Distribution Date: November 3, 2010

TRANSMITTAL MEMORANDUM

To: Distribution Date: November 3, 2010

Subject: Technical Memorandum, CWM-Related Responses and Reports, Former Fort Ord, California

Enclosed for your information is: Technical Memorandum, CWM-Related Responses and Reports, Former Fort Ord, California. This technical memorandum is a secondary document produced as part of the Fort Ord Munitions Response (MR) program and serves to document all available reports of the presence of potential CWM and all incident responses in which materials thought to contain CWM were encountered at Fort Ord. This memorandum describes how each of these reports and incidents was brought to the Army’s attention, the steps that were taken to verify the presence or absence of CWM, the results of analyses, follow-up documentation, and the final outcome of each incident.

Should you have any questions, please contact Melissa Broadston, Community Relations, U.S. Army, Fort Ord BRAC Field Office at (831) 393-1284 or by e-mail at [email protected].

MACTEC Engineering and Consulting, Inc. 1465 North McDowell Boulevard, Suite 200 • Petaluma, California 94954 • Phone: 707 793 3800 • Fax: 707 793 3900

Technical Memorandum, CWM-Related Responses and Reports November 2, 2010 Former Fort Ord, California MACTEC Engineering and Consulting, Inc., Project No. 4088107669 05.2 FP63731_Tech Memo CWM Report

Technical Memorandum CWM-Related Responses and Reports Former Fort Ord, California

MACTEC Project No. 4088107669 05.2

This document was prepared by MACTEC Engineering and Consulting, Inc. (MACTEC) on behalf of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) – Sacramento District, for the sole use of the USACE, the only intended beneficiary of this work. No other party should rely on the information contained herein without the prior written consent of the USACE. This report and the interpretations, conclusions, and recommendations contained within are based in part on information presented in other documents that are cited in the text and listed in the references. Therefore, this report is subject to the limitations and qualifications presented in the referenced documents.

ii Technical Memorandum, CWM-Related Responses and Reports November 2, 2010 Former Fort Ord, California MACTEC Engineering and Consulting, Inc., Project No. 4088107669 05.2 FP63731_Tech Memo CWM Report

CONTENTS

ACRONYM LIST ...... iv 1.0 INTRODUCTION ...... 1-1 1.1 Background ...... 1-3 1.2 Purpose and Scope ...... 1-3 2.0 RESPONSES TO SUSPECTED CHEMICAL WARFARE MATERIAL ...... 2-1 2.1 Chemical Agent Identification Sets Used at Fort Ord ...... 2-1 2.2 Buried Drum Suspected of Containing Mustard Agent ...... 2-2 2.3 Stokes Mortar Projectile Discovery ...... 2-4 2.4 Chemical Discovered in Soil near Inter-Garrison Road ...... 2-5 2.5 Possible DANC Discovered in Soil at Abrams Park Baseball Field ...... 2-7 2.6 Chemical Agent Identification Sets Discovered at MRS-13B ...... 2-9 2.7 One-Gallon Container at MRS-4B ...... 2-11 2.8 Livens Projector ...... 2-11 3.0 REPORTS OF SUSPECTED CHEMICAL WARFARE MATERIAL ...... 3-1 3.1 Potential Storage of Mustard Gas Canisters in East Garrison Nuclear Biological Chemical Storage ...... 3-1 3.2 Suspected Burial of Chemical Agent Identification Sets ...... 3-2 3.3 Potential Use/Storage of Chemical Agent Identification Sets in the Chemical/Biological/Radiological Areas ...... 3-2 3.4 Possible Use of Chemical Agent for Training at Picnic Canyon ...... 3-4 3.5 Suspect Drum in Range 31 ...... 3-6 3.6 Possible Chemical Training Area ...... 3-6 4.0 CONCLUSION ...... 4-1

PLATE

2.1 Locations of CWM-Related Responses and Reports

ATTACHMENT

A Referenced Documents

iii Technical Memorandum, CWM-Related Responses and Reports November 2, 2010 Former Fort Ord, California MACTEC Engineering and Consulting, Inc., Project No. 4088107669 05.2 FP63731_Tech Memo CWM Report

ACRONYM LIST

AC hydrogen cyanide ASP Ammunition Supply Point BRAC Base Realignment and Closure CA chemical agent CAIS Chemical Agent Identification Set CBR Chemical, Biological, Radiological CERCLA Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act CG carbonyl dichloride CK cyanogen chloride CWM chemical warfare material cy cubic yard DANC decontaminating agent, non-corrosive DENR Directorate of Environmental and Natural Resources DMM discarded military munitions DoD Department of Defense DPW Directorate of Public Works DRMO Defense Reutilization and Marketing Office DTSC Department of Toxic Substances Control EOD Explosive Ordnance Disposal EPA U.S. Environmental Protection Agency FM titanium tetrachloride GB sarin GD soman HD mustard agent HFA Human Factors Applications, Inc. HLA Harding Lawson Associates ICAD individual chemical agent monitor INEL Idaho National Engineering Laboratory IRP Installation Restoration Program LOI letter of instruction MACTEC MACTEC Engineering and Consulting, Inc. MARB Munitions Assessment Review Board MD munitions debris MEC munitions and explosives of concern MMRP Military Munitions Response Program MR munitions response MRA munitions response area MRS munitions response site NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization NBC nuclear biological chemical NSCM non-stockpile chemical materiel OE ordnance and explosives OU2 operable unit 2 OVA organic vapor analyzer PINS portable isotopic neutron spectroscope PRGs preliminary remediation goals RDX cyclotrimethylene trinitramine

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RI/FS Remedial Investigation /Feasibility Study RH195 1, 3-dichloro-5, 5-dimethyldantoin, a mild bleach SLFRC Squad Live Fire Reaction Course SPAL Simulator, Projectile, Airburst, Liquid TEU technical escort unit TNT trinitrotoluene USA USA Environmental, Inc. USACE U.S. Army Corps of Engineers UXB UXB International, Inc. UXO unexploded ordnance VX A nerve agent

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1.0 INTRODUCTION

The former Fort Ord (Fort Ord) is located near Monterey Bay in northwestern Monterey County, California. Since 1917 until base closure in 1994, portions of the Fort Ord property were used by infantry units for maneuvers, target ranges, and other purposes. Military munitions such as artillery and mortar projectiles, rockets, and guided missiles; rifle and hand grenades; land mines; pyrotechnics; bombs; and demolition materials, were fired into, fired upon, or used on the facility.

As part of the comprehensive environmental investigation of the former Fort Ord under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), several literature reviews and associated field investigations were conducted. During this process, the Army has responded to documentation or site-specific discoveries related to the potential presence of chemical warfare material (CWM). The purpose of this technical memorandum is to describe the circumstances surrounding each of these events and subsequent actions taken to resolve them. The comprehensive environmental investigations have not found any evidence of presence or use of chemical weapons at Fort Ord.

Information from various document reviews and literature searches indicate no ordnance-related CWM were stored or used at Fort Ord. Chemical agents were used at Fort Ord in the form of Chemical Agent Identification Sets (CAISs) (Army, 1993), which were used to train soldiers to recognize and protect themselves from chemical agents. These CAISs contained dilute solutions of chemical agents in small (one-ounce), hermetically sealed glass containers. Information regarding discovery and disposition of CAISs at Fort Ord are presented in Sections 2.1 and 2.6.

The investigations documented in this report show that, other than the CAISs mentioned above, no CWM or non-stockpile chemical material (NSCM), have been found on the Fort Ord. Non-Stockpile Chemical Materiel Program, Survey and Analysis Report, produced by the Army in 1993, and updated in 1996, only references the use of CAISs at Fort Ord. Non-stockpile CWM is defined as “chemical warfare material that’s not part of the chemical weapons stockpile.” This is better defined by the definition from the U.S. Army Chemical Materials Agency, Public Affairs Office (AMSCM-PA), APG, MD 20101-524 as follows: “When the United States ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention on April 29, 1997, it agreed to destroy all its chemical weapons and chemical weapons material. The U.S. divided this mission into two categories – stockpile and non-stockpile. Stockpile encompasses the declared unitary stockpiles of chemical weapons. Non-stockpile materiel includes the rest of the mission, to destroy items that are

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not part of the U.S. chemical weapons stockpile, including binary chemical weapons, former chemical warfare production facilities, miscellaneous CWM, and treaty declarable recovered CWM. Miscellaneous CWM includes; chemical samples, and Category 3 materials (materials/equipment specific to chemical weapons but not contaminated with actual agent).”

