UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI

Date:______

I, ______, hereby submit this work as part of the requirements for the degree of: in:

It is entitled:

This work and its defense approved by:

Chair: ______

Antidumping as a Form of Protectionism

Christiane Haberl

January 14, 2006

Previous Degrees: MA International Business Studies, FH Kufstein, Austria

Degree to be conferred: MA Political Science, McMicken College of Arts and Science

Committee Chair: Prof. Thomas Moore

Abstract:

The purpose of this study is to test statistically the theory advanced by opponents of

antidumping measures, that antidumping actions are in reality pure protectionism.

Specifically, it relates the internal economic condition such as the international competitive position of countries to the number of antidumping initiations and the antidumping measures taken by them. The independent variables are generally defined as the internal economic condition and the international competitive position. That is, the internal economic condition is measured by Gross National Income (GNI) per capita and the unemployment rate. The international competitive position is expressed in the trade balance and import penetration. The dependent variables are generally defined as protectionist pressure and protectionism. The former is quantified in antidumping initiations and the latter in antidumping measures. The research is conducted separately for the two dependent variables for all 147 WTO member states. The results show that

GNI and import penetration have a statistically significant relationship with antidumping actions.

Christiane Haberl Antidumping as a Form of Protectionism Master Thesis

Table of Contents

List of Tables and Graphs...... 2 I. Introduction...... 3 II. Review of Literature...... 6 II. A. General International Trade Literature...... 6

II. B. General International Political Economy Literature...... 8

II. C. International Organizations and Government Departments...... 9

II. D. Literature on Protectionism...... 11

II. E Literature on Antidumping...... 13

II. F. Literature on Antidumping as Protectionism...... 14

II. G. Quantitative Studies Relating Protectionism to Antidumping...... 18

III. Theoretical Research Design...... 20 III. A. Hypothesis...... 20

III. B. The Theoretical Regression Model ...... 22

III. C. Description of Data ...... 25

IV. Statistical Procedure ...... 38 IV. A. Outliers...... 38

IV. B. Statistical Assumptions Concerning the Structure...... 39

IV. C. Estimates of the Parameters and Residuals ...... 41

IV. D. The Regression Model Including Statistical Aspects...... 44

IV. E. Regression Equation ...... 45

V. Results ...... 47 VI. Conclusion...... 49 Bibliography...... 55 Appendix...... 59

Page 1 of 72 Christiane Haberl Antidumping as a Form of Protectionism Master Thesis

List of Tables and Graphs

Tables

Table 1: Protectionist Reasons for Antidumping 17

Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for Independent Variables 32

Table 3: Independent Variables Total 33

Table 4: Descriptive and Quartile Statistics for Independent Variables 34

Table 5: Correlations 40

Table 6: Multicollinearity 40

Table 7: Initiations Parameters 41

Table 8: Measures Parameters 42

Table 9: Initiations Coefficients 45

Table 10: Measures Coefficients 45

Table 11: Model Summary 46

Table 12: Significance 46

Graphs

Graph 1: % Initiations over Time 27

Graph 2: % Initiations Total 28

Graph 3: % Measures over Time 29

Graph 4: % Measures Total 29

Graph 5: GNI/Capita 34

Graph 6: Unemployment 35

Graph 7: Trade Balance/GNI 36

Graph 8: Import Penetration 37

Graph 9: Boxplots: GNI/capita-Unemployment-Trade Balance-Import Penetration 37

Graph 10: Boxplots: GNI/capita-Unemployment-Trade Balance-Import Penetration 39

Graph 11: P-P Plots 43

Graph 12: Scatterplots 43

Page 2 of 72 Christiane Haberl Antidumping as a Form of Protectionism Master Thesis

I. Introduction

“The starting point for any discussion of policy for the international economic system of today is the notion of ‘liberal trade’, meaning the goal to minimize the amount of interference of governments in trade flows that cross national borders.” (Jackson

1989, 8). The key principle of the WTO (World Trade Organization), perfectly matching with this statement, is trade liberalization, the elimination of quantitative and non- quantitative trade barriers (Krugman, Obstfeld 2003, 239). However, even from this perspective states can make exceptions and impose trade barriers to fight against unfair competition. One controversial issue concerning the nature of unfair competition is dumping. Dumping means that a company exports a product at a price lower than the price it normally charges on its own home market (WTO 2003a). As to the question if dumping should be considered an unfair trade practice, opinions differ. The WTO does not pass judgment but allows its member states to take antidumping actions when they claim to find evidence of dumping by foreign companies. Specifically, the WTO “allow[s] countries to act in a way that would normally breach the GATT principles of binding a tariff and not discriminating between trading partners” (WTO 2003a). According to proponents of antidumping measures, antidumping legislation can be seen as one of the methods to ensure fair trade (Lindsey 1999, 1). Its opponents think that antidumping actions, disguised as devices to ensure fairness in international trade, can be misused as protectionist measures (Bhagwati 1988, 48), which is a breach of the basic liberal principle of trade liberalization.

Page 3 of 72 Christiane Haberl Antidumping as a Form of Protectionism Master Thesis

The purpose of this quantitative study is therefore to test statistically the theory

advanced by opponents of antidumping measures, that these actions are in reality pure

protection. Specifically, it relates the internal economic condition such as the

international competitive position of countries to the number of antidumping initiations

and the antidumping measures taken by them. The independent variables are generally

defined as the internal economic condition and the international competitive position.

That is, the internal economic condition is measured by Gross National Income (GNI)

per capita and the unemployment rate.1 The international competitive position is

expressed in the trade balance and import penetration. The dependent variables are generally defined as protectionist pressure and protectionism. The former is quantified in antidumping initiations and the latter in antidumping measures (Creswell 2003, 96-

97). The research is conducted separately for the two dependent variables for all 147

WTO member states (WTO 2004), which for our purposes are amply representative of the 192 recognized internationally.2 In other words, I wanted to conduct a global study

so as to find out to what extent antidumping initiations are a form of protectionist

pressure and antidumping measures are a form of protectionism by relating

macroeconomic factors to antidumping initiations and measures.

Interestingly, the results show a statistically significant relationship between two independent variables - internal economic situation represented by GNI per capita and the international competitive position measured by import penetration - and the dependent variables measured by antidumping initiations and measures. By contrast,

1 According to the World Bank, GNI is the same (World Bank, 2004a).

2 The UN has 191 member countries (UN 2004), which are all states of the world apart from the Vatican.

Page 4 of 72 Christiane Haberl Antidumping as a Form of Protectionism Master Thesis

unemployment and the trade balance per GNI do not have a statistically significant

influence on antidumping procedures. Even though the results do not look exactly as

expected, they are further evidence that antidumping legislation is not primarily used for the fight against unfair trade but rather as simple protectionism. Consequently, my findings support the view of liberal trade theorists that antidumping laws should be abolished.

Some definitions are needed before advancing further into the subject. Dumping means that a company exports a product at a price lower than the price it normally charges in its own home market (WTO 2003a). Firms can complain to their governments that they have been injured by a foreign company that dumped its products in the domestic market. The state may then initiate an antidumping procedure, which is typically referred to as an antidumping initiation. If the complaint is found valid, antidumping measures are imposed. The complaint is valid if, firstly, there is evidence that the domestic industry has suffered “material injury” (e.g., a decline in profitability) due to foreign imports. Secondly, the price of these imports must have been “less than fair value”. The latter condition can be determined in two ways. One way is by demonstrating that the price charged in the market where antidumping has allegedly occurred by the foreign company is below the price charged for the same product in other markets. The second way is by demonstrating that the price charged in the allegedly insured market is below an estimate of cost plus normal return (Knetter, Prusa

2003, 1-2). The consequent antidumping duties are the difference between the price at which the product was dumped and the fair import price (Krugman, Obstfeld 2003, 145).

Page 5 of 72 Christiane Haberl Antidumping as a Form of Protectionism Master Thesis

II. Review of Literature

This literature review summarizes relevant writings about antidumping as a form

of protectionism. It is structured to guide the reader from more general works that position the subject in its broader context to more specific studies that address more arcane, technical aspects of antidumping as a form of protectionism. The review begins by analyzing some important books in the field of International Political Economy that surveys information provided by international organizations. Next, the review focuses on how the subject of antidumping fits into the general literature about protectionism. From

here, the review shifts to the antidumping literature itself. Finally, studies combining the

two subjects, in other words, texts on antidumping as a form of trade protectionism, are

analyzed. The last group of studies is organized in three parts: the non-protective and

protective reasons for antidumping, quantitative studies that have already tried to

assess protectionism in form of antidumping, and, finally, the effects of antidumping

actions.

II. A. General International Trade Literature

One classic work in the literature at the intersection of economic and political

analysis on international trade issues is International Economics: Theory and Policy by

Krugman and Obstfeld (2003). After an extensive discussion of free trade models, the

authors analyze the subjects of dumping and antidumping in a chapter about the

imperfections of international trade. They explain the concept of dumping and

Page 6 of 72 Christiane Haberl Antidumping as a Form of Protectionism Master Thesis

antidumping as protectionism from an economic point of view and discuss some of its

history and overall economic implications. Yet they neither endorse nor oppose

antidumping and put antidumping into a greater context (Krugman, Obstfeld 2003, 142-

147). This is why this book serves as a first starting point and is quoted for different

clarifications throughout this paper.

A more specific book on trade is The World Trading System: Law and Policy of

International Economic Relations by Jackson (1989). He explains trade law and policy

as the interplay of international law, national law, political science and economics. Apart

from clarifying the trade details, he dedicates one of his fourteen chapters to “Unfair

Trade and the Rules of Dumping” (Jackson 1989, 215-247). Besides giving the basic

insights on antidumping policies and laws as well as the determination of injury,

Jackson offers two more specific, interesting aspects. Firstly, he states that antidumping

is a response to unfair trade practices. Unfair means, as already mentioned, that

practices interfere with or distort free-market economic principles. Especially in the case

of predatory pricing, dumping is considered as unfair. According to their critics, large

foreign companies use market leverage and sell their products at a very low price to

drive small domestic firms out of business and thus reduce competition in order to be

able to reap monopoly profits. Secondly, Jackson brings up the question of interface problems, problems that emerge when different economic systems trade with each

other. One interface problem concerning antidumping involves the determination of

whether a product has been sold at “less than fair value” because variable costs need to

be determined, which is especially complicated in non-market economies. (Jackson

Page 7 of 72 Christiane Haberl Antidumping as a Form of Protectionism Master Thesis

1989, 215-247). Like Krugman and Obstfeld, Jackson sets antidumping into the frame

of trade and explains its mechanisms.

II. B. General International Political Economy Literature

The next task in the literature review is to show where the topic of dumping and

antidumping is situated within International Political Economy literature. In his book The

Challenge of Global Capitalism: The World Economy in the 21st Century, Gilpin (2000) writes about trade protectionism in his chapter about the insecure trading system. He addresses the tension between trade liberalization and trade protectionism, its pros and cons. According to Gilpin, the proponents of free trade are faithful to free-market economy principles. They base their argument on the idea of comparative advantage and their belief that free trade’s benefits exceed its costs. The only exception to free trade is based on the infant industry argument. The opponents of free trade are 18th century mercantilists that equated trade surplus with military power. The 19th century

economic nationalists who associated manufacturing with military power and national

autonomy were also against free trade. Contemporary critics of globalization either

consider trade as a threat to domestic welfare, the environment, and human rights or

want to protect their high-tech industries (Gilpin 2000, 89-92). This tension still exists

and there are sustainable arguments for and against protectionism.

In Gilpin’s (2001) complementary book Global Political Economy: Understanding

the International Economic Order, he emphasizes the role of the state in the

international political economy. He writes about dumping in two different contexts. The

first concerns international trade, where oligopolies can use dumping to increase their

Page 8 of 72 Christiane Haberl Antidumping as a Form of Protectionism Master Thesis

long-term domination of a market (215). Secondly, Gilpin mentions antidumping

regulations when writing about the evolution of the world trading system (220) and the

conflicts between major powers resulting from the United States’ misuse of antidumping

as a protectionist device (231). Gilpin’s coverage on dumping demonstrates that it is an

important issue in contemporary international political economy, especially when it is

connected with protectionism.

Hoekman’s book The Political Economy of the World Trading System: The WTO

and Beyond does not directly touch upon the topic of antidumping. Nevertheless, it

shows one very remarkable aspect of it. Hoekman illustrates in a bar chart of the major

cases dealt with by WTO Disputes Settlements between 1995 and 1999 that

antidumping agreement cases were the sixth most important ones after cases concerning national treatment on internal taxation regulation, general most-favored

nation treatment, general elimination of quantitative restrictions, schedules of

concessions and intellectual property. According to WTO statistics, the profile of

dumping has grown since 1999. Again, antidumping is a topic in international political

economy that cannot be circumvented.

II. C. International Organizations and Government Departments

In the WTO agreement devotes an article (Article 6 of the GATT agreement) to antidumping, the WTO is the most important organization concerning this subject. The

WTO antidumping regulations are binding for its 147 member countries. As already mentioned, nearly all the important economies of the world hold membership in the

WTO. Therefore, WTO members are representative of the whole world and the WTO

Page 9 of 72 Christiane Haberl Antidumping as a Form of Protectionism Master Thesis antidumping legislation can be seen as functional equivalent of international law on antidumping. The WTO’s webpage offers general information on antidumping legislation. The exact wording of the antidumping law and its interpretation and binding implementation procedures are available. Furthermore, the WTO supplies wide-ranging statistical data on antidumping initiations and measures by reporting member, affected country, industry sector, for instance. The essential legislation has already been described in the introduction.3

The webpage of the European Union basically summarizes and reproduces the information provided on the WTO webpage (EU, 2003). The webpage of the United

States International Trade Commission, the agency determining US antidumping cases, provides links to antidumping orders by country, date of order, product group and by five-year sunset review sequence group but no interpretation of the antidumping law

(ITC 2004). The Import Administration of the US Department of Commerce, the other agency determining US antidumping cases, supplies a manual about how to use antidumping procedures for US companies (IA 2004). Other relevant agencies include

The Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA 2004), the Australian Customs Service

(Australian Customs Service 2004), the New Zealand Ministry of Economic

Development (Ministry of Economic Development 2004) and Taiwan’s International

Trade Commission (MOEAITC). All of these webpages give basic information on antidumping and/or national statistical data. Remarkably, most of these countries place antidumping in a different department of their government. This shows how different antidumping is perceived and dealt with. Thus international organizations and

3 WTO webpage: http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/adp_e.htm

Page 10 of 72 Christiane Haberl Antidumping as a Form of Protectionism Master Thesis government departments provide information on antidumping without expressing their opinions or placing it into the equivalent departments of their administrations.

