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The Global Trading System
COVER STORY • Global Governance at a Crossroads – a Roadmap Towards the G20 Summit in Osaka • 3 he Global Trading System: What Went Wrong & How to Fix It TBy Edward Alden Author Edward Alden Introduction in what will become a prolonged era of growing nationalism and protectionism. Gideon Rachman, the Financial Times columnist, has It has now been more than a quarter century since the United argued that the nationalist backlash symbolized by Trump’s election States, the European Union (EU), Japan and more than 100 other and the 2016 Brexit vote in the United Kingdom is likely to spread to countries came together to conclude the Uruguay Round global trade other countries and persist for several decades. But, he noted, those agreement and establish the World Trade Organization (WHO). It was movements will have to show that they can deliver not just promises a time of extraordinary optimism. Mickey Kantor, US trade but real economic results. So far – as the process of the UK representative for President Bill Clinton, had endured many sleepless government and parliament’s efforts to leave the EU show – real nights with his counterparts to bring the deal home by the Dec. 15, economic results have not been delivered. But champions of 1993 deadline. He promised the new agreement would “raise the globalization and the “rules-based trading system” cannot simply standard of living not only for Americans, but for workers all over the wait and hope that the failures of economic nationalism will become world”. Every American family, he said, would gain some $17,000 evident. -
A Citizen's Guide to the World Trade Organization
A Citizens Guide to THE WORLD TRADE A Citizens Guide to the World Trade ORGANIZATION Organization Published by the Working Group on the WTO / MAI, July 1999 Printed in the U.S. by Inkworks, a worker- owned union shop ISBN 1-58231-000-9 EVERYTHING YOU NEED TO KNOW TO The contents of this pamphlet may be freely reproduced provided that its source FIGHT FOR is acknowledged. FAIR TRADE THE WTO AND this system sidelines environmental rules, health safeguards and labor CORPORATE standards to provide transnational GLOBALIZATION corporations (TNCs) with a cheap supply of labor and natural resources. The WTO also guarantees corporate access to What do the U.S. Cattlemen’s Associa- foreign markets without requiring that tion, Chiquita Banana and the Venezu- TNCs respect countries’ domestic elan oil industry have in common? These priorities. big business interests were able to defeat hard-won national laws ensuring The myth that every nation can grow by food safety, strengthening local econo- exporting more than they import is central mies and protecting the environment by to the neoliberal ideology. Its proponents convincing governments to challenge the seem to forget that in order for one laws at the World Trade Organization country to export an automobile, some (WTO). other country has to import it. Established in 1995, the WTO is a The WTO Hurts U.S. Workers - Steel powerful new global commerce agency, More than 10,000 which transformed the General Agree- high-wage, high-tech ment on Tarriffs and Trade (GATT) into workers in the U.S. an enforceable global commercial code. -
Policy Commitments Made Under the Agreement on Agriculture
Order Code RL32916 CRS Report for Congress Received through the CRS Web Agriculture in the WTO: Policy Commitments Made Under the Agreement on Agriculture May 12, 2005 Randy Schnepf Specialist in Agricultural Policy Resources, Science, and Industry Division Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress Agriculture in the WTO: Policy Commitments Made Under the Agreement on Agriculture Summary The Uruguay Round (UR) of multilateral trade negotiations, completed in 1994, represented the first significant step toward reforming international agricultural trade. Under the UR negotiations, domestic policies and trade policies were viewed as interconnected. As a result, WTO member countries committed to disciplines in agricultural support in three broad areas — domestic agricultural support programs, export subsidies, and market access — often referred to as the three pillars of the Agreement on Agriculture (AA). In addition, members also agreed to provisions concerning the handling of sanitary and phytosanitary measures, dispute settlement procedures, and the continuation of the reform process. Under the auspices of the UR’s AA, WTO member countries agreed to limit and reduce the most distortive domestic support subsidies — referred to as amber box subsidies and measured by the Aggregate Measure of Support (AMS) index. Several types of indirect subsidies were identified as causing minimal distortion to agricultural production and trade, and were provided exemptions — green box, blue box, de minimis, and special treatment — from WTO disciplines. Export subsidies were capped and subject to reductions in both value and volume. In addition, members agreed to improve market access for internationally traded agricultural products by converting non-tariff trade barriers (NTBs) into tariffs (a process called tariffication); binding existing tariffs at January 1, 1995, levels; and reducing tariffs from bound levels with the all-product average tariff being reduced faster than tariffs for individual products. -