Terms presented in this document are consistent with currently accepted terminology and Military Munitions Response Program (MMRP) guidance. However, older terms are also included when presenting quotes and references. For clarification purposes, some of the terms used in this document are explained below (Department of Defense [DoD] Manual 6055.09-M, Volume 8, Administratively Reissued August 4, 2010):

• Chemical Warfare Material (CWM). Items generally configured as a munition containing a chemical compound that is intended to kill, seriously injure, or incapacitate a person through its physiological effects. CWM includes V- and G-series nerve agents or H-series (mustard) and L-series (lewisite) blister agents in other-than-munition configurations; and certain industrial chemicals (e.g., hydrogen cyanide (AC), cyanogen chloride (CK), or carbonyl dichloride (called phosgene or [CG]) configured as a military munition. Due to their hazards, prevalence, and military-unique application, chemical agent (CA) identification sets are also considered CWM. CWM does not include: riot control devices; chemical defoliants and herbicides; industrial chemicals (e.g., AC, CK, or CG) not configured as a munition; smoke and other obscuration producing items; flame and incendiary producing items; or soil, water, debris or other media contaminated with low concentrations of chemical agents where no CA hazards exist.

• Munitions and Explosives of Concern (MEC; previously called ordnance and explosives [OE]). A term distinguishing specific categories of military munitions that may pose unique explosives safety risks: Unexploded ordnance (UXO), as defined in section 101(e)(5) of Reference (e). Discarded military munitions (DMM), as defined in section 2710(e)(2) of Reference (e); or munitions consituent (e.g., trinitrotoluene [TNT], cyclotrimethylenetrinitramine [RDX]), as defined in section 2710(e)(3) of Reference (e), present in high enough concentrations to pose an explosive hazard. • Munitions Response Area (MRA). Any area on a defense site that is known or suspected to contain UXO, DMM, or MEC. Examples include former ranges and munitions burial areas.

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A munitions response area is comprised of one or more munitions response sites. A discrete location within an MRA that is known to require a munitions response.

• Munitions Response Site (MRS; formerly called an OE site) - A discrete location within a munitions response area that is known to require a munitions response.

1.1 Background

Environmental investigation began at the former Fort Ord in the mid-1980's. Fort Ord was placed on the National Priorities List of Superfund sites in 1990 due to evidence of contaminated soil and groundwater. In 1991, the Basewide Remedial Investigation/Feasibility Study (RI/FS) for soil and groundwater contamination began. Since 1991 when Fort Ord was selected for base realignment and closure (BRAC), and its official closure in September 1994, site visits, historic and archival investigations, MEC sampling, and removal actions have been performed and documented in preparation for the transfer and reuse of Fort Ord property.

In November 1998, the Army agreed to evaluate MEC at Fort Ord in a RI/FS under the CERCLA. The Munitions Response (MR) RI/FSs include evaluations of past MEC investigation and removal actions as well as recommendations for future remedial actions necessary to protect human health and the environment from the physical hazards associated with MEC. Information provided in this technical memorandum summarizes the actions taken to resolve incidents involving suspected CWM.

1.2 Purpose and Scope

This technical memorandum serves to document all available reports of the presence of potential CWM and all incident responses in which materials thought to contain CWM were encountered at Fort Ord. The available reports and supporting information presented in this memorandum have been compiled from information related to the Fort Ord MR RI/FS program, as well as the Basewide RI/FS program, which addresses soil and groundwater contamination at Fort Ord. The following sections describe how each of these reports and incidents was brought to the Army’s attention, the steps that were taken to verify the presence or absence of CWM, the results of analyses, follow-up documentation, and the final outcome of each incident.

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2.0 RESPONSES TO SUSPECTED CHEMICAL WARFARE MATERIAL

The following sections describe events where and how the Army and DoD addressed finds of actual or suspected CWM at Fort Ord. The approximate locations of the responses discussed below are provided on Plate 2.1 as appropriate.

2.1 Chemical Agent Identification Sets Used at Fort Ord

Description: In 1993, Congress directed the Army to submit a survey and analysis report that identified the locations, types, and quantities of NSCM at its many facilities. The survey and analysis addressed 82 installations in over 33 states. In addition, it explained the methods used for destruction of this material, the cost and schedule for their destruction, and alternatives for transportation of these materials. The report was completed in November 1993 and updated in 1996, when it was expanded to include 96 locations in 38 states. As part of the Survey and Analysis Report, a records search was conducted regarding references to the use and disposal of CWM at Fort Ord. Only references to CAIS were discovered. The Survey and Analysis Report states that CAISs were used “for field training of troops at a site past the landfill area off Imjin Road.” The report also noted the removal of four CAISs from inventory at Fort Ord in 1974.

Related Investigations: The landfill off Imjin Road was investigated as MRS-2 (formerly OE-2). MRS-2 was initially investigated as part of the Ordnance and Explosive Waste Sampling and Removal Action conducted at Fort Ord in 1994. During the sampling activities, no MEC or CWM was observed. This area was also investigated as part of the investigation of Installation Restoration Program (IRP) Site 16 (Pete’s Pond Extension). Trenches were excavated in the area to evaluate the potential for chemicals in soil followed by extensive excavation of soil in the southern part of MRS-2 as part of the IRP Site 16 remedial action. No CWM was identified during the remediation. The remaining portion of MRS-2 was documented as a Track 1 Plug-in site in the Track 1 Plug-in Approval Memorandum, Multiple Sites, Groups 1-5, Former Fort Ord, California dated July 2006.

Final Disposition: The four CAISs in the inventory were removed from the installation in 1974 and sent to Edgewood Arsenal, Maryland. They were subsequently sent to Rocky Mountain Arsenal for destruction.

Supporting Documents: The following supporting documents are available in the Fort Ord Administrative Record:

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• Non-Stockpile Chemical Materiel Program: Survey and Analysis Report, prepared by the Army, dated November 1993. Also subsequent editions published in April and August 1995 and December 1996 (AR # OE-2020).

• OEW Sampling and OEW Removal Action. Ft. Ord Final Report, prepared by Human Factors Applications, Inc.(HFA), Explosive Ordnance Disposal Division, dated December 1, 1994 (AR # OE-0012).

• Track 1, Plug-In Approval Memorandum, Multiple Sites, Groups 1-5, Former Fort Ord, California dated July 19, 2006 (AR # OE-0591E).

• Remedial Action Confirmation Report and Post Remediation Health Risk Assessment, Sites 16 and 17 Remedial Action, Basewide Remediation Sites, Former Fort Ord, California, dated April 30, 1999. (AR # BW-2021A).

2.2 Buried Drum Suspected of Containing Mustard Agent

Description: On August 27, 1993, while conducting a remedial investigation to delineate landfill material at IRP Site 16 (Pete’s Pond Extension), a reinforced drum was uncovered. The shape and unusual reinforcement of the drum led the onsite ordnance specialist monitoring remediation activities from UXB International (UXB), to suspect it could be associated with chemical agent.

Response: The following events occurred in response to the discovery:

1. Upon discovery of the “double bung drum,” all work stopped and the site was evacuated. According to standard procedures, the Installation (Range Control and Directorate of Environmental and Natural Resources [DENR]) was notified.

2. The Installation notified the Fort Ord Police and Fire Departments and then called the 787th Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) at Moffett Field to assess the drum. The police and fire departments evacuated a one-half-mile radius around the site, which was standard operating procedure.

3. The 787th EOD inspected the drum and conducted vapor tests, which were negative for chemical mustard. The drum contained some sand, but there was no indication of residual liquids or gas- vapor in it.

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4. According to Stan Ryley, an Ordnance Specialist with HFA, the drum was “identical” to drums that can be found mounted outside buildings to feed heating oil systems. One such drum embossed “Associated Oil Co.” was found in storage at the Ammunition Supply Point (ASP).

5. At the Army’s direction, the drum was crushed and left in the trench, its location recorded, and the trench was backfilled.

6. Further excavation was postponed pending development of procedures and site safety plans for work involving potential exposure to CWM. An addendum to the Site Safety and Health Plan addressing CWM was completed on February 17, 1994.

7. On March 15, 1994, the investigation activities resumed at the site and one soil sample was collected from soil below the area where the drum was found and analyzed for mustard agent and its degradation products. Two additional samples collected from an adjacent soil boring were also analyzed for these compounds. The analytical results indicated that no mustard agent or its degradation products were present in the soil samples collected in the area where the drum was found.

Related Investigations: As part of the remedial action (landfill debris removal) performed during 1997 at Site 16, approximately 20,920 cubic yards (cy) of soil were excavated from the general area where the drum was identified. No evidence of CWM or related materials was identified during the excavation. The results of the remedial action are described in the Remedial Action Confirmation Report and Post- Remediation Health Risk Assessment, Sites 16 and 17 Remedial Action.

Disposition: Because the sample results for soil in and around the drum were non-detect, the drum was crushed and left in the trench, its location recorded, and the trench was backfilled. Remedial actions have been completed in the area, which included substantial excavation and removal of Pete’s Pond Landfill material, including the area containing the crushed drum. The area was subsequently backfilled with clean fill, and grading was performed at the site.