II. D. Literature on Protectionism

An important book for this study is Jagdish Bhagwati’s Protectionism (1988), a defense of free trade. After providing an analysis of postwar liberalization, the book examines the influence of ideology, interests and institutions in that period. He notes the rise of protectionism and proposes an institutional reform that curbs protectionism.

Regarding antidumping he is in favor of antidumping measures if they promote fair and competitive trade (Bhagwati 1988, 35). However, he thinks that the apparent promotion of fair trade can be and is actually misused for protectionism (Bhagwati 1988, 51). He acknowledges that pressure for protectionism can rise with adverse macroeconomic conditions (Bhagwati 1988, 61). This aspect of Bhagwati’s book gave the first incentive to research the connection between macroeconomic conditions and antidumping as a form of protectionism.

In The New Protectionism: The Welfare State and International Trade Krauss

(1978) makes a case against trade protectionism. His main argument is worth quoting at length:

“the new forms of intervention, which protect specific industries and specific segments of the labor force, are associated with the interventionist or welfare state and are, indeed, an integral and inevitable by-product of the social process that produces it. […] the raison d’etre of government intervention into the private economy is to provide economic security, by shielding citizens from changes that would affect them adversely and, in general, redistributing income and economic power from capital to labor. […] Where the immediate costs of welfare state policies are imposed, or appear to rest, on foreigners.” (Krauss 1978, XIV).

Page 11 of 72 Christiane Haberl Antidumping as a Form of Protectionism Master Thesis

In his book chapter International Regimes, Transactions, and Change:

Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order Ruggie also argues that the new protectionism reflects the victory of the interventionist, or welfare economy, over the market economy (Ruggie 1999, 276). Concerning dumping, Krauss explains that dumping itself is less harmful than antidumping since the latter is usually misused as protectionist instrument for the domestic market (Krauss 1978, 68-69).

Irwin’s Against the Tide: An Intellectual History of Free Trade (1994) provides not an argument in support of free trade as much as an analysis of its history. He thoroughly criticizes economic free trade logic throughout his book but comes to the conclusion that if history continues, free trade will remain one of the most durable and

robust propositions offered by economic analysis to policy makers. Antidumping is not

addressed at length in this book but it is touched upon in commenting about Keynes’

propositions (Irwin 1994, 194). In conclusion, even if protectionism might be preferable,

the free trade doctrine is likely to stay prevalent. In conclusion, literature about

protectionism actually defends free trade and identifies antidumping as a form of

protectionism although some would allow it if directed against unfair trade practices.

In his book The Theory of International Trade, Mayer makes the point that the

only argument in favor of protectionism is “the large-country argument”. According to

this argument,

“free trade is not efficient for a large country. The reason for the inefficiency of free trade is that a large country has the ability to influence the world price of internationally traded goods. Importantly, by imposing a tariff it reduces world demand for its import good and, therefore, puts downward pressure on the world price of this good. […] such a decline in the price of a country’s import good represents a welfare gain for this country. The average person becomes better off.” (Mayer 2005, 163).

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II. E Literature on Antidumping

At this stage of the literature review, antidumping itself becomes the focus. The most comprehensive source consulted on antidumping is Marceau’s (1994) book Anti-

Dumping and Anti-Trust Issues in Free-trade Areas. She addresses all relevant

economic, legal and strategic matters related to dumping and antidumping legislation,

how international and national laws collide and how they are coordinated in free trade areas. Underlying these issues are her research questions, the interaction between antidumping and competition provisions, and the phasing out of antidumping measures.

She reaches the conclusion that antidumping law should be phased out. Antidumping measures tend to disappear with more economic integration between countries, which is crucial for trade creation. According to her, in free trade areas, this is the “only way to integrate economies, rationalize the production of the industry and fully use GATT’S opportunities.” (Marceau 1994, 317). Conversely, at an international level, antidumping measures are preferable to economic isolation and have improved international relations serving as a valve for protectionist pressure. Yet they are an inadequate solution to the friction originated by divergent domestic policies, laws and practices

(Marceau 1994, 317-318). Marceau convincingly argues that antidumping laws should be phased out.

Dale (1980) offers an older source about antidumping, Anti-Dumping Law in a

Liberal Trade Order. He explains the basic concepts and the history of antidumping, its effects on welfare and antidumping practice. He concludes that antidumping is a serious problem in international trade and that not even the predatory pricing argument as in the unfair trade reasoning can be empirically sustained (Dale 1980, 190-197). The

Page 13 of 72 Christiane Haberl Antidumping as a Form of Protectionism Master Thesis

legislation itself and the implementation procedure are flawed and antidumping has

negative impacts on the economy. He proposes four possible solutions to this problem.

The first and best is to replace antidumping laws by stronger safeguard clauses and at the same time abolish them. The other three solutions are worse and engender only minor reforms of the law. In sum, he agrees with Marceau.

Tavares de Araujo Jr., Marcario and Steinfatt (2001) discuss Antidumping in the

Americas. They define five different types of dumping. The standard type of dumping

happens when the firms export at cheaper prices because the foreign market has a

higher price elasticity of demand. Cyclical dumping occurs when a company exports at

a lower price to at least cover production costs. State-trade dumping arises when state-

owned firms strive to achieve hard currency earnings through exports. Strategic

dumping is enabled by higher economies of scale that are achieved if exporting to a

foreign market. Finally, predatory-price dumping takes place when a company wants to

eliminate a foreign competitor (Tavares de Araujo Jr., Marcario, Steinfatt 2001, 559-

560). They suggest limiting antidumping to cases against predatory dumping. In sum,

the mentioned studies on antidumping suggest its abolition or its reduction to a device

that is exclusively designed to fight unfair competition.

II. F. Literature on Antidumping as Protectionism

Reasons for Antidumping Legislation

As stated earlier, the only way antidumping can fit into a liberal trade order is if

antidumping is considered to be a device to defend fair trade as opposed to being

motivated by protectionism. Some authors argue that there is no way in which

Page 14 of 72 Christiane Haberl Antidumping as a Form of Protectionism Master Thesis

antidumping measures ensure fair trade. Others accept antidumping as a means to

ensure fair trade in the presence of predatory pricing.

There are some sources that assess the fight against predatory pricing

justifies the imposition of antidumping actions. Predatory pricing has already been

touched upon in this review by referring to Jackson’s (1989) and Dale’s (1980) works.

Tavares de Araujo Jr., Marcario and Steinfatt (2001) give a definition. Utton (2003)

offers an economic definition of predatory pricing. According to economists, predatory

pricing has engendered an enormous and controversial literature. “The ‘classical’ story

of predatory pricing is usually told in approximately these terms: a dominant firm

operating in a number of regional markets of selling a range of differentiated products will cut prices to a very low level in the short run and sacrifice profits, in order to destroy

a rival or deter a potential rival. Once success has been achieved, price is raised again to a monopoly level.” (Utton 2003, 103). The main problem is to know how low prices have to be to be considered predatory (Utter 2003, 103). Obviously, predatory pricing could be a category of dumping, coming back to the same problem: when exactly is a price low enough to be considered dumping and when does it start being predatory?

The liberal opinions of antidumping as a measure to ensure fair trade are the following. As Bovard’s book title The Fair Trade Fraud suggests, the fair trade doctrine can be revealed as one of the great intellectual frauds of the 20th century. Bovard

argues that it is misused by governments for market intervention, or for the direction,

control and restriction of trade. He calls it the myth of fair trade and suggests that in fact it means that bureaucrats are fairer than markets, that government restriction and coercion can create a fairer outcome than voluntary agreement (Bovard 1991). He

Page 15 of 72 Christiane Haberl Antidumping as a Form of Protectionism Master Thesis clarifies that antidumping in its current context is justified on the basis of the fair trade argument. Bovard dedicates one of his ten chapters to this topic. Consistent with his main argument, he completely opposes antidumping measures. He even dismisses the only liberal economic argument for antidumping, the predatory pricing argument, as a pretext. For him, this is a fact as the products targeted by US antidumping are far from coming from predatory foreign companies. (Bovard 1991, 107-161). Baldwin (2001) agrees that the label of fair trade is misused to cover protectionism. In reality, he asserts, antidumping laws are used to pressure foreign competitors into agreements that raise the price and reduce welfare. In sum, maybe the only liberal non-protectionist argument for antidumping is essentially protectionist.

Some of the scholars see it as an argument in favor of antidumping orders and others as an excuse. The final answer on this topic chosen for this study is taken from

Tharakan (2000) who did a game-theoretic study on Predatory Pricing and Anti-

Dumping. He emphasizes that antidumping does not fight predatory pricing effectively.

He does not propose a reform of the WTO antidumping legislation. He rejects antidumping law fully and recommends strengthening competition law instead. I have the impression that the overall conclusion in the literature is that antidumping is automatically protectionism. Only some scholars find that antidumping can be a way to fight predatory pricing.

The purpose of this study is to determine if antidumping is really protectionism. I classify the reasons that lead countries to use antidumping procedures for protectionism into four categories: internal (domestic) economic, international economic (competitive) and internal political and political structural (international) causes, as depicted in Table

Page 16 of 72 Christiane Haberl Antidumping as a Form of Protectionism Master Thesis

1. According to Goldstein (1986), there are two political approaches that offer alternative explanations for the extent of protectionism in the US: political structural and

internal international domestic/internal political. Whereas “structuralists

1 2 argue that a nation’s trade policy will reflect its economic domestic international economic competitive foreign policy component; policy is associated with a

3 4 nation’s relative power position […] an interest political internal political political structural group of micro political economy analysis stresses

the domestic component of trade policy” (Goldstein Table 1: Protectionist Reasons for 1986, 162). Also the analysis of the Sino-US Trade Antidumping Accord and China’s Accession to the World Trade

Organization by Wong, Mai and Luo (2000) points out domestic economic reasons for antidumping. Although the replacement of the antidumping scheme would lead to a more protective scheme, antidumping measures could be reinforced by an economic slump in the US (Wong, Mai, Luo 2000, 38-39). By the way, in this practical study, some of the major problems concerning antidumping are revealed. The treatment of China as a “non-market economy” has huge disadvantages for China because the calculation of its costs in antidumping cases is based on prices in other, richer countries like India, which is to the disadvantage of Chinese companies as the antidumping margin become higher. The issue of the non-market economy treatment is also highlighted by Insoo

(2002). There are domestic and international causes for protectionism.

Held also writes about international economic reasons. In his (1999) book, Global

Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture, Held states that “[a]s trade has encouraged the development of global markets and economies have become more

Page 17 of 72 Christiane Haberl Antidumping as a Form of Protectionism Master Thesis

open, the impact of international conditions on national economies has intensified.

Macroeconomic fluctuations in one state tend to spill over to other countries and higher export levels means that external conditions have a greater impact on national output.

The transmission of economic fluctuations reflects more than just the increasing intensity of trade, but also the way in which trade has become increasingly enmeshed with domestic economic activity.” (Held 1999, 182-183). Another hint that specific international economic threats can lead to protectionism is given by Eglin (1997). She concludes in a paper about China’s WTO accession that “the European Community had a penchant for applying discriminatory safeguard measures as a protectionist device against imports from east European countries when they acceded to the GATT.” (Eglin

1997, 507). Furthermore, Liu and Vanderbusche find that one of the reasons for EU antidumping measures against China is the EU’s rising trade deficit with China (Liu,

Vanderbusche 2002, 1127). This indicates the external economic reason for antidumping as protectionism. In brief, there are domestic economic and political as well as international economic and political motivations for antidumping.

II. G. Quantitative Studies Relating Protectionism to Antidumping

There are several quantitative studies that examine the protectionist character of

antidumping procedures statistically. For this paper, two of these studies are especially

important. In the first one, Knetter and Prusa (2003) examine the relationship between

macroeconomic factors and antidumping filings. More precisely, they regress real

exchange rate (in Table 1: international economic reason) fluctuations and GDP growth

rate (in Table 1: internal economic reason) on antidumping filings. They find that both

Page 18 of 72 Christiane Haberl Antidumping as a Form of Protectionism Master Thesis have statistically significant impacts on filings. Also in my study, I am regressing macroeconomic factors on antidumping initiations and measures. Therefore, the structure of my article resembles Knetter’s and Prusa’s. Moreover, I rely on their lagging structure for my regression analysis.

Takacs (1981) Pressure for Protectionism: An Empirical Analysis is the second and even more crucial quantitative study related to this thesis. She focuses on domestic and international economic reasons (Table 1, upper row) that can lead to US protectionism in form of escape clauses between 1949 and 1979. She does a regression analysis where the independent variables are GNI and the unemployment rate representing domestic reasons and as well as the trade balance and import penetration operationalizing structural causes. The dependent variables are escape clause petitions measuring the protectionist pressure and successful escape clause cases measuring protectionism. She comes to the conclusion that domestic and structural motivations lead to protectionist pressure but not protectionism. My study extends Takac’s analysis and will therefore be referred to in greater detail later.

Page 19 of 72 Christiane Haberl Antidumping as a Form of Protectionism Master Thesis

III. Theoretical Research Design

III. A. Hypothesis

Drawing on Takacs’ study, my hypotheses are as follows:

H1: Number of antidumping initiations = a + b1 GNI per capita + b2 unemployment +

b3 trade balance/GNI + b4 import penetration

H2: Number of antidumping measures = a + b1 GNI per capita+ b2 unemployment +

b3 trade balance/GNI + b4 import penetration

In order to test these hypotheses, I have conducted a multivariate regression

analysis. In this regression analysis, I first regressed antidumping initiations on GNI and

import penetration, and then estimated the same model with antidumping measures as the dependent variable. The unemployment rate and the trade balance divided by GNI were excluded from the statistical analysis due for reasons explained in section IV.

