012; Galindo-Escamilla, Palerm-Viqueira, by all actors is necessary to achieve good Tovar-Salinas & Rodarte-García 2008; González governance—something Barsimantsov Santana, n.d.; Licea Murillo 2012; López Mera (2010) picked up on when identifying non- & Chávez Hernández 2012; Murillo Licea 2012; governmental organizations (NGOs) as key Paré & Robles 2000). actors in implementing sound resource management strategies. In his comparison Beyond the field of water governance, Ostrom’s of forest governance in the Mexican states influence has been equally apparent in the of Oaxaca and Michoacán, Barsimantsov study of other natural resource commons in (2010: 62) found that “unless communities Mexico. In the forest sector, for example, the can internalize timber extraction and aforementioned Leticia Merino is among a community development activities, external group of Mexican scholars to have made use non-governmental actors will be critical in of Ostrom’s work, having spent many years community forestry and therefore must be studying the country’s self-organizing forest considered in creating development strategies.” communities. The country’s community forests offer an excellent opportunity to Jacinta Palerm is another leading Mexican empirically apply Ostrom’s thinking given that scholar to frequently useThe Ostrom’s country’s scholarly they function as something of a laboratory work to provide for researching how self-organization affects context to community forest conditions over time. Merino-Perez analyses of forests offer irrigation systems and Hernandez-Apolinar (2004), for example, an excellent analyzed forest conservation initiatives within management in the Monarch Butterfly Biosphere Reserve, Mexico (Palerm opportunity Michoacan, from 1986 to 2000, focusing on the Viqueira, Rivas, to empirically Ávalos Gutiérrez, & experiences of two ejido communities: Cerro apply Ostrom’s Prieto and Donaciano Ojeda. In the former they Pimentel Equihua, found that pernicious self-reinforcing negative 2004; Palerm thinking given incentives led to illegal timber extraction, Viqueira 1999, that they 2000, 2003). With while in the latter, nested formal and informal function as institutions had helped to generate incentives frequent reference for forest conservation and the regulation of to Ostrom, the something of a timber extraction. work of Palerm laboratory for typically focuses Other stand-out case studies include Lujan on organizational researching Alvarez’s (2003) work that argues for the structures and how self- creation of participatory multi-stakeholder the hierarchy of roundtables to empower forest communities division of labor organization to properly manage their timber resources. in irrigation affects forest He used Ostrom’s work to set the stage management in conditions over in highlighting the need for community central Mexico. participation mechanisms in the governance Nevertheless, in time. of Mexico’s forest resources. Among the many some key work non-Mexicans working in the country, several (particularly studies inspired by Ostrom have influenced those involving POLICY MATTERS 2014: REMEMBERING ELINOR OSTROM

27 the Cuautla and Nexapa Rivers) Palerm and Finally, any review of Ostrom’s impact on collaborators explore the relevance of formal Mexican commonsRelaciones scholarship is incomplete and informal institutional arrangements within without reference to the Mexican social river basins and associated irrigation districts. science journal , which dedicated a entire volume in 2002 to the application Ostrom’s work has also been applied to the of Ostrom’s work to understanding local study of fisheries management worldwide, self-governance and the commons in Mexico and Mexico is well represented here (Basurto Understanding(Roth Seneff 2002). Institutional This was Diversity something of a et al., 2012; Cinti, Shaw, Cudney-Bueno & pioneering move, given that Ostrom’s 2005 Rojo 2010; Ibáñez de la Calle, Becerra Pérez book was & Brachet Barro 2004; Morán-Angulo 2012; yet to be published, and she was still 7 years Ortiz Paniagua 2004; Zepeda Domínguez away from being awarded the Nobel Prize. 2010). Basurto’s work, in particular, is relevant The volume summarized mostly theoretical as it draws directly from the Ostrom school work but did include some empirical studies of institutional analysis (Professor Basurto on water allocation in Izucar de Matamoros in was a student of Lin’s). In his studies of two northern Mexico, and forestry management Mexican small-scale fisheries in the Gulf of in the Monarch Butterfly Biosphere Reserve California, Mexico, he found broad divergences in Michoacan, comparing governance of in how communities access and govern fish as forest resources there with those found in a resource. While one community used a CPR Oaxaca, southern Mexico. The standout piece, regime approach, the other continued to rely however, was written by Silvia Bofill Poch, who on permits as a policy strategy (Basurto et al., explored community forestry in the indigenous 2012), showing that both formal and informal community of San Juan Parangaricutiro rules and institutions both have a direct in the Purhepecha altiplano (Bofill-Poch, effect on the effectiveness of the resource 2002). In her article, Bofill Poch looked at the governance regime. articulation (or lack thereof) and nesting of political institutions, social norms and power Beyond these more resource-specific fields struggles that have reinforced class struggles of scholarship (water, fisheries and forestry), and conflicts between governments at multiple Ostrom’s work on the commons (particularly scales and forestry community users. In the her study of rules and institutions in self- same vein as Ostrom’s work on self-governing governing systems) has also been applied irrigation units, Bofill Poch shows the more broadly to the governance of Mexico’s myriad conflicts that can stem from perverse extensive resource commons. Her early 1990s ejidos incentives and a lack of robust institutional work, which dealt with agrarian issues, is structures tend to perpetuate negative effects well suited to the study of Mexican — HOWon resources OSTROM’S governance. WORK HAS land-based tenure systems managed by small-scale resource appropriators that share INFLUENCED POLICY: THE CASE OF characteristics of both common and private WATER GOVERNANCE property. For example, Schroederejidos Gonzalez undertook an applied study of ecosystems within the Chamela-Cuxmala (Schroeder Within the context of setting new regulatory Gonzalez 2006), and reported that institutions standards for water governance in Mexico, for resource conservation were lacking and bureaucrats and scholars alike have used indicative of a loss of social cohesion and social Ostrom’s common pool resource (CPR) theory capital in the communities under study—a as an all-encompassing framework to allow finding that resonated strongly with Ostrom’s for innovative institutional reforms to be view that self-governing communities need to implemented in a relatively straightforward develop long-range, robust, and cooperative fashion. In addition, because the vast majority institutional arrangements to ensure resources of Mexican scholarship on water governance are not degraded by the actions of narrow- focuses on water allocation, redistribution minded, short-sighted appropriators. and equitable sharing, Ostrom’s research POLICY MATTERS 2014: REMEMBERING ELINOR OSTROM

28 findings are easily applied to Mexican case has been extremely influential in Mexican studies dealing with access to water. In my water policy. As an example, the past couple own research, I have departed from analyzing of years have seen a flurry of works published water access to focus more on the rules and that stressed the need to devolve control to institutions governing wastewater generation, communities as one of the necessary pillars of distribution and treatment (Pacheco-Vega future water governance in Mexico (COLMEX, & Basurto 2008; Pacheco-Vega,2005, 2009, CONAGUA, IMTA, & ANEAS 2012). 2012c). Using a comparative analysis of the sanitation policies of five Mexican States, Taking Ostrom’s insights on decentralization as Ostrom’s work has helped me to demonstrate a main tenet of resource governance, Mexican that when institutional reforms such as river water policy is slowly but surely moving in this basin councils are not robust enough, they direction.Ley de Her Aguas research has been influential can be detrimental to building a potentially Nacionalesin the design of the Mexican National Water sustainable basin-wide sanitation policy. Law ( ), Lin Ostrom’s Lin Ostrom’s teachings were much broader where changes research than just a mere list of 8 design principles for have seen greater demonstrated good commons governance. Unfortunately, emphasis placed the recent popularization of her scholarship on community that (following her 2009 Nobel Prize for participation in communities Economics) have sprouted hundreds of order to build are indeed notes, newspaper and magazine articles on resilient and robust her research that tend to narrow her major institutions for capable of self- achievements down to these very principles. water governance. organizing for As others papers in this special issue show, Similarly, sustainable doing so negates the many contributions of Ostrom’s work Lin Ostrom’s intellectual heritage. This is on institutional water no less the case with water governance in diversity and her governance. Mexico. In reviewing how her contributions emphasis on multi- have been used by scholars to understand layered forms of water governance in the country, three governance have insights in particular should be considered. opened up policy First, Lin Ostrom’s research demonstrated discussions at the national level to increase the that communities are indeed capable of self- perceived value of polycentric arrangements organizinghuertas for sustainable water governance. and to test their feasibility at the sub-national cajasTaking de her agua previous empirical work on level. Last year, Mexico’s National Water Spanish , and applying it to Mexican Commission (Comisión Nacional del Agua, , Palerm and collaborators have CONAGUA) convened a policy workshop shown that communities are capable of self- sponsored by the OECD (Organisation for organizing to improve conditions in their Economic Cooperation and Development) irrigation systems. Second, Ostrom’s insights where discussions around polycentricity and on rule and norm design have helped improve water governance in Mexico were held. These Mexican water governance by highlighting the constituted important conversations involving importance of robust institutions designed the country’s policymakers, and they were from the bottom-up. As an example of this, my informed, in part, by Ostrom’s thinking. work demonstrates how Mexican river basin councils can fail when institutional erosion Officials at all three levels of government occurs because of a conflict between policy are now looking to improve the institutional objectives and overlapping jurisdictional design of river basin councils and river basin attributions (Pacheco-Vega 2013a). And third, organisations. The results to date have been Lin Ostrom’s contribution to our understanding mixed, with both successful (the Lerma- of the notion of resource governance itself Chapala river basin), and not-so-successful POLICY MATTERS 2014: REMEMBERING ELINOR OSTROM

29 ... while (Rio Mayo river increased awareness among Mexicans of the Ostrom’s legacy basin) cases. role that local communities could and should is beginning to Nevertheless, the play in natural resources management and mere fact that conservation. Examples abound not only in yield fruit in federal, state and the governance of water resources, but for policy circles municipal-level other resource types also—how institutional around water water authorities innovations can secure sustainable fisheries are increasingly management in coastal zones in Mexico, governance in interested in or how local communities can make use of Mexico, it is no robust institutional and adapt existing customary governance design for shared institutions to help develop their own forest more than a water governance enterprises. beginning— is indicative of the Yet beyond Lin’s obvious contributions to ongoing influence Mexican commons scholarship, it is critical that of Lin Ostrom’s we strive to explore new avenues for scholarly scholarship. research on the commons—work that can While the country’s scholars, practitioners, further the intellectual heritage she provides. and now policy-makers, have begun to delve My hope with this paper is that other scholars more deeply into the long-term implications and practitioners with an interest in Mexican of institutional change for water resource resource commons can be inspired to build governance, new areas are set to be explored. a strong research programme that increases One is the application of Lin Ostrom’s our understanding of their governance institutional analysis framework to study and, in doing so, builds upon the work and rules and norms in non-traditional resource Rachievementseferences of the indomitable Lin Ostrom. management contexts (Pacheco-Vega 2013b). Others include the impact on water governance of the climate as a global commons, adaptation Barsimantov, James A. 2010. “Vicious and to changes to climate across Mexico’s diverse virtuous cycles and the role of external non- geographical regions, and the emerging idea Human government actors in community forestry of anticommons (Osorio & Lara 2012). Thus, Ecology in Oaxaca and Michoacán, Mexico”. while Ostrom’s legacy is beginning to yield fruit 38(1): 49–63. doi:10.1007/s10745- in policy circles around water governance in 009-9289-3 Mexico, it is no more than a beginning—the onus is now on others to follow in her footsteps Basurto, Xavier, Ana Cinti, Luis Bourillón, andCONCLUDING build upon herREMARKS foundational work. Mario Rojo, Jorge Torre and A. Hudson Weaver. 2012. “The emergence of access controls in small-scale fishing commons: A comparative Humananalysis Ecology of individual licenses and common Lin Ostrom’s scholarship on the commons has, property rights in two Mexican communities”. without doubt, had a significant and positive 40(4): 597–609. doi:10.1007/ impact on Mexican resource governance s10745-012-9508-1 scholarship and policy. This paper summarizes a number of those scholarly and applied Bofill-Poch, Silvia. 2002. “NegociandoRelaciones el contributions. Lin was passionate about the interes comun: Poder, conflicto y reciprocidad potential of commons research to improve en San Juan Nuevo, Michoacan”. the lives of Mexicans. During her visits to XXIII(89): 129–156. Mexico, she always kept an ear to the ground, Bravo Pérez, Héctor Manuel, Juan Carlos Castro to think about new ways in which her work Ramírez and Miguel ÁngelGestión Gutiérrez y Política Andrade. and thinking could inform, and be informed Pública2005. El banco de agua: una propuesta para by, the country’s experiences. Perhaps of salvar el lago de Chapala. most importance, her research sparked an XIV: 289–309. POLICY MATTERS 2014: REMEMBERING ELINOR OSTROM

