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Release No : 21/October 02-1/84/10/09
TRANSCRIPT OF THE PRIME MINISTER, MR. LEE KUAN YEW'S DISCUSSION WITH FIVE FOREIGN CORRESPONDENTS, RECORDED AT SBC ON 9 OCTOBER 1984
Michael
Richardson : Good evening.
On behalf of our panel, I would like to welcome the Prime
Minister of Singapore, Mr Lee Kuan Yew.
My name is Michael Richardson of "The Age" newspapers
in Melbourne and the "Sydney Morning Herald". With me
in the studio tonight to interview the Prime Minister are
four other foreign correspondents.
Kenneth
Whiting : I am Ken Whiting of the Associated Press.
Hans
lky/1984/lky1009.doc 2
Heine : I am Hans Heine with the German Radio Network, ARD-
NDR.
Chris
Sherwell : My name is Chris Sherwell. I am from the "Financial
Times" of London.
Masaru
Matsuda : I am Masaru Matsuda from the "Nihon Keizai Shimbun",
Japan.
Richardson : Singapore has just finished celebrating 25 years of nation-
building. Political power is being transferred from older to
younger leaders. We would like to start our questions
tonight with one that interests many Singaporeans and
many people in Singapore: the date of the General
Elections widely expected for later this year.
Prime Minister, have you decided on a date for those
elections? When will you announce it, and will you be
lky/1984/lky1009.doc 3
unhappy if the polls do not result in another clean sweep
for the ruling People's Action Party?
Prime Minister : I have not settled the date. I have a tentative date, but I am
watching to see how the American economy goes. If all
goes well as it looks like, it will be held in the next four,
five months, before Chinese New Year.
Richardson : Will you be unhappy if the polls don't result in another
clean sweep for the PAP?
PM : We fight to win. At the same time that tells us something
when we don't win, as we did not in Anson. So happiness
is a subjective frame of mind. This is a test and out of the
test we gain useful feedback and information, like the way
they voted the last time in Radin Mas and in Telok Blangah
where we did not have a strong candidates but they were
strong, favourable constituencies. A signal to us - a
changing electorate; a younger more intelligent, more
educated, more demanding electorate not interested in our
having a balancing slate of Chinese, Indians, Malays.
lky/1984/lky1009.doc 4
They are just saying, "Look, this man you are putting is
going to be my MP. I don't think he measures up. I am not
voting for him."
So the way the voting goes tells us something. And it
could well be. As in the case of Anson, the way the voting
went, we gained something. So being unhappy at the result
of Anson didn't mean we lost by it.
Whiting : Prime Minister, much publicity has been given recently to
the name of your son as a candidate for Parliament. Are you
pleased to see him enter politics and would you like to see
him become Prime Minister one day?
PM : Ah! It's been on my mind for many years. He has the
attributes. He also has the disadvantage of being my son
because it will always be said that he was favoured and
he'll always be measured against his father. I think he
ought to be big enough to be measured in his own right. I
was pleased that the younger Ministers decided to
nominate him because it showed they did not lack self-
lky/1984/lky1009.doc 5
confidence. He was so obvious a choice that not to have
chosen him would have told me something about the
younger Ministers. Perhaps they did not want to embarrass
me. Perhaps they also felt more comfortable without
younger, bright, strong young men. But that they chosen
him proved to me that they were not afraid of competition,
that they were out to incorporate the best in the team and
that pleased me.
Whether he will make it? First, he's got to win the
elections and he has got to prove that he is equal to the job
first of being a minister. Whether he will be Prime
Minister that's not up to me. He's got to convince the
other MPs because the Prime Minister must command the
confidence of the majority of the Members of Parliament.
And he's got some three strong men older than him with
more experience and already entrenched. He'll find his
level.
Sherwell : Prime Minister, you are not at all worried, are you,
following up this question about whether you son's entry
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into politics inevitably raises the question of whether you
are really satisfied with the second generation leadership,
which is now after all very well established and, on top of
this, that it runs the risk that you could be accused of trying
to create a dynasty? Do these suggestions worry you at
all?
PM : Not really. My methods of running the government, my
measurements for getting people to be ministers, to be
tested for leadership they are well-known. I don't think it's
a slight on the other ministers that they choose to field my
son. I think it is a tribute to their objectivity and their
willingness to incorporate the best, even if it is, or could
be, a challenge to them.