Clarification: Two documents published shortly after the drum was discovered, the Archive Search Report prepared by USACE in October 1993 and Fort Ord Phase I Work Plan and Accident Prevention Plan prepared by HFA in December 1993, inaccurately stated that the results from soil samples collected at the drum site indicated traces of mustard agent (HD). The analytical data show that mustard was not detected in the soil. This issue was clarified in a letter to Linda Millerick, cited below. There remains no evidence that drums of mustard agent were ever stored or used on Fort Ord.

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Supporting Documents: Administrative record numbers are provided for documents that are included in the Administrative Record; other documentsare provided in Attachment A:

• Letter to Linda Millerick from James Willison, Director, Environmental and Natural Resources Management, dated September 22, 1999, including three attachments:

− Selected text and analytical results for soil samples from the Final Basewide Remedial Investigation/Feasibility Study, Fort Ord, California, dated October 18, 1995.

− Material Safety Data Sheet for Mustard Agent.

− Related correspondence from Linda Millerick to James Willison, dated September 8, 1999, and from Christine Bettencourt to James Willison dated July 23, 1999.

• Site Safety and Health Plan, Remedial Investigation/Feasibility Study, Fort Ord, California: Mustard Agent Addendum, prepared by Harding Lawson Associates (HLA), dated February 17, 1994 (AR # OE-0496).

2.3 Stokes Mortar Projectile Discovery

Description: On May 19, 1994, a four-inch World War I-era British Stokes mortar projectile was found in the former Impact Area between Ranges 23 and 23M within the western portion of the impact area near MRS-15SEA 03. The discovery was reported by UXB, an ordnance and explosives contractor that was surveying the Fort Ord firing ranges for unexploded ordnance. The projectile measured four inches in diameter, 19 inches in length, and weighed 25 pounds. Stokes mortar projectiles had a variety of designs, including practice, smoke, high explosive, and chemical weapons functions.

Response: The following events occurred in response to the discovery:

1. Ordnance Specialist Gary Cole of UXB noted that the projectile’s fuze was missing, the burster charge had been removed, and the projectile contained an unknown liquid.

2. The area was immediately evacuated and the Installation (Fort Ord Range Control and DENR) was notified. The Installation then notified other responders.

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3. A Technical Escort Unit (TEU) from the Dugway Proving Ground was dispatched to the site and confirmed the projectile’s identity. They confirmed the projectile was filled with liquid and found the fuze nipple was of the small diameter variety usually reserved for chemical- rather than smoke-filled rounds.

4. The projectile was removed from the site and secured at the ASP.

5. On June 3, 1994, a team of technicians from the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (INEL) conducted a Portable Isotopic Neutron Spectroscope (PINS) assay test of the projectile.

Analytical Results: The program manager for the U.S. Army Chemical Materiel Agency’s Non- Stockpile Chemical Materiel Program reviewed the PINS test results and concluded that the projectile did not contain any chemical agent, but contained FM (titanium tetrachloride) smoke, a substance used solely to create smoke.

Disposition: According to Wilson Walters, occupational safety specialist for Huntsville USACE, because the FM smoke is conventional ordnance, not CWM, the projectile was turned back over to the onsite ordnance specialists to be destroyed properly onsite. According to James Anelle, project manager for Huntsville USACE, the projectile was destroyed onsite, according to established procedures for the MEC removal actions occurring at that time.

Clarification: Newspaper articles published shortly after the find incorrectly reported that the projectile contained phosgene. They also inaccurately reported that a team from the Sierra Army Depot responded to the site.

Supporting Documents: Documents listed below are provided in Attachment A:

• U.S. Army PINS Assay Quick Look Report (June 3, 1994).

• Telephone conversation record with Wilson Walters, Occupational Safety Specialist, USACE, dated August 13, 2001.

2.4 Chemical Discovered in Soil near Inter-Garrison Road

Description: On April 14, 1994, while conducting MEC investigation activities at MRS-31 (south of Inter-Garrison Road and east of Eighth Avenue), MR contractors became nauseated and dizzy. The contractors were investigating buried metal objects that had been detected. Presumably, their symptoms

2-5 Technical Memorandum, CWM-Related Responses and Reports November 2, 2010 Former Fort Ord, California MACTEC Engineering and Consulting, Inc., Project No. 4088107669 05.2 FP63731_Tech Memo CWM Report resulted from vapors that were released during excavation of some small metal containers. All work was stopped and the site was evacuated.

Response: The Installation was notified immediately and the following actions were taken:

1. Notification was made to the Army Directorate of Public Works (DPW), Fort Ord Fire Department, Marina Department of Public Safety, U.S. Naval Postgraduate School Fire Department Hazardous Materials Unit, Seaside Fire Department Hazardous Materials Unit, and Monterey County Environmental Health Hazardous Materials Specialists.

2. A command center was set up at Eighth Avenue and Inter-Garrison Road; Inter-Garrison Road was closed between Eighth Avenue and Abrams Drive.

3. The metal containers were covered with plastic sheeting and a fence was erected around the area to secure the site. A 24-hour Federal Guard was placed near the site.

4. On April 15, 1994, soil and fluid samples were collected at the location where the UXO crew found buried metal debris and noted that odors were emanating from the excavation.

Analytical Results: Analytical results indicated the presence of various volatile and semi-volatile organic compounds and metals in the soil and liquid samples. The analytical results are included in the Action Memorandum dated July 13, 1994 listed in the supporting documents below. Two of these compounds, lead and dichlorobenzene compounds, were determined to be chemicals of potential concern because the concentrations exceeded the preliminary remediation goals (PRGs) established for Fort Ord. None of the compounds detected indicated the potential presence of CWM or chemical agent.

Because of the presence of chemicals exceeding PRGs, a Time-Critical Removal Action was conducted in October 1994 to remove metal debris and surrounding soil. Confirmation samples collected from the soil three feet beneath the surface at the two locations contained organic chemicals. Additional work was performed after the Time Critical Removal Action that included exploratory soil borings, soils sampling and analysis, and a screening risk evaluation. Further excavation of contaminated soil in the area was completed in May 1996. Confirmation samples collected from the floor and sides of each excavation were non-detect for all analytes except motor oil, which was below its target cleanup concentration for the site.

Disposition: Soil, metal containers, and other material generated during the Time-Critical Removal Action in October 1994 were turned over to the Fort Ord Defense Reutilization and Marketing Office

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(DRMO), which was responsible for proper disposal according to all requirements of the waste generated. The soil excavated in May 1996 was disposed at the Fort Ord Landfill because the analytical results for this soil met the criteria for disposal there.

Supporting Documents: Administrative Record numbers are provided for documents that are included in the Administrative Record; other documents are provided in Attachment A of this report:

• Memorandum for Commandant, DLIFLC, Presidio of Monterey, from Dalys J. Talley, dated February 6, 1995. Package includes several attachments, including:

− Trip Report – Fort Ord, CA – TEU Orders Number ZELW01-16, prepared by Lt. Richard Zellman, dated January 24, 1995.

− After Action Report Inter-Garrison Road Incident, Hazardous Material, prepared by David A. Leist, Fire Chief, Department of Public Works, prepared April 16, 1994.

• Action Memorandum, Request for Time Critical Removal Action, Inter-Garrison Site, Fort Ord, California, prepared by HLA, dated July 13, 1994 (AR # BW-0647).

• Removal Action Report – The Inter-Garrison Site Time-Critical Removal Action, prepared by HLA, dated October 26, 1994 (AR # BW-1692).

• Interim Action Confirmation Report, Site 39B – Inter-Garrison Site, Fort Ord, California, prepared by HLA, dated April 2, 1997 (AR # IAFS-170).

2.5 Possible DANC Discovered in Soil at Abrams Park Baseball Field

Description: On December 14, 1994, potential chemical soil contamination was discovered during trenching at the Operable Unit 2 (OU2) Area A landfills in the vicinity of the Abrams Park Housing Area baseball field. The presence of potential contamination was indicated by a change in soil color from the typical yellow to a gray color. The gray color, along with previous discoveries of a World War I-era mask and a five-gallon bucket labeled “DANC” during trenching on December 1 and 8, 1994, respectively, suggested the potential presence of contamination in the form of decontaminating agent, non-corrosive (DANC), a caustic chemical commonly used for chemical agent decontamination.

Response: The soil in the backhoe bucket was screened by UXB using an individual chemical agent monitor (ICAD). The alarm that indicates nerve gas (or other compound with a long carbon chain) on the ICAD was triggered by this soil; however, an organic vapor analyzer (OVA) did not indicate the presence of organic vapors and the ICAD’s hydrocarbon alarm was not triggered. The trench was immediately

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A TEU from Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, conducted soil sampling on January 10 and 11, 1995. The samples were collected adjacent to the trench in which the soil was stained and the trench where the bucket labeled DANC was found. Splits of the samples were analyzed prior to shipping the soil samples offsite. Sampling was conducted to confirm the results of the initial field screening.

Analytical Results: The soils were analyzed for four nerve and blister agents: sarin (GB), soman (GD), HD, and a nerve agent (VX). Analytical results for the soil samples indicated that the soil was not contaminated with these compounds.

