The Wildland Urban Interface (WUI) is a common story line in many of today’s wildfire events. The WUI concept was formally introduced in 1987 Forest Service Research budget documents but was not acknowledged as a major component for federal fire management until the 2000 National Fire Plan. Although the 1987 introduction was meant to increase research focus on demographic factors influencing fire and other resource management, its California roots can be traced to post-World War II civil defense concerns about fire and water. The author offers a personal perspective on why the WUI concept was promoted by the Forest Service at an inauspicious time for fire research. The Emergence of the Wildland- Urban Interface Concept

n January 27, 1987, President Ronald Reagan gave his sixth State of the Union address. Reagan’s speech was not well received.1 Forest Service O Research—and Fire Research in particular—had suffered through six years of the Republican president’s budget request reductions. Although these

proposed reductions were partially offset by targeted (i.e., “ear- aged 51,805 fires and 2,021,846 acres burned and supported the mark”) restorations by the Democrat-controlled Congress, Forest argument that the “fire problem was solved.”2 This assumption Service research funding continually eroded. Fire activity in the would be reinforced by fire statistics that showed no discernible previous four years of the Reagan presidency (1983–86) had aver- upward trend. With the exception of the Yellowstone Fires in

BY WILLIAM T. SOMMERS

12 FOREST HISTORY TODAY | FALL 2008 F. E. DUNHAM, U.S. FOREST SERVICE, HISTORY SOCIETY PHOTO COLLECTION, FHS 2617 F. Scenes like this one from the Wheeler Springs fire on the Los Padres National Forest in 1948 demonstrated to fire researchers that “mass” forest fires could simulate the fires resulting from a nuclear attack. In the 1950s, federal funding increased during a boom cycle of fire research funding over such concerns and then ebbed and flowed over the next several decades.

1988, the public was not overly concerned with wildland fire In February 1987, the U.S. Department of Agriculture pre- throughout the 1980s and most of the 1990s. In 1987, Smokey sented its 1988 fiscal year budget request (“The FY88 Book of Bear still ruled as the iconic representative of fire management. Notes”) to Congress.5 Beginning on page 22 of the FY88 Book By 1986, national forest timber sales had exceeded ten billion of Notes, Forest Service Research announced that it would board feet every year since the early 1960s.3 Knudsen-Vandenberg “emphasize six research initiatives during 1988.”6 The first even- (KV) obligations had crossed the $100 million annual threshold tually became the Forest Service Global Change Research in FY 1984, peaking at almost $300 million in FY 1992, and would Program, and the second was titled the Wildland-Urban Interface. not drop below the $100 million threshold again until FY 2002.4 The short description accompanying the budget tables stated, Timber sales meant that the Forest Service was a revenue-pro- “Where large urban areas are adjacent to State, Federal, and pri- ducing agency of the federal government. Aggressive fire man- vate forest lands, the intermixing of city and Wildland has… agement was justified as reducing losses of the timber resource brought about major problems in fire protection, land use plan- to the ravages of wildfire. KV funds generated by timber sales ning, and recreation impacts.” The budget table showed $300,000 were available to be drawn on for fire management when and as for this area for fire research in FY 1987, and the president was needed, with eventual replenishment by supplemental appro- asking for $300,000 in FY 1988, a zero percent increase for this priations. When the president delivered his 1987 State of the important initiative. The wildland-urban interface (WUI) con- Union address, the Forest Service fire management was viewed cept was being promoted by the Forest Service at an inauspicious as having achieved fire suppression success at a reasonable cost time for fire research. with funding buffered by timber sales. The WUI initiative drew upon two precedent streams of However, not all components of the Forest Service fire pro- research concern. The smaller stream, but more important in gram were doing well. Fire and Aviation Management dealt with terms of current WUI programs, is generally attributed to Henry federal land fire management and therefore benefited from the Vaux and colleagues starting in the 1950s, with a focus on water timber-KV-fire funding triangle. Cooperative Fire Management policy conflicts between rural interests and emerging urban pop- helped state fire organizations, mainly through distribution of ulation centers in California.7 WUI demographics research is surplus equipment, and did not benefit from the funding trian- clearly derivative of this fundamental driver of societal conflicts gle. Fire research, represented in the Forest Fire and Atmospheric over natural resources. The second stream was much more Sciences Research (FFASR) budget line item, had never been asso- important to fire research in terms of level of effort and fund- ciated with the timber parts of the Forest Service and was at one ing. This stream derived from nineteenth-century experience of the low points of its historically volatile funding cycle. with fire in America and from World War II urban fires caused