As for forming a dynasty, well, I don't need to seek
fulfilment vicariously. I've reached a point in life where, if
given a choice, I'd like my accounts to be closed with me
and the judgement made on what I have done. But my
son's entry into politics means a new chapter, not
connected with me but not altogether unconnected because
lky/1984/lky1009.doc 7
it could be said that I influenced his thinking, the cast or
shape of his political philosophy, and so his account may
reflect either creditably or discreditably on me. So, well,
it's something I live with, too, as a father.
Matsuda : Prime Minister, you mentioned your time for retirement
will come. Is there a target date for that and what will
occupy you after you leave the Prime Minister's Office?
PM : Well, I've mentioned American corporation is making 65 a
good retirement age. I think that's a good target date.
What will I do? I suppose something connected with
politics but in a less active executive role.
Heine : Prime Minister, would you eventually consider election for
President in case the Constitution would be amended
accordingly?
PM : I would not rule it out, but I would not make a firm
commitment that that is a job that I will undertake. Four
years, five years is a long time and I would imagine that to
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run the job in will take several years because a new
relationship has to be created. The amendments will have
to be done after the next elections or should be carefully
thought out. The officials are thinking through all the
problems. The Auditor-General, the Accountant-General
have to work out who has to inform the President's
Committee or Secretariat what assets are being committed
or what debts are being incurred.
And we don't want to upset the present executive powers
of the Prime Minister. It is only when he encroaches on
reserves that he's got to get the President's concurrence.
That means sensible, practical relations so that the system
can continue as it is.
I would like to be Prime Minister whilst that system is first
implemented. So I can tell the President, who I hope will
be someone who knows me and will know that I am not
raiding the reserves to squander it, that these guidelines
will have to be interpreted sensibly. Then after such a
period, he'll have to serve out his term, which I think
lky/1984/lky1009.doc 9
should be more than the term of the Prime Minister and his
Cabinet, more than one Parliamentary term so that they do
not coincide. There will be a sitting President in the
middle of his office when a Prime Minister and his Cabinet
have resigned and are re-elected.
Richardson : Prime Minister, do you foresee the development of a two-
party parliamentary system in Singapore? Do you think
that would be desirable or would you prefer to see a debate
and dissent generated within and channelled through the
ruling PAP and its grassroots organisations?
PM : The way to bring it about if it were wise to do so would be
to have the People's Action Party divide into two wings.
Then both wings are committed to certain basic and
fundamental rocks on which the society will rest and can
argue about peripherals - whether more should not be spent
for social security or a more liberal view taken - liberal
with a big 'L' - of how we spend our money in tempering
the harshness of meritocracy and open competition,
whether we don't give a little more padding to those who
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can't quite make it to the middle ranges or income brackets.
That's theoretically ideal. Then you can switch sides in the
electorate field - well, all right, we've got to change
without prejudicing the whole system. In practice, it is
extremely bold, radical.
And I don't suppose I will do it because it's not wise to ask
a segment of the party, say, "Look, you go form the
opposition. Get out of office." I don't know if my
successors will. I think it's an unnecessary hazard because
there are enough schisms in the society as it is. It's not
something you can cement over - differences of race,
Chinese, Malays, Indians, and different kinds of Chinese,
and different kinds of Indians, and different kinds of
Malays. They are real. They are abiding. And we've done
a lot to make it more uniform or less stark a contrast. But if
you are discerning and you go to a housing estate, they all
look the same, but you can see that they lead slightly
different lives.
lky/1984/lky1009.doc 11
You would find in every estate now, major estate, a Malay
mosque and the amount of not just religion but social
activity that resolves around the mosque because it has
libraries and reading rooms and so on. It's quite
remarkable. It's something which we have debated often
amongst ourselves with our own Malay MPs. It is wise to
have all these extra facilities in the mosque because it
means that the Malays detach themselves from the
community centre and make the mosque their own special
community centre. Then you have more segregation and
either they want or the non-Malays want.
I'll give a simple illustration to show up their difficulties.
