Reading Clausewitz, Reimagining the Practice of Strategy
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SOQ0010.1177/1476127019854963Strategic OrganizationKornberger and Engberg-Pedersen 854963research-article2019 Essay Strategic Organization 1 –13 Reading Clausewitz, reimagining © The Author(s) 2019 Article reuse guidelines: the practice of strategy sagepub.com/journals-permissions https://doi.org/10.1177/1476127019854963DOI: 10.1177/1476127019854963 journals.sagepub.com/home/soq Martin Kornberger EM Lyon, France, WU Vienna University of Economics and Business and University of Edinburgh Anders Engberg-Pedersen University of Southern Denmark, Denmark Abstract Strategy and organization theory enjoy a reawakening interest in historical analysis. In this essay, we suggest that this engagement should include strategy’s linkage to the history of military strategy. We develop our argument through an exegesis of Carl von Clausewitz’ treatise On War. We claim that Clausewitz’ theorization of strategy advances the ongoing scholarly conversation on the practice of strategy in three specific ways. First, he defines a distinctive locus for the notion of strategy as the bridge between policy and tactics; in so doing, he addresses what has been criticized as strategy’s conceptual drift. Second, with Clausewitz, we can pose the question of strategy’s effectiveness in a critical, reflexive way. This opens up a way to answer the “so-what” question that has hampered strategy as practice research. Third, as an educator in military affairs of the Crown Prince, Clausewitz invites reflection on strategy’s pedagogy. Following Clausewitz, strategy may not want to concern itself with distilling the next practice from past history but immerse strategy students in great detail in history in order to develop their critical faculties. Keywords Clausewitz, history, policy, strategy as practice, tactics, war Introduction Frequently cited, rarely read, and even less engaged with, such is Clausewitz’ fate in studies of strategy and organization. Yet, we currently witness a revival of historical analysis in strategy and organization theory. Broadening this agenda in this essay, we discuss strategy’s own history of thought focusing on its relationship with military strategy. We contribute to such an endeavor by engaging with the work of the Prussian General and writer Carl von Clausewitz. Clausewitz ([1832] 1989) noted the fundamental closeness of the two fields: Corresponding author: Martin Kornberger, EM Lyon, 23 Avenue Guy de Collongue, 69130 Écully, France. Email: [email protected] 2 Strategic Organization 00(0) Rather than comparing [war] to art we could more accurately compare it to commerce, which is also a conflict of human interests and activities; and it is still closer to politics, which in turn may be considered as a kind of commerce on a larger scale. (p. 149) It is surprising that while both organizational and military strategy share Clausewitz as their found- ing (grand-)father, there is currently not much cross-fertilization of the two traditions. Why might such a conversation matter? Clausewitz’ treatise On War—“the most important book on strategy ever written” (Strachan, 2007: 244)—provides three lessons for organizational strategy. First, Clausewitz delimits the role of strategy in the face of the truly disruptive Napoleonic wars, inviting us to rethink the possibility of strategy in times of disruptive change (a theme usually attributed exclusively to our present). In so doing, he investigates strategy’s relation to policy on the one hand and tactics on the other, thus theorizing the practice of strategy as a bridge between the overarching purpose of war and actual conduct on the battlefield. For strategy as practice scholarship in particular (see Vaara and Whittington, 2012, for a review), this means shifting the focus of analysis toward bridging work between policy (i.e. purpose and identity) and tactics (i.e. operations). Second, General Clausewitz was concerned with strategy’s effectiveness and, of course, victory. But he experienced the difficult relationship between win- ning and losing: the stronger army may win battles only to lose the war. This puzzle invites reflection on the intricate nature of strategy’s effectiveness which we (with Freedman, 2013, 2017) define as strategy’s ability to “create power.” Again, for strategy as practice scholarship, this provides an interesting extension of its vocabulary, allowing engagement with important questions of effectiveness without falling back into either purely critical or overly normative positions. Finally, as an educator, Clausewitz was deeply concerned with how strategy could be taught in the classroom. He focused on the importance of training the strategist’s own judgment which represents an interesting pedagogical alternative