The Federal Judicial Power and the International Legal Order
CURTIS A. BRADLEY THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL POWER AND THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER Richard Falk famously argued that domestic courts should operate as "agents of the international order."1 Recent academic debates over the role of international law in the U.S. legal system, and over the relevance of foreign and international materials in U.S. con- stitutional interpretation, are at least in part debates about this proposition. Modern variants of Falk's claim can be found in the works of scholars such as Harold Koh, Jennifer Martinez, and Anne- Marie Slaughter.' These and other "internationalist" scholars con- sider the U.S. judiciary as part of a "global community of courts," emphasize the values of international cross-fertilization and har- monization, and view international law as directly permeating, and often having primacy within, the U.S. legal system. "Constitution- alist" or "revisionist" scholars, by contrast, distinguish between the international and domestic legal systems, emphasize constitutional structure as a limitation on the domestic effect of international law, and generally advocate political branch rather than judicial control over the domestic implementation of international legal obliga- Curtis A. Bradley is the Richard and Marcy Horvitz Professor of Law at Duke Law School. AUTHOR'S NOTE: Thanks to Kathy Bradley, Jack Goldsmith, Joost Pauwelyn, Eric Posner, Paul Stephan, Carlos Vazquez, Mark Weisburd, and Ernest Young for helpful comments. Richard A. Falk, The Role of Domestic Courts in the InternationalLegal Order 72 (1964). 2 See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, TransnationalLegal Process, 75 Neb L Rev 181 (1996); Jennifer Martinez, Towards an InternationalJudicial System, 56 Stan L Rev 429 (2003); Anne-Marie Slaughter, Judicial Globalization, 40 Va J Intl L 1103 (2000).
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