The independent variables are indicators of a low cyclical state of an

economy (domestic economic reason for protectionism) and the overall international competitive position of a country (international economic reason for protectionism). That is, low GNI is a measure of a low level of economic activity, high unemployment is a

cyclical measure, trade deficits and import penetration are measures for the

international competitive position. In more detail, in periods of high economic activity, it

is easy to absorb imports without adjusting costs on domestic firms and workers. In

Page 20 of 72 Christiane Haberl Antidumping as a Form of Protectionism Master Thesis

times of high unemployment, labor market competition leads to increased periods of

unemployment and pressure to lower wages. Therefore, workers have higher costs to adjust to imports. An increase in imports that is tolerable in good times might lead to

protectionism in bad times. Furthermore, the overall economic competitive position of a

state can be measured by a country’s merchandise trade balance and the import market

share. The lower the merchandise trade balance (exports minus imports) and the higher

import penetration (ratio of imports to GNI), the higher the expected protectionism.

Here, the limitations of the independent variables should be noted. In other words, there

are many more variables that could measure the internal economic and international

competitive position of a country. However, I chose not to include other variables

because first, I was curious to find out how Takacs’ model applies to a different scope.

Second, if these simple measures chosen already explained significant parts of antidumping actions, I would suppose that this indicates that better-defined measures

can only have a greater influence on antidumping actions.

The dependent variables are antidumping initiations and measures. The number of initiations of antidumping procedures quantifies the degree of protectionist pressure.

The number of successful antidumping measures, which result in an import tax,

measures the degree of protectionism. In short, the hypothesis connects internal and

domestic macroeconomic factors with pressure for protectionism (expressed in

antidumping initiations) and protectionism (expressed in antidumping measures).

Page 21 of 72 Christiane Haberl Antidumping as a Form of Protectionism Master Thesis

III. B. The Theoretical Regression Model

The hypothesis and regression model is an extension and, consequently, a modification of Takacs’ (1981) model. The model is expanded to more countries, another time period with an additional time lag, and a slightly different type of measures.

Additionally, I will conduct a more thorough statistical multivariate statistical analysis than Takacs’.

The regression models at an individual level look as follows:

Number of antidumping initiations = β0 + β1 x GNI per capita + β2 x unemployment + β4 x

trade balance/GNI + β4 x import penetration

Number of antidumping measures = β0 + β1 x GNI per capita + β2 x unemployment + β4

x trade balance/GNI + β4 x import penetration

Where β0 is the Y-intercept.

β1 is the slope of GNI per capita, i.e. the amount of change in number of antidumping initiations/measures for one unit of change in GDP per capita, holding all other independent variables constant.

β2 is the slope of unemployment, i.e. the amount of change in number of antidumping initiations/measures for one unit of change in unemployment, holding all other independent variables constant.

β3 is the slope of trade balance/GNI, i.e. the amount of change in number of antidumping initiations/measures for one unit of change in trade balance/GDP, holding all other independent variables constant.

Page 22 of 72 Christiane Haberl Antidumping as a Form of Protectionism Master Thesis

Β4 is the slope of import penetration, i.e. the amount of change in number of

antidumping initiations/measures for one unit of change in import penetration, holding all

other independent variables constant.

My analysis differs from that of Takacs in several important ways. First, Takacs

only examined the US case. Second, her study is based on data from 1949 to 1979.

This was before antidumping law became global in the form of a provision in the

GATT/WTO agreement. In the meantime, more recent data are available that allow me

to complete my analysis from 1995 on up to 2002. Third, I want to introduce a time lag

between the independent and the dependent variables. Fourth, while Takacs analyzes

the US escape clause procedures, I will look at antidumping procedures instead. Fifth,

the variables will be tested for continuity, linearity, and multicollinearity as well as the

residuals for independence, normality, and homoscedasticity. These extensions lead to

slight modifications of Takacs’ model.

In addition to expanding the countries and time frame studies, I have also included a time lag between independent and dependent variables. The lag structure is adopted from Knetter and Prusa (2003). They experimented with different structures and came to the conclusion that it seems plausible to consider time lags between one and three years but definitely not longer. They use a three-year-lag when regressing the real GDP growth on antidumping filings (Knetter, Prusa 2003, 9). Therefore, I will lag my independent variables three years behind antidumping measures, which means the data on antidumping measures are from 1995 to 2002 and the data on the independent

variables are from 1992 to 1999. Regarding antidumping initiations, I will use the same

Page 23 of 72 Christiane Haberl Antidumping as a Form of Protectionism Master Thesis

time lag since empirically there is only a maximum of one year period between

antidumping initiations and measures. When facing “AD and/or CVD investigation in the

United States, the Brazilian exporter should be prepared for a year of investigation

proceedings…” (Lima-Campos, Vito 2004, 54). And, the data on antidumping initiations and measures are given in annual terms, which is the antidumping procedures compiled over one year. In other words, the lag structure is based on the assumption that macroeconomic independent variables of the same year influence the initiations and measures that are started three years later.

The last change concerns the type of protectionist instrument. Whilst Takacs uses escape clause petitions and successful cases as a measure for protectionist pressure and protectionism, I utilize antidumping initiations and measures instead.

Jackson states that “[t]he escape clause, for example, allows import-restraining responses regardless of whether imports have benefited from unfair practices.

Responses to dumping or subsidies, however, are based on a totally different theory. In these and other cases, the basic idea is that the response of importing nations is

designed partly to offset the effects of the unfair actions, and perhaps to go further and

have a sort of ‘punitive’ effect to inhibit such actions in the future”. (Jackson 1989, 217).

Yet Finger, Hall and Nelson research US protectionism and find that “in law, the escape

clause deals with injury to U.S. producers from import competition and the LFV [i.e. less

than fair value, in other words antidumping and countervailing duty cases] mechanism

with the fairness of business practices used in the U.S. market by foreigners. But in

economics we find that they both deal with the same thing – injury from imports and the

associated gains from trade. […] Antidumping and countervailing duties are,

Page 24 of 72 Christiane Haberl Antidumping as a Form of Protectionism Master Thesis

functionally, the poor (or small) man’s escape clause.” (Finger, Hall, Nelson 1982, 464-

465). In sum, although based on a different theory antidumping cases can replace escape clauses.

Apart from these four adaptations, the analyzed countries, the time frame, the

time lag and the type of protectionist measure, there are other minor modifications due

to the extension of the model, availability of data and statistical application. This is

discussed in the next sections.

III. C. Description of Data

This section describes where the data come from and how they were handled

based on the Takacs’ operationalization of the variables, my modifications, and the

availability of the data. Furthermore, a statistical description of the raw data is included.

In all, data were colleted on five dependent variables and two independent variables.

The raw numbers are available in the Appendix.

Dependent Variable Data

The dependent variables are antidumping initiations and measures by reporting

member of the WTO. The data are taken directly from the WTO site (WTO 2003b,

2003c) where they are available from 1995 to 2002. There is one change because of

the fit between independent and dependent variables. One the one hand, in the WTO

files for the dependent variable, Chinese Taipei is listed separately from China as

“[m]embership in GATT is not limited to “sovereign nations”. The actual GATT language

allows a “separate customs territory possessing full autonomy in the conduct of its

Page 25 of 72 Christiane Haberl Antidumping as a Form of Protectionism Master Thesis

external commercial relations and of other matters provided for in this Agreement” to

become contracting parties” (Jackson 1989, 46). On the other hand, the data for the

dependent variable are only available per sovereign state. Therefore, I had to add

Chinese Taipei’s number of antidumping initiations and measures to China’s.

Furthermore, due to the same reasons, the EU is considered as one country. The fifteen

member states during the period of investigation were Austria, Belgium, Denmark,

Germany, Greece, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal, Spain,

Sweden, The Netherlands and United Kingdom (EU 2004). This did not cause a change

in the dependent variable but will be relevant for the adaptation of the independent

variable data.

The slightly adapted dependent variable data look as follows. Although the WTO

has 147 Members, only 38 countries reported antidumping initiations and 34 countries

reported measures (counting Chinese Taipei and China as one). The 34 countries that

reported measures are Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia,

Czech Republic, Egypt, European Community, Guatemala, India, Indonesia, Israel,

Jamaica, Japan, Republic of Korea, Latvia, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Nicaragua,

Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Singapore, South Africa, Thailand, Trinidad and

Tobago, Turkey, United States, Uruguay and Venezuela. The 38 countries that initiated antidumping investigations are all of the above (minus Singapore) plus Bulgaria, Costa

Rica, Ecuador, Panama and Slovenia. Singapore has reported measures in the first year of analysis 1995 but the accompanying initiations were taken before 1995. In sum,

for the dependent variable, theoretically there would be 38 countries times 8 years

equaling 304 pieces of data for antidumping initiations and 34 countries times 8 years

Page 26 of 72 Christiane Haberl Antidumping as a Form of Protectionism Master Thesis

equaling 272 pieces of data for antidumping measures. However, some data are

missing. As all WTO members are obligated to notify the WTO about their antidumping

initiations and measures (WTO 2004a), I assume that the other members neither

initiated nor took antidumping measures.

Data on antidumping initiations are presented first. For the description of the data

for the dependent variables, all explanations are based on the total number of

antidumping initiations accumulated over the eight-year-period from 1995 to 2002 per country. Between 1995 and 2002, 2,160 initiations were made in total. India alone

accounts for the highest number of initiations with 331. The lowest number of initiations

is one initiation each in eight years by Bulgaria, Ecuador, Guatemala, Paraguay and

Slovenia. The arithmetic mean is 56.8 antidumping initiations per country and 270 per

year worldwide. Almost

77 percent of all 35.00 India 30.00 United States antidumping procedures 25.00 European Community 20.00 Argentina are initiated by nine 15.00 South Africa 10.00 Australia 5.00 Canada countries among the total 0.00 Brazil Mexico of thirty-eight. Therefore, I 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002

focus on these nine Graph 1: % Initiations over Time countries in the following

two graphs. Additionally, instead of analyzing the number of cases, I center the

description on the percentage distribution of cases amongst those nine countries.

Therefore, the numbers in the graphs are not absolute numbers but percentages and the percentages are not relative to all but only to nine countries. Graph 1 illustrates the

Page 27 of 72 Christiane Haberl Antidumping as a Form of Protectionism Master Thesis evolution of the percentage distribution of initiations amongst the nine most active

countries over time. Apart

6% 4% India 20% from India, antidumping 6% United States European Community initiations decreased 9% Argentina South Africa relative to the other 18% Australia 10% Canada countries or remained Brazil 11% 16% Mexico stable for the nine

countries with the highest Graph 2: % Initiations Total number of initiations.

Interestingly, two types of countries conduct the most antidumping initiations. On the one hand, there are the most powerful trading blocks like NAFTA (US, Canada and

Mexico) and the EU. On the other hand, emerging strong economies like India,

Argentina and Brazil use antidumping procedures frequently as well. I would have expected China to be one of the main initiating countries. However, it is not clear how

China would fit into this graph as data on it are only available for the last three years, from 2000 to 2002. It initiated 22 measures in three years (8 in 2000, 12 in 2001 and 11 in 2002), averaging at around seven initiations per year. Also Mexico, the ninth leading country makes around seven initiations a year. The second graph, Graph 2 depicts how the initiations are distributed amongst these nine entities in percentage terms, adding up all eight years. The point I want to make with that graph is that even amongst these nine countries, the number of initiations is unequally distributed.

Second, I concentrate on antidumping measures. In the eight year period for the study, 1,258 antidumping measures were taken in total. India alone has taken 219

Page 28 of 72 Christiane Haberl Antidumping as a Form of Protectionism Master Thesis measures, which are 17.41 percent. The lowest number of measures is one measure each in eight years by Uruguay, Paraguay, Nicaragua, Latvia, Guatemala and Czech

Republic. The arithmetic mean is 37 antidumping measures per country and 157 per year. Exactly 81 percent of all antidumping measures are taken by nine countries of the

34 country total. Therefore, I focus on these nine countries in the following two graphs.

As with antidumping initiations, the tables and the following analysis are not in absolute

but relative percentage

35.00 India 30.00 United States numbers. 25.00 European Community 20.00 Argentina Graph 3 illustrates the 15.00 South Africa 10.00 Canada evolution of the percentage of 5.00 Mexico 0.00 Brazil measures over time. On the Australia 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 Totals:

whole, countries appear to Graph 3: % Measures over Time converge gradually in the number of antidumping measures. The same nine countries that account for the most antidumping initiations are most successful in turning them into measures. Again, the most powerful trading blocks and new economies use 5% 4% India 21% 5% United States antidumping legislation. 7% European Community Argentina China’s position is not clear South Africa 11% Canada 19% as data are only available for Mexico 12% Brazil Australia the last 3 years. It only took 16%

seven measures in 2002: Graph 4: % Measures Total

Page 29 of 72 Christiane Haberl Antidumping as a Form of Protectionism Master Thesis

this is not enough to make any conclusions. The second graph, Graph 4, shows how

the initiations are distributed amongst these nine entities in percentage terms. As

illustrated, among the nine countries that are very active in undertaking antidumping

measures, five apply the legislation especially strictly. These countries are India, the

US, the EU, Argentina and South Africa. The remaining four countries, Canada, Mexico,

Brazil and Australia together take only as many measures as India alone.

In sum, only one modification had to be done so as to enter the data into the file.

38 countries were analyzed for antidumping initiations and 34 for measures over eight years from 1995 to 2002. The data show that around four fifths of all antidumping initiations and measures are taken by only nine countries. These countries are the rich trading blocks like NAFTA, EU and Japan and the new emerging economies like Brazil and India.

Independent Variable Data

The data for the independent variables draw from the World Development

Indicators [WDI], (World Bank, 2004b). For the independent variable in Takacs’ model

(1981), the domestic internal economic position is calculated in GNP and the unemployment rate. The international competitive position is measured in trade balance and import penetration. Due to the extension of the model and the availability of data, some changes have been undertaken.

Concerning the domestic variable, instead of GNP (Gross National Product), GNI

(Gross National Income) per capita is used as a measure. According to the World Bank,

GNI was formerly referred to as GNP. Thus, GNI and GNP are the same (World Bank

Page 30 of 72 Christiane Haberl Antidumping as a Form of Protectionism Master Thesis

2004a) and in the WDI, only GNI is available. GNI per capita is used instead of GNI in

order to make it comparable between all the countries. The unemployment rate of the

total labor force is available from WDI. In sum, GNI per capita (Atlas method, current

US$) and the unemployment rate (% of total labor force) were obtained from WDI.