DANC is not CWM and is not highly toxic. It is a mixture of acetylene tetrachloride (a solvent) and RH195 (synonym 1, 3-Dichloro-5,5-Dimethylhydantoin), a mild bleach.

Disposition: Because no CWM was detected in conjunction with the DANC, the soil was treated as part of the adjacent landfill material. Remedial action has been completed in the OU2 Area A landfills, which resulted in significant excavation and removal of landfill material including the Abrams Park baseball field area.

Supporting Documents: Administrative Record numbers are provided for documents that are included in the Administrative Record; other documents are provided in Attachment A of this report:

• Memorandum for Commandant, DLIFLC, Presidio of Monterey, from Dalys J. Talley, dated February 6, 1995. Package includes several attachments, including:

− Trip Report – Fort Ord, CA – TEU Orders Number ZELW01-16, prepared by Lt. Richard Zellman, dated January 24, 1995.

− Operations Plan No 95-03 regarding soil sampling in the Fort Ord Landfill.

− Preliminary Analytical Results for CSM Screening of Soil Samples (Job Number 95-3-TEU).

• Excerpts regarding the DANC find, from the Draft Pre-design Technical Memorandum, Operable Unit 2, Fort Ord Landfills, Fort Ord, California, prepared by HLA, dated January 5, 1995 (AR # OU2-326).

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• Draft Final Remedial Action Confirmation Report and Post-Remediation Screening Risk Assessment, Area A, Operable Unit 2 Landfills, Former Fort Ord, California, Revision 0. April 2001 (AR # OU2-599A).

2.6 Chemical Agent Identification Sets Discovered at MRS-13B

Description: On March 10, 1997, CWM in the form of CAIS kits were found by the USA Environmental, Inc. (USA), an ordnance and explosives contractor, during ordnance removal activities at MRS-13B (formerly OE-13B [Practice Mortar Range]):

• Two metal cans, identified as Set K951, CAIS, War Gas Identification Set, Instructional, M1.

• Partially buried one-ounce glass vials that appeared to correspond to the two metal cans.

Response: Upon discovering the vials, the following actions were taken:

1. All excavation operations ceased and the installation was notified. No vials were broken, indicating that no release of the contents had occurred. The site was secured, pending arrival of personnel from the 787th EOD unit from Moffett Field and a TEU from Dugway Proving Ground. The 787th EOD secured the discovery site. The TEU was responsible for recovering the vials from the surrounding soil, removing the vials from the installation, and escorting them to the appropriate offsite storage facility for later destruction. The USACE provided 24-hour security at the site.

2. On Tuesday, March 11, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and California Department of Toxic Substances Control (DTSC) were notified. The TEU performed air sampling at the discovery site and concluded that there had been no chemical release. Over the next two days, 24 vials were recovered, representing two complete CAISs. The vials were repackaged and stored in the secure bunker at the ASP until they could be removed from the site.

Analytical Results: On October 2, 1997, chemical analysis using a RAMAN Spectrophotometer was performed on the 24 vials to identify their contents. The results of the analysis indicated the following:

• Six of the vials contained a mixture of phosgene and chloroform and six contained chloropicrin and chloroform

• Three vials contained a solution resembling chloroform with a five percent solution of Lewisite

2-9 Technical Memorandum, CWM-Related Responses and Reports November 2, 2010 Former Fort Ord, California MACTEC Engineering and Consulting, Inc., Project No. 4088107669 05.2 FP63731_Tech Memo CWM Report

• Nine vials contained 95 percent chloroform and another unidentified chemical compound. The unidentified chemical compound was treated as CWM.

Disposition: The 12 vials containing chloropicrin and phosgene mixtures were confirmed and treated as industrial waste and were transported and disposed properly, meeting all requirements, through the DRMO. The remaining 12 vials were shipped to Aberdeen Proving Grounds, Maryland for further analysis and ultimate disposal.

Related Investigations: MR investigation and removal activities at MRS-13B were documented in the Final Munitions Response Remedial Investigation/Feasibility Study, Parker Flats Munitions Response Area, Former Fort Ord, California dated August 31, 2006 and the Final OE Removal After Action Report, Inland Range Contract, Former Fort Ord, California, Site OE-13B dated December 24, 2001. These documents describe the results of the removal action conducted at the site. No additional CAIS kits or vials were identified during the removal action.

Supporting Documents: Administrative Record numbers are provided for documents that are included in the Administrative Record; other documents are provided in Attachment A of this report:

• Memorandum on CAIS Found on Fort Ord, prepared by James Willison, Director, Environmental and Natural Resources Management, dated March 12, 1997 (AR # OE-0265D).

• Letter to Linda Anderson, Center for Disease Control and Prevention, from the Army regarding identification and disposition of the CAIS vials, dated October 28, 1997.

• Raman Evaluation Results of Former Fort Ord K951 CAIS Vials, prepared by Project Manager for Non-Stockpile Chemical Materiel, dated October 1997.

• K951 CAIS Assessment Plan at Former Fort Ord, prepared by the U.S. Army Program Manager for Chemical Demilitarization, dated September 1997.

• Final OE Removal After Action Report, Inland Range Contract, Former Fort Ord, California, Site OE-13B dated December 24, 2001 (AR # OE-0265C).

• Final Track 2 Munitions Response, Remedial Investigation/Feasibility Study, Parker Flats Munitions Response Area, Former Fort Ord, California prepared by MACTEC, dated August 31, 2006 (AR # OE-0523N).

2-10 Technical Memorandum, CWM-Related Responses and Reports November 2, 2010 Former Fort Ord, California MACTEC Engineering and Consulting, Inc., Project No. 4088107669 05.2 FP63731_Tech Memo CWM Report

• Record of Decision, Parker Flats Munitions Response Area, Track 2 Munitions Response Sites, Former Fort Ord, California dated June 24, 2008 (AR # OE-0661).

2.7 One-Gallon Container at MRS-4B

Description of Report: During vegetation clearance activities at MRS-4B (formerly OE-4B) on January 28, 1998, an MR contractor found a one-gallon container that appeared to be a World War II vintage Landmine, 1 gal., Chemical. The container was filled with an unknown liquid, which could potentially have been CWM.

Response Action: The container was recovered, contained, and stored in a bunker at the ASP by Army EOD personnel from Moffett Field, California. Personnel from Aberdeen Proving Ground and Dugway Proving Ground later arrived to test the contents of the container.

Analytical Results: A PINS test for the item determined that the container was filled with water.

Disposition: Because the container was filled with water, it is not CWM. It was handled as nonhazardous waste.

Supporting Documents: Administrative Record numbers are provided for documents that are included in the Administrative Record; other documents are provided in Attachment A of this report:

• Draft Final After Action Report SS/GS Sampling and OE Removal OE-4B, Former Fort Ord, CA, prepared by USA, dated October 30, 1998. (Includes a photograph of the M1 Chemical Mine)(AR # OE-0220A).

• Munitions Assessment Review Board (MARB) Recommendation for Suspect Chemical Warfare Materiel Stored at the Former Fort Ord, prepared by the Deputy Chief of Staff for Chemical and Biological Matters, dated August 19, 1998.

2.8 Livens Projector

Description: At approximately 3:30 p.m. on April 12, 1999, an unexploded World War I-era Livens Projector shell was found during a MEC investigation in MRS-53 (formerly OE-53). USA, the ordnance contractor, discovered the Livens Projector. The Livens Projector measured approximately 28 inches long by 7-1/2 inches in diameter and contained liquid. Livens projectors were used at Fort Ord to project

2-11 Technical Memorandum, CWM-Related Responses and Reports November 2, 2010 Former Fort Ord, California MACTEC Engineering and Consulting, Inc., Project No. 4088107669 05.2 FP63731_Tech Memo CWM Report smoke for troop training; however, they were commonly used during wartime to deliver liquid payloads such as smoke or chemical weapons compounds.

Response:

1. On April 12, 1999, the 787th EOD team from Moffett Field arrived at the site and confirmed the identity of the Livens Projector.

2. The area was secured to prevent public access.

3. On April 14, 1999, a TEU from Dugway Proving Ground arrived to analyze the fill material and status of the firing mechanism. An x-ray showed the projector was fully intact, fused, and armed. The burster charge was present, the firing system and train were intact, and the shell had a 50 percent liquid fill. The shell was missing its handle and safety pin. The team then conducted a PINS assay test to identify the contents of the shell.

Analytical Results: The PINS test identified the shell’s contents as a sulfur trioxide-chlorosulfonic acid mixture, also known as FS smoke. FS is a liquid that produces a dense white smoke when dispersed into a humid atmosphere. It is similar to FM (titanium tetrachloride) in appearance, properties, and use.

Disposition: On April 19, 1999, the Livens Projector was transported by the 787th EOD to a secure location in the Impact Area and detonated using 200 pounds of explosives.

Supporting Documents: Administrative record numbers are provided for documents that are included in the Administrative Record; other documents are provided in Attachment A of this report:

• PINS Quick Look Report prepared by the Army, dated April 16, 1999.

