The Epistemology of Natural Deduction Seyed Hassan Masoud

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

The Epistemology of Natural Deduction Seyed Hassan Masoud The Epistemology of Natural Deduction by Seyed Hassan Masoud A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Department of Philosophy University of Alberta © Seyed Hassan Masoud, 2015 Abstract Natural deduction and the axiom method, as two derivation methods of formal deductive logic, are extensionally equivalent in the sense that they prove the same theorems and they derive the same premise-conclusion arguments: one has a derivation of a given conclusion from a given premise set if and only if the other does. They differ significantly, however, from an epistemo- logical point of view. Being based on the notion of hypothetical reasoning, providing the most logically detailed steps within a derivation, and being tied closely to the conception of logic as attempting to model mathematical reasoning are some features that give natural deduction systems an epistemic flavor the axiom-based systems, to a large extent, lack. This work investigates these features through a comparison of the two sorts of deduction systems. Analyzing the historical background of the advent and flourishing of the two methods, looking at the real examples of mathematical reasoning, and taking into account the way a rational agent carries out a logical derivation, give historical, experiential, and phenomenological dimensions to the work. All these features turn around the epistemic insight that deductive reasoning is a way of coming to know whether and how a given conclusion logically follows from a given set of premises. The general results include finding the main characteristic feature of natural deduction as having a method of making a hypothesis and deriving some conclusions from it in combination with previous premises if any. Also the notion of epistemic rigor is defined which proves to be useful in investigating the significant advantages of natural deduction. Epistemic rigor can be measured by looking at the simplicity and purity of the rules of inference. Another distinctive feature of natural deduction is the two-dimensionality of its derivations which is due to the fact ii that the formulas that occur within the scope of an assumption are not at the same level as other formulas outside the scope of that assumption. Furthermore, it is shown that, to a large extent, the best way of formalizing mathematical proofs is using natural deduction. The whole work is done within the framework of an epistemic approach to logic which characterizes logic as the science of reasoning. iii I dedicate this work to: My wife, Zahra and My son, Soroush iv Acknowledgments What I have learned―in philosophy in general and logic in particular―as well as the research I have conducted which yielded this dissertation would be impossible, if not for the intellectual and financial support by the Department of Philosophy at the University of Alberta. For more than five years, I felt at home in the department, surrounded by unexpectedly warm- hearted and amiable people―professors, students, and staff. If it was possible, I would have liked to mention all the members of the department one by one. First of all, I would like to express my deepest gratitude towards Professor Bernard Linsky, who was my interim advisor from the beginning and then my thesis supervisor. He is known as a great person to be around, and I have been lucky enough to experience innumerable moments when he surprised me by his heartening words and insightful suggestions. Having read this dissertation several times, he spent an ample amount of time going through the chapters and giving me invaluable comments. Professor Linsky has been an inspiration for me throughout the course of this long journey. Also, I owe many thanks to Professor Jeffry Pelletier, a great teacher from whom I learnt a lot in several courses and in our influential discussions. Professor Pelletier shared his wisdom with me through his many precious comments and meticulous ideas for this dissertation. Next, I have to thank Professor Bruce Hunter, another member of the committee, who made me more sensitive about epistemological aspects of logic, and gave me great ideas about my research. I feel fortunate that during my time here at the University of Alberta, Professor Allen Hazen moved to the Department of Philosophy and ran the weekly seminar of the Logic Group in which I could meet logic-oriented professors and students on a regular basis. I greatly benefited from participating in the thriving discussions of various topics in v mathematical and philosophical logic enriched by his vast knowledge. In addition to the Logic Group, Professor Hazen had a substantial impact on my research with his comments. I’m honored that I worked under the supervision of this committee of professors, who I would like to express my profound acknowledgement towards. Without them this dissertation would not be written. During my PhD studies, I received a great amount of financial support in the forms of TA, RA, and teaching as the main instructor. I sincerely appreciate the significance of the efforts the administrative staff of the department put into bestowing this support. I would like to mention Professor Bruce Hunter, the former chair, Professor Jack Zupko, the present chair of the department, and especially Professor Amy Schmitter, the graduate coordinator. Their hard work and positive attitude provided a worry-free life for me to spend my time on my study and research. Among the faculty members of the department who were not on my committee, Professor Philip Corkum showed the most interest in my work, which led to some effective discussions. From outside