UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
x TIMOTHY A. HUTCHINSON, Individually : Civil Action No. 1: 12-cv-01073-HB and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, CLASS ACTION Plaintiff, SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR vs. VIOLATION OF THE FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS ANTONIO M. PEREZ, et al.,
Defendants. DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
806584_i Case 1 :12cv-01073-HB Document 51 FUed 01/23/13 Page 2 of 100
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
1. INTRODUCTION ...... 1
II. JURISDICTION AND VENUE ...... 4
III. PARTIES ...... 4
IV. FACTUAL BACKGROUND ...... 7
V. FRAUDULENT SCHEME AND COURSE OF BUSINESS ...... 14
VI. DEFENDANTS' FALSE AND MISLEADING STATEMENTS AND OMISSIONS ISSUED DURING THE CLASS PERIOD...... 16
A. False and Misleading Statements and Omissions Made in Connection with the Company's July 26, 2011 Press Release and Earnings Conference Call...... 16
B. False and Misleading Statements and Omissions Made in Connection with the Company's September 23, 2011 Press Release ...... 19
C. False and Misleading Statements and Omissions Made in Connection with the Company's November 3, 2011 Press Release and Earnings Conference Call...... 24
D. Defendants' False and Misleading Certifications During the Class Period...... 29
E. The Truth Is Revealed When Kodak Files for Bankruptcy ...... 31
VII. SCIENTER ...... 32
A. Defendants' Restructuring of Kodak's Loan Agreement to Avoid Defaulting on a Debt Covenant Requiring a Minimum Cash Balance in U.S. Is Highly Probative of Scienter...... 34
B. Defendants' Violation of Accounting Standards, SEC Materials and SEC Regulation by Concealing the Fact that Most of Kodak's Cash Was Tied Up Overseas Is Highly Probative of Scienter ...... 36
C. Admissions Made in Defendants' Bankruptcy Filings Are Highly Probative of Scienter...... 39
D. Confidential Witness Statements Supporting that Defendants Had Access to Facts Directly Contravening Their Public Statements When They Made Them Are Highly Probative of Scienter ...... 45
806584_i Page
1. Confidential Witness Allegations Support that Defendants Were Informed that the Company's Core Business Was Failing Before September30, 2011 ...... 45
2. Confidential Witness Allegations Support that Kodak's Reduction of Investment in Inkjet and Hiring of Jones Day in September Was "Internally Viewed as Pulling the Life-Plug from Inklets and Scuttling Kodak into Bankruptcy" ...... 48
3. Confidential Witness Allegations Support that Data Throughout 2010 and 2011 Showed Ink and Inkjet Sales to Be Declining and that Kodak Was Too Large and Moved Too Slowly to Prepare for Bankruptcy in Just a Month ...... 49
4. Confidential Witness Allegations Support that, in Contrast to Perez's Statements to the Contrary, the Sale of Kodak's Digital Imaging Portfolio Was Critical for Kodak to Remain Solvent...... 50
E. Defendants' Certifications Filed with the SEC Are Further Indicative of Scienter...... 51
F. Defendants' Violation of Kodak's Own Policies Further Evidences Scienter...... 51
VIII. LOSS CAUSATION...... 52
IX. NO SAFE HARBOR ...... 54
X. CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS ...... 54
XI. PRAYER FOR RELIEF.. 57 XII. JURY DEMAND 57
806584_i I. INTRODUCTION
1. This is a securities class action for violations of the anti-fraud provisions of the
federal securities laws on behalf of all persons who purchased or otherwise acquired the publicly traded securities of Eastman Kodak Company ("Kodak" or the "Company") between July 26, 2011
and January 19, 2012, inclusive (the "Class Period") and who were damaged thereby (the "Class").
The claims asserted herein are brought against certain of Kodak's officers and/or directors: Antonio
M. Perez ("Perez"), the Company's Chairman of the Board of Directors (the "Board") and Chief
Executive Officer ("CEO"); and Antoinette P. McCorvey ("McCorvey"), the Company's former
Chief Financial Officer ("CFO") and Senior Vice President (collectively, "Defendants").
2. During the Class Period, Defendants engaged in multiple violations of §§ 10(b) and
20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("1934 Act") (15 U.S.C. §78j(b), 78t(a)) and Rule
1 Ob-5 promulgated thereunder by the U. S. Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") (17 C.F.R.
§240.1 Ob-5), by making materially false and misleading public statements and omissions concerning the Company's financial condition. Defendants' misrepresentations and omissions obfuscated
growing problems with Kodak's ability to function as a going concern while artificially inflating the
price of Kodak's publicly traded securities. As the truth was revealed throughout the latter part of
2011 and January 2012, Kodak's stock price plummeted, and the Company's shareholders suffered
millions of dollars in damages.
3. Remarkably, during the Class Period and until November 3, 2011, Defendants made
positive statements about Kodak's financial health while utterly failing to disclose that more than
70% of Kodak's cash was tied up overseas and unavailable to fund domestic operations. This
material omission made many of Defendants' positive statements about Kodak's financial condition
false and misleading. For example, in July 2011, Perez unabashedly assured investors that, "[sb far
-1- 806584_i with the best data we have, we fret very comfortable with the level of cash we have and we feel
very comfortable with the level we will have at the end of the year." In fact, the Company had just
been forced to renegotiate its Amended and Restated Credit Agreement because Kodak had been
dangerously close to violating the covenant's requirement that minimum amounts of cash be held
domestically.
4. On September 26, 2011, on news that Kodak borrowed $160 million from its
revolving credit facility, Defendants misleadingly assured investors that the "purpose" of the loan
was simply "to bridge timing differences between cash outflows and inflows" when it was actually to stave off a liquidity crisis caused by the fact that more than 70% of the Company's cash was tied
up overseas and unavailable to be repatriated - a truth altogether omitted from Defendants'
September disclosures as well.
5. On September 30, 2011, when Kodak disclosed that it had hired a known bankruptcy
firm, Jones Day for restructuring advice, CEO Perez countered the bad news by assuring investors
Kodak had "no intention offiling for bankruptcy." In fact, Kodak had already engaged known
bankruptcy advisors, Lazard Frères & Co. LLC ("Lazard"), and specifically expanded the scope of that engagement on September 12, 2011 to include a possible Chapter 11 filing. Exhibit A at ¶11;
Ex. C at 1 n.4 and accompanying text and at 2-3 (J1.h).i
6. On November 3, 2011, CEO Perez stated, "[mjore than anything, the results ofthis
quarter reflect our continuedprogress toward establishing digital growth businesses that willform
the nucleus of anew Kodak," when Confidential Witnesses ("CW5") explain that, in reality, all of
All exhibits referenced herein are to the bankruptcy proceeding, In re Eastman Kodak Co., No. 12-10202 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.), and are attached hereto unless otherwise indicated.
-2- 806584_i Kodak's main segments were declining, including the core inkjet business which missed every
internal forecast in 2011. Because of the staggering declines, CEO Perez had already "pull[ed] the
life-plug" on that core business by reducing its funding in September 2011.
7. Further, on November 3, 2011, Perez assured investors that Kodak's financial
viability was not dependent upon an IP sale ("[kjeep in mind that our expected year end cash position does not contemplate a new financing or the sale of our IPportfolio"), when in reality,
and as corroborated by Kodak's later bankruptcy pleadings and the CWs, it was widely understood throughout the Company and discussed by management at the time, that an IP sale was critical to
Kodak's ability to continue to function as a going concern.
8. Also, on November 3, 2011, with respect to a potential sale of Kodak's IP portfolio,
Defendants further stated, "the company is pleased with the progress and level of interest in the portfolios," when they were anything but. According to CWs 2 and 3, the efforts to execute such a
sale were frustrated as early as September 2011, as potential buyers had expressed legitimate fears a
purchase would constitute a fraudulent transfer should Kodak become insolvent. Thus, Defendants
had no basis to assure investors in November 2011 that they were "pleased with the progress" and
had a "high degree of confidence" in completing such a sale.
9. Finally, the Company's boilerplate, cautionary statements were too vague to be
meaningful. Indeed, Perez expressly negated the statements in the November 3, 2011 disclosure
accompanying Form 10-Q by characterizing them on the conference call as mere "requirement
statements" that should not be misconstrued as a "dampening [of his] optimism." Perez's foregoing
statements transgressed the policy underlying the reason for cautionary statements in the first place
by essentially advising the public it was okay to ignore them. The true facts about Kodak's financial
-3- 806584_i and operating conditions were not fully revealed until January 19, 2012, when Kodak filed for
bankruptcy.
II. JURISDICTION AND VENUE
10. The claims asserted herein arise under §10(b) and 20(a) of the 1934 Act [15 U.S.C.
§78j(b) and 78t(a)I and pursuant to Rule lob-S promulgated thereunder by the SEC [17 C.F.R.
§240.10b-5].
11. This court has jurisdiction over the subject matter ofthis action pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§1331 and §27 of the 1934 Act [15 U.S.C. §78aa].
12. Venue is proper in this District pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1391(b) because many of the
acts and practices complained of herein occurred in substantial part in this District.
13. In connection with the acts alleged in this complaint, Defendants, directly or
indirectly, used the means and instrumentalities of interstate commerce, including, but not limited to, the mails, interstate telephone communications and the facilities of the national securities markets.
III. PARTIES
14. Lead Plaintiff Bret S. Jones purchased the publicly traded securities of Kodak during the class Period as set forth in the certification attached hereto and was damaged as a result of
Defendants' wrongdoing as alleged in this complaint.
15. Defendant Antonio M. Perez is, and at all relevant times was, the company's
Chairman of the Board and CEO. He has held these positions since joining the company in April
2003. Prior to joining Kodak in 2003, Perez held several high level positions at Hewlett Packard for
25 years.
(a) During the class Period, Perez issued false and misleading statements about
Kodak and failed to disclose the true and material facts about the company's digital transformation,
-4- 806584_i liquidity, financial condition, financial prospects and bankruptcy considerations. In addition to issuing false and misleading statements throughout the Class Period, Perez had repeated opportunities to correct the misstatements and omissions by and on behalf of Kodak, and failed to do so.
(b) As CEO and Chairman, Perez directed Kodak's financial and business affairs.
Specifically, during conference calls with analysts and investors, Perez held himself out as knowledgeable about the Company's digital transformation, liquidity, financial condition, financial prospects and bankruptcy considerations. Moreover, in conjunction with each of Kodak's Class
Period financial reports publicly filed with the SEC, Perez assured investors that he, together with
Defendant McCorvey, was personally "responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and . . . [designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under [their] supervision, to ensure that material information relating to [Kodak], including its consolidated subsidiaries, [was] made known to [Perez and
McCorvey] by others within those entities." At no time during or after the Class Period did Perez or
McCorvey assert that they were unaware of material aspects of Kodak's business operations and financial condition. Indeed, Perez and McCorvey repeatedly assured investors that Kodak's SEC filings did not "contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading."
(c) Perez signed Kodak's SEC filings throughout the Class Period, including, but not limited to, the Company's Forms 10-Q for the periods ending June 30, 2011 and September 30,
2011, and the Company's Form 10-K for the period ending December 31, 2011. Perez also
-5- 806584_i participated in the Company's earnings conference calls and other conference calls, including, but
not limited to, the conference calls held on July 26, 2011 and November 3, 2011.
16. Defendant Antoinette P. McCorvey was Kodak's CFO and Senior Vice President
from November 2010 to September 2012. She now reports to CEO Perez in a project leadership
capacity.
(a) During the Class Period, McCorvey issued false and misleading statements
about Kodak and failed to disclose the true and material facts about the Company's digital transformation, liquidity, financial condition, financial prospects and bankruptcy considerations. In
addition to issuing false and misleading statements throughout the Class Period, McCorvey had
repeated opportunities to correct the misstatements and omissions by and on behalf of Kodak and
failed to do so.
(b) As CFO, McCorvey directed Kodak's financial and business affairs.