Differentiation Between Developing Countries in the WTO
Differentiation between Developing Countries in the WTO Report 2004:14 E Foto: Mats Pettersson Differentiation between Developing Countries in the WTO Swedish Board of Agriculture International Affairs Division June 2004 Authors: Jonas Kasteng Arne Karlsson Carina Lindberg Contents PROLOGUE.......................................................................................................................................................... 3 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY................................................................................................................................... 5 1 INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................................................... 9 1.1 Purpose of the study............................................................................................................................. 9 1.2 Limitations of the study ....................................................................................................................... 9 1.3 Background to the discussion on differentiation................................................................................ 10 1.4 Present differentiation between developing countries in the WTO.................................................... 12 1.5 Relevance of present differentiation between developing countries in the WTO .............................. 13 1.6 Outline of the new differentiation initiative...................................................................................... -
Market Access in Services 99 C
S P E C I S T A U L D I MARKETACCESS: UNFINISHEDBUSINESS E POST-URUGUAYROUND S INVENTORYANDISSUES ThisstudywaspreparedbyWTO'sEconomicResearchandAnalysisDivisionwith importantcontributionsbytheAgricultureandCommoditiesDivision,theTradein ServicesDivisionandtheIntegratedDataBaseSectionoftheStatisticsDivision. TheprojectcoordinatorwasMarcBacchetta. 6 Table of Contents Page Section I: Introduction 1 Section II: Industrial Products 7 A. Post-Uruguay Round tariffs 7 B. Other trade policy measures 18 Technical Notes to Section II 24 Appendix to Section II 28 Section III: Agricultural Products A. The Agreement on Agriculture’s origins 45 B. Trade policies under the Agriculture Agreement 46 C. Trends in trade and continuation of the reform process 64 Appendix Tables 68 Section IV: Services 97 A. The international services economy 97 B. Market access in services 99 C. The Uruguay Round and subsequent negotiations 103 D. What can be expected in the new round? 114 E. Issues arising in negotiations 122 Appendix to Section IV 133 Bibliography 141 i Tables, Boxes and Figures Page Section II Table II.1. Bound tariffs on industrial products. Scope of bindings, simple averages, standard deviations and tariff peaks 8 Table II.2. Bound tariffs on industrial products. Simple averages by country and MTN category 11 Table II.3. Bound tariffs on industrial products. Simple average tariff and standard deviation by stage of processing 14 Table II.4. Bound and applied tariffs on industrial products. Simple averages 17 Table II.5. Applied tariffs on industrial products. Duty free lines, simple averages, standard deviations and tariff peaks. 19 Table II.6. Frequency of core non-tariff barriers of selected countries 20 Table II.7. Pervasiveness of core non-tariff barriers affecting the manufacturing sector 21 Table II.8. -
Agriculture at the Uruguay Round: the European Union´S Hindering Position Towards Trade Liberalization
ISA-FLACSO Joint Conference Buenos Aires, July 24th, 2014 Agriculture at the Uruguay Round: the European Union´s hindering position towards trade liberalization Patricia Nasser de Carvalho Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ) [email protected] 1 Abstract The European Union started acting as unified trading actor in GATT negotiations in the 1960s and in the same decade launched it´s Common Agriculture Policy (CAP) that since then helped hindering a multilateral trade agreement on agriculture. The Uruguay Round, which started in 1986, prolonged for an agriculture dispute, was finished in 1994 with an agreement to reduce non-tariff barriers to agriculture imports and tariffs were scheduled for phased reductions. In this context, this article proposals are to a) discuss the European Union's position on negotiations that led to the Uruguay Agreement on Agriculture (URAA) including the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) and the Dispute Settlement Agreement (which in theory should improve the process of resolving trade conflicts) b) show that although those agreements were set to ensure a more harmonic trade negotiations to liberalize trade on agriculture, the European Union did not change it's essence protectionist agriculture policy, since CAP continued hindering an agreement with concrete results towards liberalization on agriculture. The aim is to show that although all these agreements, high price levels, barriers to foreign trade and pressure under the common budget persisted and deepened in the European agriculture market after the URAA. 1. Introduction The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) of the European Union (EU), one of the most important symbols and paradigmatic policies of the European regional integration process and that could best fulfill the aim of building a unified image of Europe, had completed fifty years in 2012. -