the department, Professor John Corcoran, of the University at Buffalo, provided me with many comments and suggestions. I have never met him in person, but we have had flourishing discussions through email since 2007. I am certainly indebted to both of them. And last but not least, I really appreciate the constant and unconditional support from my family: my wife, Zahra, and my son, Soroush. They have always put my work prior to their own interests and given up so many vacations, picnics, parties, and even family times to help me carry out my study and research. I would like to express thanks towards my parents and my brothers from Iran, who have encouraged me to follow my aspiration and have always inspired me through their nice words. I have to thank them all. vi Table of contents Chapter 1. Introduction ................................................................................................................ 1 1.1. The thesis statement .................................................................................................. 1 1.2. An outline of the dissertation .................................................................................... 2 1.3. The scope of the study .............................................................................................. 4 Chapter 2. Characterization of natural deduction ...................................................................... 12 2.1. Background: axiomatic systems ............................................................................. 12 2.2. The history of natural deduction ............................................................................. 22 2.3. Some remarks .......................................................................................................... 32 2.4. Logicians’ reluctance to embrace natural deduction .............................................. 43 2.5. Various characterizations of natural deduction ....................................................... 45 Chapter 3. Epistemic rigor vs. formal rigor ............................................................................... 48 3.1. Euclid and the axiomatic method ............................................................................ 48 3.2. Frege and the ideal of a gapless deduction ............................................................. 51 3.3. Formal rigor ............................................................................................................ 53 3.4. The cogency of a deduction .................................................................................... 56 3.5. Epistemic rigor ........................................................................................................ 63 Chapter 4. Representation of natural deduction derivations ...................................................... 70 4.1. Structured derivations vs. linear derivations ........................................................... 70 4.2. Two-dimensionality of natural deduction ............................................................... 76 4.3. Different forms of representing natural deduction derivations ............................... 81 4.4. The epistemological significance of graphical representations .............................. 91 vii Chapter 5. Real mathematical reasoning ................................................................................. 100 5.1. Introduction ........................................................................................................... 100 5.2. Examples of mathematical proofs ......................................................................... 101 5.3. A proposal to categorize the components of deductive reasoning ........................ 122 Chapter 6. Natural deduction and the epistemological approach to logic ............................... 125 6.1. Three classes of logical systems ..........................................................................
Recommended publications
  • The Deduction Rule and Linear and Near-Linear Proof Simulations
    The Deduction Rule and Linear and Near-linear Proof Simulations Maria Luisa Bonet¤ Department of Mathematics University of California, San Diego Samuel R. Buss¤ Department of Mathematics University of California, San Diego Abstract We introduce new proof systems for propositional logic, simple deduction Frege systems, general deduction Frege systems and nested deduction Frege systems, which augment Frege systems with variants of the deduction rule. We give upper bounds on the lengths of proofs in Frege proof systems compared to lengths in these new systems. As applications we give near-linear simulations of the propositional Gentzen sequent calculus and the natural deduction calculus by Frege proofs. The length of a proof is the number of lines (or formulas) in the proof. A general deduction Frege proof system provides at most quadratic speedup over Frege proof systems. A nested deduction Frege proof system provides at most a nearly linear speedup over Frege system where by \nearly linear" is meant the ratio of proof lengths is O(®(n)) where ® is the inverse Ackermann function. A nested deduction Frege system can linearly simulate the propositional sequent calculus, the tree-like general deduction Frege calculus, and the natural deduction calculus. Hence a Frege proof system can simulate all those proof systems with proof lengths bounded by O(n ¢ ®(n)). Also we show ¤Supported in part by NSF Grant DMS-8902480. 1 that a Frege proof of n lines can be transformed into a tree-like Frege proof of O(n log n) lines and of height O(log n). As a corollary of this fact we can prove that natural deduction and sequent calculus tree-like systems simulate Frege systems with proof lengths bounded by O(n log n).