Specifically, during conference calls with analysts and investors, McCorvey held herself out as
knowledgeable about the Company's digital transformation, liquidity, financial condition, financial
prospects and bankruptcy considerations. Moreover, in conjunction with Kodak's Class Period
financial reports publicly filed with the SEC, McCorvey assured investors that she, together with
Defendant Perez, was personally "responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls
and. . . [designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and
procedures to be designed under [their] supervision, to ensure that material information relating to
[Kodak], including its consolidated subsidiaries, [was] made known to [McCorvey and Perez] by
others within those entities." At no time during or after the Class Period did McCorvey or Perez
assert that they were unaware of material aspects of Kodak's business operations and financial
condition. Indeed, McCorvey and Perez repeatedly assured investors that its SEC filings did not
-6- 806584_i "contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make those statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not
misleading."
(c) McCorvey signed Kodak's SEC filings throughout the Class Period,
including, but not limited to, the Forms 10-Q for the periods ending June 30, 2011 and September
30, 2011, and the Company's Form 10-K for the period ending December 31, 2011. McCorvey
further participated in Kodak's earning conference calls and other conference calls, including, but
not limited to, the conference calls held on July 26, 2011 and November 3, 2011.
17. Defendants, because of their positions with the Company, possessed the power and
authority to control the contents of Kodak's quarterly reports, press releases and presentations to
securities analysts, money and portfolio managers and institutional investors, i.e., the market. The
Company provided Defendants with copies of the Company's reports and press releases alleged
herein to be misleading prior to, or shortly after, their issuance. Defendants had ample opportunity to prevent their issuance or cause them to be corrected. Because of their positions with the
Company, and their access to material non-public information, Defendants knew that the adverse
facts specified herein had not been disclosed to, and were being concealed from, the public; and that the positive statements made were materially false and misleading.
IV. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
18. Kodak is a New Jersey corporation headquartered in Rochester, New York. It was
founded by George Eastman in 1888 to develop the first simple camera for mass production to
consumers. In 1900, it popularized photography by marketing the world's first flexible roll film and transforming picture taking into amass commodity with the $1.00 Brownie camera. Since that time,
Kodak has become known for developing an abundance of photography products, including, for
-7- 806584_i example, photo CD systems, digital camera systems, health imaging units, dental radiography film
and digital radiography systems. Kodak grew into a global industrial and commercial giant. In
1976, Kodak commanded 90% of film sales and 85% of camera sales in the U.S. The Company
describes itself as "the world's foremost imaging innovator." On January 19, 2012, Kodak
announced that it and its U.S. subsidiaries filed voluntary petitions for Chapter 11 business
reorganization in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York. Accordingly,
Kodak is not named as a Defendant in this action.
19. Although Kodak was one of the first companies to invest in digital imaging technologies and, in fact, invented the digital camera in 1975, it was this very invention which went
on to kill its core businesses. Instead of capitalizing quickly on its new wave of know-how and
exploiting the hunger for digital photography, Kodak stayed firmly focused on its 20th-century cash
cow: film. As a result, Kodak has been forced to undergo almost constant reorganization since the
1990s and has been playing catch-up for the past decade. By 2004, Kodak found itself being
pummeled by Wall Street over its dwindling cash reserves and its stumbling attempts to reinvent
itself as a profitable player in digital imaging and printing.
20. In an effort to address these problems, Perez embarked upon a patent "monetization"
strategy of approaching other firms Kodak believed were infringing on its patents. Many settled
without litigation, allowing Kodak to generate additional income during a time when its legacy film
products were failing and its new products were equally unsuccessful. On January 24, 2011,
however, an administrative law judge issued a highly anticipated ruling, in an action involving
Blackberry and Apple, Inc. ("Apple"), that Kodak's patent claim was invalid and not infringed.
Kodak's stock dropped significantly on this news as investors became concerned about Kodak's
future.
-8- 806 584_i 21. During the Class Period, Defendants engaged in a campaign to convince investors of
Kodak's imminent transformation to a profitable, digital company, and falsely assured the public of the Company's financial stability and that such stability was not dependent on revenue to be
generated from a sale of its IP portfolio, which, in any event, they also falsely assured was likely
imminent.
22. According to the CWs, throughout 2011, it became clear that the Company's digital
growth initiatives failed to enable the Company to achieve sustainable and profitable growth by the
end of 2011. The consumer inkjet business, which relied primarily on the sale of ink and other
supplies to recoup investments lost on printer sales and to fund expansion, was failing, missing
internal forecasts for every quarter in 2011. Internal reports showed that consumers were not
utilizing Kodak's printers with sufficient frequency or duration to achieve profitability in ink sales,
hammering the Company's core business.
23. Compounding matters, Kodak's liquidity had been declining for some time; as a
consequence, cash flow from the licensing and sale of intellectual property had been delayed due to
litigation tactics employed by a small number of infringing technical companies with strong balance
sheets and an awareness of Kodak's liquidity crisis.
24. By July 2011, Kodak resorted to hawking an entire portfolio of digital patents,
reportedly valued at $2-$3 billion, 2 all the while continuing to assure investors that its transformation to profitability was imminent. For example, on July 26, 2011, Perez assured investors that, "[sjofar
2 On December 19, 2012, The New York Times published an article entitled, "Kodak to Sell Digital Imaging Patents for $525 Million," reporting that Kodak's estimation appeared to be an exaggeration of the portfolio's value, given that on December 19, 2012, Kodak sought court approval to sell its portfolio for a meager $527 million.
-9- 806584_i with the best data we have, we fret very comfortable with the level of cash we have and we feel
very comfortable with the level we will have at the end of the year."
25. In actuality, more than 70% of that cash was unavailable for use in the U.S.
Moreover, in addition to the problems Kodak experienced with IP negotiations and inkjet
profitability that constrained the Company's liquidity and financial outlook, Kodak's bankruptcy
filings reveal that Kodak had, at the time, declined into a state of crisis management, requiring it to
retain Lazard on July 20, 2011 to assist with securing a patent sale. When that didn't work, Kodak
expanded Lazard's engagement on September 12, 2011 specifically to include bankruptcy and
restructuring.
26. The true magnitude of the problems facing Kodak began to seep into the market. For
example, on September 11, 2011, SeekingAipha published an article entitled "Eastman Kodak: On the Road to Bankruptcy," painting a bleak picture of Kodak's financial condition and future. On
September 23, 2011, Kodak issued a press release announcing that the Company borrowed $160
million against its revolving credit line "for general corporate purposes." On this news, the stock
plummeted. Shares of Kodak dropped $0.64, to close at $1.74 per share on September 26, 2011, a
decline of nearly 27% on volume of approximately 43 million shares. The next week, on September
30, 2011, it was further disclosed that Kodak retained Jones Day, a major restructuring law firm, a
move which many interpreted as a precursor to a bankruptcy filing. Investor fears sent Kodak stock tumbling to an all-time closing low of $78 per share.
27. In response, Defendants continued with their campaign of reassurance to effectively
counterbalance the bad news. With respect to the $160 million draw on its credit, Perez explained it
away by stating it was a simple, commonplace effort to address timing differences:
"The purpose of the revolving creditfacility is to bridge timing differences between cash outflows and inflows, which is a common practice at many corporations. As - 10- 806584_i we have said in the past, our cash flow is highly seasonal. This is a tool to help manage that seasonality."
28. These statements are remarkable given that, in reality, Kodak faced a liquidity crisis
in the U. S. Most of its available cash was tied up overseas and could not be repatriated due to the
need to fund local country operations abroad, Chinese restrictions on repatriation and U.S. tax
penalties as high as 35%. 3 These facts were not disclosed until November 3, 2011. Moreover, by this time, as consumer inkjet had missed every internal forecast so far in 2011 and failed to achieve
profitability, management had already severely curtailed its investment in the digital businesses,
lowering unit productions and halting penetration into new markets - essentially "pulling the plug"
on the digital growth initiatives that were key to Kodak's transformation and survival. Kodak's
financial status was so dire that, as evidenced by its first-day bankruptcy filings, Kodak had already
engaged Lazard to handle its bankruptcy and restructuring issues at the time these statements were
made.
29. Because Defendants failed to disclose this information to investors, their misleading
assurances had the desired effect on the market. Dow Jones reported that shares of Kodak rose 47% to $1.15 in after-hours trading on September 30, 2011 as a result of Company assurances that it was
"committed to meeting all of its obligations and ha[dJ no intention offiling for bankruptcy."
30. As late as November 2011, while Kodak engaged in fire-sale efforts to raise
desperately-needed cash by offloading such components as its online photo-sharing business, Perez
nevertheless assured investors and analysts during a November 3, 2011 conference call of his
"optimism," essentially telling them to disregard the cautionary statements in the Form 8-K:
See Accounting Standards Codification 210-10-S99, SEC Materials and SEC Regulation S-X, Rule 5-02 —Balance Sheets, Assets and Other Debits.
-11- 806584_i The[] require[d cautionary] statements shouldn't be misunderstood in anyway as dampening my optimism in [Kodak's] ability to complete the sale of [its] digital imaging patent portfolio, which is very high.. . . I want to emphasize again that our 2012 cash performance from our digital business will be significantly better than this year. That 2011 was the peak of our cash usage.... [And that] by the end of 2012, we're going to [be] this self-standing digital company.
31. On November 3, 2011, Perez further assured investors that Kodak was not dependent
on an IP deal ("[k]eep in mind that our expected year end cash position does not contemplate a
new financing or the sale of our IPportfolio"), when nothing could have been further from the truth. In fact, most of the Company's cash was tied up overseas; and as corroborated by CWs 1, 2
and 3, the Company's main business segments, including its touted core digital businesses, were
failing. CWs further confirm that management viewed an IP deal as a desperate measure to obtain the much-needed cash, not just to maintain the Company's cash position, but to save it from
bankruptcy.
32. Moreover, as is revealed in Kodak's recent bankruptcy filings, the Company had been
in crisis management mode for several months and had already retained bankruptcy and restructuring
advisors as a result. The bankruptcy filings further reveal that, at a minimum, between July 13, 2011
and September 12, 2011, it had "bec[o]me clear that [Kodak's] U.S. liquidity was declining and
might reach a critical level before a sale of the digital imaging patents could be completed,"
suggesting that, contrary to Defendants' statements on November 3, 2011, it was clear that an IP sale
was absolutely necessary. Ex. AatJ11.
33. In stark contrast to Defendants' materially false and misleading assurances and
omissions during the Class Period, on January 19, 2012, the Company filed for Chapter 11
It is further noted that, in late December, the Company disclosed that three of its then-current directors, Adam H. Clammer, Herald Y. Chen and Laura D. Tyson, had notified the Company's
- 12- 806584_i bankruptcy protection, causing the stock to plummet and the NYSE to delist Kodak shares. Finally, it was clear to all, despite the seemingly credible and consistent denials by those at the helm of the
Company, that Kodak's main lines, including its inkjet business, were failing and the sale of its IP portfolio was both necessary and unobtainable outside bankruptcy.
34. The following chart illustrates how Defendants' false and misleading statements and omissions caused the price of Kodak securities to be maintained at an inflated price during the Class
Period and how Class members were damaged when the Company's true financial and operating conditions were revealed to the market:
Board of Directors of their resignations from the Board. Moreover, on January 3, 2012, the Company disclosed that it had received a continued listing standards notice from the New York Stock Exchange (the "NYSE") because the average closing price of the Company's common stock had been less than $1.00 per share over a period of 30 consecutive trading days.
- 13 - 806584_i I....
