Nonviolence speaks: communicating against repression

by Brian Martin and Wendy Varney (Cresskill, NJ: Hampton Press, 2003) This is the text as submitted to the publisher. It differs from the published text due to copyediting changes, different pagination and omission of the index.

Contents 1. Introduction 3 2. Nonviolence against Indonesian repression: barriers to action [co-authored by Adrian Vickers] 12 3. Nonviolent resistance to Soviet repression 30 4. Resisting global corporate domination 55 5. Nonviolence theory: insights for communication 79 6. Communication theory: insights for nonviolent action 102 7. Giving voice to nonviolence 136

Acknowledgments

We thank Valentin Bazhanov, Stephen Brown, and Anna Salleh for helpful comments on earlier versions of individual chapters, and Ralph Summy and two anonymous referees for comments on the entire text. Brenda Dervin provided essential support. Portions of the text, in different forms, appeared in Wendy Varney and Brian Martin, “Net resistance, net benefits: opposing MAI,” Social Alternatives, Vol. 19, No. 1, January 2000, pp. 47–51; Wendy Varney and Brian Martin, “Lessons from the 1991 Soviet coup,” Peace Research, Vol. 32, No. 1, February 2000, pp. 52–68; Brian Martin, Wendy Varney, and Adrian Vickers, “Political jiu- jitsu against Indonesian repression: studying lower profile nonviolent resistance,” Pacifica Review, Vol. 13, No. 2, June 2001, pp. 143–156. This work was supported by the Australian Research Council.

1 Introduction

Rallies, strikes, boycotts, sit-ins, and other vocal protests. This was taken up enthusi- methods of people’s action without violence astically. have a tremendous potential to challenge As popular resistance continued over the aggression, repression, and oppression. How- next several days, a section of the military ever, governments give this approach almost planned an anti-Marcos coup. As forces loyal no resources and the mass media give it little to Marcos were mobilized to crush the attention compared to the vast expenditures uprising, the military rebels called on popular and saturation coverage given to violent support. Leaders of the popular resistance put methods of handling conflict. Therefore, it is out a call and an enormous crowd surrounded vital to learn as much as possible from the the rebel soldiers in Metro Manila. Troops and experiences of nonviolent action that do occur. pilots loyal to Marcos would not attack the Communication plays a crucial role in any unarmed civilians, who thus provided protec- conflict. How can communication be used to tion for the rebels. support popular nonviolent action and to make The mass protest was impromptu but well this a more effective method of struggle? Our organized. Training in techniques of civilian task in this book is to address that question. protest had taken place throughout the country We can learn something about the strength for some years. As the mass rally in Manila of nonviolent action and the role played by continued for days, religious groups coordi- communication by recalling the situation in nated food distribution. Nuns were pressured the Philippines after 1972 when President to go on the front lines; their presence worked Ferdinand Marcos declared martial law and to get oncoming tanks to stop. Influential clamped down on opponents. Opposing forces church leaders discouraged violence by par- included an armed insurgency and various ticipants. Independent radio broadcasts helped civilian social movements and critics. In 1983, to coordinate activities. leading opposition politician Benigno Aquino The mass people’s action caused more and was murdered. This act, attributed to Marcos more troops to defect to the rebels. However, forces, mobilized sections of the Philippine the rebel leaders, having pledged loyalty to elite, including the Catholic Church, busi- Aquino and fearing the power of the people, nesses, and politicians, to oppose the govern- could not easily move to form a military ment. As pressure for change increased, government, so after four days of mass action Marcos called a snap election to be held in Aquino became president and Marcos left the February 1986. Left-wing opposition groups country. This political transition is called the called for a boycott of the election since they “EDSA Revolution” after Epifanio de los anticipated voting fraud by the government. Santos Avenue (EDSA), where the massive Nevertheless, most people voted anyway, and demonstrations occurred on 24–27 February. most of the votes were for Cory Aquino, The amazing display of popular action against widow of Benigno Aquino. a repressive regime is also called “people As predicted, there was extensive voting power.”1 fraud and Marcos declared himself the winner. However, the fraud was so blatant that it was easily exposed by poll observers and the 1 Anne Mackenzie, “People power or palace coup: international media. The Catholic Bishops’ the fall of Marcos,” in Mark Turner (ed.), Regime Conference condemned the poll fraud, as did Change in the Philippines: The Legitimation of the Aquino Government (Canberra: Department of many foreign governments. On 16 February, a Political and Social Change, Research School of million people turned out on the streets of the Pacific Studies, Australian National University, capital, Manila, to protest. Aquino called for a 1987), pp. 1–57; Sterling Seagrave, The Marcos civil disobedience campaign involving strikes, Dynasty (New York: Harper & Row, 1988); Mark boycotts, delayed payment of bills, and regular R. Thompson, The Anti-Marcos Struggle: Person-

3 4 Nonviolence Speaks

The events in the Philippines are far from • the Chinese pro-democracy movement, the only example of large-scale nonviolent crushed in the 1989 Beijing massacre;7 action. Some others — including both suc- • the Palestinian intifada, 1987–1993, a cesses and failures — are: popular resistance to the Israeli occupation;8 • the toppling of Serbian ruler Slobodan • direct action against nuclear power, espe- Milosevic in 2000; cially in the 1970s and 1980s, in many • the East Timorese urban resistance to countries;9 Indonesian occupation, culminating in inde- • Czechoslovak resistance to the 1968 pendence in 1999;2 Soviet invasion;10 • the removal of the racist and oppressive • the collapse of the Algerian Generals’ apartheid system in South Africa in the revolt in 1961 due to noncooperation in 1990s;3 Algeria and France;11 • civil resistance to Serbian rule in Kosovo • the US civil rights movement in the 1950s in the 1990s;4 and 1960s;12 • resistance to the repressive regime in Burma, 1980s and 1990s;5 • collapse in 1989 of repressive Eastern 6 European regimes; 6 Michael Randle, People Power: The Building of a New European Home (Stroud: Hawthorn, 1991). alistic Rule and Democratic Transition in the 7 Scott Simmie and Bob Nixon, Tiananmen Philippines (New Haven, CT: Yale University Square: An Eyewitness Account of the Chinese Press, 1995); Stephen Zunes, “The origins of People's Passionate Quest for Democracy (Seattle: people power in the Philippines,” in Stephen University of Washington Press, 1989). Zunes, Lester R. Kurtz, and Sarah Beth Asher (eds.), Nonviolent Social Movements: A Geo- 8 Souad R. Dajani, Eyes Without Country: Search- graphical Perspective (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999), ing for a Palestinian Strategy of Liberation pp. 129–157. For events outside Manila, see (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1994); Benedict J. Kerkvliet and Resil B. Mojares (eds.), Andrew Rigby, Living the Intifada (London: Zed From Marcos to Aquino: Local Perspectives on Books, 1991). Political Transition in the Philippines (Manila: 9 Barbara Epstein, Political Protest and Cultural Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1991; Revolution: Nonviolent Direct Action in the 1970s Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1992). and 1980s (Berkeley: University of California While people power was impressive in ending the Press, 1991); Wolfgang Rüdig, Anti-Nuclear Marcos dictatorship, subsequent developments did Movements: A World Survey of Opposition to not live up to this promising start. The Aquino Nuclear Energy (Harlow, Essex: Longman, 1990). government continued many of the same policies, and the crucial problems of gross inequality, 10 H. Gordon Skilling, Czechoslovakia’s Inter- corruption, and exploitation continued. rupted Revolution (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976); Philip Windsor and Adam 2 Chisako M. Fukuda, “Peace through nonviolent Roberts, Czechoslovakia 1968: Reform, Repres- action: the East Timorese resistance movement’s sion and Resistance (London: Chatto and Windus, strategy for engagement,” Pacifica Review, Vol. 1969). 12, No. 1, 2000, pp. 16–31. 11 Adam Roberts, “Civil resistance to military 3 Stephen Zunes, “The role of non-violent action coups,” Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 12, No. 1, in the downfall of apartheid,” Journal of Modern 1975, pp. 19–36. African Studies, Vol. 37, No. 1, 1999, pp. 137– 169. 12 Taylor Branch, Parting the Waters: America in the King Years, 1954–1963 (New York: Simon and 4 Howard Clark, Civil Resistance in Kosovo Schuster, 1988); Taylor Branch, Pillar of Fire: (London: Pluto, 2000). America in the King Years, 1963–65 (New York: 5 Aung San Suu Kyi (conversations with Alan Simon and Schuster, 1998); David Halberstam, Clements), The Voice of Hope (London: Penguin, The Children (New York: Random House, 1998); 1997). Coretta Scott King, My Life with Martin Luther Introduction 5

• refusal by Norwegian teachers in 1942 to regimes maintained their full repressive appa- teach Nazi doctrine;13 ratus, including police, prisons, and extensive • Indian independence struggles led by surveillance of the population. Military and Gandhi, 1920s to 1940s.14 police power were intact. What the regimes The common theme in these and other cases lost in 1989 was legitimacy. is that people take direct action to oppose Consider East Germany, one of the most aggression, repression, and oppression. Non- highly militarized and tightly controlled of the violent action is the power of people without East European regimes, with an extensive weapons in the conventional sense. To under- internal spying apparatus, as was revealed take armed struggle might be to engage in after the collapse. A key factor was that the aggression or repression themselves. Instead, international situation had changed dramati- nonviolent action relies on rallies, marches, cally: the Soviet government, in the throes of vigils, strikes, boycotts, sit-ins, and a host of glasnost and perestroika, no longer guaranteed other techniques that do not physically harm support for East European regimes. Even so, others. the East German government seemed to have From a conventional military or police everything it needed to maintain power. perspective, these sorts of methods should In this case, nonviolent action worked its have no chance against armed forces.15 Yet transformation through two main channels.16 there are dozens of cases where nonviolent First, after Hungary opened its border to the action has worked as well as, or better than, west, thousands of East Germans began armed force. Western military strength did not emigrating via Hungary. This exodus could cause the collapse of Eastern European not be hidden since it was broadcast on West communist regimes; indeed, it can be argued German television. The massive emigration that the Western military threat provided a severely dented the credibility of the regime, convenient justification for Eastern European which had long claimed to be superior to the military strength and internal repression. The decadent west. Second, there were small rallies in opposition to the government, which within a few weeks became enormous rallies. This King, Jr. (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, public display of opposition also undermined 1969). the credibility of the government. 13 Jacques Semelin, Unarmed Against Hitler: In this crisis, East German political leaders Civilian Resistance in Europe 1939–1943 had two main choices: they could call out (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1993). troops to attack the rallies, or they could 14 Judith M. Brown, Gandhi: Prisoner of Hope capitulate. Calling out the troops seems obvi- (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1989); ous enough, but it had major drawbacks. It Dennis Dalton, Mahatma Gandhi: Nonviolent would have meant a major confrontation, and Power in Action (New York: Columbia University possibly many civilian deaths and injuries, Press, 1993); M. K. Gandhi, An Autobiography or very likely leading to a tremendous increase in the Story of My Experiments with Truth (Ahmeda- support for the opposition movement. Indeed, bad: Navajivan, 1927); Gene Sharp, Gandhi as a so rapidly was support for the opposition Political Strategist (Boston: Porter Sargent, 1979). growing that it was uncertain whether troops We thank Tom Weber for advice on Gandhi would have been willing to act, even if references. ordered. 15 A common argument against nonviolence is The regime was prepared for a military that it won’t work against ruthless opponents. attack and prepared for western spying. It was However, this argument has fundamental flaws: “failures” historically may be due to not trying nonviolence at all or not doing it well enough. See 16 We draw here on Roland Bleiker, Nonviolent Ralph Summy, “Nonviolence and the case of the Struggle and the Revolution in East Germany extremely ruthless opponent,” Pacifica Review, (Cambridge, MA: Albert Einstein Institution, Vol. 6, No. 1, May-June 1994, pp. 1–29. 1993).

6 Nonviolence Speaks not prepared for nonviolent action. Caught interest is in the role of communication, which unprepared, East German government leaders has been largely neglected in previous studies. opted to resign rather than fight. The incredi- Consider again the 1989 events in East bly repressive regime was brought down Germany. A crucial factor in the regime’s loss without a fight in a process that was a surprise of legitimacy was West German broadcasts to nearly everyone, including western military about both emigration and rallies. There were analysts and foreign affairs specialists. In many people who opposed the regime, but military and government circles, nonviolent individually they were afraid to act. When they action simply was not understood as a method found out, through television broadcasts, that of opposing repressive regimes. others were resisting, many of them were In the years since, it remains the case that emboldened to join the action. few people in government understand nonvio- Communication is crucial in both maintain- lent action, much less promote it. Foreign ing and undermining a repressive regime’s policy continues to be run on the basis of gov- legitimacy, in coordinating or disrupting ernment-to-government interaction, whether resistance, and in contacting sympathizers in this takes the form of cooperation, competi- other parts of the world. In addition, many of tion, or confrontation. The idea of encouraging the methods of nonviolent action, such as nonviolent action to undermine repressive vigils, rallies, and sit-ins, are themselves forms regimes or promote social reform lies idle. It is of communication. So it can be said that only outside government circles, among nonviolent action relies on effective communi- people’s movements, that the transformative cation and is communication too. potential of nonviolent action is taken seri- Our primary concern is with communica- ously. tion as a means to support challenges to Our aim is to seek insights into how to make nonviolent action more effective. There is a large amount of writing and practical Recurrent Vision (Honolulu, HI: Spark M. experience about nonviolent action in practice, Matsunaga Institute for Peace, University of dealing with analysis, preparation, training, Hawai’i, 2000); Roger S. Powers and William B. 17 Vogele (eds.), Protest, Power, and Change: An methods, tactics, and strategy. Our special Encyclopedia of Nonviolent Action from ACT-UP to Women’s Suffrage (New York: Garland, 1997); 17 For accounts of nonviolent action, see for Paul Wehr, Heidi Burgess, and Guy Burgess (eds.), example Peter Ackerman and Jack DuVall, A Justice Without Violence (Boulder, CO: Lynne Force More Powerful: A Century of Nonviolent Rienner, 1994); Zunes et al., Nonviolent Social Conflict (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000), Movements, as well as sources cited earlier. Ronald which gives treatments of several of the case M. McCarthy and Gene Sharp, Nonviolent Action: studies above, among others; Robert Cooney and A Research Guide (New York: Garland, 1997) is Helen Michalowski (eds.), The Power of the an annotated bibliography, mostly of books, People: Active Nonviolence in the United States covering cases of nonviolent struggle around the (Philadelphia: New Society Press, 1987); Ralph E. world as well as methods and dynamics of Crow, Philip Grant, and Saad E. Ibrahim (eds.), nonviolent action and theoretical works on power, Arab Nonviolent Political Struggle in the Middle conflict, and violence. East (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1990); Staughton For practical material see Howard Clark, Sheryl Lynd and Alice Lynd (eds.), Nonviolence in Crown, Angela McKee, and Hugh MacPherson, America: A Documentary History (Maryknoll, NY: Preparing for Nonviolent Direct Action (Notting- Orbis, 1995); Pam McAllister, The River of ham: Peace News/CND, 1984); Virginia Coover, Courage: Generations of Women’s Resistance and Ellen Deacon, Charles Esser, and Christopher Action (Philadelphia: New Society Press, 1991); Moore, Resource Manual for a Living Revolution Philip McManus and Gerald Schlabach (eds.), (Philadelphia: New Society Publishers, 1981); Per Relentless Persistence: Nonviolent Action in Latin Herngren, Path of Resistance: The Practice of America (Philadelphia: New Society Press, 1991); Civil Disobedience (Philadelphia: New Society Yeshua Moser-Puangsuwan and Thomas Weber Publishers, 1993); Martin Jelfs, Manual for Action (eds.), Nonviolent Intervention across Borders: A (London: Action Resources Group, 1982). Introduction 7 systems of power. Communication can also be In the mass media, there is an implicit scale used to promote change at the interpersonal of what is considered newsworthy. Other and small group level, for example to move things being equal, violent action usually gets from the mode of blaming and criticizing to more coverage than nonviolent action: thou- the mode of expressing oneself and listening to sands of people may join a protest march, but others empathetically. While efforts at this if just a few get in a fight or smash windows, level are extremely important,18 they are not they are likely to gain just as much media our focus of attention. coverage as the thousands who didn’t. Similarly, some types of nonviolent action are When action is absent or at a lower more newsworthy: a sit-in dramatizes a level conflict more than a boycott; a mock funeral is more visible than social ostracism. Action is tremendously enticing. Television If violent and visible actions are more news is filled with action, in many cases newsworthy than nonviolent and diffuse ones, involving violence and death, such as wars, then even further down the scale is the every- natural disasters, and accidents. Nonviolent day campaigning aimed mainly at trying to action can be exciting and newsworthy too, raise people’s level of awareness and convince such as pickets, freeway blockades, or massive them that involvement in resistance is worth- rallies. while. This can involve talking amongst However, the continual focus on action friends, small group meetings, writing about often obscures something that is vitally issues, trying to promote nonviolent solutions important: absence or lower levels of action. among acquaintances, suggesting relevant There is a picket line today, but there wasn’t books for libraries, teach-ins, leafleting, stick- one last week. There is a blockade on the ers, graffiti, individual stands as an example to southern freeway but not on other freeways. others, and other forms of campaigning, often There is a massive rally about the war in local. These are seldom a focus of attention, Serbia but not one about the war in Ethiopia.19 whether by media or anyone else, including That does not mean that activists are not nonviolent activists. If there is a war — working away in these areas. Their efforts may especially one involving or close to the not yet have led to actions that are perceived dominant western states — then it is likely to as noteworthy. Indeed there is no guarantee be a focus of attention. Little notice is given to that these actions will reach such levels, for those regions of the world where there isn’t a there are numerous barriers to action and, for war, terrorism, or famine, or at least a prospect action to reach the levels evident in, say, of violence or suffering. “people power” in the Philippines, barriers It is important to acknowledge that resis- need to be overcome. That actions of lesser tance to aggression, repression, and oppression visibility can easily be misunderstood for no occurs all the time in all sorts of ways, large action at all partly has to do with the media. and small. Even in situations of severe repres- sion, such as slavery or Nazi death camps, there are expressions and acts of autonomy, defiance, and insubordination.20 Subtle uses of 18 See especially Marshall B. Rosenberg, Nonvio- language and gestures can express resistance, lent Communication: A Language of Compassion as can religious ceremonies, songs, styles of (Del Mar, CA: PuddleDancer Press, 1999). See also the many books by Suzette Haden Elgin on the gentle art of verbal self-defense, for example 20 Roland Bleiker, Popular Dissent, Human How to Disagree without Being Disagreeable: Agency and Global Politics (Cambridge: Cam- Getting Your Point Across with the Gentle Art of bridge University Press, 2000); James C. Scott, Verbal Self-Defense (New York: Wiley, 1997). Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden 19 Any example we use is bound to become out of Transcripts (New Haven, CT: Yale University date. Press, 1990).