30 Análisis institucional de la gestión del agua en la Zona MetropolitanaBriseño Ramírez, de GuadalajaraHugo. 2012. Galindo-Escamilla, Emmanuel, Jacinta Palerm- Viqueira, Jorge L. Tovar-Salinas and Raúl. (ZMG). Rodarte-García.Agrociencia 2008. “Organización social en la gestión de una fuente de agua: Los Caire Martínez, Georgina Leticia. 2004. Jagüeyes”. , 42: 233–242. “Implicaciones del marco institucional y de la The organización gubernamentalGaceta Ecológica para la gestión Samaritan’sGibson, Clark Dilemma: C, Krister The Andersson, Political EconomyElinor integral por cuencas. El caso de la cuenca ofOstrom Development and Sujai Aid Shivakumar. 2008. Lerma-Chapala”. 71: 55–79. . Oxford, UK: Oxford Caldera Ortega, Alex Ricardo. 2012. University Press. Entre la “Regulación en el subsector de agua potable organización colectiva y la flexibilidad: y saneamientoSegundo en México: Congreso análisis de la crítico Red de ImpactosGonzález socialesSantana, de Octavio. la adopción de tecnología Investigadoresa la propuesta de Agualas ANEAS y propuesta hidroagrícola en el municipio de Ecuandureo, alternativa”. Michoacán . Red de Investigadores Sociales Sobre Agua (RED-ISSA). . Camacho, Joaquin, Ismael Aguilar and Ibáñez de la Calle, Mariela, Mariana Becerra Fernando Cervantes. 2012. “Confianza,Archivos normas de Pérez and Gaelle Brachet Barro. 2004. “Cuotas zootecnicay participación: análisis de organizaciones de individuales Gaceta transferibles: Ecológica Una alternativa para productores lecheros en México”. resolver la problemática de las pesquerías en 61(234): 197–207. México”. 70: 31–43.Hacia un posicionamiento de gobernanza del agua Cinti, Ana, William Shaw, Richard Cudney- enLicea México Murillo, Daniel (ed.). 2012. Bueno and Mario Rojo. 2010. “The unintended consequences of formal fisheries policies: . El Colegio de México / Comisión Social disparities andMarine resource Policy overuse in Nacional del Agua / Instituto Mexicano de a major fishing community in the Gulf of Tecnología del Agua / Asociación Nacional de California, Mexico”. 34(2): Empresas de Agua y Saneamiento. Mexico, DF. 328–339. doi:10.1016/j.marpol.2009.08.002 Hacia un posicionamiento de gobernanza del López Mera, Ricardo and Pablo Chávez aguaCOLMEX, en México CONAGUA, IMTA, and ANEAS. 2012. Hernández. 2012. “Gobernanza del agua y participación social”. In: Murillo Licea, D. . México, D.F.: El Colegio de (ed.), Gobernanza del agua: un desafío actual. México, Comisión Nacional del Agua, Instituto Hacia una mirada crítica del concepto y de su Mexicano de Tecnología del Agua, Asociación aplicación. (pp. 396–439). Instituto Mexicano Nacional de Empresas de Saneamiento. 105pp. de Tecnología del Agua. Conservacion o deterioro: El impacto de las politicas publicas Cortez Lara, Alfonso Ándres. 2005. “¿Hacia enMerino las instituciones Perez, Leticia. comunitarias 2004. y en los una gestión binacional deProblemas aguas fronterizas socio- en usos de los bosques en Mexico laambientales cuenca caja y experienciasdel Río Colorado?”. organizativas In: Vargas. en S.las and cuencas E. Mollard de México (eds.), . Mexico D.F.: Secretaria de Medio Ambiente y Recursos (pp. 331–355). Instituto Naturales, Instituto Nacional de Ecologia, Mexicano de Tecnología del Agua. Consejo Civil Mexicano para la Silvicultura Sostenible. 336 pp. Domínguez, Judith. 2012. “Gobernanza urbana del agua:Gobernanza los problemas del agua:por resolver un desafío en las Milman, Anita D. and Christopher A. Scott. actual.ciudades Hacia latinoamericanas”. una mirada crítica In: Murillo del concepto Licea, 2010. “Beneath the surface: intranational yD. de (ed.), su aplicación institutions andEnvironment management and of Planning the United C: GovernmentStates — Mexico and Policytransboundary Santa (pp. 255–296). Instituto Cruz aquifer”. Mexicano de Tecnología del Agua. 28(3): 528 – 551. POLICY MATTERS 2014: REMEMBERING ELINOR OSTROM

31 Water and Ecosystems: Water Ciencia Resources Management in Diverse Ecosystems PesqueraMorán-Angulo, Ramón Enrique. 2012. “La andINWEH Providing (Ed.), for Human Needs pesca: Observatorio del ecosistema”. 20: 67–73. . UNU-INWEH/ UNESCO-MAB-IHP International Workshop, Murillo Licea, Daniel. 2012. “La trampa de la Hamilton, Ontario (Canada). gobernanzaGobernanza del agua. del Problemas agua: un deldesafío traslado actual.del concepto Hacia auna la aplicación”.mirada crítica In Murillo del concepto Licea, Pacheco-Vega, Raul. 2007a. “Participación de la yD. de (ed.), su aplicación Comisión Nacional del Agua en el tratamiento de aguas residualesRegion y Sociedad en la Cuenca Lerma- (pp. 79–114). Instituto Chapala: Estadísticas federales y realidades Mexicano de Tecnología del Agua. estatales”. XIX(39): 55–76. El agua potable en México: Historia reciente,Olivares, actores,Roberto procesos and Ricardo y propuestas Sandoval (eds.). Pacheco-Vega, Raul. 2007b. “Construyendo 2008. puentes entreEconomía, la política Sociedad ambiental y Territorio y la política . de tratamiento de aguas en la cuenca Lerma- Asociación Nacional de Empresas de Agua y Chapala”. Saneamiento, A.C. 6(24): 995–1024. La pesca en el Lago de Patzcuaro. Arreglos institucionalesOrtiz Paniagua, y Carlos política Francisco. pesquera: 2004. 1990-2004 Pacheco-Vega, Raul. 2009. “Arreglos institucionales para el saneamiento de aguas . residuales en México. Un caso de estudio en la Unpublished Masters thesis, El Colegio de la cuenca Lerma-Chapala”.Gestión del In: agua: Sandré una Osorio, visión I., Frontera Norte, Tijuana. comparativeR. L. do Carmo, entre S. Vargas-Velázquez México y Brasil and N.B. Guzmán (eds.), Osorio, Helder and Arturo Lara. 2012. . Jiutepec, “La tragedia de los anti-comunes en la International Association for Morelos: Instituto Mexicano de Tecnología del construccion del conocimiento del genoma the Study of the Commons: First Thematic Agua. Conferencehumano”. In on the Knowledge Commons Pacheco-Vega, Raul. 2012a. “Governing Canadianwastewater: Association A cross-regional of Latin analysisAmerican within and (pp. 1–27). Louvain, Belgium: International Caribbeanthe Lerma-Chapala Studies river basin in Mexico”. In: Association for the Study of the Commons (IASC). (CALACS) 2012. Kelowna, BC: Canadian Association of Latin American Ostrom, Elinor. 2010. “Beyond markets and American Economic Review and Caribbean Studies. states: Polycentric governance of complex economic systems”. Pacheco-Vega, Raul. 2012b. “Shifting 100: 1–33. paradigms in water governance: Questioning the validity of river basin councils as an Ostrom, E. 2011. “Background on the Canadian The Policy Studies Journal integrated water resources management Institutional Analysis and Development Association of Geographers strategy”. Paper presented at Framework”. 39(1): (CAG) 2012. 7–27. Aid, Incentives, Waterloo, ON, Canada: Canadian Association of andOstrom, Sustainability: Elinor, Clark An Gibson, Institutional Sujai ShivakumarAnalysis Geographers. and Krister P. Andersson. 2001. of Development Cooperation. Evaluation Pacheco-Vega, Raul. 2012c. “Arreglos institucionales dentro de la cuenca Lerma- . Chapala: Una visión desde la política Stockholm, Sweden: Swedish International ambiental”. In: Sánchez Rodríguez, M., J. de Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA). Los estudios del J. Hernández López, J. M. Durán Juárez and 389pp. agua en la cuenca Lerma-Chapala-Santiago. Agricultura,A. Torres Rodríguez industria (eds.), y ciudad. Pasado y Pacheco-Vega, Raul. 2005. “Applying the presente Institutional Analysis and Development framework to wastewater management policy (pp. 347–360). Guadalajara, Jalisco y in the Lerma-Chapala River Basin”. In: UNU- Zamora, Michoacán. POLICY MATTERS 2014: REMEMBERING ELINOR OSTROM

32 Polycentric Water Governance in Mexico: Beyond the Governing- by-river-basin-councilPacheco-Vega, Raul. 2013a. Model Palerm Viqueira, Jacinta. 2003. “La organizaciónAgua, socialmedio de ambiente los regantes y desarrollo en el río . Paper presented enNexapa, el siglo estado XXI de Puebla”. In: Ávila García, at 2013 Meeting of the Latin American Studies P. (ed.), Association (LASA). Washington D.C.: Latin (pp. 347–362). Michiacan, Geographies American Studies Association. Mexico: El Colegio de Michoacán. Secretaría of Wastewater: A Comparative Analysis de Urbanismo y Medio Ambiente. Instituto ofPacheco-Vega, Urban Sanitation Raul. Governance2013b. in the Mexicano de Tecnología del Agua.Organizational Mexican Municipalities of Aguascalientes Strategies in Water Shortage Situations: (Aguascalientes) and León (Guanajuato). MexicanPalerm Viqueira, Self-administrated Jacinta. 2000. Irrigation Systems.

Paper presented at the 2013 Meeting of Paper presented at Eighth Biennial Conference the Association of American Geographers, of the International Association for the Study Los Angeles, California, USA: Association of of Common Property (IASCP), Bloomington, American Geographers. Indiana, May 2000. Pacheco-Vega, Raul and Fernando Basurto. Palerm Viqueira, Jacinta, María Rivas, Claudio 2008. “Instituciones en el saneamiento de Ávalos Gutiérrez and José Luis Pimentel aguas residuales: reglas formales e informales Revista Mexicana de Sociología Equihua. 2004. “Capacidad autogestiva para en el Consejo de Cuenca Lerma-Chapala”. la administración de sistemas de riego: la 70(1): 87–109. El agua en México vista desdeteoría lay problemáticasacademia externas”. In: Jimenez, Pacheco-Vega, Raul and Obdulia Vega. 2008a. B. and L. Marin (eds.), “Los debates sobre la gobernanza del agua: (pp. 371–387). Mexico D.F.: Hacia una agendaLa Gestin de investigación de Recursos Hidráulicos: en México”. Academia Mexicana de Ciencias. In: Soares, D., S. Vargas-Velázquez and R. Participación ciudadana en el manejo del agua: Realidades y Perspectivas (Tomo I) Paré, Luisa and Carlos Robles. 2000. Nuño (eds.), una nueva relación entre la ciudad y el campo (pp. 57–86). en el sur de Veracruz Jiutepec, Morelos y Guadalajara, Jalisco: Instituto Mexicano de Tecnología del Agua / , 185–195. Unpublished Universidad de Guadalajara. manuscript. Pacheco-Vega, Raul and Obdulia Vega. 2008b. Robson, James P andJournal Gabriela of Lichtenstein. Latin American 2013. “Current trends in Latin American “Retos y perspectivas en materia de políticaEl Agua de Geography commons research”. Potabletratamiento en México: de agua Historia y saneamiento Reciente, en Actores, México”. In: Olivares, R. and R. Sandoval (eds.), 12(1): 5–31. Procesos y Propuestas Relaciones: Estudios de historiaRoth Seneff, y sociedad Andrew. 2002. “Bienes comunales (pp. 173–186). México, y autogobierno local”. D.F.: ANEAS (Asociación Nacional de Empresas , XXIII: 11–15. de Agua y Saneamiento). El ejido como institución de acción colectiva Schroeder Gonzalez, Natalia Mariel. 2006. Pahl-Wostl, Claudia, Georg Holtz, Britta en el manejo de los ecosistemas de la región Kastens and Christian Knieper. 2010. de Chamela-Cuixmala, Jalisco Environmental“Analyzing complex Science water & Policy governance regimes: . Instituto de The Management and Transition Framework”. Ecologia, A.C. El 13: 571–581. co-manejo pesquero en México: Fortalezas doi:10.1016/j.envsci.2010.08.006 yZepeda debilidades Domínguez, del concepto José Alberto.2010. Palerm Viqueira, Jacinta. 1999. “Detrás de los . Centro reglamentos formales: distribución del agua IX Congreso Nacional de Irrigación Interdisciplinario de Ciencias Marinas entre regantes autogestivos en situaciones de (Cicimar-IPN), La Paz, Baja California Sur. escasez”. In: (Vol. 1999). POLICY MATTERS 2014: REMEMBERING ELINOR OSTROM

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Rompiendo paradigmas Gobernanza de los bienes comunes y ciudadanía en las políticas forestal y de conservación3 Mexicanas Leticia Merino Pérez Rompiendo paradigmas: Gobernanza de los bienes comunes y ciudadanía en las políticas forestal y de conservación Mexicanas Leticia Merino Perez1

Síntesis

Retomo3 en el texto algunas de las aportaciones más relevantes de la obra de Elinor Ostrom, considerando el contexto en que emergieron: la polémica con la tesis de la universalidad de la “Tragedia de los Bienes Comunes”. Reviso diversas rupturas de la obra de Ostrom con los paradigmas sobre la relación sociedad naturaleza, dominantes en las ciencias sociales y en las políticas de conservación y manejo de los recursos naturales: el paradigma de la propiedad privada o pública como panaceas, la visión de los derechos de propiedad acotados a los derechos de alineación; el paradigma de la elección racional y las posiciones neo-malthussianas sobre la relación sociedad naturaleza. Analizo las implicaciones políticas y conceptuales de estas rupturas y de propuestas: el potencial de la propiedad colectiva como base de arreglos institucionales para la conservación, la propiedad vista como “conjunto de derechos” que generan incentivos y responsabilidades con la sustentabilidad de los bienes; la posibilidad de cooperación, gobernanza y sustentabilidad en contextos de recursos naturales utilizados, incluso en condiciones de densidad demográfica relativamente alta. Busco aplicar este esquema al análisis de la gestión de recursos forestales en el Sur de México, área con fuerte presencia indígenaPalabras Clave: Gobernanza, bienes comunes, acción colectiva, comunidades, panaceas, paradigmas, derechos de propiedad, políticas públicas