V FRAUDULENT SCHEME AND COURSE OF BUSINESS
35. Plaintiff alleges that, during the Class Period, Defendants devised and carried out a fraudulent scheme to misrepresent and conceal the Company's true financial condition by failing to disclose (until November 2011) that more than 70% of the Company's cash was overseas and unavailable for use in the U.S. and by repeatedly and aggressively assuring investors that the
Company had "no intention" of filing for bankruptcy, that the inkjet business was making "continued progress toward. . . form[ing] the nucleus of a new Kodak" and that an IP sale was likely but in any event unnecessary. Defendants issued false and misleading statements in press releases, analyst conference calls and quarterly reports filed with the SEC regarding the Company's financial and operating conditions. The true and material facts, which were known by Defendants but concealed from the investing public during the Class Period, are as follows:
- 14- 806584_i (a) Kodak's business model was not working - the Company was unable to
leverage its extensive portfolio and scale of products and services in a strategically beneficial
manner; and Kodak's main lines, including Consumer Inkjet, Kodak's "core" business, missed every
internal forecast in 2011;
(b) Kodak's cash position was much more precarious than Defendants stated
because most of its cash was tied up overseas and unavailable for use in the U.S., and its U.S.
liquidity was declining to critical levels; as such, Kodak expanded Lazard's engagement by
September 12, 2011 to include a possible bankruptcy filing;
(c) Kodak's survival was dependent upon an IP sale, which could not be executed
due to buyers' reasonable fears that if Kodak became insolvent, the purchase would be considered a
fraudulent transfer, and their reasonable expectations that a much better price could be obtained
when Kodak was in bankruptcy; and
(d) Based on the foregoing, Defendants lacked a reasonable basis for their
positive statements about Kodak's digital transformation, financial conditions and prospects during the Class Period.
36. As a result of Defendants' false statements, Kodak's stock traded at artificially
inflated prices during the Class Period, reaching a high of $3.40 per share on August 30, 2011.
However, after the above revelations seeped into the market, the Company's shares were hammered
by massive sales, sending them down 91.2% on January 19, 2012 from their Class Period high.
37. Defendants are liable for: (a) making false statements; and/or (b) failing to disclose
material, adverse facts known to them about Kodak. Defendants' fraudulent scheme and course of
business that operated as a fraud or deceit on purchasers of Kodak's publicly traded securities was a
success as it: (i) deceived the investing public regarding Kodak's financial prospects and business;
- 15 - 806584_i (ii) artificially inflated the prices of Kodak's publicly traded securities; and (iii) caused Plaintiff and other members of the Class to purchase Kodak's publicly traded securities at an inflated price.
VI. DEFENDANTS' FALSE AND MISLEADING STATEMENTS AND OMISSIONS ISSUED DURING THE CLASS PERIOD
38. During the Class Period, Defendants made materially false and misleading statements and omissions concerning Kodak's financial and operating conditions, including statements and omissions related to the Company's cash position, the need to draw $160 million, the need for and negotiations of an IP sale, the performance of core product lines and preparations for bankruptcy.
As bad news seeped into the market, Defendants maintained inflation in the stock price by stepping up their efforts to publicly counter the bad news. They were effective in doing so because the bad news was not of a degree of intensity and credibility sufficient enough to effectively counterbalance
Defendants' resounding false assurances.
A. False and Misleading Statements and Omissions Made in Connection with the Company's July 26, 2011 Press Release and Earnings Conference Call
39. On July 26, 2011, Defendants filed a Form 8-K and a press release announcing
Kodak's second quarter 2011 financial results. The Company reported a second-quarter loss from continuing operations of $179 million, or $0.67 diluted earnings per share, and revenue of $1485 billion for the second quarter of 2011. Defendants additionally updated Kodak's 2011 financial guidance, forecasting a full-yeartotal revenue of $6.4-$6.7 billion for the Company and targeting a
2011 loss in the range of $200-$400 million, up from its previously forecasted loss in the range of
$100-$300 million. The press release stated in part:
"We are investing in these growth businesses to create a new profitable, sustainable digital company by 2012," Perez said. "At the same time, we continue to fund legacy liabilities associated with the traditional businesses. This was especially evident in our cash usage during the second quarter, in which we typically use cash because of seasonal patterns. We have every expectation our cash flow pattern this year will mirror the pattern of previous years, with sizeable cash
- 16- 806584_i generation in the second half of the year, primarily in the fourth quarter. In summary, while we continue to face challenges, I remain confident in Kodak's future and in our ability to maintain the investments necessary to complete our transformation."
40. After releasing its second quarter 2011 financial results on July 26, 2011, Kodak hosted a conference call with investors, media representatives and analysts, during which Defendants represented the following:
[PEREZI In summary, the announcement reinforces the strategy of the company. We are committed to completing our transformation to a digital, profitable and sustainable company by 2012.
We used approximately $350 million in cash this quarter, essentially in line with our 2010 cash performance when you adjust for two things. One, the cash that we received from non-recurring intellectual property license and revenue in the second quarter of 2010. And second, the timing of our contribution to the U.K. pension plan. The contribution of the U.K. pension plan was moved from the fourth quarter in 2010 to the second quarter this year.
When we evaluate our cash performance in the first half combined with our outlook for the second half, we willfinish the year with between $1.6 billion and $1.7 billion, in line with our prior year end cash balance. We finished the quarter, the second quarter, with around $1 billion in cash and our heaviest cash usage periods are already behind us. Consistent with prior years, we will generate cash in the second half of this year.
So far with the best data we have, we feel very comfortable with the level of cash we have and we feel very comfortable with the level we will have at the end of the year.
41. During the second-quarter 2011 earnings call, an analyst followed up with questions about whether the Company had enough cash on hand to run the business:
[Shannon S. Cross, Cross Research:] Andthen, how much cash doyou need to run the business? Do you think on an ongoing basis the cash bal ance you're comfortable with?
[McCorvey:] We expect that we'll end the year with about $1.6 billion to $1. 7 billion and we're comfortable with that. - 17- 806584_i [Cross:] Okay. But usually, I think it used to be about $1 billion that you - a minimum cash balance. Again, I'm just trying to get numbers out there so that with your CDS trading where it's at I think people need to understand what your liquidity position is versus what they've seen just in terms of cash burn in thefirst half
[McCorvey:] We're comfortable with where we think our cash balance is going to be at the end of the year and comfortable with what that means for what will be necessary for the first half of 2012. Because some of the things we've talked about that are going to improve the back half of2011 of course, will already be in place for the first half of2012.
42. In response to the materially false and misleading statements and omissions made in the Company's July 26, 2011 press release and earnings conference call, Defendants were able to
maintain and increase the artificial inflation in the Company's stock price, which traded as high as
$3.34 on August 18, 2011.
43. The statements contained in ¶J39-41 above concerning the timing of the Company's
digital transformation and its cash flow patterns and free cash expectations were materially false and
misleading when made because Defendants failed to disclose the true and material facts, including:
(a) The Company lacked the financial resources necessary to achieve profitability
in the Company's core digital growth business and complete the digital transformation;
(b) A significant portion of Kodak's cash balance was only available in Europe or
China, not the United States, and thus the amount of cash available to fund domestic operations -
including the Company's "key digital growth businesses" and digital transformation - was
significantly less than the Company portrayed as the balances overseas were subject to repatriation
restrictions, and taxes as high as 35% even if they could be repatriated. See infra §VII.B. (discussing
Accounting Standards Codification 210-10-S99, SECMaterials and SEC Regulation S-X, Rule 5-02
- Balance Sheets, Assets and Other Debits);
- 18- 806 584_i (c) The Company was desperate for cash as it had failed to derive any income from patent sales or licenses in the second quarter of 2011, had already hired bankruptcy and debt advisors for crisis management and continued to burn through its cash reserves;
(d) As corroborated by CWs 1-3, internal reports demonstrated that all of Kodak's main product lines, including ink and inkjet, were failing, missing internal forecasts for each quarter in 2011; and
(e) As a result of the foregoing, Defendants lacked a reasonable basis for their positive statements about Kodak's digital transformation, financial resources, key financial metrics, and cash and cash flow expectations.
B. False and Misleading Statements and Omissions Made in Connection with the Company's September 23, 2011 Press Release
44. After the market closed on Friday, September 23, 2011, Kodak filed a Form 8-K and press release with the SEC announcing the Company was borrowing $160 million against its credit line. Kodak failed to disclose any specific purposes for the loan in its filing. The Form 8-K stated, in pertinent part:
On September 23, 2011, Eastman Kodak Company (the "Company") initiated a draw of $160 million under the Second Amended and Restated Credit Agreement, dated as of April 26, 2011 (the "Restated Credit Agreement"), for general corporate purposes. The revolving credit advance bears interest at applicable margins over the Base Rate, as defined in the Restated Credit Agreement. The borrowing will bear interest initially at 1.5% (the applicable margin) plus the Base Rate, which fluctuates daily based on the highest of the following reference rates: the Federal Funds Rate plus 0.5%, Bank of America's prime rate, and a one- month Eurodollar rate plus 1.0%. The Company may repay the advances at any time without penalty, subject to certain conditions if the advances have been converted to a Eurodollar rate.
45. The public was surprised by Kodak's need for a loan. As financial analyst Shannon
Cross with Cross Research put it, "I'm surprised - given the cash balance they had at the end of the last quarter - that this is necessary." And according to Dave Novosel, an analyst with Gimme
- 19- 806584_i Credit, "Kodak's decision to access its credit line now is particularly alarming since the fourth quarter is typically when it generates a decent chunk of cash." Paul R. La Monica, "Kodak: Death of an American Icon?," CNN Money, September 28, 2011. As reported in The New York Times,
Deutsche Bank Securities Analyst Chris Whitmore commented that given Kodak's recent confirmation that it had $957 million in cash and expected to end the year with $1.7 billion,
"investors were expecting Kodak to be selling [its] assets to generate cash, not borrowing."
46. On Monday, September 26, 2011, as reported by The New York Times, Defendants issued a false and misleading statement to effectively counter the bad news about the $160 million loan, reassuring investors by explaining the draw as a simple, commonplace effort to address "timing differences." As reported by The New York Times, Kodak stated that:
"Thepurpose of the revolving creditfacility is to bridge timing differences between cash outflows and inflows, which is a common practice at many corporations. As we have said in the past, our cash flow is highly seasonal. This is a tool to help manage that seasonality."
47. On news of the loan, Kodak's stock dropped $0.64, to close at $1.74 per share on
September 26, 2011, a decline of nearly 27% on volume of approximately 43 million shares.
However, the stock price remained inflated because the false and misleading statements and omissions set forth above in ¶J44 and 46, about the purpose of the draw on the revolving credit line, mitigated the Company's stock decline.
48. As a result of this news, on September 27, 2011, Moody's Investors Service lowered all of Kodak's ratings and issued a Negative Outlook, and the following day, Fitch Ratings ("Fitch") downgraded Kodak's IDR to "CC" with a Negative Outlook, also in direct response to the
Company's draw on its credit facility, which Fitch believed "likely signifies weaker than expected cash flow in the second-half of 2011 . . . resulting in cash flows below historical levels" and that a
- 20 - 806584 1
"default of some kind appears probable." Between September 27 and 28, 2011, Kodak's stock
declined nearly $0.30 from $1.82 to $1.55 on news of Kodak's ratings downgrades.
49. The statements regarding the purpose for the loan alleged in ¶J44 and 46 above were
materially false and misleading because Defendants failed to disclose the true and material facts,
including that:
(a) The reason for the loan was not, as stated, merely to manage seasonal cash
flows but rather because of the fact that more than 70% of Kodak's cash was tied up overseas and
unavailable for domestic use. The Company had only $230 million of cash and cash equivalents left
within the U. S., and the cash abroad was needed to support local country operations, restricted by
China's stringent requirements related to net asset balances impeding Kodak's ability to repatriate
cash, and heavily taxed in event of repatriation;
(b) Also necessitating the loan was, as corroborated by CWs 1-3, that Kodak's
main lines, including its core inkjet business, were failing, missing every internal forecast in 2011;
(c) Also necessitating the loan was that Kodak was facing increasing difficulties
executing a desperately-needed patent sale as potential buyers were expressing concerns that any
such sale would be viewed as a fraudulent conveyance in the event of a bankruptcy and that a much
better deal could be obtained once Kodak filed for bankruptcy; and
(d) Kodak had already specifically expanded Lazard's engagement (on September
12, 2011) to include a potential bankruptcy filing (Ex. A at ¶11; Ex. C at 1 n.4 and accompanying
text and at 2-3 (J1.h.)).