8 Nonviolence Speaks work, and a host of other aspects of everyday relevant here is military attack, noting that life. Resistance is possible, and routinely what is normally called “military defense” occurs, in every conceivable circumstance. often involves attack. Repression refers to Nevertheless, because there is no guarantee military or police attacks on or control of a that the momentum will build, we need to population, for example through arrest, im- reflect on how, when, and under what circum- prisonment, surveillance, beatings, torture, and stances these everyday resistances give rise to killing. Oppression refers to social systems larger, more capable challenges. We need to involving exploitation or inequality. In each face the hard reality of sometimes misplaced case we are primarily concerned with collec- efforts in somewhat futile actions and to ask tive rather than solely interpersonal behavior. what could have occurred but didn’t or could Aggression, repression, and oppression are be occurring but isn’t. There were massive often interlinked. Consider for example the rallies challenging the Marcos dictatorship in Soviet people during World War II. The 1986 but no rallies of a similar scale in 1985 Soviet Union suffered from military attack by or preceding years. There were massive rallies Nazi Germany; the Soviet government re- against the East German government in sponded with military defense and, eventually, October and November 1989 but not a few counterattack. The Soviet government re- months earlier. We want to illuminate the path pressed the Soviet population under its control between the lower levels of action and much with killings, imprisonment, and forced popu- greater levels of action. lation transfers. Finally, The Soviet working class was oppressed by the Soviet regime: Words workers were denied any voice in how their factories, farms, and the country were run, and We use the standard expression in writings in their work was exploited to benefit the privi- this area, “nonviolent action,” which is defined leged Communist Party elite. Oppression is in contrast to violent action, which includes often backed up by repression or the threat of killing, beating, torture, and imprisonment — aggression. essentially, the use of physical force against The term “action” refers to people doing humans. Nonviolent action refers to collective things, which potentially includes everything action that excludes physical violence, and from talking to fighting. Our primary interest thus includes occupations, pray-ins, work-to- is in nonviolent action, as described above. rule, deputations, severing diplomatic rela- More challenging is the concept of “absence of tions, refusal to disperse, boycotts of elections, action.” One way of looking at this is that refusal to pay debts, picketing, slogans, protest people are always doing something, so that emigration, mock awards, and a host of other “absence of action” is a contradiction in terms. methods.21 The concept of nonviolent action It is possible, though, to talk sensibly about however normally excludes routine actions absence of particular types of action in par- such as buying goods, talking to co-workers, ticular circumstances, such as there being no or building a house. These are all nonviolent, rallies of more than a thousand people in a but generally are not intended to bring about particular city over a certain period. In this social change. sense, every situation has an absence of action: Another term for nonviolent action is only some actions are taken and there is an Gandhi’s expression satyagraha, which trans- absence of other actions. lated literally means “truth-force.” Even the most energetic activists cannot do Our main interest is in nonviolent action to everything at the same time. If people are challenge aggression, repression, and oppres- locked in prison, obviously they cannot be on sion. The most important type of aggression the street protesting. The sorts of constraints that interest us are those that are not physical. People in Manila could have left their homes 21 Gene Sharp, The Politics of Nonviolent Action and joined a rally just as readily in 1985 as in (Boston: Porter Sargent, 1973), pp. 107–445. Introduction 9

1986 — though of course the consequences remains, and so-called “conventional weap- might have been quite different. By the same ons” are being made more deadly all the time. token, even in 1986 only some of the popula- Indeed, there is massive research into ever tion joined the rally in Manila, so while there more effective ways to kill, maim, control, and was certainly plenty of action, in principle manipulate people. Although not a single there could have been an even greater level of government admits to using torture, dozens of participation. them do in practice. In this sense, inaction on the part of some The United Nations has not provided a people is something that is around us all the solution. It is dominated by governments and time. There are numerous social problems, is virtually powerless to act without support by including military dictatorships, male domina- the greatest powers. Since the UN was set up tion, capitalist exploitation of workers, and after the end of World War II, and human assaults on the environment. Resistance occurs rights agreements signed, genocide and politi- in many ways, to be sure, but not everyone is cide (mass killings for political reasons) have resisting all the time in every possible way, continued, including the Soviet Union 1943– hence lack of sufficiently effective resistance 1950, China 1950–1951 and 1966–1975, In- is an issue. donesia 1965–1966, Pakistan 1971, Cambodia Our aim in focusing on areas of no action 1975–1979, Afghanistan 1978–1979, Sudan and less visible action is to learn better how to from 1983, Iraq from 1990, and Rwanda 1994. promote action against repression, aggression, In each of these cases, the death toll exceeded and oppression. In other words, as well as half a million.22 As well, there are numerous studying nonviolent action in order to learn other cases of brutal repression, such as in how to improve nonviolent action, it can be Central and South America: Argentina, Chile, worthwhile to study episodes of absence of Guatemala, Nicaragua, El Salvador, and action, low level action, and “dormant” poten- others. The UN has been useless or worse in tial for action. terms of stopping genocide.23 Another major set of problems is starvation, Why nonviolent action is needed malnutrition, poverty, economic exploitation, and increasing inequality globally. As the To study and promote nonviolent action is to world’s productive capacities increase, ine- go against the grain. Most people’s normal quality is increasing both between countries assumption is that defense and human rights and within countries. Associated problems are the responsibility of governments or of include occupational injury and death, prosti- international bodies such as the United tution, and slavery. Nations. Courts are supposed to ensure that justice is done. Governments have both the formal mandate to deal with major problems 22 Barbara Harff and Ted Robert Gurr, “Victims and enormous resources to undertake the task. of the state: genocides, politicides and group Furthermore, in an age of professionalization repression from 1945 to 1995,” in Albert J. and specialization, the standard assumption is Jongman (ed), Contemporary Genocides: Causes, that social problems should be dealt with by Cases, Consequences (Leiden: Projecten Interdis- experts and specialist agencies. ciplinair Onderzoek naar de Oorzaken van Yet there is ample evidence that enormous Mensenrechtenschendingen, 1996), pp. 33–58. The problems continue and that governments are inclusion of Iraq may seem anomalous. For the case that the death of one or two million Iraqis as a responsible for many of them. In spite of result of sanctions is a form of mass killing, see peacekeeping forces, there are dozens of wars Geoff Simons, The Scourging of Iraq: Sanctions, around the globe. In spite of the end of the Law and Natural Justice (Basingstoke: Macmillan, Cold War, military spending remains at an 1998, 2nd ed.) extraordinarily high level. The possibility of nuclear, biological, and chemical warfare 23 Leo Kuper, Genocide (Harmondsworth: Pen- guin, 1981).

10 Nonviolence Speaks

This recitation of the world’s problems Overview could be extended at great length, but the basic point is clear enough. The problems are In the next three chapters we present, in some enormous, but governments and international detail, case studies of popular nonviolent bodies, which are supposed to be responsible action against repression or oppression: for fixing them, are either ineffectual or • the toppling of Indonesian President actually the cause of the problems. Suharto in 1998; Nonviolent action is an alternative that is • the thwarting of the attempted coup in the deeply threatening to governments. While Soviet Union in 1991; hundreds of billions of dollars are spent on • the blocking of the Multilateral Agree- military forces and weapons every year, hardly ment on Investment (MAI) in 1998. any support is available to educate and train We selected these case studies with a number citizens in nonviolent methods of struggle. of aims in mind. First, we sought relatively While billions of dollars are spent on military recent events so that we could check our research, hardly any is spent on researching assessments with participants or experts. Sec- nonviolent struggle. The reason is straightfor- ond, we wanted a variety of types of action. ward: if citizens learn skills in how to be more One was a rapid, urgent action (Soviet coup) effective in protest, noncooperation, and non- while two were escalating campaigns (anti- violent intervention, then they might use those Suharto; MAI). Two were primarily located at skills not just against repressive governments a national level while one was global (MAI). somewhere else, but also closer to home, for Third, we selected cases that involved com- example against exploitative corporations or munication, including communication tech- unresponsive government departments. nology, in a prominent way. This at least is one interpretation of why Fourth, we chose cases that offered a clear governments have given so little attention to contrast with much less visible action at other and support for the development of nonviolent times or on other issues. To focus attention, action. Another interpretation is that the power we picked out some situations that provide a of the people is not really yet understood in strong contrast to the actions taken, because government and military circles, and that once they are situations where more or stronger the pragmatic effectiveness of nonviolent action would have been valuable but few action is realized, then government leaders actions of immediate consequence or even will adopt the alternative as a matter of high visibility were taken. For example, in rational policy-making. In either case, the fact Indonesia, the inspired action that led to is that nonviolent action has tremendous Suharto’s resignation in 1998 can be con- potential but so far has received virtually no trasted with a lack of visible action in 1965– attention or support compared to military and 1966 during massacres that claimed at least diplomatic approaches. half a million lives. Our aim is not to argue the case for nonvio- Finally, each of the three cases involves an lent action, which has been done ably by many international dimension as well as a local and others. Rather, we begin with the assumption national one. The Suharto regime was sup- that nonviolent action is a worthwhile option ported by many other governments, opposed that deserves more study and development. by some nongovernment groups and was not Our special interest is in how communication an issue for most people outside the country. can be used to promote nonviolent action, Communication issues are especially impor- especially when little or no action is taking tant in this international dimension, since few place. people outside the country ever have the op- portunity to experience events in Indonesia. Even those who visit the country, such as tourists in Bali, may have little inkling of political struggles or how to intervene. There- Introduction 11 fore, the mass media, governments, and groups chapters to analyze the case studies in depth. such as Amnesty International play a crucial This approach certainly has merit, but it is a role in shaping people’s ideas about what is rather different project than the one we happening and what could be happening. undertook. Rather than putting priority on After these case studies, we are in a good developing theoretical insight into case studies position to deal with a number of questions — a worthy task, to be sure — our principal about nonviolent action and communication. aim is to develop a framework that has some What communication methods are useful for practical use for activists. For this purpose, we nonviolent action? Which technologies are found it fruitful to use the case studies to most helpful? What preparations should be inform the discussion of theory, leading to the made to aid the struggle? What can be done to discussion of communication strategy in foster nonviolent action against repression, chapter 7. Thus, our ordering of the material aggression, and oppression when there is little reflects our primary purpose, which is to use awareness of the need for or possibility of theory to help promote better action, with the action? study of action to promote better theory being Chapters 5 and 6 offer two routes for deal- secondary for us.24 Those with a special inter- ing with these sorts of questions. First is est in theory can easily proceed straight to nonviolent action theory. We outline in chapters 5 and 6. We hope that others will be chapter 5 a variety of perspectives to see what stimulated to undertake a variety of analyses insights they provide into communication dealing with communication and nonviolence, against repression, aggression, and oppression. a field of vital significance whose surface has As one would expect, nonviolent action theory only been touched. is highly useful for understanding the dynam- ics of nonviolent action, but surprisingly there is little on offer to deal with communication issues. The most useful tool is Johan Galtung’s model of the great chain of nonviolence, which can be developed into a communication framework. In chapter 6 we turn to communication theory, canvassing a range of perspectives ranging from signal transmission theory to semiotics. It turns out that each theory — even when the theory has serious flaws for other purposes — provides some insight into how to better communicate against repression, aggres- sion, and oppression. As we progress through this chapter, we gradually build a model for this purpose. Finally, in chapter 7 we propose a set of 24 A comment from a different field is relevant steps for developing communication strategies here: “If we look at social phenomena not from the against repression, aggression, and oppression, point of view of contributing to theory, but rather illustrating them by examining options for from the point of view of contributing to actions each of the three case studies. under specific circumstances, very different We chose to put case studies first (chapters aspects can be the most important.” Bjørn 2, 3 and 4), followed by theory (chapters 5 and Gustavsen, “Liberation of work and the role of 6), finishing with communication strategies social research,” in Tom R. Burns, Lars Erik (chapter 7). Another arrangement would have Karlsson, and Veljko Rus (eds.), Work and Power: been to put the theory before the case studies The Liberation of Work and the Control of and to use models developed in the theory Political Power (London: Sage, 1979), pp. 341– 356, at p. 347.

2 Nonviolence against Indonesian repression: barriers to action

In 1965 on the Indonesian island of Java those events with two others: the 1965–1966 where there had been widespread slaughter of massacres and the Indonesian invasion and alleged communists, peasant women would occupation of East Timor from 1975. occasionally line the roads as soldiers in trucks passed by. The women, in a display of con- The toppling of Suharto2 tempt and a refusal to co-operate with the activities of these rampaging soldiers, would Indonesia became a Dutch colony through a turn their backs and lift their sarongs to long period of expansion beginning in 1619 display their backsides to the troops, a gesture and ending in the 1920s. After occupation by that in numerous cases cost them their lives.1 the Japanese during World War II, nationalist Thus our first case study, nonviolent resistance leaders declared independence in 1945 and in Indonesia from 1965, starts with a reminder after a national revolution gained sovereignty of the courageous resistance that challenged in 1949. Over the period 1965–1967, the left- the brutal regime of that country. leaning Sukarno government was replaced by Yet defeat of repressive regimes generally a military-dominated regime led by Suharto, takes much more than contempt and courage. accompanied by a major bloodbath, as It requires high levels of organization, prepa- described later. ration, and commitment. Accordingly, it was The foundation of the Suharto regime’s more than 30 years before Indonesian Presi- power was the military forces, but with a dent Suharto resigned. The years of his rule democratic facade. Within this framework, coincided with continual but varying levels of Suharto maintained power through astute po- resistance in Indonesia, which makes it an ap- litical maneuvering.3 He sidelined challengers, propriate case study to demonstrate the waxing rewarded friends (especially family members), and waning of nonviolent struggle and its and repressed dissent. Repression was system- effectiveness. Despite massive repression and atic: all potential opponents, both popular and killings undertaken under the Suharto regime, in the elite, including those in the military, for most of his rule there was not a high level were crushed. All organizations, such as of worldwide outrage at events in Indonesia. political parties, trade unions, and cultural On the contrary, as far as most Western bodies, that might provide a basis for ques- governments were concerned, the situation in tioning or challenging the regime were Indonesia seemed fairly satisfactory for most of the period from 1965 to 1998. It was only when dissent at the popular level grew suffi- 2 Useful collections on these events are given in ciently for governments to feel that they must Edward Aspinall, Herb Feith, and Gerry van respond to public opinion that foreign policies Klinken (eds.), The Last Days of President Suharto turned around. (Melbourne: Monash Asia Institute, Monash However, we will start firstly with resis- University, 1999); Geoff Forrester and R. J. May (eds.), The Fall of Soeharto (Bathurst, NSW: tance in Indonesia itself and specifically that Crawford House, 1998). See also Marcus Mietzner, short period in 1998 when there was massive “From Soeharto to Habibie: The Indonesian armed and effective resistance, before comparing forces and political Islam during the transition,” in Geoff Forrester (ed.), Post-Soeharto Indonesia: Renewal or Chaos? (Bathurst, NSW: Crawford This chapter is co-authored by Adrian Vickers. House Publishing, 1999), pp. 65–102. 1 James C. Scott, Weapons of the Weak: Everyday 3 Ed Aspinall, “Opposition and elite conflict in the Forms of Peasant Resistance (New Haven: Yale fall of Soeharto,” in Forrester and May, The Fall of University Press, 1985), p. 283. Soeharto, pp. 130–153, at pp. 131–132.

12

Nonviolence against Indonesian repression 13 banned, restrained, or disempowered by being Opposition political parties were banned or brought into the state mechanism, a process severely constrained, serving only as fig leaves called “depoliticization.” for a pretend democracy. Western govern- As a method to prevent challenges to the ments feted the regime and its policies. The regime, co-optation was a potent supplement Indonesian military retained ultimate power to repression. The most effective form of co- and received weapons and training from optation was through economic growth, which various governments such as Australia and the proceeded at an impressive 7% annually from US. 1970. During this time the regime was sup- This suddenly changed as a result of ported by Western governments and the major economic collapse, triggered by the crash in international funding agencies and praised for Thailand beginning in 1997 which spread to its economic policies.4 several South-East Asian economies. Indone- After the announcement of a period of sia was particularly hard hit, with the collapse “openness” in the late 1980s, voices of dissent of the currency leading to widespread impov- began to emerge, but no one inside or outside erishment, more extreme than in other the country believed that Suharto’s grip on countries.7 Prior to the collapse, Indonesia’s power was weakening. There were still economic policies had been fully supported by hundreds of thousands of former prisoners the World Bank, the International Monetary from the earlier and more extreme repression Fund, and most commentators, but afterwards who had to carry identity cards and who were blame was placed either on corruption and restricted in various ways, including being cronyism or on global markets. limited in where they could live or work. The dramatic change in economic climate These people, known as “ex-Tapols,” had to opened the door for a deeper expression of report at least once a month to their district popular opposition that had been building. By military command headquarters, an exercise 1996 at least one economic commentator was that served as a reminder of the power of the doubting that Suharto would be able to sup- military in Indonesia.5 press the growing democracy movement.8 Thus, into the mid 1990s, popular opposi- Now outrage over corruption, collusion, and tion was muted, partially as a result of cronyism became a rallying cry, with the continued economic growth and partly as an government blamed for economic misfortunes. outcome of the ongoing repressive culture and The regime was not well structured to deal disempowerment of most opposition. For with this new situation. Suharto had become instance, the Indonesian government under- increasingly out of touch with everyday took “mental ideological screening” to ensure realities since he was surrounded with syco- that anyone who was deemed to have “com- phants, operated using a 1960s way of munist ties” — and this included not only ex- thinking (including a Cold-War fear of Tapols but also their extended families — was communism) and was tied into the crony excluded from employment in the military, the system he had used to build his power. As a civil service, the schools, political parties, the result, his political judgment suffered. In press, legal aid societies, the priesthood, and addition, his health was poor, so both even shadow puppet troupes.6 physically and mentally he was not ready for

4 Richard J. Barnet and Ronald E. Müller, Global Reach: The Power of the Multinational Corpora- 7 Kevin Evans, “Economic update,” in Forrester, tions (London: Jonathan Cape, 1974), p. 79. Post-Soeharto Indonesia, pp. 105–127. 5 Aryen Neier, “Watching rights,” The Nation, 8 Michael Shari, "Suharto may win this battle, but Vol. 251, No. 2, 9 July 1990, p. 43. not the war,” Business Week, 26 August 1996, p. 6 Neier, “Watching rights.” 45.

14 Nonviolence Speaks the unprecedented challenges he faced in At a student-led protest on 12 May 1998, 1998.9 four students and two others in the crowd were The economic crisis had the most severe killed by troops at Trisakti University, an elite impact on the urban working class and the private institution in Jakarta. This event trig- unemployed. Some Indonesians were earning gered massive rioting and looting in Jakarta, as little as 70 cents a day and were drastically causing extensive damage and leaving more affected by the rising cost of food and soaring than a thousand people dead (principally unemployment. Accordingly there were pro- looters caught in fires). There is strong evi- tests and food riots, to which Suharto dence that the riots were orchestrated, responded by banning mass rallies in Jakarta probably to discredit the protesters.12 In any and insisting that anyone caught hoarding event, the killing of the four students and essential commodities would be sentenced to subsequent events caused a loss of public faith death.10 However, it was not poor Indonesians, in the regime and led some military elites to mainly preoccupied with pure survival, who think that Suharto should resign in order to organized the major actions. The overt oppo- placate the population.13 sition was drawn primarily from the middle As is common in nonviolent struggles, classes, including students, academics, univer- violence by the regime triggered much greater sity graduates, journalists, lawyers, artists, and support for the resistance. Massive rallies were staff of nongovernment organizations (NGOs). held throughout the country. In Jakarta, This middle-class group, having grown up in a students continued to lead protests, which time of prosperity, was particularly affected by involved ever larger sectors of the population. the sharp changes in lifestyle brought about by This unprecedented public display of opposi- the crisis. Of those involved, students were by tion caused splits within the ruling elite. far the most vocal. Not long before these events, Suharto had Before 1997, NGO leaders and former promoted his son-in-law Subianto Prabowo to student activists had tried to create a coalition head the Kopassus special force. A ruthless in opposition to the regime, but had not got operator, Prabowo had ambitions to gain very far: Suharto’s methods of depoliticization power over the head of the armed forces, were too effective.11 The collapse of the General Wiranto, who was also close to economy served as a catalyst and a rallying Suharto. Earlier in 1998, various activists point for a more solidified and organized “disappeared,” some of them emerging weeks opposition. or months later after imprisonment and torture Students began to openly challenge the in secret locations. Others were presumed to government by holding rallies on campus and have been murdered; their relatives still do not then moving off campus in defiance of condi- know their fate. Prabowo probably orches- tions imposed by the police. As the rallies trated this repressive operation. He sought to became larger, more students joined in and stop student protests by force and was respon- leaders became bolder. Meanwhile, opposition sible for the killing of students on 12 May, activity blossomed in a range of areas, such as which may have been done purposely by the arts scene. military units rather than accidentally in general shooting.14 Since this repressive approach was triggering ever more massive 9 Geoffrey Forrester, “Introduction,” in Forrester and May, The Fall of Soeharto, pp. 1–23, at pp. 17–18. 12 Susan Berfield and Dewi Loveard, “Ten days that shook Indonesia,” Asiaweek, 24 July 1998, pp. 10 “Food riots batter Indonesia,” Maclean’s, Vol. 30–41. 111, No. 9, 2 March 1998, p. 31. 13 Forrester, “Introduction,” p. 21. 11 Ikrar Nusa Bhakti, “Trends in Indonesian stu- dent movements in 1998,” in Forrester and May, 14 Berfield and Loveard, “Ten days that shook The Fall of Soeharto, pp. 167–178. Indonesia.”