FOREST HISTORY TODAY | FALL 2008 13 by incendiary bombing strategies.8 Civil defense interest in pos- Acres Burned by Fire sible mass fire involving flammable wildlands, proximate urban areas, and ignition from nuclear bombs prompted a significant amount of fire research from the 1950s through the 1970s. California was the nexus of both streams of WUI precedent research. C. P. Butler summarized the issue as “Houses built in 1986 canyons and up and down steep hills covered with native vege- tation pose a fire hazard from large Wildland fires….Threat is accentuated because the interface separating the two classes of inflammable materials is…not the responsibility of any agency.”9 “Fire at the Urban-Forest Interface,” the title of a chapter in Volume II: Fire in Forestry, by Craig C. Chandler and others, published in 1983, represents the earliest textbook mention of the WUI fire concept this author can find.10 Both Butler and Chandler were closely associated with research organizations (Stanford Research 1960–2006 Institute spin-off groups and the Forest Service Pacific Southwest

SOURCE: NATIONAL INTERAGENCY FIRE CENTER SOURCE: NATIONAL Station, respectively) that conducted civil defense fire research. Chandler, the lead author of a 1963 report on mass fire resulting from nuclear attack,11 went on to serve as FFASR director until National Forest Timber Sold–1,000 BF his retirement in 1983. The 1987 launching of the WUI research initiative is more clearly understood when associated with a California-based history of intermingling of urban-rural natural

& HARVEST SUMMARY” resource conflict and fire research funding for studies of mass 1986 fire from nuclear attack.

THE BOOM-OR-BUST FUNDING CYCLE At the time that the president’s 1988 budget request was released, the U.S. Forest Service Fire Research Program had been going through several years of funding decline. Since the Forest Service program was the only sustained national wildland fire research program in the United States at that time, it meant U.S. wildland fire research as a whole was in budgetary decline. Forest Service 1940–2006 FFASR work was concentrated at dedicated fire laboratories in Macon, Georgia (the first to open); Missoula, Montana; and Riverside, California. A fourth laboratory in East Lansing, Michigan, was planned but never built. Additional fire research activities, Knudson-Vandenburg (KV) Funds mostly related to timber, were ongoing at several other locations. Each of the three fire labs was built specifically for fire research and thus housed specialized facilities. Macon focused on fire use, Missoula on fire impacts in natural systems, and Riverside on fire impacts on people and communities. Funding contraction dur- 1986 ing the Reagan years eventually lead to the closing of Macon and the inclusion of nonfire research at the Riverside facility. The mid-1980s proved to be both a nadir for agency fire research for- tunes and the time when the foundation was laid for the rein- vigorated fire research that emerged in the 1990s and first decade of the twenty-first century. It was also the time when, hindsight shows, fire activity began the upward trend that now dominates Forest Service and other agency budgets and marked the begin- ning of a transition from natural resource-driven (i.e., timber) 1960–2006 fire management to one increasingly dominated by concerns for

SOURCE: USFS “FY 1905–2007 NATIONAL FOREST TIMBER SOLD & HARVEST SUMMARY”SOURCE: USFS “FY 1905–2007 NATIONAL FOREST TIMBER SOLD SOURCE: USFS “FY 1905–2007 NATIONAL life and property. Few realized at the time of the 1987 State of the Union message that I had assumed responsibility for the fire research program 1986 would mark a watershed for fire management, with the years when I was appointed director of FFASR in December 1986, after ahead bringing a new era of increased fire activity. At the same time, serving as acting director for nine months. FFASR had developed there was a drop in K-V funds because of falling timber sales. The ten initiatives in the previous four years under the leadership of “Poly” line in the graphs produces a smoothed view of the data and my predecessor, Charles W. Philpot, including one for a program better reflects long-term trends. of research on what we called the wildland-urban interface and