50. On September 30, 2011, TheStreet.coni reported that Kodak had hired the law firm
Jones Day, a major restructuring firm, to consider a possible bankruptcy as a way to speed up the
sale of valuable intellectual property to potential buyers such as Google. On October 1, 2011, The
-21 - 806584 1 Wall Street Journal and Bloomberg News reported the same. Kodak later confirmed reports of the
hiring. Investor fears sent Kodak stock tumbling nearly 54% from $1.69 to an all-time closing low
of $0.78 per share. Because Defendants did not reveal the true extent of the Company's domestic
cash shortfall, however, the stock inflation was not completely removed.
51. On September 30, 2011, to counter the bad news that had leaked into the marketplace
about Kodak's hiring of Jones Day, Defendants issued a press release entitled, "Kodak States No
Intention to Filefor Bankruptcy." Defendants mitigated investors' fears by aggressively denying they had any intention of filing for bankruptcy:
Eastman Kodak Company (NYSE:EK), in response to rumors circulating in the capital markets, issued the following statement:
"Kodak is committed to meeting all of its obligations and has no intention of filing for bankruptcy. The company also continues to actively pursue its previously announced strategy to monetize its digital imaging patent portfolio. Kodak remains focused on meeting its commitments to customers and suppliers, and on delivering on its strategy to become a profitable, sustainable digital company."
"It is not unusual for a company in transformation to explore all options and to engage a variety of outside advisers, including financial and legal advisers. Jones Day is one of a number of advisers that Kodak is working with in that regard."
52. The statements in ¶51 above were materially false and misleading as Defendants
failed to disclose the true and material facts, including that:
(a) The Company lacked the financial resources necessary to achieve profitability
in the Company's core digital growth business and complete the digital transformation;
(b) As admitted in Kodak's subsequent bankruptcy filing, by September 12, 2011,
it had already "bec[o]me clear" that Kodak's liquidity might reach critical levels before an IP sale
could be executed (Ex. A at ¶11), and thus Kodak had already expressly expanded Lazard's
- 22 - 806584 1 engagement to include a potential filing for bankruptcy (Ex. Cat 1 n.4 and accompanying text and at
2-3 (J1.h.));
(c) More than 70% of Kodak's cash was tied up overseas and unavailable for
domestic use; thus, by September 30, 2011, the Company had only $230 million of cash and cash
equivalents left within the U.S. to meet its financial obligations and fund domestic operations,
including the Company's "key digital growth businesses" and digital transformation (see infra
§VII.B.);
(d) Internal reports demonstrated that all of Kodak's main product lines, including
ink and inkjet, were failing, missing every internal forecast in 2011; thus, by September 30, 2011,
Defendants had already "pull[ed] the plug" on Kodak's core product line by reducing investment in
ink and inkjet, the lines executives viewed as key to Kodak's survival;
(e) Kodak was having difficulties procuring a buyer for its patents because the
uncertainty surrounding Kodak's financial condition left prospective buyers concerned that if Kodak
became insolvent, the purchase could be a fraudulent transfer and creditors might sue for recovery
and because potential buyers knew they could get a better deal after bankruptcy; accordingly, as
corroborated by CW2, the "offers were not there";
(f) Because Kodak's financial condition and liquidity had seriously deteriorated, the Company was experiencing delays in its licensing negotiations with various vendors, including
Apple, Research in Motion, Corp. ("RIM") and HTC Corporation, which Kodak believed owed the
Company substantial royalties for use of its digital capture technology; 5 and
The January 2011 U. S. International Trade Commission ("ITC") ruling that Apple and RIM had not infringed Kodak's patent had a significant negative impact on the Company's ability to generate cash via IP deals and/or sales that were necessary to fund Kodak's digital transformation
- 23 - 806584 1 (g) According to CW3, Jones Day was hired by September 30, 2011 because
Lazard and management had failed to execute an IP sale and Kodak was already preparing for
bankruptcy, a process which would take a company of Kodak's size approximately six months.
53. Defendants' false statements had the desired effect on the market because, on this
news, Dow Jones reported that shares of Kodak rose 47% to $1.15 in after-hours trading as a result
of the Company's assurances.
C. False and Misleading Statements and Omissions Made in Connection with the Company's November 3, 2011 Press Release and Earnings Conference Call
54. On November 3, 2011, Defendants issued a press release announcing Kodak's third
quarter 2011 financial results. The Company reported a wide $222 million loss for the third quarter
of 2011, announcing that cash reserves had fallen almost 10% and that the 131-year-old corporate
icon was now seeking to raise an additional $500 million in financing to support "ongoing
operational needs." To counter this bad news, Defendants falsely touted the progress made in
connection with their efforts to execute an IP sale and in connection with the Company's digital
growth businesses.
55. Specifically, in the Form 8-K, Defendants stated how pleased they were with the
progress of the patent sale negotiations:
[T]he company announced in July its intention to explore strategic alternatives for approximately 1,100 U.S. digital imaging patents, which represent about 10% of its patent portfolio and which are not core to its future. The company is pleased with
strategy. These problems were exacerbated by the ITC's June 30, 2011 decision to affirm in part, reverse in part and remand in part the administrative lawjudge's January 2011 Initial Determination, the October 24, 2011 reassignment of the case and the October 27, 2011 notice setting a December 30, 2011 target date for completion of the investigation, which would necessarily delay resolution until well into 2012.
- 24 - 806584 1 the progress and level of interest in the portfolios...... More than anything, the results of this quarter reflect our continued progress toward establishing digital growth businesses that willform the nucleus of a new Kodak"
56. Also on November 3, 2011, Defendants held a conference call in which they commented on the financial results. Notably, Perez expressly negated the cautionary statements made in connection with the November 3, 2011 Form 8-K by essentially advising investors to disregard them. He specifically urged investors not to "misunder[stand]" the cautionary statements as a "dampening [of his] optimism," while at the same time falsely assuring investors that Kodak's projected cash position was not dependent on an IP sale and that he had a "high degree of confidence" in Kodak's ability to complete the digital transformation:
[PEREZI Thank you, Sandy, and good morning, everyone.
Before I share with you my observations on the third quarter, I would like to spend a few minutes to address several points relating to our liquidity position and the status of our sale of digital imaging patent portfolios.
And I'll start by making some comments about the statements included in the liquidity section of our 10-Q. A few things on this. First, as you know, under SEC rules companies are required to identify all potential risks that could impact business performance and results and to communicate various scenarios. These requirement statements shouldn't be misunderstood in anyway as dampening my optimism in our ability to complete the sale of our digital imaging patent portfolio, which is very high. We have been successfully monetizing our IP portfolio for seven years and we have both the value in the portfolio and the expertise in our team to execute this well.
Second, to be clear, we outlined several things that we can fund our operations, including continuing our successful IP licensing strategy that we have had in place for years, the sales of assets, and other actions. We are an asset rich company and we have many tools in our kit. Keep in mind that our expectedyear end cash position does not contemplate a new financing or the sale of our IF portfolio. We expect to reach this range by executing our operational plans and generating full year sales of non-strategic assets of approximately $200 million and intellectual property licensing transactions between $250 million and $350 million.
In relation to the recent speculation in the market place about the future of Kodak, I want to note that I have a high degree of confidence in our ability to
- 25 - 806584_i execute this plan. We continue to be highly focused in completing our transformation to a digital, profitable, and sustainable company. I want to emphasize as well that we recognize the importance of all of our stakeholders, including our customers and our suppliers. Importantly, we have fulfilled and remained committed to fulfilling all of our obligations.
And now an update on our sale of our digital imaging patent portfolio. As the company has previously discussed, Kodak intellectual property strategy has three goals. Number one, to provide the company with design freedom to develop and introduce innovative new products; number two, to provide access to new markets and partnerships; and number three, to generate income and cash.
In recent years, in keeping with that strategy, we have actively monetized our intellectual property through a series of individual transactions in a way to fund our digital transformations. We are building a new product, based on our technology advantages, at the intersection of material science and digital imaging science. Based on these technology advantages, we have introduced differentiated product lines that are growing very rapidly. They will be the nucleus of the new Kodak
We announced in July our intention to explore strategic alternatives for approximately 1,100 new digital imaging patents. These patents represent approximately 10% of our patent portfolio and are not strategic to the new company that we're building. We are very pleased with the progress that we have made with this project and with the level of interest in the portfolios.
Our Consumer Inkjet Printer growth continuedto significantly outpace the market We continued to increase our market share in all ofthe markets where we are participating in. Year-to-date, we have increased our printer shipments by more than 50%, far exceeding the overall industry growth in this very large market.
We fully understand our challenges and we are focused on creating a sustainable, profitable, digital Kodak. The installed base we've been creatingfor our Consumer Inkjet business is paying off. The increase in ink gross profit is impressive.
57. These falsely positive statements had its desired effect on the market. On November
3, 2011, it was reported by Ben Dobbin, AP Business writer, that CEO Perez "remain[ed] bullish about Kodak 'sprospects ofreinventing itselfby 2012 as aprofitableplayer in digital imaging and
- 26 - 806584 1 printing." As a result of the false and misleading statements about the timing and extent of the
Company's digital transformation, its financial resources, its ability to meet its financial obligations,
its expected year-end cash position and its patent sale negotiations, Defendants were able to maintain
and increase the artificial inflation in the Company's stock price, which traded as high as $1.38 per
share on November 17, 2011.
58. The statements infl55-56 above were materially false and misleading as Defendants
failed to disclose the true and material facts, including that:
(a) The Company lacked the financial resources necessary to achieve profitability
in the Company's core digital growth business and complete the digital transformation;
(b) As admitted in Kodak's subsequent bankruptcy filing, by September 12, 2011,
it had already "bec[o]me clear" that Kodak's liquidity might reach critical levels before an IP sale
could be executed (Ex. A at ¶11), and thus Kodak had already expressly expanded Lazard's
engagement to include a potential filing for bankruptcy (Ex. C at 1 n.4 and accompanying text and at
2-3 (J1.h.));
(c) Contrary to Defendants' statements, the digital imaging and printing
businesses were not flourishing. As has now been admitted in recent bankruptcy pleadings (Ex. B
¶10) and corroborated by CWs 1-3, Kodak's consumer inkjet business had been suffering since 2008
and throughout 2011. Kodak was heavily invested in the consumer inkjet business, which ran on a
"razor/blade" model in which "profits are not made on the sale of the printers, but on the aftermarket
sales of ink and other consumables." Id. at ¶37. However, due to "market conditions since 2008," there had been slower growth in the installed base than Kodak had projected and in lower printer
prices in the market. Id. at ¶34. Thus, the Company had been unable to realize expected "profits through the sale of ink and consumables." Id. at ¶37. Moreover, internal reports shared with
- 27 - 806584 1 executive management before the September 30, 2011 hiring of Jones Day demonstrated that all of
Kodak's main product lines, including ink and inkjet, were failing; thus, by September 30, 2011,
Defendants had already "pull[ed] the plug" on Kodak's core product line by reducing investment in
ink and inkjet, the lines executives viewed as key to Kodak's survival;
(d) Kodak was having difficulties procuring a buyer for its patents because the
uncertainty surrounding Kodak's financial condition left prospective buyers concerned that if Kodak
were insolvent, the purchase could be a fraudulent transfer and creditors might sue for recovery and
because potential buyers knew they could get a better deal after bankruptcy; accordingly, as
corroborated by CW2, the "offers were not there";
(e) Because Kodak's financial condition and liquidity had seriously deteriorated, the Company was experiencing delays in its licensing negotiations with various vendors, including
Apple, RIM and HTC Corporation, which Kodak believed owed the Company substantial royalties
for use of its digital capture technology;
(f) According to CW3, Jones Day was hired by September 30, 2011 because
Lazard and management had failed to execute an IP sale and Kodak was already preparing for
bankruptcy, a process which would take a company of Kodak's size approximately six months;
(g) Unbeknownst to investors, Kodak's liquidity had suffered a significant and
critical decline; and because it had been unable to monetize its patent portfolio through litigation or
licensing transactions, it had already retained bankruptcy and restructuring advisors. See Ex. A at
¶11; Ex. C at 1 n.4 and accompanying text and at 2-3 (J 1.h.). As a result of the foregoing,
Defendants lacked a reasonable basis for their positive statements about Kodak's digital transformation, financial resources, ability to meet their financial obligations and cash projections
for year-end 2011; and
- 28 - 806584 1 (h) According to CWs 1 and 4, a sale of Kodak's digital imaging portfolio was considered critical for Kodak to remain a solvent, viable entity.