We used to have certain constituencies where the Malays
were the majority of the voters. Now we face a
fundamental problem when we resettle them. Do we
rebuild these areas and rehouse Malays in these areas so
that they will still be the majority, or do we expose them
and, like the Chinese and Indians, ballot for their
neighbours?
lky/1984/lky1009.doc 12
Well, the Malay MPs thought it over. So did we. We
decided no. In the long term, it's better that we mix
everybody up. So we have. No constituency has more
than 30% Malays as the ceiling. The result will
progressively be, or already I suspect is, a tremendous
pressure on us to find Malay candidates who can fight
against a Chinese candidate or an Indian candidate who is
better qualified, more education, more energy, more
whatever, and still win.
That's quite a problem because the electorate has changed.
A young electorate is no longer interested about the party
having a balanced slate. They've never faced riotous
situation where people run amok and butcher, kill, maim
each other because they are berserk. Now there's no such
situation.
So with these kind of deep, underlying, almost primeval
urges, I don't really see a Whig-Tory kind of tossing power
back and forth.
lky/1984/lky1009.doc 13
Sherwell : Prime Minister, the Singapore economy is expected to
grow by about 9% in real terms this year, helped somewhat
by the recovery in the United States, of course, and also by
the domestic public sector's construction effort in
particular. But there also seems to me some gloom about
the prospects in the properly market. Retailing sectors are
quite depressed. Some of the country's blue-chip
companies, including some government-controlled ones,
are reporting disappointing results. And even some
bankers are saying that times are getting harder. I'd like to
ask you what you see as the main domestic engine of
economic growth for Singapore over the rest of the
decade?
PM : Well, that depends on how the United States recovery
goes. If it is sustained, and you have 3% or 3 1/2% next
year, or even 2 1/2% next year, and continues in that
steady fashion, and the Europeans pick up and the
Japanese provide more of a lift, I think we will gradually
shift into higher value-added industries. They call it high-
tech, but it's really just servicing high-tech industries,
lky/1984/lky1009.doc 14
computer software, computer peripherals, the manufacture
of computer parts. But still very much what it is - the
spread between manufacturing and servicing.
But by the next decade, if the trend continues, then with
the information age, we should be moving more into
servicing, which would make me a lot more comfortable.
We haven't got a large population, and we would be
maximising on our small population base by having them
more and more in servicing, financial servicing - banks,
insurance companies, credit cards, telecommunications,
information generally. I think as fibre optics and all these
data banks spread around the world, and everybody has his
own personal computer and you can switch your set on and
link up with databases in America, and Europe, and Japan,
we should become more and more a regional information
centre.
In the information age, we have a clear advantage because
lky/1984/lky1009.doc 15
we have always concentrated on communications. We
have good lines already established worldwide and
regionally, and it's not subject to protectionist measures.
So it's a great deal more comfortable than what it is now
because it means worrying about what happens with the
GSP in the United States. Has it extended another 8 1/2
years and are we disqualified? If so, when? Do we reach
a $9,000 per capita? Is it fair to us that measurement, and
so on ?
Richardson : Prime Minister, can Singapore remain an open and
internationally competitive economy with such a strong
dollar and high wage and other costs? I think that certainly
Australian businessmen here have some doubts on that
score, and I believe that other business groups in Singapore
do as well?
PM : No, I don't think you are right. I think the Australians are
worried because they take their Australian experience with
them when they interpret these happenings in Singapore.
A strong dollar is not too strong. It's weaker than the US
lky/1984/lky1009.doc 16
dollar. It's always lagging behind. I think it's 2.16 to the
US dollar. It used to be nearly $2.
High wages? I don't really think they are high. We settled
last year for the NWC, National Wages Council,
recommendation which was, I think, 3 1/2-7% range. And
the overall settlement across the board was 11 1/2% over
and above the top. So 4% above the top.
This year the settlement was $27 plus 4-8%, and up till the
end of last month, end September, about 15-20% settled
above that range. There are open settlements between
managements and workers and unions. Slightly over 50%
settled at the top end of the range, 6-8%, and the rest
settled in the middle ranges. Almost a small minority of
about less than 10% settled at the lower ends of the range -
shipbuilding, the ones not doing well.
So there's no evidence that this is so. And it's very
manifest when you look at the labour figures. Jobs created
lky/1984/lky1009.doc 17
this year, second quarter, increased by 5% over the first
quarter, and I think about 3, 4% over the same quarter last
year, jobs lost, retrenchment and jobs created was about
6,000. Jobs lost about a 1,000 and 6,000 has taken into
account the jobs lost 1,000. So it's 6,000 over and above
the 1,000. Unemployment figures went down, I think, by a
few hundreds from about 7,000 to 6,400, 6,300.