• Information paper on the PINS System, prepared by the Army, dated July 1, 1999.

• Information paper on the components and use of screening smokes, prepared by the Army (undated).

• After Action Report, 100% Grid Sampling/4’ OE Removal-Site OE-53, Former Fort Ord, California dated September 30, 2001 (AR # OE-0326).

Related Investigations: The removal actions at MRS-53 were documented in the Final Munitions Response Remedial Investigation/Feasibility Study, Parker Flats Munitions Response Area, Former Fort

2-12 Technical Memorandum, CWM-Related Responses and Reports November 2, 2010 Former Fort Ord, California MACTEC Engineering and Consulting, Inc., Project No. 4088107669 05.2 FP63731_Tech Memo CWM Report

Ord, California dated August 31, 2006. This document describes the results of the removal action conducted at the site. No other incidents related to potential CWM occurred during the removal actions.

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3.0 REPORTS OF SUSPECTED CHEMICAL WARFARE MATERIAL

The following sections describe actions taken in response to anecdotal evidence (documents, interviews, etc.) regarding suspected chemical CWM at Fort Ord.

3.1 Potential Storage of Mustard Gas Canisters in East Garrison

Nuclear Biological Chemical Storage

Description: According to an interview with a former Army private stationed at Fort Ord, mustard gas canisters were stored in the East Garrison nuclear biological chemical (NBC) warehouse, between 1980 and 1983. In July 1996, Lawrence Grater, a former private, responded to an advertisement in USA Today requesting people who had knowledge of ordnance and chemical weapons use at Fort Ord to call the Fort Ord Hotline. A telephone interview was subsequently conducted (Earth Tech Archives Search Control No. 96–004).

Response Action: A thorough investigation of documents related to NBC training has been conducted. No records indicate that CWM other than CAIS kits was used or stored at the former Fort Ord. As stated in an interview with Jerry Stratton, former Garrison Commander and Chief of Training at Presidio of Monterey, no CWM except CAIS was used at the installation. CAIS kits were stored at the NBC warehouse, but were handled under a strict sign out/sign in process.

In 1974, the 7th Infantry Division occupied the installation. The 761st Chemical Company was attached to the 7th Infantry Division and was responsible for detecting the presence of chemicals in the field and advising the units on decontamination procedures. They did not use CWM in their training activities.

Disposition: None. No mustard gas canisters have been identified at Fort Ord.

Supporting Documents: The following documents related to the above-mentioned action are located in Attachment A of this report:

• Earth Tech Archives Search Control No. 96-004, documentation of interview with Lawrence Grater.

• Telephone conversation record, documenting conversation with Jerry Stratton, August 13, 2001.

3-1 Technical Memorandum, CWM-Related Responses and Reports November 2, 2010 Former Fort Ord, California MACTEC Engineering and Consulting, Inc., Project No. 4088107669 05.2 FP63731_Tech Memo CWM Report

3.2 Suspected Burial of Chemical Agent Identification Sets

Description: In an interview conducted by USACE personnel in 1993, Staff Sergeant Davis suggested that CAISs were suspected to have been buried near the Imjin Road (Pete’s Pond) Landfill, between the roadway and old stockade.

Response: A follow-up interview was conducted to verify burial of CAISs in the area. As stated in a letter dated September 22, 1999, to Linda Millerick from James M. Willison, Director, Environmental and Natural Resources Management, his office contacted Staff Sergeant Davis, who stated that “the burial of CAIS was not known to him personally and that he could not specifically identify a location where CAIS might be buried.” Although several remedial investigations and surveys for unexploded ordnance have been conducted in the area (MRS-2, formerly OE-2), no CAISs have been discovered. As discussed in Section 2.6, the only non-inventory CAIS discovered at Fort Ord were discovered in MRS 13-B.

Disposition: None. No CAISs have been identified during any investigations near the Imjin Road (Pete’s Pond) Landfill.

Supporting Documents: The following documents related to the above-mentioned action are in the Administrative Record:

• Memorandum on CAIS Found on Fort Ord, prepared by James Willison, Director, Environmental and Natural Resources Management, dated March 12, 1997 (AR # 0265D).

• Interview information from Archives Search Report, Fort Ord, California, prepared by USACE, Huntsville Division, in October 1993 (AR # OE-0005).

• Track 1, Plug-In Approval Memorandum, Multiple Sites, Groups 1-5, Former Fort Ord, California dated July 19, 2006 (AR # OE-0591E).

3.3 Potential Use/Storage of Chemical Agent Identification Sets in

the Chemical/Biological/Radiological Areas

Description: Four chemical/biological/radiological (CBR) training areas have been identified on historical maps, as reported in the Revised Archive Search Report prepared by the USACE, St. Louis District, in 1997. The CBR storage areas may have been used for storage of CAIS, and nearby areas may have been used for simulated chemical training.

3-2 Technical Memorandum, CWM-Related Responses and Reports November 2, 2010 Former Fort Ord, California MACTEC Engineering and Consulting, Inc., Project No. 4088107669 05.2 FP63731_Tech Memo CWM Report

Response: All four sites were identified as requiring MEC investigations. These four areas were originally designated Sites OE-4A, OE-4B, OE-4C (now part of Site OE-31), and OE-4D (renamed Site OE-40). These sites are currently named MRS-4A, MRS -4B, MRS - 31, and MRS -40 in accordance with revised MMRP site naming conventions. Site walks of MRS-4A and MRS-4B were conducted in 1993-94, and additional survey and sampling activities at these two sites were conducted in 1997. Although MEC and munitions debris (MD) were observed, no CWM was observed. In 1998, removal actions were conducted at MRS-4A and MRS-4B to remove MEC to a depth of three to four feet. Ordnance and ordnance scrap were identified and removed; however, no CWM was discovered.

Site MRS-4C underwent a MEC removal action as part of the California State University footprint (MRS-31 removal). A removal action was also completed at MRS-40 as part of the MRS-50 removal action.

MRS-4B and MRS-40 were evaluated as part of the Final Track 2 Munitions Response, Remedial Investigation/Feasibility Study, Parker Flats Munitions Response Area. No CWM was identified during removal actions at these sites.

Disposition: None. No CWM has been identified in these areas.

Supporting Documents: The following documents related to the above-mentioned action are in the Administrative Record:

• Revised Archives Search Report, Former Fort Ord, California, Monterey County, California, prepared by USACE, St. Louis District, dated 1997 (AR # OE-0022).

• Draft Final Literature Review Report, Ordnance and Explosives, Remedial Investigation/Feasibility Study, Former Fort Ord, California, prepared by HLA, dated January 4, 2000. Table 1, Site Status, Known or Suspected OE Sites. (AR # OE-0245H).

• Draft Final SiteStats/GridStats Sampling and OE Removal After Action Report, Site OE-4A, prepared by USA, dated October 23, 2000 (AR # 0216A).

• Draft Final After Action Report SS/GS Sampling and OE Removal OE-4B, prepared by USA, dated October 30, 2000 (AR # 0220A).

• Final Report for Ordnance and Explosive Removal Action, Fort, Ord, California, Site CSU, prepared by USACE, Huntsville Division, dated July 1994 (AR # OE-0121).

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• Final OE Sampling SiteStats/GridStats After Action Report, Inland Range Contract, Former Fort Ord, California, Site OE-40. September 30 (AR # OE-0321).

• Final 100 Percent Grid Sampling & 4’ Removal After Action Report, Inland Range Contract, Former Fort Ord, California, Site OE-50. September 30(AR # OE-0337).

• Record of Decision, Parker Flats Munitions Response Area, Track 2 Munitions Response Sites, Former Fort Ord, California dated June 24, 2008 (AR # OE-0661).

3.4 Possible Use of Chemical Agent for Training at Picnic Canyon

Description: From May 1982 to the time of the base closure, Fort Ord Ranges N-1 and N-2 (known as Picnic Canyon and also identified as MRS-12) were used as a Squad Live Fire Reaction Course (SLFRC) to train army troops under simulated battle conditions (Plate 2.1). Training activities were restricted to the canyon floor within 100 meters of the trail that runs through the canyon. Live fire was directed at the east and west canyon walls. The SLFRC was used approximately 45 times a year for:

1. Live-Fire Assault Training (using 5.56 mm and 7.62 mm ammunition), and use of 40 mm practice projectiles.

2. Simulated NBC Integrated Training, in which troops encountered a variety of combat scenarios that simulated battle conditions involving nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons.