D. Defendants' False and Misleading Certifications During the Class Period
59. Throughout the Class Period, Defendants Perez and McCorvey signed false and misleading certifications that assured investors about the integrity of Kodak's disclosure controls and procedures and its financial statements, ensuring that all material information was disclosed to investors.
60. In connection with the Company's Quarterly Reports on Form 10-Q, filed, inter al/a, on November 3, 2011, Perez and McCorvey both signed the following certification:
I, [Antonio M. Perez/Antoinette M. McCorvey, certify that:
1. I have reviewed this [report] of Eastman Kodak Company;
2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;
3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of and for, the periods presented in this report;
4. The registrant's other certifying officers and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) and internal control over financial reporting (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(f) and 15(d)-15(f)) for the registrant and have:
a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;
b) Designed such internal control over financial reporting, or caused such internal control over financial reporting to be designed under our supervision, to provide reasonable assurance regarding the reliability of financial reporting and the
- 29 - 806584_i preparation of financial statements for external purposes in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles;
C) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and
d) Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant's internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant's most recent fiscal quarter (the registrant's fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant's internal control over financial reporting; and
5. The registrant's other certifying officers and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting to the registrant's auditors and the audit committee of the registrant's board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):
a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant's ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and
b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the registrant's internal control over financial reporting.
/s/ [Antonio M. Perez/Antoinette M. McCorvey
61. The certifications identified in ¶60 above were materially false and misleading because, as set forth in ¶J38-58, Defendants failed to disclose material facts necessary to make their public statements not misleading and failed to fairly present, in all material respects, the Company's financial condition.
62. Certifications pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350, as adopted pursuant to §906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, stating:
I, [Antonio M. Perez, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the Company/Antoinette P. McCorvey, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify,
- 30 - 806584_i pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to the best of my knowledge:
1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the company.
/s/ [Antonio M. Perez/Antoinette P. McCorvey
63. The certifications identified in ¶62 above were materially false and misleading
because, as set forth in ¶J38-58, Defendants failed to fairly present, in all material respects, Kodak's
financial condition and results of operations.
E. The Truth Is Revealed When Kodak Files for Bankruptcy
64. Despite Perez's repeated assertions during the Class Period about the strength of the
Company, on January 3, 2012, Kodak filed a Form 8-K with the SEC, revealing that it had received
a notice from the NYSE that the Company was below continued listing criteria under §802.0 1C of the NYSE's listing standards because the average closing price of Kodak common shares was less than $1.00 over a consecutive 30-day trading period. Kodak stock declined nearly 28% from $0.65
per share to $0.47 per share on the news.
65. On or around January 4, 2012, it was leaked that Kodak would, in fact, seek
bankruptcy protection. The following day, January 5, 2012, The Wall Street Journal published an
article entitled, "Kodak Teeters on the Brink," reporting that sources indicated the Company was
"making preparations for a filing. . . including talking to banks about some $1 billion in financing to
keep it afloat during bankruptcy proceedings." According to the article, "[t]he company and its
board have weighed a potential bankruptcy filingfor months."
66. Several media outfits sought Kodak's comments and reported that the Company
declined, stating only that it was the Company's "long-standing policy not to comment on market
-31- 806584_i rumors or speculation." The Company's position contrasted sharply with the stance taken in
September 2011, when it issued a press release in direct response to market rumors that Kodak's
hiring of Jones Day signaled bankruptcy.
67. On January 19, 2012, Kodak filed a Form 8-K with the SEC attaching a press release that announced the Company had filed for protection under Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.
Kodak stock declined 35% from trading highs of $0.55 to $0.36 on this news, trading as low as
$0.29 per share on January 23, 2012.
68. As a result of Defendants' materially false and misleading statements and omissions,
Kodak securities traded at artificially inflated prices during the Class Period. After the above
revelations seeped into the market, however, the Company's shares were hammered by massive
sales, sending them down 91% from their Class Period high.
VII. SCIENTER
69. As alleged in the following paragraphs, Defendants had actual knowledge of the
falsity of their Class Period financial statements or acted in reckless disregard of the truth or falsity
of those statements. In doing so, Defendants committed acts and participated in a course of conduct that operated as a fraud or deceit on purchasers or acquirers of Kodak's stock during the Class
Period.
70. As described in §IV above, even prior to the Class Period, Kodak was struggling to
gain a foothold in the digital age. As a result of the mass migration in which consumers abandoned
film for digital, Kodak was forced to reinvent itself. But by the start of the Class Period, its new
businesses, focused on Consumer and Commercial Inkjet, Workflow Software and Services and
Packaging Solutions, were actually failing; and the Company was relying on a patent-monetization
strategy to raise cash. As a result, the Company suffered from declining revenues, liquidity and
- 32 - 806584 1 profitability and increasing debt. Investors were understandably concerned. Since 2004, the
Company reported only one full year of positive earnings - in 2007— and was anticipating losses to
continue in 2011. Kodak continued to burn cash. At the beginning of 2010, the Company had $2
billion in cash and burned through another $400 million, ending the year with just $1.6 billion. By the middle of 2011, the Company had just $1.0 billion in cash and was still unprofitable. Indeed, the
Company had equity value of more than $30 billion at its peak in the 1990s and had shed more than
98% of that value by 2011. Defendants were thus highly motivated to assure investors that Kodak
would remain viable and complete the transformation to a sustainable, profitable digital enterprise
despite the Company's waning financial condition.
71. Consumer Inkjet was Kodak's key digital growth business essential to the Company's
survival and the center point of its digital transformation. As is corroborated by CWs 1-3, contrary to Defendants' public statements about the business's success and growth prospects, inkjet was not
producing sufficient revenue or profits in 2011. Because the Company lost money in the printer
sales, ink sales were critical not only to recoup the Company's investment in the printers but to fund the business's expansion and enable market penetration sufficient to enable the business to achieve
sustainable profitability. The business, however, repeatedly missed its forecasts, including forecasts
for every quarter in 2011, signaling that it would not achieve profitability as quickly as Defendants
hoped, if at all. Moreover, Defendants knew that the data available to prepare forecasts was not
granular enough to generate forecasts for the ink business with any reasonable degree of accuracy
because the forecasts indicated deficiencies in data concerning printer life span and frequency of use that was critical to the forecast's accuracy.
72. Throughout 2011, it became clear that Kodak's printers were not being utilized with
sufficient frequency or duration to generate enough revenue and profit from ink sales. As
- 33 - 806584_i corroborated by CW1, throughout the Class Period, Defendants received reports exhibiting this trend.
73. Throughout 2011, Defendants had sufficient knowledge of the profitability problems
in consumer inkjet that they began reducing investments in the growth of the printer/ink business.
As corroborated by CW2, by the third quarter of 2011, management was forced to lower its unit
production and stopped penetrating new countries and markets, halting growth in the very business that was key to Kodak's digital transformation and survival. This was internally viewed as pulling the life plug from inkjets and scuttling Kodak into bankruptcy.
74. By the time the Company announced its hiring of Jones Day on September 30, 2011,
Defendants had curtailed their cash-generating digital growth initiatives and continued to suffer from
a lack of cash-generation via IP licensing or sales, exacerbating their liquidity position.
Nevertheless, they continued to falsely assure investors that the Company had no intention of filing
for bankruptcy, was not dependent on an IP sale and, in any event was likely to execute one.
A. Defendants' Restructuring of Kodak's Loan Agreement to Avoid Defaulting on a Debt Covenant Requiring a Minimum Cash Balance in U.S. Is Highly Probative of Scienter
75. Scienter is further evidenced by the facts surrounding Kodak's cash position and loan
agreements. In March 2009, Kodak entered into an Amended and Restated Credit Agreement
("March 2009 Loan Agreement") with various lenders and Citicorp USA, Inc. as agent. This
agreement imposed a negative covenant on Kodak, requiring it to maintain a minimum level of cash
in the U.S., stating: "The Company is also requiredto maintain cash and cash equivalents inthe U.S.
of at least $250 million." The agreement provides that "[s] long as any Advance or any other
payment obligation of any Loan Party of which the Company has knowledge under any Loan
Document shall remain unpaid, any Letter of Credit is outstanding or any Lender shall have any
- 34- 806584 1 Commitment hereunder, the Company will not. . . (j) Maintenance of Cash and Cash Equivalents.
Permit the aggregate balance of cash and Cash Equivalents in Deposit Accounts (other than any
checking accounts) in the Un ited States as to which the Agent has a perfected security interest to be
less than $250,000,000 at any time."
76. Article VI of the March 2009 Loan Agreement, §6.0 1, entitled "Events of Default,"
states that in the event Kodak violates this covenant, the agent is authorized to terminate "the
obligation of each Lender to make Advances. . . and of the Issuing Banks to issue Letters of Credit."
77. Thus, in April 2011, when Defendants were aware that they were dangerously close to violating (if not already in violation of) this debt covenant, they entered into a Second Amended
and Restated Credit Agreement ("April 2011 Amended Loan Agreement") removing the negative
covenant requiring a minimum level of $250 million cash in the U.S. However, rather than disclose to investors that they had so little cash on hand in the U.S., they were in jeopardy of defaulting on their debt covenants and thus were forced to renegotiate their loan agreement, they told investors
how "pleased" they were "to take advantage of improvements in the credit market to increase [the
Company 's]financialflexibility" by entering into an amended loan agreement, that they were "on track" to achieve positive cash generation and that their "strategy [was] working." This Pre-Class
Period information demonstrates that Defendants were well aware during the Class Period (and
earlier) that a large majority of Kodak's cash was tied up overseas and unavailable for use in the
U.S.; however, they conveniently omitted this material information from disclosures until November
3, 2011 when, even then, they downplayed the cash shortage by telling investors the Company's
solvency was not dependent upon an IP sale.
-35 - 806584_i B. Defendants' Violation of Accounting Standards, SEC Materials and SEC Regulation by Concealing the Fact that Most of Kodak's Cash Was Tied Up Overseas Is Highly Probative of Scienter
78. Defendants knew that their statements about Kodak's liquidity during the Class
Period were materially false and misleading and violated Generally Accepted Accounting Principles
("GAAP") and SEC rules, including Accounting Standards Codification 210-10-S99, SEC Materials
and SEC Regulation S-X, Rule 5-02 —Balance Sheets, Assets and Other Debits, which states that:
Cash and cash items. Separate disclosure shall be made ofthe cash and cash items which are restricted as to withdrawal or usage. The provisions of any restrictions shall be described in a note to the financial statements.
79. GAAP are those principles recognized by the accounting profession as the
conventions, rules and procedures necessary to define accepted accounting practice at a particular time. SEC Regulation S-X, Rule 4-01 (17 C.F.R. §210.4-01(a)(1)) states that financial statements
filed with the SEC that are not prepared in compliance with GAAP are presumed to be misleading
and inaccurate, despite footnote or other disclosure. Regulation S-X requires that interim financial
statements must also comply with GAAP, with the exception that interim financial statements need
not include disclosure that would be duplicative of disclosures accompanying annual financial
statements. 17 C.F.R. §210.10-01(a). 6
80. Defendants were aware of significant restrictions on their use of cash to meet their
obligations and fund the Company's digital transformation but failed to disclose these restrictions in
0 On June 30, 2009, the Financial Accounting Standards Board ("FASB") issued a Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 168, the FASB Accounting Standards Codification and the Hierarchy of Generally Accepted Accounting Principles - a replacement of FA SB Statement No. 162. FASB Accounting Standards Codification became the source of authoritative U. S. accounting and reporting standards for non-governmental entities, in addition to guidance issued by the SEC, effective for financial statements issued for reporting periods that ended after September 15, 2009. The Accounting Standards Codification did not change existing U.S. GAAP requirements.
