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SSStttooonnnyyy BBBrrrooooookkk UUUnnniiivvveeerrrsssiiitttyyy The official electronic file of this thesis or dissertation is maintained by the University Libraries on behalf of The Graduate School at Stony Brook University. ©©© AAAllllll RRRiiiggghhhtttsss RRReeessseeerrrvvveeeddd bbbyyy AAAuuuttthhhooorrr... The Pedagogy of Wisdom A Dissertation Presented by Gregory Kirk to The Graduate School in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy Stony Brook University December 2012 Stony Brook University The Graduate School Gregory Kirk We, the dissertation committee for the above candidate for the Doctor of Philosophy degree, hereby recommend acceptance of this dissertation. Peter Manchester – Dissertation Advisor Associate Professor - Philosophy Edward S. Casey - Chairperson of Defense Distinguished Professor - Philosophy David Allison – Internal Reader Professor - Philosophy Patricia Locke – External Reader Tutor – St. John’s College, Santa Fe This dissertation is accepted by the Graduate School Charles Taber Interim Dean of the Graduate School ii Abstract of the Dissertation The Pedagogy of Wisdom by Gregory Kirk Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy Stony Brook University 2012 My dissertation is an interpretation of Plato's Theaetetus. The Theaetetus is typically taken as the first work of epistemology, in which Socrates and Theaetetus fail to find satisfactory any of the three proposed definitions of knowledge – that it is perception, that it is true opinion and that it is true opinion with an account. I argue that the discussion of these claims is in aid of demonstrating Socrates' pedagogy, and that the examination of his method of questioning Theaetetus causes to emerge a reading of the text placing primary emphasis on the presentation of his activity as a midwife of ideas, i.e. one who extracts from interlocutors un-reflected-upon presumptions about reality in order to examine them, with the result that the interlocutor has an improved understanding both of reality and of herself. Emphasis on Socrates' education of Theaetetus makes clear the fact that the failure of each definition to provide an adequate account of knowledge is a consequence of the abstraction of particular capacities (perception, opinion and speech) from the whole of the living human being, a whole that is finite, limited in perspective, and that accumulates ideas about reality prior to ever having developed the ability to ask questions. Further, one is given an implicit account of knowledge as emerging from the particular context of human life, as mediated by the interplay between apprehension and reflection, and as a relational phenomenon emergent from and transcending an assortment of limited capacities. Socrates' pedagogy shows that he is responsive to the way that understanding develops, and is thus responsive to human reality in educating in a way that the explicitly presented definitions of knowledge are not. I argue that Socrates is oriented to the cultivation of the ability to experience the world simultaneously as something that it is intrinsically desirable to strive to know, and as something about which the conclusions we reach always demand further questioning, i.e. to the cultivation of an erotic orientation towards the world, an orientation the realization of which is called wisdom. iii Table of Contents Introduction – Human Life as the Occasion for the Possibility of Knowledge 1 1. Life is the Context of Knowledge 6 2. Perception and Reflection are Mutually Mediating, Inextricable and Transformational 10 3. Knowledge is a Relational Identity, the Offspring of the Soul's Capacities 12 Chapter 1 - Preparing an Introduction to the Question of Knowledge (142a-143c) 16 Introduction 16 i. Platonic Beginnings 16 ii. The Epistemological Significance of the Problem of Beginning 20 Section One – The Inadequate Starting-Point, or Starting-Points as Inadequacy (142a1) 24 Section Two – Knowing Our Way To Death (142a9-b1, 142c6) 30 Section Three – Knowing: The Continuity of Character (142b6-d4) 33 Section Four – Knowledge, Memory and Recollection (142c2-5, 142d4-143a9) 40 Section Five – Representation, Interpretation and Reliability (143b6-c8) 45 Conclusion 51 Chapter 2 – The Teacher: (143d1-151d3) 53 Introduction 53 Section One – What Socrates cares about (143d1-e4) 58 1. Interpersonal Dynamics 58 2. Socrates' First Account of Himself 65 i. The Call from the City 66 ii. Young Men and the Time for Philosophy 68 a. Vocational Obstacles in the Euthyphro 70 b. Youth in the Lysis 76 Section Two – How Socrates Teaches (143e5-149e9) 82 1. Initiation into Questioning 82 iv i. Distinguishing Authority from Expertise 82 ii. Distinguishing Disciplinary Knowledge from Wisdom 88 iii. What These Questions Accomplish 91 2. The Mechanics of Inquiry: Interrogation, Estrangement, Adoption 93 i. Interrogation: Making Words Matter 93 ii. Estrangement: Theaetetus’ First Definition 100 iii. Adoption: The Significance of Analogy in Making Ideas One’s Own 104 Section Three – Socrates as Midwife (149a1-151d3) 108 Conclusion 