14 FOREST HISTORY TODAY | FALL 2008 another on climate change. During the development of the FY station, and telecommunications technologies, but its most well- 1988 budget request, we lobbied hard for these initiatives to be known features were the Multi Agency Coordination System included in the Forest Service budget. As a result, there appeared (MACS) and the Incident Command System, which became the in the FY88 Book of Notes the first published reference to the National Interagency Incident Management System that is in wildland-urban interface as a topic of importance for wildland wide use today. FIRESCOPE remains a functioning operational fire. The use of initiatives was meant to reproduce previous fund- entity in California.20 After the research component of ing success pathways for fire research. FIRESCOPE wound down in the late 1970s, funding for the com- Following World War II, $81,000 was budgeted for Forest Service ponents of Forest Service fire research that were primarily dri- fire research nationwide, sufficient to support about thirteen full- ven by concerns associated with wildland fire impacts on time technical employees.12 In each of the next three postwar communities dried up. The post–World War II era of coopera- decades, Forest Service fire research would grow as a result of fund- tive ventures between Forest Service fire research and the civil ing booms—followed by busts—which were driven by forces exter- defense community also came to an end with the creation of the nal to the main Forest Service interests of timber and watersheds. Federal Emergency Management Agency, the eventual succes- In the 1950s, the boom came from surplus military equipment and sor to the Office of Civil Defense, in 1979.21 engineers and led to aerial fire suppression technologies, as high- lighted by Operation Firestop.13 But as the 1950s came to a close, MASS FIRES AND CIVIL DEFENSE fire research funding sharply dropped as the new aerial fire sup- pression technologies were put into operation. The fluctuations in support for wildland fire research by civil During the 1960s, the boom came from civil defense fears dri- defense agencies reflected a larger three-decades-long struggle ven by the Cold War. Increased funding revitalized a moribund within the federal government over the effects of nuclear bombs, Forest Service fire research program.14 The civil defense link was as described by Lynn Eden.22 The struggle was basically framed officially established in December 1955 when the National by the need to predict the potential payoff (destruction) caused Academy of Sciences (NAS), responding to a formal request from by given bombing approaches. Two camps evolved, one focused the Federal Civil Defense Administration, established the eight- on nuclear blast damage and the other on nuclear fire damage. member Committee on Fire Research “to simulate and advise During World War II, bomb weaponry was for the most part research directed toward the development of new knowledge conventional (nonnuclear). Strategic planning during World War and new techniques that may aid in preventing or controlling II involved development, production, supply, and delivery of either wartime and peacetime fires.”15 A. A. Brown, then Forest Service high-blast impact bombs or incendiary bombs, the latter of which fire research director, was one of five NAS committee members was typified by bomb-caused firestorms in Hamburg, Tokyo, and with a background in civilian fire. The Kennedy administration Dresden. Nuclear weaponry, with the bombing of Hiroshima moved civil defense into the Department of Defense in 1961, and Nagasaki, was capable of inflicting both blast and fire dam- renamed it the Office of Civil Defense, and increased its budget age. That, and the absence of further empirical data, shifted the by $200 million.16 This budget increase provided the funds for strategic argument to theoretical predictions (with some limited Project Flambeau, a Forest Service-led project that boosted and experimentation) of the amount of damage that could be sustained fire research into the late 1960s.17 The reason for the achieved with a given suite of nuclear weapons. If x amount of funding increase was the belief that “mass” forest fires could sim- damage was predicted from nuclear blast effects, and y amount ulate the fires resulting from a nuclear attack. The most cata- of damage was predicted from nuclear fire effects, the accuracy strophic U.S. fire disaster was the October 1871 Peshtigo Fire, and relative magnitudes of x and y became the critical bases for and the second most significant was the August 1910 Big Blowup the amount (number and size) of nuclear weapons to be pro- in Idaho and Montana.18 Although the Peshtigo fire has been his- duced and deployed. torically obscured by the coincident occurrence of the Great Military intelligence was divided into “blast” and “mass fire” Chicago Fire, the Big Blowup led to national forest fire manage- camps. The blast camp gained the upper hand by convincing deci- ment policies that dominated the twentieth century and are still sion makers that the other camp could not reliably predict mass driving fire management practices today through accounting fire effects from nuclear blasts. Those arguments were largely practices based on acres burned. By 1969, Flambeau had come based on the premises that environmental (mostly meteorolog- to a close and fire research was in full bust mode. ical) conditions were too variable for reliable damage prediction The next boom came out of the 1970 Southern California and that the mix of fuels (both wildland and urban) was too com- fires that would now be characterized as WUI fires. That last plex to reliably incorporate in models. The wildland fire research boom went to FIRESCOPE (FIrefighting REsources of Southern community (mostly the California contingent) was approached California Organized for Potential Emergencies), which was to help quantify mass fire effects and eventually realized a research funded by the Congress in 1971, with $675,000 appropriated for funding opportunity. The establishment of the NAS Committee the fire lab in Riverside.19 The funding came after the 1970 fire on Fire in 1955 formally recognized the cooperative potential. season when, during a thirteen-day period, sixteen lives were lost, Funding for nuclear fire effects research would go on to be only seven hundred structures were destroyed, and more than one- a small percentage of funding for nuclear blast effects research. half million acres burned. FIRESCOPE was always promoted as Further, the fire research was funneled through the civil defense an “all emergencies” response system, in keeping with the well- arm of the government. But when that arm was moved under established ties between Forest Service fire research and the civil FEMA, its ties to military intelligence were devalued. defense community. FIRESCOPE provided pioneering efforts in Although the nuclear blast camp came to dominate strategic fire management use of remote sensing, automated weather weapons planning and civil defense funding support for wildland