Response: The following literature was reviewed to evaluate the possibility that chemical, nuclear, or biological weapons material was used at Picnic Canyon:

1. Ft. Ord PAM 350-5: Standard Operating Procedures, (Area N-1 and N-2), Squad Live-Fire Reaction Course (May 3, 1982).

2. Disposition Form/AFZW–AF: Live-Fire Squad Assault Range, Area N, Fort Ord Tactical Training Area (March 1, 1983).

3. Disposition Form/AFZW–GC–CM: NBC Integrated Training Area Letter of Instruction (LOI) (January 31, 1984).

3-4 Technical Memorandum, CWM-Related Responses and Reports November 2, 2010 Former Fort Ord, California MACTEC Engineering and Consulting, Inc., Project No. 4088107669 05.2 FP63731_Tech Memo CWM Report

4. Fort Ord Small Arms Ranges: Compatible Use Zone Study (December 1987).

5. Decision Memorandum/AFZW–PTM–R: Waiver of Surface Danger Zone for Small Arms Firing on Range N–1 and N–2 (March 4, 1991).

6. Decision Memorandum/AFZW–PTM–R Revised: Waiver of Surface Danger Zone for Small Arms Firing on Range N–1 and N–2 (April 27, 1992).

7. Draft Final Data Summary and Work Plan, Site 39, Inland Ranges, Fort Ord, California.

The literature review indicates that only practice occurred here and that CWM was not used during that practice.

According to Disposition Form/AFZW–GC–CM: NBC Integrated Training Area LOI, among the support equipment used in NBC training were the following weapons simulation components: (1) Warsaw Pact contamination markers; (2) North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) contamination markers; (3) white or yellow smoke grenades; (4) CG burning grenades; (5) polyethylene glycol (PEG– 200); (6) N-Butyl Mercaptan (an odorant); (7) M-9 Simulator, Projectile, Airburst, Liquid (SPAL) Devices; (8) simulated VX land mines; (9) simulated nerve agent rounds, and (10) smoke generators (52d Cml Det.). None of these items constitutes CWM.

Disposition: Because this site was identified as an MRS, random sampling was conducted in 1994-1995 and MEC removal was conducted between September 1997 and January 1998. The removal was performed to a depth of one foot over the entire 28 acres of the site. Although MEC and munitions debris were discovered, no CWM or biological or radiological weapons were observed.

Supporting Documents: In addition to the documents listed above, the following documents related to the above-mentioned action are in the administrative record:

• Revised Archives Search Report, Former Fort Ord, California, Monterey County, California, prepared by USACE, St. Louis District, dated 1997 (AR # OE-0022).

• After Action Report, 100% OE Removal, Inland Range Contract, Former Fort Ord, California, Site OE-12 (Picnic Canyon), prepared by USA, dated February 3, 2000 (AR # OE-0269A).

3-5 Technical Memorandum, CWM-Related Responses and Reports November 2, 2010 Former Fort Ord, California MACTEC Engineering and Consulting, Inc., Project No. 4088107669 05.2 FP63731_Tech Memo CWM Report

3.5 Suspect Drum in Range 31

Description: In April 1994, a large, heavy gauge steel drum was discovered during field investigations in the down range area of Range 31, within the Impact Area. The drum was reinforced with support ring bands on the sides and a welded bung and appeared to be similar to drums used to store CWM.

Response: A site walk was conducted on August 9, 2000. Harding ESE, Inc., representatives and a USACE OE Safety Specialist attempted to locate the drum, but were unable to because of existing heavy vegetation, or because the location of the drum was possibly misidentified. However, the OE safety specialist was provided a snapshot of the drum and subsequently concluded that it was a fuel drum of the type mentioned in Section 2.2.

Disposition: The drum was no longer suspected of containing CWM; therefore, when it is discovered, it will be turned over to the Fort Ord DRMO for disposal.

Supporting Documents: The letter below is located in Attachment A of this report:

• Letter to Harvey D. Jones, Army Corps of Engineers, from Bruce L. Wilcer, HLA, dated May 5, 1994.

3.6 Possible Chemical Training Area

Description: In an interview conducted by USACE personnel in 1993, Maurice MacBride, who was a military dependent during 1933-37, said he remembered watching soldiers training with protective masks on in an area between the stockade and Imjin Road (between the intersection of Fifth and Eighth Streets and the intersection of Imjin and Eight Streets.) He thought that live agents were probably not being used for the training because the horses present were not masked. This site overlaps the area discussed in Section 3.2 of this report.

Response: This area was identified as corresponding with MRS-2/IRP Site 16. It is also known as Pete’s Pond. Remedial Actions have already been completed in the area, including excavation and removal of Pete’s Pond Landfill. The area was also sampled for MEC. No CWM was identified in any of these investigations and removal actions.

Disposition: None. No CWM was identified.

3-6 Technical Memorandum, CWM-Related Responses and Reports November 2, 2010 Former Fort Ord, California MACTEC Engineering and Consulting, Inc., Project No. 4088107669 05.2 FP63731_Tech Memo CWM Report

Supporting Documents: The following documents related to the above-mentioned action are in the Administrative Record:

• Summary of interview with Maurice McBride in the Archive Search Report, Fort Ord, California, prepared by USACE, St. Louis District, dated December 1993 (AR # OE-0005).

3-7 Technical Memorandum, CWM-Related Responses and Reports November 2, 2010 Former Fort Ord, California MACTEC Engineering and Consulting, Inc., Project No. 4088107669 05.2 FP63731_Tech Memo CWM Report

4.0 CONCLUSION

There is no evidence of CWM weapons having been used at former Fort Ord based on the results of the incidents and investigations described above. A comprehensive search was conducted at Fort Ord and did not uncover any evidence in records, interviews, or other information sources to indicate that chemical weapons were ever stored, used, or buried at Fort Ord. Evidence indicates that the only CWM used at the former Fort Ord were CAISs, which were used to train soldiers to recognize and protect themselves from chemical agents, as described in Section 1.0 of this report.

In addition, more than 13 million anomalies have been investigated and more than 300,000 cubic yards of contaminated soil have been excavated during investigations and removals at Fort Ord without any evidence of CWM weapons, or other evidence that contradicts the results and conclusions presented in this technical memorandum. Although it is unlikely, should additional CAISs be discovered at Fort Ord, the removal and remediation will follow the Non-Stockpile Chemical Warfare Material Program protocol.

4-1

PLATE

A EXPLANATION

L I F Training Area Boundary

! O Marina Former Fort R Approximate Locations of Suspected Ord Location R CWM Items N es er I va A tio n 1. CAIS KITS- MRS-13B Ro ad FORMER FORT 1 2. Stokes Mortar Projectile Discovery (6) (UXB) - Monterey |ÿ oad R ORD BOUNDARY 5 Imjin May 1994 Bay 8th Street 3. Buried Drum IRP Site 16 3 4. Chemical Discovery in Soil near Inter-Garrison Inter-Garrison Road 9 Road 8 4 5. Possible DANC Discovered in Soil at Abrams Park Baseball Field 1 6. Livens Projector

9 7 7. One-Gallon Container - MRS-4B

9 8. East Garrison Nuclear Biological Chemical Storage - Building T021 6 9 9. CBR Training Areas (Simulated) - MRS-4A, MRS-4B, MRS-4C, and MRS-40

10. Picnic Canyon Training Area Eu caly ptus 10 Roa d 11. Suspect Drum in Range 31 d

Sand a

R City

d n v l a

B C

e y r o o l r o a M B Seaside m IMPACT i J

l a AREA r e n 2 e G 11

Del Rey d

Toro x m

Oaks .

Regional p a

p M

Park _ n o i t

0 1 2 a

Laguna c o L Seca - 1

Miles - 2 e t a l P \ S I M P G

\ 4 d

68 r 2

|ÿ : O 8 t r 3 : o 2 F

DRAWN: PROJECT NO: _

PLATE 0 TJH 9 4088107669 05.2 1 6 0 6

ENGINEER: SCALE: Technical Memorandum 2 7

AS SHOWN 0 6 1 \ CWM-Related Responses and Reports 1

Location Map 8

CHECKED: APPROVED: t s BPF 2.1 8 u Former Fort Ord, California 0 g 4

DATE: DATE: \ 8/2010 8/2010 u : A P

Attachment A

Referenced Documents

/\ / \ / \ DATE: 14 Dec 1992 /PDISON\ HCSDS NO: 20058A \ / U.S. ARMY EDGEWOOD RESEARCH, Emergency \ / DEVELOPMENT Telephone tis: \ / &~D ENGINEERING ERDEC Safety CENTER 410-671-4411 Office \/ EST 0700-1700 After normal duty ED, AND TED (See hours: 410-278-5201 Addendum A) Ask for ERDEC Staff Duty Officer MATERIAL SAFETY DATA SHEET SECTION I - GENEP~L INFORMATION MANUFACTURER'S NAME: Department of the MANUFACTURER'S Army ADDRESS: U.S. ARMY CHEMICAL EDGEWOOD AND BIDLOGICAL RESEARCH DEVELOPMENT DEFENSE AGENCY CENTER AND ENGINEERING ATTN: SCBRD-ODR-S ABERDEEWPROVING· GROUND; CAS REGISTRY NUXBER: ED 21DlO-5423 505-60-2, 39472-40-7, CHEXICAL 68157-62-0 NA~E AND SYNONYMS:

Sulf ide, bis Bis(beta-chlcrcethyl)su1fide(2-chlorcethyl) Bis(2-chloroethyllsulfide 1-chloro-2(beta-chloroethy1thio) beta, beta'-dichlorodiethyl ethane 2,2'dichlorodiethyl sulfide Di-2-ch1oroethyl sulfide sulfide beta, beta'-dichloroethyl 2,2'-dichloroethyl sulfide sulfide TRADE NAME AND SYNONYMS: ED Sulfur mus tard Senfgas Iprit S-l Kampstoff os t H "Lost ll Sulphur mustard HS Los t S-yped gas Mustard te Gas Yellow Cross Yperite Liquid CHEMICAL FAMILY: chlorinated sulfur FORMULA/CHEMICAL compound STRUCTURE: . C4 (HB) C12 (S) H H I \ H H \ I \ I C1 - C - C - S I I I I - C - C - \ I I I C1 NFPA H H I I 704 SIGNAL: Health H H 4 Flammability- 1\ Reactivi 1 ty- 1 1 \ 1\1 /\ I\!\ \4 /\1 / \! \/ \ / ------\!