Relating to the international competitive position variable, trade balance and import penetration are needed. So as to calculate the trade balance (exports minus imports) the export and import statistics are directly downloaded. The trade balance is quoted in absolute numbers and therefore needs to be made comparable among all the countries. It is divided by each country’s total GNI. This is a measure to show the trade balance in relation to the overall production of a country. Consequently, three data sets were retrieved for the calculation of the trade balance per income: exports of goods and services (current US$), imports of goods and services (current US$) and GNI (current

US$). Import penetration is the ratio of imports to GNI. The necessary data are already included in the calculation of the trade balance. For the domestic and structural variable, five data sets were collected from WDI.

One more change was made in gathering data for the independent variables. The

WDI does not offer data for the EU as a whole. I downloaded the numbers for all fifteen member countries for the time period between 1992 and 1999 and calculated the sum for exports, imports and GNI. For the unemployment rate and GNI per capita, I used the simple arithmetic mean of the fifteen countries per year. The independent variables are lagged 3 years behind, so the data goes from 1992 to 1999 for both antidumping initiations and measures.

Page 31 of 72 Christiane Haberl Antidumping as a Form of Protectionism Master Thesis

First, I will describe the entire data set containing 1,248 cases as a whole. This

means that if there were no data missing, there would be 39 countries times 8 years

times 4 independent variables of data cases. Table 2 shows the descriptive

N Range Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation Gross National Income 308 41770 260 42030 6988.36 8661.388 per Capita (Atlas Method) Unemployment. total (% 284 24.50 .80 25.30 8.4343 4.75072 of total labor force) Trade Balance 304 .8995 -.6298 .2696 -.027007 .0934316 (Exports-imports) / GNI Import Penetration 304 .9680 .0680 1.0360 .346034 .1960012 (Imports/GNI)

Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for Independent Variables

statistics for the four independent variables of the 1,248 pieces of data. The number of

cases varies due to missing data on some variables.

Obviously, there are big differences in income and unemployment. The country with the best year of GNI per capita is Japan with $42,030 in 1999 and the country with the worst income year is Nicaragua with $260 in 1995. The country having the year with the lowest unemployment rate of .8 percent is Guatemala in 1997 and the country with

the highest unemployment year of 25.3 percent is South Africa in 2002. The differences

in trade balance divided by GNI and import penetration are not that evident as they are

quotients. However, the difference becomes more apparent realizing that the trade

deficit of the worst performing country, Nicaragua, in its worst year 1999 accounts for

62.98 percent of the GNI and the trade surplus of the best performing country, Malaysia,

in its best year 1999 is 26.96 percent of its GNI. In an average year, countries have a

small trade deficit and the imports account for slightly more than a third of the GNI. The

least penetrated country in its best year was Japan in 1993 with an import penetration of

Page 32 of 72 Christiane Haberl Antidumping as a Form of Protectionism Master Thesis

only 6.8 percent. The most penetrated country in its worst year is Malaysia in 1999 with

103.6 percent import penetration, which means that it imported more than it produced.

This might seem odd, however, checking the raw numbers, Malaysia’s imports exceed

total GNI twice in the analyzed time period, in 1995 and 1999. These fluctuations are probably due to the Asian financial crisis.

Only for illustrative purposes, the independent variables per country are

summarized over all eight years as was done with the dependent variables. Instead of

simply adding up all eight years Domestic Structural Country GNI/capita Unemployment Trade Bal./GNI Import Pen. Argentina 7640.00 13.34 -0.0188 0.1116 per country, I took the average Australia 20085.00 8.76 -0.0115 0.2115 Brazil 3748.75 7.46 -0.0124 0.0992 Bulgaria 1303.75 15.74 -0.0160 0.5007 per country over the eight years. Canada 20192.50 9.63 0.0201 0.3629 Chile 4083.75 5.79 -0.0094 0.3044 China 577.50 2.85 0.0284 0.1950 Table 3 shows the results. We Colombia 1983.75 11.56 -0.0433 0.2037 Costa Rica 3198.75 5.14 -0.0254 0.4554 Czech Republic 4315.00 4.89 -0.0293 0.5912 can see, for example, that Ecuador 1495.00 9.54 -0.0037 0.2830 Egypt 1050.00 9.56 -0.0627 0.2680 EU 21358.00 8.59 0.0134 0.2719 between 1992 and 1999, Japan Guatemala 1417.50 1.35 -0.0722 0.2565 India 380.00 -0.0115 0.1197 Indonesia 862.50 5.15 0.0207 0.2890 had the highest average GDP per Israel 15120.00 8.46 -0.1219 0.4490 Jamaica 2065.00 15.83 -0.1023 0.6094 Japan 36015.00 3.30 0.0156 0.0806 capita. We can also see that, in Korea, Rep. 9261.25 3.49 0.0086 0.3265 Latvia 2112.86 11.81 -0.0330 0.5780 Malaysia 3720.00 3.01 0.0560 0.9523 an eight-year average, no country Mexico 4035.00 3.63 -0.0190 0.2784 New Zealand 14126.25 7.65 0.0096 0.3095 Nicaragua 345.00 15.70 -0.4663 0.8277 had an import penetration Panama 3107.50 13.64 -0.0305 0.3857 Paraguay 1742.50 5.51 -0.1512 0.4500 exceeding one, which means that Peru 1968.75 8.21 -0.0436 0.1806 Philippines 1020.00 8.60 -0.0647 0.4636 Poland 3017.50 12.73 -0.0204 0.2763 overall, production (GDI) exceeds Singapore 21865.00 2.99 0.00% Slovenia 9446.00 8.31 -0.0039 0.5700 South Africa 3497.50 11.65 0.0214 0.2196 imports. This is logical as imports Thailand 2387.50 1.71 -0.0038 0.4584 Trinidad&Tobago 4157.50 16.69 0.0627 0.4645 Turkey 2888.75 7.58 -0.0402 0.2428 exceeding production would not Uruguay 5555.00 9.68 -0.0037 0.2021 US 28528.75 5.64 -0.0137 0.1224 Venezuela 3183.75 10.34 0.0473 0.2254 be sustainable for a long time. Table 3: Independent Variables Total The independent variable

Page 33 of 72 Christiane Haberl Antidumping as a Form of Protectionism Master Thesis becomes clearer when presented graphically and supported with descriptive and quartile statistics as I have done in Table 4.

GNI/capita Unemployment Trade Bal./GNI Import Pen. N Valid 39 38 38 38 Missing 0 1 1 1

Mean 6996.3618 8.3029 -.0298 .3473 Median 3198.7500 8.3850 -.0131 .2860 Mode 345.00a 1.35a -.01a .08a Range 35670.00 15.34 .53 .87 Minimum 345.00 1.35 -.47 .08

Maximum 36015.00 16.69 .06 .95

Percentiles 25 1742.5000 5.0775 -.0410 .2096 50 3198.7500 8.3850 -.0131 .2860 75 9261.2500 11.5825 .0106 .4597 a. Multiple modes exist. The smallest value is shown

Table 4: Descriptive and Quartile Statistics for Independent Variables

The fist independent variable is GNI per capita. The average income of a country is almost $7,000 per capita, with Nicaragua having the lowest average income per person between 1992 and 1999. The widest range is within the last quartile because the maximum income is more than four times higher than the poorest country’s in the last quartile. Graph 5 shows GNI per capita from the richest to the poorest country.

40000.00 35000.00 30000.00 25000.00 20000.00 15000.00

GNI/capita 10000.00 5000.00 0.00

US EU New Peru India Chile Israel China Latvia Brazil Egypt South Costa Japan Czech Korea, Turkey Poland Mexico Canada Bulgaria Ecuador Panama Thailand Jamaica Uruguay Slovenia Australia Malaysia Colombia Paraguay Indonesia Argentina Nicaragua Singapore Venezuela Trinidad&T Guatemala Philippines Country

Graph 5: GNI/Capita Page 34 of 72 Christiane Haberl Antidumping as a Form of Protectionism Master Thesis

As expected, only very few countries, namely seven, have a higher average income per capita than $15,000. Income is very unevenly distributed with Japan, the

US, Singapore and the EU being the wealthiest and Indonesia, China, India and

Nicaragua being the poorest countries.

The next independent variable, unemployment is presented from the “most

18.00 16.00 14.00 12.00 10.00 8.00 6.00 4.00 2.00

Unemployment Rate Unemployment 0.00 EU US New Peru Chile Israel Latvia Brazil China South Egypt Japan Costa Czech Korea, Turkey Poland Mexico Canada Bulgaria Jamaica Panama Uruguay Ecuador Slovenia Thailand Australia Malaysia Colombia Argentina Indonesia Paraguay Nicaragua Singapore Trinidad&T Venezuela Philippines Guatemala Country

Graph 6: Unemployment occupied” to the “least occupied” country in Graph 6. There are no data available for

India. Guatemala’s unemployment rate is only available for two years and if the data are correct, it has an extremely low average unemployment rate of 1.35 percent. It is unclear if these numbers are reliable and it is difficult to assess their credibility.

Therefore, they will be excluded and assumed to be missing. Trinidad and Tobago has the highest average rate of 16.69 percent. Unemployment rises more equally than GNI.

This is also obvious looking at the quartiles, where the distance between the quartiles is more equal with three percent difference between both the second and third and the third and fourth quartile. Guatemala and other South East Asian countries have the

Page 35 of 72 Christiane Haberl Antidumping as a Form of Protectionism Master Thesis

lowest unemployment rates while those with the highest rates are South American and

Caribbean countries. This could be an indicator that Guatemala’s unemployment statistics are not correct.

Concerning the trade balance, there are huge differences between the antidumping-reporting countries. A positive number means a trade surplus and a negative one a trade deficit. The trade balance is divided by GNI and therefore, the deficit or surplus is quoted as a percentage of the national income. If a country’s deficit percentage is higher than 100%, the country’s value of imports exceeds the value of its economic product (GDI). Graph 7 illustrates the 38 available countries, all apart from

0.1000

0.0000 US -0.1000 EU New Peru India Chile Israel Brazil Latvia China Egypt Costa Japan South Czech Korea, Turkey Poland Mexico Canada

-0.2000 Bulgaria Jamaica Panama Slovenia Thailand Uruguay Ecuador Australia Malaysia Colombia Paraguay Argentina Indonesia Nicaragua Singapore Venezuela Trinidad&T -0.3000 Guatemala Philippines Country -0.4000 Trade Balance/GNI Trade -0.5000

Graph 7: Trade Balance/GNI

Singapore, from the country with the smallest deficit to the one with the biggest surplus.

The countries with the highest deficit, are, again, South American and Caribbean

countries. Surprisingly, the countries with the highest surplus are not the richest, they

are mainly South East Asian countries.

There is also a wide range in import penetration despite the more equal

distribution of penetration amongst the states. The average country imports goods for

Page 36 of 72 Christiane Haberl Antidumping as a Form of Protectionism Master Thesis around 35% of its GNI, the most penetrated country is Malaysia with about 95 percent and the least penetrated Japan with around 8 percent. Graph 8 represents the least

1.0000 0.8000 0.6000 0.4000 0.2000 0.0000 Import Penetration US EU India Peru Chile Israel Brazil Egypt China Latvia Japan Czech Turkey Poland Mexico Canada Bulgaria Uruguay Ecuador Panama Thailand Slovenia Jamaica Australia Argentina Colombia Indonesia Paraguay Nicaragua Venezuela Philippines Guatemala Costa Rica Costa Korea, Rep. South Africa New Zealand Trinidad&Tob Country

Graph 8: Import Penetration penetrated to the most penetrated country.

In conclusion for the independent variables, the range between the minima and maxima of each of the independent variables are considerable. As depicted in the boxplots in Graph 9, the most unequally distributed variable is GNI, the other three variables are more evenly distributed. The richest countries are not necessarily the ones with the highest unemployment, strongest trade balance and lowest import penetration.

Graph 9: Boxplots: GNI/capita-Unemployment-Trade Balance-Import Penetration

Page 37 of 72 Christiane Haberl Antidumping as a Form of Protectionism Master Thesis

IV. Statistical Procedure

IV. A. Outliers

So that the results of the multivariate regression proposed in this research are valid, outliers have to be dealt with. “Extreme cases have too much impact on the regression solution and also affect the precision of estimation of the regression weights

[…]. Therefore, outliers should be deleted, rescored, or the variable transformed.”

(Tabachnick 2001, 117-118). I chose to rescore or disregard the outliers seen in Graph

9 as missing values so that they do not skew the outcome too much. First, I analyzed the four independent variables and then the two dependent variables.

Concerning GNI/capita, all the outliers in Graph 9 are due to Japan’s high income and are excluded as missing. Concerning unemployment, Guatemala will be excluded due to the theoretical imprecision of data as already stated. Statistically, there are several outliers. I decided to exclude all unemployment rates equal to or above 20%.

Taking a look at the 6 concerned data points, this decision is not only statistically but also theoretically based. South Africa is the most extreme case, unemployment rates of

25.2% and 25.3% in 1998 and 1999 respectively, whereas during all other years its unemployment is lower than 6%. Also, Nicaragua’s 1993 data are recoded as missing as in this year it is 23.3% whereas in all other years it is smaller than 20%. Bulgaria’s

1993 and 1994 are excluded as the other data points are below 15%. Finally,

Colombia’s 1999 is excluded, as all other years were below 16%. Regarding the trade balance divided by GDI, in Graph 9, the extreme outliers marked with asterisks are the ones below -.2 and above .2. This is Malaysia in 1998 and 1999 and Nicaragua during

Page 38 of 72 Christiane Haberl Antidumping as a Form of Protectionism Master Thesis

the whole studied period and they will be marked as missing. Turning to import

penetration, data above 80% are excluded, which affects Nicaragua from 1996 to 1997

as well as Malaysia from 1993 to 1999.

There are many outliers in the dependent variable due to the fact that many

countries only initiate one antidumping procedure measures and a few countries are extremely active. Nevertheless, I do not want to exclude outliers and see if the structural and residual statistical assumptions are fulfilled. The boxplots for the cleaned independent variables are illustrated in Graph 10. There are still outliers within GNI and

Trade Balance. However, they are not as skewed as before.

