Canadian Military History
Volume 19 Issue 2 Article 2
2010
Lost in Normandy The Odyssey of Worthington Force, 9 August 1944
Mike Bechthold
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Recommended Citation Mike Bechthold "Lost in Normandy The Odyssey of Worthington Force, 9 August 1944." Canadian Military History 19, 2 (2010)
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholars Commons @ Laurier. It has been accepted for inclusion in Canadian Military History by an authorized editor of Scholars Commons @ Laurier. For more information, please contact [email protected]. : Lost in Normandy The Odyssey of Worthington Force, 9 August 1944 Lost in Normandy The Odyssey of Worthington Force, 9 August 1944
Mike Bechthold
he lamentable story of speculated “it seems clear that the Abstract: The standard account of regiment, fighting its first battle, TWorthington Force is well Worthington Force is well known – on 9 known. During the second phase August 1944 during Operation Totalize and advancing across country with of Operation Totalize a battlegroup a battlegroup formed by the tanks of few landmarks and dealing with formed by the tanks of the British the British Columbia Regiment and scattered opposition as it did so, Columbia Regiment and the infantry the infantry of the Algonquin Regiment simply lost its way.”1 After setting was ordered to capture Point 195. of the Algonquin Regiment was Unbeknownst to anyone, including out for Point 195 in the early morning ordered to capture a piece of high the men of Worthington Force, the hours of 9 August the battlegroup ground known as Point 195. In the battlegroup lost its way in the dark encountered enemy fire diverting it pre-dawn darkness of 9 August 1944 and found itself on a different piece of from its intended route. As dawn the battlegroup set out on its mission. high ground, near Point 140, some six broke high ground, assumed to be kilometres northeast of their objective. Rather than capturing Point 195, Cut off from any support, Worthington their destination, was sighted directly they found themselves on a different Force was destroyed by concerted ahead. Stacey surmised that the piece of high ground, near Point 140, German attacks over the course of the battlegroup mistook a straight section some six kilometres northeast of their day. Based on new archival research and of the road running from Estrées-la- objective. Soon after daybreak the an examination of contemporary aerial Campagne to Mazières for the main photographs, this article will show how battlegroup was heavily attacked by the battlegroup lost its way as well as Caen-Falaise highway. After crossing German units in the area. Lieutenant- reveal that the battlegroup was not as this road the battlegroup found Colonel D.G. Worthington, the out of touch as previous accounts have a defensible position on the high commanding officer of the BCRs indicated. ground and dug in. The battlegroup and the overall commander of the was repeatedly attacked by German force, made the fateful decision to But nobody knew where to find forces until early evening when the stay put and await reinforcements. Worthington Force. Communications position was finally overun ending Unfortunately, nobody came to their with the battlegroup were lost before the desperate battle. How could this rescue. Though small bodies of troops noon on 9 August and the limited happen? That a battlegroup could get were able to escape, Worthington attempts to find it were focussed on lost and ultimately destroyed before Force was destroyed losing 240 men the vicinity of Point 195. Intermittent reinforcements could arrive was killed, wounded and captured, 47 radio communications between the unprecedented in Normandy, and tanks and numerous other armoured battlegroup and rear elements were perhaps in the course of the Second vehicles and half-tracks. made during the course of the day World War. The closest example was The odyssey of Worthington as were contacts with elements of the destruction of elements of the Force is one of the great enigmas of the Polish Armoured Division, the British 22nd Armoured Brigade at the Normandy campaign. In their artillery and aircraft of 2nd Tactical Villers-Bocage on 13 June 1944, but advance to Point 140 the battlegroup Air Force but the location of the it was never lost and its casualties crashed through the last major German battlegroup was never relayed to HQ were much lower than those of defensive line, effectively opening 4th Canadian Armoured Brigade Worthington Force.2 the way to Falaise. Reinforcing this (4th CAB). Until now this was our best breakthrough with additional troops How did Worthington Force understanding of the destruction might have caused the entire German get lost? C.P. Stacey, the official of the battlegroup. Recently, new front north of Falaise to collapse. historian of the Canadian army, photographic evidence has emerged.
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The Laurier Centre for Military (Gouvix) could not be identified. Strategic and Disarmament Studies Unfortunately a number of American possesses a collection of Second aircraft dropped their bombs short World War aerial reconnaissance hitting Canadian and Polish troops photographs. Among the hundreds causing over 350 casualties (including of boxes of images are a number more than 65 men killed). This friendly containing images taken on 9 August bombing caused serious difficulties 1944. A careful examination of these in the rear area, and to the Polish photographs reveals a great deal Armoured Division in particular, about the odyssey of Worthington but it did not prevent 4th Canadian
Force. The entire path of the Armoured Division (4th CAD) from 113649 PA Canada (LAC) Library and Archives battlegroup can be traced, from the starting their attack on time. The 10th British Columbia Regiment (BCR) Archives (BCR) Archives British Columbia Regiment time it left its harbour north of Canadian Infantry Brigade, led by the Cintheaux until its final arrival Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders southeast of Estrées-la-Campagne. of Canada, captured the villages of The air photos reveal information Cintheaux and Hautmesnil by last about the route of the battlegroup, light. Renewed German resistance, the resistance it encountered along however, prevented the expected the way, locations where tanks breakout. Lieutenant-General Guy and vehicles were destroyed and Simonds, the commander of 2nd evidence regarding German reactions Canadian Corps, was not satisfied to the breakthrough of the Canadian with this progress and during the force. Most importantly, the air course of the day was constantly photos provide evidence to support urging the armour to move faster.4 a new hypothesis about how the The disappointing pace on battlegroup got lost. This article will 8 August led Simonds to order re-examine the events of 9 August his armoured units to continue 1944 which culminated with the advancing in the dark. However, destruction of Worthington Force and night operations for tanks are difficult provide a better understanding of and Canadian and Polish armoured why and how things went so terribly units generally halted operations wrong. and withdrew to harbours to await Lieutenant-Colonel Donald Worthington dawn.5 The lack of a breakout also was the commanding officer of the * * * * * British Columbia Regiment. He was forced a reshuffling of assignments peration Totalize, launched late considered by Major-General George for the next day. Halpenny Force, Oon 7 August 1944, was a major Kitching, the commander of 4th composed of the Canadian Grenadier armoured offensive designed to break Canadian Armoured Division, to be “the Guards (CGG) and the Lake Superior outstanding regimental commander through the German positions south Regiment, was originally tasked in the armoured brigade…he was the of Caen and open the way to Falaise. youngest, full of energy and quick to to capture Point 195. The control At 2300 hours 1,020 Lancasters and seize an opportunity.” of this high ground was seen as Halifaxes of RAF Bomber Command essential for any advance to Falaise. commenced dropping 3,462 tons The momentum of the attack However, Halpenny Force had been of bombs to open the attack. The was to be maintained in the second unable to advance past Hautmesnil ground attack started 30 minutes phase of Totalize by committing 4th on 8 August. Brigadier E.L. Booth, later. The first phase of Totalize was Canadian and 1st Polish Armoured commander of the 4th CAB, now remarkably successful. The attack Divisions. Again the attack was ordered Halpenny Force to capture did not go exactly as planned but to be led by heavy bombers, this the village of Bretteville-le-Rabet in less than 24 hours the infantry of time supplied by the US Eighth Air while a fresh formation - Worthington the 2nd Canadian and 51st Highland Force. The bombing started at 1226 Force – was ordered to reach Point Divisions, supported by the 2nd hours on 8 August and was largely 195 by first light. The stage was Canadian and 33rd British Armoured accurate, hitting three of four targets now set for the dramatic events of 9 Brigades, had pushed more than (Bretteville-sur-Laize, St. Sylvain and August 1944.6 nine kilometres into the German Hautmesnil/Cauvicourt) with good defences.3 concentrations while a fourth target * * * * *
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Sherman tanks and other vehicles of the 4th Canadian Armoured Brigade await the order to move, 8 August 1944.