- 36 - 806584 1 a "separate disclosure" as required. In other words, Kodak's liquidity was much weaker than
disclosed in its SEC filings and other public statements.
81. In 2011, Kodak began touting $1,624 million in cash. The Company drained $324
million in cash in the first quarter of 2011, bringing the cash balance down to $1,300 million. Kodak
drained another $343 million in cash in the second quarter of 2011, bringing the cash balance down to $957 million— Kodak's lowest level in more than five years. The Company continued to drain its
cash balance throughout 2011, ending the third quarter of 2011 with just $862 million and the fourth
quarter of 2011 with just $861 million.
82. Defendants, however, were aware of and, prior to November 3, 2011, failed to
disclose that the Company's problems with its cash drain were worse than portrayed. Indeed, the
vast majority of Kodak's cash was overseas and unavailable. As of September 30, 2011, Kodak had just $230 million in cash in the U.S., with the remaining $630 million in Europe and China, and such
balances were "not available" to fund U.S. operations. The Company's third quarter 2011 Form
10-Q, filed November 3, 2011, admitted for the first time:
Cash and cash equivalents are held in various locations throughout the world. At December 31, 2010 and September 30, 2011, approximately $580 million and $230 million, respectively, of cash and cash equivalents were held within the U.S. During the nine month period ended September 30, 2011 approximately $310 million of cash was repatriated, or loaned, from foreign subsidiaries to the U. S., net of loans and repayments of loans to foreign subsidiaries, at an incremental cash tax cost of $4 million. The Company utilizes a variety of tax planning and financing strategies in an effort to ensure that cash is available in locations where it is needed; however, as of September 30, 2011 cash balances held outside of the U.S. are generally required to support local country operations and are therefore not available for operations in other jurisdictions. Additionally, in China, where approximately $320 million in cash and cash equivalents was held as ofSeptember 30, 2011, there are limitations related to net asset balances that impact the ability to make cash available to otherjurisdictions in the world The Company plans to meet its current U.S. liquidity needs through existing cash balances, operating earnings from foreign subsidiaries, including Chinese subsidiaries, when available, proceeds from planned sales of businesses and assets, and through monetization of its digital imaging patent portfolio.
- 37- 806584 1 w7muramal wall W1 *= Dow 12M,1111111 11111111 i ii 1 1 1 _1
83. By the end of the year, Kodak had drained its cash available to fund U.S. operations even further, 7 explaining in the Form 10-K for 2011:
Cash and cash equivalents are held in various locations throughout the world. At December 31, 2011 and December 31, 2010, approximately $170 million and $580 million, respectively, of cash and cash equivalents were held within the U.S. During the twelve month period ended December 31, 2011, approximately $320 million of cash was repatriated, or loaned, from foreign subsidiaries to the U.S., net of loans and repayments of loans to foreign subsidiaries, at an incremental cash tax cost of $4 million. The Company utilizes a variety of tax planning and financing strategies in an effort to ensure that cash is available in locations where it is needed; however, as of December 31, 2011, cash balances held outside of the U.S. are generally required to support local country operations and are therefore not available for operations in other jurisdictions. Additionally, in China, where approximately $340 million in cash and cash equivalents was held as ofDecember 31, 2011, there are limitations related to net asset balances that impact the ability to make cash available to other jurisdictions in the world The Company plans to meet its current liquidity needs through existing cash balances, operating earnings from foreign subsidiaries, including Chinese subsidiaries, when available, financing available under the DIP Credit Agreement, proceeds from sales of businesses and assets, and through monetization of its digital imaging patent portfolio.
84. The fact that most of Kodak's cash was maintained in financial institutions in Europe and China, and that there were critical limitations on Kodak's cash held overseas, was a material omission of fact prior to November 3, 2011.
85. The SEC clarified the principles of materiality in Staff Accounting Bulletin ("SAB")
99, issued August 1999, and as subsequently revised in SAB 114, issued March 7, 2011. Neither
SAB 99 nor SAB 114 presents new materiality standards but, instead, reaffirms long-accepted concepts expressed in auditing and accounting literature. It also provides interpretative guidance to ensure those concepts are properly applied.
/ As explained in Kodak's motion to allow post petition financing, filed January 19, 2012, (Dkt. No. 16 of the bankruptcy proceeding), "[immediately prior to the Petition Date, the Debtors had been operating on approximately $56.7 million in cash in the United States." Ex. F at ¶32 (at 27) and at ¶43.
-38- 806584_i 86. Among the most important of SAB 99's and SAB 114's points are that: (a) registrants
and auditors may not rely solely on quantitative criteria to evaluate an item's materiality; (b) the
materiality of items can be determined reliably only if they are evaluated both individually and
collectively; and (c) an intentional misstatement may be illegal even if the item it concerns is
immaterial.
87. Additionally, according to SAB 99 and SAB 114, "quantifying, in percentage terms, the magnitude of a misstatement is only the beginning of an analysis of materiality; it cannot
appropriately be used as a substitute for a full analysis of all relevant considerations. Materiality
concerns the significance of an item to users of a registrant's financial statements. A matter is
'material' if there is substantial likelihood that a reasonable person would consider it important."
88. Investors clearly would have wanted to know prior to November 3, 2011 that a
substantial portion of Kodak's cash was held in overseas financial institutions and that cash balances
held outside of the U.S. were generally required to support local country operations and were therefore not available for operations in other jurisdictions.
C. Admissions Made in Defendants' Bankruptcy Filings Are Highly Probative of Scienter
89. Kodak adamantly denied that it was considering filing for bankruptcy, expressed a
"very high" probability of completing a digital patent sale before year end and had provided firm
guidance that the Company would end 2011 with at least $1.3-1.4 billion in cash - and
"substantially" more cash after completion ofthe digital patent sale, which it did nothing to dispel in
advance of the January 2012 bankruptcy.
90. However, Defendants' admissions contained in their bankruptcy court pleadings
directly contravene their public statements leading up to the bankruptcy because they demonstrate that by September 12, 2011 Defendants were concerned that a patent sale might not be completed,
- 39 - 806584_i mm-muramal wall W1 -*= Dow 12M,1111111 11111111 i ii 1 1 1 -1
resulting in the Company's liquidity reaching a "critical level" where bankruptcy could not be avoided.
91. On January 19, 2012, Kodak filed its Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Petition in the
Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York. In connection with that petition, Kodak filed a declaration, attached hereto as Exhibit A, prepared by Matthew J. Hart of Lazard Frères &
Co. LLC (the "Lazard Declaration"). Lazard is a "financial advisory and asset management firm" well known for its involvement with large, complex bankruptcies, including:
. In reNw. Airlines Corp., Case No. 05-17930 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. filed Sept. 14,2005); and
• In re Calpine Corp., Case No. 05-60200 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. filed Dec. 20, 2005).
• In reLehnianBros. Holdings Inc., Case No. 08-13555 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. filed Sept. 15, 2008);
• In re Charter Coninic 'ns, Inc., Case No. 09-11435 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. filed Mar. 27, 2009);
• In re Citadel Broad. Corp., Case No. 09-17442 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. filed Dec. 20, 2009);
• In re The GreatAtl. & Pac. Tea Co., Inc., Case No. 10-24549 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. filed Dec. 12, 2010);
• In re Dynegy Holdings, LLC, Case No. 11-38111 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. filed Nov. 7, 2011);
92. Contrary to Defendants' assertions that Lazard was hired in July 2011 merely to advise on a potential patent sale and not to consider the possibility of a Chapter 11 restructuring, the
Lazard Declaration disclosed the fact that it "became clear" between July 13, 2011 and September
12, 2011 that Kodak's U.S. liquidity was declining and that, absent a patent sale, Kodak's liquidity might reach a critical level. The declaration stated:
On July 13, 2011, the Debtors [Kodak] engagedLazardto advise them with respect to a potential sale of their digital imaging patent portfolio. In the course of this engagement, it became clear that the Debtors' U.S. liquidity was declining and
- 40 - 806584_i mm-Muramal wall W1 -*= 611M 12M,1111111 11111111 i ii 1 1 1 -1
might reach a critical level before a sale of the digital imaging patents could be completed Hence, on September 12, 2011, Lazard's engagement was expandedto encompass a variety ofpossible strategic,financing and restructuring alternatives, including, if necessary, a restructuring through chapter 11.8
93. Indeed, the engagement letter between Kodak and Lazard specifically contemplated a
potential reorganization through Chapter 11 bankruptcy, stating that Kodak "hereby retains Lazard
as investment banker to provide Kodak with general financial and strategic advice and to advise it in
connection with any. . . [restructuring," defined as "any restructuring, reorganization (whether or
not pursuant to Chapter 11 ofthe United States Bankruptcy Code) and/or recapitalization of all or
a material portion of the Company's outstanding indebtedness."
94. The Lazard Declaration further indicates that Lazard assisted the Company "in
exploring and evaluating a number of such alternatives," but "a transaction could not be arranged
in an amount that would have provided adequate assurances that a chapter 11 filing could be
avoided." In other words, the Company and its advisors knew that bankruptcy was inevitable unless they could increase their liquidity via a patent sale.
95. In a declaration signed by McCorvey that was filed in support of Kodak's bankruptcy
petition, attached hereto as Exhibit B, Kodak made additional admissions concerning its business
and financial condition that were material and had not been disclosed to investors during the Class
Period. The declaration supports that Defendants had increasing knowledge of a number of forces
negatively impacting Kodak's liquidity position since at least 2008 and deteriorating in 2011:
See Ex. A at ¶11; see also Lazard's expanded engagement letter attached hereto as Exhibit C.
-41 - 806584_i mm-muramal wall W1 -*= Dow 12M,1111111 11111111 i ii 1 1 1 -1
(a) The Company's liquidity shortfall exists "primarily in the United States," and
"[flhe Company's non-U.S. businesses are expected to be funded primarily from non-U.S. sources and should not be affected by the filing of these chapter 11 proceedings" (Ex. B at ¶J16-17);
(b) "Since 2008, despite Kodak's best efforts, restructuring costs and recessionary forces have continued to negatively impact the Company's liquidity position, ultimately leading to the commencement of these chapter 11 cases" (Ed. at ¶10);
(c) An increasing proportion of Kodak's revenues was being earned overseas, and in 2011, just 33% of the Company's total revenue was generated in the U.S.;
(d) Kodak was suffering from declining liquidity, and "cash flow from the licensing andsale ofint ellectual property [had] been delayed due to litigation tactics employed by a small number of infringing technology companies with strong balance sheets and an awareness of Kodak's liquidity challenges" (Ed at ¶34); and
(e) Kodak was heavily invested in its consumer inkjet business, which ran on a
"razor/blade" model in which "profits are not made on the sale oftheprinters, but on aftermarket sales ofink and other consumables." Id. at ¶37. Because market conditions since 2008 "resulted in slower growth in the installed base than Kodak hadprojected and in lower printer prices in the market," the Company was unable to realize expected "profits through the sale of ink and consumables." Id. As is corroborated by CWs 1-3, this segment declined significantly, missing each internal forecast in 2011.
96. "Revenue generated through monetization of the digital capture portfolio over the past several years has been an integral part of the funding for Kodak's digital transformation." Ex.
B at ¶40. "When Kodak's financial condition started to deteriorate, Kodak began to experience delays in licensing negotiations with [Apple, RIM and HTC Corporation,] all of which owe
- 42 - 806584 1 substantial royalties for use of Kodak's digital capture portfolio." Id. at ¶41. "As an alternative to
lengthy patent litigation, Kodak has explored the sale of the Imaging Portfolio to third parties.
However, the Company has faced difficulties executing the sale due to uncertainty about its financial condition." Id.