Graph 10: Boxplots: GNI/capita-Unemployment-Trade Balance-Import Penetration

IV. B. Statistical Assumptions Concerning the Structure

The first assumption about the structure is that all the independent variables are

continuous. This is the case as all variables are scale variables. The second

assumption is that there exists linearity between the DV and the IVs, regression being a

Page 39 of 72 Christiane Haberl Antidumping as a Form of Protectionism Master Thesis linear model. The correlation matrix in Table 5 depicts that there is linearity between all the independent variables and antidumping initiations apart from unemployment

Number of AD Unemploy Trade Import initiations GNI ment Balance / GNI Penetration Number of AD initiations Pearson Correlation 1 .393** -.072 .143* -.403** Sig. (2-tailed) . .000 .241 .015 .000 GNI Pearson Correlation .393** 1 -.154* .076 -.174** Sig. (2-tailed) .000 . .012 .204 .003 Unemployment Pearson Correlation -.072 -.154* 1 .013 .202** Sig. (2-tailed) .241 .012 . .835 .001 N 270 266 278 261 260 Trade Balance/GNI Pearson Correlation .143* .076 .013 1 -.215** Sig. (2-tailed) .015 .204 .835 . .000 N 286 282 261 294 289 Import Penetration Pearson Correlation -.403** -.174** .202** -.215** 1 Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .003 .001 .000 . N 285 281 260 289 293 **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). *. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Table 5: Correlations because the correlation is not significant. Statistically speaking, the remedy is to exclude unemployment. The same procedure shows that there is linearity between antidumping measures and GNI/capita and import penetration. This means that unemployment and the trade balance have to be excluded for antidumping measures.

The third assumption states that there has to be limited multicollinearity among the independent variables. This is the case as the correlation coefficients in Table 5 and the ones for antidumping measures are smaller than .7 Also, the independent variables are within the tolerance levels for both

Collinearity Statistics antidumping initiations and Model Tolerance VIF 1 GNI/capita .940 1.064 measures. As Table 6 shows for Unemployment. total .975 1.026 Trade Balance / GNI .934 1.070 initiations, they are higher than .5 Import Penetration .894 1.119

Table 6: Multicollinearity

Page 40 of 72 Christiane Haberl Antidumping as a Form of Protectionism Master Thesis

and close to 1. Also the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) is just over 1 and smaller than 2.

The same is true for antidumping measures.

Reviewing the adaptations, due to statistical assumptions about the structure,

unemployment has to be excluded for antidumping initiations and measures as well as

the trade balance for antidumping measures.

IV. C. Estimates of the Parameters and Residuals

The estimates of parameters for antidumping initiations are listed in Table 7. At a

5% level of significance, only GNI per capita and import penetration

Unstandardized Standardized Coefficients Coefficients Model B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 1 (Constant) 9.927 1.827 5.435 .000 Gross National Income 8.836E-04 .000 .567 11.958 .000 per Capita (Atlas Method) Unemployment. total (% -.109 .129 -.039 -.843 .400 of total labor force) Trade Balance 9.672 9.472 .049 1.021 .308 (Exports-imports) / GNI Import Penetration -22.839 3.744 -.297 -6.100 .000 (Imports/GNI)

Table 7: Initiations Parameters

have a statistically significant relationship with antidumping initiations. The standardized coefficients reveal that GNI per capita is the most powerful predictor of antidumping initiations followed by import penetration. The unstandardized coefficients indicate that a one dollar increase in GNI per capita would lead to an increase of .00088 antidumping initiations. In other words, there would have to be a $1,136 (1/.00088) increase in GDP

per capita to provoke another antidumping initiation. The average GNI per capita of the

Page 41 of 72 Christiane Haberl Antidumping as a Form of Protectionism Master Thesis

countries analyzed is almost $7,000. Therefore, statistically seen, only a GNI per capita increase of 16% (1,136/7,000) of an average country would trigger one additional antidumping initiation. A hundred (absolute number 1) percent increase in import

penetration would lead to a decrease of 22.8 antidumping initiations. That is, import

penetration would have to increase by 4 percent (=100/22.8) to lower antidumping initiation cases by 1. This is a very realistic scenario as there is a very wide range in

import penetration (Japan 8% and Malaysia 95%). The same procedure was conducted

for antidumping measures, the results are shown in Table 8. The standardized

Table 8: Measures Parameters coefficients reveal that concerning antidumping measures, GNI per capita is the most

powerful predictor followed by import penetration. The unstandardized coefficients

indicate that a one dollar increase in GNI per capita would lead to an increase of 0.0005

antidumping measures. There would have to be a $2,000 increase in GDP per capita to

provoke another antidumping initiation. GNI per capita of an average country would

have to increase by a third to result in one additional antidumping measure. A hundred

percent increase in import penetration would lead to a decrease of 15.15 antidumping

initiations. That is, import penetration would have to increase by 6.6 percent

(=100/15.15) to lower antidumping initiation cases by 1. Actually, in real terms it seems

Page 42 of 72 Christiane Haberl Antidumping as a Form of Protectionism Master Thesis that import penetration is a more realistic predictor for antidumping initiations and measures.

There are three assumptions about the residuals. First, the independent variables are supposed to be independent. This is the case considering that theoretically, GNI per capita is not closely related to import penetration or the trade balance. Second, the independent variables have to be normally distributed. The P-P Plots in Graph 11 show

Normal P-P Plot that this can be assumed as the Normal P-P Plot DV: Number of AD initiations 1.00 DV: Number of AD measures 1.00 residuals do not diverge too

.75 .75 much from the normal line. The .50 .50

.25 third assumption is that there is .25

0.00 Expected Cum Prob Cum Expected 0.00 0.00 .25 .50 .75 1.00 Prob Cum Expected 0.00 .25 .50 .75 1.00 homoscedascity. This can be Observed Cum Prob Observed Cum Prob Graph 12: P-P Plots assessed by looking at the scatterplots in Graph 12. This assumption is severely violated because the scatterplot is

Scatterplot: DV: Number of AD initiations Scatterplot: DV: Number of AD measures very skewed. “Violations of 6 6

5 4 homogeneity usually can be 4 2 3

2 0 corrected by transformation 1

0 -2

-1 of the [dependent variable] -4 Regression Standardized Residual Standardized Regression -2 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 Residual Standardized Regression -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4

Regression Standardized Predicted Value Regression Standardized Predicted Value scores. Interpretation, Graph 11: Scatterplots however, is then limited to the transformed scores. Another option is to use untransformed variables with a more stringent α level […] .01 with severe violation.”

(Tabachnick 2001, 82). The analysis of the residuals does not demand data transformation but the use of a more stringent level of significance.

Page 43 of 72 Christiane Haberl Antidumping as a Form of Protectionism Master Thesis

IV. D. The Regression Model Including Statistical Aspects

The regression model has been dealt with theoretically in section III. Apart from

determining which factors theoretically influence antidumping, statistical methods allow

us to choose significant independent variables for a regression model. This section will

statistically select a regression model by applying four different regression methods that help in selecting significant independent variables.

The first regression method, the default enter method, uses all independent variables. It was applied to derive Table 7 for antidumping initiations and the results for measures. For both dependent variables, only GNI per capita and import penetration have a significant relationship and should be the only independent variables included in the regression model. The second regression model is stepwise regression. It is a combination of backward and forward regression, where independent variables are added one after another, but they may also be excluded as soon as they do not contribute significantly anymore. The third method is forward regression, where independent variables are added to an empty regression until there are no statistically significant independent variables left. The fourth method is backward regression that starts out with all independent variables and then deletes the unimportant ones. The last three methods were applied to antidumping initiations and measures and all come to the exact same selection of independent variables: for both antidumping measures and initiations, only GNI per capita and import penetration should be included as independent variables.

In conclusion, from a statistical perspective, there are only two independent variables that should be included in the regression model: GNI per capita and import

Page 44 of 72 Christiane Haberl Antidumping as a Form of Protectionism Master Thesis

penetration. The regression model statistically based on the theoretical model looks as

follows:

Number of antidumping initiations = β0 + β1 x GNI per capita + β2 x import penetration

Number of antidumping measures = β0 + β1 x GNI per capita + β2 x import penetration

Where β0 is the Y-intercept.

β1 is the slope of GNI per capita, i.e. the amount of change in the number of

antidumping initiations/measures for one unit of change in GDP per capita, holding all

other independent variables constant.

β2 is the slope of is the slope of import penetration, i.e. the amount of change in the number of antidumping initiations/measures for one unit of change in import penetration, holding all other independent variables constant.

IV. E. Regression Equation

Table 9 presents the data for the regression equation for antidumping initiations

using the independent variables selected before. Table 10 shows the data for the

regression equation for antidumping measures.

Table 9: Initiations Coefficients

Table 10: Measures Coefficients

Page 45 of 72 Christiane Haberl Antidumping as a Form of Protectionism Master Thesis

These are the regression equations:

Y’ (# of antidumping initiations)= 13.81+. 000727 x GNI/capita - 31.769 x import penetration + ε Y’ (# of antidumping measures)= 9.025+. 000392 x GNI/capita – 20.321 x import penetration + ε

Table 11: Model Summary Table 12: Significance

The two independent variables explain 34% of the variance in the number of

antidumping initiations and 25.5% of the variance in the number of antidumping

measures (see Table 11). The standardized coefficients for both dependent variables

indicate that GNI per capita is the most powerful predictor followed by import

penetration. Based on the unstandardized coefficients, a one dollar increase in GNI per

capita would lead to an increase of .00072 antidumping initiations. There would have to

be a $1,389 increase in GDP per capita to provoke another antidumping initiation. A hundred percent increase in import penetration would lead to a decrease of 31.8 antidumping initiations. That is, import penetration would have to increase by 3.14 percent to lower antidumping initiation cases by 1. Concerning antidumping measures, a one dollar increase in GNI per capita would lead to an increase of .0004 antidumping measures. There would have to be a 2,500 increase in GDP per capita to provoke

another antidumping measure. A hundred percent increase in import penetration would lead to a decrease of 20.32 antidumping measures. That is, import penetration would have to increase by 4.9 percent to lower antidumping measures by 1. Actually, in real

Page 46 of 72 Christiane Haberl Antidumping as a Form of Protectionism Master Thesis terms it seems that import penetration is a more realistic predictor for antidumping initiations and measures. Interestingly, in comparison to antidumping measures, antidumping initiations seem to be more sensitive to changes in GNI per capita and less sensitive to changes in import penetration.

According to the F test, there is a significant relationship between the independent variables and the dependent variables at the 1% level of significance (see

Table 12, Sig. < .001). In sum, the two independent variables have a very significant influence on the dependent variables.

V. Results

As discussed, the relationship between domestic internal economic conditions and structural international competitive position with protectionist pressure and protectionism is tested. Relating to the independent variable, the internal condition is measured by GNI per capita and unemployment and the international position is calculated by trade balance per GNI and import penetration. Concerning the dependent variable, protectionist pressure is expressed in antidumping initiations and protectionism in antidumping measures. I expected to find a negative relationship between GNI per capita and antidumping, a positive relationship between unemployment and the dependent variables, as well as a negative relationship between trade balance divided by GNI and antidumping and a positive relationship between import penetration and antidumping initiations and measures. Analysis was performed using Statistics Program for Social Sciences (SPSS) for evaluation of assumptions and hypothesis.

Page 47 of 72 Christiane Haberl Antidumping as a Form of Protectionism Master Thesis

The statistical results led to a transformation of the variables to reduce outliers and to fulfill the assumptions about the structure and residuals. Also, the application of four different regression methods led to the exclusion of independent variables that were first included for theoretical reasons. Based on boxplots, some extreme data cases were excluded as missing. This exclusion coincided with theoretical concerns about the validity of the data excluded. Concerning the structure, normality of the variables and multicollinearity among the independent variables was present. However, there was not enough linearity either between the unemployment rate as an independent variable and the dependent variables or between trade balance as an independent variable and the number of antidumping measures. Regarding the residuals, independence and linearity was present. However, homoscedascity was not fulfilled and could be rescued with the application of a 1% level of significance. Four different regression methods confirmed that only GNI per capita and import penetration should be used as independent variables.

The results of the standard multiple regression analysis show a very significant relationship between the independent variables, GNI per capita and import penetration, and the dependent variables, antidumping initiations and measures. Surprisingly, the multiple regression analysis shows partly different results from the hypothesis. In other words, protectionist pressure is influenced by the domestic and international position.

However, it seems that the overall state of the economy measured in GNI has an influence on protectionist desires whereas the labor market appears not to have significant impact. Also, whereas the overall trade balance does not seem to significantly provoke pressure for antidumping, import penetration does. Protectionism

Page 48 of 72 Christiane Haberl Antidumping as a Form of Protectionism Master Thesis appears to be related to the same causes as protectionist pressure. Whereas the overall economy and import penetration significantly drive protectionism, a high unemployment rate and a trade deficit appear not to lead to the initiation of initiate antidumping procedures.

Now that the relationship between independent and dependent variables is clear, the remaining question concerns the strength of the statistically significant relationships.

The two independent variables explain 34% of the variance in the number of antidumping initiations and 25.5% of the variance in the number of antidumping measures. Although GNI per capita is a more powerful predictor, import penetration is the more realistic predictor, antidumping initiations being more sensitive to GNI per capita changes and antidumping measures more sensitive to import penetration fluctuations.

In conclusion, the domestic economic condition and the international competitive position of a country have an influence on its antidumping initiations and measures.

However, the chosen independent variables do not fully explain the variance in the dependent variable.

VI. Conclusion

This study has examined the relationship between the domestic economic situations and international competitive position of a country and protectionism in the form of antidumping initiations and measures. Two of the measures, GNI per capita and import penetration, had a statistically significant relationship with antidumping

Page 49 of 72 Christiane Haberl Antidumping as a Form of Protectionism Master Thesis

procedures. This finding is consistent with the idea that antidumping procedures are

misused for protectionism instead of defending fair trade.

However, I have to acknowledge the weakness of the operationalization of the independent variables internal economic condition and international competitive position. First, theoretically, there are many more and different measures that can be used to express the independent variable. Second, statistically, two of the chosen measures were not sufficiently related to the dependent variable so as to even be included in the regression analysis. On the other hand, even this parsimonious model explains a third of the variance in antidumping initiations and a fourth of the variance in antidumping measures. I assume that an exploration of more numerous and accurate measures would definitely explain the rest of the variance in the dependent variables.

Yet this would exceed the scope of this thesis and is therefore suggested for further research instead.

My thesis advances the literature on antidumping by showing that antidumping initiations and measures are statistically connected to domestic and structural factors.