~------SECTION II - COMPOSITION INGREDIENTS NAME FORMULA ------PERCENTAGE BY WEIGHT AIRBORNE· EXP(I~TT"" ,,,-- hr-TWA) 100 0.003 mg/m3 (8 Sulfur l'Ius tard C4(H8)Cl2(S) ------SECTION III - PHYSICAL DATA ------liOILING POINT DEG F (DEG C): 422 DEG F (217 DEG C) Hg @ 25 DEG C) VAPOR PRESSURE (rom Hg): 0.072 mm Hg @ 20 DEG C (0.11 rom

VAPOR DENSITY (AIR=l): 5.5 in acetone, CH3 (Cl), SOLUBILITY IN WATER: Negligible. Soluble tetrachloroethane, ethylbenzoate, and ether. SPECIFIC GRAVITY (H20=l): 1.27 @ 20 DEG C VOLATILITY: 610 mg/m3 @ 20 DEG C 920 mg/m3 @ 25 DEG C Normally pale yellow to black. AND ODOR: Water clear if pure. APPEARANCE Slight garlic type odor. The odor threshold for HD is 0.0006 mg/m3 ------SECTION IV - FIRE AND EXPLOSION DATA ------~------charges) FLASHPOINT (METHOD USED): 105 DEG C (ignited by large explosive FLAMMABILITY LIMITS (% by volume): Unknown use of extinguishing EXTINGUISHING MEDIA: Water, fog, foam, C02. Avoid methods that will splash or spread mustard. in extinguishing SPECIAL FIRE FIGHTING PROCEDURES: All persons not engaged evacuated from the area. Fires involving HD the fire should be immediately areas. When should be contained to prevent contamination to uncontrolled in buildings or areas containing agents, fire responding to a fire alarm clothing (without fighting personnel should wear full firefighter protective chemical agent firefighting and fire rescue operations. TAP clothing) during facepiece, protection is required. Positive pressure, full Respiratory apparatus (SCBA) will be worn where NIOSH-approved self-contained breathing or of oxygen deficiency and When directed by the fire chief there is danger cases where fire chemical accident/incident (CAl) operations officer. In responding to a chemical accident/incident for rescue/ fighters are will wear appropriate reconnaissance purposes vice firefighting, they levels of protective clothing (see Section 8).

SECTION V - HEALTH HAZARD DATA

LIMIT (AEL): The AEL for HD is 0.003 mg/m3 as found AIRBORNE EXPOSURE and Control in "AR 40-173, Occupational Health Guidelines for the Evaluation Exposure to l'Iustard Agents H, ED, HT". To date, however, of Occupational has not promulgated the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) a permissible exposure concentration for HD. and alkylating EFFECTS OF OVEREXPOSURE: HD is a vesicant (causing blisters) action on the hematopoietic (blood-forming) agent producing cytotoxic of ED in tissues which are especially sensitive. The rate of detoxificati.on and repeated exposures produce a cumulative effect. the body is very slow Agency for HD has been found to be a human carcinogen by the International Research on Cancer (IARe). l'Iedian doses of HD in man are:

LD50 (skin) ~ 100 mg/kg ICt50 (skin) ~ 2000 mg-min/m3 at 70 - 80 DEG F (humid en~ironment) = 1000 mg-min/m3 ICt50 (eyes) at 90 DEG F (dry lCt50 (inhalation)= 200 mg-min/m3 environment) = 1500 mg-min/m3 LD50 (oral) (Ct unchanged = 0.7 mg/kg with time) Maximum safe Ct for skin and eyes are 5 and 2 ACUTE PHYSIOLOGICAL mg-min/m3, respectively. ACTION OF HD IS 'CLASSIFIED LOCALLY. AS LOCAL AND HD affects both SYSTEMIC. percutaneous the eyes and organs. resorption. the skin. SKIN Skin penetration ~eing lipid soluble. damage occurs. (blisters) is rapid HD can be resorbed after period and reddening without skin into all of 4-24 hours (erythema) of irritation. and individual following the the skin occurs Swelling sensitivity. exposure, depending after a latency skin mucoUS The s~in on degree membrane healing proces~ of exposure the ~ffects of and perSplratlon is very eyes. RD. HD's effect covered skln slow .. ~ender Local action on the skin, are more sensltlve eyesight. on the eyes however, is to Exposure of produces severe less than on photophobia. eyes to HD vapor necrotic damage the and inflammation ,or ~erosol and:los~ of of the conJunct,va produces 1acrlmatlon, SYSTEMIC ACTIONS and cornea. vapor occur primarily or aerosol is through When inhaled, less toxic to inhalation and the upper the skin or eyes ingestion. The inflamed after respiratory than the HD coughing, a few hours tract (nose, liquid farm. and bronchitis, latency period, throat, tracheal Exposure to nearly loss of accompanied is lymph lethal appetite, dia:r~ea, by sneezing, nodes, and dose of HD can fever, results spleen as indicated produce lnJury and apathy. in increased by a drop to bone marrow, Ingestion of susceptibility in WBC count and, stools HD will produce to local and ~herefore, after a 15-20 severe stomach systemic infections. minute latency pains, vomiting, period. and bloody CHRONIC EXPOSURE to ED can cause (cough, shortness sensitization, respirritory of breath, chest chronic tract, skin, pain), and lung impairment, and leukemia. cancer of the It may mouth, throat, EMERGENCY AND also cause birth FIRST AID PROCEDURES: defects. INHALATION. give Remove from the artificial respiration. source IXXEDIATELY. Seek medical If If breathing attention breathing is has stopped, IMMEDlATELY. difficult, administer EYE oxygen. CO~TACT. Speed Remove person in decontaminating by tilting from the liquid the eyes is the head source, flush absolutely essential. and pouring to the .ide, pulling the eyes immediately but, water slowly into the eyelids ~ith water if necessary, the eyes. Do apart with the fer the protect eyes by nat coVer eyes fingers patient to a medical means of dark ~ith bandages facility IMMEDIATELY. or opaque gaggles. SKIN CONTACT. Trans from Don respiratory agent source immediately. protective mask tion of sodium Flush and gloves; Cut hypochlorite skin and clothes remove victim and remove contaminated or liquid household with 5 percent with 5 percent clothing, bleach within solu sodium flush contaminated one minute. area with hypochlorite solution, skin thoroughly soap and water. then area again and transfer If shower wash contaminated i~ated to medical facilities skin with a thickened facility. are available, wlth an absorbent agent, blot/wipe If the skin wash pa~/paper the becomes contam towel prior material off INGESTION. to using decontaminatingimmediately medical Do not induce solution. attention vomiting. Give IMMEDIATELY. victim milk I to drink. Seek

------~-SECTION VI - REACTIVITY DATA 'TABILITY: Stable at ------_49 DEG C ambient tempe:atures \ moisture, to 177 DEG C. •. Decomposition and Mustard l~ temperature has been known a pe:slstent agent lS to rema.n actlve depending on INCOMPATIBILITY: for up to three pH and Conditions years in soil. to avoid. Rapidly corrosive to brass @ h' ~~~ contained and chemically approved decontaminated effluent incinerator, air which will or thermally protective before discharge filter or decomposed clothing to scrub toxic in an EPA analyzed should be the atmosphere. by-pradutct: clothing to assure decontaminated Any frtom should it is free.of usi~g con amina and then be dete table ~TH or e d held for sealed in 7 c?nt~m,nation bleach and or exc'ess shipment back plas~lC bags,lnside (3X) level. material to the prope=~y Th; outlined shall BA lssue l~beled above be accompliShed pOlnt. Decon~aminatlon drum_ with the following in accordance exception: Wl of waste th the procedures reaction HD on laboratory with glassware concentrated may nitric acid. be oxidized Open pit by its vigorous HD burning or in any quantity burying of HD is prohibited. or items containing NOTE: or contaminated Some states with waste. define decontaminated surety material as a RCRA hazardous SECTION VIII - SPECIAL PROTECTION RESPIRATORY INFORMATION PROTECTION: Concentration mg/m3 Respiratory Protection/Ensemble Required Less than or equal to 0.003 A full facepiece, purifying protectivechemical canister, escape. mask air (The M9-, will be onhand masks are 1'117-, and for masks acceptable M40-series Greater certified for this purpose. 0.003 than as equivalent Other NIOSH/MSHA may be used.) facepiece approved pressure SCBA suitable demand full concentrations for use (See with protective in high agent DA PAM 385-61 ensemble. VENTILATION: for examples).