115 Chapter 3 – The Student: Learning to Think Through Perception (151d4-186e11) 117 Introduction 117 Section One – The Labour of Articulation (151d4-152a10) 125 1. Preparation for Labour and the Proper Conditions for Conversation 126 2. Why Socrates does not take Theaetetus’ definition on its own terms 130 Section Two – Perception as Erotic Coupling (152b1-160e6) 135 1. Perception as Initiation 135 2. Relational Identity and the Denial of Independent Being 137 3. Motions: Corporeal and Incorporeal, Generating and Maintaining 141 4. The Principle of Non-Contradiction and the Necessity of Independent Being 146 5. The Myth of Infinite Motions 154 6. Reformulating the Myth 165 7. Hackneyed Arguments as a Test 168 Section Three – Treating One’s Claims with Care (160e7-172c2) 174 1. What one is and is not responsible for 176 2. Socrates as Performer of Disputation 181 3. The True versus The Better 191 Section Four – The Philosopher and the Everyday World (172c3-177c7) 196 v 1. Leisure and Self-Constraint 197 2. Freedom vs. Domestication 199 3. The Perception of the Philosopher 201 4. Is Socrates a philosopher? 206 Section Five – Soul as the Place of Perception (177c8-186e11) 208 1. Knowledge Concerning the Future 210 2. Challenging Heraclitus 212 Conclusion 220 Chapter 4 –The Shortcomings of Abstraction (187a1-201c7) 222 Introduction 222 Section One – Opining and Thinking (187a1-191a8) 227 1. Theaetetus' Hastily Adopted Opinions 231 2. The Statement of the Second Definition 232 3. What Socrates calls Thinking and Opining 241 4. The Integrated Whole of Thinking and Opinion 246 Section Two – Two Images of the Becoming of Opinion (191a9-201c7) 247 1. The wax example: The re-introduction of a developmental model (191c-195b9) 248 2. The chatterbox is who he is – Socrates’ Second Sailing (195b9-197a8) 263 3. Two Ways of Having Knowledge (197a9-197b7) 268 4. The Bird-cage (197b8-200e7) 272 5. Passivity: The River-Guide and the Art of the Rhetorician (200e7-201c7) 280 Conclusion 284 Chapter 5 – Knowledge as a Whole (201c8-210d4) 286 Introduction 286 Section One – Speech and the Unspeakable Elements (200e8-202c8) 293 1. The Metaphysics of Opinion and Deliberative Thought 293 2. Theaetetus' Memory of the Third Definition of Knowledge 296 vi 3. What the Third Definition Provides 303 Section Two – Things, Alls, Parts, Wholes (202c9-210d4) 307 1, Emergent Wholes 309 2. That Which Reveals Itself Through Others 313 3. The Organizing Principle as the Distinction between Aggregates and Wholes 315 4. What The Account (Logos) Adds 322 5. A Digression Concerning Shadow-Painting and the Ambiguity of Illusion 328 6. Aporia 331 Conclusion 336 Concluding Remarks on the Theaetetus as a Whole 339 Bibliography 345 vii Acknowledgments I am grateful to many people for helping me to complete this document, for helping to transform my thinking about Plato, and for helping me to understand better what it is exactly that one is trying to accomplish in the activity of doing philosophy. Regarding all of these, but particularly the latter, most of all I am grateful to John Russon, who has, dare I say, played the role of midwife to me and to my incomplete and underdeveloped ideas, and who has played a central role in the transformation of my understanding of the world that is ongoing. I am also grateful to Anna Bekerman for her love and support, for having a keen editor's eye toward my sometimes convoluted sentences, and for being the essential person to whom I presented my ideas in their earliest form. I want to thank Whitney Howell for being a great friend and an essential dialogue partner, Peter Manchester for the inspiring creativity of his thinking and for the blunt, unvarnished and highly perceptive comments he has given me in my time at Stony Brook, Ed Casey for the opportunities he has given me and for the careful attention he gives to my writing, Patricia Locke and David Allison for their thoughtful and challenging comments on my work, Mitchell Miller for making himself available to discuss with me the immensely difficult final section of the Theaetetus at the Collegium Phaenomenologicum, and Jeff Epstein and Emiliano Diaz for their invaluable insights during our Plato reading group. I would also like to thank Anne O'Byrne, Mary Rawlinson, Lee Miller, Allegra De Laurentiis, Donn Welton, Lorenzo Simpson, Harvey Cormier, Alissa Betz, Nathan Leoce-Shappin, Katie Amella, David Ciavatta, Shannon Hoff, Kirsten Jacobson, Patricia Fagan, Eric Sanday, Tim Fitzjohn, Kym Maclaren, Gregory Recco, Jared Babin, Susan Bredlau, Joe Arel, Eve Rabinoff, Laura McMahon, Simon Rice, Matthew Drake, and Allan and Janet Kirk. There are no doubt others, too. Finally, thanks to Alice. viii Introduction – Human Life as the Occasion for the Possibility of Knowledge Plato's Theaetetus presents a documented conversation Socrates is said to have had with his acquaintance, the mathematician and teacher, Theodorus, along with Theodorus' promising student, Theaetetus. The documented conversation is presented to us as having been written by a student of Socrates, or at least an admirer of Socrates, named Euclides.