FOREST HISTORY TODAY | FALL 2008 15 COURTESY OF THE U.S. FOREST SERVICE Smoke from a Project Flambeau “burn.” The fire represents a block of homes in a residential neighborhood ignited by an atomic explosion. Project Flambeau, an Office of Civil Defense–funded, Forest Service Research–led field experiment was meant to simulate “mass” fire in urban settings—a foreshadowing of today’s wildland-urban interface.

fire research dried up after Flambeau, the research legacy carried THE PAST TWO DECADES forth into FIRESCOPE, twenty-first-century fire management, and the WUI initiative. Some interesting side notes also need to The Forest Service Research component of the FY 1988 federal be mentioned. One involves the ongoing relationship between budget contained two initiatives that in retrospect laid the research fire and climate. As mentioned before, in the same budget year foundation for two primary drivers of twenty-first-century fire that the Forest Service introduced its WUI initiative, it also intro- management—climate change and demographic change. Both duced a climate change research initiative. The climate-fire rela- initiatives were attempts to ensure an improved funding future for tionship has now moved to the forefront of federal agency Forest Service fire research from anticipated science trends and thinking in regard to fire and is becoming central, along with new budget packaging of previously successful research thrusts. WUI associated demographics, in twenty-first-century fire man- The climate change research initiative was specifically intended agement planning.23 “Nuclear winter” emerged as a different to retain and enhance a funding base that had been dedicated to aspect of the fire-climate relationship in the early 1980s. Several acid rain research under the National Acid Precipitation Program, of the scientists involved with nuclear fire effects in the previous which FFASR Director Philpot had obtained. We knew that this decades applied their models to potential longer-term atmos- funding would likely expire when its research results were applied pheric effects of a full-scale nuclear war. The predicted effects to planned amendments of the Clean Air Act. The arrival of the from individual nuclear bombs were scaled up for multiple George H. W. Bush administration in 1989, two years after events.24 The involvement of the publicly popular scientist Carl Reagan’s 1987 State of the Union address, ushered in a dramatic Sagan helped bring the issue to prominence and was reinforced change in environmental leadership that included the 1990 Clean by the November 1983 broadcast of the television movie The Day Air Act Amendments, which in conjunction with the 1990 initia- After. Opening images of nuclear effects included pine trees being tion of the U.S. Global Change Research Program led to a rapid hit by the blast shockwave, from film footage taken during Project transition from acid rain to climate change research as the prin- Flambeau. Several authors associated with the nuclear winter cipal environmental research thrust of the federal government. debate and with earlier nuclear fire effects research have recently The FY 1991 budget (introduced in February 1990) was the first reemerged and coupled their effects models with “a modern cli- budget plan fully crafted by the new administration and contained mate model and new estimates of smoke generated by fires in significant new funding for Forest Service climate change research, contemporary cities to calculate the response of the climate sys- some of which was targeted for fire and climate science. During tem to a regional nuclear war”; with a prediction of “significant the George H. W. Bush, William J. Clinton, and George W. Bush cooling and reductions of precipitation lasting years, which would administrations, climate change research was subject to strident impact the global food supply.”25 political debate. Federal fire management did not acknowledge