Abstract

I reflect on what I consider to be some of the key contributions of Elinor Ostrom’s work, taking into account the scholarly context in which it emerged – the debate over the validity of Hardin’s “Tragedy of the Commons” argument. I also review diverse ruptures of Ostrom´ s work with some of the traditional paradigms with regards to Nature-Society relationships, still dominant in the social sciences and frequently referenced in policy discourses—privatization and state control as institutional panaceas for nature´s conservation; the concept of property and property rights reduced to alienation rights; and, “rational choice” theory and neo-Malthusian conservation proposals as self evident givens. I analyze some of the policy and theoretical implications of Ostrom’s conceptual proposals, such as: the potential for collective property and associated institutional arrangements to enable conservation; property as a “bundle of rights” that create incentives and responsibilities towards sustainable resource uses; and, the viability of cooperation, governance and sustainability in contexts where natural resources are used, even under conditions of relatively high population density. I try to apply these lessons to the analysis of the experience of use and governance of forest in Southern Mexico, with its significantKey words: indigenous Governance, populations. common resources, collective action, communities, panaceas, paradigms, property rights, public policies

1 International Association for the Study of the Commons Investigadora, Instituto de Investigaciones Sociales (IIS) de la Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México (UNAM) y Presidenta de la (IASC). Email: [email protected]

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36 “Ningún problema puede ser resuelto desde el mismo nivel de conciencia que lo creó” tierras comunales permitieron una enorme expansión de las haciendas dedicadas a 2 Albert Einstein plantaciones orientadas al3 mercado mundial INTRODUCCIÓN sobre las antiguas milpas dedicadas al consumo de los pueblos. La concentración de la tierra y la riqueza generaron niveles de miseria mayores que los existentes durante Un tema seminal en la obra de Elinor la colonia (Warman, 2003). La recuperación Ostrom es la crítica a la tesis que sostiene de las tierras comunales fue el reclamo más la universalidad de la tragedia de los bienes sentido del movimiento social que sacudió utilizados o poseídos colectivamente, al país durante la primera década del S.XX. planteada por Hardin en 1968, que sostiene El reparto de tierras durante 1930-1970 que los usuarios de estos bienes nunca son fue eje de estabilidad política. En los 1980 capaces de coordinarse y evitar su destrucción más de 60% de las tierras del país y más de (Ostrom, 1990). Hardin ilustró esta propuesta 65% de sus áreas forestales4 eran propiedad utilizando el caso hipotético de destrucción de comunidades locales . Las tierras de de un pasto comunal en Inglaterra Medieval. comunidades forestales—en muchos El análisis históricocommons de la enorme tragedia casos indígenas—se encuentran en áreas de las comunidades rurales a partir del montañosas y de selvas, de difícil acceso y “cercado”commoners de los “ ” quedó fuera de su valor agrícola marginal que por siglos fueron horizonte. Entre los siglos XIII al XVII miles regiones de refugio para los sobrevivientes de “ ” fueron expropiados de los y prófugos de la colonización europea y más medios de vida con que tradicionalmente tarde de la expansión del capital nacional e contaban. Su expulsión masiva de las tierras internacional. ancestrales, sin más opciones que la ocupación como mano de obra sobre-explotada, incluso El planteamiento de Hardin extendió el semi-esclavizada que requerían la industria, ámbito del discurso sobre los bienes comunes el comercio marítimo y las colonias inglesas del campo de la economía al de la ecología, en Norte América, y la violenta represión a sumando una nueva culpa a lo comunitario: su resistencia han sido calificadas como uno la responsabilidad de destruir la naturaleza. de los “grandes crímenes de la modernidad” Este postulado hacía eco con la percepción del (Linebaugh and Rediker, 2001). acelerado deterioro ambiental, emergente en los 1960 y 1970 entre el público de los países El discurso de búsqueda de eficiencia como industrializados, luego de la publicación de los justificación de la expropiación, acumulación textos de Carson (1962), Ehrlich (1968) y del y concentración de antiguos bienes comunes, Informe “Los límites del crecimiento” (1972). acaecidos en distintas latitudes, se convirtió La pérdida de los bosques tropicales del en prontamente ideología que identifica mundo es uno de los temas ambientales que a lo comunitario con los obsoleto y a la desde los 1970 ha recibido mayor atención privatización de los bienes comunes con el global. Desde la perspectiva de la TBC las progreso; para la que los dramáticos costos causas del deterioro forestal son la ausencia sociales de esa exclusión son el precio y/o inestabilidad de los derechos de propiedad necesario de la modernidad. Fuera de Europa en los países “en desarrollo”, donde se ubican esta ideología y las políticas consecuentes la mayoría de las selvas del planeta; asociado se nutrieron en abismales inequidades a la pobreza allí prevaleciente. La aceptación sociales y en el racismo imperante en las paradigmática del diagnóstico de Hardin se sociedades coloniales. En México del siglo XIX funda en gran medida en su simplicidad. En las reformas liberales de privatización de las contextos académicos disciplinarios donde

2 3 Henequén, caña de azúcar, algodón, café, tabaco. 4 Cultivo tradicional de maíz, frijol, calabaza y vegetales semicultivados. Comunidades agrarias y ejidos (Warman, 2000)

POLICY MATTERS 2014: REMEMBERING ELINOR OSTROM

37 impera la dificultad de asumir la complejidad mientras los funcionarios gubernamentales de los procesos socio-ambientales, la tesis y agentes de mercado son omnipotentes de Hardin pareciera auto-evidente: “cuando para solucionar los retos de gestión de los los recursos son limitados, las decisiones más diversos bienes, resulta autoritario racionales para cada individuo dan lugar a un y excluyente (Ostrom, 1990; Ostrom, dilema irracional para el grupo… por lo que Janssen and Anderies, 2007). La valoración todos los recursos poseídos en común son, o de las capacidades de gestión de sociedades serán eventualmente sobre-explotado…, las auto-organizadas y la crítica a los esquemas causas… son la libertad y el crecimiento de la de gestión totalitarios, son centrales en su PARADIGMASpoblación” (Hardin, Y PANACEAS 1968). axiología, influida por su larga colaboración con Vincent Ostrom y por la tradición Tocquevilliana de valoración de la cooperación ciudadana como base de la gestión pública. Dos décadas después de la publicación de la Esta axiología fue para Ostrom una rica fuente Teoría de los Bienes Comunes (TBC), E. Ostrom de preguntas de investigación e hipótesis, no (1990) reconoce la relevancia del problema generadora de respuestas dogmáticas. planteado: gran parte de los recursos de los que dependen las sociedades contemporáneas Al tomar distancia de los discursos basados en enfrentan riesgos de tragedias similares a la el sentido común y las panaceas académicas de la metáfora de Hardin, aunque de mayor y políticas, insiste en la necesidad de que la trascendencia. Sistemas naturales clave del construcción teórica y política estén basada medio ambiente global, numerosos bienes en investigación empírica rigurosa y multi- culturales y de conocimiento e importantes método, comprometida con el reconocimiento medios de información y comunicación de la complejidad y la inter-disciplina (Ostrom, dependen de acción y gestión colectivas, 2009; Poteete, Janssen and Ostrom, 2010). sujetas a potenciales fallas. Ostrom no niega Contra lo que puede suponerse, el extenso la realidad de estas fallas sino el carácter análisis de experiencias de éxitos y fallas de inevitable que Harin les atribuye. Señala el cooperación a partir de fuentes históricas, error metodológico y conceptual de construir de campo y de experimentos económicos modelos explicativos universales con sustento (Cárdenas, 2009; Poteete, Janssen y Ostrom, empírico endeble, manejando los modelos 2010) no condujo a Ostrom a proponer lo como realidades, generalizando excesivamente comunitario como una nueva panacea; sí a condiciones y explicaciones particulares, reconocer el peso de los actores locales en sobre-simplificando los procesos que se los procesos de apropiación y protección de pretende comprender. Considera la tesis los bienes comunes, en el éxito o fracaso del de la “TBC” más como una ideología sobre gobierno de los bienes comunes, aún en los esquemas de derechos y toma de decisiones casos de bienes o procesos de gran escala ideales, que como un marco explicativo. Una como la regulación climática, vista como ideología a partir de la cual se han impuesto resultado del “anidamiento” de sistemas de alrededor del mundo esquemas de control PARADIGMAS,distintas escalas. PANACEAS, PROPIEDAD Y estatal y de privatización como panaceas CONSERVACIÓN institucionales. Ostrom comparte con Hardin el interés por la resolución de problemas. Sus empeños A partir de la crítica de la universalidad de la académicos buscan contribuir a generar “TBC”, Ostrom problematiza otros paradigmas elementos para comprender y evitar tragedias prevalentes en los análisis sobre las relaciones de los bienes comunes y de las comunidades sociedad-naturaleza. Cuestiona la noción de que dependen de ellos. Desde la perspectiva propiedad y la falla inevitable de la propiedad de Ostrom, el supuesto de que la mayoría de colectiva, que se percibe a menudo como los usuarios de bienes comunes están siempre ausencia de propiedad y sinónimo de acceso atrapados en la imposibilidad de cooperar, abierto asociados con frecuencia, al deterioro POLICY MATTERS 2014: REMEMBERING ELINOR OSTROM

38 de los bienes. Su concepción cuestiona las las decisiones sobre el uso y control de los nociones de propiedad de los distintos polos bienes. Asume plenamente el valor de la del espectro político. Define a la propiedad certeza de los derechos de propiedad para colectiva como “propiedad privada colectiva”, generar perspectivas de largo plazo en el uso en la que—a diferencia de la propiedad pública y protección de los recursos, pero identifica —existen titulares reconocidos de derechos y a la propiedad colectiva como un régimen de responsabilidades respecto a los bienes, y bajo propiedad capaz de generar certeza. Encuentra la cual al igual que en regímenes de propiedad que en muchos contextos los derechos de privada individual—los titulares poseen uso y decisión crean sentido patrimonial, derechos de excluir a los no propietarios, perspectivas e incentivos de largo plazo; impidiendo el libre acceso abierto. mientras que los derechos de alienación no resultan indispensables en todos los casos En la crítica de Ostrom a Hardin, se señala para crear compromisos con la sustentabilidad la confusión generada por el uso indistinto de los bienes, sino que en algunos contextos de las categorías de “bienes comunes” y generan incertidumbre y vulneran la gestión propiedad colectiva. (Schlager y Ostrom, 1992; colectiva de bienes de “acceso común”. Ostrom et.al., 2001; Ostrom, 2009; Potetee, Jansen, Ostrom, 2011). Los tipos de bienes La aplicación de este marco a un gran número se definen: por los costos de excluir usuarios de casos, así como un amplio meta-análisis potenciales del acceso a los bienes y por el (Potetee, Jansen, Ostrom, 2011) llevan a nivel de “rivalidad” (implicaciones que el concluir que ningún régimen de propiedad es uso de los bienes tiene en el uso potencial de garantía de conservación de los recursos, ni nuevos usuarios), (Ostrom 1990). Reconoce se asocia invariablemente con su deterioro. cuatro tipos de bienes: públicos,5 de uso Existen tanto casos de bienes comunes (acceso, o acervo) común , tarifa y privados. naturales (y culturales) conservados, como Esta tipología permite visibilizar los retos casos de bienes comunes deteriorados en que enfrentan el gobierno y uso sostenido regímenes de propiedad pública, privada de distintos bienes. Estos retos derivan de individual y colectiva. La explicación del éxito o las formas en que la apropiación (uso) de los fracaso de la gestión colectiva y la construcción bienes se lleva a cabo y de los costos de su de esquemas de gobernanza de los bienes mantenimiento y protección (provisión). Las comunes requiere atender a la distribución de presiones de apropiación tienden a ser más derechos entre actores, a las desigualdad del importantes para los bienes de alta rivalidad: acceso a derechos, poder y activos (Ostrom privados y de uso común. Las presiones de 2009) y a los incentivos para un determinado provisión resultan más relevantes para la tipo de uso e inversión en reglas y acciones de conservación de bienes de difícil exclusión: protección. públicos y de uso común. De ahí que los bienes de uso común, como la mayoría de los En distintas áreas forestales de África, sistemas y recursos naturales, sean los bienes Asia y América Latina existen altos niveles potencialmente más vulnerables. Por otra de deforestación en tierras públicas parte los regímenes de propiedad se refieren a concesionadas a empresas madereras los titulares de la propiedad: los individuos y el externas con incentivos de maximizar el Estado. uso de los recursos en el corto plazo (White and Martin, 2002). Las tierras de propiedad Ostrom cuestiona la noción6 generalizada privada—individual o colectiva—no son que reduce los derechos de propiedad a inmunes al deterioro en ausencia de incentivos los derechos de alienación , destacando para su uso sustentable y altas7 tasas de la importancia de los derechos de acceso, descuento de la conservación . Estos son exclusión, uso y capacidad de participar en los motivos de la sustitución de selvas por 56 “Common pool resources”, 7 Compra, venta, renta, hipoteca. Frecuentemente como resultado de políticas públicas y demandas de mercado.