this advance, unlike the Governor officer, Lieutentant J.T. Jenkinson, The Breakthough General’s Foot Guard which lost two recorded, “As we left the conference, tanks to mine strikes. At last light, Col. Worthington commented quietly or the Algonquin Regiment, the the BCRs pulled into a laager north and off the record about the changes Ffirst day of operations was one of of Cintheaux where it “blackhorsed in the original plan. He recounted slow advances and great monotony. in an open field.”8 the Principles of War and how so The men boarded armoured half- Just before midnight on 8 August, many of them had been violated tracks in Vaucelles (just south of Lieutenant-Colonel Worthington was and that we would need luck if we Caen) before midnight on 7 August called to the brigade orders group (O were to, ‘bring it off.’”9 By the time shortly before the column headed Group). Brigadier Booth outlined the that Worthington returned to hold south. By dawn, the column had new plan. The Poles would not be able his own regimental orders group at advanced three kilometres and halted to move that night and the advance 0130 hours he was determined to be north of Ifs. They remained in this was to be led by Grenadier Guards positive. Worthington briefed the location most of the day and it was and BCR battlegroups. The normally officers of the BCRs and Algonquins here the unit witnessed American upbeat Worthington left the O Group on the new plan. Major J.H. Carson, bombers hit targets behind them. dismayed. The BCR’s intelligence officer commanding “B” Squadron, Major L.C. Monk, the commander of “B” Company, recalled, “What a situation, to see your own people bombed by your own people, without being able to do anything about it...It was a grim thing to witness just before going into battle.”7 Fortunately, the Algonquins escaped being hit by the bombs and their advance continued at 1700 hours. The column slowly passed through Rocquancourt which was still being cleared by Canadian Map drawn by Mike Bechthold ©2010 Mike by Map drawn infantry before pulling into a harbour with the British Columbia Regiment (BCR) just as it was getting dark. The experience of the BCRs that day was similar. The unit began its advance at 0130 hours and its move was equally slow due to the difficulty of moving an armoured column at night. No casualties were sustained during
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recalled that Worthington expected The tanks will do the fighting destroyed nine American bombers “merely a few second rate German on the way down. Keep moving; during the attacks of the previous formations holding feature 195 try to reach the objective before day.14 As the lead tanks of the column and vicinity.”10 Major Monk was daylight.11 passed between Hautmesnil and also present during this briefing Cavicourt they took fire from the and remembered the orders “as The column left its harbour south south, likely from this German something like this”: of Lorguichon at about 0230 hours in position. It was here that the seeds the pre-dawn darkness of 9 August of the disaster were sown.
The attacks have gone well today. 1944. Progress was slow as the column Lieutenant-Colonel Worthington 140822 PA LAC The enemy is disorganized - the received constant, though largely was faced with a tough decision. His higher command intend to take inconsequential, German machine orders were clear - Simonds wanted advantage of the situation and gun fire. By about 0400 hours the his battlegroup entrenched on Point push on. column reached Cintheaux. The lead 195 by daybreak. The direct route The Polish Division will be formation, “C” Squadron, was forced to his objective was not available operating on our left. We will to halt for 15-30 minutes to deal with to him. Bretteville-le-Rabet was likely be beyond our artillery this opposition emanating from a tree still held in some strength. The support, but may have some air line extending east of Cintheaux. This village was supposed to have been co-operation. The Algonquin was eventually neutralized as was cleared by Halpenny Force but it had Regiment is under command. The machine gun fire emanating from the started late and its lead squadron Brigadier’s intention is to seize the church in Cauvicourt.12 More serious was arriving at the same time as high ground feature, spot height resistance was encountered a little Worthington Force. As the BCR war 195... farther south in the triangle formed diary recorded, “it was undecided My intention is to seize and hold by the quarry south of Hautmesnil, for a moment or two whether we this feature until the rest of our Bretteville-le-Rabet and Cauvicourt. should wait for them to clear the town troops can reach us. The terrain the battlegroup was or not. Then the CO gave the order Method - we will move out of passing over was heavily scarred ‘Move on anyway, while we still this harbour, cross the highway by the American bombing of the have surprise.’”15 There was a great at MR (guess 080547) about 300 previous day but this does not seem deal of confusion. In order to keep yards south of where we are now, to have seriously affected German moving the battlegroup maneuvered pass through the Lake Superiors defences in this area. There was a east to avoid German fire to their who are dug in at this point, German gun position containing four front and the CGG to their right. It advance south on the east side of 88 mm dual purpose anti-aircraft was a clear night but the moon was the highway, taking advantage guns and six smaller-calibre anti- only in its first quarter and did not of ground until opposite the aircraft guns in an open field on the provide much light for navigation. objective, then recross the highway north edge of Bretteville-le-Rabet.13 Visibility was further degraded by an and assault the hill from the south- This position contributed to the early morning ground fog as well as east. “intense and accurate flak” which the dust generated by the armoured
A line of 4th Canadian Armoured Division Sherman tanks head south on the Caen-Falaise highway on the afternoon of 8 August 1944.