World Trade Statistical Review 2021
World Trade Statistical Review 2021 8% 4.3 111.7 4% 3% 0.0 -0.2 -0.7 Insurance and pension services Financial services Computer services -3.3 -5.4 World Trade StatisticalWorld Review 2021 -15.5 93.7 cultural and Personal, services recreational -14% Construction -18% 2021Q1 2019Q4 2019Q3 2020Q1 2020Q4 2020Q3 2020Q2 Merchandise trade volume About the WTO The World Trade Organization deals with the global rules of trade between nations. Its main function is to ensure that trade flows as smoothly, predictably and freely as possible. About this publication World Trade Statistical Review provides a detailed analysis of the latest developments in world trade. It is the WTO’s flagship statistical publication and is produced on an annual basis. For more information All data used in this report, as well as additional charts and tables not included, can be downloaded from the WTO web site at www.wto.org/statistics World Trade Statistical Review 2021 I. Introduction 4 Acknowledgements 6 A message from Director-General 7 II. Highlights of world trade in 2020 and the impact of COVID-19 8 World trade overview 10 Merchandise trade 12 Commercial services 15 Leading traders 18 Least-developed countries 19 III. World trade and economic growth, 2020-21 20 Trade and GDP in 2020 and early 2021 22 Merchandise trade volume 23 Commodity prices 26 Exchange rates 27 Merchandise and services trade values 28 Leading indicators of trade 31 Economic recovery from COVID-19 34 IV. Composition, definitions & methodology 40 Composition of geographical and economic groupings 42 Definitions and methodology 42 Specific notes for selected economies 49 Statistical sources 50 Abbreviations and symbols 51 V. -
Trade and Employment Challenges for Policy Research
ILO - WTO - ILO TRADE AND EMPLOYMENT CHALLENGES FOR POLICY RESEARCH This study is the outcome of collaborative research between the Secretariat of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the TRADE AND EMPLOYMENT International Labour Office (ILO). It addresses an issue that is of concern to both organizations: the relationship between trade and employment. On the basis of an overview of the existing academic CHALLENGES FOR POLICY RESEARCH literature, the study provides an impartial view of what can be said, and with what degree of confidence, on the relationship between trade and employment, an often contentious issue of public debate. Its focus is on the connections between trade policies, and labour and social policies and it will be useful for all those who are interested in this debate: academics and policy-makers, workers and employers, trade and labour specialists. WTO ISBN 978-92-870-3380-2 A joint study of the International Labour Office ILO ISBN 978-92-2-119551-1 and the Secretariat of the World Trade Organization Printed by the WTO Secretariat - 813.07 TRADE AND EMPLOYMENT CHALLENGES FOR POLICY RESEARCH A joint study of the International Labour Office and the Secretariat of the World Trade Organization Prepared by Marion Jansen Eddy Lee Economic Research and Statistics Division International Institute for Labour Studies World Trade Organization International Labour Office TRADE AND EMPLOYMENT: CHALLENGES FOR POLICY RESEARCH Copyright © 2007 International Labour Organization and World Trade Organization. Publications of the International Labour Office and World Trade Organization enjoy copyright under Protocol 2 of the Universal Copyright Convention. Nevertheless, short excerpts from them may be reproduced without authorization, on condition that the source is indicated. -
the Wto, Imf and World Bank
ISSN: 1726-9466 13 F ULFILLING THE MARRAKESH MANDATE ON COHERENCE: ISBN: 978-92-870-3443-4 TEN YEARS OF COOPERATION BETWEEN THE WTO, IMF AND WORLD BANK by MARC AUBOIN Printed by the WTO Secretariat - 6006.07 DISCUSSION PAPER NO 13 Fulfi lling the Marrakesh Mandate on Coherence: Ten Years of Cooperation between the WTO, IMF and World Bank by Marc Auboin Counsellor, Trade and Finance and Trade Facilitation Division World Trade Organization Geneva, Switzerland Disclaimer and citation guideline Discussion Papers are presented by the authors in their personal capacity and opinions expressed in these papers should be attributed to the authors. They are not meant to represent the positions or opinions of the WTO Secretariat or of its Members and are without prejudice to Members’ rights and obligations under the WTO. Any errors or omissions are the responsibility of the authors. Any citation of this paper should ascribe authorship to staff of the WTO Secretariat and not to the WTO. This paper is only available in English – Price CHF 20.- To order, please contact: WTO Publications Centre William Rappard 154 rue de Lausanne CH-1211 Geneva Switzerland Tel: (41 22) 739 52 08 Fax: (41 22) 739 57 92 Website: www.wto.org E-mail: [email protected] ISSN 1726-9466 ISBN: 978-92-870-3443-4 Printed by the WTO Secretariat IX-2007 Keywords: coherence, cooperation in global economic policy making, economic policy coordination, cooperation between international organizations. © World Trade Organization, 2007. Reproduction of material contained in this document may be made only with written permission of the WTO Publications Manager. -
Trade Policy and Economic Growth