POLICY MATTERS 2014: REMEMBERING ELINOR OSTROM

39 plantaciones de soja en terrenos privados certificadas por el FSC en México, las10 de la Amazonia y el Chaco en Sudamérica reservas indígenas “extractivistas” en la y del deterioro de los bosques comunales Amazonia brasileña, los bosques comunitarios en Papua-Nueva Guinea concesionados a dedicados al uso doméstico en condiciones empresas transnacionales. Durante los años de alta presión demográfica y pobreza en 1970-2000 muchas comunidades mexicanas la India y Nepal y los bosques sagrados del optaron por deforestar en respuesta a los Sahel Africano (Larsson, Barry, Dahal and subsidios a la expansión de la ganadería y Pierce Colfer, 2010) hablan del potencial de agricultura en tierras forestales; en ausencia la propiedad colectiva para la conservación. de incentivos para conservar (en contextos de En estos casos los factores determinantes en vedas generalizadas al uso de los bosques). las dinámicas de deterioro o conservación Actualmente la minería de es un factor han sido la equidad de la distribución de central de destrucción forestal en América derechos entre actores sociales, la estructura Latina. En México las concesiones mineras de incentivos a que da lugar y su “anidamiento en zonas montaña se incrementaron en 30% en los sistemas de gobernanza” locales y entre 2006-2012, incluyendo terrenos donde nacionales. algunas comunidades han establecido8 áreas de conservación comunitaria. Durante la mayor parte del siglo XX, México fue el único país en el mundo donde la Los bosques públicos conservados propiedad forestal comunitaria contaba presentan muchas veces condiciones de con reconocimiento legal, a pesar de que baja densidad de población, valoración continuamente los derechos de propiedad ciudadana y capacidades financieras de comunitarios han sido vistos como obstáculos los gobiernos. Son los casos de distintos para intereses públicos y de empresas parques nacionales en los Estados Unidos, privadas. Entre los 1950 y 1980 los bosques Canadá y Europa Occidental, o de las comunitarios fueron concesionados a Reservas de la Biósfera de Calakmul y Tikal empresas externas para la extracción en las zonas turísticas de la selva maya en comercial de madera, convirtiéndose en México y Guatemala. La conservación de importantes activos para las finanzas públicas bosques públicos se ha logrado a partir de y fuente de fáciles ganancias para esas la participación social con base en prácticas empresas. En los años 1980, como resultado de gobernanza tradicional en los bosques de la movilización de las comunidades de los cantones suizos en los Alpes, en los forestales, concluyeron oficialmente bosques municipales del Totonicapan en las concesiones. A partir de los 1990 al Guatemala; o en las selvas de propiedad extenderse la preocupación por los servicios nacional concesionados a comunidades eco-sistémicos de los bosques, la propiedad locales para su aprovechamiento y comunitaria ha sido tratada como causa certificados por el Forest Stewardship Council central del deterioro forestal. Los diagnósticos en el Petén Guatemalteco, cuya capacidad suelen ignorar los impactos de las políticas para contener la expansión9 de la ganadería que durante décadas promovieron el y de cultivos ilícitos de enervantes en la cambio de uso del suelo o expropiaron a las selva es hoy mayor que las Áreas Naturales comunidades de derechos de uso, decisión y Protegidas en esa región. Las propiedades exclusión, imponiéndoles concesiones y vedas privadas—individuales o familiare—en al uso de los bosques. En muchos casos estas Finlandia y Austria, han producido madera políticas llevaron a las comunidades a percibir de manera sostenida durante generaciones. los derechos de propiedad forestal como Las comunidades productoras forestales inciertos.

8 El área de conservación de Capulalpam, Oaxaca, de altísima biodiversidad, donde nacen abundantes manantiales fue concesionada en 2005 a una minera canadiense; a pesar de que esta comunidad cuenta con amplio reconocimiento por su compromiso con la conservación9 y con la certificación de buen manejo forestal del FSC. 10 Mariguana y amapolas utilizadas para la producción de opio y morfina. Donde se recolectan resinas, nueces.

POLICY MATTERS 2014: REMEMBERING ELINOR OSTROM

40 PANACEAS, COOPERACIÓN, GOBERNANZA Y CONSERVACIÓN Para Ostrom los individuos actúan de manera diferente en distintos contextos: tienden a comportarse de manera competitiva y La segunda gran ruptura de Ostrom con el oportunista en condiciones de mercado, pensamiento económico convencional es pero aprenden normas de interacción, y el cuestionamiento de la universalidad del utilizan racionalidades distintas en diferentes paradigma de la “elección racional”, de la contextos. (Ostrom y Walker; 2003). La búsqueda del beneficio económico individual acción colectiva no está dada, su construcción como móvil exclusivo de la conducta social. implica costos y dilemas significativos. Asumir Las implicaciones del paradigma del individuo riesgos de cooperar requiere credibilidad como “maximizador racional” rebasan las del compromiso de los pares, visiones fronteras de la academia. En diversos análisis compartidas sobre los bienes colectivos y Ostrom alerta contra el riesgo de panaceas las presiones a que están sujetos; acuerdos políticas basadas en el supuesto de la sobre las reglas que sustentan la cooperación, incapacidad de cooperación, que conducen evidencia del cumplimiento de los otros y persistentemente a prescripciones de de la preservación de los bienes como fruto concentración de derechos en manos de unos de esos esfuerzos. Estas no son condiciones cuantos. La contraparte de 11los esquemas de espontáneas sino construidas a partir de la concentración de derechos es la privación de interacción, la agencia, los esfuerzos sociales derechos sobre los bienes comunes naturales y políticos; que pueden estar ausentes o o culturales, de carácter local o regional para presentes en distintas medidas en diversos la mayoría de sus usuarios, incluyendo a los casos. La crítica del modelo del “dilema grupos que dependan de ellos, valoran su del prisionero” (Ostrom, 1990) reconoce presencia y conocen sus dinámicas. el valor que tienen para la cooperación el conocimiento previo entre los actores Sin negar el papel de los mercados y los (reputación) y la comunicación al interior estados en la vida social, la investigación de de los grupos. Aprender a confiar a partir Ostrom muestra repetidamente resultados de la experiencia colectiva, es clave para la 13 inesperados, incluso perversos de la superación de los “dilemas de lo colectivo” imposición unilateral de panaceas, que califica (Cárdenas, 2007). Ostrom asume que las como disfuncionales: concentración de poder12 tragedias de lo colectivo son extensas: “cuando y de beneficios en élites, inequidad social las decisiones que se toman de forma anónima toma de decisiones ajenas a las condiciones la sobre-explotación es mayor que la prevista y necesidades locales, destrucción o por los modelos teóricos” (Ostrom, 2009), “saturación” (Ostrom, 2007; Cárdenas, 2007) sin embargo en su visión hay espacio para el de la institucionalidad local y de las formas “optimismo racional”: la evidencia muestra de cooperación comunitarias, obstaculizando que cuando los usuarios tienen posibilidad de paradójicamente la destrucción de los bienes diseñar sus propios esquemas de monitoreo comunes que se quiere proteger. Panaceas y sanción y discutir “cara a cara” sobre sus que resultan en actores locales carentes de visiones, conflictos y reglas, los resultados de capacidades y/o incentivos para proteger la cooperación son casi “óptimos” (Ostrom los bienes y actores externos empoderados, 2009). Otras condiciones que favorecen la con capacidades de acción local insuficientes acción colectiva en torno a la gestión de los e inadecuadas y posibilidad de abuso bienes comunes son: un nivel relevante de de los bienes, en casos de los mercados dependencia de los bienes, de modo que dominados crecientemente por corporaciones existan incentivos para construir y aplicar internacionales (Dauvergne, 2008). reglas colectivas con perspectivas de largo

11 12 Junto a la gran concentración creada por los mercados globales y la globalización de la orientación de las políticas ambientales. 13 Que Richard Wilkinson y Pikett propone considerar como un “mal público” (Wilinson and Pickett, 2010). Estos dilemas derivan de la contradicción entre la búsqueda de beneficios individuales y los posibles beneficios colectivos.

POLICY MATTERS 2014: REMEMBERING ELINOR OSTROM

41 plazo; bajos costos de la cooperación y la técnicas y de gobernanza ha tenido un conservación, ausencia de abuso de los bienes papel fundamental. En distintos periodos colectivos basado en inequidad e impunidad 14 algunas políticas públicas, organismos no que erosionan drásticamente el capital social gubernamentales y agencias de cooperación de los grupos. Los liderazgos y las políticas y conservación internacionales han apoyado15 son pueden contribuir a movilizar la agencia el desarrollo de capacidades comunitarias . grupal y acercar visiones, promoviendo Entre las lecciones aprendidas de estas prácticas de comunicación, construcción iniciativas destacan; el valor del respeto institucional y espacios de resolución de y apoyo al capital social y gobernanza conflictos. (Ostrom, 1990). comunitarias, como sostén de las empresas colectivas y las iniciativas de conservación de La gestión centralizada impera en las agendas los bienes comunes forestales. La importancia de las agencias multilaterales y en las de promover visiones compartidas de políticas nacionales, a pesar de la evidencia los territorios y recursos comunitarios y de su frecuente inviabilidad (Ostrom, 2007). desarrollar reglas basadas en el consenso Siguiendo esta inercia, las políticas de para el gobierno de los bienes comunes. conservación, pago por servicios ambientales El reconocimiento de las comunidades y mitigación del cambio climático suelen locales y sus espacios de organización como imponer a las poblaciones rurales del “Sur interlocutores y contrapartes necesarios de Global” costos desproporcionados de la las políticas públicas de sustentabilidad16 y protección de los bienes “comunes globales”, conservación. Un estudio reciente revela en contextos nacionales donde el desarrollo la existencia de estrecha correlación entre de incentivos, el aprendizaje adaptativo y las actividades y medida de protección y la ciudadanización de la conservación son conservación de los bosques, con el nivel de incipientes. En México el gobierno federal organización y confianza en las comunidades mantiene fuertes derechos de regulación sobre y el desarrollo de actividades productivas los bosques que se traducen en una marcada forestales. (Merino y Martínez, 2013; sobre-regulación, a pesar de las escasas Merino 2012). También se encontró que en capacidades gubernamentales de vigilancia comunidades con mayor capital social, con y sanción de los usos forestales ilegales. ingresos y empleo17 forestales, las presiones Las actividades de producción y vigilancia sobre los bosques son menores. comunitarias enfrentan fuertes exigencias y costos, mientras que los usos ilegales La sustentabilidad de bienes comunes de prevalecen con alto nivel de impunidad importancia regional y nacional (las cuencas (Merino y Ortiz, 2013) hidrológicas) o global (el sistema clima, la biodiversidad, los océanos o la atmósfera) Durante las pasadas tres décadas, en algunas no implica que para su gobernanza basten regiones de México, a partir de las luchas los derechos y la actuación de los estados contra las concesiones, diversas comunidades nacionales o las agencias internacionales. En forestales han desarrollado experiencias tanto se trata de sistemas complejos, cuyas de buen manejo y uso de los bosques. Los condiciones son frecuentemente resultado bosques y la inversión comunitaria para de la “anidación” de bienes comunes y la producción forestal son hoy nuevos de prácticas de menor escala (bosques, activos comunitarios. En la construcción y pesquerías, prácticas agrícolas y ganaderas consolidación de estas iniciativas el esfuerzo en territorios específicos, patrones regionales por el desarrollo de capacidades locales de consumo de energía y consumo) su

14 15 Capital social entendido como: confianza, redes y normas (Ahn y Ostrom, 2003). Destacan el Programa de Conservación y Manejo Forestal Comunitario, el de Conservación Indígena de la Biodiversida, el Corredor Biológico16 Mesoamericano y el Consejo Civil Mexicano para la Silvicultura Sustentable entre otros. 17 Con base en entrevistas en 102 comunidades Se consideraron indicadores de presión: la presencia en las áreas forestales de incendios, plagas, cultivos ilícitos y extracciones ilegales.