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vehicles. 16 Crossing the bomb- cratered wheatfields the battlegroup came upon a wide straight road. In France, where narrow, twisted roads were the norm, this, they believed, could only be the Caen-Falaise highway. The lead elements of the battlegroup immediately turned 90
LAC PA 140822 PA LAC degrees to their right and increased speed to follow the road which would lead them to their objective. Their navigation was confirmed as the first glimmers of sun began to appear in the east. As the BCR war diary related: “High ground was sighted and we headed for it.”17 U n fortunately, the road discovered by the battlegroup was not the main highway. The Chemin Haussé du duc Guillaume (the raised road of Duke William) was indeed wide and straight at the point where it was crossed by the battlegroup, but it did not lead to Point 195. This ancient road had been ordered constructed by William the Conqueror to mark the route of his escape from the vicinity of Valognes through the intervening territory to Bayeux and then on to Falaise. A straight section from Laize-la- Ville (east of the Orne River) to just west Rouvre was still in existence in 1944, nearly nine centuries after its construction.18 Aerial reconnaissance photos taken mid-morning on 9 August clearly show the route taken by
Top: Captain Lyle Monk watches Corporal Jack Richmond demonstrate the handling of a Sten gun at the Algonquin Regiment’s barracks in England, 22 November 1943. Monk would subsequently be promoted major commanding “B” Company. Middle: Major Tommy Baron (second from right), officer commanding “C” Squadron of the BCRs, poses with his tank crew before the battle. Bottom: Officers of the British Columbia Regiment. In the front row (from left to right) are Major Baron, Major G.R. Sidenius, the “A” Squadron commander, Colonel Whyte and Lieutenant-Colonel Worthington. Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2010 9 5
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Worthington Force. The battlegroup assumed they had stumbled upon objective. In fact the Chemin Haussé initially followed the Caen-Falaise the Caen-Falaise highway. After led straight to their destruction.19 highway, but soon left the highway crossing the road they immediately From the narrow vision slits of and continued their advance south turned to the right and followed this their tanks and in the gloom of the parallel to the highway. Just south road to what they thought was their early morning the terrain fit what of Cintheaux the battlegroup headed to the southeast and passed west of Top: This oblique aerial photograph, taken on 26 July 1944, shows the intended route of Cauvicourt. After passing the village Worthington Force as a solid line. When the battlegroup approached Bretteville-le-Rabet they discovered that the village was still being cleared by Halpenny Force so Lieutenant- it briefly moved south. At this point Colonel Worthington made the decision to skirt the village and continue on to Point it began to take fire from German 195 (dashed line). The dotted line shows the direction the battlegroup actually took. positions north of Bretteville-le- Above: This oblique aerial photograph, also taken on 26 July 1944, shows the actual Rabet. Wheeling to the left (due route taken by Worthington Force. The position where they ended up is just visible in east) to avoid the enemy gunscreen the top left corner of the photo. it travelled about half a kilometre Opposite: This aerial photograph, taken on 9 August 1944, contains the evidence before crossing the Chemin Haussé. which shows how Worthington Force got lost. The prominent straight road starting at The fog of war now took over. In the the top left corner and extending to the centre of the photo is the Chemin Haussé du confusion of battle and with poor duc Guillaume. The tracks in the field made by Worthington Force show that as the battlegroup move south, roughly parallel to the Caen-Falaise highway (just off the photo visibility the lead elements of the BCR to the left) it moved west where it encountered the Chemin Haussé. After crossing this lost track of their position. When they wide, straight road the battlegroup immediately wheeled to the right and continued crossed the wide, straight section of to follow this road all the way to its final position near Hill 111. It is believed that in the Chemin Haussé they must have the confusion of the early morning battle, with visibility obscured by smoke, mist and dust, this road was mistaken for the Caen-Falaise highway. https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol19/iss2/210 6
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The aerial photographs taken on 9 August 1944 capture the tragedy of Worthington Force. This image shows the area immediately to the west of their final position. A number of burning vehicles can be seen. The two on the left centre of the image almost certainly belong to “A” Squadron which was almost entirely destroyed before reaching the rectangular wood. The white smoke emanating from the tree line below the road at the top centre of the photo is most likely a German position that has been destroyed by the battlegroup while it is impossible to tell the identity of the vehicles on the road.
they expected to find. They were at Point 195, “No evidence of enemy Algonquins, “B” and “C,” were able following a straight road which they occupation - but recent signs. Few to catch up with Carson’s squadron. intended to cross on their right and lorries destroyed, slit trenches and Major Monk deployed 10 Platoon to find a height of land which was their tools about. We are holding until our check out Estrées, but they quickly objective. This description fits both friends come fwd to consolidate.”21 returned and reported the village their intended route to Point 195 and At this point nobody knew that to be unoccupied. By the time his their actual route to Point 140. Worthington Force was far removed men had returned from their recce The rapid pace of the advance and from its objective. In fact, the the tanks along with “C” Company the concealment provided by the half battlegroup was 2000 metres due east had disappeared over the hill so light of dawn allowed the vanguard of Estrées-la-Campagne near Point Monk followed their tracks. Upon of the battlegroup to proceed with 111,22 and over 6000 metres northeast arrival at Point 111 he realized that limited German intervention. The of Point 195. Neither Worthington 10 Platoon was missing so after Sherman tanks of the BCRs led the nor Brigadier Booth knew that the reporting to Lieutenant-Colonel A.J. way firing at any potential targets battlegroup was lost. This had two Hay, the commanding officer of the along the way. The BCR war diary deadly consequences. There would Algonquins, he set out to find his remarked that some haystacks be no reinforcements, and even missing men: exploded when fired upon while more importantly, there would be machine gun bullets ricocheted off no protection or support from the By the time I reached them, they had other haystacks. South of Cauvicourt artillery. all but annihilated a German gun the lead tanks passed through a small During the advance to the position consisting of about 30 all wood containing enemy troops. “As objective the battlegroup became ranks, 2 88 mm guns and about 10 we approached…we sighted enemy spread out. As dawn broke, “B” motorcycles. The platoon which had soft skin vehicles, armoured cars, and Squadron of the BCRs, lagging been trailing the rest of the company half-tracks. These were duly shot up behind the vanguard, stopped north by about 200 yards, had been fired at as we proceeded and many of the of Estrées-la-Campagne to check by this German position. Lieutenant enemy were killed.”20 their location. After consulting his Clare Dutcher, 10 Platoon commander, The Regimental Headquarters map Major J.H. Carson, the squadron without hesitation, changed the course (RHQ) and “C” Squadron of the commander, realized the battlegroup of his two vehicles, and rushed the BCRs did not stop until they reached was in the wrong place. He was in position headlong, debusing on top the high ground shortly before the process of reorienting his force to of the Germans. They killed all but 0650 hours. Lieutenant-Colonel advance to Point 195, and had already five who were taken prisoner. The Worthington made the decision to despatched his No.2 Troop to the motorcycles and guns were put out create a fortress position inside a correct objective, when he received of action. The German prisoners were rectangular field on a piece of high a radio order from Worthington to terrified, and with good reason since ground that offered good visibility “advance to high ground in front.” in the excitement of the moment, of the surrounding countryside. At Carson had no choice but to join the the bayonet had been freely used. 0650 hours Worthington reported to rest of the battlegroup.23 During this This whole episode took less than 15 HQ 4th CAB that they had arrived pause the two lead companies of the minutes.24