Here, the finding that antidumping actions are actually protectionism should be placed in

broader context. Aside from being protectionist, antidumping procedures have other

negative effects as well. Many articles have been dedicated to this subject but only

some can be addressed here. Barfield (2003) writes about the irrationality of

antidumping laws in High-Tech Protectionism. In the high-tech sector, antidumping

actions had negative effects on other industries, US consumers, and workers. Barfield

reveals that political intervention can harm the integrity of the administrative process

and can lead the administration to wrong predictions. Consequently, he points out the

Page 50 of 72 Christiane Haberl Antidumping as a Form of Protectionism Master Thesis

irrelevance of certain antidumping measures. Tavares de Araujo Jr. (2002) examines

the interface of legal and economic issues as they relate to antidumping and antitrust

policies. He concludes that whilst antidumping was originally designed to protect

domestic industries from international competition, it remains a protectionist weapon in

industries such as steel, chemicals and textiles whose other protectionist instruments are limited by their technological character. (Tavares the Araujo Jr. 2002, 172). Breton

(2001) demonstrates that antidumping measures in the EU create trade diversion from the countries affected by the measures to other countries exporting to the EU market.

He states that this outcome is consistent with similar studies of the US and EU.

Antidumping possibly engenders harmful consequences for workers, consumers, other industries, leads to trade diversion and serves as a substitute for other forms of protectionism.

Lima-Campos and Vito (2004) confirm the negative effects of antidumping measures. They find that Brazilian exporters will suffer from US antidumping initiations even if the final measures are never taken. This is because US importers will expect the price of their Brazilian exporter’s product to rise due to the possible antidumping measures. Thus, they search for and switch to an alternative exporter. (Lima-Campos,

Vito 2004, 54). According to Messerlin and Reed (1995), removing antidumping orders

would cause an economy-wide welfare gain of $1.6 billion for the US alone. (Messerlin,

Reed 1995, 1571). Anderson, Schmitt and Thisse stipulate in a quantitative study that

antidumping laws change the pricing policies of foreign firms in favor of the domestic

ones. If domestic and foreign firms succeed in lobbying against the imposition of

antidumping actions in their respective home country, their profits fall but consumer

Page 51 of 72 Christiane Haberl Antidumping as a Form of Protectionism Master Thesis

surplus rises. In other words, profits that go to producers protected by antidumping

actions shift to the consumers when antidumping actions end. However, the overall

surplus rises when antidumping actions are abolished. Governments prefer not to have

antidumping legislation - irrespective of the antidumping actions of a foreign country -

because they can maximize domestic surplus by ignoring dumping. One more negative

result of antidumping procedures is that companies accused of dumping will suffer

losses when antidumping actions are initiated against them even if they are never found

guilty.

On the whole, antidumping is an important topic in the literature on international

trade and international political economy. Many international organizations provide facts

and statistics on antidumping legislation but do not question its legitimacy. The literature

on trade protectionism generally advocates free trade, identifying antidumping

procedures as protectionist and therefore arguing against them except when unfair trade practices are targeted. Antidumping researchers argue similarly, calling for reform or abolition of antidumping procedures. They would only allow it as an instrument against unfair trade. However, the literature that addresses antidumping as a protectionist measure reveals that the only non-protectionist motivation for antidumping, the unfair trade justification, is simply a mask for protectionism. The real causes for antidumping are internal domestic, international structural or external, and as such aim at the protection of the domestic industry. Selected from the many quantitative studies dealing with these three reasons, this paper is based on two studies that focus on the first two causes of antidumping. In this way, this thesis fills a small gap of the literature by extending analysis of domestic and structural reasons for antidumping to the whole

Page 52 of 72 Christiane Haberl Antidumping as a Form of Protectionism Master Thesis world. As a last point, many articles stress the different negative consequences of antidumping. Weighing the literature’s overall message in one sentence, antidumping legislation is a form of protectionism that should be reformed or even abolished.

For further research, I suggest to improve the weaknesses of this study and examine the relationship of several other macroeconomic factors that represent the domestic economic situation and the international power position to antidumping procedures. Another interesting research topic would be the international political reasons for antidumping. This would entail research not from the side of the reporting countries, but from the affected countries’ perspective. A very important aspect in analyzing affected countries will be the success rate of antidumping investigations. This means how many antidumping initiations are realized successfully in antidumping measures. If cases – countries - for analysis were chosen by how strongly they are affected by antidumping procedures initiated against them by other countries, they would be chosen by the dependent variable. This can be avoided by choosing them by success rate. Yet another point for further investigation would be the internal political influences on antidumping actions. This would be feasible when examining a certain industry.

In sum, I agree with Lindsey who states that “WTO-legalized protectionism” is a

“major loophole in the free-trade disciplines of the world trading system” (Lindsey 1999,

5). Combining the protectionist character of antidumping and its negative effects, one has to question its existence. My research bolsters the position taken by observers such as McGee (2002) to Abolish the Antidumping Laws. In McGee’s words, there is no way

Page 53 of 72 Christiane Haberl Antidumping as a Form of Protectionism Master Thesis to reform the legislation because “Antidumping laws are a form of protectionism”

(McGee 2002, 50). I can only concur.

Page 54 of 72 Christiane Haberl Antidumping as a Form of Protectionism Master Thesis

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Page 58 of 72 Christiane Haberl Antidumping as a Form of Protectionism Master Thesis

Appendix

Data for Antidumping Initiations

Argentina 1995 27 6400 6.70 -.0156 .0829 Argentina 1996 22 7230 10.10 -.0244 .0943 Argentina 1997 14 7720 12.10 -.0312 .1075 Argentina 1998 8 7510 18.80 -.0043 .1026 Argentina 1999 24 7910 17.20 -.0068 .1130 Argentina 2000 45 8340 14.90 -.0229 .1305 Argentina 2001 26 8230 12.80 -.0261 .1326 Argentina 2002 14 7780 14.10 -.0179 .1184 Australia 1995 5 18640 10.50 -.0053 .1918 Australia 1996 17 18430 10.70 -.0055 .1970 Australia 1997 42 18610 9.20 -.0221 .2155 Australia 1998 13 19610 8.10 -.0041 .2091 Australia 1999 24 21260 8.40 .0031 .2028 Australia 2000 15 22030 8.40 -.0087 .2181 Australia 2001 23 21240 7.80 -.0252 .2205 Australia 2002 16 20860 7.00 -.0234 .2299 Brazil 1995 5 2810 6.50 .0253 .0855 Brazil 1996 18 2780 6.20 .0144 .0932 Brazil 1997 11 3100 99.00 .0036 .0932 Brazil 1998 18 3700 6.10 -.0179 .0964 Brazil 1999 16 4320 7.00 -.0209 .0932 Brazil 2000 11 4740 7.80 -.0267 .1035 Brazil 2001 17 4610 9.00 -.0268 .1017 Brazil 2002 9 3930 9.60 -.0160 .1225 Bulgaria 1995 0 1430 15.30 -.0592 .5382 Bulgaria 1996 0 1250 21.40 -.0775 .4665 Bulgaria 1997 0 1250 20.00 -.0064 .4664 Bulgaria 1998 0 1370 15.70 -.0165 .4781 Bulgaria 1999 0 1210 13.50 .0563 .5206 Bulgaria 2000 0 1200 13.70 .0474 .5556 Bulgaria 2001 0 1270 12.20 .0024 .4793 Bulgaria 2002 1 1450 14.10 -.0585 .5106 Canada 1995 11 20470 11.20 -.0046 .2885 Canada 1996 5 20250 11.40 -.0007 .3169 Canada 1997 14 19960 10.40 .0118 .3449 Canada 1998 8 19970 9.40 .0328 .3581 Canada 1999 18 19910 9.60 .0418 .3601 Canada 2000 21 20380 9.10 .0199 .3924 Canada 2001 25 20000 8.30 .0200 .4133 Canada 2002 5 20600 7.60 .0353 .4135 Chile 1995 4 2900 4.40 .0143 .3069 Chile 1996 3 3170 4.50 -.0254 .3114 Chile 1997 0 3410 5.90 .0139 .2946 Chile 1998 2 4040 4.70 .0190 .2997 Chile 1999 0 4560 5.40 -.0224 .3215 Chile 2000 5 4970 5.30 -.0283 .3202 Chile 2001 0 4890 7.20 -.0492 .3237 Chile 2002 0 4730 8.90 .0173 .2582 China P.R. 1995 99 390 2.30 .0154 .1795 China P.R. 1996 99 410 2.60 -.0152 .1864

Page 59 of 72 Christiane Haberl Antidumping as a Form of Protectionism Master Thesis

China P.R. 1997 99 450 2.80 .0188 .2349 China P.R. 1998 99 520 2.90 .0234 .2206 China P.R. 1999 99 620 3.00 .0218 .1917 China P.R. 2000 9 710 3.00 .0483 .1853 China P.R. 2001 12 740 3.10 .0472 .1760 China P.R. 2002 11 780 3.10 .0314 .1948 Colombia 1995 4 1250 9.20 .0204 .1645 Colombia 1996 1 1360 7.80 -.0241 .1941 Colombia 1997 1 1690 7.60 -.0603 .2130 Colombia 1998 6 2080 8.70 -.0654 .2133 Colombia 1999 2 2390 12.00 -.0577 .2129 Colombia 2000 3 2500 12.10 -.0605 .2123 Colombia 2001 6 2410 15.00 -.0600 .2128 Colombia 2002 0 2190 20.10 .0055 .1812 Costa Rica 1995 0 2400 4.10 -.0475 .4086 Costa Rica 1996 4 2810 4.10 -.0663 .4331 Costa Rica 1997 1 3070 4.20 -.0565 .4170 Costa Rica 1998 1 3290 5.20 -.0287 .4116 Costa Rica 1999 0 3360 6.20 -.0353 .4346 Costa Rica 2000 0 3490 5.70 -.0392 .4547 Costa Rica 2001 0 3590 5.60 -.0285 .5183 Costa Rica 2002 0 3580 6.00 .0647 .5194 Czech Republic 1995 0 2900 2.60 .0090 .5356 Czech Republic 1996 0 2970 4.30 .0153 .5449 Czech Republic 1997 0 3540 4.30 -.0268 .5319 Czech Republic 1998 2 4400 4.00 -.0477 .5851 Czech Republic 1999 1 5150 3.90 -.0649 .5969 Czech Republic 2000 0 5280 4.80 -.0604 .6343 Czech Republic 2001 0 5160 6.50 -.0122 .6114 Czech Republic 2002 0 5120 8.70 -.0131 .6343 Ecuador 1995 0 1040 8.90 .0526 .3385 Ecuador 1996 0 1140 8.30 -.0169 .2830 Ecuador 1997 0 1350 7.10 -.0180 .2775 Ecuador 1998 1 1590 6.90 -.0265 .2961 Ecuador 1999 0 1730 10.40 .0241 .2531 Ecuador 2000 0 1830 9.20 -.0009 .2688 Ecuador 2001 0 1800 11.50 -.0724 .2986 Ecuador 2002 0 1480 14.00 .0713 .2708 Egypt 1995 0 790 9.00 -.0283 .3208 Egypt 1996 0 800 10.90 -.0304 .3107 Egypt 1997 7 880 11.00 -.0521 .2821 Egypt 1998 12 990 11.30 -.0504 .2744 Egypt 1999 5 1100 99.00 -.0574 .2575 Egypt 2000 1 1200 8.40 -.0618 .2541 Egypt 2001 7 1270 8.20 -.0967 .2619 Egypt 2002 3 1370 8.10 -.0831 .2347 European Community 1995 33 19783 8.05 -.0015 .2493 European Community 1996 25 19373 9.41 .0109 .2428 European Community 1997 41 19898 9.59 .0126 .2552 European Community 1998 22 21171 9.07 .0153 .2694 European Community 1999 65 22707 9.13 .0188 .2702 European Community 2000 32 23103 8.57 .0216 .2857 European Community 2001 29 22441 7.80 .0169 .2933 European Community 2002 20 22387 7.12 .0105 .3010 Guatemala 1995 0 1070 99.00 -.0933 .2759 Guatemala 1996 1 1180 99.00 -.0845 .2632

Page 60 of 72 Christiane Haberl Antidumping as a Form of Protectionism Master Thesis

Guatemala 1997 0 1270 .80 -.0741 .2513 Guatemala 1998 0 1400 99.00 -.0624 .2573 Guatemala 1999 0 1490 99.00 -.0484 .2289 Guatemala 2000 0 1580 99.00 -.0571 .2390 Guatemala 2001 0 1660 1.90 -.0815 .2648 Guatemala 2002 0 1690 99.00 -.0843 .2763 India 1995 6 330 99.00 -.0077 .0991 India 1996 21 310 99.00 .0002 .1015 India 1997 13 330 99.00 -.0031 .1047 India 1998 27 380 99.00 -.0121 .1234 India 1999 65 410 99.00 -.0119 .1188 India 2000 41 420 99.00 -.0127 .1221 India 2001 79 420 99.00 -.0171 .1302 India 2002 79 440 99.00 -.0198 .1383 Indonesia 1995 0 680 99.00 .0335 .2848 Indonesia 1996 11 810 99.00 .0310 .2471 Indonesia 1997 5 900 99.00 .0118 .2606 Indonesia 1998 8 1010 99.00 -.0137 .2848 Indonesia 1999 8 1120 4.00 -.0063 .2717 Indonesia 2000 3 1120 4.70 -.0028 .2898 Indonesia 2001 4 670 5.50 .1033 .4580 Indonesia 2002 4 590 6.40 .0875 .2969 Israel 1995 5 12590 11.20 -.1398 .4523 Israel 1996 6 13070 10.00 -.1638 .4935 Israel 1997 3 13830 7.80 -.1558 .4869 Israel 1998 7 14750 6.90 -.1484 .4662 Israel 1999 0 16450 6.70 -.1369 .4412 Israel 2000 1 17070 7.70 -.1051 .4194 Israel 2001 4 16730 8.50 -.0785 .4054 Israel 2002 0 16470 8.90 -.0808 .4566 Jamaica 1995 0 1610 15.40 -.0103 .6904 Jamaica 1996 0 1680 16.30 -.0927 .6264 Jamaica 1997 0 1690 15.40 -.0706 .6571 Jamaica 1998 0 1960 16.20 -.1163 .6889 Jamaica 1999 0 2150 16.00 -.1268 .6097 Jamaica 2000 1 2370 99.00 -.1404 .5702 Jamaica 2001 1 2450 99.00 -.1116 .5623 Jamaica 2002 1 2610 15.70 -.0929 .5573 Japan 1995 0 29800 2.20 .0214 .0758 Japan 1996 0 32830 2.50 .0219 .0680 Japan 1997 0 36280 2.90 .0199 .0694 Japan 1998 0 40950 3.20 .0138 .0761 Japan 1999 0 42030 3.40 .0049 .0909 Japan 2000 0 39280 3.40 .0109 .0950 Japan 2001 2 33780 4.10 .0180 .0871 Japan 2002 0 33170 4.70 .0153 .0839 Korea, Rep. of 1995 4 7340 2.50 -.0149 .2918 Korea, Rep. of 1996 13 7920 2.90 .0005 .2753 Korea, Rep. of 1997 15 8810 2.50 -.0114 .2902 Korea, Rep. of 1998 3 10220 2.10 -.0148 .3176 Korea, Rep. of 1999 6 11370 2.00 -.0412 .3372 Korea, Rep. of 2000 2 11400 2.60 -.0102 .3594 Korea, Rep. of 2001 4 8500 7.00 .1370 .3691 Korea, Rep. of 2002 10 8530 6.30 .0695 .3594 Latvia 1995 99 99 2.30 .0687 .7299 Latvia 1996 99 1710 5.80 .1578 .5663