16 FOREST HISTORY TODAY | FALL 2008 Vulnerability to WUI fires like the 8th Street Fire in 1996 helped earn Boise, Idaho, tenth place among U.S. urban cen- ters on the place-based vulnerability index. The fire consumed 22 square miles. Nearly twelve years to the day on the opposite end of town, the Oregon Trail Fire destroyed ten houses and damaged nine more, and killed one person. COURTESY OF THE BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, IMAGE IDFIREBARRY005.JPG COURTESY OF THE BUREAU LAND MANAGEMENT, the potential impacts of climate change on fire in any of its major wildland fire management was slowly learning to adjust its strate- planning efforts from the 1980s through the 2000 National Fire gic focus from protection of timber resources to more heuristic Plan. Only since 2007 has climate change gained somewhat equal considerations of fire as an ecosystem process. The basic argu- footing with fuels buildup as a stated concern of fire managers. ment made to support this shift was that decades of aggressive The WUI initiative has had a very different pathway to accep- fire suppression had resulted in vegetation changes that put many tance. Although it has failed to gain almost any funding for Forest fire dependent western wildland ecosystems at increased risk Service fire research directly, it has emerged as a major driving from catastrophic fire. The widely reported Yellowstone fires of force for fire management planning and policy. When we 1988 provided the impetus for policy debate regarding the impor- launched the initiative, our major concern was our ability to tance of fire in restoring and maintaining ecosystem health. The define an actual demographic research program that would quan- following February, President George H. W. Bush presented his tify the issue. We hoped that fire spread models would be able FY 1990 budget. The FY 1990 Book of Notes in support of Forest to fully incorporate both wildland and structural fuels to seam- Service research provided a precursor for later fire management lessly predict WUI fire behavior. That has been very slow in com- shifts in emphasis by subsuming WUI under a new “Catastrophic ing. But WUI quantification pioneered by Susan I. Stewart, Volker Forest Fires” initiative. The initiative noted that “Fire is a natural Radloff, and their colleagues has fully redeemed our mid-1980s part of most of our Wildland ecosystems; in fact it is necessary hopes and then some.26 Although fire managers have, and con- for their continued health and vitality, it must be managed to tinue to be, the primary appliers of WUI demographics research avoid catastrophic results.” Why were catastrophic fires felt to findings, those findings are beginning to affect a much wider be increasing? “Some of the contributing factors are persistent range of natural resource issues. Demographics information, dis- drought (a possible indicator of global climate change); fuel played with geographic information systems (GIS) technologies buildups (particularly in wilderness areas); the effect of insects, and coupled with satellite remote sensing imagery, is informing disease and pollutants on Wildland vegetation; and the ever planners, managers, and policy makers in ways made possible increasing trend toward development and human activities in by the 1987 WUI Forest Service Research initiative. Budget-driven Wildland areas.” During the next decade, federal wildland fire consolidations have led to only one fully dedicated national fire management strategic thinking focused on fuel buildup and staff in Forest Service headquarters. The former Cooperative returning fire to fire-dependent ecosystems. As forest policy Fire Management responsibilities were combined into that staff shifted from timber extraction to ecosystem sustainability, fire and placed under the deputy chief for State and Private Forestry. came to be viewed as a needed elixir as well as a threat. WUI The FFASR fire research responsibilities now reside in the Forest received mostly lip service until the 2000 National Fire Plan and Management Sciences staff under the deputy chief for Research climate change received mostly sneering lip service until very and Development. The Joint Fire Science Program and the recently. During the twenty years since the WUI concept was National Fire Plan had injected significant new funding into fire formally introduced, fire suppression costs have escalated while research since their creation in 1998 and 2000, respectively, and fire managers face a twelve-month fire season with increased that funding has led to a flow of new research findings about WUI risks.27 WUI and most other fire topics. WUI and climate change con- But the question remains: Has putting WUI demographics cerns are now clearly center stage for fire management. on the wildland fire research strategic agenda really improved The WUI initiative received only two years of stand-alone strategic fire management decision making? The current fire prominence in Forest Service budget documents. During the costs being borne by the Forest Service and other federal and time that strategic military interest in nuclear fire effects waned, state agencies seem to be pointing to a Rubicon where demo-