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way forward as “A” Major A.K.J. Stirling, the commander Squadron was being of “D” Company, to hold back until destroyed. He recalls: his tanks had cleared the way. When Stirling realized what was happening We suddenly saw that to the tanks he tried to take his A Squadron, which was company forward, but was unable to slightly off to our left, move due to heavy mortar, tank, anti- were having a tough tank and machine gun fire directed time of it. These were at his men. After trying without luck the first Shermans that to contact the rest of the regiment we had actually seen Stirling withdrew his men to a hill destroyed in battle. We overlooking Bretteville-le-Rabet. had seen many films Stirling sent a fighting patrol into the of the 8th Army in town where they linked up with the action in Africa, with Lake Superior Regiment who were smoke slowly curling clearing the town. After committing out of the turrets on his company to complete this task knocked out tanks, but Stirling was ordered late in the day
LCMSDS Air Photo 3/3190 Air Photo LCMSDS not so with Shermans. to St. Hillaire Farm north of Point 195 When a Sherman was which they captured without a fight. hit by anti-tank fire, They were joined here early on 10 particularly from the August by the remaining elements 88, there seems to be an of the battalion. Neither “A” or “D” immediate explosion Companies of the Algonquins were and flames roared 20 able to join the rest of the battalion or 30 feet out of the at Point 111.28 This rectangular wood is the final position of Worthington top of the turret. This Force. This air photograph, taken on the morning of 9 August was followed by two of * * * * * 1944, allows us to see the Sherman tanks of the British three explosions of high Columbia Regiment arrayed around the perimeter of the field. octane gas and the high The Fight on the Hill Worthington’s tank and command post are visible around the tree near the centre of the position. The small white squares explosive shells and and the white line in the position are air recognition panels the ammunition racks he calm which surrounded the displayed to prevent attacks by friendly aircraft. exploding. As I watched Tarrival of the battlegroup at Point through binoculars, the 111 belied the firestorm that was soon After neutralizing this position first tank that I saw hit was that to be unleashed. Worthington had 10 Platoon joined the rest of the of Captain Ray Tiffen, the Battle established his troops on a defensible battlegroup on the objective. Captain of A Squadron. What I piece of high ground that he thought Not all the subunits from described suddenly happened and to be (or be near) Point 195. His Worthington Force made it to Point his whole tank became a roaring position was in a rectangular field 111. “A” Squadron of the BCRs along torch of flame. Most of the rest of the 300 yards long by 100 yards wide. with “D” Company of the Algonquins squadron followed suit.26 It offered good visibility and fields were last in the order of march. Upon of fire over the surrounding terrain. reaching the vicinity of Estrées- Though the squadron claimed the It also provide some protection as la-Campagne the Shermans came destruction of two Tiger tanks and it was bounded on the south by a under fire from an enemy force. By an anti-tank gun, as many as 17 wooded area, to the west by a broken this time the tanks had lost the cover Shermans from the squadron were hedge and small thicket, to the north of darkness. What followed was a destroyed. Only two tanks from “A” by a thin line of tall trees and to the daylight, close quarter battle with Squadron were able to break through east by stubble fields.29 Worthington an enemy armoured force supported and join up with the regiment.27 had ample time to establish his by anti-tank guns. The outcome The men of the Algonquins’ defensive positions, but he did was never in doubt. “A” Squadron “D” Company could only watch not know that he had stirred up a was annihilated.25 Lieutenant John helplessly while this was taking hornet’s nest. The German reaction Stock, commander of No.4 Troop, place. Major G.R. Sidenius, the “A” to this penetration of their line was “B” Squadron, was still making his Squadron commander, ordered swift and unmerciful. The Canadian
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and British attacks at the start of available 31 Shermans and one was knocked out by fire from unseen Operation Totalize the previous day light recce tank.32 The tanks were German guns soon after leaving the had penetrated the main German positioned around the perimeter of battlegroup position. At 0900 hours a line of resistance and smashed the the field, interspersed with the half- second force, composed of two troops 89th Infantry Division. The night tracks which had carried the infantry. from “B” Squadron, was send out to of 8/9 August was spent trying to Lieutenant-Colonel Hay similarly capture 30 Acres Wood.35 Lieutenant piece together a new line to hold the deployed his infantry. “C” Company John Stock’s No.4 Troop (down to Allied advance. The 12th SS Hitler was placed along the southeast and two tanks) led the way to the wood Youth Panzer Division, commanded southwest edges of the wood while while Lieutenant John Scudamore’s by SS-Oberführer Kurt Meyer was “B” Company covered the northern No.3 Troop provided covering fire now holding the line. By this point portions. The 3-inch mortars of the and smoke. Despite heavy fire Stock in the Normandy Campaign the mortar platoon were situated in the and his troop sergeant made it to 12th SS was a shadow of its former southwest corner of the wood. “D” the copse where they discovered self having been heavily mauled, Company was tasked to cover the a network of enemy bunkers and primarily by the Canadians, over northwest and southwest edges of trenches. He was in the process of the previous two months. However, the wood, but it never arrived. The firing high explosive shells into the it was still a formidable force. Meyer infantry were not bothered as they position when his tank came under redeployed his forces to prevent a prepared their positions, but they fire. The first shot, fired by a Tiger breakthrough to Falaise. The heights found it very difficult to dig trenches tank, narrowly missed and hit a large north of Mazières and Rouvres were in the hard gravel fields.33 tree next to the Sherman. The German covered by Kampfgruppe Krause; After reporting back to Wünsche, gunner did not miss the second time from Point 140 to the Caen-Falaise Meitzel returned to the area seeking as he put his shot through the front highway north of Quesnay were to obtain more information on the right sponson of Stock’s Sherman, held by Kampfgruppe Wallmüller; Canadians’ intentions. A shell from killing the co-driver and igniting the Point 195 and its approaches was a Sherman tank destroyed Meitzel’s fuel and ammunition. The resulting held by the 3rd Battalion, 26th Panzer armoured car and he was thrown explosion blew the rest of the crew, Grenadier Regiment along with from the turret, breaking his arm in including Stock, out of the tank. stragglers from 89th Division. The the process. He was quickly made a Subsequent shots knocked out the tanks of the division, along with 501st prisoner by a Canadian tank crew.34 tank of Sergeant George Wallbank. SS Tiger Battalion, were positioned Worthington Force did not come Major Carson and his battle captain, in Quesnay Woods.30 The depth under serious fire until about 0800 Johnny Hope, also had their tanks of the advance by Worthington hours, over an hour after their arrival. destroyed as they moved forward Force was first discovered by SS- In their advance to Point 111 the to join Stock. Aerial photographs Obersturmführer Bernhard-Georg Canadians had passed through taken