Nonviolence against Indonesian repression 15 popular opposition, some members of the elite Sulwesi, Kalimantan, Bali, Lombok, Irian decided Suharto had to go.15 Jaya, and Timor as well as thirteen cities in A student occupation of parliament was Java. crucial. This occupation reached its climax on In many respects, the police, in trying to 20 May and was a key factor in convincing suppress the dissent,17 played into the demon- members of cabinet that Suharto had to resign. strators’ hands. Certainly the Trisakti Univer- As the protest expanded, opposition political sity students did not want, nor plan for, four of leaders joined in. Amien Rais, a leading their group to be killed but, following this Islamic political figure, called a rally for 20 incident, they were definitely not going to be May. In order to stop it, Indonesian troops shut silenced. On the contrary, many more joined down central Jakarta. This in turn alienated the the protests. The four killed students came to business sector, supplying yet more pressure be known as “Martyrs of Reformation”. for change. The end was near when the leader Rallies in their honor were held all over of the parliament — all of whose members had Indonesia, at which the special song “Fallen been virtually handpicked by Suharto — called Flowers,” reserved for those who die in a holy for Suharto to step down. On 23 May Suharto war, was hummed. These martyrs served as a suddenly announced his resignation and his point of focus and an inspiration for other deputy, B. J. Habibie, took over. The surprise demonstrators.18 resignation reduced the chance of a broader The Indonesian events fit a standard pattern democratization at that time. of nonviolent action, in which open defiance of the regime generates greater support.19 If Nonviolent action against Suharto the regime does nothing, then opponents become bolder in their actions. If the regime The protests of the Indonesian students responds with overt violence, this causes demonstrated several classical, as well as some public outrage and greater support for the novel, forms of nonviolent action. These opposition. Open use of violence by the included martyrdom, visual props, solidarity- regime, especially the killing of students at an building, and ensuring good relations with at elite university, turned out to be very counter- least some of the media. Importantly, the productive. In comparison, the “disappear- students appear to have appealed to the ances” earlier in the year caused far less community in ways that gained widespread outrage. The main difference was that it was sympathy rather than suspicion or hostility. harder to assign responsibility for covert Achieving this sympathy was probably torture and killing. Similarly, the regime largely due to the diversity of the students attempted to distance itself from responsibility involved in the protests, whom Human Rights by using agents provocateurs, paid demon- Watch identified as coming from a “wide strators, gangs, and criminals to undertake variety of Muslim, radical leftist, and reform- looting, arson, and rape, including attacks on oriented organizations.”16 Importantly, the the Chinese minority, designed to aggravate protests were also geographically broad-based, with the involvement of campuses in Sumatra,

15 While Suharto was the primary target, there was 17 This assumes it was the police behind the also a faction fight in the military, which split into shootings of the four students for, as mentioned, Wiranto and Prabowo camps, with the Navy and there is evidence that suggests the military were Air Force distancing themselves from the rest of responsible. the armed forces and the police becoming autonomous. 18 Charlé, “‘Banning is banned’,” p. 15. 16 Quoted in Suzanne Charlé, “‘Banning is 19 See Gene Sharp, The Politics of Nonviolent banned’,” The Nation, Vol. 267, No. 10, 5 October Action (Boston: Porter Sargent, 1973), pp. 447– 1998, pp. 15–19, at p. 18. 817, on the dynamics of nonviolent action.

16 Nonviolence Speaks ethnic tensions and reduce the chance of of their goals and serving as an example of unified opposition to the regime.20 what can be achieved. Directly after Suharto’s One of the standard methods used by the resignation, some students went to work with regime to maintain control was to infiltrate farmers and factory workers, raising political potential opposition groups and to foster consciousness and helping to build a civil dissension, such as by accentuating religious society. Others were busy training new univer- and ethnic divisions. Eventually, students sity students in the tactics and philosophy of attempted to overcome this by instituting tight dissent.24 The actions of both groups suggest internal discipline, to the extent of preventing that the students knew that the struggle would nonstudents from joining occupations, in order be ongoing and had the foresight needed to to prevent infiltration and to maintain focus on prepare for the next stages of the struggle. On a single goal: to get rid of Suharto. the other hand, in the years after Suharto’s The tactics used by one key student group, departure, some student leaders have sup- Forum Kota (City Forum) illustrate one ported the use of violent methods, in addition method of avoiding co-optation. Every week to nonviolent ones, as part of their strategy. the group changed both its leader and its Student protests and sit-ins were backed up command post so that no one leader or campus with teach-ins where tactics could be thrashed could gain control and be open to co- out, information shared, uncertainties clarified, optation.21 Although the military did try, as and group solidarity strengthened. Both usual, to infiltrate the student groups, this organizationally and strategically, students had proved unsuccessful. One student said laugh- learned from demonstrations in both Thailand ingly of those who attempted to infiltrate, in the 1970s and South Korea much more “They always have short hair, and they are in recently. Among the chants were those good physical condition. You can spot them a borrowed from overseas struggles, including mile away.”22 one from the French New Left in the 1960s: Even though the protests caused huge “Il est interdit d’interdire” which translates as traffic jams, the students enjoyed wide popular “Banning is banned.”25 support even among those directly affected This suggests that students had weighed up such as taxi and pedicab drivers. Women what had been successful in other struggles passed out roses to pedicab drivers with notes and thought about what might be applicable in attached: “Don’t let your consciences die.” their own. Therefore, news and other informa- Two other vivid protests included students tion from protests elsewhere, as well as links putting flowers down the barrels of soldiers’ with the movements themselves, can be very guns and other students walking around with beneficial. Kurt Schock, writing of differences their mouths taped up, as a symbolic protest in the social movement mobilizations in the against the lack of free speech in Indonesia.23 Philippines and Burma in the 1980s, noted that Setting up alternative societies and practic- the Burmese movement may have been disad- ing the sort of life one envisages as the vantaged by a lack of contact with influential outcome of one’s struggles play an important international allies.26 part in the struggle itself, reminding activists

24 Charlé, “‘Banning is banned’,” p. 18. 20 Sometimes the regime blamed labor leaders for rioting against ethnic groups. See “Labor round- 25 Charlé, “‘Banning is banned’,” p. 18. We thank up,” Multinational Monitor, Vol. 15, No. 9, Henri Jeanjean for advice on this slogan. September 1994, p. 4. 26 Kurt Schock, “People power and political op- 21 Charlé, “‘Banning is banned’,” p. 17. portunities: social movement mobilization and outcomes in the Philippines and Burma,” Social 22 Charlé, “‘Banning is banned’,” p. 18. Problems, Vol. 46, No. 3, August 1999, pp. 355– 23 Charlé, “‘Banning is banned’,” p. 18. 375, at p. 365.

Nonviolence against Indonesian repression 17

Schock also identifies political opportuni- As well as censorship, the regime also ties, influential allies, and press freedoms or at made a habit of fabricating stories that put its least information flows as other crucial factors action in a more favorable light. These stories in allowing sufficient mobilization of social would then be picked up and run by the more groups to challenge a regime or its leaders. In compliant sections of the media. Such was the Indonesia, the economic downturn was a case with the November 1974 stories carried catalyst for the already present discontent to by the Indonesian press of Communist escalate, while political opportunities opened Chinese infiltration into East Timor, which up suddenly as the government’s and mili- helped to ideologically prepare the way for tary’s actions backfired. The question of Indonesian invasion the following year.29 This information flows needs to be looked at as part was followed by numerous other fabrications of the broader question of communication. about East Timor carried in the Indonesian press over the entire period of the occupation. The role of communication As another form of media control, the Suharto regime also sponsored the Union of Communication was crucial in coordinating Indonesian Journalists. However, a number of resistance and alerting people to what was journalists formed their own independent occurring. At the level of the mass media, this union, the Alliance of Independent Journalists. was a challenging task since there was a When these journalists signed petitions in history of Suharto closing down newspapers if support of Tempo, one of the weeklies closed they strayed from the official government line. in 1994 and reputed to have been the country’s Variations of censorship include “stifling of all most popular magazine, the Indonesian viewpoints critical of the regime through government threatened to also close down the closing down alternative publications, re- publications for which these journalists stricting access to communication technolo- worked.30 gies, and centralizing the news media services Along with Tempo, the newsweeklies under the control of the state” as well as Editor and De Tik were closed on the basis of “imposition of economic sanctions, the revo- “ignorance of press ethics.” Prior to the three cation of publishing licenses, and the harass- closures, there had been two years of what has ment, imprisonment, torture, or assassination been termed “relative press freedom” during of journalists.”27 Several of these tactics were which time some Indonesian journals had used by the Indonesian regime to keep the cautiously reported on some events in East media in check. Timor. However, throughout 1993 the military For example, in the summer of 1994 the and the official Ministry of Information regime closed three weekly magazines, issued applied increasing pressure on journalists, official warnings against three other publica- especially in relation to East Timor. Foreign tions, and placed three more “under watch” for governments and commercial institutions such misdemeanors as reporting on human conspired in the suppression of information. rights demonstrations in East Timor.28 The The Straits Times of Singapore, for instance, government oversaw a licensing system by printed an edition sent for sale in Indonesia. means of which it could simply withdraw a Before doing so, it would remove any articles license and close a newspaper. or pictures that may have been offensive to the Indonesian government.31

27 Schock, “People power and political opportuni- 29 James Dunn, Timor: A People Betrayed ties,” p. 370. (Brisbane: Jacaranda, 1983), p. 79. 28 Murray Seeger, “Press suppression in Indone- 30 Seeger, “Press suppression in Indonesia.” sia,” Nieman Reports, Vol. 49, No. 1, Spring 1995, p. 44. 31 Seeger, “Press suppression in Indonesia.”

18 Nonviolence Speaks

Despite the regime’s best efforts to silence mainly determined by internal dynamics, them, however, some Indonesian journalists especially in Jakarta. However, reports of were in the forefront of the dissent. Ahmad actions on the web and CNN helped the Taufik had been a journalist on Tempo and students to maintain their momentum. was involved in the formation of the Alliance We have seen, then, that in 1998 there was of Independent Journalists. The group founded mass action that led to Suharto’s resignation, its own magazine, though at great cost to its but what about 1988 or 1978, indeed any of members’ personal safety and freedom. They the previous 30 years during which repression were among numerous journalists jailed for was a way of life? In reality, there was the articles they wrote critical of the regime’s substantial resistance to repression throughout policies. Even an 18 year-old office worker at this time: it is wrong to imagine that there was the magazine was arrested and sentenced to 20 no dissent or action.34 However, our focus now months imprisonment.32 turns away from those courageous individuals During the student protests of 1998, the and groups that did resist, resting instead on Alliance of Independent Journalists played an occasions and situations where there was important role, running crash courses for the considerably less action, for example students to better advise them on how to compared to 1998. Of course, to target situa- publish newsletters and convey their ideas. tions where there is relatively little action Other media and journalists were also sympa- opens an enormous range of material for thetic, including the Jakarta Post, whose examination. In order to draw clearer insights, editor noted that, by covering the protests, his it is useful to consider events where repression paper could address issues which otherwise was especially brutal or extensive and where it were not permitted under the strict rules of the was widely known. Hence we turn now to the Suharto regime.33 1965–1966 massacres in Indonesia and what Electronic mail and the World Wide Web lessons they can reveal about why at least were effective tools for the opposition, since some things that “could have been done” did they by-passed censorship of the mass media not occur. and were low cost. Although relatively few Indonesians then had access to the Internet, it The 1965–1966 massacres35 proved most useful for those who did. This once again confirmed Schock’s point that links President Sukarno, leader of the government with the outside world can be useful and that came to power following Indonesian international news coverage can be influential independence in 1949, rose to prominence on in domestic affairs, a point underscored by an anti-colonial platform. He sponsored the students at the demonstrations carrying development of an alternative “Third World” placards stating “Wear your lipstick. You through the 1955 Bandung conference and was might be on CNN tonight.” A number of quick to invoke anti-foreign feeling when banners were in English, the students knowing that this was crucial to informing people in other countries of the situation in their own. 34 Max Lane, “Voices of dissent in Indonesia,” Throughout the events, foreign govern- Arena, No. 61, 1982, pp. 110–128. ments played little overt role and certainly did 35 Robert Cribb (ed.), The Indoensian Killings little to help the opposition. Public events were 1965–1966 (Melbourne: Centre for Southeast reported to the world but the outcome was Asian Studies, Monash University, 1990). For concise summaries, see Malcolm Caldwell (ed.), Ten Years’ Military Terror in Indonesia (Notting- ham: Spokesman, 1975), pp. 13–17; Noam 32 John Pilger, “The secret history of Suharto’s Chomsky and Edward S. Herman, The Political bloody rise,” New Statesman & Society, Vol. 8, 22 Economy of Human Rights, Volume 1: The September 1995, pp. 14–15. Washington Connection and Third World Fascism 33 Charlé, “‘Banning is banned’,” p. 15. (Montréal: Black Rose Books, 1979), pp. 205–217.

Nonviolence against Indonesian repression 19 faced with what he perceived to be continuing garrison that defeated the coup, took the colonialist tendencies of large Western states. opportunity to massacre those who were He showed himself willing to court the Soviet known, thought, or rumored to be members of and Chinese governments if it suited him to do the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI) or business with them rather than the West. The their sympathizers and many more as well. US government36 felt that the Sukarno govern- Using a well-orchestrated media campaign, ment could not be relied upon in a region it Suharto banned the PKI and escalated his considered to be of utmost strategic impor- program of slaughtering communists and tance and was desperate for a more staunchly suspects. The army systematically went about anti-communist regime to rule in the archi- the obliteration of those deemed politically pelago.37 undesirable in Central Java, moving east The opportunity for change came in 1965 through to Bali. As well as killing suspected following an attempted coup.38 The incident communists themselves, army officers gave deeply tarnished Sukarno’s reputation and lists of names to right-wing Muslim groups heralded a power shift towards the military. and other anti-communist militias who were Along with his military supporters, General provided with arms, transport, and training for Suharto, the Commander of the Jakarta the purposes of carrying out this pogrom. The CIA was firmly behind Suharto’s actions, supplying lists of leading communists to the 39 36 We try to avoid constructions in which a Indonesian army and recording their deaths. country is identified with its government, e.g. “The Although most of the deaths occurred in 1965 US had never been pleased.” This form of and 1966, the slaughter continued until 1969 metonymy is especially inappropriate when when virtually all apparent opposition had discussing nonviolent action, which often pits been eliminated. citizens against their government or its agents. Against this wave of killings, left-wing Even our own constructions are shorthands for opponents were quickly rendered few and more accurate but complex formulations, such as disorganized. Power shifted further to Suharto “US government” really meaning something like in March 1966 when the army insisted that “US dominant foreign policy elites.” Sukarno delegate extensive powers to Suharto, 37 In accordance with its assumed right to interfere at the time Chief of Staff of the Army, and in the affairs of other countries and its history of then officially in 1968 when Suharto was doing so, the US government undertook serious appointed to the presidency in his own right. covert intervention in Indonesia in 1956–1958, in By then he had set up the conditions for order to undermine Sukarno. This particularly took comfortable rule with the bulk of his oppo- the form of US government agencies’ heavy support for rebels but this interference backfired in nents killed or imprisoned. It is commonly its immediate aims. For a fuller story, see Audrey estimated that 500,000 to one million died in R. Kahin and George McT. Kahin, Subversion as the anti-communist rampages, making this one Foreign Policy: The Secret Eisenhower and Dulles Debacle in Indonesia (New York: New Press, 39 Kathy Kadane, “Ex-agents say CIA compiled 1995). death lists for Indonesians,” San Francisco 38 Responsibility for the coup has been much Examiner, 20 May 1990, pp. 1, 22; http://users.wes debated. Suharto and his allies consistently attrib- tnet.gr/~cgian/suha-cia.htm. For a discussion of the uted it to the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI) significance of the CIA role, see Robert Cribb, in order to justify their pogrom. Given that the PKI “Problems in the historiography of the killings in was totally unprepared for action, many analysts Indonesia,” in Cribb, The Indonesian Killings believe the coup was an internal military matter. 1965–1966, pp. 1–43, at p. 7. On the role of the Yet others think that Suharto knew about the plans CIA and US policy makers in Suharto’s rise to and used the coup to get rid of rivals. See for power, see Peter Dale Scott, “Exporting military- example Humphrey McQueen, “How Suharto won economic development: America and the power,” Independent Monthly, September 1990, overthrow of Sukarno, 1965–67,” in Caldwell, Ten pp. 24–29. Years’ Military Terror in Indonesia, pp. 209–263.

20 Nonviolence Speaks of the century’s major bloodbaths.40 At least instead welcoming the elimination of the 400,000 were imprisoned, many on the remote communist threat.43 Australian Prime Minister island of Buru. Harold Holt was obviously pleased with the Those Indonesians who openly opposed the situation in Indonesia when he announced in massacres did so at enormous cost. Many 1966 that “with 500,000 to 1,000,000 chose not to act because the risks were too Communist sympathizers knocked off, I think great: even the slightest resistance was dan- it is safe to assume a reorientation has taken gerous and could mean the death of oneself or place.”44 one’s family. Indeed, it is believed that many There was no groundswell of international PKI members went meekly to their deaths, public opinion that might have forced sometimes even to the extent of lining up in governments to adopt a different approach. their funeral clothes to be executed.41 Overt Perhaps the strongest barrier to more wide- resistance would have required not only spread mobilization was the Cold War para- extraordinary courage but, to be effective, high digm within which many people understood and efficient levels of organization would have the global order. The beneficiaries of this had to be developed for the new circumstances ideology were arms manufacturers and those which prevailed. This would have been a who sought to invest in repressive regimes daunting challenge, given the number of such as Indonesia which, if nothing else, activists being killed. However, examples of seemed politically stable as well as obviously individual bravery exist. For example, the then friendly to foreign investment. head of Denpasar Hospital, Dr Djelantik, at However, many people in these Western great personal risk refused killing squads countries did not perceive the situation in this access to his patients.42 economic light, nor did they understand the As hundreds or thousands were killed every relevance of these economic arrangements. day, Western governments had good informa- Many simply perceived the world situation as tion about what was happening. Documents one of danger with the overwhelming need from the period show that Australian and US being to hold communism at bay. There was governments knew about the massacres as they widespread paranoia about the march of were occurring, yet did nothing to stop them, communism, widely supported by government propaganda that took advantage of much of the pain and loss from the previous world war. 40 Barbara Harff and Ted Robert Gurr, “Victims Belief in the so-called domino effect pro- of the state: genocides, politicides and group moted fear that the southward march of repression from 1945 to 1995,” in Albert J. communism was almost inevitable except by Jongman (ed), Contemporary Genocides: Causes, means of the utmost vigilance, enormous Cases, Consequences (Leiden: Projecten Interdis- expenditure on arms, and inclusion within a ciplinair Onderzoek naar de Oorzaken van nuclear umbrella. With communism having Mensenrechtenschendingen, 1996), pp. 33–58. For established itself in Eastern Europe and having a discussion of different estimates of the number “spread” from the Soviet Union to China and killed, see Cribb, “Problems in the historiography Korea, it was a common belief that Indonesia of the killings in Indonesia,” pp. 7–14. and then Australia (probably by invasion) were 41 Cribb, “Problems in the historiography of the killings in Indonesia,” p. 20. 42 A. A. M. Djelantik, The Birthmark: Memoirs of 43 Marian Wilkinson, “Hidden holocaust,” Sydney a Balinese Prince (Singapore: Peripuls, 1997), pp. Morning Herald, 10 July 1999, pp. 1s, 4s–5s; 299–303. For an account of the systematic torture David Jenkins, “The silent watchers,” Sydney and imprisonment of suspected communists, and of Morning Herald, 12 July 1999, p. 11. underground attempts to reorganize, see Carmel Budiardjo, Surviving Indonesia’s Gulag: A 44 New York Times, 6 July 1966, quoted in Western Woman Tells Her Story (London: Cassell, Chomsky and Herman, The Political Economy of 1996). Human Rights, p. 217