to theory-light, often normative case study teaching and critical approaches. Thus, and in short, our aim with this essay is to advance the research agenda on the practice of organizational strategy by drawing on Clausewitz. Of course, given that Clausewitz wrote his oeuvre almost 200 years ago, he does not provide straightforward answers for problems of today, but what Clausewitz can do is help us to problematize the present way of thinking strategy, to pose different questions, and to propose an alternative analytical vocabulary. Our essay is structured as follows. First, we describe the status quo of military strategy and its radical disruption through Napoleonic warfare. We then turn to Clausewitz’ theory of strategy as the search for new guiding principles in the midst of this radical disruption. We conclude with a discussion of how our reading of Clausewitz might challenge and change ongoing conversations in strategy and organization theory. Napoleonic disruptions Before Clausewitz: the quest for formalization of strategy Clausewitz (1780–1831) traced his ideas over the course of several decades, collecting them in his unfinished manuscript On War which was published posthumously in 1832 by his wife. Clausewitz was actively engaged on the battlefield and, later on, in charge of instructing the Prussian Prince in the conduct of war. Thus, for him, strategy was primarily a practical concern that needed to be answered through experience: “Just as some plants bear fruit only if they don’t shoot up too high, so in the practical arts the leaves and flowers of theory must be pruned and the plant kept close to its proper soil—experience” (Clausewitz, [1832]1989: 61). Kornberger and Engberg-Pedersen 3 Figure 1. Map of battlefield, following principles of geometry. The soil in which Clausewitz grew his ideas was one of radical disruption. The Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars from 1792 to 1815 expanded military efforts vastly in both scope and inten- sity. When Napoleon invaded Russia in 1812, for instance, his Grande Armée counted almost half a million men, while the Battle of Leipzig the following year was fought over 4 days, involving 600,000 soldiers on both sides. In the 18th century, war had been contained to smaller battles that were limited in time, space, and intensity. This more contained form of warfare was guided by a military theory that was modeled on geometry. Around 1750, for instance, the French theorists of war Jacques-François de Chastenet de Puységur and Lancelot Turpin de Crissé translated the design of material defense structures to the arrangement of soldiers, shaping “human material” according to the same laws of geometry (Figure 1). The result of such formalized warfare was a strict choreography, perhaps best embodied in the maneuvers of Frederick the Great, King of Prussia from 1740 until 1786. Napoleonic warfare, distinguished by its unprecedented scale, dynamic, and destructive force, posed a serious challenge to this logic of strategy based on geometry. As the Grande Armée swept through Europe (Napoleon reportedly stated that the best soldier is not so much the one who fights as the one who marches), military strategy theory had to retreat and find new ground from where to formulate propositions that could provide a sound basis for action. Strategy based on geometry became obsolete as Clausewitz ([1809] 1992) lamented in his letter to the German philosopher Fichte: “I have seen all the traditional opinions and forms of military power among which I grew up come apart like rotten timber and collapse in the swift stream of events” (p. 280). 4 Strategic Organization 00(0) War’s radical contingency In response to the “rotten timber” that the disruptive Napoleonic Wars left behind, Clausewitz developed a concept of strategy that addressed the contingencies on the battlefield. The new warfare was riddled with elements beyond the control and comprehension of the decision maker, transforming war into an “empire of chance” (Engberg-Pedersen, 2015). Hence, war was not a geometric puzzle or a chess game—the favorite metaphor of 18th century military theory. Rather, Clausewitz ([1832] 1989) argued, “in the whole range of human activities, war most closely resembles a game of cards” (p. 86). The conditions and context for strategy had become shrouded in a “fog of war” that defied logical analysis. Clausewitz defined three specific difficulties for the strategist. First, the strategist faces what Nobel laureate Herbert Simon would describe much later as “bounded rationality”: Since all information and assumptions are open to doubt, and with chance at work everywhere, the commander continually finds that things are not as he expected. […] During an operation decisions have usually to be made at once: there may be no time to review the situation