Page 61 of 72 Christiane Haberl Antidumping as a Form of Protectionism Master Thesis

Latvia 1997 99 1820 6.50 .0162 .4422 Latvia 1998 0 1910 18.90 -.0242 .4949 Latvia 1999 0 2060 18.30 -.0808 .5896 Latvia 2000 0 2290 14.40 -.0843 .5898 Latvia 2001 1 2430 13.80 -.1339 .6420 Latvia 2002 6 2570 14.50 -.1041 .5469 Malaysia 1995 3 2860 3.70 .0143 .7881 Malaysia 1996 2 3210 3.00 -.0010 .8300 Malaysia 1997 8 3580 99.00 -.0168 .9535 Malaysia 1998 1 4030 2.80 -.0413 1.0282 Malaysia 1999 2 4480 2.50 .0145 .9459 Malaysia 2000 0 4600 2.50 .0097 .9760 Malaysia 2001 1 3630 3.20 .2325 .9911 Malaysia 2002 5 3370 3.40 .2696 1.0360 Mexico 1995 4 3820 3.10 -.0517 .2082 Mexico 1996 4 4230 3.20 -.0404 .1973 Mexico 1997 6 4590 4.20 -.0498 .2234 Mexico 1998 12 3800 5.80 .0279 .2911 Mexico 1999 11 3660 4.30 .0215 .3139 Mexico 2000 7 3710 3.40 -.0011 .3142 Mexico 2001 5 4020 2.90 -.0221 .3390 Mexico 2002 10 4450 2.10 -.0166 .3330 New Zealand 1995 10 11730 10.30 .0260 .3098 New Zealand 1996 4 11950 9.50 .0314 .2998 New Zealand 1997 5 12740 8.10 .0200 .3113 New Zealand 1998 1 14330 6.30 .0082 .3048 New Zealand 1999 4 15780 6.10 .0058 .3002 New Zealand 2000 10 16530 6.60 .0037 .2987 New Zealand 2001 1 15310 7.50 .0033 .3106 New Zealand 2002 2 14640 6.80 -.0096 .3429 Nicaragua 1995 0 260 14.40 -.4977 .7361 Nicaragua 1996 0 320 23.30 -.3543 .6181 Nicaragua 1997 0 320 18.60 -.3841 .7282 Nicaragua 1998 2 350 16.90 -.3512 .7499 Nicaragua 1999 0 360 14.90 -.4372 .8120 Nicaragua 2000 0 370 13.30 -.5124 .9448 Nicaragua 2001 0 380 13.30 -.4801 .8848 Nicaragua 2002 0 400 10.90 -.6298 1.0093 Panama 1995 0 2550 14.70 -.0108 .3954 Panama 1996 0 2750 13.30 -.0019 .3832 Panama 1997 0 2910 14.00 .0119 .3895 Panama 1998 3 2940 14.00 -.0209 .4091 Panama 1999 0 3150 14.30 -.0135 .3715 Panama 2000 0 3290 13.40 -.0351 .4027 Panama 2001 0 3590 13.60 -.0804 .3770 Panama 2002 0 3680 11.80 -.0589 .3681 Paraguay 1995 0 1450 5.30 -.1058 .3885 Paraguay 1996 0 1580 5.10 -.1085 .4748 Paraguay 1997 0 1670 4.40 -.1831 .5205 Paraguay 1998 0 1840 3.40 -.1619 .5060 Paraguay 1999 1 1960 8.20 -.1604 .4453 Paraguay 2000 0 1980 99.00 -.1615 .4327 Paraguay 2001 0 1810 5.40 -.1691 .4511 Paraguay 2002 0 1650 6.80 -.1371 .3663 Peru 1995 2 1450 9.40 -.0305 .1599 Peru 1996 7 1590 9.90 -.0401 .1694

Page 62 of 72 Christiane Haberl Antidumping as a Form of Protectionism Master Thesis

Peru 1997 2 1810 8.90 -.0351 .1676 Peru 1998 3 2030 7.00 -.0588 .1881 Peru 1999 8 2220 7.00 -.0508 .1856 Peru 2000 1 2360 7.70 -.0451 .1899 Peru 2001 8 2210 7.80 -.0553 .1919 Peru 2002 6 2080 8.00 -.0240 .1774 Philippines 1995 1 790 8.60 -.0482 .3345 Philippines 1996 1 840 8.90 -.0830 .3912 Philippines 1997 2 940 8.40 -.0615 .3913 Philippines 1998 3 1040 8.40 -.0761 .4299 Philippines 1999 6 1190 7.40 -.0843 .4734 Philippines 2000 2 1240 7.90 -.0992 .5687 Philippines 2001 0 1080 9.60 -.0631 .5591 Philippines 2002 1 1040 9.60 .0015 .4870 Poland 1995 0 1910 13.30 .0156 .2261 Poland 1996 0 2270 14.00 .0099 .2230 Poland 1997 1 2490 14.40 .0220 .2208 Poland 1998 0 2790 13.30 .0239 .2340 Poland 1999 7 3200 12.40 -.0157 .2604 Poland 2000 0 3560 11.20 -.0435 .3004 Poland 2001 0 3860 10.70 -.0528 .3365 Poland 2002 3 4060 12.50 -.0640 .3271 Singapor 1995 0 15370 2.70 99.0000 99.0000 Singapor 1996 0 17440 2.70 99.0000 99.0000 Singapor 1997 0 20420 2.60 99.0000 99.0000 Singapor 1998 0 23230 2.70 99.0000 99.0000 Singapor 1999 0 25150 3.00 99.0000 99.0000 Singapor 2000 0 27140 2.40 99.0000 99.0000 Singapor 2001 0 23510 3.20 99.0000 99.0000 Singapor 2002 0 22660 4.60 99.0000 99.0000 Slovenia 1995 0 99 11.50 .0701 .5659 Slovenia 1996 0 99 9.10 .0109 .5790 Slovenia 1997 0 99 9.00 .0256 .5565 Slovenia 1998 0 8280 7.40 -.0200 .5661 Slovenia 1999 1 9310 7.30 -.0103 .5634 Slovenia 2000 0 9890 7.10 -.0082 .5802 Slovenia 2001 0 9740 7.70 -.0152 .5800 Slovenia 2002 0 10010 7.40 -.0441 .5676 South Africa 1995 16 3320 99.00 .0412 .1770 South Africa 1996 33 3460 99.00 .0375 .1819 South Africa 1997 23 3610 4.40 .0234 .2022 South Africa 1998 41 3740 4.50 .0089 .2252 South Africa 1999 16 3760 5.10 .0140 .2371 South Africa 2000 21 3680 5.40 .0115 .2395 South Africa 2001 6 3290 25.20 .0119 .2517 South Africa 2002 4 3120 25.30 .0269 .2366 Thailand 1995 0 1900 1.40 -.0410 .4191 Thailand 1996 1 2140 1.50 -.0430 .4282 Thailand 1997 3 2410 1.30 -.0492 .4440 Thailand 1998 0 2760 1.10 -.0685 .4939 Thailand 1999 0 3010 1.10 -.0642 .4656 Thailand 2000 0 2770 .90 .0145 .4784 Thailand 2001 3 2110 3.40 .1646 .4453 Thailand 2002 21 2000 3.00 .1292 .4701 Trinidad and Tobago 1995 0 4030 19.60 .1016 .3748 Trinidad and Tobago 1996 1 3830 19.80 .0525 .4210

Page 63 of 72 Christiane Haberl Antidumping as a Form of Protectionism Master Thesis

Trinidad and Tobago 1997 0 3800 18.40 .1463 .3564 Trinidad and Tobago 1998 4 3870 17.20 .1593 .4298 Trinidad and Tobago 1999 3 4120 16.20 .1126 .4533 Trinidad and Tobago 2000 1 4330 15.00 -.0370 .6076 Trinidad and Tobago 2001 1 4540 14.20 -.0563 .5648 Trinidad and Tobago 2002 0 4740 13.10 .0582 .4621 Turkey 1995 0 2900 8.30 -.0293 .1718 Turkey 1996 0 3080 8.70 -.0563 .1919 Turkey 1997 4 2600 8.40 .0097 .2028 Turkey 1998 1 2750 7.50 -.0441 .2406 Turkey 1999 8 2820 6.50 -.0587 .2709 Turkey 2000 7 3100 6.70 -.0569 .2981 Turkey 2001 16 3060 6.80 -.0348 .2723 Turkey 2002 9 2800 7.70 -.0361 .2657 United States 1995 14 24990 7.50 -.0043 .1065 United States 1996 22 25800 6.90 -.0091 .1098 United States 1997 15 27000 6.10 -.0125 .1168 United States 1998 36 28260 5.60 -.0115 .1231 United States 1999 47 29200 5.40 -.0114 .1245 United States 2000 47 30030 4.90 -.0108 .1282 United States 2001 76 30700 4.50 -.0173 .1277 United States 2002 35 32250 4.20 -.0269 .1336 Uruguay 1995 0 3830 9.00 .0084 .1998 Uruguay 1996 0 4350 8.30 -.0044 .1988 Uruguay 1997 1 5040 9.20 -.0063 .2076 Uruguay 1998 0 5540 10.20 -.0011 .1941 Uruguay 1999 0 6170 99.00 -.0019 .2014 Uruguay 2000 1 6570 99.00 .0001 .2083 Uruguay 2001 4 6620 10.10 -.0074 .2087 Uruguay 2002 0 6320 11.30 -.0128 .1958 Venezuela 1995 3 2890 7.70 -.0262 .2979 Venezuela 1996 2 2860 6.70 -.0023 .2800 Venezuela 1997 6 2760 8.70 .0884 .2305 Venezuela 1998 10 3060 10.30 .0543 .2238 Venezuela 1999 7 3110 11.80 .1557 .2186 Venezuela 2000 1 3520 11.40 .0685 .2234 Venezuela 2001 1 3540 11.20 -.0124 .2154 Venezuela 2002 1 3730 14.90 .0537 .1660

Data for Antidumping Measures

Argentin 1995 13 6400 6.70 -.0156 .0829 Argentin 1996 20 7230 10.10 -.0244 .0943 Argentin 1997 11 7720 12.10 -.0312 .1075 Argentin 1998 12 7510 18.80 -.0043 .1026 Argentin 1999 9 7910 17.20 -.0068 .1130 Argentin 2000 16 8340 14.90 -.0229 .1305 Argentin 2001 15 8230 12.80 -.0261 .1326 Argentin 2002 24 7780 14.10 -.0179 .1184 Australi 1995 1 18640 10.50 -.0053 .1918 Australi 1996 1 18430 10.70 -.0055 .1970 Australi 1997 1 18610 9.20 -.0221 .2155 Australi 1998 7 19610 8.10 -.0041 .2091 Australi 1999 6 21260 8.40 .0031 .2028 Australi 2000 5 22030 8.40 -.0087 .2181

Page 64 of 72 Christiane Haberl Antidumping as a Form of Protectionism Master Thesis

Australi 2001 10 21240 7.80 -.0252 .2205 Australi 2002 9 20860 7.00 -.0234 .2299 Brazil 1995 2 2810 6.50 .0253 .0855 Brazil 1996 6 2780 6.20 .0144 .0932 Brazil 1997 2 3100 99.00 .0036 .0932 Brazil 1998 14 3700 6.10 -.0179 .0964 Brazil 1999 5 4320 7.00 -.0209 .0932 Brazil 2000 9 4740 7.80 -.0267 .1035 Brazil 2001 13 4610 9.00 -.0268 .1017 Brazil 2002 4 3930 9.60 -.0160 .1225 Canada 1995 7 20470 11.20 -.0046 .2885 Canada 1996 0 20250 11.40 -.0007 .3169 Canada 1997 7 19960 10.40 .0118 .3449 Canada 1998 10 19970 9.40 .0328 .3581 Canada 1999 10 19910 9.60 .0418 .3601 Canada 2000 14 20380 9.10 .0199 .3924 Canada 2001 19 20000 8.30 .0200 .4133 Canada 2002 0 20600 7.60 .0353 .4135 Chile 1995 2 2900 4.40 .0143 .3069 Chile 1996 0 3170 4.50 -.0254 .3114 Chile 1997 2 3410 5.90 .0139 .2946 Chile 1998 2 4040 4.70 .0190 .2997 Chile 1999 0 4560 5.40 -.0224 .3215 Chile 2000 0 4970 5.30 -.0283 .3202 Chile 2001 0 4890 7.20 -.0492 .3237 Chile 2002 0 4730 8.90 .0173 .2582 China, P 1995 99 390 2.30 .0154 .1795 China, P 1996 99 410 2.60 -.0152 .1864 China, P 1997 99 450 2.80 .0188 .2349 China, P 1998 99 520 2.90 .0234 .2206 China, P 1999 99 620 3.00 .0218 .1917 China, P 2000 0 710 3.00 .0483 .1853 China, P 2001 0 740 3.10 .0472 .1760 China, P 2002 7 780 3.10 .0314 .1948 Colombia 1995 1 1250 9.20 .0204 .1645 Colombia 1996 1 1360 7.80 -.0241 .1941 Colombia 1997 1 1690 7.60 -.0603 .2130 Colombia 1998 0 2080 8.70 -.0654 .2133 Colombia 1999 6 2390 12.00 -.0577 .2129 Colombia 2000 2 2500 12.10 -.0605 .2123 Colombia 2001 0 2410 15.00 -.0600 .2128 Colombia 2002 0 2190 20.10 .0055 .1812 Czech Re 1995 0 2900 2.60 .0090 .5356 Czech Re 1996 0 2970 4.30 .0153 .5449 Czech Re 1997 0 3540 4.30 -.0268 .5319 Czech Re 1998 0 4400 4.00 -.0477 .5851 Czech Re 1999 0 5150 3.90 -.0649 .5969 Czech Re 2000 1 5280 4.80 -.0604 .6343 Czech Re 2001 0 5160 6.50 -.0122 .6114 Czech Re 2002 0 5120 8.70 -.0131 .6343 Egypt 1995 0 790 9.00 -.0283 .3208 Egypt 1996 0 800 10.90 -.0304 .3107 Egypt 1997 0 880 11.00 -.0521 .2821 Egypt 1998 5 990 11.30 -.0504 .2744 Egypt 1999 13 1100 99.00 -.0574 .2575 Egypt 2000 0 1200 8.40 -.0618 .2541