Nonviolence against Indonesian repression 21 next in line. Crude though this was, it held small kingdoms. East Timor remained Portu- much sway in a fiercely paranoid and anti- guese until 1975, shortly after the Caetano communist climate, used by Western govern- regime in Lisbon was overthrown by a coup, ments to control domestic situations as well as bringing about a policy change towards to guide foreign policy. During the 1960s and decolonization. In response several political 1970s, the most visible manifestation of the parties formed in East Timor with views about anti-communist impulse was the war in what sort of future the territory should have. Vietnam. Fretilin was the party that went on to gather The mass media’s commitment to anti- most popular support and that was paramount communism meant that the government line in the struggle for independence. went largely unchallenged. For their part, Following the Lisbon coup, the Portuguese opposition political parties usually spent more stayed in East Timor until one of the East time supporting the ideology and trying to Timorese parties, the Timorese Democratic distance themselves as much as possible from Union, staged a small and unsuccessful coup any socialist taint than trying to challenge that was fairly easily put down. At that stage Cold War assumptions. These barriers proved the Portuguese retreated to the island of too large, in the case of the 1965–1966 Atauro, thus leaving a temporary vacuum, of massacres, to have sufficient pressures which the Indonesian government was keen to mounted on governments to take strong stands take advantage despite Fretilin declaring against the Indonesian government’s brutality independence for the Democratic Republic of and repression. East Timor in November 1975. Both the Thus, the massacres proceeded without Indonesian and Australian governments much resulting backlash. Within Indonesia, promoted the view that Fretilin was Marxist. this can be explained in part by the lack of Indonesian forces invaded in December. As preparation for resistance and lack of an well as military operations, they engaged in organized movement to build on outrage massive killing of civilians, rape, torture, and caused by the killings.45 Outside Indonesia, the destruction. Fretilin was the target of much of massacres received relatively little attention, the slaughter, although the group held its own with anti-communism providing a framework initially, having its major strongholds in the for justifying what was happening. This has mountains and being in possession of a been called a case of “constructive terror,” substantial number of arms that the Portuguese namely mass killing that fostered a favorable had left behind. However, the Indonesian investment climate.46

East Timor Dunn, Timor: A People Betrayed; Jill Jolliffe, East Timor: Nationalism and Colonialism (Brisbane: East Timor47 became a Portuguese colony in University of Queensland Press, 1978); Arnold the 1500s. Prior to that it had been a series of Kohen, From the Place of the Dead: The Epic Struggles of Bishop Belo of East Timor (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999); Arnold Kohen and John Taylor, An Act of Genocide: Indonesia’s 45 Various factors are discussed by Cribb, Invasion of East Timor (London: TAPOL, 1979); “Problems in the historiography of the killings in John Pilger, Distant Voices (London: Vintage, Indonesia.” 1994), pp. 231–323; Constâncio Pinto and Matthew Jardine, East Timor’s Unfinished 46 Chomsky and Herman, The Political Economy Struggle: Inside the Timorese Resistance (Boston: of Human Rights, p. 205. South End Press, 1997); John G. Taylor, 47 Sources include Carmel Budiardjo and Liem Indonesia’s Forgotten War: The Hidden History of Soei Liong, The War Against East Timor (London: East Timor (London: Zed Books, 1991); Rodney Zed Books, 1984); Peter Carey and G. Carter Tiffen, Diplomatic Deceits: Government, Media Bentley (eds.), East Timor at the Crossroads: The and East Timor (Sydney: University of New South Forging of a Nation (London: Cassell, 1995); Wales Press, 2001).

22 Nonviolence Speaks military slaughter of East Timorese people and Liberal Prime Minister William McMahon was so great that it decimated Fretilin forces as (1971–1972) received Suharto as his guest in part of its overall culling. Fretilin later made a Australia in 1972. In 1968, immediately after resurgence in small and then greater becoming leader of the Australian Labor Party numbers.48 (then in opposition), Gough Whitlam advo- The Indonesian military assault against East cated a friendly and supportive approach to the Timor left the small territory devastated. Some Suharto regime which he suggested was estimates claim that up to one-third of the preferable to a communist government which population died. Agricultural output fell by he felt had nearly been in command there.52 almost 70 percent in just three years, causing Richard Walsh and George Munster claim that serious famine. Infant mortality was elevated Whitlam had an image of Indonesia that had to among the highest in the world, nearly all little to do with reality but more to do with his East Timorese teachers were executed, and desire for good relations. Whitlam wanted to 400 schools destroyed.49 be sophisticated and cultured, and he was The Indonesian invasion was largely under- contemptuous of the White Australia Policy taken with the condonation of Western which had tarnished Australia’s reputation in governments, if not their blessing.50 The Asia. Hence he was keen for a new and close Australian and US governments provided quiet relationship with the neighbor to the north but succor, hinting only that they did not wish to this meant believing the regime to be more be seen as openly supporting or condoning any innocuous than it was.53 such invasion. Suharto obliged by forestalling As Australian Prime Minister (1972–1975), a full-scale invasion until President Gerald Whitlam visited Indonesia in 1974 and report- Ford and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger edly told Suharto that an independent Timor had completed a visit they were making to would be an unviable state and a potential Jakarta.51 threat to the area. This was tantamount to In Australia, both Liberal and Labor giving Suharto a green light for invasion and governments adopted the same policies toward simultaneously a virtual guarantee that the Indonesia. Liberal Prime Minister John Gorton Australian government would acquiesce in the visited Indonesia during his term (1968–1971) event of such an invasion.54 Such appeasement seems puzzling in some respects but can partially be explained — though certainly not justified — by a some- 48 Budiardjo and Liong, The War Against East what problematic history in the relationship Timor; Paulino Gama, “The war in the hills, 1975– between Australia and Asia generally. The 85: a Fretilin commander remembers,” in Carey and Bentley, East Timor at the Crossroads, pp. relationship had been dogged by a White 97–105; Kohen and Taylor, An Act of Genocide; Australia Policy which was founded largely on Pinto and Jardine, East Timor’s Unfinished xenophobia and a fear that the Australian Struggle. There is a theory that the Indonesian (assumed essentially British) way of life was military “allowed” Fretilin to survive in the hills in order to blood new soldiers in counter-insurgency. Some 10,000 to 20,000 Indonesian troops died in 52 Gough Whitlam, The Whitlam Government, East Timor between 1975 and 1998. 1972–1975 (Melbourne: Penguin, 1985), pp. 102– 49 Ed Ayres, “The costs and benefits of war,” 119. World Watch, Vol. 8, No. 1, January-February 53 Richard Walsh and George Munster, Secrets of 1995, p. 9. State (Sydney: Angus & Robertson, 1982), pp. 54– 50 Chomsky and Herman, The Political Economy 55. of Human Rights, pp. 129–204; Kohen and Taylor, 54 David Lee and Christopher Waters (eds.), Evatt An Act of Genocide; Pilger, Distant Voices. to Evans: The Labor Tradition in Australian 51 Budiardjo and Liong, The War Against East Foreign Policy (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1997), p. Timor, p. 9. 228.

Nonviolence against Indonesian repression 23 threatened by the “yellow masses” to the extensive communication equipment, as well north. Whitlam, on taking office, was keen to as providing counter-insurgency training. The overcome the longstanding image of Australia Bronco planes in particular are credited with as a nation that eyed its Asian neighbors having stepped up the war to new offensive suspiciously and he felt particularly strongly levels.57 The US government concealed its about the cool relations that had existed armaments role from Congress and the US between the Indonesian president and his more public, with equipment misleadingly justified recent prime ministerial predecessors. In 1967, as being for “training purposes only.”58 five years before taking office, he claimed “In Journalist John Pilger repeatedly tried to Indonesia we lost our first opportunity to expose the hypocrisy and complicity of preserve and build the legacy of goodwill left Western governments, especially the British by the policies of the Chifley Government and and Australian governments.59 Pilger reported the actions of Dr Evatt.”55 But Indonesia, post- the $1 billion sale of British Hawk aircraft to 1965, was a very different country from that Indonesia.60 According to the Center for encountered by Chifley and Evatt in its early Defense Information in Washington, the days of independence. Although Whitlam had Hawks were “ideal counter-insurgency ample intelligence resources signaling the aircraft, designed to be used against guerrillas Indonesia regime’s intentions regarding East who come from among civilian populations Timor, Whitlam had long wanted to rekindle and have no adequate means of response good relations with the Indonesian govern- against air attack.”61 British arms exports ment, even at the cost of other Asian provided the Indonesian navy with a warship, neighbours.56 the Green Rover, shortly after global media The slaughter of guerrillas and civilians coverage of a 1991 massacre in Dili, East alike in East Timor was largely undertaken Timor’s capital, discussed below. Western with arms from Western countries. The US governments could no longer credibly deny government supplied A4-Skyhawks, used to Indonesian repression but they sent arms terrorize people in the mountains, as well as anyway. OV10 Bronco planes; Lockheed C-130 The US and British governments were not transport aircraft; Cadillac Cage V-150 alone in supplying the technology of repres- Commando armored cars equipped with sion to the Indonesian military. The Nether- machine guns, mortar, cannons, and smoke lands government supplied three Corvette and tear-gas launchers; M-17 rifles; pistols; warships despite the demands of Dutch action mortars; machine guns; recoilless rifles; and groups that the deal be cancelled. Meanwhile, the Australian government donated Nomad Searchmaster planes, fitted with ground and 55 Whitlam, The Whitlam Government, p. 102. Ben Chifley was prime minister immediately after World War II and H. V. Evatt was a prominent diplomat and leader of the Australian Labor Party. 57 Budiardjo and Liong, The War Against East 56 Tiffen, Diplomatic Deceits, gives an excellent Timor, p. 27. account of the way the key figures in the Austra- 58 Pilger, “The secret history of Suharto’s bloody lian government, with full knowledge of what was rise.” happening in Indonesia and East Timor (including through spy operations), gave some public lip 59 Pilger, Distant Voices, pp. 301–311. service to human rights while in practice seeking 60 John Pilger, “Land of the dead: journey to East to placate Indonesian elites. For original docu- Timor,” The Nation, Vol. 258, No. 16, 25 April ments, see Department of Foreign Affairs and 1994, pp. 550–552. Trade (Wendy Way, ed.), Australia and the Indonesian Incorporation of Portuguese Timor, 61 John Pilger, “Inside the ministry of propa- 1974–1976 (Melbourne: Melbourne University ganda,” New Statesman & Society, Vol. 7, 29 April Press, 2000). 1994, pp. 16–18.

24 Nonviolence Speaks sea surveillance radar.62 The Australian “Free East Timor,” in large black letters, to the military, like the British and US, also provided sites.66 training. In Australia the Campaign for an Independ- East Timor solidarity campaigns were ent East Timor (CIET) was established in started around the world. Activists struggled November 1974.67 Campaign activists in CIET long and hard to stop the bloodshed and issued press releases warning of the threat of pursued various campaigns such as against invasion, contacted members of parliament, Western arms sales to Indonesia. Activists met with Fretilin activists, sought trade union used symbolic actions in an attempt to alert actions, organized demonstrations, gathered other citizens to the situation in East Timor information, put out fortnightly bulletins, fed and to take a stand against Western govern- information to the media, arranged interviews ments’ military involvement.63 In an attempt to between Australian media and Fretilin spokes- “disturb consciences,” one British activist people, and encouraged formation of East conducted a peaceful raid on British Aero- Timor solidarity groups in other countries. space where he hung a banner, painted Perhaps one of the group’s biggest contribu- slogans, and hammered the machines of tions was helping set up secret radio contact in destruction. Conducting his own defense at his Darwin with Fretilin in nearby East Timor and resulting trial, he focused on Britain’s supply providing operators and technical support. of this weaponry to Indonesia and its role in Several times Australian security police the repression of East Timorese.64 Some time tracked down and seized the transmitter.68 later four women undertook a similar raid on a Australian authorities ordered an end to distri- British Aerospace plant, attacking with house- bution of messages from East Timor that had hold hammers a Hawk fighter aircraft destined been routed through an Australian telecommu- for Indonesia the following day and leaving in nication center.69 the pilot’s seat a videotaped explanation for According to Denis Freney of CIET, “… their actions.65 despite the best efforts of many people around Other activists attempted to use the Internet the country [Australia] to get the government to expose the lies of the Indonesian regime and to stop supporting Suharto we had little the real situation in East Timor. In September success, although we were able to keep the 1998, Portuguese hackers modified numerous question alive even while most people thought Indonesian websites, adding links to sites it a ‘lost cause’.”70 elsewhere containing information on human Certainly more pressure, more actions, and rights abuses in East Timor. They also added more demands brought to bear much earlier might have undermined some of the support offered by Western governments to the 62 Budiardjo and Liong, The War Against East Suharto regime. The Indonesian government Timor, p. 30. hired a public relations firm, Burson Marsteller, to put forward a more acceptable 63 For a personal testimony of religiously based resistance, see Ciaron O’Reilly, Remembering Forgetting: A Journey of Nonviolent Resistance to the War on East Timor (Brisbane: Swords into Ploughshares, 2000). 66 Amy Harmon, “‘Hactivists’ of all persuasions take their struggle to the web,” New York Times, Vanessa Baird, “Bringing the blood back to 64 31 October 1998. British Aerospace,” New Internationalist, March 1994, p. 21. 67 Denis Freney, A Map of Days: Life on the Left (Melbourne: Heinemann, 1991), p. 348. 65 John Pilger, “In a Liverpool court next week, four women who disarmed a warplane headed for 68 Freney, A Map of Days, pp. 357–373. Indonesia will raise the issue of our right to stop 69 Taylor, Indonesia's Forgotten War, p. 77. genocide,” New Statesman & Society, Vol. 9, 19 July 1996, p. 23. 70 Freney, A Map of Days, p. 363.

Nonviolence against Indonesian repression 25 image of Indonesia’s presence in East Timor,71 Eventually public sentiment abroad turned suggesting that the regime feared that, as more against the Indonesian regime, largely as a people in the West learned of events in East result of getting more information about Timor, they would pressure their governments events in East Timor than governments were to take action. This $5 million contract is a willing to disseminate through formal chan- testament that there was a war of image to be nels. Following the UN-supervised vote in won, as well as a war against the people of East Timor in September 1999, in which East Timor. nearly 80% of voters supported independence, In the 1980s, the East Timorese resistance the Indonesian military in East Timor con- reorganized to gain more support, with the aim nived with anti-independence militias75 in a of building unity in East Timor and gaining ruthless orgy of destruction, killing, and forced support in Indonesia and internationally. The relocation.76 Because there had been consider- new emphasis was on nonviolent action, urban able attention on the referendum in a country participation, and orientation of guerrillas to which had been struggling for its independ- defending against attacks and not initiating ence for a long time, substantial media violence. This resulted in a much more potent resources had been stationed in East Timor resistance movement.72 and there was considerable focus on events A crucial obstacle to generating interna- there. Such attention was itself an outcome of tional support was lack of information about massacres for outside audiences. The Indone- Hodder and Stoughton, 1992); Pilger, Distant sian occupiers did everything possible to shut Voices, p. 236; Tiffen, Diplomatic Deceits, pp. 43– down communication outside the country. The 53. McMillan also describes the voyage of the importance of communication to outside peace ship that sailed from Darwin for Dili in early audiences can be illustrated by a couple of 1992. Later, copies of Stahl’s videotape were examples. In 1989, the Indonesian government smuggled into Indonesia and had quite an impact “opened” East Timor to outside contact: in antigovernment circles. journalists, among others, were allowed to 75 Hamish McDonald, “Masters of terror,” Sydney visit. On 12 November 1991, a slaughter of Morning Herald, 28–29 April 2001, pp. 23–25; more than 200 peaceful protesters at the Santa Lindsay Murdoch, “UN lays blame for Timor Cruz cemetery in Dili, the capital of East wave of terror,” Sydney Morning Herald, 20 April Timor,73 was witnessed by several Western 2001, pp. 1, 14; Lindsay Murdoch, “Old friend of journalists and recorded on videotape by Max Timor says what others will not,” Sydney Morning Stahl from Yorkshire TV, who was able to Herald, 20 April 2001, p. 14. One reason that smuggle the tape out of the country. When the states may tolerate, encourage, or set up death squads is so that the government’s direct involve- journalists’ eyewitness accounts and especially ment can be publicly denied. This is definitely of the video footage reached an international significance in mobilizing resistance to repression. audience, they caused outrage and triggered a See Bruce B. Campbell, “Death squads: definition, great increase in Western popular support for problems, and historical context,” in Bruce B. the East Timorese struggle.74 Campbell and Arthur D. Brenner (eds.), Death Squads in Global Perspective: Murder with Deniability (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000), 71 Pilger, “Inside the ministry of propaganda.” pp. 1–26, at pp. 12–13. See also, in the same volume, Robert Cribb, “From petrus to ninja: death 72 Chisako M. Fukuda, “Peace through nonviolent squads in Indonesia,” pp. 181–202. action: the East Timorese resistance movement’s strategy for engagement,” Pacifica Review, Vol. 76 For a summary of political events in East Timor 12, No. 1, 2000, pp. 16–31. in 1999, see Bob Lowry, “East Timor: an overview of political developments,” in Chris Manning and 73 Pinto and Jardine, East Timor’s Unfinished Peter van Diermen (eds.), Indonesia in Transition: Struggle, pp. 188–199. Social Aspects of Reformasi and Crisis (Singapore: 74 Kohen, From the Place of the Dead, pp. 160– Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2000), pp. 187; Andrew McMillan, Death in Dili (Sydney: 91–108.