POLICY MATTERS 2014: REMEMBERING ELINOR OSTROM

42 gestión requiere esquemas de gobernanza de densidad demográfica, escasez y pobreza complejos, capaces de responder a presiones se han generado también experiencias de y condiciones de bienes de distintos tipos y cooperación para la construcción de nuevos escalas, cuyo manejo requiere la coordinación bienes comunes: represas para captar agua de actores, ubicados en distintas escalas, de lluvia en la región Nahua de Guerrero;19 con diversos intereses, percepciones y cooperativas rurales de crédito popular , derechos; sistemas de gobernanza que Ostrom creación de empresas comunitarias para: la caracteriza como “policéntricos (Ostrom, producción orgánica de café, miel, maíz, frijol, 2012).POBLACIÓN, POBREZA Y madera, muebles, agua de manantial, resinas, CONSERVACIÓN artesanías, flores, hongos, para su certificación y comercialización, y para la prestación de servicios de turismo comunitario, Un tercer paradigma cuestionado por Ostrom construcción de escuelas, bibliotecas y centros se refiere a la supuesta la relación unívoca de internet financiados con recursos de entre el crecimiento de la población y la comunidades campesinas pobres. pobreza y la destrucción de la naturaleza. El envejecimiento de las poblaciones y el Uno de los ejes de argumentación de la “TBC” despoblamiento de las regiones—crecientes es el riesgo apocalíptico del crecimiento en el campo en México y Sudamérica—tienen demográfico—que se supone es siempre a menudo como consecuencia la debilidad exponencial. Si bien las poblaciones humanas local para proteger y restaurar áreas ejercen presión sobre los sistemas naturales forestales, cuerpos de agua, fauna silvestre y de los que dependen en gran medida los suelos, recursos que enfrentan20 ya sean usos pobres rurales del mundo, en sus decisiones ilícitos o presiones naturales . En algunas y prácticas de uso y manejo de los recursos regiones de baja densidad demográfica, los naturales influyen18 los incentivos y las bienes comunes han sido deteriorados como instituciones , que a su vez dependen de la resultado de prácticas de ganadería extensiva, valoración, percepción y conocimiento local agricultura industrial21 con alto uso de insumos de los ecosistemas por parte de los actores químicos22 y agua , de cultivos ilícitos y sociales, del nivel de confianza existente entre crimen. ellos y de los costos de oportunidad de la Dos importantes análisis recientes sobre sustentabilidad. el cambio ambiental global exponen como Desde los años 1990 la investigación empírica patrones de relación población-naturaleza encontró que las relaciones población- determinantes de este proceso: una fuerte pobreza-conservación distan de ser lineares relación entre los altos niveles de consumo y se caracterizan por su complejidad. Se han y producción globalizados y la destrucción documentado experiencias de conservación de los bienes comunes ambientales globales y sustentabilidad en condiciones de pobreza y locales (Dauvergne, 2008; Merino, 2013), y alta densidad poblacional: en bosques de y una fuerte relación negativa entre el India y Nepal; en el Totonicapan Guatemalteco nivel de desigualdad social, el capital social y en la Sierra Nahua-Totonaca de México. y la disposición a asumir compromisos Además de la densidad de población y su ambientales (Wilkinson and Pikett, 2010). pobreza, estos casos tienen en común: alta Más allá de cierto nivel de desarrollo, dependencia y valoración de los recursos el crecimiento de la economía tiende a forestales, clara percepción de su escasez, incrementar la desigualdad y el consumismo derechos locales de uso y regulación, y fuertes —fuente clave de presiones ambientales. tradiciones de gestión local. En contextos Estas propuestas demandan análisis y 18 19 Las instituciones se definen como patrones de interacción que a fuerza de repetirse se instituyen. 20 Promovidas por la Asociación Mexicana de Uniones de Crédito en contextos de alta marginación. 21 Cuya magnitud e incertidumbre se han incrementado a partir de los procesos de Cambio Ambiental Global. 22 Los suelos y cuerpos de agua del Valle Central de California se encuentran entre los más contaminados en los Estados Unidos. Frecuente en los estados de Guerrero, Michoacán, Durango y Chihuahua en México.

POLICY MATTERS 2014: REMEMBERING ELINOR OSTROM

43 políticas conservación de mayor complejidad Nobel de Economía paradigmático que y diversidad que aquellas que consideran reconoció la importancia global del gobierno el ejercicio de los derechos de los pobres, de los bienes comunes, con certeza el Premio como opuesto a la conservación, enfocadas Nobel de Economía que ha generado mayor en criminalizar o impedirles el uso de los alegría alrededor del mundo. Elinor Ostrom territorios naturales. falleció el 11 de Junio de 2012 dejando como herencia un impulso formidable de renovación Propongo una redacción alternativa para dar a la investigación socio-ambiental, basado mayor claridad: Estas propuestas demandan en nuevas formas de práctica académica análisis y políticas conservación de mayor y de pensar la acción social, así como una complejidad y diversidad que aquellas extensa comunidad académica y activista enfocadas en criminalizar o impedir el uso comprometida con la continuidad de su legado de los territorios naturales a los habitantes de búsqueda de equidad y práctica cotidiana locales por considerar el ejercicio de sus Rdeeferencias la democracia. CONCLUSIONESderechos como opuesto a la conservación.

Foundations of Social Capital. Ahn, T.K. y Elinor Ostrom (eds). 2003. La Teoría de la Acción Colectiva busca rebasar Cheltenham, UK: los esquemas ideológicos sobre la gestión de Edward Elgar Publishing. los bienes, reformulando las preguntas sobre The Community Forests of Mexico: Bray, David, Leticia Merino y Deborah Barry. su gobernanza, reconociendo la complejidad Managing for Sustainable Landscapes 2005. de los sistemas socio-ambientales que analiza. . Austin, Propone: sustituir los debates sobre las TX: Texas University Press. La virtudes o lastres intrínsecos a los regímenes experiencia de las comunidades forestales de de propiedad por cuestionamientos en torno MéxicoBray, David y Leticia Merino. 2004. a las condiciones que permiten a los grupos superar los dilemas de la acción colectiva; . Instituto Nacional de Ecología, Ciudad Dilemas de lo investigar los factores que favorecen la de México. Colectivo: Instituciones, Pobreza y Cooperación regulación local adaptada a condiciones socio- enCárdenas, el Manejo Juan Local Camilo. de Los 2009. Recursos de Uso ambientales únicas y favorecer la construcción Común de sistemas de gobernanza policéntricos capaces de asumir los retos de gestión de . Universidad de Los Andes, Facultad de sistemas complejos. La respuesta no son las Economía, Bogotá. Silent Spring comunidades vistas como panacea; los estados y mercados tienen papeles importantes en Carlson, Rachel. 1962. . New York: Houghton Mifflin Company.The Shadows of esta construcción, pero generalmente el peso Consumption: Consequences for the Global de la comunidad local es determinante en Environment.Dauvergne. Peter. 2008. el éxito o fracaso de la gestión de los bienes comunes. Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts Institute for Technology. The Population Bomb Coherente con el espíritu de optimismo racional, Lin Ostrom fue practicante Ehrlich, Paul. 1972. . New convencida de la acción colectiva académica, York: Ballantine Books. Science durante más de 40 años cientos de Hardin, Garret. 1968. “The tragedy of the estudiantes, y académicos visitantes de más commons”. 162(3859): 1243-1248. de 40 países participamos en el hoy llamado “Vincent and Elinor Ostrom Workshop for ForestsLarson, forAnne People. M., Deborah Community Barry, Rights Ganga and Ram Political Theory and Policy Analysis”. En ForestDahal yTenure Carol J.Reform Pierce Colfer (eds). 2010. 2009 Lin fue distinguida con el “Sveriges . London, UK: Earthscan. Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel Nóbel”. Un Premio Linebaugh, Peter y Marcus Rediker. 2001. POLICY MATTERS 2014: REMEMBERING ELINOR OSTROM

44 The Many-Headed Hydra: Sailors, Slaves, Commoners, and the Hidden History of the Revolutionary Atlantic. Ostrom, Elinor, Marco A. Janssen, y John M. Anderies. 2007. “Going beyond panaceas”. Boston, MA: Beacon PNAS 104:15176-15178. Press. Trust and Reciprocity: Interdisciplinary The Limits of Growth MethodsOstrom, Elinorfrom Experimental y James Walker Research (eds). 2003. Meadows, Donella, Garry Madoc, J. Randers y William Behren. 1972. . . New New York: Universe Books. York: Russell Sage Foundation. Merino, Leticia. 2013. “Conservation and forest Community Ostrom, Elinor,The Thomas Drama ofDietz, the CommonsNives Dolsak, Actioncommunities for Conservation: in Mexico: MexicanAn ongoing Experience struggle Paul C. Stern, Susan Stonich y Elke U. Weber over forest property rights”. En, (eds). 2001. . , Washington, D.C.: The National Academies editado por Luciana Porter-Bolland, Isabel Press. Governing the Commons: Ruiz-Mallen, Claudia Camacho-Benavides, y The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Sussanah McCandless. New York: Springer ActionOstrom, Elinor. 1990. Books. Encuentros y Desencuentros: La política forestal . Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Merino, Leticia y Gabriela Ortiz. 2013. en tiempos de transición política Press. Working Together: Collective Action, . Miguel Ángel thePoteete, Commons, Amy, MarcoMultiple Janssen Methods y Elinor in Practice Ostrom. Porrúa e Instituto de Investigaciones Sociales 2010. de la UNAM, Ciudad de México. . A Vuelo de Pájaro: Las condiciones de las Princeton, NY: Princeton University Press. comunidadesMerino, Leticia con y Anabosques Eugenia templados Martínez. en México 2013. Schlager, Edella y Elinor Ostrom. 1992.Land . Economics“Property rights regimes and natural Comisión Nacional para el Uso y Conocimiento resources: A conceptual analysis”. Conservación o de la Biodiversidad, México, 2013. 68(3): 249-262.El siglo XX en el campo Deterioro. El impacto de las políticas públicas en México: Siglo de luces y sombras enMerino, las comunidades Leticia. 2004. y en los bosques de México Warman, Arturo. 2000. . Fondo de . Cultura Económica: CiudadLos indiosde México. mexicanos Instituto Nacional de Ecología, Ciudad de en el umbral del milenio México. Warman, Arturo. 2003. . Fondo de Cultura Ostrom, Elinor. 2012. “Green from the Económica: Ciudad de México Who grassroots”. Publicado electronicamente por Owns the World’s Forests? Proyect Syndicate ‘A World of Ideas’, en Junio White, Andy y Alejandra Martin. 2002. 12 de 2012. Disponsible en: http://www. Forest Tenure and project-syndicate.org/commentary/green- Public Forests in Transition. Washington, from-the-grassroots Beyond Markets and D.C.: Forest Trends / Center for International States: Polycentric Governance of Complex Environmental Law. EconomicOstrom, Elinor. Systems 2009. The Spirit Level: Why Equality is Better for EveryoneWilkinson, Richard y Kate Pickett. 2010. . Nobel Prize Lecture, given on December 8, 2009, Stockholm, Sweden. . London, UK: Penguin Books.

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45

An Assessment of Community Management of Traditional Woodland Enclosures (Hiza’ti) in the Highlands4 of Eritrea Bereket Tsehaye Haile An Assessment of Community Management of Traditional Woodland Enclosures (Hiza’ti) in the Highlands of Eritrea Bereket Tsehaye Haile1

Abstract

In rural4 Eritrea, people’s lives are closely linked to local natural resources. Villages in the hiza’ti highlands of Eritrea have a long-standing tradition of forest and woodlands management. The system (traditional woodland enclosure), which is practiced by systematically restricting grazing and biomass harvesting, is one example. However, efforts to understandhiza’ti such traditions and assess their effectiveness as management systems have been limited. This research explores how communities manage their traditional woodland enclosures ( ) and assess their effectiveness, through qualitative research conducted in the village of Lamza. Four focus group discussions were conducted in addition to several key informant and household-head interviews. Ostrom’s Design Principles for commons management were then used to analyse the robustness of the management regime. The study found that the village held a strong attachment with their natural resources and traditions of managing the local woodland. The community played a major role in protecting and monitoring their enclosure, with a mutual monitoring and sanctioning system that was commensurate with the benefits that villagers drew from the woodland enclosure. Analysis shows that the hiza’ti system fulfills most of Ostrom’s design principles through a robust set of institutional arrangements. However, the study identified potential threats to Design Principles three and seven, particularly in relation to interferencebaito from lower level government institutions that may affect collective choice among the villagers, as well as other actors that threaten to weaken the autonomy of the village assembly ( ) and their right to organise. Keywords: Traditional woodland enclosure (Hiza’ti), Common Pool Recourses (CPRs), Ostrom, Design Principles, Eritrea

1 School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, UK, Email [email protected]

POLICY MATTERS 2014: REMEMBERING ELINOR OSTROM

48 INTRODUCTION

traditional practices and evaluate their effectiveness. This study thus looks to assess Eritrea is an agrarian state located in the the current role played by local communities horn of Africa. From a total population of 6.2 in managing woodland enclosures and to million people (July 2013 estimate), 80% of appraise the effectiveness (robustness) Eritreans depend on traditional agriculture, of their management using the criteria characterised by rain-fed subsistence farming developed by Nobel Laureate, Elinor Ostrom. and a pastoral livestock system relying While Garrett Hardin (1968) suggested primarily on family labour (NSEO and ORC that communal resources will inevitably Marco, 2003; Sibhatu, 2006). In rural areas, suffer overexploitation unless transferred to people interact daily with their natural private or government ownership, he failed environment, and have acquired significant to recognise that commons can be managed knowledge in the use and management of by a group of users with exclusive rights to their shared (communal) resources. If such regulate the resource under customary tenure resources are utilized without regulation, arrangements, with effective local institutions they are exploited on “a first-come, first- enabling user access to be regulated. It was served” basis (Gebremedhin et al. 2003), Ostrom’s work, The usefulness possibly resulting in their eventual depletion. in particular, that and validity Communities tackle the problem of openly challenged overexploitation by crafting local institutions the limitations of of Ostrom’s to regulate and ensure the sustainable use of Hardin’s thesis design these communal resources. and argued for principles solutions beyond Several villages in the highlands of Eritreahiza’ti state or private have been have a management system in place for property (Ostrom shown in their hiza’titheir forests and woodlands called 1990). (traditional woodland enclosure). The application in system is practiced by systematically Due to the complex CPR studies interactions that restricting grazing and biomass harvesting. over the past The main objective is to enhance the natural link society and regeneration of thosehiza’ti native species that environment, two decades. contribute to sustaining local community analysing the livelihoods. The system is believed to effectiveness of have started when a shortage of firewood common property and pastoral resources began toHiza’ti impact rural regimes is no communities, and rules were established easy task (Ostrom 2007). Most of the ‘success to ration their use (FAO 1997). are factors’ are site specific, while Agrawal (2001) managed and monitored by local communities, argued that the variables that determine the with monitoring taking place either through success of Common Pool Resource (CPR) a rotational scheme that each household institutions are numerous, correlated and is obliged to participate in, or by hiring interrelated. Nonetheless, some common permanent guards whose salaries are paid attributes are shared by many successful collectively (Sibhatu 2006). common propertyGoverning management the Commons systems (Ostrom 1990; Tucker 1999). In her ground- Despite the rich tapestry of grassroots forest breaking work, , management practices evident in Eritrea, Ostrom (1990) pointed to eight general design government policymakers have, on the whole, principles characteristic of successful CPR ignored them. The top-down approach of institutions (Table 1). According to Ostrom, deploying government-appointed forest a design principle refers to “an essential guards and enacting strict regulation is still element or condition that helps to account for the predominant management approach in the the success of these institutions in sustaining country, with minimal efforts to understand the CPRs and gaining the compliance of POLICY MATTERS 2014: REMEMBERING ELINOR OSTROM