mid-morning on 9 August pay Meitzel who had been sent from elements of Kampfgruppe Krause mute testament to this engagement Quesnay Woods to Point 140 to which had been ordered to take up showing the burning hulks of the located Kampfgruppe Waldmüller. new defensive positions exactly where Canadian tanks beside the wood.36 As he approached Point 140 his Worthington Force now sat. The After the tanks were destroyed light armoured car was fired on result was a sporadic and disjointed Major Carson led some of the by the lead tanks of the BCRs who initial response to the Canadian survivors into the wood where they were already in the area. Meitzel’s battlegroup. Harassing fire targeted “annihilated one enemy section of vehicle was not hit and he was the Canadians from a small wood infantry.”37 Back at the main position able to return to Quesnay Woods. (referred to on modern topographic Worthington watched the destruction Upon receiving Meitzel’s report SS- maps as 30 Acres Wood) located on a of his tanks and made arrangements Obersturmbannführer Max Wünsche piece of higher ground 700 metres to to rescue the survivors. He told immediately organized his tanks to the south. At the same time fire was Lieutenant Jenkinson to take a half- launch an attack on the Canadian also directed at the Canadians from track to bring back the wounded. The position lest they establish a firm hold the northeast. The tanks deployed driver assigned to the mission did not on the ground.31 around the perimeter of the field at think much of the task, answering, Worthington calmly organized Point 111 returned fire, but with no “who me?” when told he was to drive his defences. Command of the tanks definite targets their response was the carrier. was delegated to Major T.B. Baron, ineffective. Worthington attempted Before the carrier arrived Stock officer commanding “C” Squadron. to eliminate this fire. One troop of helped to get his remaining members At this point in the day he had tanks was sent to the north but it of his crew back to the battlegroup
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at Point 111. Along the way he came men finally had something concrete 195. An hour later another request for across Sergeant Wallbank: at which to shoot. Major Carson a location check received the same estimated that this attack was made answer. This was the last recorded I found him stretched on the ground by about 200 infantry and four message between HQ 4th CAB and moaning, with one foot completely tanks. It was defeated with heavy Worthington Force.43 Major-General blown off and the boot lying about casualties.40 The Germans made George Kitching, commander of 4th four feet from the stump with a long numerous attempts during the course CAD, and Brigadier Booth became piece of achilles tendon still attached. of the day to break into the Canadian “deeply disturbed” by the silence George had always been a great position, but each attempt was coming from Worthington Force. athlete and he always stated that he repelled, often with heavy German Most of the chatter recorded in the 4th would rather get it completely than losses. CAB radio log on 9 August related lose a limb. He was staring down at Soon after the battlegroup to their attempts to get information the stump of his leg and looked up defeated the first major German on the location of the missing at me and said, “You still have your counterattack, Worthington held battlegroup. The first attempt to find pistol, kill me.” I tried to assure him an improvised orders group at his Worthington Force was made at 0914 that all would be well and reached tank near the centre of the position. hours when the Governor General’s in my battle dress for a morphine Present were Worthington, Hay, Foot Guard (GGFG) were ordered syrette…After a few minutes George Stock, and Major W.S. Macpherson, to proceed to Point 195. Though relaxed a bit from the effects of the commander of “C” Company, urged repeatedly to get moving, the morphine.38 along with his company sergeant- GGFG did not start forward until major, A.J. Primeau. As the men late afternoon when they completed Stock was in no shape to help were talking a German armour- the clearance of Bretteville-le-Rabet. Wallbank to safety. Indeed when he piercing round struck the side of A great deal of effort was expended arrived back at the main position he Worthington’s command tank. CSM to locate the missing battlegroup but needed immediate first aid to deal Primeau was killed in the blast and nobody thought to look outside the with his painful burns. Jenkinson a fragment struck Hay severing immediate vicinity of Point 195. remembered that Stock was virtually his leg. A tourniquet was placed A clear indication of this comes unrecognizable due to the swelling of on Hay’s leg to stop the bleeding. from the reaction of Major-General his face. In spite of the German fire Macpherson assumed command Kitching. He stated in his memoirs the half-track made it to the survivors of the Algonquins even though his that he thought the battlegroup had and Lieutenant Jenkinson helped to back was filled with sharpnel as a overshot its objective and ended administer first aid to those in need. result of the same shell.41 Major Monk up further south in the vicinity of A series of German near-misses estimated that by late morning over Potigny. Brigadier J.N. Lane, the showered the group with dirt and half the tanks that made it to Point commander Royal Artillery of 4th shrapnel and injured a number of 111 had been destroyed. CAD, set off in his personal Auster men including Lieutenant Jenkinson. About noon Worthington ordered aircraft to search for the battlegroup. The half-track driver took a number the remaining half tracks to collect the of wounded men back to the main wounded and make a “mad dash to This remarkable air photo captures group leaving the rest to crawl back, safety.” The vehicles were loaded the battle in progress during the early including Jenkinson and Sergeant with Lieutenant-Colonel Hay, Major afternoon of 9 August 1944. The half- Wallbank who was missing a foot.39 Carson, and Lieutenants Stock and tracks have departed the battlegroup position to carry the wounded to They were able to make it back on Jenkinson, among others. The half- safety but the results of the morning’s their own. tracks displayed prominent red engagements are still evident. To the By 0930 hours all the survivors crosses, but were still fired on as they north of the rectangular field are the had returned to the position. The ran the gauntlet to safety. At least two burning Shermans that Worthington entire affair at 30 Acre Wood had of the six carriers, and perhaps more, sent out to deal with German fire coming 42 from that direction (See 1). At the lasted only 30 minutes. made it to Allied lines. bottom of the photo is 30 Acre Wood The first major counterattack While the fight was taking place and the still burning Shermans of Major on the Canadian position was made at 30 Acres Wood the battlegroup still Carson, Captain Hope, Lieutenant Stock at about 1000 hours. It came as had no clear idea of its true location. At and Sergeant Wallbank (See 2). All the something of a relief to the men 0748 hours HQ 4th CAB radioed the tracks in the fields south and east of 30 Acre Wood belong to enemy forces. defending the position as German BCRs requesting their position. The At least one German tank has been mortar fire on the position was reply came seven minutes later that captured in this photo (See 3). suspended during the attack and the they were on their objective at Point
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1 2
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In 1945 members of the British Columbia Regiment returned to the rectangular field near Point 111 and found many of their Shermans still sitting where they had been destroyed on 9 August 1944. Photos on these two pages courtesy of the British Columbia Regiment on these two Photos
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Though he could not cross over the front line, he flew straight down the main highway until he could see Falaise. The location of Worthington Force would have been clearly visible to him at the height he was flying and its exact position would have been obvious with the thick columns o f b l a c k s m o k e emanating from the knocked out Shermans. However, if opportunity of finding the lost somebody in the CGG who were still he did see them he must have believed battlegroup. The first Allied troops fighting in Bretteville-le-Rabet. There the tanks belonged to the Poles and contacted by the casualties who were is no record that the CGG relayed this was not the missing battlegroup.44 evacuated was Lieutenant J.E. Brooks message back to brigade. The apparent radio silence from of the reconnaissance troop. He had Though Worthington was unable