26 Nonviolence Speaks the nonviolent struggle to draw the world’s understanding barriers to action and how they eyes to the situation in East Timor. The upshot might be overcome. was that the post-election massacre occurred in the full spotlight of the world media (at least What else could have been done? for those countries where East Timor is considered significant, such as Australia). It is relatively easy, after the fact, to speculate Large numbers of people outside Indonesia about what opponents of Indonesian repression were horrified and outraged, leading to many could have done differently in the period forms of nonviolent action including trade 1965–1998 that is the focus of our attention. union bans and discouragement of tourism. Since participants in any struggle are con- Note that in both the 1991 Dili massacre strained by the circumstances in which they and the 1999 post-vote violence, the East operate — including resources, ideas, dangers, Timorese resistance had by that stage adopted and contingencies — it is unfair to blame them a largely nonviolent approach. Indonesian for acting as they do and unrealistic to demand repression was exercised against nonviolent a different course of action. Similarly, it would civilians and information was available to an be unfair to expect action from those whose international audience. Thus, conditions were lives, freedom, or families may be at risk, even more conducive to generating international though some people do act under those support than in the decade from 1975. Of circumstances. Nevertheless, it can be produc- course, other factors played a role, including tive to talk about “what ifs” in order to learn the saliency of anti-communism, the strength lessons about nonviolent action that can be of international human rights and solidarity applied in future situations. Another way of groups, and the interest of the mass media. framing the question is to ask: what barriers to That increased interest on the mass media’s action existed and what eventually breached part was itself a tribute to the work done by these barriers? solidarity groups which had made the East Within Indonesia, opponents of government Timor issue of interest to international repression did in fact use a wide variety of audiences, to which media responded with nonviolent techniques, including leaflets, increased coverage. Overall the reasons that speeches, strikes, rallies, marches, occupa- there was more interest and fewer barriers in tions, and vigils. Similarly the people of East the 1990s are a complicated blend of outcomes Timor used many methods of nonviolent of tactics, a growing awareness of some inter- action, though in this case there was guerrilla national issues — which always vie against warfare as well. While vitally important, others for coverage — and a differently analyzing domestic nonviolent opposition, configured notion in the “public mind” of both what was done and what could have been international rights and responsibilities. done, is a type of study well traversed in the What is far less studied, and far less easy to literature on nonviolent action. Therefore we understand, is the relative lack of concern and look instead at what has been less commonly action when information about repression is examined, namely support for the struggle readily available, though not necessarily from outside the country, in this case from presented as the sort of headlines that are outside Indonesia. influential in determining what many people As noted previously, there was little help consider important. While nonviolence for the Indonesian democratic opposition research has concentrated on nonviolent action movement from outside the country. In con- and how it does or doesn’t generate support, trast, the call for independence for East Timor there has been a neglect of situations, such as generated international popular support from East Timor after 1975, that warrant nonviolent the start, growing eventually to proportions action but where relatively little or none that governments could not ignore. Invasion of occurs. Such cases provide a rich ground for the small territory was poorly received throughout most of South-East Asia, even at a

Nonviolence against Indonesian repression 27 government level, and there was even less A third form of foreign support for the support from African and Latin American Indonesian government came through business governments.77 It was mainly the US, Austra- investment and financial links. Although lian, and Japanese governments that tried to business activities in a country do not neces- play down the invasion or to at least put it in sarily imply any formal endorsement of the the best light possible. In fact, their support government, they implicitly condone its proved crucial and, as a result, the Indonesian policies. Withdrawal or avoidance of invest- regime received significant support from ment can be a tactic to signal opposition to foreign governments. domestic policies, as in the case of disinvest- This occurred in three main ways. First, ment in the South African economy under governments around the world legally recog- apartheid. nized and maintained the usual diplomatic Also worth noting is the role of foreign relations with the Indonesian government. intellectuals, such as US academics who built James Dunn, a former Australian consul in links with and supported antisocialist Indone- East Timor, claims that the Indonesian sian figures during Sukarno’s presidency, a government calculated — correctly, as it process funded by the Ford and Rockefeller turned out — that, if the Australian and US Foundations and carried out through leading governments could accommodate East Timor’s universities such as Cornell, MIT, and annexation, then the international community Berkeley. Western economists helped teach at large would not challenge it.78 Formal “modernization theory” to Indonesian recognition in the international arena is an economic planners.79 important source of legitimacy for any The three main forms of support for the government; withdrawing recognition is seen Indonesian regime were combined in the as a sign of serious hostility. Some govern- Timor Gap Treaty, which divided up resources ments went further and formed closer ties with in the oceans near Timor between Australia the Indonesian government. The Australian and Indonesia. The treaty provided additional government later made military agreements acknowledgment of Indonesian sovereignty with the Indonesian government, including over East Timor, laid the foundation for joint training exercises and providing military increased economic investment, and denied aid. Furthermore, the Australian government, any role for the Indonesian people (not to unlike most others, recognized Indonesian mention the people of East Timor). annexation of East Timor, thereby giving Defenders of government policy would greater legitimacy to repressive actions there. argue that diplomatic recognition and business Secondly, the reverse side of this support investment are means to provide a dialogue for the regime has been that foreign govern- with the Indonesian government and that good ments failed to support democratic opposition movements within Indonesia, whether rhetori- cally or more substantively. During the cold 79 David Ransom, “The Berkeley mafia and the war, Western governments often gave at least Indonesian massacre,” Ramparts, No. 9, October rhetorical support to dissidents and opposition 1970, pp. 27–29, 40–49. It would be a worthwhile exercise to investigate more deeply the links groups in communist countries, but this sort of between western intellectuals and Indonesian open advocacy for “freedom and democracy” repression. A relevant study in another context is was mostly lacking in the case of Indonesia Jonathan Feldman, Universities in the Business of under Suharto. Repression: The Academic-Military-Industrial Complex and Central America (Boston: South End Press, 1989). On experts as servants of power, see David Elliott and Ruth Elliott, The Control of Technology (London: Wykeham, 1976) and 77 Taylor, Indonesia’s Forgotten War, p. 76. Edward T. Silva and Sheila A. Slaughter, Serving 78 James Dunn, “The darkest page,” New Interna- Power: The Making of the Academic Social tionalist, March 1994, pp. 24–25. Science Expert (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1984).

28 Nonviolence Speaks relations offer greater opportunities for Dili massacre.82 This was in vivid contrast to positive influence. Against this, it can be the Australian government, which welcomed, argued that this approach had little obvious in a visit to Canberra, the Indonesian general success over more than thirty years of Indone- who directed the massacre.83 There was a sian repression. Indeed, far from trying to “boycott Bali” campaign after the Dili influence the Indonesian government to massacre, although it didn’t receive much promote human rights and democratic values, attention. There were also actions such as Australian governments after 1965 mostly fell writing, publishing, and distributing letters, over themselves to appease and ingratiate petitions, and articles, providing symbolic themselves with the Suharto regime. support for the Indonesian democratic opposi- However, our focus here is not on official tion, and sponsoring of trips abroad by rhetoric and short-sighted diplomatic “prag- Indonesian and East Timorese activists. matism”80 but on a strategy against repression Ahmad Taufic, a journalist from the banned based on nonviolent action. Diplomatic recog- Indonesian weekly Tempo, who had himself nition, military training, and business invest- been imprisoned for several years, was one ment, whatever their effectiveness as means of activist who visited the UK to highlight the reducing repression, are not the subject of situation in Indonesia.84 nonviolence theory,81 except as barriers to Any one of these actions which were taken, mobilization of nonviolent action. Although along with others that may not have been, governments supported the Indonesian regime could be developed in detail. For example, under Suharto, it was quite possible for setting up effective communication systems citizens to oppose it and to support the could involve obtaining simple and cheap democratic opposition. “Citizens” here is a short-wave radios and miniature video record- shorthand for individuals and groups including ers and getting them to opponents of the churches, trade unions, political parties, regime. Given that Indonesian government solidarity groups, human rights organizations, officials have systematically lied about their and many others — what can be called actions, providing first-hand information about “organized civil society.” events can be quite a powerful challenge, as in We have already described many of the the case of the Dili massacre. actions of campaigners for independence for East Timor, from hitting out at weaponry Conclusion bound for Indonesia to hacking Indonesian government websites. Among other actions The protests in Indonesia in 1998 that led to was a refusal by Melbourne dockworkers to the resignation of President Suharto fit the handle Indonesian shipping following the 1991 standard pattern of nonviolent action, in which conspicuous protests encourage more people to participate and open repression against protesters causes a backlash against the regime. Studying these events — plus the 1999 protests in Australia and elsewhere over 80 Tiffen, Diplomatic Deceits, makes a powerful massacres in East Timor following the vote for case that the Australian government’s self-styled pragmatism over East Timor was not pragmatic in practice, in part because the government ignored the role of the news media in exposing Indonesian 82 “A diplomatic massacre,” The Economist (US), repression and Australian government hypocrisy. Vol. 321, 30 November 1991, pp. 36–37. 81 Business investment in principle could be a 83 Pilger, “The secret history of Suharto’s bloody form of nonviolent action, if implemented in rise.” support of a nonviolent struggle, but this has certainly not been the way it has been used in 84 Pilger, “The secret history of Suharto’s bloody Indonesia. rise.”

Nonviolence against Indonesian repression 29 independence85 — using nonviolence theory • The mind set in Western governments, can be a fruitful exercise. An additional aim especially foreign affairs departments, which here is to draw attention to the limited action favors friendly relations with other govern- at other times, namely the previous decades of ments as a form of “real-politik” in which the repressive Suharto regime, especially moral issues should not intrude into foreign during the 1965–1966 massacres and the 1975 affairs, and rejects direct support for pro- invasion and subsequent occupation of East democracy movements. Timor. Although there was substantial opposi- • News values in Western media that give tion to Indonesian repression in these earlier priority to government perspectives. years, there were also many who supported, condoned, or ignored it. For example, the 1998 protests leading to Our argument is that nonviolence theory Suharto’s resignation were aided by the social can be enriched by studying occasions context of economic collapse and by email characterized by a relative lack of action, or communication; at earlier times the barriers insufficient action, in order to learn about associated with social context and communi- barriers to action. Studying action must remain cation created much greater obstacles to the centerpiece of the study of nonviolent action. In 1999, Australian mass media action, but this needs to be supplemented by provided massive and to some extent crusad- much more attention to periods and occasions ing coverage of destruction and killing in East where there are relatively low levels of action. Timor, supporting and fostering popular The 1998 protests in Indonesia show what sort protest that was sufficient to override the of people’s action was possible, and throw into traditional mind set in Australian governments relief the relative lack of this scale of opposi- that favored good relations with the Indone- tion at other times. Likewise, the 1999 protests sian regime above other considerations. In in Australia against killings in East Timor earlier times, the social context was less favor- show what sort of people’s action was possible able, less information was available and media outside of Indonesia, and throw into relief the interest was far less, thus helping to explain relative lack of this scale of opposition at other the lower level of action against the 1965– times, notably during the 1965–1966 massa- 1966 massacres and against the invasion and cres and during and after the 1975 invasion of occupation of East Timor. East Timor. Finally, we point out that there has been We have mentioned some barriers to action brave and continual resistance to repression in in the course of our accounts of events. Indonesia itself, East Timor, and in other countries where activists have struggled to • Social context, such as anticommunism, draw attention to events in the archipelago. trade links, nationalism, domestic preoccupa- Their courageous protests have in their own tions, and prevailing attitudes about whether way been the foundations for the greater one should intervene, make judgments — or actions that followed. However, we would even be concerned — about affairs in other hope that, by developing lessons and insights countries. (Feelings of insularity can wax and from such periods, in future similar struggles wane). need not be as drawn out and action can more • Communication blockages, such as cen- quickly move into a more effective phase. sorship and removal of radio transmitters. In chapters 5, 6, and 7, we re-examine some of the barriers to effective communication against repression, aggression, and oppression, using perspectives from nonviolence theories 85 Although these protests used many methods of and communication theories. Through an nonviolent action, a primary demand by protesters interplay between theory and case studies, it was for military intervention against the killings, may be possible to develop insights that causing some complications in undertaking an activists can use in ongoing struggles. analysis of these protests using nonviolence theory.

3 Nonviolent resistance to Soviet repression

The Soviet Union provides an intriguing case history in nonviolent action and many of the Chronology of significant events issues relevant to it. The Union was largely in the Soviet Union born of nonviolent actions (along with parallel violence) in 1917, when strikes, factory February 1917: Dictatorial ruler Tsar Nicholas occupations, demonstrations in the street, and II abdicates under huge public pressure. A other forms of resistance resulted in a coup provisional government is established. d’état by the Bolsheviks. Ironically, street demonstrations and massive social resistance October 1917: The Bolsheviks (Communist led to the defeat of another coup in 1991, Party), led by Lenin, seize power from the signaling the end of the Soviet Union. provisional government. In between 1917 and 1991 (see chronol- ogy), there was much repression and the 1918–1920: Civil war between the Bolsheviks emergence of numerous strategies to deal with and the anti-Bolsheviks (the Whites). The the repression in its varied stages. This chapter West supports the Whites. provides an overview of the forms and roles of dissent in the Soviet Union, focusing espe- 1922: Stalin is elected General Secretary of the cially on nonviolent resistance to the 1991 Communist Party. The Union of Soviet attempted coup. It discusses how resistance Socialist Republics (USSR) is formed. differed during the different stages of repres- sion that characterized the Soviet Union’s 1924: Lenin dies and is succeeded by Alexei years and poses possible reasons for the Rykov as Premier of USSR. Zinoviev and relatively low levels of action, before Kamenev form triumvirate with Stalin to rule assessing what was and what might have been USSR. useful, what specific problems were faced, and how they might have been overcome. The role 1928: After outmaneuvering the left, then the of international observers and supporters and right, Stalin becomes the nation's leader. The their relative inaction through many of the first Five Year Plan is established. worst times is also considered. Three periods of particularly harsh repres- 1929: Agricultural collectivization begins and, sion stand out in the history of the Soviet with it, terrorization of peasants. Union: (1) forced collectivization; (2) the Stalin Terror; and (3) “re-stalinization” under 1932: Second Five Year Plan begins. Death Brezhnev. Each of these was met with penalty degree passed for stealing from resistance in some form but the impact of that collectives. resistance was not always even or clear. But before examining these three periods, we start 1933: Famine devastates USSR, largely as a with a discussion of the 1991 coup. result of rural turmoil.

1934: Kirov — a possible challenger to Sta- lin’s power — is killed. The Great Purges begin.

1936: Beginning of show trials of Party leaders, including Zinoviev, Kamenev, Bukharin, and Rykov.

50 Nonviolent resistance to Soviet repression 31

1986: Gorbachev introduces mechanisms for a 1941: Germany invades the Soviet Union, more open society (glasnost) and for economic which undergoes huge losses and is crucial in restructuring (perestroika). the Allies’ victory. 1989: People power topples Eastern European 1945: Germany surrenders. Western leaders communist regimes. look to the Soviet Union to help defeat Japan but are worried at the prospect of the USSR 1990: Following growth of the Baltic nation- “sharing” in the triumph of that defeat. To alist movement, Lithuanians elect a pro- hasten Japan's surrender before full Soviet independence parliament and begin protesting involvement, atomic bombs are dropped on strongly for independence. Boris Yeltsin Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Cold War com- becomes chairman of the Russian Supreme mences building and continues until 1989. Soviet and declares that Russian laws take precedence over Soviet laws. 1953: Stalin dies and is replaced by Nikita Khrushchev. 1991: In response to Gorbachev's announce- ment that the leaders of 10 republics have 1956: The Twentieth Party Congress hears in a agreed on a new Union treaty, an Emergency “secret speech” by Khrushchev that Stalin was Committee is formed and attempts a coup. responsible for genocide and terror, allowed Nonviolent action begins immediately. Several by a Cult of Personality which had developed days later the coup is defeated but the event around him. Soviet troops invade Hungary. weighs heavily against Gorbachev and the Emergence of a questioning sub-culture in the Communist Party, bringing about the eventual USSR. collapse of the Soviet Union.

1964: Khrushchev becomes the first Soviet leader to be dismissed. He is replaced by Leonid Brezhnev. Resisting the 1991 coup

1968: Soviet troops invade Czechoslovakia. In August 1991 a group calling itself the Soviet citizens are arrested for protesting and Emergency Committee detained Soviet Presi- are sent to labor camps. Dissent becomes more dent Michael Gorbachev in his Crimean dacha organized, especially with first publication of and attempted a coup. Headed by Vice-Presi- the Chronicle of Current Events. dent Gennadi Yanayev, the coup was largely an effort to block moves by Gorbachev to 1979: Soviet troops invade Afghanistan. decentralize the Soviet Union, with ultimate independence for the republics. However it 1982: Yuri Andropov is elected General also stemmed from apprehension by political Secretary of Communist Party, following conservatives about the new democratic terrain Brezhnev's death. into which Gorbachev had led the USSR. Some top Communist Party officials and 1984: Andropov dies and is replaced by bureaucrats felt that power was slipping away Konstantin Chernenko. from the party, from them personally, and from the Soviet government which had long 1985: Michail Gorbachev is elected as leader, tried to assert the Soviet Union as a leading after Chernenko’s death. nation in world directions and political thought. The collapse of the Eastern bloc had been made possible by Gorbachev’s declared

32 Nonviolence Speaks unwillingness to support the previously en- prepared a Moscow command bunker for use trenched Brezhnev doctrine whereby the by the coup leaders if the need arose.3 Soviet government intervened in the political On awaking to the news that Gorbachev affairs of its neighbors to ensure that its own was ill and that an Emergency Committee had interests prevailed1. This had led to the demise taken over, many citizens realized that there of the Cold War, which had propped up a great had been a coup. Muscovites had the tanks in many myths, ideologies, and rationales in both the street to further demonstrate that likeli- the US and the USSR. These had lost their hood. Resistance started immediately, with credibility with subsequent repercussions on many workers striking or simply staying away the Soviet home front. But Gorbachev had also from work. This took place across the USSR, introduced a wide range of reforms domesti- from the coal-mining regions of Siberia to the cally. After many years of stagnation under huge military-industrial complexes of Gorky.4 previous policies, these reforms did not run People gathered at major city points in altogether smoothly, allowing conservatives to Moscow, such as Manezh Square and outside complain that the nation was in shambles. the Russian Parliament. When the state- Thus the coup leaders justified their controlled television program Vremya showed August actions by reference to the troubled an uncensored snippet of Yeltsin on a tank state of affairs throughout the Soviet Union. outside the Russian parliament, many more The Committee voided what it deemed to be people were roused to join the protests. “unconstitutional laws,” banned strikes, rallies, Faced with huge opposition, the coup and demonstrations, closed down all liberal leaders issued plans for the demonstrations to newspapers and those it felt it could not trust, be broken up. One factory was ordered to dispatched columns of tanks to Baltic capitals urgently send a quarter of a million pairs of and to Moscow and Leningrad, and announced handcuffs to Moscow in readiness for mass the takeover of the media and many other arrests. Vladimir Kruchkov, one of the facilities. members of the Emergency Committee and Among the first moves of the Emergency head of the KGB, ordered two floors of the Committee was to put all military units on Lefortovo Prison in central Moscow to be alert, ordering them to occupy Moscow and cleared. There is no question that the coup prepare for battle. Although an elite unit was leaders intended to move forward with their ordered to arrest Boris Yeltsin, this was never plans but these became unstuck at the point of carried out, probably due to divisions in the execution and even prior to it. For instance, the ranks of those ordered to make the arrest.2 By putschists’ plans were leaked to Yeltsin and 9am Moscow time, the first military units were demonstrators at the Russian Parliament were taking up strategic positions in the capital, given fliers outlining the plans for how their with a column of 25 armored personnel resistance was to be crushed. Many wept and carriers, staffed with paratroopers, parked troops present had an opportunity to contem- outside Moscow City Hall. The KGB (secret plate what role they might play for or against police) had been put on early alert and had the coup as the orders came down. There was also the story of at least one KGB agent walking around the city, ensuring that he was incommunicado so that he could not be ordered to take part in the putschists’ plot.

1 See Ralph Summy and Michael E. Salla (eds.), Why the Cold War Ended: A Range of Interpreta- 3 Jeff Trimble and Peter Vassiliev, “Three days tions (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1995). that shook the world,” U.S. News & World Report, Vol. 111, 18 November 1991, pp. 54–62. 2 Monica Attard, Russia: Which Way Paradise? (Sydney: Doubleday, 1997), p. 175. 4 Attard, Russia: Which Way Paradise?, p. 184. Nonviolent resistance to Soviet repression 33

A tense situation saw three people shot By late morning of 21 August the tanks dead at Manezh Square on the second day of that had been patrolling the Kremlin had been the coup when soldiers became frightened. recalled. The putschists tried to escape but The crowd expressed anger, fear, and grief. were arrested in a sure sign that the coup had This may have led other soldiers to ponder failed. Several top officials and party heads what they would do in a similar situation. who had supported the coup suicided, at least Many of them were already empathizing with one also killing his wife.7 These suicides/kill- the demonstrators. By the third day many of ings probably constitute the bulk of the deaths them were openly saying that they would not related to the coup (though they are of course shoot the protesters. This was in fact the final much less celebrated than the deaths of blow to the coup. protesters at Manezh Square). In confrontations such as those between If the coup leaders made one crucial the protesters and the Soviet soldiers there are mistake, it was thinking that the Soviet complicated dynamics at work. It is crucial to citizenry would simply go along with the fate success that resisters, as much as possible, decided for them at higher levels. It seems avoid a process whereby each party constructs they also misjudged the amount of military an image of the other as enemy. James A. Aho support they would get, although this itself has identified a number of ingredients in such was, arguably, connected with the strength of a process. Among those relevant to encounters the resistance which signaled to the armed between soldiers and citizens are myth making forces that this was not a coup to be supported. that too easily categorizes the other party and The air force in particular was anxious not to expects certain negative behavior on their part become involved in an attack on Soviet to be inevitable and predictable. These can citizens and many mayors and other leaders become self-fulfilling prophecies as each party were appealing directly to the military to defy responds to the other within ritualistic patterns the Emergency Committee’s orders. that confirm their worst suspicions.5 Those The resistance could be seen as a mixture who view themselves as acting righteously — of indignation, ingenuity, and hardened and each of the parties are likely to regard resolve to reject a return to repression. It bore themselves so — “respond ‘appropriately’ to the signs of a people having had a taste of those they have designated as evil [or as freedom under glasnost and not wanting to enemy] — with secrecy, caution, cunning, and, retreat, as illustrated by one Muscovite who if necessary, cruelty. To act in any other way joined the protests, declaring that “… for years would be imprudent.”6 We would not expect nothing but obedience and inertia was nonviolent activists to act cruelly, of course, pounded in to my brain.” But now that a but soldiers who believe the worst of these government that she had help elect was under demonstrators may still view them as threat- threat, she vowed to ignore the curfew and let ening in other more subtle but poorly under- tanks roll over her if necessary.8 stood ways. Also evident were signs of the re- It is important, therefore, to treat soldiers emergence of previously used techniques of with respect, appeal to their humanity and underground organization, such as publication decency, and hope it has not been extinguished of underground newspapers and people pulling by military training and indoctrination. their old short-wave radios out of mothballs. Citizens commented that they hadn’t used

5 James A. Aho, This Thing of Darkness: A Sociology of the Enemy (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1994), pp. 29–30. See also Sam 7 Attard, Russia: Which Way Paradise?, pp. 197– Keen, Faces of the Enemy: Reflections of the 202. Hostile Imagination (San Francisco: Harper & 8 Gladys D. Ganley, Unglued Empire: The Soviet Row, 1986). Experience with Communications Technologies 6 Aho, This Thing of Darkness, p. 31. (Norwood, NJ: Ablex, 1996), p. 144.