49 Design Principles

Clearly defined boundaries and users Congruence between appropriation and provision rules and local conditions Collective choice arrangement;

those affected by operational rules should be allowed to participateMonitoring; and modify the rules. monitors who actively audit common pool resource conditions and users’ behaviourGraduated are sanctions; users and/or are accountable to them. sanctions to violation increase proportionally relative to the severityConflict ofresolution crimes mechanism; Low cost, readily accessible and rapid mechanism to settleRights conflicts to organise; rights and legitimacy of users to devise their own institutions is recognisedNested Enterprises by outsiders Table 1: Design principles that(for characterise CPRs that long areenduring part CPR of larger institutions. systems) (Source: Ostrom 1990:90)

generation after generation of appropriators resource management tradition and limited to the rules in the use” (1990: 90). Rather government involvement. Lamza is located than acting as a checklist for deciding the about 8km south of the national capital of robustness of local institutions, the design Asmara, and had a resident population of 430 principles are better understood as guides to (128 households) in 2012. help analyse the relative success or failure of institutional arrangements for CPRs (Ostrom Four focus group discussions were conducted, 1999). numbering between 4 and 6 participants per group and representative of adult men and The usefulness and validity of Ostrom’s design women of different ages. Each focus group also principles has been shown in their application contained participants representing a variety in CPR studies over the past two decades. Cox of socio-economic backgrounds. To help et al. (2010) analysed 91 such studies and provoke discussion on a range of issues related found that Ostrom’s design principles are to the access, management and protection well supported empirically. The principles of their enclosures, several exercises were also have their limitations, with some (e.g., carried out, including resource mapping, plant Singleton and Taylor 1992; Tucker et al. resource valuation, and seasonal resource 2007) arguing that issues such as external availability. In-depth interviews (with open socioeconomic factors and urban connections ended questions) were also conducted have not been adequately considered given with the village administrator and other their clear impact on CPR management selected village elders. To obtain a detailed METHODOLOGYregimes. understanding of how individual households interact with resources from the enclosure, and abide by set rules, a semi-structured questionnaire was also conducted with ten For this study, qualitative research was (8 male and 2 female) randomly selected used to assess the management of Eritrea’s household heads. traditional woodland enclosures. The village of Lamza was selected due to its strong The data collected were analysed against POLICY MATTERS 2014: REMEMBERING ELINOR OSTROM

50 Map 1: Location of Lamza, Eritrea (Cartography by Marcel Morin)

hiza’ti Ostrom’s design principles. The strength of the road, which leads to the village, bisects the system in fulfilling the criteria of each hiza’tienclosure. Each side is open in turn for grazing EVALUATINGdesign principle THE was HIZA’TIthen evaluated. SYSTEM for approximately two months each year. The USING OSTROM’S DESIGN PRINCIPLES is rich in planthiza’ti species. Elders estimate that there are 35 types of tree and shrub hiza’ti species withinhiza’ti the .

The system in Lamza was established How does the system perform against about 120 years ago. It was widely held that Ostrom’s Design Principles for community- a community leader named Kentiba Zere had Designbased natural Principle resource 1: Clearly management? defined initiated the practice of restricting access to boundaries and users local woodlands in fear that Italian soldiers (Eritrea was a colony of Italy at the time) hiza’ti would cut down trees for timber. Subsequent The has clear boundaries, both in terms administrators continued to restrict access to of resource and resource users. Distinctive these areas, devising several rules and bylaws hiza’ti features such as a river, a basaltic dyke and to help govern resource use and access. The other features separate Lamza’s from village has several specialised grazing areas the land of neighbouring villages. Village for small ruminants, for suckling sheep and hiza’ti houses form the southern border. Use rights goats and freehiza’ti grazing areas for all kinds of livestock. Compared to these other grazing of any resource within the belong solely lands, the area is strictly managed and to residents of Lamza village. Since everyone reservedhiza’ti mainly for oxen. knows each other very well, it is very easy for users to identify one another. Residence status The is located north of the village and is gained by birth or through marriage to a covers about 130 ha (Map 2). The dry-weather resident, and non-residents are prohibited POLICY MATTERS 2014: REMEMBERING ELINOR OSTROM

51 Map 2: Map of Lamza (Reconstructed from FGD resource mapping)

hiza’ti hiza’ti from accessing the . Lamza residents cut any more than is needed. Similarly, rules do not share resources within the with exist around the collection of firewood.negdet Every any neighbouring village—in this way, what villager is allowed to collect dry fallen wood is managed and by who is clear to community three times a year: mid-March for (a Designmembers. Principle 2: Congruence between religious festival); around Newacacia Year; etbaica and, at appropriation and provision rules / local Easter. In addition, for funerals and weddings, conditions three bundles of seraw tree ( ) are permitted, although for weddings the hiza’ti bridegroom’s family’s quota can include a couple of extra bundles for firewood during The opening and closing of the hiza’ti the honeymoon. coincides withhiza’ti the farming season. Only oxen are allowed to graze inside the . Each The operational rules that govern the side of the is grazed for two months a appropriationhiza’ti (use) of resources fit the local year; with one side of the hiza’ti open from situation in the village, and it is this ability the beginning of May to the middle of July, of the to meet the specific needs of hiza’tiand the other side opening at the end of July villagers thathiza’ti appear to be the crucial factor and closing at the end of September. The behind its effective protection. If benefits plays a major role in the recuperation from the area were not commensurate of sick or injured oxen and castrated calves, with the efforts required to protect and which are allowed to graze even during the manage it, local people would not be so closed season, pending special permission diligent in their stewardship of the resource. from the village administrator. It is strictly The study showed that residents believe the prohibited to take firewood or grass from the rules to be both fair hiza’tiand legitimate. Indeed, enclosure to sell in nearby towns. Users are all respondents were satisfied with current only permitted to take what is needed for their management of the and want future household consumption. For example, under administration of the enclosure to be left to supervision, villagers are allowed to use local the community. Moreover, they agreed that trees to make farm tools. However, villagers without rules to govern access, the resources know which branch is suitable for a specific within the enclosure would be severely tool, and guards ensure that users do not degraded. POLICY MATTERS 2014: REMEMBERING ELINOR OSTROM

52 The fact that only a limited number of oxen Designrelevance Principle and autonomy 4: Monitoring can be diluted. and less destructive activities (e.g. carving farm tools, bee keeping, grazing of sick oxen etc.) are permitted is indicative that hiza’ti Every resident is under the obligation to the operational rules in place are tied to monitor and safeguard the and to bring the capacity of the resource to regenerate. rule-breakers to the attention of the guard These rules not only prevent outsiders from or the village council. Residents are always accessing the area but also regulate use-rate attentive to movements within the enclosure among eligible members, pointing to clear and able to quickly spot and report unlawful congruence between appropriation and activities. Designprovision Principle rules. 3: Collective choice baito arrangement One guard is officially appointed by the village , who also decide how much each household should contribute to the guard’s hiza’ti Though no separate institution exists for salary. On the top of his base salary, fines managing the or woodlands, there is a levied also go to the guard, making their pay roughly equivalent to that of a university- traditional administration system in LamzaBaito educated government employee and thus Adithat manages several activities in accordance with local customary laws. This is called attractive in an area where wages are generally (village assembly) and is the space where low. This helps to minimise the opportunity cost for guards, who have to forego the income important and divisive issues canbaito be debated baito Abo guasa and decided upon, including the management they could potentially earn from farming. The also appoints an (father of of local natural resources.hiza’ti The devises laws, ensures the equitable allocation of herders), who is responsible for overseeing resources from the and settles any the activities of both guards and herders, and conflicts over resource use and allocation. holds power to enforce punishments and hiza’tilisten to the appeals of those charged. The In Lamza, every inhabitantbaito has the right to most common transgressions in relation to the participate and give his or her opinion in the are grazing out of season and illegal tree village baito. The has both judiciary cutting. Generally, all residents follow the rules and legislative elements. In this way, the and most culprits are outsiders. According appointment of new guards, the amount of to the village administrator, this is because (or any modifications to) a guard’s salary, and the resources of neighbouring villages were the contribution of each household towards depletedzeraa long ago. that salary, takes place at these meetings. The system is used in monitoring and Each participanthiza’ti has the right to raise, discuss and debate issues related to the operational safeguardinghiza’ti the area. This allows the guard to rules of the , and together craft and pass seize all livestock found to be grazing illegally new bylaws. Decisions are made based on inside the . The owner haszeraay to pay a fine consensus. to get the livestock back. For this reason the guard is commonly known as ‘ ’, which Althoughhiza’ti the baito system allows resource means “one who seizes livestock.” Besides users to modify operational rules affecting his power to seize livestock, the guard is also the , study participants did point to entitled to levy penalties to any offender the potential threat from government-ledbaito in accordancebaito with village bylaws. If the administrative structures that have the offender refuses to pay, the guard takesAbo him/guasa potential to interfere in the system and her to the to be judged by the village impose new baitorules that do not necessarily administrator and elders. Here, the reflect the needs of local communities. This is plays a key role in enforcing any punishment. because the is a customary rather than If the offender is from a neighbouring village statutory structure, and so without continued and refuses to pay the fine, the village recognition from government agencies their administrator takes the case to the offender’s POLICY MATTERS 2014: REMEMBERING ELINOR OSTROM

53 baito Design Principle 6: Conflict Resolution Mechanism village . He will accuse him/her based on the ‘law of the fathers’, which is highly baito respected in the area. Neighbouring villages hiza’ti The village listens to and settles conflicts. know that Lamza residents are very serious It is rare that a resident of Lamza will appeal about the system and thus often afraid to the nearby Ministry of Agriculture office of not only the guard but also Lamza residents. baito with regards to a resource-related conflict. The fact that monitoring is carried out by While Lamza’s is capable of settling resource users, means that mutual monitoring conflicts vis-à-vis resource use within the is extremely important. A quasi-voluntary village, respondents revealed that for issuesbaito form of compliance based around the idea of ‘I involving neighbouring villages, it is the ‘law will if you will’ is highly visible, and the reason of the fathers’, in combination with the why so few law breakers come from within the system, that creates access to what Ostrom Designcommunity. Principle 5: Graduated Sanctions refers to as “rapid, readily accessible and low cost local mediation” (Ostrom 1990). When this does not suffice, government agencies are hiza’ti asked to get involved. Punishments and sanctions designed to help Acknowledging the role of elders and local regulate the system have evolvedmelelik overtime. Fifty years ago, the punishment authorities in mediating conflicts and the for any illegal action was about nine importance of a low-cost justice system, the (about five kilos) of cereals per shepherd. government recently introduced ‘community Today, the punishment is based around courts’, whose decisions are officially monetary fines and tied to the rules being recognised by higher-level courts. The contravened:• presence of ‘community courts’ increase the 2 capacity of the village baito to settle conflicts, 10 Nakfa per cattle and 5 Nakfa per and again this is reflective of a strong internal • sheep/ goat for illegally grazing out of Designmediation Principle procedure. 7: Rights to Organise season 100 Nakfa for illegally cutting trees with • hiza’ti an axe Study participants said that government 25 Nakfa for illegally collecting dry and interventions in the management fallen wood with bare hands system have been minimal and generally In general, penalties and sanctions are limited to the provision of seedlings and graduated and increase based on offender technical assistance. While villagers view intent, degree of damage caused, and the their management system as largely self- offender’s past record. Generally, offences sufficient, with villagers holding the right in relation to grazing fall into one of two to devise their own rules, it is also true that Wererta they are held accountable to an official inter- categories. The first is unintentional damage village- institutional arrangement known as (known as ), typically when livestock memihidar kebabi, which typically comprises that’s browsing at the periphery of the of 3-4 neighbouring villages. The decisions of enclosure enters without being noticed by memihdar kebabi the baito prevail only if it does not contradict the herder. Though a punishable offense, it is the verdicts of . considered lessHasya serious and so the punishment less severe. Other categories cover deliberatehiza’ti At state levels, the Eritrean Forestry and illegal entry ( ), or when a herder Wildlife Conservation and Development intentionally leads his livestock into the Proclamation (No 115/2006; article 24) out of season. Since he is doing this knowingly, states that “communities… may utilize any the fine is much higher (usually double). naturally growing trees in accordance with the

2 1 Nakfa is equivalent to approximately USD$15

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54 management plan in which the government that Ostrom (1990) developed to characterise will have a role to play in the technical robust commons institutions and management assistance as required”. This proclamation systems. allows villagers to practice self-management The study provides an illustration of how in their woodland and/or woodlots, but3 within a framework of state ownership . The Ostrom’s Design Principles have stood the test Proclamation also states that government of time (Cox et al. 2010) as a tool to assess CPR can enter into agreement with community management, where trust and reciprocity is members where appropriate, for the crucial to sustaining collective action in the hiza’ti purpose of sustainable forest management, management of shared resources. afforestation and reforestation, protection of However, while the system of commons wildlife, watershed management and the like. management appears robust and successful in Both land and forest proclamations give terms of resource sustainability, this study also recognition to community-based resource shows how tenuous certain aspects of the system management and limit the ability of can be (in this case, the arrangements around government to interfere in situations where collective choice and the right to self-organise) stable management scenarios are being because of their dependence upon supportive achieved through customary means. However, government policy—a situation that can easily the power of local people to exercise their change with political upheaval at the state rights is not absolute and remains contingent level and/or the influence of evolving market upon it being in line with government policy economies. of the day. The State’s role in providing Yet despite the threat of upheaval, this study oversight is not, therefore, an immediate also shows how important it is to properly threat but still open to misuses of power that assess the effectiveness of local resource could potentially (andhiza’ti unilaterally) reduce the management efforts ahead of instituting benefits that Lamza residents receive from any kind of external intervention that could Designresources Principle within the 8: Nested. Enterprises fundamentally change a system’s dynamics. In this case study from Eritrea, locally-crafted hiza’ti institutional arrangements, evolved over many decades, have enabled a sustainable resource Given that the system is not part of a management system based around customary larger CPR, Ostrom’s eighth design principle practices and norms. At the heart of this was not included in this study. CONCLUSIONS system is a degree of autonomy that provides resource users with the political space to craft operational and collective choice rules—a situation that requires continued statutory This study reports on a community in the recognition and the kind of tenure security Eritrean highlands, holding a long tradition that incentivizes local people to use and of communal resource management, which protect the resource over the long-term. has developed a set of comprehensive village References bylaws to enable the sustainable use of biologically diverse woodland enclosures of livelihood importance to local people. The Agrawal, Arun. 2001. “Common property study finds that these bylaws, or operational World Development institutions and sustainable governance of rules, play a major role in protecting, resources”. Managing Forests 29: 1649-1672. as monitoring and enhancing the regenerative Common Property capacity of these enclosures, and appear to Arnold J.E.M. 1998. fulfil most of the design principles (Table 2) . Food and Agricultural

3 Land Proclamation (No 58/1994) declares a fundamental change to the customary tenure system and proclaims all land to be property of the state in which villages are allowed to ‘continuous use and control’ of their communal land including woodlands.

