TESTING ADVERSE SELECTION AND MORAL HAZARD ON FRENCH CAR INSURANCE DATA Guillaume CARLIER1 Université Paris Dauphine Michel GRUN-REHOMME2 Université Paris Panthéon Olga VASYECHKO3 Université Nationale d'Economie de Kyiv This paper is a modest contribution to the stream of research devoted to find empirical evidence of asymmetric information. Building upon Chiappori and Salanié's (2000) work, we propose two specific tests, one for adverse selection and one for moral hazard. We implement these tests on French car insurance data, circumventing the lack of dynamic data in our data base by a proxy of claim history. The first test suggests presence of adverse selection whereas the second one seems to contradict presence of pure moral hazard. Keywords: empirical evidence of moral hazard, adverse selection, car insurance. JEL Classification: C35, D82. 1 Université Paris Dauphine, CEREMADE, Pl. de Lattre de Tassigny, 75775 Paris Cedex 16, FRANCE,
[email protected] 2 Université Paris Panthéon, ERMES, 12 Pl. du Panthéon, 75005 Paris, FRANCE,
[email protected] 3 Université Nationale d'Economie de Kyiv, UKRAINE,
[email protected] BULLETIN FRANÇAIS D’ACTUARIAT, Vol. 13, n° 25, janvier – juin 2013, pp. 117- 130 118 G. CARLIER – M. GRUN-REHOMME – O. VASYECHKO 1. INTRODUCTION There has been an intensive line of research in the last decades devoted to find empirical evidence of asymmetric information on insurance data. Under adverse selection, the insured has some private information about his type of risk, which the insurer cannot observe before the subscription of an insurance contract. The adverse selection assumption stipulates that the high-risks tend to choose more coverage than the low-risks (Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976), Wilson (1977), Spence (1978)).