34 Nonviolence Speaks these for years but were pleased not to have symbolic, supportive, and designed to influ- got rid of them. The experience from earlier ence others. Some of these categories obvi- days of dissent served the resisters well and ously overlap. For instance, when the crowd at the fact that short-wave radios were plentiful Moscow’s Manezh Square joined hands to was of further benefit to the struggle. block the entry of armored personnel carriers, However, if dissidents of previous eras this fell across all categories, being highly had come largely from the intelligentsia, albeit visible, obviously nonviolent, displaying and with a diversity of interests, concerns, and invoking group solidarity, and making it ideologies but all with the common desire to psychologically difficult, though certainly not express their opinions freely, those who re- physically impossible, for the armed troops to sisted the coup appeared to have come from a proceed. Overlap of categories is also seen in more diverse background. While the intelli- leaflets and posters, which involved organiza- gentsia and middle classes made up a large tion in terms of getting them produced, proportion of the resistance, workers also reproduced, and disseminated but which were joined the demonstrations and played their also aimed at gaining support of others and own role. The trade union movement in influencing those who were wary about Leningrad was particularly strong in the joining the actions. resistance, with calls for strikes widespread on Strikes, although usually of an organiza- workers’ placards at the large demonstration in tional nature with their economic ramifications Palace Square, where at least 100,000 people and political potential, can be highly symbolic. gathered. The city’s Kirov tractor factory, with This was certainly the case with the one- 30,000 workers, became a strong center of person strike conducted by Vladimir Petrik, resistance, using its fax machines to transmit chief of an assembly division at a factory speeches of defiance and support. Workers at implicated in military equipment.9 Petrik, at that factory spoke openly and enthusiastically risk of jeopardizing his job, was determined to of a campaign of civil disobedience. oppose the passive acceptance evident at his Media workers played their own role and factory and to show that a person can take an were involved in ways that had not been individual stand on issues. possible during the pre-glasnost days, using One of the most active groups was the ploys of broadcasting and reporting details and Memorial Society, established to assist victims information which surely went against the of Stalin. Members collected all the paper they coup initiators and constantly showed them to could gather from offices and elsewhere, be on shaky ground. In a threatening situation produced a vast number of leaflets, and such as a coup, especially if there is a distributed them on the streets. One distributor background such as the Soviet Union had, expected trouble when he was approached by many people inevitably lie low and see which two policemen. But it turned out that they way the wind blows, fearing that, if there is a were eager to have the leaflet to keep abreast new wave of repression, the regime may of the news, suggesting the widespread retaliate against open opponents. The part support for the resistance.10 played by media workers served to embolden Communication was paramount, from the those who, even though ideologically opposed slogans and hastily made placards demanding to the coup, may otherwise have been inclined "No to the Fascist Junta!" to the 20,000 copies to lie low . The nonviolent actions undertaken by the 9 Vladimir Petrik, “Moscow’s MV Khrunichev resisters warrant discussion, both for their machine-building factory reacts to the August having been shaped, to some extent, by the coup,” in Victoria E. Bonnell, Ann Cooper, and history of resistance in the Soviet Union, as we Gregory Freidin (eds.), Russia at the Barricades: shall later see, and for what they tell us about Eyewitness Accounts of the August 1991 Coup how coups may be resisted generally. Resis- (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1994), pp. 111–119. tance fell into the categories of organizational, 10 Ganley, Unglued Empire, p. 156. Nonviolent resistance to Soviet repression 35 of Yeltsin’s decrees run off by the Mayor of only recently been popularly elected as Presi- Ryazan, to the ham radios that kept events dent of Russia and many soldiers were thought alive. It was not just about convincing trusted to have voted for him. As he clambered on the friends, as had so often been the thrust of the tanks and spoke forcefully against the coup, communicative efforts of previous Soviet many of the soldiers would therefore have dissidents. Photocopies announcing the considered him to represent the voice of demonstration at the Russian White House legitimate Russian authority.12 Nevertheless, were pasted up on the Metro walls and at least the discussions initiated and pleas made one woman heading towards the demonstra- directly to the soldiers by the demonstrators, tion begged people heading the other way to who sought to identify with the soldiers and join the demonstration.11 Those opposing the seek a show of humanity, seem to have been coup knew they had to act swiftly and deci- crucial. Numerous nonviolent struggles, sively to maximize the effectiveness of their especially against repressive regimes, have efforts. They had to convince great numbers of succeeded or failed largely on the basis of total strangers, including, perhaps most im- whether they have been able to overcome the portantly, the soldiers who had been sent to image of themselves as the enemy in their oppose them. In convincing the soldiers of the encounters with armed forces. Arguably, this worthiness of their cause, or at least that there was a telling factor in Burma in 1988 when, were no real grounds for animosity and that despite the determined efforts of nonviolent the soldiers should not shoot if ordered to do protestors who knelt before soldiers and so, the demonstrators had several advantages, pleaded with them to join their cause, the ironically linked to militaristic and imperialis- soldiers massacred the demonstrators.13 Soviet tic policies of the Soviet Union. citizens seem to have been more successful, One was that, due to the Soviet Union’s even without any prominently outspoken program of national (military) service, most leaders of nonviolence. This suggests that the troops were conscripts who did not have the issue of seeking solidarity with soldiers who strong commitment to their job that might might otherwise see resisters as enemies is a generally be expected of those who join the delicate and complex one. Some of the armed services voluntarily. Opponents there- protesters sought to define the moral grounds fore felt they could appeal to them more of the encounter, with one woman asking a convincingly. Additionally, many civilians had soldier: “Do you know what you’re doing?” their own experience of military service which When he shook his head, she responded “Then provided insights into how best to apply go back to your barracks like a noble Soviet pressure to the troops. Secondly, the Soviet soldier and leave us in peace!”14 government, with a somewhat imperialistic As well as pleading, arguing, and joking attitude towards many of the smaller and with the soldiers, protesters shared sweets and further flung republics, had a history of trying cigarettes with them and tried to find common to “Russify” the country. As part of this grounds for a relationship in which they could process, Soviet leaders gave heavy priority to not easily be perceived as enemy. A row of having the Russian language taught and under- women held a sign: “Soldiers! Don’t shoot stood as widely as possible. This meant that protesters could converse with most of the troops, regardless of where they were from. 12 Geoffrey Hosking, “The roots of dissolution,” Of course, the bulk of the armed forces New York Review of Books, Vol. 39, No. 1–2, 16 sent to the Russian White House were Russian January 1992, pp. 34–38. and this itself was important. Boris Yeltsin had 13 Alan Clements, “Introduction,” in Aung San Suu Kyi, The Voice of Hope: Conversations with Alan Clements (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1997), 11 Jeremy Gambrell, “Seven days that shook the pp. xi–xx, at pp. xiii–xiv. world,” New York Review of Books, Vol. 38, No. 15, 26 September 1991, pp. 56–61. 14 Attard, Russia: Which Way Paradise?, p. 181.

36 Nonviolence Speaks your people.” These sorts of appeals may well The symbolism of the barricades was have reached their target as, when a foreign evident by the piles of rubble and material reporter climbed on to a tank and asked a taken from unfinished buildings, plentiful commander if he would shoot, if ordered, he around Moscow.19 The hastily torn-up roads stopped and thought before replying “You and fragments of reinforced concrete sent sure know, I’m Russian, just like all of them. I signs that behind them stood those who were think I’d rather go to jail for treason than shoot willing to resist. Following initial confronta- at my own people.”15 tion with soldiers, there were flowers adorning Discussing the issues with soldiers was the tanks at the barricade and children climb- not confined to the barricades, although that ing over them, playing, giving evidence of the was a telling point of the encounter between nonviolent nature of the resistance and the potentially opposed forces. Moscow-area likelihood that their actions had almost Supreme Soviet deputies organized themselves certainly been successful. This military to visit military bases and installations in their equipment had been transformed, “if not into region to acquaint armed forces personnel with ploughshares, then into a heavy-duty tenement Yeltsin’s address and decrees and to win jungle gym.”20 support. The All-Union Soviet of the Parents Organizational aspects were just as promi- of Military Personnel tried collective parental nent with a mobile medical treatment center persuasion in calling on all officers, soldiers, established at the large Moscow demonstration and sailors to oppose the coup.16 and ambulances on standby in case of the The barricades took on important attack that was expected. People were in- functional and symbolic roles. In Leningrad a structed in how to best deal with gas attacks caravan of water trucks blocked approaches to and makeshift equipment towards this end was the Palace Square, an activity that was self- shared around. Some set up stalls where coffee generated, as many of the activities were.17 and other refreshments were dispensed free to Taking a more offensive approach, Leningrad the demonstrators to keep up their morale and taxi drivers, using their taxi radios to co- physical strength. Strategies were employed to ordinate their movements, organized them- protect the demonstrators and the broadcasting selves into a fleet to scout around the suburbs equipment on the White House. All the lights looking for tanks or other early signs of attack at the White House were turned off at night, so so that prior warning could be given to that they would not illuminate the broadcasters demonstrators. In Moscow, couriers on bikes and make them easy targets for snipers who sped through the city and around the obstruc- were reported to have been set up across the tions, bringing news and messages to and river in the Ukraine Hotel.21 among resisters. A hot line was set up so These examples show how diverse the people could report troop movements in their resistance was in terms of both action and neighborhoods and give information on where deliberate non-action. It included physical stations could be heard, to overcome jam- obstruction, graffiti, slogans, pleading with ming.18 soldiers, defying curfews, refusal to obey orders, compromising and re-interpreting orders, seeking outside support, and attending 15 Attard, Russia: Which Way Paradise?, pp. 182– to the physical needs and morale of demon- 83. strators. It also seems very likely to have 16 Coup in the Soviet Union. Day 1. 18–19 August included some intentional inefficiency. While 1991. A Minute-By-Minute Chronology, http://artne t.net/~upstart/1819aug.html. 19 Gregory Freidin, “To the barricades,” in 17 Valerii Zavorotnyi, “Letter from St Petersburg,” Bonnell, Cooper, and Freidin, pp. 71–77, at p. 74. in Bonnell, Cooper, and Freidin, Russia at the Barricades, pp. 147–157, at p. 155. 20 Freidin, “To the barricades,” p. 74. 18 Gambrell, “Seven days that shook the world.” 21 Gambrell, “Seven days that shook the world.” Nonviolent resistance to Soviet repression 37

Martin Malia claims that “… the cabinet, the throw their weight behind the coup to the Party leadership, the three high officers of the presence of a strong civilian resistance. KGB and the Army … had to be capable of Even where television centers were closed ineptitude and miscalculation on a Homeric down or their broadcasting severely curtailed, scale,”22 it seems more plausible that at least media workers, as mentioned, contributed to a some of these displayed “deliberate inepti- tide of anger against and ridicule of the coup. tude,” something much closer to disobedience. The ridicule included careful attention to For instance, although the KGB did close showing Yanayev’s shaking hands at the press Radio Moscow, they did not arrest Yeltsin, as conference called by the putschists, as well as ordered. Indeed they provided positive several embarrassingly blunt questions being support, a network of informers passing on to put.25 These would have been an encouraging him intelligence on the plotters’ plans.23 It is sign to those who wanted to openly oppose the difficult to separate ineptitude from noncoop- coup. There was also feigned inability to edit eration, much more again to guess the motiva- from the press conference those pieces that the tions for noncooperation. This is especially the coup leader requested be cut, as well as subtle case since some in the KGB, and especially in selection of music to accompany the television its upper echelons, may have had more sinister blackout. For instance, a concert hall produc- motivations than those of the protesters who tion of Boris Godunov, “an operatic blast at essentially wanted democracy to prevail. There regicides, silent majorities and pretenders” was are many conflicting claims about whether an among these.26 order for Yeltsin’s arrest was issued and, if so, Newspaper workers also took a stand, whether it was rescinded or ignored. Victor including workers for those few newspapers Karpukhin, Commander of the KGB's special that were officially allowed to remain operat- Alpha Team, claims that he was responsible ing and that the Emergency Committee felt it for seeing to Yeltsin's arrest but boasts “I did could trust. Printers at Izvestia refused to print everything I could to do nothing,” a good the paper unless it contained Yeltsin’s anti- recipe for noncooperation, even if his inten- coup declaration. Meanwhile, journalists from tions were not clear.24 suspended radical newspapers immediately Likewise, there were examples of the started producing makeshift newspapers and military both acting against and for the coup, leaflets. When workers from the independent confirming ambivalence in the upper ranks. newspaper Nezavisimaya Gazeta, banned by Some television and radio centers were closed the Emergency Committee, prepared a four- down while others were left open, especially in page proof for Monday’s edition, only to find further out towns such as Irkutsk and Tomsk, that the state printing office, fearing repercus- where political leaders opposing the coup sions, would not print it, the edition was faxed appeared on television denouncing the to France for translation and publication there. putschists and inviting people to join demon- Liberation of Paris faxed the Gazeta workers, strations. Mayor Sobchak of Leningrad attrib- urging them to “keep up the good work.”27 uted the KGB’s and military’s reluctance to Twenty-five Gazeta workers then stayed at the office through Monday night, putting together a new edition of A Chronicle of Events of 22 Martin Malia, “The August Revolution,” New August, a play on the name of the samizdat York Review of Books, Vol. 38, No. 15, 26 publication of the Brezhnev era. One thousand September 1991, pp. 22–27. copies were posted in prominent places around 23 Trimble and Vassiliev, “Three days that shook the world.” 25 Reddaway and Glinski, The Tragedy of 24 Peter Reddaway and Dmitri Glinski, The Russia’s Reforms, p. 214. Tragedy of Russia’s Reforms: Market Bolshevism 26 Freidin, “To the barricades,” p. 72. against Democracy (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2001), p. 205. 27 Ganley, Unglued Empire, p. 155.

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Moscow, along with other newsletters, many passing on information within the country.30 of which had been published by other banned GlasNet, a dial-up network and joint interna- newspapers. tional venture commenced in the glasnost and Also acting in the tradition of samizdat, perestroika era, provided information on journalists from prohibited newspapers ille- events in Moscow and Leningrad via news gally edited and published a paper called feeds from CNN and the BBC. The volume of Obshchaya Gazeta, translating as United traffic became so heavy that networkers were Newspaper. It was distributed all over asked not to flood the lines with questions but Moscow, free of charge, and played a strong to leave the lines open for posting vital part in keeping the population up to date with information.31 events and resistance to the coup.28 The staff RELCOM, a provider of e-mail and news of Rosier set themselves up at the Russian and linked with EUnet, the European UNIX White House, from where they produced one network, also proved useful. One resister, who edition of their newspaper and 42 different was busily using this service while others were leaflets, as well as duplicating dozens of out at demonstrations, commented “… Thank Yeltsin’s appeals and decrees. Heaven, they don’t consider RELCOM mass Efforts to maintain broadcasts were an- media or they simply forgot about it.”32 other area where resisters needed to outwit the Clearly, a wide array of strategies were plotters. The independent radio station used and available technologies, while cer- Moscow Echo continuously transmitted tainly not as advanced or as widespread as in Yeltsin’s declarations, despite being closed many countries, appear to have been used to down by the junta several times. Ham radio their maximum. There were far more Soviet operators, to stay on air, had to constantly citizens with technical know-how than there change frequency to circumvent jamming, was sophisticated equipment, yet for commu- further outwitting the would-be jammers with nication purposes the will to communicate and use of jargon.29 The whole resistance move- the ability to think of ways and means to do ment was remarkable for its ability to think this most effectively, including overcoming creatively and improvise, as had often been the jamming and circumventing other obstacles, is case in a country where people adapted probably much more important than the available materials to meet their needs, technology itself. including making their own satellite dishes The West appears to have played a and using the emulsion of discarded x-ray relatively minor role in the resistance, except plates to make recordings. in the area of communication where its Not that new technologies were scorned involvement may have been crucial. Even or forgotten, at least not by resisters. Although prior to the coup, US intelligence agencies had e-mail and fax facilities were recent to the been helping Yeltsin improve his personal Soviet Union and still scarce, people took security arrangements and the security of his great advantage of these wherever they were communication system. During the coup the available, sending messages overseas and asking for international support, as well as 30 Bob Travica and Matthew Hogan, “Computer networks in the X-USSR: technology, uses and social effects,” Proceedings of the ASIS Annual Meeting, Vol. 29, 1992, pp. 120–135. 28 We thank Valentin Bazhanov (personal 31 Travica and Hogan, “Computer networks in the communication, July 2000) for this information. X-USSR,” p. 128. 29 Anton Rebezov and Dima Guskov, “The ‘White 32 David Alan Bozak and Larry Press, “The House’ Operation,” QST (official monthly journal Internet as an information resource,” http://www. of the American Radio Relay League), November funet.fi/pub/culture/russian/politics/coup/papers/Bo 1991. zakPress. Nonviolent resistance to Soviet repression 39

US Embassy sent a communication specialist Some of the lessons which can be drawn to the Russian White House with portable from the success of the resistance relate to the telephone equipment to enable Yeltsin to make possible vulnerability of the military forces for secure phone calls to military commanders and any group staging a coup; the volatility of others. The US National Security Agency, in a situations, so that initial, well organized rare display of its everyday monitoring skills, resistance can gather momentum and force the made available to Yeltsin real-time reports of coup organizers to retreat; the importance of calls made by members of the Emergency symbolism; and the benefits of thinking Committee on their special government tele- innovatively and planning ahead. phones.33 Years before the Soviet coup, Adam While this information possibly contrib- Roberts made the point that coups have a uted to defeating the coup, it must be stressed certain vulnerability, not least among the that Yeltsin had access to it only because the armed forces, and that this might be even more US government had by then deemed it to be in so where the military forces have a large its own interests. Nonviolent activists cannot component of conscripts.35 There is an irony in normally count on such assistance and may that nonviolent activists are usually opposed to even have cause to worry about the motiva- conscription, yet here, as with the forced use tions of those who provide such information. of Russian language throughout the USSR, Meanwhile anti-coup activists sought a opponents were able to use this to their own different sort of assistance from the West and advantage. used available communication technology It is clear that symbolism, where used, towards these ends. As the coup perpetrators enhanced the resistance efforts. One of moved to close down the liberal media and symbolism’s contributions can be to provide a jam short-wave radios, Soviet resisters found it succinct sense of what the problem is and what helpful to directly tell their story outside of the needs to be done, where censorship, physical Soviet Union, hoping that this would not only obstructions, and time restraints might stop the bring pressure to bear from the West but that, full gamut of arguments from being put. The probably more importantly, the news would throngs with their arms linked bravely as they find its way back in to a multitude of confronted the tanks that might run them recipients. This seems to have worked well down, the flowers decking the tanks, and the and there is no doubt that the resistance was posters pasted over the normally scrupulously pleased to have the ear of the outside world. unmarked walls of the metro stations ex- However, there was no direct overseas support claimed loudly that a resistance was underway for the resistance. It was mainly psychological and nonviolent in nature. Where symbols support and complementary media support. At clearly expressed that nonviolence, they may a US college a Chinese student with have been even more effective. experience of the protests in Tiananmen Even from the successes, we can see how Square summed it up: “Western sympathy things might have been done better. One of our amounts to little in changing the situation. The areas of discomfort about the remarkable and Soviet people are their own savior.”34 praiseworthy defeat of the coup was that Yeltsin appears to have been too strong a focus. There are several problems with this. Had he been arrested — and perhaps it was 33 Reddaway and Glinski, The Tragedy of only by some stroke of fate and a particular Russia’s Reforms, p. 203. Reddaway and Glinski point out that the National Security Agency opposed sharing intercepted information with http://www.funet.fi/pub/culture/russian/politics/cou Yeltsin, fearing it would compromise future p/papers/Cadenhead. surveillance. 35 Adam Roberts, “Civil resistance to military 34 Rogers Cadenhead, “Computer networks kept coups,” Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 12, 1975, information flowing during coup,” 22 August 1991, pp. 19–36, at p. 31.