Photos on these two pages courtesy of the British Columbia Regiment on these two Photos Worthington Force was caused by been ordered to hold near Bretteville- to contact brigade headquarters, the deteriorating fortunes of the now le-Rabet. Brooks’ after-action report he was in contact with his supply trapped battlegroup. The arrival notes that he talked to Lieutenant echelon during the course of the day. of two surviving tanks from “A” Stock who “gave me a message At 1100 hours Regimental Sergeant- Squadron brought the unwelcome from the CO [Worthington] to the Major Jay, the officer commanding news that their approach route effect that the regiment could hold the Admin Report Centre, received a was now closed. The destruction the position with some assistance message from Worthington to bring of the tanks at 30 Acres Wood and also that their position was in forward the reserve of ammunition. signalled the arrival of the German Square 0947.”46 Unfortunately, this His attempt was prevented by heavy armour sent by Wünsche to deal map reference placed the battlegroup German fire which destroyed at least with the battlegroup. According the just north of Point 195 and nearly six one of his vehicles, a Crusader anti- Kurt Meyer’s memoirs, Wünsche kilometres from their actual location. aircraft tank. Jay contacted elements despatched five Tigers directly from The communications difficulties did of the Polish Armoured Division Quesnay Wood to attack Point 140 not end there as Brooks was unable who were operating in the area, from the west while sending a second to contact brigade headquarters and but their attempt to deal with the group of 15 Panthers around to attack instead passed the message on to German resistance also resulted in from the east. The Panthers would act as the hammer to the Tigers’ anvil.45 The battlegroup was out of touch with the higher e c h e l o n s o f command during most of the day, b u t t h e r e w e r e numerous contacts with Allied units during the course of the day that held the tantalizing
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the loss of a number of Polish tanks. absence we were suffering heavy Jay stated, “The air conditions [radio casualties from the mortar and arty reception] was very bad and I had fire which surrounded us.50 trouble getting through to my unit. I last heard from the CO at 1415 Kurt Meyer was dismissive of the role hours, but spoke to his operator of air power during the battle stating several times until 1500 hours then that even though his tanks were out all communications were lost to us. in the open and “looked like targets I then tried to contact Brigade on on a range,” the Typhoons ignored the Q link but could not get through his men and directed their attack to them.”47 Though it is unknown against the Canadian positions.51 if Worthington was ever able to Meyer records only the one air attack communicate the battlegroup’s true courtesy BCR Photos and it is likely that he is describing location to RSM Jay, it is of great note only the initial appearance of the RAF that he was in regular contact with on the battlefield and not any of their him for most of the day and none of subsequent attacks. these messages were received at, or The battlegroup received limited forwarded, to brigade. support during the afternoon from The battlegroup received regular the 1st Polish Armoured Division as it support throughout the day from advanced south from St. Sylvain. Like the Royal Air Force. According to the RAF, they too initially fired on Major Monk, two Hawker Typhoons the Canadians but once recognition appeared over the Canadians “fairly smoke was released the friendly early in the morning.” After circling fire stopped. The Poles attempted the position the aircraft attacked the to drive forward to support the battlegroup with rockets and cannon Canadians. Approximately 1500 fire. The RAF pilots would have been metres from the battlegroup the thrilled to find such a target - dozens Germans recognized the threat posed of tanks and other vehicles in the by the Poles and began to concentrate open beyond the bombline on which their fire on them. This provided a they had been briefed. As it was temporary, but desperately welcome, in an area where no Allied forces relief for the Canadians. A further were known, or supposed to be, the advance brought the Poles within pilots attacked. The Canadians were The RAF returned at regular half- 300 metres of the Canadian position quick to get out recognition signals hour intervals and attacked German where they broke up a German which were acknowledged by the positions all around Point 111 where formation massing to attack the aircraft overhead. The recognition they were “heartily cheered many battlegroup. Despite their attempts panels are clearly visible in the aerial times during the day.”48 On one to move forward the Poles sustained reconnaissance photos taken before particular occasion “C” Company serious losses and were forced to noon. What is not clear is why word of the Algonquins saw “the enemy withdraw without making direct of the battlegroup’s location was mustering on the high ground to contact with the battlegroup. By not relayed to army headquarters. the south [in the vicinity of 30 Acres late afternoon there was no further The RAF continued to support the Wood]. However, the Typhoons support provided by the Poles and battlegroup throughout the day. It arrived back and strafed the enemy intense German fire once again was must be questioned why there was who were caught in the open and directed at the Canadians.52 no communication between the RAF suffered heavily.”49 Lieutenant Ken Another avenue of contact for the and army headquarters. Would the Gartley, the officer commanding battlegroup was through the artillery RAF not report the presence of a 11 Platoon, “B” Company of the net. Captain M.A. Baker of the substantial and unexpected Allied Algonquins, also praised the air 19th Field Regiment was one of the force beyond the bombline? And support: forward observation officers (FOOs) if such a report was made, would assigned to the battlegroup. He was the army not make every effort Our rocket-firing Typhoons…gave in radio contact with his regiment to determine the identity of this us good support by silencing the throughout the day, and as late as force? But, this did not happen. enemy guns. However in their 1830 hours he reported, “enemy
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attacking with heavy mortaring.”53 to Allied lines. Also, “D” Company As the Germans swarmed into the Lieutenant Ken Gartley recalls that of the Algonquins never made it to position, small groups of men made about noon one of the forward Hill 111 but they had advanced far their escape as best they could. Some observation officers, possibly Baker, enough forward to know the general reached Allied lines that night while contacted an artillery command post direction taken by the battlegroup. others returned with harrowing tales in the rear. The battery fired three Somehow none of this information after many nights on the run. rounds of smoke, but it fell some made it to anyone who could send Worthington Force fought 1800 metres short.54 This intriguing support for the lost men. gallantly, but the battlegroup information indicates that someone By late afternoon it was clear the was destroyed and losses were in the Canadian lines was aware of end was near for the battlegroup. catastrophic. The BCRs, in their first the location of Worthington Force, Worthington held out hope that relief battle, lost 47 tanks (44 Shermans, 2 but the information was not shared was imminent and intended to fight Stuarts, 1 Crusader) and suffered 112 with anyone who could intervene. to the finish. He had maintained his casualties (40 killed, 38 wounded and In spite of all these outside cool all day long, calmly directing the 34 prisoners of war). Over two days, contacts, the battlegroup was unable battle. He emerged unscathed from 9 and 10 August, the Algonquins to relay their location to anyone the shell that killed CSM Primeau suffered 128 