So the signals that we get from the market - demand for
labour, jobs that are going settlement of wage rates - show
that we are competitive. That is not so.
And, indeed, the American Business Council put up a
submission in August - they are all members of the
National Productivity Council - asking the EDB, our
Economic Development Board, not to canvas or recruit any
more new companies because they say, "Look, you haven't
got the workers. We need workers to expand. This is a
year of recovery. And if you bring in more companies who
call themselves high-tech but, in fact, are doing simple
assembling jobs of computer peripherals and very simple
lky/1984/lky1009.doc 18
computer programming, they are just competing in the
labour market." So they are very different signals.
I think the Australian tends to interpret high wage rates
with what's happened in Australia where high wage rates
are not matched by increased productivity and
competitiveness in selling his products and, therefore,
every time he sees a wage rise of 11% his heart is in his
mouth. But where our productivity is going up by 7, 8% -
last year it was about 6, this year may be 7 - and we are
competitive, I think it's wiser to move the wages nearer
what the market can easily carry, then keep it down, and
have an explosion two, three years down the road. Then
you upset the whole stable relationship between employer,
management and government.
We've got confidence between employers, management
and unions and the government. The figures are there. We
can study it every year, reach broad agreement on what is
feasible, and we allow a bigger and bigger range for
employers to decide with their workers at which end of the
lky/1984/lky1009.doc 19
range they ought to be. We have suggested we ought to
phase ourselves out. The government should phase itself
apart from the Americans, who have a very robust attitude
and prefer bilateral bargaining, and a good company would
pay above the market rate to get the best workers, all the
others are against it. They want the government involved
so that the weight of the government is behind the NWC
recommendations. So the facts do not support that point of
view.
Matsuda : Prime Minister, you just mentioned so-called high-tech
companies, which aren't really high-tech, ...
PM : They are not.
Matsuda : ... are coming into Singapore. Then could I ask what does
high-tech mean to Singapore? Does Singapore really have
a high-tech future?
PM : Well, we've started this Kent Ridge estate and there are a
few, I suppose, to link up with the university doing
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biotechnology research. A few of our Singaporeans who
have gone abroad to Canada and America have come back
to help us set up these units. They are doing research in
America and in Canada. And they tell us that in certain
peripheral areas there is a chance we can make a
breakthrough. But I must not discourage our enthusiasts in
the Economic Development Board and Science and
Engineering faculties where I think sheer mass of brain
power in numbers and quality ... you face a population of
250 million, the whole of North America - extremely
bright, particularly in the areas that they have chosen for
themselves: electronics, communications, computers,
biotechnology. Maybe the Japanese have given them some
competition in computers. They haven't yet in
biotechnology.
So really what we can hope to do is to keep abreast with
what they are doing and, perhaps, service them at the
peripherals or little niches which are left open. If the
lky/1984/lky1009.doc 21
Europeans can't muscle in on computers, I don't see how
we can.
Sherwell : Prime Minister, I'd like to turn to the banking centre if I
may. There have been three major pieces of legislation
already this year toughening the considerable powers of the
Monetary Authority still further. And in the past year or so
we've seen a finance company close down, several billion
and commodity dealers closed down and only recently a
merchant bank. At the same time, some commercial banks
have been ordered to make large debt provisions. And the
overall impression is that the government seems to be
battening down the hatches at the very time that New
York, London, Tokyo, Sydney are apparently opening
doors and liberalising. Shouldn't Singapore be doing the
same thing?
PM : I am not sure first, if that's what New York, London,
Frankfurt or Tokyo is doing. I thing that's what New York
appears to be doing. They are not making debt provisions
for what their bankers must know - very, very long-term
lky/1984/lky1009.doc 22
loans ... sometimes 200% their capitalisation value. So
they've got to keep the road show going on the road and
reschedule, but I believe the Germans and the Japanese do
make substantial provisions for reserves. I think the
British, too, are conservative.
So the analysis of the people outside the collective cartel
that has to keep on lending is that there will be a
divergence of interests in a few years because those banks
by Germans, Japanese, maybe British, who have made
substantial provisions for these loans, troublesome loans,
will ie less willing to risk fresh funds.