FOREST HISTORY TODAY | FALL 2008 17 graphic trends will dictate a choice between natural resource and Forestry, Volume II: Forest Fire Management and Organization (New York: WUI fire suppression priorities. Recurrence of historical fire John Wiley & Sons, 1983), 189. research interests may influence that choice. At the time the ideas 11. C. C. Chandler, T. G. Storey, and C. D. Tangren, “Prediction of Fire in this paper were originally being presented during the 2008 Spread Following Nuclear Explosions,” (U.S. Forest Service Research Annual Meeting of the American Society of Environmental Paper PSW-5, 1963). 12. C. W. Wilson and J. B. Davis, “Forest Fire Laboratory at Riverside and History held in Boise, Idaho, a report in the journal Risk Analysis Fire Research in California: Past, Present, and Future,” Gen. Tech. Rep. assessing Boise as one of America’s urban centers most vulner- PSW-105 (USDA Forest Service, 1988). able to terrorist attack was receiving moderate press coverage. 13. C. B. Phillips, “California-Nevada-Hawaii Forest Fire Council: Its Boise ranked tenth among 132 U.S. urban centers in terms of a History and Highlights of Its Meetings.” Available at calculated “all hazards” place-based vulnerability index and was http://www.cnhfire.org/cnh_history.doc. the only western urban center placed in the high-risk category.28 14. Pyne, Fire in America, 489. Boise received its surprisingly high ranking because of the threat 15. L. Eden, Whole World on Fire: Organizations, Knowledge, and Nuclear from WUI fire and dam failure, a threat made real by the Oregon Weapons Devastation (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004), 194. Trail Fire in August 2008.29 Updating of the long relational con- 16. Ibid., 200. cern between nuclear fire impacts and what we now know as the 17. R. N. Meroney, “Fires in Porous Media: Natural and Urban Canopies.” WUI may further emphasize support for traditional wildland fire Presented at NATO Advanced Study Institute, May 5–15, 2004, in Kiev, management natural resource objectives. ■ Ukraine. Accessed at http://www.engr.colostate.edu/~meroney/pro- jects/Fires%20in%20Porous%20Canopies%20Text.pdf; and C.M. Countryman, Project Flambeau—An Investigation of Mass Fire William T. Sommers has been involved with wildland fire research and (1964–1967), Vol. I (U.S. Forest Service: Pacific Southwest and Range Experimental Station, 1969). management for thirty-five years. His career with the U.S. Forest Service 18. Meroney, “Fires in Porous Media.” from 1973 until his retirement in 2000 included assignments as direc- 19. “FIRESCOPE: Past, Current and Future Directions, A Progress tor of Forest Fire and Atmospheric Science Research (FFASR) and chair Report.” October 1988. Accessed at http://www.firescope.org/ of the interagency National Wildfire Coordinating Group. He is cur- firescope-history/past%20present%20future.pdf. Some highlights of rently director of the EastFIRE Laboratory at George Mason University. the evolution of the Incident Command System as developed by The author thanks Dr. Peter J. Roussopoulos for his very helpful review FIRESCOPE are available online at: http://www.firescope.org/ of a draft version of this manuscript. firescopehistory/Some%20Highlights%20of%20the%20Evolution%20 of%20the%20ICS.pdf. 20. “FIRESCOPE: Past, Current and Future Directions.” NOTES 21. The Office of Civil Defense was succeeded by the Federal Civil 1. T. Berland, “The 1987 State of the Union Address: Riding into the Defense Authority in 1972, which in turn was succeeded by the Federal Sunset” (paper presented at the annual meeting of the Association for Emergency Management Agency in 1979. Education in Journalism and Mass Communication, San Antonio, TX, 22. Eden, Whole World on Fire. August 1–4, 1987). 