    [Show full text]
  • Reflection Principles, Propositional Proof Systems, and Theories
    Reflection principles, propositional proof systems, and theories In memory of Gaisi Takeuti Pavel Pudl´ak ∗ July 30, 2020 Abstract The reflection principle is the statement that if a sentence is provable then it is true. Reflection principles have been studied for first-order theories, but they also play an important role in propositional proof complexity. In this paper we will revisit some results about the reflection principles for propositional proofs systems using a finer scale of reflection principles. We will use the result that proving lower bounds on Resolution proofs is hard in Resolution. This appeared first in the recent article of Atserias and M¨uller [2] as a key lemma and was generalized and simplified in some spin- off papers [11, 13, 12]. We will also survey some results about arithmetical theories and proof systems associated with them. We will show a connection between a conjecture about proof complexity of finite consistency statements and a statement about proof systems associated with a theory. 1 Introduction arXiv:2007.14835v1 [math.LO] 29 Jul 2020 This paper is essentially a survey of some well-known results in proof complexity supple- mented with some observations. In most cases we will also sketch or give an idea of the proofs. Our aim is to focus on some interesting results rather than giving a complete ac- count of known results. We presuppose knowledge of basic concepts and theorems in proof complexity. An excellent source is Kraj´ıˇcek’s last book [19], where you can find the necessary definitions and read more about the results mentioned here.
    [Show full text]
  • Substitution and Propositional Proof Complexity
    Substitution and Propositional Proof Complexity Sam Buss Abstract We discuss substitution rules that allow the substitution of formulas for formula variables. A substitution rule was first introduced by Frege. More recently, substitution is studied in the setting of propositional logic. We state theorems of Urquhart’s giving lower bounds on the number of steps in the substitution Frege system for propositional logic. We give the first superlinear lower bounds on the number of symbols in substitution Frege and multi-substitution Frege proofs. “The length of a proof ought not to be measured by the yard. It is easy to make a proof look short on paper by skipping over many links in the chain of inference and merely indicating large parts of it. Generally people are satisfied if every step in the proof is evidently correct, and this is permissable if one merely wishes to be persuaded that the proposition to be proved is true. But if it is a matter of gaining an insight into the nature of this ‘being evident’, this procedure does not suffice; we must put down all the intermediate steps, that the full light of consciousness may fall upon them.” [G. Frege, Grundgesetze, 1893; translation by M. Furth] 1 Introduction The present article concentrates on the substitution rule allowing the substitution of formulas for formula variables.1 The substitution rule has long pedigree as it was a rule of inference in Frege’s Begriffsschrift [9] and Grundgesetze [10], which contained the first in-depth formalization of logical foundations for mathematics. Since then, substitution has become much less important for the foundations of Sam Buss Department of Mathematics, University of California, San Diego, e-mail: [email protected], Supported in part by Simons Foundation grant 578919.
    [Show full text]
  • Proof Complexity in Algebraic Systems and Bounded Depth Frege Systems with Modular Counting
    PROOF COMPLEXITY IN ALGEBRAIC SYSTEMS AND BOUNDED DEPTH FREGE SYSTEMS WITH MODULAR COUNTING S. Buss, R. Impagliazzo, J. Kraj¶³cek,· P. Pudlak,¶ A. A. Razborov and J. Sgall Abstract. We prove a lower bound of the form N ­(1) on the degree of polynomials in a Nullstellensatz refutation of the Countq polynomials over Zm, where q is a prime not dividing m. In addition, we give an explicit construction of a degree N ­(1) design for the Countq principle over Zm. As a corollary, using Beame et al. (1994) we obtain ­(1) a lower bound of the form 2N for the number of formulas in a constant-depth N Frege proof of the modular counting principle Countq from instances of the counting M principle Countm . We discuss the polynomial calculus proof system and give a method of converting tree-like polynomial calculus derivations into low degree Nullstellensatz derivations. Further we show that a lower bound for proofs in a bounded depth Frege system in the language with the modular counting connective MODp follows from a lower bound on the degree of Nullstellensatz proofs with a constant number of levels of extension axioms, where the extension axioms comprise a formalization of the approximation method of Razborov (1987), Smolensky (1987) (in fact, these two proof systems are basically equivalent). Introduction A propositional proof system is intuitively a system for establishing the validity of propo- sitional tautologies in some ¯xed complete language. The formal de¯nition of propositional proof system is that it is a polynomial time function f which maps strings over an alphabet § onto the set of propositional tautologies (Cook & Reckhow 1979).