Indeed the Basle Concordat has an offshoot called the
(Cook) Committee, where bank regulators and supervisors
meet and discuss what should be done, and the MAS
representative attends these meetings. And the last one in
Rome, I read the report, urging stricter supervision and
urging banks, the big multinationals, big money banks, not
to set up branches where supervision is lacking or
inadequate. They are recommending that no subsidiaries
lky/1984/lky1009.doc 23
or branches should be set up in centres which are not
adequately supervised. In other words, they are signalling
to us, supervise. And we've had no complaints from any
head office. I don't know about the people on-the-spot.
You know about the branches in Lugano where they went
trading on the foreign exchange markets without notice and
vast sums of money were lost.
But I believe that not only have we taken measures which
were necessary, we have taken them in time before
irretrievable damage has been done to the system. And,
fortunately, I think no one, no single bank or indeed
finance company, has been unable to meet the new
provisions required. I think there are higher liquidity and
reserve requirements, limits on lending to any single
borrower or group of borrowers, limits on investments,
investment limits on real estate, and so on.
The amendments affect only Domestic Banking Units
(DBU), ie S$ transactions. Asia Currency Units (ACUs)
or the Asian Dollar do not have reserve requirements or
lky/1984/lky1009.doc 24
other prudential regulations to meet. The banks are
therefore completely at liberty to deal in ACUs (Asian $)
as they were before. Of course depositors of ACUs will
not be as protected as depositors of S$. They receive a
higher rate of interest in line with rates in the Euro-market.
There is no opportunity cost for reserve requirements and
liquidity ratios which are required of S$ deposits.
Therefore the first charge on the assets of any bank is for
DBU (S$) deposits.
The only adjustment time we had to concede was from one
year to two years for those who had lent 60% of their
capital assets to one borrower or a group of borrowers to
get down to 30%. We are giving them two years instead of
one year. They have asked for two years.
And what is interesting is no bank, either Singaporean or
foreign-owned, made any representation to the MAS or to
the Minister of Finance during the period between first
reading and second reading. So nobody thought that they
were wrong in principle. Whatever they may have desired
lky/1984/lky1009.doc 25
privately, nobody came out and said, "Look, these
provisions are wrong. They will stifle the growth of the
banking industry," and so on. In fact, they all know that
this is wise. If we don't do that we will have the sort of
problems which have plagued Hong Kong.
Last year, September '83, one Hang Lung Bank had to be
taken over by the government, nationalised, rescued. And
then there was a deposit-taking company that went bankrupt,
couldn't meet its liabilities.
I don't think we want to wait for that situation to develop.
Sherwell : You are not concerned at all that the image will be gained
that there is the heavy hand of the government that works
with the regulation and that this might impair the chances
of Singapore achieving its ambition as an international
financial centre.
PM : No. I think that may have been the view of bankers
previous to the debt crisis, when I was told by many lky/1984/lky1009.doc 26
bankers that it's much better to do business in Luxembourg
than in Frankfurt because "they let us do what we like and
all this molly-coddling of so much in the reserves loses us
so much opportunity costs."
But the same bankers who said all those things have got
into trouble with their Luxembourg branches, and the mood
has changed. And I believe that the Basle Concordat, the
(Cook) Committee has really articulated their present mood
that banks which are not properly regulated or whose
branches are not properly regulated, set offshore, are in
jeopardy, or in more jeopardy than if you are in a centre
which is properly regulated.
Sherwell : You alluded a moment ago to the international debt
problem and the aspect of that which has potentially more
severe implications for Singapore is in the Philippines.
How has that problem affected Singapore exactly?
PM : Well, foreign and Singapore banks, but mainly foreign
banks, have lent a total of S$7 billion. I suppose many of
lky/1984/lky1009.doc 27
them are now meeting in New York to discuss how they
are going collectively with other banks around the world,
probably 1,500 banks, to raise $1 1/2 billion for the next
year. Obviously the capital is not going to be paid for
quite some time, and like everybody else, we hope the
interest will be paid. But for the Singapore banks, we have
asked them to make provisions for the contingency which
we hope will not arise. But it's already done, so we've got
to live with the problems as they are.
lky/1984/lky1009.doc 28
Heine : Sir, recently there has been strong emphasis on defence in
the media in Singapore as well as in speeches - total
defence, civil defence, or what kind of defence. Might that
lead to the conclusion that you foresee any threat to the
security of Singapore and if yes, what kind of threat would
that be?