Page 65 of 72 Christiane Haberl Antidumping as a Form of Protectionism Master Thesis

Egypt 2001 0 1270 8.20 -.0967 .2619 Egypt 2002 7 1370 8.10 -.0831 .2347 European 1995 14 19783 8.05 -.0015 .2493 European 1996 17 19373 9.41 .0109 .2428 European 1997 11 19898 9.59 .0126 .2552 European 1998 25 21171 9.07 .0153 .2694 European 1999 18 22707 9.13 .0188 .2702 European 2000 41 23103 8.57 .0216 .2857 European 2001 13 22441 7.80 .0169 .2933 European 2002 25 22387 7.12 .0105 .3010 Guatemal 1995 0 1070 99.00 -.0933 .2759 Guatemal 1996 0 1180 99.00 -.0845 .2632 Guatemal 1997 1 1270 .80 -.0741 .2513 Guatemal 1998 0 1400 99.00 -.0624 .2573 Guatemal 1999 0 1490 99.00 -.0484 .2289 Guatemal 2000 0 1580 99.00 -.0571 .2390 Guatemal 2001 0 1660 1.90 -.0815 .2648 Guatemal 2002 0 1690 99.00 -.0843 .2763 India 1995 7 330 99.00 -.0077 .0991 India 1996 2 310 99.00 .0002 .1015 India 1997 8 330 99.00 -.0031 .1047 India 1998 22 380 99.00 -.0121 .1234 India 1999 22 410 99.00 -.0119 .1188 India 2000 57 420 99.00 -.0127 .1221 India 2001 38 420 99.00 -.0171 .1302 India 2002 63 440 99.00 -.0198 .1383 Indonesi 1995 0 680 99.00 .0335 .2848 Indonesi 1996 0 810 99.00 .0310 .2471 Indonesi 1997 4 900 99.00 .0118 .2606 Indonesi 1998 2 1010 99.00 -.0137 .2848 Indonesi 1999 7 1120 4.00 -.0063 .2717 Indonesi 2000 0 1120 4.70 -.0028 .2898 Indonesi 2001 1 670 5.50 .1033 .4580 Indonesi 2002 0 590 6.40 .0875 .2969 Israel 1995 1 12590 11.20 -.1398 .4523 Israel 1996 0 13070 10.00 -.1638 .4935 Israel 1997 0 13830 7.80 -.1558 .4869 Israel 1998 6 14750 6.90 -.1484 .4662 Israel 1999 4 16450 6.70 -.1369 .4412 Israel 2000 0 17070 7.70 -.1051 .4194 Israel 2001 1 16730 8.50 -.0785 .4054 Israel 2002 0 16470 8.90 -.0808 .4566 Jamaica 1995 0 1610 15.40 -.0103 .6904 Jamaica 1996 0 1680 16.30 -.0927 .6264 Jamaica 1997 0 1690 15.40 -.0706 .6571 Jamaica 1998 0 1960 16.20 -.1163 .6889 Jamaica 1999 0 2150 16.00 -.1268 .6097 Jamaica 2000 0 2370 99.00 -.1404 .5702 Jamaica 2001 1 2450 99.00 -.1116 .5623 Jamaica 2002 2 2610 15.70 -.0929 .5573 Japan 1995 1 29800 2.20 .0214 .0758 Japan 1996 0 32830 2.50 .0219 .0680 Japan 1997 0 36280 2.90 .0199 .0694 Japan 1998 0 40950 3.20 .0138 .0761 Japan 1999 0 42030 3.40 .0049 .0909 Japan 2000 0 39280 3.40 .0109 .0950

Page 66 of 72 Christiane Haberl Antidumping as a Form of Protectionism Master Thesis

Japan 2001 0 33780 4.10 .0180 .0871 Japan 2002 2 33170 4.70 .0153 .0839 Korea, R 1995 0 7340 2.50 -.0149 .2918 Korea, R 1996 5 7920 2.90 .0005 .2753 Korea, R 1997 10 8810 2.50 -.0114 .2902 Korea, R 1998 8 10220 2.10 -.0148 .3176 Korea, R 1999 0 11370 2.00 -.0412 .3372 Korea, R 2000 5 11400 2.60 -.0102 .3594 Korea, R 2001 0 8500 7.00 .1370 .3691 Korea, R 2002 1 8530 6.30 .0695 .3594 Latvia 1995 99 99 2.30 .0687 .7299 Latvia 1996 99 1710 5.80 .1578 .5663 Latvia 1997 99 1820 6.50 .0162 .4422 Latvia 1998 0 1910 18.90 -.0242 .4949 Latvia 1999 0 2060 18.30 -.0808 .5896 Latvia 2000 0 2290 14.40 -.0843 .5898 Latvia 2001 0 2430 13.80 -.1339 .6420 Latvia 2002 1 2570 14.50 -.1041 .5469 Malaysia 1995 0 2860 3.70 .0143 .7881 Malaysia 1996 2 3210 3.00 -.0010 .8300 Malaysia 1997 2 3580 99.00 -.0168 .9535 Malaysia 1998 4 4030 2.80 -.0413 1.0282 Malaysia 1999 1 4480 2.50 .0145 .9459 Malaysia 2000 1 4600 2.50 .0097 .9760 Malaysia 2001 0 3630 3.20 .2325 .9911 Malaysia 2002 1 3370 3.40 .2696 1.0360 Mexico 1995 16 3820 3.10 -.0517 .2082 Mexico 1996 4 4230 3.20 -.0404 .1973 Mexico 1997 7 4590 4.20 -.0498 .2234 Mexico 1998 7 3800 5.80 .0279 .2911 Mexico 1999 7 3660 4.30 .0215 .3139 Mexico 2000 7 3710 3.40 -.0011 .3142 Mexico 2001 3 4020 2.90 -.0221 .3390 Mexico 2002 4 4450 2.10 -.0166 .3330 New Zeal 1995 3 11730 10.30 .0260 .3098 New Zeal 1996 4 11950 9.50 .0314 .2998 New Zeal 1997 0 12740 8.10 .0200 .3113 New Zeal 1998 1 14330 6.30 .0082 .3048 New Zeal 1999 0 15780 6.10 .0058 .3002 New Zeal 2000 1 16530 6.60 .0037 .2987 New Zeal 2001 2 15310 7.50 .0033 .3106 New Zeal 2002 0 14640 6.80 -.0096 .3429 Nicaragu 1995 0 260 14.40 -.4977 .7361 Nicaragu 1996 0 320 23.30 -.3543 .6181 Nicaragu 1997 0 320 18.60 -.3841 .7282 Nicaragu 1998 0 350 16.90 -.3512 .7499 Nicaragu 1999 1 360 14.90 -.4372 .8120 Nicaragu 2000 0 370 13.30 -.5124 .9448 Nicaragu 2001 0 380 13.30 -.4801 .8848 Nicaragu 2002 0 400 10.90 -.6298 1.0093 Paraguay 1995 0 1450 5.30 -.1058 .3885 Paraguay 1996 0 1580 5.10 -.1085 .4748 Paraguay 1997 0 1670 4.40 -.1831 .5205 Paraguay 1998 0 1840 3.40 -.1619 .5060 Paraguay 1999 1 1960 8.20 -.1604 .4453 Paraguay 2000 0 1980 99.00 -.1615 .4327

Page 67 of 72 Christiane Haberl Antidumping as a Form of Protectionism Master Thesis

Paraguay 2001 0 1810 5.40 -.1691 .4511 Paraguay 2002 0 1650 6.80 -.1371 .3663 Peru 1995 2 1450 9.40 -.0305 .1599 Peru 1996 1 1590 9.90 -.0401 .1694 Peru 1997 2 1810 8.90 -.0351 .1676 Peru 1998 0 2030 7.00 -.0588 .1881 Peru 1999 3 2220 7.00 -.0508 .1856 Peru 2000 4 2360 7.70 -.0451 .1899 Peru 2001 1 2210 7.80 -.0553 .1919 Peru 2002 4 2080 8.00 -.0240 .1774 Philippi 1995 0 790 8.60 -.0482 .3345 Philippi 1996 2 840 8.90 -.0830 .3912 Philippi 1997 0 940 8.40 -.0615 .3913 Philippi 1998 1 1040 8.40 -.0761 .4299 Philippi 1999 3 1190 7.40 -.0843 .4734 Philippi 2000 3 1240 7.90 -.0992 .5687 Philippi 2001 0 1080 9.60 -.0631 .5591 Philippi 2002 0 1040 9.60 .0015 .4870 Poland 1995 0 1910 13.30 .0156 .2261 Poland 1996 0 2270 14.00 .0099 .2230 Poland 1997 0 2490 14.40 .0220 .2208 Poland 1998 1 2790 13.30 .0239 .2340 Poland 1999 0 3200 12.40 -.0157 .2604 Poland 2000 6 3560 11.20 -.0435 .3004 Poland 2001 0 3860 10.70 -.0528 .3365 Poland 2002 0 4060 12.50 -.0640 .3271 Singapor 1995 2 15370 2.70 99.0000 99.0000 Singapor 1996 0 17440 2.70 99.0000 99.0000 Singapor 1997 0 20420 2.60 99.0000 99.0000 Singapor 1998 0 23230 2.70 99.0000 99.0000 Singapor 1999 0 25150 3.00 99.0000 99.0000 Singapor 2000 0 27140 2.40 99.0000 99.0000 Singapor 2001 0 23510 3.20 99.0000 99.0000 Singapor 2002 0 22660 4.60 99.0000 99.0000 South Af 1995 0 3320 99.00 .0412 .1770 South Af 1996 8 3460 99.00 .0375 .1819 South Af 1997 18 3610 4.40 .0234 .2022 South Af 1998 14 3740 4.50 .0089 .2252 South Af 1999 34 3760 5.10 .0140 .2371 South Af 2000 13 3680 5.40 .0115 .2395 South Af 2001 5 3290 25.20 .0119 .2517 South Af 2002 15 3120 25.30 .0269 .2366 Thailand 1995 0 1900 1.40 -.0410 .4191 Thailand 1996 0 2140 1.50 -.0430 .4282 Thailand 1997 1 2410 1.30 -.0492 .4440 Thailand 1998 2 2760 1.10 -.0685 .4939 Thailand 1999 0 3010 1.10 -.0642 .4656 Thailand 2000 0 2770 .90 .0145 .4784 Thailand 2001 0 2110 3.40 .1646 .4453 Thailand 2002 1 2000 3.00 .1292 .4701 Trinidad 1995 0 4030 19.60 .1016 .3748 Trinidad 1996 0 3830 19.80 .0525 .4210 Trinidad 1997 0 3800 18.40 .1463 .3564 Trinidad 1998 2 3870 17.20 .1593 .4298 Trinidad 1999 0 4120 16.20 .1126 .4533 Trinidad 2000 1 4330 15.00 -.0370 .6076

Page 68 of 72 Christiane Haberl Antidumping as a Form of Protectionism Master Thesis

Trinidad 2001 2 4540 14.20 -.0563 .5648 Trinidad 2002 0 4740 13.10 .0582 .4621 Turkey 1995 11 2900 8.30 -.0293 .1718 Turkey 1996 0 3080 8.70 -.0563 .1919 Turkey 1997 0 2600 8.40 .0097 .2028 Turkey 1998 0 2750 7.50 -.0441 .2406 Turkey 1999 1 2820 6.50 -.0587 .2709 Turkey 2000 8 3100 6.70 -.0569 .2981 Turkey 2001 2 3060 6.80 -.0348 .2723 Turkey 2002 11 2800 7.70 -.0361 .2657 United S 1995 33 24990 7.50 -.0043 .1065 United S 1996 11 25800 6.90 -.0091 .1098 United S 1997 20 27000 6.10 -.0125 .1168 United S 1998 16 28260 5.60 -.0115 .1231 United S 1999 24 29200 5.40 -.0114 .1245 United S 2000 32 30030 4.90 -.0108 .1282 United S 2001 33 30700 4.50 -.0173 .1277 United S 2002 23 32250 4.20 -.0269 .1336 Uruguay 1995 0 3830 9.00 .0084 .1998 Uruguay 1996 0 4350 8.30 -.0044 .1988 Uruguay 1997 0 5040 9.20 -.0063 .2076 Uruguay 1998 1 5540 10.20 -.0011 .1941 Uruguay 1999 0 6170 99.00 -.0019 .2014 Uruguay 2000 0 6570 99.00 .0001 .2083 Uruguay 2001 0 6620 10.10 -.0074 .2087 Uruguay 2002 0 6320 11.30 -.0128 .1958 Venezuel 1995 2 2890 7.70 -.0262 .2979 Venezuel 1996 0 2860 6.70 -.0023 .2800 Venezuel 1997 4 2760 8.70 .0884 .2305 Venezuel 1998 0 3060 10.30 .0543 .2238 Venezuel 1999 8 3110 11.80 .1557 .2186 Venezuel 2000 9 3520 11.40 .0685 .2234 Venezuel 2001 0 3540 11.20 -.0124 .2154 Venezuel 2002 1 3730 14.90 .0537 .1660

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