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The Christian Origins of Modern Science

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The Christian Origins of Modern Science Seattle Pacific University – iTunes U Transcription Well this morning, I’d like to talk to you about the origin of science. And of course, if you want to understand something, it’s desirable to know something about its origin. And I emphasize that I’m talking about the origin of modern science because the word science is used in the very general sense. You speak of the science of the ancient peoples, and so on. But I’m specifically talking about modern science. That is, the science which has developed over the last three of four hundred years, first of all in Europe then spreading all over the world. And it has transformed our civilization that we now have means of communication of transport, we have numerous devices to help our daily lives that was not present in any other civilization. And what modern science essentially is, is a detailed knowledge and understanding of the properties of matter expressed in differential equations and I’m speaking mainly of course of physics, which is the most basic of all the sciences and afterwards of course it just spreads out; this knowledge into the other sciences. And this first came into the world in its maturity, although as we shall see it, it had roots earlier in the past. The work of Newton in the 17th century, when he wrote down his three laws of motion and his theory of gravitation, and used those, solved those equations to show the motion of projectiles on the earth and the motions of the moon and the planets. And that was something which was quite new in human history. Detailed mathematical calculations, which enabled you to calculate very exactly the motions of the planets and the moons, and this could be tested to a high degree of numerical accuracy. And then in the subsequent centuries, this work was extended, and in the 19th century, Maxwell wrote down his equations and I was following John yesterday speak of them as beautiful equations, and they are very beautiful equations. Just 4 equations will describe all of electromagnetic phenomena. And then in the 20th century, the discoveries of the atomic world and the nuclear world were brought into the big scheme with the work of Schrodinger and others. And that is quite unique in human history. You look back over the great civilizations of the past, and you find achievements, great achievements in every other area of human endeavor. You find great skills in building magnificent monuments of the past. You find skills in ceramics, in woodwork, in metal work. You have developments of it in the mental world of the historians of ancient Greece, you have playwrights, you have artists. But you have nothing at all comparable to our modern science. And so that is a very remarkable thing which is often not sufficiently appreciated. Why, among all civilizations, do we have modern science? And that is what I want to talk about today. Now if we think about a civilization, I want to begin by asking “Now what characteristics of that civilization are necessary in order for science to begin? In order for science to be born? What must be the features of that civilization?” Well I think, first of all, it is necessary to certainly have a well-developed social structure so that the various activities are divided among different groups of people. So that means that not everybody has to worry day-to-day or hour-to-hour where the next meal is coming from. So there are people who are able to spend their time just thinking about things. And most of us are in that very happy situation. It’s a very great privilege looked over the whole of history to be able to spend our lives just studying and thinking and writing. Then, we need to have, for science to develop, some system of writing, some mathematics because that’s necessary, and some means of communication from one person to another. Now those are what I would call the material conditions of science. And I think that we can see that those are present in all the ancient civilizations, so that’s not going to answer why science arose in our present civilization. I want to suggest, and I would emphasize that of course in this talk, I’m ranging over a wide range of historical and theological and philosophical issues, and I can just suggest a few lines of thought which you might like to follow up yourselves afterwards. And I want to suggest that the reason why 1 Seattle Pacific University – iTunes U Transcription science develops or not develops in a particular civilization depends on the beliefs that we have about the material world. That is, we can believe certain things about the material world, and what those beliefs are determined whether science is at all likely to develop or not. Now, I just invite you to think along with me about what sort of beliefs that you have to have in order for science to have a chance at even beginning. First of all, I think we must believe that in some sense, the world is good. That if matter is good. Because if we thought that matter was somehow discreditable or not interesting, not worth our attention, then we would never become scientists. Then I think it’s also important that we should believe, and believe very strongly, that matter is rational and behaves in an ordinary way. So that if I find out anything today, it’s still going to be true tomorrow, it’s still going to be true in other places because science is a knowledge which is independent of place and time. So we have to believe that things behave in an orderly way. If we believe that things were chaotic, as other civilizations, they believe that matter was controlled by various demons who could do this and that, then you could never have any chance of developing science. Then we have to believe that somehow, the aim to understand the material work is a practicable one. That somehow the material work is open to our minds. Because if from, many of you of course have tried to do experiments, and you know unauthorable law of science is that if something can go wrong, it will go wrong. So it’s a very discouraging business, and you’ve got to be strongly convinced that in the end, you are going to win through and get somewhere. So a conviction to the world is open to the human mind. And then another belief which I think is necessary is if you discover anything about the material world, then this is not your own secret to cherish but it is something which you’ve got to share with other people. Because science, as we know it now, has been built up over the centuries of the labors of thousands of men and women who have freely shared their knowledge with each other. So those are some of the beliefs which I think are necessary and I think we can see just by introspection. Now, just one important belief that concerns the rationality of the world, the orderliness of the world, and that is we must, I think, believe in a particular type of order. There are 2 types of possibilities there. First of all, the order could be a necessary order. That is, that the order in the world cannot be other than it is. And if we believe that, then we are likely to say well since it’s the only possible, it’s rather like mathematics, all I need to do is sit in my study and think and I will be able to develop [physics just in the same way as I can develop mathematics. What we must believe is that the order in nature is another type which is called a contingent order. That is, it could be otherwise. There are various possible orders of nature. Various ways in which the world could be arranged and designed, but we don’t know that in advance and the only way to do that and to find out about it is to make experiments. So that is a special type of belief in the order of nature. That it is certainly orderly, but a contingent it could be otherwise. So, those, I think, are some of the beliefs which we must have in order for science to begin. And they must, of course, be spread throughout the whole of the civilization. And what I want to ask here is how do these beliefs come to be so firmly built into the European mind and not into the minds of the people in other civilizations. If you look at those other civilizations, which is a vast task, of course, you find that those beliefs are not present. Some are present, others are not present, and so you can understand why science didn’t develop in those ancient civilizations. One of the most brilliant of the ancient civilizations was that of Greece. And they certainly made a very important start in many respects. Particularly in mathematics. As you know, Euclid and several other Greek mathematicians developed these ideas of mathematics. And one of the great contributions of the Greeks was that they showed how to ask the right questions and that’s a very important first step is to 2 Seattle Pacific University – iTunes U Transcription ask the right question. Afterwards, then, you can try to find the right answer but if you never ask the right question, of course you’re not going to get anywhere.
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