PM : Well, our biggest threat in Singapore is that any threat will
come from someone bigger than us. It must be in the
nature of our situation, in the nature of our circumstances.
And the greatest disservice we can do ourselves is to be
terrified and panic-stricken. We have a national service
defence force based on a civilian population. If the civilian
population is faint-hearted and is intimidated as they see
forces mobilising, huge, massive forces, then the battle is
lost before any shot is fired.
A younger generation is coming of age. My generation,
we've faced Japanese Occupation, conquest, hardships,
brutalities. We've gone through quite a tumultuous period
lky/1984/lky1009.doc 29
of human history and we are accustomed to staking our
lives. The younger generation now in their 30s have had
relatively quiet and placid a life. Life has meant
growth over the last 15 years. A few hiccups in 1973-74
oil crisis, 1979, second oil crisis, so growth rates went
down. But on the whole, every year meant a better life.
I think they've got to face up to the very real possibility
that one day somebody is going to take their knuckles, put
knuckle-dusters on and say, "You give me, or else." And I
think Singaporeans will just have to take a deep breath and
say, "Well, or else, let's see what we can do." A civil
defence, a total defence is to involve the civilian population
whose morale - fathers and mothers, brothers and sisters -
affects the morale of sons, brothers.
I am not sure whether we will succeed in this way. But at
least, theoretically, intellectually, we have posed the
problem to them, that whatever the threat it's going to be
bigger than us. So let's live with that, and let's not get
terrified.
lky/1984/lky1009.doc 30
Richardson : Prime Minister, do you foresee increasing threats in the
years ahead to ASEAN member countries? What kinds of
threats do you see coming up, and should they be met
collectively as well as individually?
PM : I think we ought to wait and see how the Cambodian issue
is resolved because that will decide the balance of forces
between the Communist group of countries and the non-
Communist group of countries. If it is resolved with a total
Vietnamese withdrawal and the re-installation of a
Cambodian government, not beholden to either Vietnam or
to China or to the Soviet Union, then I can foresee a period
of relative stability in which the non-Communist groups
can together withstand the pressures of the Communist
group of countries.
If it is resolved unfavourably, in that there is a clear benefit
to use arms supplied by the Soviet Union to extend one's
territory, then enormous problems arise because in
lky/1984/lky1009.doc 31
expectation of such further moves, shifts will be made in
national positions. So ASEAN is agreed that there should
be a withdrawal, and there should be elections to decide
who is to govern Cambodia. In other words, that there
should be no benefit to any one by exploiting an alliance
with a super-power and supplies of arms and military aid
from that super-power to expand one's territory.
Of course, there are very strong desires on the part of
several ASEAN countries not to want to weaken Vietnam
because they see a useful role for Vietnam in this balancing
between Communist powers. And it's a viewpoint which
we take seriously. I think there is merit in that viewpoint.
But there must be a withdrawal.
lky/1984/lky1009.doc 32
Matsuda : Prime Minister, in connection with the Cambodian issue,
after Australia's inconclusive effort, do you think Japan can
be a useful mediator between ASEAN and Hanoi in
resolving the issue?
PM : If you ask my personal opinion, I'd say yes, because Japan
has got more to give Vietnam than Australia. And
Vietnamese are not slow-witted. But if you ask me what
are the chances of a successful mediation in the immediate
future, I'd say not very much because the Vietnamese are
not yet ready.
They have thrown the dice. They had this treaty of
friendship and co-operation. They had the arms and they
thought one swift sweep into Cambodia and it's all over.
Well, they are wrong. It's not over. They are landed with
an intractable problem. But they are very old men who
have gone through many crisis and have not yielded lightly.
They are all in their 70s. The first three leaders in Vietnam
are unlikely to admit that they are wrong very quickly.
lky/1984/lky1009.doc 33
And we'll have to wait and be patient.
Sherwell : Prime Minister, do you think the Vietnamese can possibly
do a deal over Kampuchea with the Kampuchean
resistance and thus with the ASEAN countries without
being sure at the same time that the Khmer Rouge will not
return and thus unless there's a deal with China
simultaneously?