casualties (45 men killed with the ability to intervene in their and severely wounded Lieutenant- or died of wounds, 38 wounded situation. Colonel Hay in the morning, one of and 45 prisoners of war). The vast his many close calls during the day. majority of these would undoubtably * * * * * His luck ran out at approximately have come from the two companies at ate in the afternoon, perhaps 1730 hours. Worthington was Point 111. Stacey’s opinion resonates Laround 1500 or 1530 hours, dealing with yet another German well: “Such losses would have been Worthington took stock of their counterattack and had just visited deeply regrettable even had they been situation. He realized that his the Algonquin mortar platoon the price of success. Unfortunately, remaining infantry were well when a mortar bomb landed at his they were suffered in the course of entrenched and he made the decision feet killing him instantly.56 Major a tactical reverse which did much to to evacuate his remaining tanks. At Macpherson assumed command of prevent us from seizing a strategical this point only eight tanks of his the battlegroup. He agreed with Major opportunity of the first magnitude.”58 original 55-60 that had started the Monk to attempt the extrication of the advance were still mobile. These survivors once darkness fell. German * * * * * Shermans broke out of the position pressure on the position continued and all but one were able to link up to constrict the perimeter, bringing The Dénouement with Polish forces. A liaison officer infantry and armour within a couple with the Poles reported this event to hundred metres of the Canadian ong after the battle had HQ 4th CAB at 1500 hours but this battlegroup. Lieutenant Gartley was Lfinished, aerial reconnaissance information does not appear to have there at the end: photographs have given us a look provided Booth or Kitching with any back in time. Stacey’s explanation information upon which they could At last light the Germans started that the battlegroup mistook the east- act.55 to line up an attack to wipe out the west road at Estrées-la-Campagne One of the most remarkable remainder of the attacking force for the north-south Caen-Falaise aspects of this drama is that the that had moved in so boldly that highway does not make sense. The battlegroup had repeated contacts morning. The first information of this battlegroup was already off course with Allied forces during the course was in C Coy area when we heard by the time it had advanced that far of 9 August, but this did not generate machine gun and rifle fire; thence the south. The error in navigation was intelligence that allowed 4th CAB to roars of a tank and the shouting of made much earlier. Stacey was right positively influence the battle. The infantry. Almost simultaneously we that the battlegroup followed the RAF was aware of the location of the hear shouting to our rear as another wrong road, but it was the Chemin battlegroup as were the Poles, radio force was moving in from east to Haussé south of Cauvicourt that contact had been made with RSM Jay west along the dead ground…Lt. they misidentified. It was close to the and at least one artillery unit, and Blais had the fwd pl in C Coy and Caen-Falaise highway. It was wide two separate groups had escaped was taken prisoner along with his and straight where the battlegroup (the half-tracks with the wounded men when they were overrun.57 picked it up, and in the darkness, at noon and the eight tanks later in dust, smoke, chaos and confusion the day) and run the gauntlet back of the unit’s first battle, it appeared
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to go in the correct direction. To Baker was lost after he reported that complete the perfect deception, as the enemy was attacking supported the first shadows of doubt crept by heavy mortaring.61 No where is into the minds of those leading the it recorded what, if any, artillery battlegroup, dawn broke over the support was provided to Baker battlefield revealing a tantalizing by his regiment. There are many piece of high ground directly in unanswered questions here. Did front of them. It could only be their Baker have continuous contact with objective. Worthington ordered the his regiment during the course of the battlegroup to make for the heights Bechthold Mike by Photo day, or do the recorded messages as quickly as possible so as not to represent the only contacts he was lose the element of surprise. Though able to make? By the afternoon of the the Canadians arrived at the wrong 9th Baker should have been aware location and missing some of its that he was not at Point 195. Why was elements, it was still a formidable this information not conveyed to his entity, entrenched on favourable regiment? Or, if it was, why was it ground of its own choosing. The The Worthington Force memorial near not shared with brigade or divisional bold advance by the battlegroup had Point 111. The plaque reads: headquarters?62 stolen the initiative from the Germans IN MEMORIUM The difficulties of the field and forced the enemy to take steps to regiments meant that 11th Medium To the soldiers of the 28th Canadian react to the Canadian breakthrough. Armoured Regiment (The British Regiment was the only possible The fatal problem on 9 August was Columbia Regiment) CAC and the source of artillery support for not the navigation error, but the Algonquin Regiment who, on the 9 Worthington Force during most of inability of the Canadian command August 1944 in the surrounding area of the day. The British FOO assigned Hill 140 Gave their Lives for Freedom. and control system to react to the to the BCRs was Captain M.A. unexpected event and turn a negative GREATER LOVE HATH NO MAN Searle. Upon joining the unit on into a positive. the evening of 8 August, he stated, Artillery support for the Unfortunately, in the words of the “This regiment looked extremely battlegroup completely failed on 9 unit’s history, “The regiment pulled good, very friendly fellows...[who] August 1944. Three units – 19th and a boner.” The regiment’s adjutant gave me the impression they were 23rd Field Regiments, and the British incorrectly deciphered the new map going to ‘bust the show wide open.’” 11th Medium Regiment, along with coordinates and the unit ended up Unfortunately, Searle’s OP tank a FOO from each regiment – were over three kilometres northwest of broke down just as the advance was allocated to support the battlegroup. their assigned position. This mistake starting and he was forced to hitch It was clear from the start, however, took the regiment out of the battle a ride in the tank of Major Carson. that the field regiments would not be for most of the day and they did not The wireless was not working in this able to support the initial moves of arrive at their new position between tank, and Searle’s wireless operator, the battlegroup. As the battlegroup Hautmesnil and Urville until late Gunner Biggs, found a ride in another moved off prior to dawn, only the afternoon.60 The 19th Field Regiment tank. After arriving at Point 111, British medium regiment was in a also remained out of the battle until Searle tried to find a working wireless position to provide artillery support. mid-afternoon. It was not ordered set but each tank he joined was The two Canadian field regiments forward until 1230 hours and only knocked out. As a result, Searle spent the afternoon and evening of reported ready for action southwest was unable to contact his regiment 8 August located south of the village of Cintheaux at 1420 hours. Captain and the powerful 5.5-inch medium of Rocquancourt. These units were M.A. Baker, the 19th Field FOO, guns were never brought to bear not ordered forward until dawn on was in contact with his regiment on the enemy.63 The lack of artillery 9 August. The maximum range of for most of the day. At 1250 hours, support was not simply a result the Sexton’s 25-pounder gun meant just as the unit was commencing of the battlegroup arriving at the that it was incapable of supporting its move forward, Baker reported wrong objective. This undoubtably the battlegroup upon its arrival at that he was being heavily shelled. contributed to the problem but poor Point 195.59 At 0500 hours 23rd Field At 1700 hours he reported that the planning, mistaken deployments Regiment was ordered to a new enemy was forming for an attack, and a myriad of communication gun position south of Cintheaux. and 90 minutes later contact with difficulties compounded the issue.