Local Exhaust. shall meet Mandatory. local, state Must be filtered and federal or scrubbed. Special. regulations. Air emissions velocity Chemical laboratory velocity of 100 linear hoods shall at any feet per minute have an that 20%. point not deviating (lfpm) aver~ge inward 150 Existing laboratory from plus or m,nus face Lfpm plus hoods the average lO~ with that cross or minus 20 shall have face velocity the drafts percent. Laboratory an inward by more performance do not exceed hoods face velocity assessing test utilizing 20. of the shall be of the smoke inward face located such ability of producing devices Velocity. the hood to shall A visual Other. ,Recirculation contain agent be performed connect,on HD.' in between of exhaust is ~ermitted. agent air from Emergency area and other agent areas serol-annually backup areas through is prohibited. should or after power is necessary. the ventilation No be performed modification Hoods system 20 cm inside or maintenance should be PROTECTIVE hoods. operations. tested GLOVES: Operations (~3, M4, gloveset). MANDATORY, Butyl toxicological EYE agent protective PROTECTION: gloves hO~ard use goggles As a minimum, and face-shield.chemical goggles will J PROTECTIVE be Worn. For Shall EQUIPMENT: splash be worn with For general M9 or M17 mask lab work, In addition, readily available. gloves when and lab coat handling contaminated lab animal. foot covers, a~d head covers are required. MONITORING: Available monitoring equipment for agent HD is the M8/M~ dete7- tor paper blue bane tube, M256/M256Al kits, bubbler, Depot Area Alr MOn1- toring Sy~tem (DNi~S), Automated.Cont~nu~us Air Monitoring System . (~CAMS), CAM-Ml, Hydrogen Flame Photometrlc Em1sS1on Detector (HYFED~. the M,n1a ture Chemical Agent Monitor (MINI CAM) , and Real T,me Analyt1cal Platform (RTAP) . . Real-time, low-level monitors (with alard) are required for HD operations. In their absence, an IDLH atmosphere must be presumed. Laboratory opera tions conducted in appropriately maintained and alarmed engineering controls require only periodic low-level monitoring. ------SECTION IX - SPECIAL PRECAUTIONS ------PRECAUTIONS TO BE TAKEN IN HANDLING AND STORING: During handling, the "buddy" (two-man) system will be used. Containers should be periodically inspected for leaks, eit~er vi~ually or using a detector kit, and prior to transfering the conta1ners from storage to work areas. Stringent control over all personnel handling HD must be exercised. Chemical showers, eyewash stations, and personal cleanliness facilities must be provided. Each worker will wash their hands before meals and shower thoroughly with special attention given to hair, face, neck, and hands using plenty of soap before leaving at the end of the work day. No smoking, eating, or drinking is permitted at the work site. Decontaminating equip ment shall be conveniently located. Exits must be designed to permit rapid evacuation. HD should be stored in containers made of glass for Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDTE) quantities or one-ton steel con tainers for large quantities. Agent shall be double-contained in liquid tight containers when in storage. OTHER PRECAUTIONS: For additional information see "AR 385-61, The Army Toxic Chemical Agent Safety Program", "DA PAM 385-61, Toxic Chemical Agent Safety Standards'l, and liAR 40-173, Occupational, Health Guideli.nes for the Evaluation and Control of Occupational Exposure to Mustard Agents H, HD, and HT".

------~------SECTION X - TRANSPORTATION DATA

PROPER SHIPPING NAME: Poisonous liquids, n.o.s. DOT HAZARD CLASS: 6.1 DOT LABEL: Poison DOT l'1ARKING: Poisonous liquids, n.O.S. (Sulfid ... bis 2-chloroethyl)) UN 2810 DOT PLACARD: POISON EMERGENCY ACCIDENT PRECAUTIONS AND PROCEDURES: See Sections IV and VIII.

PRECAUTIONS TO BE TAKEN ~N T~SPORTATION: Motor vehicles ~ill be ~lacarde~ regardle~s of 9uant1ty. Dr1v:r.shall be given full and complete 1nformat1on regard1ng sh1pment and cond,t,ons in case of emergency. AR 50-6 d~als specificall¥ with the shipment of chemical agents. Shipment of agents w1ll be escorted 1n accordance with AR 740-32.

Wh1le the Edgewood Research Development and Engineering Center, Department of the Army b:l~eves that the data contained herein are factua; and the op1n1ons expressed are those of qualified experts regard1ng the results of the tests conducted, the data are not to be taken as a warranty or representation for which the Department of the Army or Edgewoo~ . ~esearch Development and Engineering Center assumes legal respons1b1llty. They are offered solely for your consideration, month @ 65 DEG C. Will corrode steel at a rate of .0001 in. of steel per C. and will hydrolyze to form HCl HAZARDOUS DECOMPOSITION: Mustard thiodiglycol. HAZARDOUS POLYMERIZATION: Will not occu~, ------~------SECTION VII - SPILL, LEAK, AND DISPOSAL PROCEDURES ------Only personnel IS RELEASED OR SPILLED: STEPS TO BE TAKEN IN CASE MATERIAL allowed in an area where in full protective clothing (see Section 8) will be mustard is spilled. RECOMMENDED FIELD PROCEDURES: earth, should be contained using vermic~lite, .diatom~ceous The mustard uSlng COplOUS amounts clay or fine sand and neutralized as soon as pOSSlble of 5.25 percent Sodium Hypochlorite solution. container. Cover the Scoop up all material and place in an approved DOT solution as above, The exterior contents of the drum with decontaminating DOT be decontaminated and then labeled lAW EPA and of the drum shall with vermiculite regulations. All leaking containers shall be overpacked and exterior containers. Decontaminate and placed between the interior ,dis and DOT regulations. Dispose of the,material lAW waste label lAW EPA used to decontamlnate posal methods provided below. Dispose of the materla! state and local regulatlons. Conduct general exterior of drum lAW Federal the with an appr~ved monitor (see Sec~ion 8) to confirm.t~at area monitoring exposure llmlt (see atmospheric concentrations do not exceed the alrborne Sections 2 and 8). then the fol percent Sodium Hypochlorite solution is not available If 5,25 are listed in the order of lowing decontaminants may be used instead and Decontamination Solution No.2 (DS2) , preference: Calcium Hypochlorite, Calcium Tropical Bleach Slurry (STB). WARNING: Pure, undiluted and Super blister agent. Hypochlorite (HTH) will burn on contact with liquid RECOMMENDED LABORATORY PROCEDURES: grams of decon solution per gram of ED is allowed to agitate A minimum of 65 following the first for a' minimum of one hour. Agitation is not necessary phase is obtained. At the end of 24 hours, the resulting hour if a single Test for presence of solution shall be adjusted to a pH between 10 and 11. potassium iodide solution to give free active chlorine by use of acidic several Place 3 ml of the decontaminate in a test tube, Add iodine color. Add 3 ml of 50 wt crystals of Potassium Iodine and swirl to dissolve. and swirl. IMMEDIATE Iodine color indicates percent Sulfuric Acid:water 5.25 percent the presence of active chlorine. If negative, add additional solution to the decontamination solution, wait two Sodium Hypochlorite procedure until posi hours, then test again for active chlorine. Continue tive chlorine is given by solution. for percent Calcium hypochlorite (HTH) mixture may be substituted A 10 wt of HD and continue the Sodium Hypochlorite. Use 65 grams of decon per gram test as described for Sodium Hypochlorite, in approved DOT containers. Cover the con Scoop up all material and place of drum with decontaminating solution as above. The exterior tents of .the EPA and DOT regula the drum shall be decontaminated and then labeled lAW containers shall be overpacked with vermiculite placed tions. All leaking and label lAW between the interior and exterior containers. Decontaminate Dispose of the material lAW waste disposal methods EPA and DOT regulations. exterior of provided below. Dispose of the material used to decontaminate and local regulations. Conduct general area monitor drum lAW Federal, state atmospheric approved monitor (see Section 8) to confirm that the ing with an (see Section 8). concentrations do not exceed the airborne exposure limits may contaminated with ED and then rinse-decontaminated NOTE: Surfaces response. evolve sufficient mustard vapor to produce a physiological should be collected, WASTE DISPOSAL METHOD: All decontaminated material

Supporting Documents

Section 2.7

One-Gallon Container at MRS-4B