40 Nonviolence Speaks personality in the KGB that he wasn’t — might be in similar circumstances. They at could the protesters have rallied in the same least had some experience of the sorts of way? We will never know, of course, but it measures introduced by the Emergency makes good sense not to be too reliant on a Committee and some sort of equipment and particular personality. The transmission of his knowledge of how to move into underground decrees appeared to have taken up a great deal mode. One resister boasted how quickly they of the energy and direction of the underground had been able to “shift to underground,” media. It would be nice to think that, without having organized “reserve nodes, backup these decrees, they could have put together channel and hidden locations. They’ll have a strong and powerful arguments of their own. hard time catching us!”37 This ability to move Their case certainly deserved that. swiftly to new modes of operation may have Another of the problems with the appeals considerable advantage. It is an advantage that to and reliance on Yeltsin is that much of what nonviolent activists can work towards with he said was nationalistic, directed at replacing forethought and preparation. the Soviet Union as the “motherland” with Another major lesson is about aiming for Russia. This was not the root of the problem inclusiveness of as many groups as possible and at times it seems that there was a risk of and taking notes of their strengths, talents, and confusing the issues of democracy and weaknesses. Resistance may come from some patriotism. Moreover, history has shown sections of the population more than others Yeltsin to be a perpetual opportunist with little and in the case of the Soviet coup it was more commitment to democracy, despite the rhetoric widespread among the intelligentsia and he used at times.36 middle classes. There can also be considerable Historically the Russian people have fre- geographical variations. Leningrad was by far quently expected and even turned to strong the most outspoken city against the coup, leaders and there can be some advantages to perhaps partly because of the influence of this. A strong nonviolent leader can be critical Mayor Sobchak but mainly because of its to the success of a campaign, providing strong revolutionary tradition.38 Preparation direction, eliminating confusion, and becom- for nonviolent action might then include ing a symbol of resistance that aids mobiliza- consideration of the strengths, weaknesses, tion. However, Yeltsin was neither Gandhi nor and possible roles of different regions and Martin Luther King and appears to have used cities, particularly those where it seems that the mobilization for his own purposes. support for nonviolent resistance might be Activists need to be watchful of emerging strongest, for instance where the trade union leaders and to constantly reassess their movement has been heavily involved in social commitment to the cause and to nonviolence, as well as industrial issues and where there is for leaders’ prominence and status can be used civic pride about that social consciousness. as fast lanes to their own self-interested goals. Perhaps Mayor Sobchak best summed it One of the major lessons is about prepar- up: “… it might have been a successful coup, edness. It is a characteristic of coups that the with far-reaching implications, had the people resistance is usually not prepared for them. remained silent.”39 Soviet citizens, despite the warning of ex- Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze several months earlier that a coup was in the offing, were still largely caught by surprise. However, while they might not have been mentally or 37 Bozak and Press, “The Internet as an informa- organizationally prepared, nor were they tion resource.” caught as short of preparation as some others 38 Joseph Scholmer, Vorkuta (New York: Henry Holt, 1954), p. 256. 36 Reddaway and Glinski, The Tragedy of 39 Ganley, Unglued Empire, p. 134. Emphasis in Russia’s Reforms. the original. Nonviolent resistance to Soviet repression 41

Early cases of resistance to Soviet grain for sale abroad in order to generate power foreign currency to support its plans for rapid industrialization. The peasants, already feeling At many times in the USSR’s history, a great squeezed, resisted these attempts and became many people have been silent and others have generally less supportive of the Bolsheviks spoken out, sometimes at great cost. These and their program, though many of them had periods tell us something about successful previously been enthusiastic about the resistance and the reason for a relative dearth Revolution.41 However, rather than ease the of action. The first period of marked oppres- pressure, Stalin launched attacks on the sion was when forced collectivization took agricultural sector and especially the kulaks, place.40 the better-off peasants. The leaders of the The history of the Soviet Union was Soviet Union had a vision for agriculture, beleaguered by agricultural crises. An old joke heavily influenced by rationalist ideas and quipped “What are the four greatest problems notions that bigger is better, and they conceded facing Soviet agriculture?” The answer: little to the peasantry in terms of acknowl- “Winter, spring, summer, and autumn.” The edging their experience and in-the-field joke gives evidence of the common belief that knowledge of agriculture.42 the problems were other than (or at least Part of Stalin’s speech to agrarian additional to) the largely inhospitable climate Marxists in 1929 hints at his callousness and of much of the region which made up the willingness for terror: “Taking the offensive Union, and that Soviet leaders had a penchant against the kulaks means preparing for action for blaming anything but their own policies. to deal the kulak class such a blow that it will This was certainly the case with Stalin’s no longer rise to its feet. … When the head is forced collectivization and his accusation that off, one does not grieve for the hair.” He the kulaks were the source of all agricultural further went on to question whether kulaks woes. should be allowed to join collective farms, During most of the 1920s there were answering his own question: “Of course not, debates among the Bolsheviks as to whether for they are the sworn enemies of the collec- agricultural collectivization should be pushed tive farm movement.”43 This meant the kulaks ahead rapidly or whether it should be a slower could neither continue farming privately nor process, taking into account the anxieties of join collectives. Instead they were deported, peasants and trying to educate them rather than along with others who resisted collectiviza- force them into collectives against their tion, to labor camps in the far north and in wishes. The peasants had already had a bad Siberia. Kulaks were almost completely liqui- time of it during the Civil War which followed dated in the course of 1930.44 the Revolution when Soviet power was Collectivization did not affect all parts of challenged from both within and from abroad, the USSR equally. Stalin used the policy to and the “Scissors Crisis” which was the name intimidate Ukrainians and give them their given to the situation resulting from the prices paid to peasants for their surplus having been kept low while the price of materials they 41 Jerry F. Hogan and Merle Fainsod, How the needed to purchase rose dramatically. Because Soviet Union is Governed (Cambridge, MA: the USSR had no foreign sources of financial Harvard University Press, 1979), p. 72. credit, the government sought to maximize 42 James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition

Have Failed (New Haven, CT: Yale University 40 For a full account of the forced collectivization Press, 1998), pp. 193–222. and its impacts, particularly the resulting famine, 43 Martin McCauley, The Soviet Union, 1917–1991 see Robert Conquest, The Harvest of Sorrow: (London: Longman, 1993, 2nd ed.), pp. 81–82. Soviet Collectivization and the Terror-Famine (London: Hutchinson, 1986). 44 McCauley, The Soviet Union, 1917–1991, p. 82.

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“come-uppance.” The Ukraine was one of the Resistance at times took on a more more productive agricultural regions so the pointed and spectacular form, not always particularly harsh treatment meted out there nonviolent. For instance, 30,000 fires were resulted in seriously decreased production, registered in Russia alone during just one year contributing greatly to the ensuing famine. of the forced collectivization and many, Another particularly affected area was perhaps most, of these were attributed to arson Kazakhstan where a large nomadic population as many peasants set fires of destruction as with no knowledge or experience of cereal part of their protest.48 Among the campaigns cropping was forced into collectivized cereal of protests were actions by peasant women, farms with disastrous results. Between 1.3 and referred to as bab’i bunty, loosely translated as 1.8 million Kazakh nomads are estimated to “women’s riots.” These often took the form of have died through this collectivization.45 what was judged to be “female hysteria, It is not surprising that there was irrational behavior, unorganized and inarticu- resistance. Historian Sheila Fitzpatrick has late protest, and violent actions.”49 However, noted that Russian peasants had a tradition of L. Viola has made a strong case that the violent rebellions against landowners and women were taking advantage of gender officials.46 Much of the resistance to forced stereotypes, particularly via the greater leeway collectivization was of a limited and short- given to women protesters. term nature, aimed at making the new The nature of one bab’i bunt in the collectives unworkable. The feeling among the Ukraine illustrates how women dealt with the resistant peasants was that, if they weren’t day-to-day realities of forced collectivization allowed to keep their livestock and imple- being forced upon them: ments, then they would ensure that the collective would not get them either. There are A crowd of women stormed the kolkhoz stories of peasants breaking their implements, [collective farm] stables and barns. They slaughtering all their livestock and gluttoniz- cried, screamed, wailed, demanding their ing on the meat of their kill. “The peasants had cows and seed back. The men stood a way a feast. Between 1928 and 1933 they slaugh- off, in clusters, sullenly silent. Some of tered 26.6 million cattle or 46.6 per cent of the the lads had pitchforks, stakes, axes total Soviet herd.”47 Such behavior was an tucked in their sashes, The terrified invitation to famine, an impact that they granary man ran away; the women tore off perhaps thought would stop the government in the bolts and together with the men began its tracks. Unfortunately, Stalin did not abound dragging out the bags of seed.50 with rationality, humanity, or common sense. A serious famine did occur, the collectiviza- Viola claims that the bab’i bunty demon- tion continued, and that part of the protest — strated a significant degree of organization and to the extent that it was a protest — seems to conscious political opposition and that they have been largely ineffective in halting the may well have played an important role in the program, although Stalin, in his usual erratic way, did relax the collectivization efforts for some time in 1930, at least to allow the spring sowing. 48 L. Viola, “Bab’i bunty and peasant women’s protest during collectivization,” in Chris Ward (ed.), The Stalinist Dictatorship ( London: Arnold, 45 Robert Service, A History of Twentieth Century 1998), pp. 213–231, at p. 214. Russia (London: Allen Lane, 1997), pp. 201–202. 49 Viola, “Bab’i bunty and peasant women’s 46 Sheila Fitzpatrick, The Russian Revolution protest during collectivization,” p. 213. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 20. 50 Viola, “Bab’i bunty and peasant women’s 47 McCauley, The Soviet Union, 1917–1991, p. 83. protest during collectivization,” p. 224. Nonviolent resistance to Soviet repression 43 amendment of policies and practices.51 market,”54 all the normal meeting places where Certainly, they posed problems for the local peasant women would meet and exchange cadres whose task it was to put Stalin’s news and views and keep abreast of local collectivization plans into practice.52 There events. To be equipped with as much knowl- were instances of women peasants bringing edge as possible about what had been their children to protests with them, thus happening and the issues at stake and to have causing further headaches to the cadres, and the opportunity to discuss possible strategies also of the women laying down in front of against unwelcome events proved as useful for tractors to block collectivization. They were the peasant women as for any group of people also often nominated by the men as the setting out to resist policies to which they spokespeople of the movement against collec- object. tivization, with men insisting that the women Nevertheless, successes seem to have would simply make a larger din if they were been small, sporadic, and short-term, and pale not allowed to voice their opposition. Women against the overriding trend. Although there also took advantage of the tendency for were common forms of resistance such as women not to be prosecuted under the relevant foot-dragging, “failure to understand instruc- article of the criminal code when their opposi- tions,” and refusal to take initiative, these tion led to court actions.53 It was often the appear to have eventually given way to passive women who would initiate that opposition and and active accommodation, suggesting resig- they would take it through particularly those nation.55 Resistance appears to have worked parts of the resistance process where women best when it was thought through and had were thought to have less vulnerability than some achievable goal, as in re-securing confis- men. Once more they were taking advantage cated grain and equipment. By comparison, of gendered stereotypes whereby women were simply killing off livestock and breaking not presumed to play such a key role in implements appears to have been ineffective opposition but nor were those who were meant and, with its contribution to the horrific famine to quell opposition always culturally prepared that ensued, seems to have added to the to deal with them as they would deal with tragedy that was forced collectivization. men. One of the problems was that, though the Traditional means of communication brutality was widespread, Ukrainians had little appear to have played important roles. “Heated in common with Kazakhs (other than their discussions took place in village squares, at obvious victimization), some peasants may the wells, in the cooperative shops and at the have happily joined in the campaign against the kulaks while others did not, and generally there were divisions and confusion. As well as there being a lack of the necessary solidarity, access to information seemed relatively poor in this case. Both these factors — solidarity 51 Viola, “Bab’i bunty and peasant women’s and access to relevant information — stand out protest during collectivization,” p. 227. as momentous advantages in nonviolent 52 Not that the cadres alone were in charge of resistance, enforcing collectivization. According to Service, A History of Twentieth Century Russia, p. 180, men from the factories, militia, and the Party were called to venture into the villages to enforce collectiviza- tion. They were given neither limits on the use of 54 Viola, “Bab’i bunty and peasant women’s violence nor detailed instructions on how to distin- protest during collectivization,” p. 217. guish the rich, middling, and poor peasants from 55 Sheila Fitzpatrick, Stalin's Peasants: Resis- each other. tance and Survival in the Russian Village after 53 Viola, “Bab’i bunty and peasant women’s Collectivization (New York: Oxford University protest during collectivization,” pp. 224–225. Press, 1994), pp. 5–10.

44 Nonviolence Speaks

The Stalin Terror repression and terror.58 While most of those in the upper echelons, including the Politburo There can be little doubt that “the Terror” and the Central Committee, survived, unleashed by Stalin in the mid 1930s was the members of the Sovnarcom (the Council of most vicious and all-encompassing of all the People's Commissars) were decimated, as periods of repression faced in the Soviet were the upper ranks of the army. During the Union.56 Between 1935 and 1941 more than Great Purge of 1937–38, two-thirds of the 19 million people were arrested, seven million army’s marshals, corps, and division of them shot and the remainder sent to the commanders were arrested.59 Gulag (the term used for a state of exile, which In the republics, many party and state could take place in numerous areas, most of leaders disappeared, as did many managers of them bitterly inhospitable), where many of the economy. Diplomats or anyone who had them died.57 Following World War II and up contact with the West, whether through until the time of Stalin’s death in 1953, there friends, colleagues, or relatives, were immedi- was another wave of mass arrests, directed ately under suspicion on that premise alone.60 often at Jews. Among the officials shot or sent to Siberia, for The years of terror under Stalin were, in instance, was the Foreign Ministry’s head of many ways, an intensification and expansion protocol who was under suspicion for of what he had done to the peasants in his “connections with foreigners” which was, of efforts to collectivize agriculture. The expan- course, his job.61 In the lower classes, as in the sion of terror was extraordinary in that it upper strata, people were cajoled to spy on one targeted highly placed party and government another and inform on the slightest suggestion officials as well as ordinary people. Indeed, so of ideological non-conformity or aberration. many bureaucrats were liquidated during the One woman who dreamt that she had sexual terror that the period was noted for high social relations with the Commissar of Defense was mobility, as those killed left gaps into which taken to a labor camp after mentioning the others could move, creating career opportuni- dream to a friend who reported her to the ties. This is one of the reasons that many NKVD.62 people did not want to acknowledge “the Terror” or their own tenuous positions. As well as shootings — often of highly 58 NKVD was the People’s Commissariat for placed officials — and the running of “show Internal Affairs, which combined the secret police trials” involving those who had been in the and interior commissariat. Ironically, it was forefront of the Revolution, there were mas- modeled partly in the secret police of Ivan the sive intakes into labor camps of people across Terrible. A full description of its role in the Terror all different social strata. Stalin’s secret police can be found in Robert Conquest, Inside Stalin’s — the NKVD, a forerunner to the KGB — Secret Police: NKVD Politics, 1936–39 (Basing- stoke: Macmillan, 1985). unleashed and directed a campaign of severe 59 Mark Galeotti, Gorbachev and his Revolution (London: Macmillan, 1997), p. 8. 60 Meanwhile, diplomats from other countries were often cautious not to mix with local people for fear that they might be “responsible for an 56 Robert Conquest, The Great Terror: Stalin’s innocent Russian’s death or exile”: Harold Eeman, Purge of the Thirties (London: Macmillan, 1968); Inside Stalin’s Russia: Memories of a Diplomat Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, The Permanent Purge: 1936–1941 (London: Triton, 1977), p. 45. Politics in Soviet Totalitarianism (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1956). 61 Hochschild, The Unquiet Ghost, p. 110. 57 Adam Hochschild, The Unquiet Ghost: Russians 62 Andrei Sinyavsky, Soviet Civilization: A Remember Stalin (London: Serpent’s Tail, 1994), p. Cultural History (New York: Arcade Publishing, xi. 1988), p. 90. Nonviolent resistance to Soviet repression 45

Under such conditions of terror, within a were interrogating and were themselves culture where all people were encouraged to dragged off to labor camps. inform and where there was great adulation of Yet we know that there were at least some Stalin, organizing any form of open resistance activists who took the grave risks involved. was something akin to suicide. Opponents Suzanna Pechuro was part of a group of six were picked off and shot — along with a great teenagers who, unlike so many others who many others who were not even opponents — were arrested, were actually involved in before any significant level of organization strategies against Stalin. Pechuro makes light could be accomplished. Even opposition to the of what the group did: “What did we manage Terror inside the Party is difficult to piece to do? Practically nothing. We issued two together since Stalin operated with tight leaflets. We developed a program.”64 Such secrecy and few were willing to risk breaking actions were brave in the context of what was ranks from the silence. At the 17th Party happening in the Soviet Union at that time. Congress in 1934, before Stalin’s repression The group refused to continue participating in moved onto its most bloodthirsty phase, there a literary group where they were not allowed was a push for relaxation of both economic to read out poems unless the director had first development and of party discipline, though checked them. Instead the teenagers formed the stenographic reports of this secret congress their own group, setting themselves assign- were not published. Opposition to Stalin’s ments to read, making synopses, and meeting excesses had its center in the Party in Lenin- to discuss their findings and views. Though grad, with Sergei Kirov emerging as the leader they had to be extremely careful, they would of this more liberal faction. At the congress it also raise issues with other friends. Pechuro was proposed that Stalin be stripped of his notes that, although the period is known as a General Secretary status and given a less time of mass betrayals and cowardice, none of embracing role, with Kirov taking up Stalin’s her group was ever betrayed by their friends. other duties. Stalin no doubt perceived this as The group realized that, if each person a slight. spoke to others about what they knew and In December 1934, Kirov was assassi- what they had learned and those in turn told nated, a killing that was generally thought to other trusted friends, then a process of have been on Stalin’s orders, though recently questioning would be underway. “Our task released documents suggest otherwise. In any was to get the process going,” Pechuro has case, this eliminated the person whom Stalin explained. She claimed group members knew feared as a possible rival. Subsequently, Stalin it was imperative that they not be intimidated, used Kirov’s death to step up the terror and to even though each of them knew the risks launch a ferocious political campaign against involved.65 The group of six was eventually his enemies. arrested and charged with plotting against With such ruthless determination to eradi- Stalin, as were eleven of their friends who cate all opposition, even within the upper were under suspicion by virtue of their friend- echelons, it is apparent how difficult it would ships. Of the six, three were shot and the have been for ordinary Soviet citizens to others sent to labor camps. In the labor camps, organize full-scale and effective resistance. Pechuro had the chance to resist in smaller and Citizens could be taken for interrogation different ways. Her fellow prisoners taught her anywhere or at any time. There were secret, a number of strategies for survival and for unmarked doors in train stations and other communication, involving tapping on the wall places and people recall that by-standers would look the other way if someone was taken through one of these doors.63 Sometimes interrogators gave assistance to those they 64 Hochschild, The Unquiet Ghost, p. 31. 63 Hochschild, The Unquiet Ghost, p. 129. 65 Hochschild, The Unquiet Ghost, p. 32.