    [Show full text]
  • Automated Theorem Proving
    Automated Theorem Proving Frank Pfenning Carnegie Mellon University Draft of Spring 2004 Material for the course Automated Theorem Proving at Carnegie Mellon Uni- versity, Fall 1999, revised Spring 2004. This includes revised excerpts from the course notes on Linear Logic (Spring 1998) and Computation and Deduction (Spring 1997). Material for this course is available at http://www.cs.cmu.edu/~fp/courses/atp/. Please send comments to [email protected] This material is in rough draft form and is likely to contain errors. Furthermore, citations are in no way adequate or complete. Please do not cite or distribute this document. This work was supported by NSF Grants CCR-9303383, CCR-9619684, CCR- 0306313, and CCR-0325808. Copyright c 1999, 2004 Frank Pfenning ii Draft of April 13, 2004 Contents 1 Introduction 1 2 Natural Deduction 3 2.1 Intuitionistic Natural Deduction . 5 2.2 Classical Logic . 17 2.3 Localizing Hypotheses . 17 2.4 Proof Terms . 20 2.5 Exercises . 24 3 Sequent Calculus 29 3.1 Intercalation . 29 3.2 Compact Proof Terms . 35 3.3 Sequent Calculus . 36 3.4 Cut Elimination . 43 3.5 Applications of Cut Elimination . 48 3.6 Proof Terms for Sequent Derivations . 49 3.7 Classical Sequent Calculus . 52 3.8 Exercises . 59 4 Focused Derivations 63 4.1 Inversion . 63 4.2 Backchaining . 72 4.3 Focusing . 76 4.4 Unification . 80 4.5 Unification with Parameters . 88 4.6 Exercises . 91 5 The Inverse Method 93 5.1 Forward Sequent Calculus . 94 5.2 Negation and Empty Succedents . 97 5.3 The Subformula Property .
    [Show full text]
  • Frege Systems
    Introduction Proof systems The propositional Pigeonhole Principle Sequent Calculus Course "Propositional Proof Complexity\, JASS'09 Frege Systems Michael Herrmann Department of Computer Science TU Munich May 10, 2009 Michael Herrmann: Frege Systems 1/ 44 Introduction Proof systems The propositional Pigeonhole Principle Sequent Calculus Table Of Contents Introduction Motivation Basics Proof systems Frege systems Extended Frege systems The propositional Pigeonhole Principle PHP model for Frege proof Frege proof Extended Frege proof Sequent Calculus Michael Herrmann: Frege Systems 2/ 44 Introduction Proof systems The propositional Pigeonhole Principle Sequent Calculus Motivation Motivation Question: Why even dealing with proof systems? We differ between two kinds of proofs. I Social proofs. Proofs consisting of social conventions with that scientists reciprocal convince each other of the truth of theorems. This is done in natural language and with some symbols and figures. I Formal proofs. A proof is a string, which satisfies some precisely stated set of rules. Michael Herrmann: Frege Systems 3/ 44 Introduction Proof systems The propositional Pigeonhole Principle Sequent Calculus Motivation Of course our motivation in studying formal proof systems is to develop a formal proof system. But there is a greater impact on proof systems to complexity theory. Michael Herrmann: Frege Systems 4/ 44 Introduction Proof systems The propositional Pigeonhole Principle Sequent Calculus Basics Repetition NP and coNP P is the set of decision problems, which can be solved by a deterministic Turing machine in polynomial time. NP is the set of decision problems, for which the answer yes has simple proofs if the answer is indeed yes. coNP a element X is in coNP if and only if the element X¯ is in NP.
