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Rule 14A-8 No-Action Letter

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Rule 14A-8 No-Action Letter March 23, 2018 Jane Whitt Sellers McGuireWoods LLP [email protected] Re: PNM Resources, Inc. Incoming letter dated January 22, 2018 Dear Ms. Sellers: This letter is in response to your correspondence dated January 22, 2018 concerning the shareholder proposal (the “Proposal”) submitted to PNM Resources, Inc. (the “Company”) by Robert Andrew Davis (the “Proponent”) for inclusion in the Company’s proxy materials for its upcoming annual meeting of security holders. We also have received correspondence from the Proponent dated February 13, 2018. Copies of all of the correspondence on which this response is based will be made available on our website at http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cf-noaction/14a-8.shtml. For your reference, a brief discussion of the Division’s informal procedures regarding shareholder proposals is also available at the same website address. Sincerely, Matt S. McNair Senior Special Counsel Enclosure cc: Robert Andrew Davis *** *** FISMA & OMB Memorandum M-07-16 March 23, 2018 Response of the Office of Chief Counsel Division of Corporation Finance Re: PNM Resources, Inc. Incoming letter dated January 22, 2018 The Proposal requests that the board adopt a policy, and amend the bylaws as necessary, to require the chair of the board of directors to be an independent member of the board whenever possible. We are unable to concur in your view that the Company may exclude the Proposal or portions of the supporting statement under rule 14a-8(i)(3). We are unable to conclude that the Proposal, taken as a whole, is so vague or indefinite that it is rendered materially misleading. We are also unable to conclude that you have demonstrated objectively that the portion of the supporting statement you reference is materially false or misleading. Accordingly, we do not believe that the Company may omit the Proposal or portions of the supporting statement from its proxy materials in reliance on rule 14a-8(i)(3). We are unable to concur in your view that the Company may exclude the Proposal under rule 14a-8(i)(10). Based on the information you have presented, it appears that the Company’s policies, practices and procedures do not compare favorably with the guidelines of the Proposal and that the Company has not, therefore, substantially implemented the Proposal. Accordingly, we do not believe that the Company may omit the Proposal from its proxy materials in reliance on rule 14a-8(i)(10). Sincerely, Caleb French Attorney-Adviser DIVISION OF CORPORATION FINANCE INFORMAL PROCEDURES REGARDING SHAREHOLDER PROPOSALS The Division of Corporation Finance believes that its responsibility with respect to matters arising under Rule 14a-8 [17 CFR 240.14a-8], as with other matters under the proxy rules, is to aid those who must comply with the rule by offering informal advice and suggestions and to determine, initially, whether or not it may be appropriate in a particular matter to recommend enforcement action to the Commission. In connection with a shareholder proposal under Rule 14a-8, the Division’s staff considers the information furnished to it by the company in support of its intention to exclude the proposal from the company’s proxy materials, as well as any information furnished by the proponent or the proponent’s representative. Although Rule 14a-8(k) does not require any communications from shareholders to the Commission’s staff, the staff will always consider information concerning alleged violations of the statutes and rules administered by the Commission, including arguments as to whether or not activities proposed to be taken would violate the statute or rule involved. The receipt by the staff of such information, however, should not be construed as changing the staff’s informal procedures and proxy review into a formal or adversarial procedure. It is important to note that the staff’s no-action responses to Rule 14a-8(j) submissions reflect only informal views. The determinations reached in these no-action letters do not and cannot adjudicate the merits of a company’s position with respect to the proposal. Only a court such as a U.S. District Court can decide whether a company is obligated to include shareholder proposals in its proxy materials. Accordingly, a discretionary determination not to recommend or take Commission enforcement action does not preclude a proponent, or any shareholder of a company, from pursuing any rights he or she may have against the company in court, should the company’s management omit the proposal from the company’s proxy materials. February 13, 2018 U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission Division of Corporate Finance Office of Chief Counsel 100 F. Street, N.E. Washington, DC 20549 ([email protected]) Re: PNM Resources, Inc. – Exclusion of Shareholder Proposal Submitted by Robert Andrew Davis Pursuant to Rule 14a-8 Ladies and Gentlemen: I am writing in response to the No Action request submitted by McGuireWoods on January 22nd on behalf of their client PNM Resources. I am the proponent filing the Proposal seeking an independent separate Chair. I have copied Jane Whitt Sellers of McGuireWoods who submitted the No Action request. The No Action request argues that this Resolution, which seeks a change in policy and the bylaws to require the Chair of the Board be an independent member of the Board, be excluded under Rule 14a-8(i)(3) (materially false and misleading) and 14a- 8(i) (10) (substantially implemented). We believe the McGuireWoods letter has not presented a convincing case and request the Staff deny the No Action request and allow the Resolution to be included in the 2018 proxy for a vote by shareholders. DISCUSSION The request to separate the roles of CEO and Chair and have the Chair of the Board be an independent Director is a longstanding request for governance reform and has been the subject of shareholder resolutions to hundreds of companies. It is a widely discussed governance topic raised at numerous governance conferences and debated in corporate boardrooms. It is a common practice in many U.S. companies to have a separate independent Chair as well as the norm in the United Kingdom. However, with the rapid growth of Lead Directors by U.S. companies, many with job descriptions close to that of an independent Chair, many companies have argued that the basic concerns raised in the separate independent Chair debate have been essentially met. We welcome this attention to improving corporate governance and strengthening the independence and power of the Board of Directors by strengthening the role and 1 responsibilities of the Lead Director. It is an important step forward. However we believe that it is preferable to have the role of Chair be separate from the CEO and be an independent director. This position is supported by numerous institutional investors whose proxy voting policies support shareholder resolutions urging this change, or clarify the criteria they use in deciding how to vote on this request. These proxy voting guidelines are published on company websites like State Street, BlackRock and Vanguard as well as public pension funds like CalPERS and CalSTRS. As noted, some investors vote “case by case” after assessing the assigned responsibilities of the Lead Director to see if they adequately provide checks and balances for the CEO. In short, institutional investors are very conversant with the discussion about having an independent director serve as Chair. They are unlikely to be confused by this resolution which has been on the proxies of numerous companies in the last several years and is so commonplace that virtually all major investment firms stipulate in their Guidelines whether they support a YES or NO vote. Rule 14a-8(i) (3) – False and Misleading The No Action letter goes to great lengths to argue that the Resolution is confusing and that shareholders might interpret the Proposal differently and be “uncertain as to the matter on which he/she is being asked to vote.” We believe this is flawed logic and that shareholders will certainly understand the thrust of the Resolution, including its intent and meaning. This Resolution, as should be clear to McGuireWoods, is a blended request that seeks a bylaw change to have an Independent Director serve as Chair (the request captured in the Resolved clause) and then supports the request by highlighting the benefits of separate roles. Obviously a change to an Independent Director being Chair (as proposed in the Resolved Clause) automatically results in a separation of the roles. You cannot have one without the other. They are not two separate requests; they are automatically intertwined. The Supporting Statement extols the benefits of separating these roles and is simply an attempt to convince the reader of the benefits of voting for the Resolution. It is not confusing to the reader to read through a series of cogent and convincing arguments bolstering the Resolution. And the selected quotes from the Resolution by McGuireWoods seem to intentionally exclude points that support both independence and separation. For example, the quote from Andrew Grove, former Chair of Intel, clearly states the CEO needs a “boss” and 2 that is the Board, and “The Chairman runs the Board. How can the CEO be his own boss?” It couldn’t be clearer that Mr. Grove is supporting an independent Chair who is NOT the CEO. In addition, the next sentence states: “In our view, shareholders are best served by an independent Board Chair who can provide a balance of power between the CEO and the Board.” The rest of the paragraph adds additional information to support that argument including arguing that the combined role “creates a potential conflict of interest.” These points naturally flow together with other arguments in the Supporting Statement providing insights into why an investor would vote for the Resolution.
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