TRADE POLICY AND ECONOMIC GROWTH: A SKEPTIC'S GUIDE TO THE CROSS-NATIONAL EVIDENCE Francisco Rodríguez and Dani Rodrik University of Maryland and Harvard University Revised May 2000 Department of Economics University of Maryland College Park, MD 20742 (301) 405-3480 John F. Kennedy School of Government 79 Kennedy Street Cambridge, MA 02138 (617) 495-9454 We thank Dan Ben-David, Sebastian Edwards, Jeffrey Frankel, David Romer, Jeffrey Sachs, and Andrew Warner for generously sharing their data with us. We are particularly grateful to Ben- David, Frankel, Romer, Sachs, Warner and Romain Wacziarg for helpful e-mail exchanges. We have benefited greatly from discussions in seminars at the University of California at Berkeley, University of Maryland, University of Miami, University of Michigan, MIT, the Inter-American Development Bank, Princeton, Yale, IMF, IESA and the NBER. We also thank Ben Bernanke, Roger Betancourt, Allan Drazen, Gene Grossman, Ann Harrison, Chang-Tai Hsieh, Doug Irwin, Chad Jones, Frank Levy, Douglas Irwin, Rick Mishkin, Arvind Panagariya, Ken Rogoff, James Tybout, and Eduardo Zambrano for helpful comments, Vladimir Kliouev for excellent research assistance and the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs at Harvard for partial financial support. TRADE POLICY AND ECONOMIC GROWTH: A SKEPTIC'S GUIDE TO THE CROSS-NATIONAL EVIDENCE ABSTRACT Do countries with lower policy-induced barriers to international trade grow faster, once other relevant country characteristics are controlled for? There exists a large empirical literature providing an affirmative answer to this question. We argue that methodological problems with the empirical strategies employed in this literature leave the results open to diverse interpretations. -
Trade Liberalization in China's Accession To
Trade Liberalization in China’s Accession to WTO Elena Ianchovichina and Will Martin World Bank Abstract China’s forthcoming accession to the WTO involves reforms across a wide range of sectors in China, both in directly trade-related sectors and behind the border. The implications of these reforms are greatly influenced by the starting point—a partially reformed economy with relatively high import duties, but in which export sectors benefit from liberal duty exemptions on their inputs. The paper takes account of this special feature in assessing the implications of reform. We find that China and its major trading partners gain from accession, while some competing countries suffer smaller losses. The adjustments required are greatly reduced by the dramatic liberalization that China undertook in the 1990s. JEL Classification: F02, F13, F14. ________________________________________________________________________ *Corresponding address: Elena Ianchovichina, MC8-810, World Bank, 1818 H St NW, Washington DC 20433. Ph 1-202-458-8910. Fax 1-202-522-1557. Email: [email protected] I. Introduction Accession to the WTO will be a major milestone in China’s economic development, modernization and integration into the world economy. Completion of the accession formalities will not be the end, but rather the beginning, of a new process of reform and adaptation that builds on the sweeping economic changes begun in 1978. The reform era in China, and other East Asian transition economies (Martin, 2001), has been a period of extraordinary growth in trade and output. Part of the growth in trade has been a consequence of economic reforms that have stimulated opening to the outside world, and part has been a consequence of the economic growth that opening to the world has done so much to facilitate. -
Conflicts Between U.S. Law and the World Trade Organization's Dispute Settlement Reports: Should the Court of International
Conflicts Between U.S. Law and the World Trade Organization’s Dispute Settlement Reports: Should the Court of International Trade and the Federal Circuit Seek to Reconcile Their Decisions with the WTO’s Reports in the Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Area? By Neal J. Reynolds1 I. Introduction In April 1994, the Uruguay Round Agreements, which were designed to establish a more comprehensive regime governing international trade among member states, were adopted by the United States and more than one hundred other nations.2 As the text of the Agreements indicated, they were “reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements {that were} directed to the substantial reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade and the elimination of discriminatory treatment in international trade relations.”3 Among its other important achievements, the Uruguay Round established the World Trade Organization (“WTO”), which was designed to be a “permanent forum for member governments to address issues affecting their multilateral trade relations as well as to supervise implementation of the trade agreements negotiated in the Uruguay Round.”4 One important component of the Uruguay Round negotiations was the adoption of two 1 Mr. Reynolds is the Assistant General Counsel for Litigation at the U.S. International Trade Commission. The views expressed in this paper are solely those of the author. The paper was not prepared by the Commission or on its behalf, and does not represent the official views of the Commission or any individual commissioner. 2 See generally Final Act Embodying the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, April 15, 1994. 3 Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Chapeau, April 15, 1994.