97. These recent admissions belie the repeated false assurances that were made
consistently throughout the Class Period to the effect that Kodak's inkjet business was flourishing,
an IP sale was likely and in any event unnecessary, and the Company had sufficient cash to effect a
complete transformation to profitability by 2012.
98. Defendants' knowledge of Kodak's impending bankruptcy is further bolstered by an
additional pleading filed in the bankruptcy case, the Verified Statement ofAdHoc Committee of
Second Lien Noteholders Pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 2019 ("Verified Statement"), filed on
January 30, 2012 (Dkt. No. 153 of the bankruptcy proceeding, Ex. D). The Verified Statement
provides that:
In October 2011, certain holders of the Second Lien Notes contacted Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP ("Akin Gump") to represent them in connection with a potential restructuring of the Debtors. In the intervening months before the chapter 11 cases were filed, certain additional holders of the Second Lien Notes joined the ad hoc group and created the Second Lien Noteholders Committee.
Ex. D at ¶1. That Kodak's creditors were taking concrete actions (including forming an ad hoc
committee and seeking bankruptcy counsel) in preparation for Kodak's bankruptcy as early as
October 2011 supports a strong inference that Kodak itself was doing the same.
99. In the Second Lien Noteholders' objections to first day relief request, filed on January
19, 2012 (Dkt. No. 39 of the bankruptcy proceeding, Ex. E), the Second Lien Noteholders stated that
Kodak had been travelling a path toward Chapter 11 "for quite some time" and objected to Kodak's
request to spend $100 million on "critical vendor payments" in the next 13 weeks:
- 43 - 806584_i mm-Muramal wall M1 *= 611M 12M,1111111 11111111 i ii 1 1 1 _1
1. The Debtors have been travelling a path toward chapter 11 for quite some time. In the last two years alone, EKC has burned through approximately $2 billion in cash, including losses exceeding $1 billion through the first three quarters of 2011. The monumental losses will not stop with the commencement of these proceedings. In fact, the Debtors' own budget projects that they will spend/lose an additional $364 million in the next thirteen weeks. This must stop.
2. Notwithstanding these staggering losses, the Debtors have continued to adhere to a misguided strategy of funding businesses that are not profitable or viable. In addition, for several years, the Debtors' management has followed a practice akin to "burning the furniture" - selling off valuable assets in one-time cash generation events to stave off a bankruptcy filing. These efforts have failed and the Debtors, after depleting all of their cash, are now forced to commence these proceedings.
3. It is entirely unclear at this point what the Debtors intend to do in chapter 11. What is clear is that the Debtors must not be permitted to continue the same destructive practices that resulted in the loss of in excess of $2 billion in the last two years alone. While we do know that the Debtors have spent many months attempting to sell a substantial number of patents, the value of that portfolio, and the impact of that decision upon the Debtors' operations and remaining assets and, most importantly, its creditors, is as yet unknown. Through the variety of relief they have sought, the Debtors appear to want carte blanche to operate in chapter 11 as they did outside of chapter 11. Among other things, the Debtors have requested unfettered authority to (i) spend up to $100 million in "critical vendor" payments in the first days of these cases without identifying which vendors are critical or providing a shred of evidence that any such payments are necessary, (ii) continue their existing Intercompany Transactions netting scheme such that funds may flow outside of the United States to the detriment of creditors of these estates, and (iii) continue their bonus compensation program for senior management, many of whom may well be responsible for the Debtors' current state of affairs - all of this before their creditors have had a chance to fully educate themselves about the Debtors and their businesses and what is the right path to maximize value.
100. That Kodak suffered losses exceeding $1 billion in the first three quarters of 2011 raises a strong inference that Defendants' Class Period statements about how comfortable they were with Kodak's level of cash were knowingly false. That Kodak needed $100 million for "critical vendor payments" in January of 2012 raises a strong inference that Defendants' November 3, 2011 statement that "we have fulfilled and remained committed to fulfilling all of our obligations" was also knowingly false.
- 44 - 806584_i D. Confidential Witness Statements Supporting that Defendants Had Access to Facts Directly Contravening Their Public Statements When They Made Them Are Highly Probative of Scienter
101. The allegations contained herein are also based upon first-hand accounts of former
Kodak employees, including the Confidential Witnesses described below.
1. Confidential Witness Allegations Support that Defendants Were Informed that the Company's Core Business Was Failing Befor September 30, 2011
102. CW 1 was a Business Research Manager in the Consumer Inkj et Systems Division at
Kodak from June 2010 through January 1, 2012. As part of his/her job responsibilities, CW1
supervised a group that researched data and created forecasts for Kodak printer and inkjet sales.
CW1 created and contributed to various reports that were distributed to upper management and
executive management, including Defendants.
103. CW 1 tracked Kodak's printer/inkjet market share and used data from Lyra and MPD
for statistical research on how many printers were sold, how many pages were printed and how many
cartridges were used in order to project Kodak sales using estimated pricing and Kodak's steady gain
in market share. S/he stated that new information came to light throughout 2011 that caused the forecast models to be questioned, and management was informed of the emergence of certain
discovered variables that gave less confidence to forecasts for this line.
104. CW1 explained that money was actually lost on each printer sold and that it was the
future sales of ink cartridges that were expected to be so profitable that it would absorb this expense.
However, growth in a market that starts with a loss leader is expensive, and the forecasted future
growth in market share, revenue and margin was completely dependent on Kodak's continued cash
infusion into this line. The idea came down to stuffing as many stores with as many Kodak printers
as possible by eroding into the shelf space of Kodak's competitors. This meant continuously
- 45 - 806584_i developing, designing, manufacturing, marketing and distributing printers at a per-unit loss to grow
inkjet sales, with a key component of success being the life span of the printer and how much inkthe
user will buy for that unit before buying a new printer.
105. CW 1 stated that one trendthat became clear throughout 2011 was that the low-end,
low-cost print ers where Kodak was gaining market share were not generating much in cartridge
sales. The main reason appeared to be that the more expensive the printer, the more it was actually
used to print. The cheaper ones were not lasting as long as projected and were not being used as
much as projected. This meant that Kodak would be continually selling printers at a loss without following with enough ink sales to turn the losses to profits. The data showed that consumers were
either throwing these cheaper printers away rather than buying new cartridges orjust not using them
for very long due to quality problems and the cost of cartridges. In any event, it became clear that the profits in the market were loaded toward the mid- to higher-end models, where Kodak was less
competitive. In order to continue growing market share, Kodak still had to fill shelves with models
at the lower price bands, and this fundamentally changed the forecast models throughout 2011;
and it became clear in 2011 that the "magic day" when inkjet would become profitable would be
much later than planned. S/he said that theflaws in assumptions for theseforecasts became known
especially as Kodak missed internalforecasts each quarter in 2011. Another major issue was the
size of Kodak's market share for Kodak ink as companies like Costco were springing up and selling
ink refill cartridges. Management continued to run the Company based on theflawedforecasting.
The printer/ink side ofthe business needed continued cash investments to become profitable, and the
Company was burning through cash faster than anticipated.
106. CWlfurth er statedth at the hiring ofLazard was internally regarded as an effort to
look at reorganization to reduce costs and bureaucracy so the Company could respond to
- 46 - 806584 1 emerging trends; however, the hiring of Jones Day signaled that Kodak had tried andfailed to
avoid bankruptcy. At the time Jones Day was hired (which was September 30, 2011), Rochester
management began reducing investment in the growth of the printer/ink business. They lowered
unit production and stopped penetrating new countries and markets, contrary to the strategy
Kodak had employed as away to survive - keep investing and growing the inkjet business until it
became profitable and transitioned the Company to digital.
107. CW1 attended meetings and conference calls with management ofthe division and
the executives. CW1 said this information was given to executive management by s/he and others
once the seriously declining trends were evident in 2011, sometime before Jones Day was hired.
108. CW 1 also stated that another trend that was made clear in 2011 and earlier was in the
camera business - where Kodak had significantly invested in its "point and shoot" models, but the
market was turning to SLRs - cameras that attach large lenses. This caused significant misses in
camera sales forecasts. Kodak's patents for digital cameras applied to both its own designs and the
SLRs, so this was another reason Kodak management looked at patent sales as a way to turn profits
(large and immediate) on the camera business in order to fund the printer and inkjet growth. S/he
said that management saw the efforts to execute an IP sale as "an act of desperation" to avoid
bankruptcy with Kodak missing internal forecasts while spending so much cash on its future
"core" product, which was failing.
109. CW1 also stated that Kodak moved engineering for the Inkjet Division from San
Diego to Singapore in early 2011. S/he said this was an indication that Kodak was already taking
costs out of this line. S/he said that in forecasting to what product managers described would be the
new Kodak printer models, once units hit the shelves, they were different from what forecasting had
used to project sales. S/he said that most of these decisions were made by corporate management.
- 47 - 806584_i 2. Confidential Witness Allegations Support that Kodak's Reduction of Investment in Inkjet and Hiring of Jones Day in September Was "Internally Viewed as Pulling the Life-Plug from Inkjets and Scuttling Kodak into Bankruptcy"
110. CW2 was a Director of Finance at Kodak from approximately February 2005 to
January 1, 2012. S/he states that in 2011, Kodak's main business lines all declined in sales, and
most failed to meet sales forecasts. S/he states that the main focus of the 2011 annual "plan" was
cost reduction along with adjusting sales targets downward to reflect known trends. The plan
resulted from an exercise that involved submission of drafts by CW2 for his/her region to his/her
boss, a Regional Finance Director who reported to a Worldwide Director of Finance; and that s/he
went "back and forth" with corporate finance, including the CFO, until settled as a plan.
111. CW2 stated that there were significant declines in main business lines in 2011. S/he
said that as far as s/he knew, from being in meetings and on finance-related conference calls, the
main reason why Kodakfiledfor bankruptcy at year end revolved around the Company 'sfailure
to sell patents. S/he said that after Kodak suffered an adverse appellate ruling in the Apple RIM
litigation from a court that had made favorable rulings on the same issues before, according to what
Defendants claimed to believe internally, Kodak could not find a buyer for its patents. S/he saidthat
buyers were afraid to pay money for fear Kodak would file early and the assets they just purchased would be held by the trustee.
112. CW2 described a "continuous exercise" for increased annual cost reduction
campaigns each year since at least 2009. S/he said that when CEO Perez announced the sale of patents aroundthe same time that the Company hiredLazard, it was already clear that Kodak was
in "serious trouble." In September, Jones Day was hired because Lazard and management had failed to sell patents, and executives began to plan the bankruptcy at that time with Jones Day - as
- 48 - 806584_i bankruptcy is something that would take afew months to prepare for as away to keep operating
as Kodak has done.
113. CW2 stated that with respect to the investment in inkjet, this was an area that was not
initially reduced because "the executives viewed growth of that product line as key to Kodak's
survival." However, executives could not sustain this needed level of investment due to declines in the other lines and a miss in inkj et as well and significantly cut the investment into inkjet, which was
internally viewed as "pulling the life-plug from inkjets and scuttling Kodak into bankruptcy."
114. CW2 learn edfrom his own managers about what the executives were doing and
why. S/he stated that once Jones Day, a known bankruptcyfirm, was hired, the executives saw no
hope to sell thepatents as other companies had done to stay solvent and transform andthat such
hope had been dashed because the offers were not there. S/he understood the reason for no buyers to be the Apple RIM ruling and also that such assets could bepurchased later at extreme discounts
in bankruptcy.
3. Confidential Witness Allegations Support that Data Throughout 2010 and 2011 Showed Ink and Inkjet Sales to Be Declining and that Kodak Was Too Large and Moved Too Slowly to Prepare for Bankruptcy in Just a Month
115. CW3 worked with Kodak from 1983 through April 2012 in various positions. From
May 2009 through April 2012, s/he served as Technology and Intellectual Property Manager.
Among his/her responsibilities was to review the Company's IP patents and analyze their value.