23. See, for example, M. Ryan, S. Archer, et al., “Land Resources: Forests 2. National Interagency Fire Center (NIFC): Fire Information—Wildland and Arid Lands,” in The Effects of Climate Change on Agriculture, Land Fire Statistics, available online at http://www.nifc.gov/fire_info/ Resources, Water Resources, and Biodiversity (Washington, DC: U.S. fires_acres.htm. Climate Change Science Program and the Subcommittee on Global 3. “FY 1905–2007 National Forest Timber Sold and Harvest Summary,” Change Research, 2008). available at http://www.fs.fed.us/forestmanagement/reports/sold- 24. R. P. Turco, O. B. Toon, T. P. Ackerman, J. B. Pollack, and C. Sagan, harvest/index.shtml. “Nuclear Winter: Global Consequences of Multiple Nuclear 4. The Knutson-Vandenberg Act (K-V) of June 9, 1930 (16 U.S.C. 576- Explosions,” Science 222(23) (December 1983): 1283–92. 576b; 46 Stat. 527), as amended by the National Forest Management 25. A. Robock, L. Oman, G. L. Stenchikov, O. B. Toon, C. Bardeen, and R. Act of October 22, 1976 (16 U.S.C. 1600 et seq.) (FSM 1011), is, accord- P. Turco, “Climatic Consequences of Regional Nuclear Conflicts,” ing to the Renewable Resources Handbook, “the authority for requiring Atmos. Chem. Phys. 7(2007): 2003–12. purchasers of national forest timber to make deposits to finance sale 26. S. I. Stewart, V. C. Radeloff, R. B. Hammer, and T. J. Hawbaker, area improvement activities needed to protect and improve the future “Defining the Wildland Urban Interface,” Journal of Forestry 105 (2007): productivity of the renewable resources of forest lands on timber sale 201–207. areas.” K-V information kindly provided by Douglas W. MacCleery and 27. U.S. Department of Agriculture, “1990 Budget Explanatory Notes for Dick Zaborske, U.S. Forest Service. Committee on Appropriations—Forest Service,” 1989. 5. U.S. Department of Agriculture, “1988 Budget Explanatory Notes for 28. W. W. Piegorsch, S. L. Cutter, and F. Hardisty, “Benchmark Analysis for Committee on Appropriations–Forest Service,” 1987. The 1988 federal Quantifying Urban Vulnerability to Terrorist Incidents,” Risk Analysis fiscal year ran October 1, 1987–September 30, 1988. 27(6) (2007): 1411–25. 6. “1988 Budget Explanatory Notes,” 22. 29. S. Glascock, “Vulnerable to Terror: NYC, New Orleans and … Boise?” 7. H. J. Vaux, “Forestry’s Hotset: The Urban/Forest Interface,” American Los Angeles Times, March 31, 2008. Accessed at Forests 88(5): 36–46. http://articles.latimes.com/2008/mar/31/nation/na-boise31. On 8. S. J. Pyne, Fire in America: A Cultural History of Wildland and Rural Fire August 25, 2008, the Oregon Trail Fire destroyed ten houses and dam- (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1982), 287–90, 394–400. aged nine more, and killed one person. Rocky Barber and Patrick Orr, 9. C. P. Butler, “The Urban/Wildland Interface.” Combustion Institute “Fire raced into Oregon Trail Heights before residents realized what Western States Section, 1974 Spring Meeting, at Washington State was happening,” Idaho Statesman, http://www.idahostatesman.com/ University, Pullman. WSS/CI Papers 74(15). 1404/story/484397.html. 10. C. Chandler, P. Cheney, P. Thomas, L. Trabaud, and D. Williams, Fire in

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