    [Show full text]
  • Plausibly Hard Combinatorial Tautologies
    Plausibly Hard Combinatorial Tautologies Jeremy Avigad Abstract. We present a simple propositional proof system which con- sists of a single axiom schema and a single rule, and use this system to construct a sequence of combinatorial tautologies that, when added to any Frege system, p-simulates extended-Frege systems. 1. Introduction As was pointed out in [6], the conjecture that NP = coNP can be con- strued as the assertion that there is no proof system (broadly6 interpreted) in which there are short (polynomial-length) proofs of every propositional tautology. Though showing NP = coNP seems to be difficult, the above formulation suggests an obvious restriction,6 namely the assertion that spe- cific proof systems are inefficient. One of the nicest results of this form to date is the fact that there are no short proofs of tautologies representing the pigeonhole principle in a fixed-depth Frege system (see, for example, [1, 2]). This approach to demonstrating a proof system's inefficiency seems natu- ral: choose a suitable sequence of propositional formulas that express some true combinatorial assertion, and then show that these tautologies can't be proven efficiently by the system in question. Unfortunately, in the case of Frege systems, there is a shortage of good candidates. Bonet, Buss, and Pitassi [3] consider a number of combinato- rial principles with short extended-Frege proofs, and conclude that most of them seem to require at most quasipolynomial Frege proofs (see also [7] for further discussion). This isn't to say that there are no examples of tautolo- gies whose Frege proofs are likely to require exponential length: Cook [5] has shown that propositional tautologies ConEF (n), which assert the par- tial consistency of extended-Frege systems, have polynomial extended-Frege proofs; whereas Buss [4] has shown that if a Frege system is augmented by these tautologies, it can polynomially simulate any extended-Frege system.
    [Show full text]
  • Bounded-Depth Frege Complexity of Tseitin Formulas for All Graphs
    Electronic Colloquium on Computational Complexity, Revision 1 of Report No. 69 (2019) Bounded-depth Frege complexity of Tseitin formulas for all graphs Nicola Galesi1, Dmitry Itsykson2, Artur Riazanov2, and Anastasia Sofronova2,3 1Dipartimento di Informatica, Sapienza Universit`adi Roma 2St. Petersburg Department of V.A. Steklov Institute of Mathematics of the Russian Academy of Sciences 3St. Petersburg State University [email protected], [email protected], [email protected], [email protected] May 6, 2019 Abstract We prove that there is a constant K such that Tseitin formulas for an undirected graph G requires twpGqΩp1{dq K log n proofs of size 2 in depth-d Frege systems for d ă log log n , where twpGq is the treewidth of G. This extends H˚astadrecent lower bound for the grid graph to any graph. Furthermore, we prove tightness of our bound up to a multiplicative constant in the top exponent. Namely, we show that if a Tseitin formula for a graph G has size s, then for all large enough d, it has a depth-d Frege proof of size Op1{dq 2twpGq polypsq. Through this result we settle the question posed by M. Alekhnovich and A. Razborov of showing that the class of Tseitin formulas is quasi-automatizable for resolution. 1 Introduction Propositional proof complexity is motivated by the result of Cook and Reckhow [13] saying that if there is a propositional proof system in which any unsatisfiable formula F has a short proof of unsatisfiability (of size polynomial in the size of F ), then NP “ coNP.
    [Show full text]
  • The Relative Efficiency of Propositional Proof Systems Author(S): Stephen A
    The Relative Efficiency of Propositional Proof Systems Author(s): Stephen A. Cook and Robert A. Reckhow Source: The Journal of Symbolic Logic, Vol. 44, No. 1 (Mar., 1979), pp. 36-50 Published by: Association for Symbolic Logic Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2273702 Accessed: 26/02/2010 18:07 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=asl. Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission. JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. Association for Symbolic Logic is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The Journal of Symbolic Logic. http://www.jstor.org THE JOURNAL OF SYMBOLIC LOGIC Volume 44, Number 1, March 1979 THE RELATIVE EFFICIENCY OF PROPOSITIONAL PROOF SYSTEMS STEPHEN A.