His/her group reported to the Chief Technology Officer. S/he stated that Kodak's valuation for the
IP portfolio of $3 billion was inflated and that $1 billion was closer to reality. S/he further stated
that "the clear strategy among potential buyers of the portfolio was to wait," as "the value was
dropping and would continue to do so." S/he also said that Apple and RIM (Blackberry) were the targets most spoken about as likely buyers.
- 49 - 806584_i 116. Additionally, CW3 stated that plenty of data showed inkjet and ink sales in 2010
and throughout 2011 to be declining. S/he said it was well known at Kodak that printers were not
selling atprojeeied rates and, worse, th at printer usage was not generating the amount ofink sales
that Kodak projected prior to bankruptcy. S/he further indicated that although Kodak executives
were touting printer and ink sales as the business that would carry the Company through to its
new digital base, internally employees wondered how this declining market could possibly replace a
significant part of the hole left from dying film sales.
117. CW3 states that Kodak was preparing for bankruptcy with the hiring of Lazard and then, especially, Jones Day. With IP sales lagging on as it became clear it was advantageous to
buyers to wait; and the decline in ink demand particularly —the one component where Kodak could
make a profit, the prognosis for recovery was poor. CW3 statedthat because the Company was still
so large and moved too slowly to react in the face of its changing market, there was no way it
could have made a bankruptcy decision andpreparedfor itinjust a month andthat preparation for bankruptcy would have had to have begun six months earlier when Lazard was hired to help
with restructuring and IP sales.
4. Confidential Witness Allegations Support that, in Contrast to Perez's Statements to the Contrary, the Sale of Kodak's Digital Imaging Portfolio Was Critical for Kodak to Remain Solvent
118. CW4 worked with Kodak, in relevant part, from 2010 to 2012 in several capacities.
In 2011, s/he served as General Manager of New Products. In this position, s/he was required to
attend monthly Operational Counsel Meetings, during which Kodak's key officers would review
monthly operations reports. Defendant Perez regularly attended these meetings.
119. CW4 stated that during the foregoing meetings, s/he had frank discussions with
Defendant Perez regarding Kodak's digital imaging segment.
- 50 - 806584_i 120. CW4 confirmed it was clear that a sale of Kodak's digital imaging portfolio was
critical for Kodak to remain a solvent, viable entity.
E. Defendants' Certifications Filed with the SEC Are Further Indicative of Scienter
121. As set forth in §VI.D., Defendants' "review" of Kodak's quarterly and annual reports
and their responsibility for "establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures. . . and
internal control over financial reporting . . . to ensure that material information relating to the
registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities
[and] to provide reasonable assurance regarding the reliability of financial reporting . . . in
accordance with [GAAP]," that Defendants certified they had personally performed as of the dates they signed the above certifications, would clearly have alerted Defendants to the presence of the
false and misleading statements and omissions disseminated to the public and alleged herein.
According to their certifications, every quarter throughout the Class Period, Defendants "[e]valuated the effectiveness of [Kodak's] disclosure controls and procedures" and "internal control over
financial reporting" and reported in every quarterly and annual filing that those procedures, in fact,
"were effective." Therefore, Defendants either knew of the material misrepresentations and
omissions disseminated to the public or knowingly failed to carry out the required review of the
Company's disclosure controls and procedures. In either case, Defendants knew or recklessly
disregarded that the certifications they signed were false.
F. Defendants' Violation of Kodak's Own Policies Further Evidences Scienter
122. Kodak's Business Conduct Guide further supports a strong inference of scienter.
According to Kodak's own internal policy, "[flhe Company maintains a system of internal controls
and disclosure controls and procedures to ensure that. . . transactions are executed in accordance
with management's authorization. . . [and] the Company accurately andtimely discloses required
- 51 - 806584_i financial and non-financial information." The guide specifically mandates that "[ajll Company financial reports, accounting records, research reports, sales reports, expense accounts, time sheets,
and other documents must accurately and clearly represent the relevantfacts or the true nature of
a transaction. Improper or inaccurate accounting, documentation, or financial reporting are contrary to Company policy and may also be in violation of applicable laws."
123. Kodak mandated accurate and clear representation of all relevant facts in "[a]ll
Company financial reports . . . and other documents," ensuring that all reports provided to
management were not only accurate with regard to the information contained therein but contained
clear representations of all facts relevant to the provided information.
124. The policy was widespread and included "written policies and procedures, budgetary
controls, supervisory review and monitoring, auditing, a roll-up process for internal certifications for
accuracy and completeness, ongoing self-evaluations, and [other] safeguards."
125. Kodak was clear that "[responsibility for compliance with these policies [to provide
clear, accurate and complete information] rests with all employees, not solely with the Company's
finance and accounting personnel."
126. The policy's stringent requirements concerning accuracy and clear representation of
all relevant facts would have revealed to Defendants the information set forth in §VI, VII and IX.
Nevertheless, Defendants failed to disclose this information to investors, which itself violated the
Company's policy of providing "accurate[] and timely disclos[ur]es."
VIII. LOSS CAUSATION
127. During the Class Period, as detailed herein, Defendants made false and misleading
statements concerning the current and future financial condition of the Company and engaged in a
scheme to deceive investors regarding the same. These materially false representations caused
- 52 - 806584 1 Kodak's stock to trade at an inflated level and operated as a fraud or deceit on the Class. Later,
when the relevant truth regarding the Company's financial condition and prospects was disclosed, the prices of Kodak securities fell precipitously as the prior artificial inflation came out of the stock
price. As a result, Plaintiff and other members of the Class suffered economic loss, i.e., damages,
under the federal securities laws.
128. Defendants' false statements and omissions, identified herein at §VI, had the intended
effect and caused Kodak's stock to trade at artificially inflated levels up to and above $3 per share
during the Class Period. As the truth began to leak into the market, and as a direct result of the
disclosures on September 23, 2011, September 30, 2011 and January 19, 2012, Kodak's stock price
suffered material, statistically significant declines.
129. On September 23, 2011, when Kodak disclosed during after-market hours that it was
drawing $160 million from its revolving credit line, the Company's stock price dropped nearly 21%
from $2.38 to $1.89 before the market opened on September 26, 2011, the next trading day, and only
continued its decline, closing at $1.55 on September 28, 2011. The New York Times published an
article on September 26, 2011 entitled, "Kodak Stock Dives After Credit Line Is Tapped," noting that shares were down 25% since the announcement.
130. On September 30, 2011, rumors surfaced, confirmed by Kodak, that the Company
had hired Jones Day - an entity well known as an advisor to major companies considering
restructuring and bankruptcy. In response, Kodak's stock price tumbled to an all-time low, closing
at $0.78 per share - down nearly 54% from $1.69 the prior trading day. The Company's stock
continued to decline throughout the remainder of 2011 and 2012 as the truth about Kodak's business
and financial condition continued to enter the market.
- 53 - 806584_i 131. Finally, on January 19, 2012, Kodak filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 11. The remaining artificial inflation in the Company's stock price was eliminated as shares fell another
$0.25 from $0.55 on January 18, 2012 to $0.30 on January 19, 2012, when news of the bankruptcy petition surfaced.
132. Individually and collectively, these drops removed the inflation from Kodak's stock price, causing real economic loss to investors who purchased the stock during the Class Period.
IX. NO SAFE HARBOR
133. Kodak's verbal safe-harbor warnings accompanying its oral forward-looking statements ("FLS") issued during the Class Period were ineffective to shield those statements from liability. Moreover, Perez's statements that the warnings were "requirement statements" that should not be misunderstood as a "dampening [of his] optimism" negated the warnings made on November
3,2011.
134. Defendants are also liable for any false or misleading FLS pled because, at the time each FLS was made, the speaker knew the FLS was false or misleading and the FLS was authorized and/or approved by an executive officer of Kodak who knew the FLS was false. None of the historic or present-tense statements made by Defendants were assumptions underlying or relating to any plan, projection or statement of future economic performance as they were not stated to be such assumptions underlying or relating to any projection or statement of future economic performance when made, nor were any of the projections or forecasts made by Defendants expressly related to or stated to be dependent on those historic or present-tense statements when made.
X. CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS
135. Plaintiff brings this action as a class action pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on behalf of all persons who purchased or otherwise acquired Kodak's publicly
- 54- 806584 1 traded securities during the Class Period. Excluded from the Class are Defendants and their families, the officers and directors of the Company at all relevant times, members of their immediate families
and their legal representatives, heirs, successors or assigns and any entity in which Defendants have
or had a controlling interest.
136. The members of the Class are so numerous that joinder of all members is
impracticable. The disposition of their claims in a class action will provide substantial benefits to the parties and the Court. Kodak has over 272.34 million shares of stock outstanding owned by
hundreds, if not thousands, of persons.
137. There is a well-defined community of interest in the questions of law and fact
involved in this case. Questions of law and fact common to the members of the Class that
predominate over questions which may affect individual Class members include:
(a) Whether the 1934 Act was violated by Defendants;
(b) Whether Defendants omitted and/or misrepresented material facts;
(c) Whether Defendants' statements omitted material facts necessary to make the
statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading;
(d) Whether Defendants knew or deliberately disregarded that their statements
were false and misleading;
(e) Whether the prices of Kodak publicly traded securities were artificially
inflated; and
(f) The extent of damages sustained by Class members and the appropriate
measure of damages.
138. Plaintiff's claims are typical of those of the Class because Plaintiff and the Class
sustained damages from Defendants' wrongful conduct.
- 55 - 806584_i 139. Plaintiff will adequately protect the interests of the Class and has retained counsel
who are experienced in class action securities litigation. Plaintiff has no interests that conflict with those of the Class.
140. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient
adjudication of this controversy.
COUNT I For Violation of Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act and Rule lOb-S Against All Defendants
141. Plaintiff incorporates §I, III and V-TX by reference.
142. During the Class Period, Defendants disseminated or approved the false statements
specified above, which they knew or deliberately disregarded were misleading in that they contained
misrepresentations and failed to disclose material facts necessary in order to make the statements
made, in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading.
143. Defendants violated §10(b) of the 1934 Act and Rule 1Ob-5 in that they:
(a) Employed devices, schemes and artifices to defraud;
(b) Made untrue statements of material facts or omitted to state material facts
necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they were
made, not misleading; or
(c) Engaged in acts, practices and a course of business that operated as a fraud or
deceit upon Plaintiff and others similarly situated in connection with their purchase of Kodak
publicly traded securities during the Class Period.
144. Plaintiff and the Class have suffered damages in that, in reliance on the integrity of the market, they paid artificially inflated prices for Kodak publicly traded securities. Plaintiff and the Class would not have purchased Kodak publicly traded securities at the prices they paid, or at all,
- 56 - 806584 1 if they had been aware that the market prices had been artificially and falsely inflated by Defendants' misleading statements.
COUNT II For Violation of Section 20(a) of the 1934 Act Against All Defendants
145. Plaintiff incorporates §I, III and V-TX by reference.
146. Defendants acted as controlling persons of Kodak within the meaning of §20(a) ofthe
1934 Act. By virtue of their positions with the Company and their ownership of Kodak stock,
Defendants had the power and authority to cause Kodak to engage in the wrongful conduct complained of herein. By reason of such conduct, Defendants are liable pursuant to §20(a) of the
1934 Act.
XI. PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment as follows:
A. Declaring this action to be a proper class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23;
B. Awarding Plaintiff and the members of the Class damages, including interest;
C. Awarding Plaintiff reasonable costs and attorney's fees; and
D. Awarding such equitable/injunctive or other relief as the Court may deem just and proper.
XII. JURY DEMAND
Plaintiff demands a trial by jury.
- 57- 806584 1 Case 1:1 2cv01 073HB Document 51 Filed 01/23/13 Page 61 of 100
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CERTIFICATE OF .
I, Kelly Stadelmann, hereby certify that on Januw r 23, 2013, I caused a true and
correct copy of the annexed:
Second Amended r Violation of the Federal Securities Laws
to !": (1) filed by hand with di k the Unurt of the Southern District of New York;