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55 Ostrom’s Design Principles Fulfilled / Not fulfilled

Clearly defined boundaries and users Fulfilled Congruence between appropriation and provision rules and local conditions Fulfilled Collective choice arrangement Fulfilled but potentially threatened by interference of government institutions Monitoring Fulfilled Graduated sanctions Fulfilled Conflict resolution mechanism Fulfilled Rights to organise Fulfilled but dependent on future government interventionscontinuing to Table 2: The woodland management system and Ostrom’sbe Design supportive Principles of self-organisation hiza’ti The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action Organization (FAO) of the United Nations. Forestry Paper 136. Rome, Italy. . Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press Self-Governance and Cox, Michael and Tomas Villamayor. 2010.Ecology “A Forest Resources andreview Society of design principles for community- Ostrom, Elinor. 1999. based natural resource management”. . CIFOR Occasional Paper No. 15(4): 38. Available from: http:// 20 www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol15/iss4/ Ostrom, Elinor. 2007. “A diagnostic approach art38/[AccessedPre Investment April, 2012] Study on Forestry and Wildlife Sub-Sector of Eritrea; Technical for going beyond panaceas”. PNAS 104(39): An Institutional Approach CooperationFAO. 1997. Program (TCP) 15181-15187 to Appropriation and Provision in the Commons: Sibhatu, Adam. 2006. . Food and A Case study in the Highlands of Eritrea Agricultural Organization (FAO) of the United Nations. Rome, Italy. . Graduation thesis in AgricAdmin, University of Gebremedhin, Jhon and Girmay Tesfay. 2003. Stellenbosch. South Africa Environment“Community naturaland Development resource management: Economics The case of woodlots in Northern Ethiopia”. Singleton, SaraJournal and Michael of Theoretical Taylor. Politics1992. 8: “Common property, collective action and 129-148. community”. Science 4(3): 309-324. Hardin, Gareth. 1968. “The tragedy of commons” 162(3859): 1243-1248. Tucker, Catherine. 1999.Fletcher “Common Journal property of Soil and Water Developmentdesign principles Studies and development in a ConservationNegassi, Amanuel, Manual Bo forTengnas, Eritrea: Estifanos Some Case Honduran community”. StudiesBein and Kifle Gebru. 2002. XV. Available online: http://fletcher.tufts.edu/praxis/archives/xv/ . RELMA, Technical Report Series, 23. Tucker.pdf [Accessed June, 2012) Nairobi, Kenya Tucker, Randolph and Edwin J. Castellanos. National Statistics and Evaluation Office 2007. “Institutions, biophysical factors and (NSEO). 2003. Eritrea Demographic and Governing the Commons: history: an integrativeHuman Ecology analysis of private and Health Survey 2002. Calverton, Maryland, USA common property forests in Guatemala and Ostrom, Elinor. 1990. Honduras”. 35(3): 259-274. POLICY MATTERS 2014: REMEMBERING ELINOR OSTROM

56 Governing the Commons Through Customary Law Systems of Water Governance The Case of5 the Marakwet Elizabeth Gachenga Governing the Commons Through Customary Law Systems of Water Governance The Case of the Marakwet

Elizabeth Gachenga1

Abstract5 The resilience of customary law systems of natural resource governance in many parts of the world lends credence to Ostrom’s theory on the governance of commons. Ostrom argued that resource users who enjoy relative autonomy in the design of rules for governing and managing common-pool resources, frequently achieve better2 economic (as well as more equitable) outcomes than when experts do this for them. In support of this theory and acknowledging that most common pool resource governance regimes are based on a customary law system, Bosselman has sought to demonstrate a3 link between customary law systems and positive outcomes for sustainable development. Using a case study of the customary law system of water governance of the Marakwet community of Kenya, this paper tests and builds on the design principles4 and tools developed by Ostrom, to study normative institutions in a dynamic environment. The paper proposes an analytical framework that helps identify the features that strengthen customary institutions and ensure their adaptability and resource sustainability. This exercise illustrates the parallels between commons governance and customary law governance Keywords:of natural resources. commons, common pool resources, customary, law, natural resource governance, irrigation system, sustainability, sustainable development, property, water

Plate 1: The River Embobut, which is the source of the irrigation furrows used by the Marakwet people. (Photo credit: Elizabeth Gachenga)

1 Elizabeth Gachenga (PhD) is a law lecturer and researcher at Strathmore Law School in Nairobi, Kenya. This paper is based on research2 undertaken as part of her doctoral research at the University of Western Sydney. Email [email protected] (Ostrom 1990); (Agrawal and Gupta 2005); (Gibson, McKean, and Ostrom 2000); (Tang and Ostrom 1993); (Schlager and Ostrom 1992);3 (Ostrom and Basurto 2011) 4 (Bosselman 2005) (Ostrom and Basurto 2009)

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58 THE CONCEPTS OF CUSTOMARY LAW AND COMMON POOL RESOURCE communities have crafted/developed over GOVERNANCE SYSTEMS an extended period of time. Although it is true that these systems are often closely related to long-standing activities of resource- Common pool resource (CPR) governance dependent people, customary law constitutes systems refer to the various models of norms a more dynamic reality. In this paper, the term and institutions used by communities to ‘customary law systems’ refers to the norms manage the use of a shared resource. The and institutions whose moral authority and field of CPR governanceGoverning gained the Commons: popularity The in force emanates from the contemporary as Evolutionthe 1990s of following Institutions the forpublication Collective of Action Elinor well as traditional culture, customs, religious Ostrom’s book: 5 beliefs, ideas or practices of the people to 7 . whom it applies, rather than from the state. Her work provided a highly insightful critique Notions such as ‘community-based’, ‘informal’ into the theoretical foundations of prevalent or ‘local’ forms of governance are used policy on natural resource governance, and regardless of their antiquity or association motivated a reconsideration of the two- with tradition. In this context, customary dimensional approach to the ‘problem’ of law systems of resource governance are limiting the governance of common pool understood as a popular normative pattern resources to state or ‘market’ (through reflecting the common understanding of valid privatisation) solutions. compulsory rights and obligations relating to the resource. Most of the work done in the area of CPR governance has been contextualized Customary law systems for natural resources in economics and more specifically in governance provide an ideal opportunity institutional economics. However, since for investigating the emerging theories on the publication of Ostrom’s book, legal commons’ governance in a legal context. This property theorists have also demonstrated is because most customary law systems of an interest in the conclusion she drew; natural resource governance are based on a that tragedy is not a necessary fate for all CPR governance system. In recognition of this, commons. Consequently, in legal property Ørebech et al (2005) have sought to explore literature, there is a growing appreciation the implications of commons governance of successful institutional arrangements for research on customary law, suggesting a the management of commons that do6 not link between customary8 law and sustainable fall within the two-dimensional framework development. This paper contributes to of private property or state control. Despite these efforts by exploring how Ostrom’s work reference by legal property theory to Ostrom’s on commons can be applied to customary work, its practical implications have not been law systems for water resource governance. widely researched in the context of law. This Focusing on a case study of the Marakwet paper seeks to explore one such application by people of western Kenya, and by applying investigating the linkages between the work of Ostrom’s work to Ørebech et al’s research Ostrom and colleagues on the commons, and into customary law systems, I propose an customary law governance systems for natural analytical framework to help identify the resources such as water. main features of successful customary law systems for natural resource governance. The Modern legal frameworks tend to associate paper confirms that parallels do exist between customary law systems with the traditional the salient design principles identified by norms and practices that local and indigenous Ostrom and others as indicators of successful

56 (Ostrom 1990) 7 (Rose 1986) 8 This definition is adapted from that of the International Council on Human Rights Policy. See (Policy 2009) 43. (Ørebech et al. 2005)

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59 commons institutions and features of resilient responsible for management of the furrows customary law systems of governance. Above and thus knowledgeable on customary all, it establishes that customary law systems law norms and institutions for water that enjoy autonomy over the design of rules governance in the community. The objective and norms, and which are open to adaptation of the focus group discussion was to provide and change, are more likely to result in background information on the furrows, positive sustainable resource governance their management, and allow for an in-depth MARAKWET’Soutcomes. CUSTOMARY LAW analysis of the Marakwet’s customary law SYSTEM FOR WATER GOVERNANCE system for water governance. Under this customary law system, women do not have a direct role in the management The Marakwet community of Kenya have a of the irrigation system. This research tradition of customary law 9and governance nevertheless sought to obtain the views of that predates colonial rule. The community’s female members of the community and to customary law also forms the backbone of determine the extent of their participation in a robust water resource governance regime the design and implementation of customary based on an irrigation system that runs along rules for water governance. A focus group more than 40km of the Marakwet Escarpment10 discussion was thus organised with both from south of Arror to north of Tot. The a selection of older and younger women. community practices a form of hill furrow The stratification of age groups was useful irrigation common in East Africa, described to determine if perspectives around the as a slope off-take irrigation system. The perceived roles of women in water governance irrigation furrows of the Marakwet, which had changed over time. date back to the initial occupation of the Data was also collected from randomly community in the valley, more than 200 selected water users with the aid of semi- hundred years ago, are the main source of structured questionnaires. Forty-three water freshwater resources both for agricultural users, consisting of men and women of and domestic use. As the country’s oldest different ages and from different households, customary irrigation system, the Marakwet’s were interviewed. Interviews were also water governance system thus provides an conducted with the local chief of the area, an excellent case for analysis of a customary law official working in the Eldoret Water Services systemMethodology of water resource governance in Kenya. Company (ELDOWAS) and a representative of the Lake Victoria North Water Services Board The(LVNWSB) Marakwet’s Office inCustomary Eldoret. Law System for The primary data used for this case is based Water Governance on a field study conducted from November 2010 to February 2011. A qualitative research methodology was used that combined various Among the Marakwet community, it was data collection methods, including semi- clear that customary law continues to play structured interviews, three focus group a central role in societal life. In the case of discussions, and participant observation. The water resource governance, customary law population sampled came from Sambalat, the constitutes the primary regulatory framework area of Marakwet that borders West Pokot. for managing shared water resources. The participants of the first focus group Community members demonstrated a keen discussion were purposefully chosen knowledge of their customary water resource from among clan council elders who are governance system. The clan elders in charge

9 10 This is evidenced by the early accounts of the Marakwet’s law and custom. For example (Beech 1921) (Watson, Adams, and Mutiso 1998)

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60 of furrows explained that the origin of the community members. system dates back more than two centuries. Although the clan council in charge of According to oral histories, the first four the furrows are viewed as custodians of furrows, belonging to the Lakeno, Kapterit, customary law on water resources, the Shaban and Kabishoi clans, were constructed design, implementation and modification in 1882. Construction of the furrows was of the rules is carried out through a broad triggered by drought in the region. Irrigation consultative process. Consequently, rules furrows were considered the only means by are subject to negotiation and modification which to bring water from the Embobut River to people on the valley floor, which lies more with relative ease. For instance, most of the than 1000m below the escarpment. water users interviewed talked about the rule that stipulates how households whose An important feature of Marakwet’s customary male members do not contribute to furrow water governance system is that it is entirely maintenance and repairs are not entitled home grown or autochthonous, with the to water provided by the irrigation system. norms that underpin the system developed However, before this rule is implemented, solely by the community. In the case of local there is a consultative process in which the water law, the rules governing development offender is given an opportunity to present and use were designed by the clan elders, his case. Depending on the reason for in consultation with the wider community, default, other sanctions may be applied to following construction of the furrows. This avoid punishing the entire household, such autonomy in design (both in terms of rules as a monetary fine. Young clan members and their implementation) is considered unavailable for furrow work due to school or sacrosanct. One discussant expressed the work commitments outside of the community centrality of autonomy in the following way, may substitute their physical labour with ‘There is no law that will come to tell us who monetary compensation. will or how we will use the water. The water is for us and for our children from11 our elders. No This type of rule modification can be seen as one will tell us how to use it’. a response to emerging circumstances. While based largely on norms and practices that Although ultimately geared towards conservation and sustainability of the water date back many years, there are still changes resource, the scope of their customary that the rule system of the Marakwet has water law is relatively broad and includes undergone in recent times. For instance, the directives on the use of land and other custodian of the customary law system was natural resources. While the rationale for traditionally a group of clan elders selected on crafting rules is often based on environmental the basis of their age and thus knowledge and indicators, the connection between rules and experience of the furrow system. However, ecological conditions is not always evident. recognising the value of formal education, the For instance, some of the rules and norms are community has begun to allow some younger encoded within a sacred religious system that community members to join the clan council. include taboos and prohibitions associated While obviously lacking in experience, with the felling of trees, the contamination younger members are often very resourceful of furrow water, or the requirement to plant and savvy in their relations with external indigenous trees, which are regarded as organisations and donor agencies, as well as sacred, around rivers and streams. In the holding greater knowledge of (potentially course of discussion with village elders, it useful) new technologies. was confirmed that the underlying objective of these rules is to conserve water resources and foster a sense of respect for water among