PM : The terms for a settlement which have been agreed upon in
the United Nations does offer all of us such a solution. I
am not saying that it is going to be the ideal that the
Vietnamese want. They want a solution which takes the
status quo as it is and the withdrawal as and when they
think it's necessary, 5 to 10 years after peace and the
dismantling of all the resistance forces. The Chinese have
their views as to what should be a good settlement.
But in between those two extreme viewpoints there is a
lky/1984/lky1009.doc 34
large body of opinion in the United Nations that believes
the Cambodian people should be allowed to decide their
future. A situation could be created in which, reluctantly,
both the Vietnamese and the Chinese and the Soviet
Union, I suppose, will think it is worthwhile letting the
Cambodian people decide. And if the Cambodian people
decide I don't see how Pol Pot will come back.
Heine : Sir, may I come back to Asean for just a minute. Are you
always satisfied with the pace of progress with political
and economic cooperation within Asean?
PM : I have been asked that question time and time again. You
know, If I were a complacent, easily satisfied person, we
would have made very little progress. But at the same
time, I have learned over the years that if we are going to
make progress in Asean we will have to make it at the pace
which is most comfortable to the majority.
That means we must accept that we will make more
political progress does not require domestic concessions -
lky/1984/lky1009.doc 35
a change in five-year national development plans. It just
means coordinating our foreign policy and bargaining with
the developed group of countries, either America, EEC or
Japan, in a united front. Whereas actual economic
cooperation means tearing down tariff barriers, having
freer flow of goods and services and freer flow of capital
between countries in Asean and that will take some time.
Richardson : Prime Minister, the United States says that continued,
unhampered access for its forces to military facilities in the
Philippines, and the maintenance of regional security
arrangements including the ANZUS Treaty between the
United States, Australia and New Zealand, are essential.
Do you think that a satisfactory balance of power in
Southeast Asia can be maintained without a substantial US
presence, which is underpinned by these arrangements?
PM : No. The United States presence is the only counterweight
to a Soviet presence. If there is no American presence in
East and Southeast Asia, we have a very different world.
lky/1984/lky1009.doc 36
Ricardson : Do you see a danger from the developments in the
Philippines, the gains apparently being made by the
insurgents and political uncertainties ...... that access that
the United States says is essential, maybe restricted or
even denied in future?
PM : That the United States Administration has seen fit to have a
senior official - I think Mr Armitage - express his fears
over the growth of the NPA, New People's Army, and the
communists in the Philippines openly discuss the
possibility of a communist take-over within ten years is, I
think, significant and worrisome. They must have reasons.
I mean they are thinking people. They are not alarmists.
By the time they sound this alarm the situation must be
grave enough for the alarm to have been sounded. And I
think it will have grave repercussions on the whole region.
Whiting : Prime Minister, based on current trends, what kind of
nation do you imagine Singapore is likely to be when it
celebrates 35 years of nation-building, ten years from now?
lky/1984/lky1009.doc 37
PM : Given peace, no major world recession or depression,
growth rates of say 4 to 8%, by ten years we would have
been graduated for GSP reasons. I think we have to accept
that. We should be more in the service sector. We should
be a growing information centre or a part of the
information age network of centres in the world, a standard
of living which should be able to sustain reasonable
cultural levels, reasonable cultural activities. If we could
enjoy say a standard of life of, let's say, Ireland or Britain
of today and we won't be able to compare with them in
their cultural manifestations - orchestras, ballet and the
arts. But there will be more of it.
I would think our major acute problems of want, privation,
bad housing, malnutrition, that's already over. The sub-
acute ones of inadequate care for the old and the aged -
inadequate institutional care because more and more
families find it very irksome to look after their old because
wives are working and not enough free hands in the
household. All that could improve.
lky/1984/lky1009.doc 38
On the whole, I'd say a more gracious, a less pressured
society. It should have already arrived. It shouldn't be
anxious about whether it's going to arrive or not. We
should by then have established our educational system
and got everybody educated who can be educated, and
establish it so well that for the next 10, 15 years people
will keep on being educated that there should be no fall-
back.
lky/1984/lky1009.doc 39
Sherwell : Prime Minister, Singapore's great economic achievements,
I think, have rightly won great acclaim abroad. One of the
criticisms I've heard most often made of Singapore, of the
education system and perhaps more widely, the media or
the cultural environment, is that in some sense it doesn't
put enough emphasis on independent critical thought, that
the government errs if you like in favour of control.