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These problems would have been They had occupied a key piece of train to fight in the dark. The hours of darkness were to be spent in maintenance apparent even if the battlegroup had terrain that was so important to the and resupply. Carravaggio lecture, arrived at Point 195 and would have Germans that they would commit Laurier Centre for Military Strategic and resulted in a much weaker artillery large reserves to recapture it. The Disarmament Studies, 15 April 2010. 6. W.E.C. Harrison, “Canadian Participation umbrella than the Canadians were advantage should have fallen to in the Operations in North-West Europe, used to fighting under. the Canadians who were fighting 1944. Part III: Canadian Operations, Even in defeat much was from prepared positions against 1-23 August,” Canadian Military Headquarters (CMHQ) Historical Section accomplished by Worthington an enemy that had to come out Report No.169, 14 January 1947, pp.87-90. Force. Having broken through the into the open to reach them. This 7. Major L.C. Monk, “An Account of the main German line of resistance, the battle could have parallelled Arthur Battle Participation of the Algonquin Regiment between August 6 and August battlegroup posed a dire threat to Currie’s tremendous success at Hill 11, 1944 (Monk report),” contained as the entire German position north 70 in 1917.65 Instead, the battlegroup appendix to WD Algonquin Regiment, of Falaise. All available German did not have the firepower to make August 1944. 8. War Diary (WD), 28 Canadian Armoured firepower was brought to bear on this happen and Point 111 became Regiment (CAR) (British Columbia eliminating this threat. This meant Canada’s Alamo in Normandy. Regiment ), 8 August 1944. the destruction of Worthington Force, It did not have to turn out this 9. J.T. Jenkinson, “The 28th Armoured Regiment (British Columbia Regiment) in but prevented any other German way. Worthington Force was lost the Second Phase of Operation Totalize, initiative on 9 August.64 It can also but there was enough information August 8-9, 1944,” n.d. but written after 1962. BCR Archives. be argued that the German focus flowing out of the battlegroup to find 10. “Narrative of Maj (now A/Lt-col) J.H. on Worthington Force cleared the it. While it is true that the battlegroup Carson, OC ‘B’ Sqn 28 Cdn Armd Regt way for the brilliant capture Point was not where it was supposed to (BCR), of events up to 9 Aug 44,” nd, BCR Archives (Carson narrative). 195 in the early morning hours of 10 be, it should have been possible for 11. Quoted in Monk report, p.3. August by the Argyll and Sutherland higher headquarters to locate and 12. Carson narrative; WD BCR, 9 August 1944; Highlanders of Canada. support the force. There were plenty “An Account of the Battle Experiences of “D” Coy, Algonquin Regiment, Aug. 8, 9, The ability of Worthington Force of indicators that could have led to 10, 11, 12, 1944 by Major Keith Stirling, to last as long as it did without support the location of the battlegroup, but O.C. “D” Coy. Algonquin Regiment and in the face of concerted and ever nobody was able to connect the dots (Stirling report),” contained as appendix to WD Algonquin Regiment, August strengthening German attacks led by in a timely manner. With proper 1944. Panthers and Tigers is a testament artillery support and the timely 13. This position is noted on the Defence to the courage and determination of arrival of reinforcements the story Overprint maps issued on 6 August 1944 for Operation Totalize. See “France Canadian soldiers involved. Allied could have been very different. 1/25000 Sheet 40/14 NW Defence doctrine in the Second World War Overprint ‘Operation Totalize’” copy in possession of author. The gun batteries relied on firepower as the cornerstone are also clearly visible on the aerial of any operation. The success of the Notes reconnaissance photographs taken 7th Canadian Infantry Brigade in on 9 August 1944. In particular see Laurier Centre for Military Strategic defending Bretteville-l’Orgueilleuse, The author would like to thank Keith Maxwell and Disarmament Studies Air Photo Norrey-en-Bessin and Putot-en- and the British Columbia Regiment for sharing Collection 102/4136. Bessin in the days immediately the wealth of documents and photographs 14 .W.F. Craven and J.L. Cate, The Army Air contained in their recently reorganized Forces in World War II, Volume 3: Europe - following the invasion was as archives. Argument to VE Day, January 1944 to May much the result of the dominance 1. C.P. Stacey, The Victory Campaign: The 1945 (Chicago: University of Chicago of Canadian artillery as it was the Operations in North-West Europe 1944-1945 Press, 1951), pp.250-1. 15. WD BCR, 9 August 1944. bravery of the soldiers of the Regina - Official History of the Canadian Army in the Second World War, Volume III (Ottawa: 16. Lieutenant A.E. Biddlecombe, “The Rifles and Royal Winnipeg Rifles. At The Queen’s Printer, 1960), p.225. British Columbia Regiment in Operation Point 111 the Canadians had to fight 2. L.F. Ellis, Victory in the West: Volume 1, ‘Totalize,’” n.d. BCR Archives The Battle of Normandy (London: HMSO, (Biddlecombe Report); Information on the a daylong battle without any artillery 1962), p. 254. Ellis states vehicle losses moon state found on the NASA Eclipse support. If their location had been were 25 tanks, 14 armoured trucks and website:
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only after a perilous journey that he One tank from the troop was destroyed Cdn Armd Regt Concerning activies on 9 safely reached Falaise. The incident is and the rest were unable to proceed. Aug 44,” 12 August 1944, BCR Archive. believed to have occurred in 1044. In 28. Stirling report; Monk report, p.5. 56. Monk report, p.7; WD BCR, 9 August 1944. commemoration of his miraculous escape 29. Biddlecombe Report. 57. Gartley report, p.2. William later punished his enemies by 30. Hubert Meyer, “12th SS Panzer Division 58. Stacey, p.228. The casualty figures come from forcing them to construct a raised road “Hiterjugend”, June to September Stacey and the WD BCR, 9 August 1944. to mark the route of his journey from 1944,” MS P-164, Historical Division, 59. The maximum range of the 25-pounder Valognes to Falaise as a lasting memorial Headquarters United States Army, gun mounted in a Sexton was of their treachery. (Thomas Roscoe, The Europe. 23 June 1954, pp.100-2. approximately 10 000 metres with charge Life of William the Conqueror (Philadelphia: 31. Meyer, “12th SS Panzer Division super, over 2000 metres less than the Lea and Blanchard, 1846), p.53) “Hiterjugend, p.103. standard towed 25-pounder gun due 19. Aerial reconnaissance photos taken on 32. An unknown additional number of tanks to the restricted elevation in the Sexton 9 August 1944 clearly show the route of would straggle into the position during mount. See British Artillery in World War the battlegroup following the Chemin the morning, including the two tanks of 2
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