11 Focus Group Discussion with Clan Elders and Representatives of Furrows Council (Marakwet District- Kenya, February 10 2010)

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61 REVISITING THE DESIGN PRINCIPLES OF SUSTAINABLE COMMONS MANAGEMENT AND THEIR present but also continue to be relevant in the future. In other words, a system that has the APPLICATION TO CUSTOMARY LAW capacity to adapt to changing conditions. Given SYSTEMS that the social, economic and ecological factors that impinge upon and influence natural resources use and management are in a state As noted in the introduction, Ostrom’s of constant flux, any ideal system of resource Governing the Commons illustrated how management needs to be capable of adapting different communities develop rule-based itself to18 such changes, whether anticipated institutional arrangements for the sustainable or not. This is what Ostrom and Basurto management of their shared natural (2011) were pointing to when stating that CPR resources. Ostrom’s analysis culminated in governance systems, in order to be successful, the identification of eight design principles need to have a tested capacity19 for adaptability that appeared characteristic of successful12 and openness to change; typically by commonsSalient Features management of Successful regimes. CPR means of a normative system that exhibits Systems and their Application to Resilient substantial variety in its rules, with changes Customary Law Systems in rules driven by institutional memory as well as socio-economic20 and/or environmental change. One of the fundamental observations made As a result of their genesis and nature, by Ostrom is that appropriators who enjoy customary governance systems also tend relative autonomy from government or towards versatility and flexibility in the other external actors in the design of their sense that rules and institutions reflect institutional arrangements are more likely 13to the prevalent social, economic, cultural, develop sustainable management regimes. political and ecological21 circumstances in Such autonomy ensures that the users of the which they operate. To this extent, such resource play a role not only in the design systems contain an inherent adaptive but also the modification of the rules that mechanism that makes them suitable for regulate access and use. The case studies also natural resource management. However, as demonstrated that CPR governance systems noted by Bosselman, not all customary law with collective choice arrangements (that systems integrate this22 adaptive management allow individuals affected by operational strategy effectively. A successful customary rules to participate in their modification)14 law system will recognise the structure of often result in positive outcomes. Apart adaptations that it has made in the past and from participating in rule modification, the it is this that offers an effective vehicle for users in these successful CPR systems are also making changes to existing rules, encourages charged15 with the implementation of those fine-grained rules that can be modified rules , as supported by subsequent research without having to modify the entire system, that analysed multiple16 communal irrigation and has23 a meaningful feedback mechanism in systems in Nepal. place. Based on the work of Ostrom and others, Bosselman’s principles of resilient customary Ørebech et al (2005) argued that adaptability law systems are comparable to the design is also an indispensable characteristic of principles identified by Ostrom and built upon success17 in any complex resource management by others, and the synergy that exists between system. Adaptability relates to the inherent the two will be looked at in more detail in the capacity of a system not only to deal with the following section. 12 17 13 (Ostrom 1990) 18 (Bosselman 2005) 245 Commission 1986) for the Australian Aborigi- 14 (Ostrom 1990), 101 19 (Ørebech et al. 2005) nal experience and (Pradhan 2002)409-446 for 15 (Ostrom 1990), 93 20 (Ostrom and Basurto 2011) 22experience from India 16 (Ostrom 1990), 94 21 (Ostrom and Basurto 2011), 336 23 (Bosselman 2005) (Ostrom and Basurto 2011) See for example (Australian Law Reform (Bosselman 2005)

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62 An Analytical Framework for Identifying Successful Customary of this framework, knowledge management Law Systems of Natural Resource signifies the capacity of the normative system Governance to identify the insights and experiences necessary to develop rules that result in the sustainable governance of common Figure 1 encapsulates some of the main pool resources. Knowledge management contributing factors that lie behind the success thus implies the capacity to capture the of customary law systems for natural resource accumulated experiences of responses to governance. Departing from the premises environmental, socio-economic or other types put forward by Ostrom and building on of change. It is this record of past experiences Bosselman’s work, the framework identifies that forms the basis for institutional memory five main indicators of successful systems all and a repository of knowledge that is of which are dependent on users enjoying maintained for the purposes of improving the some level of autonomy in system design and system down the road. 1. Knowledge Management System implementation. An insight into the importance of this feature was gained during fieldwork among the Marakwet. Through focus group Both Ostrom’s and Ørebech’s work point discussions, the responses of water users, to the need for a rational process for the and the observations of the researcher, it was development and modification of rules in evident that an implicit system existed for order for any normative CPR governance accumulating knowledge of the conditions framework to work effectively. Based on affecting water resources and associated insights drawn from the Marakwet case study, rule system. Most interview respondents this paper recognises this crucial feature and demonstrated knowledge of the origin of develops it further. the furrow system in response to prolonged drought in the valley and of their water First, any successful customary system for rules. The rationale for the rules and their governing a CPR needs to have a record (oral relation to past experiences was not always or written) of how the system works under evident as respondents often associated different conditions and that this knowledge non-compliance of the rules with taboos and experience ought to be institutionalised. and religious sanctions. However, as noted The term ‘knowledge management’ is used in the focus group discussions, clan elders to denote this characteristic. For purposes explained that the objectives of water rules Knowledge Stratification of Rules Management System Rule system sufficiently Oral or written record of stratified to allow for partial working of system in different modification conditions

Autonomy

Feedback Mechanism Inherent Right information of current Modification operation Procedure

Figure 1: Framework for Analysing Successful Customary Law Systems of Water Resource Governance

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63 were the preservation of water resources, informal social learning mechanism can be environmental conservation, or the socio- observed in the community habits of the 2.economic Feedback welfare Mechanism of local people. Marakwet, whereby customary norms are crafted, implemented and enforced by means of member consultation—further aided by a A second feature characteristic of successful physical space, the Sambalat trading centre, customary law systems is the presence of a which acts as a hub for irrigation users to feedback mechanism. A successful system 3.share Inherent experiences. Rule Modification Procedure must have ways of ensuring that accurate information is promptly fed back into the system and that information24 then used in the Bosselman developed this feature by building decision making process. This mechanism upon Ostrom’s work on rules and game theory is dependent on the knowledge management in the context of institutional arrangements26 for system, which ensures that relevant natural resource management. It concerns information is captured and used to drive the a procedure by which any given resource rule appropriate adaptation of resource rules and system can be improved and thus ensure its institutions. continued relevance in the context of changing The Marakwet’s customary water governance circumstances. It is both considered an 27 system provides clear evidence of this. The essential attribute of system sustainability flexibility of rules on water and land use point and requires the maintenance of an open- to their adaptation to ecological conditions. minded attitude to rule making by those For instance, while commercial mango involved—thus assuring congruence between farming was not a traditional practice among rules in use and local conditions. the community, many women are currently As noted, Marakwet’s customary water involved in growing mangoes that are proving governance system, while based on traditional successful given their higher tolerance to norms and institutions, continues to evolve the increasingly dry climate. Further, some to adapt to changing circumstances. For of the respondents indicated that they are instance, the incorporation of younger men testing the feasibility of farming green gram into the clan elder council responsible for commercially, along with other non-traditional irrigation furrows is one important example crops that require less water. The customary of institutional flexibility that allows for rule law rules on farming and use of irrigation 4.modification Stratification when of needed.Norms water have consequently been adapted to allow for commercial farming and changes in cultivation practices. One of the necessary conditions for designing The Marakwet case thus points to the an effective feedback mechanism is a rule importance of an effective feedback system that is sufficiently stratified. Bosselman28 mechanism and suggests that successful refers to this feature as ‘fine graininess’, and customary law systems need to include involves rules that can be easily modified; that a wider base of knowledge inputs that partial changes can be made without having encompass not only environmental change to affect the entire system. Although this but economic and social shifts also. As Ostrom feature guarantees the sustainability of the and Basurto (2011) note, the success of any rule system rather than the sustainability of such system is also dependent on an enabling the resource system, resource sustainability is environment that facilitates learning25 from closely associated with a resilient governance the success and failure of others. Such an system that exhibits institutional adaptive

24 26 (Bosselman 2005) 27 (Ostrom, Gardner, and Walker 1994) 28 (Ostrom and Basurto 2011) (Bosselman 2005) POLICY MATTERS 2014: REMEMBERING ELINOR OSTROM

64 capacity. A system with a great potential to governance are interested in a similar deliver sustainable development outcomes institutional framework albeit one where the would be useless if it were to fail in its actual basis of authority rests in informal rather operation as a rule system—for example, than formal/statutory norms and institutions a system whose design requires an entire and where the focus is the relationship that overhaul each time a single rule is changed. connects actors and their environment to those rules. Given these parallels, Ostrom’s While most rules of the Marakwet’s water pioneering work on commons management resource governance system were broadly provides a set of most useful insights into the defined, implementation take places through operation of resilient customary law systems consultation with all water users, which The centrality subjects rules to negotiation and also allows for the governance them to be modified with relative ease. For of common pool of autochthony instance, while there are clear rules on clan resources, such for building as the irrigation allocation of water resources from the furrow resilient systems, the elders explained that these rules system of the could be altered to grant more water29 resources Marakwet. customary to those families in greater need. In other The centrality of law systems words, discretion is sometimes used in the autochthony for application of rules, but this occurs without confirms building resilient having to change the major institutions that Ostrom and customary law 5.fall Autonomy under customary law. systems confirms Basurto’s Ostrom and observation Basurto’s (2011) that, in Lastly, as was noted in the work of Ostrom observation that, and Basurto (2011), evidence from research in places where places where on irrigation systems from different countries commoners enjoy commoners around the world has clearly demonstrated autonomy in CPR enjoy autonomy that the autonomy of resource users to design, rule design there operate and modify rules governing the water is an increased in CPR rule resources they use and depend on, ensured likelihood for design there is better and more equitable outcomes. This positive outcomes. an increased finding resonates strongly with the analysis As noted, while of the customary law system of the Marakwet, the origin of likelihood where the community itself develops norms. customary for positive The operation and implementation of rules law systems is outcomes. is thus in the hands of resource users, with often linked to such autonomy in rule design regarded as past traditions inviolable. LESSONS FROM OSTROM FOR and customs, CUSTOMARY LAW SYSTEMS the systems themselves must continue to evolve in response to This paper confirms the parallels that exist changing environmental and socio-economic between CPR governance systems and circumstances. Consequently, Ostrom and customary law governance systems. While Basurto’s tool for analysing ever-changing the former focus on the normative structures commons governance institutions also (rules in use) for managing shared resources, provides a most useful framework for the customary law systems for natural resource analysis of customary law governance systems.

29 (Focus Group Discussion with Clan Elders and Representatives of Furrows Council (Marakwet District- Kenya, February 10 2010) 2010)

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65 As is the case with successful CPR Hess, Charlotte and ElinorLaw Ostrom. and Contemporary 2003. management systems, customary law systems Problems“Ideas, artifacts and facilities: Information as a must also contain mechanisms to ensure common pool resource. adaptability to changing circumstances if 66:111-145. Perfect Order: they are to persist. The analysis presented Recognizing Complexity in Bali in this paper lends credence to Ostrom’s Lansing, J. Stephen. 2006. central thesis that ‘tragedy’ is not a necessary . Princeton: outcome for commons scenarios and by Princeton University Press. extension customary law systems for natural Okoth-Ogendo, HWO. 2008. “Managing resource governance. As demonstrated the agrarian sector for environmentalEnvironmental by the analysis of Marakwet’s customary Governancesustainability”. in Kenya: In: Okidi, Implementing C., P. Kameri-Mbote the water governance system, autochthonous Frameworkand Migai-Akech Law (eds), or home grown normative and institutional frameworks for governing CPRs, providing : East African Educational they can successfully adapt in the face of Publishers Ltd. Sustainable Development change, can produce positive and sustainable by Means of Market Distribution Mechanism Ørebech, Peter. 1996. Rresourceeferences outcomes. . Paper presented at ‘Econometrics of Environment and Transdisciplinary’ First Agrawal, Arun and Krishna Gupta. 2005. International Conference, April 10-12, 1996 at “DecentralizationWorld and participation: Development The Lisbon, Portugal. governance of common pool resources in Nepal’s Terai”. 33 Ørebech, Peter and Fred Bosselman. 2005. (7):1101-1114. The “The place of customary law in democratic Recognition of Aboriginal Customary Laws societies”. In: Ørebech,The Role P., of F. Customary Bosselman, Law Australian Law Reform Commission. 1986. inJ. 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