Looking ahead to the future as you've been doing, is that
your intention for the future as well, and do you feel that it
creates the best climate in which future leaders, your
successors, can cope with the unexpected?
PM : First, let me divide your statement because I think they are
two different things. One, that our education system does
not allow more independent thinking, more creativity, and
therefore, more scientists, more discoverers of the great
undiscovered frontiers of knowledge and science. I do not
think that is just a question of system of education. I think
it has to do with culture or with norms, standard behaviour
of students and teachers.
lky/1984/lky1009.doc 40
The Japanese face the same criticism and they want more
creative innovators. They are saddled with the same
criticism that they lack this questioning, this debate, this
ruthless pursuit of trust even at the expense of the dignity
of one's teachers.
I think we are all products of our own culture. And
oriental culture requires students to be polite, not to be
obstreperous. I mean, if you know so much you shouldn't
be in class. You should be running your own class.
At the same time because we've had so many foreign
teachers, some in our schools, definitely in our universities
and many of our teachers themselves having been educated
abroad, there is more give and take than say a typically
Chinese language school in the 1950s or 1960s. But I am
reconciled to accepting a more polite classroom situation.
I think that's part of oriental culture and we can't change
that. The media, on the other hand, is total different. I
mean, that's just a particular character, trait or not just
lky/1984/lky1009.doc 41
character. It's also culture. If you read the Indian
newspapers as I do in Delhi, there is such a plethora of
views. You are confused.
I think the East Asian is different from the South Asian.
The South Asian is the European and American
exaggerated because he loves debate for the sake of
debate.
In Japan, I've noticed that when they make important
decisions like rebuilding their defence forces, there is a lot
of kite-flying and then the tortoise draws in his head, then
he puts it out again, and he tests the water and he puts the
flipper out or puts a toe out. I think there's merit in that,
and they do argue very serious issues.
Whether indiscipline in the schools reflects something
fundamental in society, that consumerism and working
mothers have bred this restless violent generation, or what
is the reason for it, it's a serious questing.
lky/1984/lky1009.doc 42
But I would say the contentiousness of the American media
is like American wrestling on television. You know it's a
sham but people enjoy it because it is a sham. Everybody
knows that they down Reagan because he looks a winner,
and therefore, nothing like trying to cut him down a few
pegs. But when it comes to voting, do they really want to
vote out a man that's brought back a sense of well-being, a
sense of confidence, high purchasing power for the US
dollar, growth, lower unemployment?
Now, I do not believe the American system is either
desirable or affordable. I notice the British are trying to
copy the American. They weren't like the Americans
before, If you breach the Official Secrets Act, you just
went to jail. So because American officials release secrets,
that's supposed to be the 'in' thing. It shows that yours is a
free society where if any ministers, courts suppress the
truth, you feel it is your duty to leak it to the opposition.
That is something new and it's not proven. So when you
lky/1984/lky1009.doc 43
tamper around with the fundamentals of society, like new
values, what's right, what's wrong, the effects are in the
next, and often after the next generation. But it's a
philosophy of life and perhaps because I am conservative,
because one is a proven tested system, the other is not
proven, why not let the other chap prove it first? If he
proves it, that in fact all the contentiousness lead to a great
flourishing of scientific and technological discoveries and
plenty of everybody in great happiness and absence of real
social problems, it would be stupid not to look into those
possibilities for ourselves.
But when I see the countries that say, "Yes, let's abolish
the pornography laws," only I find that crime hasn't gone
down. In fact, it has gone up. The Danes haven't become
a healthy, virile, sun-loving people, but are even more
preoccupied with more hang-ups. And that pornographic
trade is in the billions of dollars and it's spread into
America, into Britain, into all the Western countries, less in
Japan because they take a more conservative approach and
lky/1984/lky1009.doc 44
they black out parts of nude photographs that come into
Japan. Well, I think there's some merit in it because the
final proof is what happens to the society.
Richardson : Well, our time has run out. We would like to thank the
Prime Minister for being with us tonight and for answering
a wide range of questions head on, and, to use one of his
words, "robustly".
Thank you.
PM : Thank you.
lky/1984/lky1009.doc