    [Show full text]
  • The Deduction Theorem for Strong Propositional Proof Systems
    This is a repository copy of The Deduction Theorem for Strong Propositional Proof Systems. White Rose Research Online URL for this paper: http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/74443/ Article: Beyersdorff, O (2010) The Deduction Theorem for Strong Propositional Proof Systems. Theory of Computing Systems, 47 (1). 162 - 178 . ISSN 1432-4350 https://doi.org/10.1007/s00224-008-9146-6 Reuse See Attached Takedown If you consider content in White Rose Research Online to be in breach of UK law, please notify us by emailing [email protected] including the URL of the record and the reason for the withdrawal request. [email protected] https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/ The Deduction Theorem for Strong Propositional Proof Systems⋆ Olaf Beyersdorff Institut f¨urTheoretische Informatik, Leibniz Universit¨atHannover, Germany [email protected] Abstract. This paper focuses on the deduction theorem for proposi- tional logic. We define and investigate different deduction properties and show that the presence of these deduction properties for strong proof systems is powerful enough to characterize the existence of optimal and even polynomially bounded proof systems. We also exhibit a similar, but apparently weaker condition that implies the existence of complete disjoint NP-pairs. In particular, this yields a sufficient condition for the completeness of the canonical pair of Frege systems and provides a gen- eral framework for the search for complete NP-pairs. 1 Introduction The classical deduction theorem for propositional logic explains how a proof of a formula ψ from an extra hypothesis ϕ is transformed to a proof of ϕ → ψ. While this property has been analysed in detail and is known to hold for Frege systems [5, 6], the situation is more intricate for stronger systems such as extensions of Frege systems.
    [Show full text]
  • Proof Complexity of Non-Classical Logics
    This is a repository copy of Proof complexity of non-classical logics. White Rose Research Online URL for this paper: http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/74771/ Book Section: Beyersdorff, O and Kutz, O (2012) Proof complexity of non-classical logics. In: Bezhanishvili, N and Goranko, V, (eds.) Lectures on Logic and Computation ESSLLI 2010 Copenhagen, Denmark, August 2010, ESSLLI 2011, Ljubljana, Slovenia, August 2011, Selected Lecture Notes. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 7388 . Springer Verlag , 1 - 54 . ISBN 978-3-642-31484-1 https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-31485-8 Reuse See Attached Takedown If you consider content in White Rose Research Online to be in breach of UK law, please notify us by emailing [email protected] including the URL of the record and the reason for the withdrawal request. [email protected] https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/ Proof Complexity of Non-Classical Logics⋆ Olaf Beyersdorff1 and Oliver Kutz2 1 Institut f¨ur Theoretische Informatik, Leibniz-Universit¨at Hannover, Germany [email protected] 2 Research Center on Spatial Cognition (SFB/TR 8), Universit¨at Bremen, Germany [email protected] Abstract. Proof complexity is an interdisciplinary area of research util- ising techniques from logic, complexity, and combinatorics towards the main aim of understanding the complexity of theorem proving proce- dures. Traditionally, propositional proofs have been the main object of investigation in proof complexity. Due their richer expressivity and nu- merous applications within computer science, also non-classical logics have been intensively studied from a proof complexity perspective in the last decade, and a number of impressive results have been obtained.
    [Show full text]
  • Yet Another Argument in Favour of NP = Conp
    Yet another argument in favour of NP = CoNP Edward Hermann Haeusler† Departmento de Informática PUC-Rio Rio de Janeiro, Brasil †Email:[email protected] January 5, 2021 Abstract This article shows yet another proof of NP = CoNP. In a previous article we proved that NP = PSPACE and from it we can conclude that NP = CoNP immediatly. The former proof shows how to obtain polyno- mial and, polynomial in time ckeckable Dag-like proofs for all purely impli- cational Minimal logic tautologies. From the fact that Minimal implicational logic is PSPACE-complete we get the proof that NP = PSPACE. This first proof of NP = CoNP uses Hudelmaier linear upper-bound on the height of Sequente Calculus minimal implicational logic proofs. In an ad- dendum to the proof of NP = PSPACE we observe that we do not need to use Hudelmaier upper-bound, since any proof of non-hamiltonicity for arXiv:2101.00003v1 [cs.CC] 28 Dec 2020 any graph is linear upper-bounded. By the CoNP-completeness of non- hamiltonicity we obtain NP = CoNP as a corollary of the first proof. In this article we show a third proof of CoNP = NP, also providing polyno- mial size and polynomial verifiable certificates that are Dags. They are gen- erated from normal Natural Deduction proofs, linear height upper-bounded too, by removing redundancy, i.e., repeated parts. The existence of re- peated parts is consequence of the redundancy theorem for family of super- polynomial proofs in the purely implicational Minimal logic. Its manda- tory to read at least two previous articles to get the details of the proof pre- sented here.
    [Show full text]