Chapter 2 Holding eu Agencies to Political Account
The rapidly increasing number and powers of eu agencies have made the political accountability of eu agencies a salient political and legal issue. This chapter analyzes how the political accountability of eu agencies is arranged. In doing so, it addresses the first part of the research question of this study. The findings serve both as a stand-alone assessment of the political accountability relationship between eu agencies and eu representative institutions as well as a basis for the comparison between the eu and us jurisdictions (Chapter 4). The chapter is divided into three parts. Section 2.1 introduces the institu- tions of the accountability relationship under investigation; the Council and the European Parliament (2.1.1) and eu agencies (2.1.2). It is followed by the investigation of the political accountability of eu agencies with the help of the five dimensions introduced in Chapter 1 (2.2). These include the creation of and the delegation to eu agencies by representative bodies (2.2.1), the appoint- ment and removal of eu agencies’ top officials by representative bodies (2.2.2), accountability through statutory regulation (2.2.3), financial oversight (2.2.4) and the mechanism of scrutiny (2.2.5). In light of the recent developments at the eu level, Section 2.2.6 offers a succinct critical analysis of the ‘Common Approach’ on eu agencies which has been the result of a three-year negotia- tion between the eu main institutions within the Interinstitutional Working Group on eu agencies. Section 2.3 finally assesses the political accountability of eu agencies using the formula presented in Chapter 1. It implies evaluating the political accountability of eu agencies based on three criteria: the avail- ability of accountability mechanisms, their design, and practical application.
2.1 Introducing the Council, the European Parliament, and eu Agencies
This book focuses on the political accountability of eu agencies, implying rep- resentative institutions, typically parliaments, but including both the European Parliament and the Council in the eu context (Article 10 teu), holding eu agencies to account. Before political accountability is going to be investigated and assessed, it is necessary to introduce the institutions under discussion, which is done in this section and divided into two respective parts: Section 2.1.1 on the Council and the European Parliament and Section 2.1.2 on eu agencies.
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2.1.1 The Council and the European Parliament The Lisbon Treaty has become the first treaty in the history of the eu integra- tion to state that the functioning of the European Union is based on the prin- ciple of representative democracy (Article 10 teu). Article 10 teu specifies further that citizens are directly represented at the Union level in the European Parliament and member states are represented in the Council, whose mem- bers are democratically accountable either to their national parliaments or to their citizens.1 This section gives a brief introduction of the structural compo- sition and functions of the Council and the European Parliament (2.1.1 and 2.1.2 accordingly) and discusses potential implications of the institutional design of the eu representative institutions for the process of holding eu agencies to account (2.1.3).
2.1.1.1 The Council and the European Parliament from a Structural Perspective The Council The Council has always been one of the principal decision making institutions of the European Union. While this book talks about the Council, it is necessary to point out that it is “not a monolithic body”;2 in reality, it meets in different configurations depending on the policy area.3 For instance, ministers of finance gather within the Economic and Financial Affairs Council (Ecofin), while the Environment Council is made up of ministers of the environment, etc. Each of those configurations comprises 28 national ministers in relevant fields and has a different frequency of its meetings from once a month (for instance, in the fields of general affairs and economic and financial matters) to twice a year (for instance, in the field of culture and education)4 which seems
1 Article 10 teu also lists the European Council as another representative institution of the member states. It is however excluded from the focus of this book because it is not directly involved in holding eu agencies to political account as the Council and the European Parliament usually are according to eu agencies’ founding acts. 2 Hayes-Renshaw (2006) p. 96. 3 Article 16(6) of the Treaty on European Union (Further: teu) and Article 236 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (Further: tfeu); also, see, Article 2(1) of Council’s Rules of Procedure. Ten compositions of the Council are: 1. General Affairs; 2. Foreign Affairs; 3. Economic and Financial Affairs; 4. Justice and Home Affairs; 5. Employment, Social Policy, Health and Consumer Affairs; 6. Competitiveness (internal market, industry, research and space); 7. Transport, Telecommunications and Energy; 8. Agriculture and Fisheries; 9. Environment; and 10. Education, Youth, Culture and Sport (Find at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ council/council-configurations?lang=en (last check October 2012)). 4 Cini (2004) p. 150.