46 Nonviolence Speaks to the next cell, using a code to spread critical judgments and even intuitions. Cen- messages to other prisoners.66 sorship and state control went hand in hand Clearly the obstacles faced by resisters with the mass arrests. If ever there was a under Stalin’s reign of terror had much more strong case for carefully planned and orches- to do with betrayal, fear, and trauma than with trated pressure from outside of the country, the actual technology of communication. this would seem to be such a case. The part Nevertheless it is interesting to see that played internationally will be discussed later. Pechuro’s group of resisters made a hecto- graph, a primitive printing machine, a descrip- Relaxation born of resistance tion of which they found in the memoirs of a nineteenth-century revolutionary. With this Although Stalin died in 1953, there was no they were able to print 250 copies of anything automatic release of political prisoners from needing to be circulated, although 250 copies the labor camps. On the contrary, there were may arguably have been an optimistic number slow and tedious re-evaluations of prisoners, to have circulated in those days of mass with many questions asked, many details informing and NKVD terror. taken, and a bureaucratic process undertaken Some of the resistance to Stalin took the to decide whether each particular prisoner form of just trying to escape being arrested might have been arrested and exiled “mistak- and thus avoid falling victim to his pogrom, enly.” One survivor of the camps explained though this is obviously not a strategy that that, had all the political prisoners been initially involved actively confronting the declared innocent, “… it would be clear that regime. One couple developed a special way the country was not being run by a legal of ringing the doorbell, so as to ensure the government, but by a group of gangsters — other that it was not the NKVD coming to take which, in point of fact we were.”69 However, them away.67 A few others who thought that there were also economic reasons for the the NKVD might come for them changed their continuation of the camps which had been set names and kept on the move. This could be up in the 1920s and greatly expanded under quite successful, especially since it has been the reign of Stalin. He had used this cheap and noted that the forte of the organization was involuntary labor for projects such as railway inspiring terror and it was often quite poor at and canal building, tree felling, and mineral detective work.68 extraction. Some of the most inhospitable These conditions were among the most areas of the Soviet Union were rich in miner- difficult for nonviolent activists. Not only was als, including uranium which posed another arrest and execution a constant threat — and threat to the inmates of the labor camps, some the continual disappearance of so many was a of whom suffered severe radiation exposure. reminder of this — but the culture of Stalinism The period following Stalin’s death, with would have made resistance seem as futile as it its ongoing repression for masses of political was dangerous. prisoners in camps, brought strong resistance. The very symptoms fed into the structures At first, news that the dictator was dead was which made it so difficult to oppose or even kept from the prisoners, but it eventually question dominant views. Stalinism was a cult trickled through. There were rebellions inspired by massive propaganda and a state- involving thousands of people in some of the promoted image of Stalin as loving, all-wise, largest camps.70 In Kengir prisoners took over and deserving of his power. The leader was deified, with believers suppressing normal

69 Hochschild, The Unquiet Ghost, p. 223. 66 Hochschild, The Unquiet Ghost, p. 36. 70 A brief account of the strike is found in Michail 67 Hochschild, The Unquiet Ghost, p. 96. Baitalsky, “Rebellion in the Northern Camps,” in 68 Hochschild, The Unquiet Ghost, p. 276. Stephen F. Cohen (ed.), An End to Silence: Nonviolent resistance to Soviet repression 47 the camp complex for 40 days, setting up their notes that the strikers were generally dealt own newspaper and theatre. News of these with much less harshly than many of them rebellions reached other camps via such expected, though this is clearly relative. methods as desperate messages chalked on the Having already endured a great deal, many had inside walls of freight cars by inmates in other grave anticipations about their fate. One of the camps who had loaded or unloaded them. The important factors in their having some negoti- methods of Stalinism were still in force. In ating power was that these Vorkuta prisoners Kengir women rebels were driven from their were a crucial cog in the Soviet economy, barracks and ridden over by Red Army tanks, providing much of the energy requirements for with 700 prisoners killed. In Norilsk the camps Leningrad, which was quickly plunged into a were bombed and in Vorkuta the inmates were power shortage during the strike. shot, en masse.71 One reason that the strikes should not be On paper the rebellions looked like considered failures is that from them sprang failures but one inmate of one of the camps Khrushchev’s relaxation which in turn gave that was involved in the strike at Vorkuta rise to the Soviet dissident movement. This throws a different light on this. Joseph movement is usually dated from 1956 when Scholmer, a German prisoner in Vorkuta Khrushchev read his speech to the Twentieth Camp 6, claims that the strike “destroyed the Party Congress condemning the cult of Stalin myth that the system was unassailable.” He and acknowledging, to at least some extent, points out that the strike enjoyed the support that there had been terror.73 However, at least of the 10,000 prisoners directly involved and one inmate from the camps at the time of the much of the civilian population who quickly rebellions believes that Khrushchev’s relaxa- learned of the strike. Scholmer claims that tion was directly related to the resisters’ most of the soldiers were sympathetic, as were refusal to cooperate. She explains: the local peasantry.72 The Vorkuta strike lasted for several All the 1956 reforms and the shutting weeks, with organizing committees being set down of the camps were caused by those up and pamphlets and slogans used to achieve rebellions! It was no longer possible to the fairly modest demands of the activists. keep this army of people in obedience. Scholmer claims the strike could not have When the camps rebelled, coal-mining been possible without the prior existence of output dropped, timber-cutting also. underground resistance groups. Nevertheless, Nobody was at work. Gold and uranium there was little direct experience the strikers — no one was working. Something had to could call on, a factor which he claims led to be done. Nikita Khrushchev released us. its demise. As soon as the strike was over, the What else could he do? We managed to resistance groups began analyzing their make them release us.74 actions, seeking to understand what might have been done better. It was felt that a better In this way the dissidence should be per- and more effective campaign might have been ceived as ongoing, although certainly going run from inside the pit, “the exclusive preserve through different phases and taking different of the prisoners.” Instead the prisoners were in forms. Also from the time of Khrushchev’s the camps where the NKVD were able to “sort speech dissent grew among a new sector of out, isolate and remove the most active people, who had not been in the camps, elements in the strike.” In any case, Scholmer particularly intellectuals. The speech gave the impetus around which people could express

Uncensored Opinion in the Soviet Union (New York: Norton, 1982), pp. 98–100. 73 Sinyavsky, Soviet Civilization, pp. 227–28. 71 Hochschild, The Unquiet Ghost, pp. 38–39. 74 Susanna Pechuro, cited in Hochschild, The 72 Scholmer, Vorkuta, pp. 234–269. Unquiet Ghost, p. 39.

48 Nonviolence Speaks their disgust but it was also a point of conflict course writers did not want to bother the because the party was not taking any of the government but previously they had had to blame that dissidents felt it should.75 The submit their works to the government censor.78 loosening of repression gave rise to networks This change resulted in a flux of works critical of people, kompanii, who would gather of the Soviet Union being published overseas, regularly to socialize and discuss issues. These including a number by Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn were the breeding grounds for inakomsla- whose The Gulag Archipelago described the yashchie, as dissidents were known, though conditions in some of the worst camps.79 the Russian word has a meaning not precisely Khrushchev, under pressures from conser- the same as dissident. vatives, later retreated on some of these Dissident Ludmilla Alexeyeva claimed reforms. Criticism of Stalinism was curtailed that it was these kompanii which in turn gave and relations cooled between the leader and rise to samizdat. In the mid-1950s a poet some of the dissenting artists and writers folded blank sheets of paper and typed poems whom he had encouraged.80 on all four sides, then sewed the pages together as in a booklet and wrote samsebya- Consolidation of repression izdat, an acronym for “I published myself” on the front. This was a parody of gozpolitizdat, Khrushchev was ousted in 1964. Under Leonid the name of an official publishing house in the Brezhnev, who was president from then until USSR.76 The practice became popular not just 1982, there were serious moves away from in the Soviet Union but throughout the Eastern liberalization and some signs of restaliniza- bloc and the name became shortened to tion. This period was characterized by a samizdat. Samizdat was used to publish first tightening of censorship, introduction of new poetry and memoirs, particularly of those who laws that put dissidents at greater risk, and had been in labor camps for political reasons, harsher persecution of political and religious but later it was used for translations and for dissidents. Brezhnev also halted the rehabili- circulating banned writings, petitions, and tations of Gulag victims that Khrushchev had various documents.77 Using the humble commenced. Under the new head of the KGB, typewriter, carbon paper, and very thin paper, Yuri Andropov, who was later to become dissidents would type up as many copies as leader, the KGB took on a more sophisticated would be legible. These would be circulated to approach to dissidents, which included many others who often would themselves type of them being locked up in psychiatric multiple copies and distribute these. hospitals or even deported from the country.81 Accompanying his censure of Stalin, But the period of relaxation had allowed Khrushchev took a more flexible stance on dissidents to grow more knowledgeable and to literature, urging writers not to “bother the resolve that there would be no return to the government” but to decide among themselves past. The resistance that the new clamping the worth of their peers’ manuscripts. Of down met was more mature and became better organized, especially around 1968, with several significant events. Sovietologist Peter 75 Donald Filtzer, The Khrushchev Era: De- Reddaway notes that about this time people Stalinisation and the Limits of Reform in the USSR, 1953–1964 (London: Macmillan, 1993), p. 29. 78 McCauley, The Soviet Union, 1917–1991, p. 76 Ludmilla Alexeyeva and Paul Goldberg, The 256. Thaw Generation: Coming of Age in the Post-Stalin 79 Alexander Solzhenisyn, The Gulag Archipel- Era (Toronto: Little, Brown, 1990), pp. 97–98. ago, 1918–1956 (London: Collins, 1975). 77 Alexeyeva and Goldberg, The Thaw Generation, 80 Filtzer, The Khrushchev Era, pp. 28–29. pp. 97–99; Marshall S. Shatz, Soviet Dissent in Historical Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge 81 Galeotti, Gorbachev and his Revolution, pp. 24– University Press, 1980), p. 128. 25. Nonviolent resistance to Soviet repression 49 dared to think and act independently of Another significant event occurred in authorities.82 This was a time when there was a 1968: the first publication of the Chronicle of significant protest and push for social change Current Events, a samizdat journal committed around the world and dissidents in the USSR to reporting on events relating to human or no doubt took heart from this. Dissidents national rights. Editorial policy was to avoid created formal and semi-formal associations value judgments and to keep readers abreast of and began to intercede on behalf of persecuted new works being circulated in samizdat. It individuals and groups. They also formed contributed hugely to systematically docu- networks to help dissidents in prison or in menting human rights abuses in the Soviet psychiatric hospitals and to assist their Union and enjoyed considerable credibility families. both among those Soviet citizens who came On 25 August 1968 Pavel Litvinov led a into contact with it and among concerned small group of Soviet dissidents in a demon- groups overseas. stration in Red Square against the Soviet Samizdat as a method of communication invasion of Czechoslovakia. One woman may seem laborious and time-consuming pushed a baby carriage and had two banners compared with printing, mimeograph and, written on strips of cloth, one written in Czech later, photocopying. However, it had some and proclaiming “Long live free and inde- advantages in that it gave rise to particular pendent Czechoslovakia!”, the other “To your forms of writing. Hungarian George Konrád freedom and ours!”83 Less than twenty noted that samizdat “is not an appropriate minutes after their demonstration began and vehicle for lengthy analyses and descriptions; the banners were unfurled, the protesters were the samizdat cannot afford to be boring. … taken away by the KGB, put on trial, and Samizdat is a medium, and perhaps a genre as sentenced to three years in prison camps. The well. It is not cheap, it is relatively difficult to next day an editorial of the Literarni Listy read, one cannot prattle, it has to be worth newspaper in Prague declared “Those seven one’s while.”86 The conciseness that was people on Moscow’s Red Square are at least essential for samizdat, for the typists’ benefit, seven reasons why we will never be able to also served the medium well in that writing hate the Russians.”84 The Czechoslovaks were which is to the point and does not waffle not the only people to admire the bravery of probably encourages a larger and more the seven dissidents. According to Alexayeva, attentive readership, including readers who are members of the national liberation movements very busy and who are unable to read through in the Ukraine and Baltic states spoke of their voluminous material. Samizdat works were admiration “… when you go out protesting in widely circulated and discussed during the the open, without weapons, just seven of you 1970s. Even some members of the bureauc- against the world, well, that takes a special racy and political leadership were among the brand of courage.”85 readers. Arguably, this contributed strongly to 87 glasnost, which will be discussed later. Slightly more sophisticated technologies 82 Peter Reddaway, “The development of dissent further enabled dissidents to communicate and opposition,” in Archie Brown and Michael news and views that would not have otherwise Kaser (eds.), The Soviet Union Since the Fall of been given an airing. As cassette players Khrushchev (London: Macmillan, 1975), pp. 121– became more available, they were used in a 156, at p. 126. 83 Alexeyeva and Goldberg, The Thaw Generation, p. 219 86 George Konrád, “Informing on ourselves,” The 84 Alexeyeva and Goldberg, The Thaw Generation, Nation, Vol. 244, 28 February 1987, pp. 237–239. p. 220 87 Stuart Anderson, “Gorbie’s choice: Perestroika's 85 Alexeyeva and Goldberg, The Thaw Generation, dissident roots,” The New Republic, Vol. 200, No. p. 222. 16, 17 April 1989, pp. 11–12.

50 Nonviolence Speaks samizdat fashion, with people making tapes, Glasnost then making copies for others, who would then copy the cassettes in turn.88 This allowed As mentioned, samizdat and the ideas of the satirical songs and other protest music to also dissidents played a crucial role in glasnost, be circulated, known as magnitizdat. A huge introduced by President Gorbachev in the mid demand for tape recorders grew in the Soviet 1980s. Even the term glasnost was taken up by Union during the 1960s and the state happily Gorbachev after being used by some dissidents satisfied the demand, believing that the uses to as a key demand for a new sort of society. which the technology was being put were Indeed Gorbachev not only pushed ahead with more “innocent” than was the case.89 Short- many of the political and economic reforms wave radios were hugely important and that the dissidents had argued for, but he used became very popular from 1968 when remarkably similar terms and arguments, dissidents used them to listen to groups in suggesting that he had been significantly Czechoslovakia and to hear about what influenced by them. A number of the ideas in a demonstrations were taking place in the United Nations speech he made in December USSR.90 Their popularity remained after the 1988, for instance, had appeared in dissident reformist period known as the Prague Spring Andrei Sakharov’s 1968 samizdat work had been squashed and contributed to the Progress, Co-existence and Intellectual dissent that demanded and brought the next Freedom.91 period of relaxation. Under glasnost, Gorbachev not only As well as sending information to the allowed but encouraged a diversity of views. editors of the Chronicle of Current Events, Not that repression died out under his leader- dissidents similarly gave material to foreign ship. There were several instances of disturb- journalists, tourists, and diplomats in the hope ing state repression, much of it revolving of spreading their cause and gathering support around the increasingly vexed question of for their push for human rights. Reddaway independence for the republics that had been claims that it was also about this time that under Russian rule for decades and sometimes Soviet citizens started to listen systematically centuries. Eighteen people died when to foreign radio stations and circulate infor- commandos stormed first the Lithuanian TV mation thus obtained and to propose to center and then the headquarters of the Latvian authorities carefully drafted proposals for law Interior Ministry. Nor was the repression all reform. Clearly these activities signaled a new the state’s doing. In some of the republics level of activism. Dissidents were now being tensions arose and prejudices overwhelmed much more than victims. They were active social relations so that national groups, protagonists of change. impassioned by the nationality issue being on the agenda, fought each other, with loss of life and increasingly disharmonious relations. Gorbachev also found that his encourage- ment to criticize was sometimes turned against him. In the May Day march of 1991 some placards demanded his resignation. The road 88 Shatz, Soviet Dissent in Historical Perspective, to political freedom was not going to be p. 129. smooth, nor did it enjoy wholehearted support. This became most obvious when the democra- 89 Gene Sosin, “Magnitizdat: uncensored songs of dissent” in Rudolf L. Tökes (ed.), Dissent in the tization process threatened to come to a halt USSR: Politics, Ideology, and People (London: with the 1991 coup. With one fell swoop, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975), pp. 276– repression was restored. 309, at p. 278. 90 Alexeyeva and Goldberg, The Thaw Generation, 91 Anderson, “Gorbie’s choice: Perestroika's p. 222 dissident roots,” p. 11. Nonviolent resistance to Soviet repression 51

The role of international support for Murmansk in 1918; US, Serbian, and Italian resistance troops were stationed in the north; US, British, Japanese, and Czech troops were in Siberia; International support for Soviet resistance British troops were in the Caucasus; and movements has not always been what it might French troops were in the Crimea. Although have been. The period of most success was these troops seldom engaged in direct battle from 1968 and through the years of the against the Reds,93 their very presence and the Brezhnev era, when dissidents placed heavy postures of hostility by their home govern- reliance on international efforts to make the ments set the stage for an acrimonious rela- Soviet government abide by its human rights tionship. Thus, as historian McCauley notes, obligations. Much of the dissidents’ energy “The Bolshevik regime was fashioned by the was aimed at getting information to the West exigencies of Civil War.”94 The party’s inter- and hoping that that strategy would both put nal disagreements about freedoms and open pressure on the Soviet government and also dissent tended to be set aside as the more allow the information to come back into the pressing question of survival took precedence. country via short-wave radio and communica- This was in contrast to the early days of the tions from foreigners. This appears to have Revolution, when there was popular participa- worked well. tion, workers’ control, and considerably However, at other periods international greater tolerance for disagreement. support was minimal and sometimes even Although the Red Army had been set up misdirected. The main problems seem to have in keeping with the spirit of the revolution, the been: hostility directed towards the Soviet Union • Western foreign policy was linked less from outside drove the army towards a differ- with concern for the people of the Soviet ent model. In 1917 there had been soviets of Union than with Western governments’ own soldiers and a move away from the rigid perceived political interests; hierarchies of the Czarist army, but this was • there was a misplaced belief in reversed as Trotsky took control and reorgan- militarism as the best form of diplomacy; ized the army along more traditional hierarchi- • both the right and left held to their own cal lines. Tens of thousands of former Czarist rigid ideologies; officers were put into positions of command. • little reliable information came out of This effectively brought about a militarization the USSR, a problem to which ideological of the revolution, which in turn impacted on supporters of the Soviet Union and foreign the society which was emerging in the newly diplomats there themselves contributed. formed Union. The conventionally organized The building of the Soviet system took army could be used to repress challenges to the place under extraordinary isolation. Interna- increasingly centralized Bolshevik rule. tionally, there was a great deal of hostility As further crises arose, important ques- towards the Bolshevist regime from the tions of liberty and open criticism were beginning. Several Western governments habitually put on the backburner so that, in the supplied money and guns to the counter- years between 1926 and 1929 especially, revolutionaries in the Civil War that ensued in Stalin was able to amass more power than 1918 to 1920.92 This was despite workers in many in the party wanted him to have. Lenin many of these countries, and particularly the had earlier warned of this power accruing to UK, feeling strongly that the new Soviet Stalin but the hostility from outside worked regime should be given a chance to implement against it being addressed. its programs. Allied troops were also sent: British troops landed in Archangel and

93 McCauley, The Soviet Union, 1917–1991, p. 28. 92 Service, A History of Twentieth Century Russia, p. 117. 94 McCauley, The Soviet Union, 1917–1991, p. 30.

52 Nonviolence Speaks

Ironically, the disastrous agricultural pol- provements. This gradually resulted in loss of icy of the USSR during the 1920s and early popular support for the Soviet government. 1930s was related in no small way to attempts We should not assume, however, that it is by foreign governments to crush the Soviet only governments that can influence outcomes Union. By supporting the counter-revolution- in other countries. The international movement aries and cutting off access to many raw against apartheid, in response to the actions materials, intervening governments gave the and requests of the people of South Africa, Soviet leaders cause to feel under siege. There shows otherwise. Groups of activists and was a fear that the West would attack. The individuals, especially if they are well-known only answer was seen to be rapid industriali- and enjoy notoriety, can have a significant zation, at which point increasing pressure was impact on swaying public opinion or in put on the peasantry, as discussed earlier. boosting the morale of those facing problems Hostilities against the Soviet Union took in their home countries. Unfortunately, people many forms and surfaced numerous times. in such a position, for the most part, failed Such was the strength of the suspicion and badly in regard to what they might have done hostility that in the build-up to World War II in respect to repression in the Soviet Union, the British government saw the Soviet Union particularly during the years of Stalin’s rule. as a larger threat than fascism. Some even felt Many writers, social commentators and that fascism had some benefits in that it might others who had an interest in international be able to squash Communism.95 politics and who were of a left persuasion, Following initial military intervention in chose to believe that Stalin was something the Soviet Union in the early days, there were akin to the god-like figure painted of him in further encounters of a militaristic nature, with the USSR. They had a view of how they the result invariably being that the Soviet wanted the Soviet Union to be and they government would strengthen its own military preferred to make their beliefs fit the ideal capabilities. This was particularly the case in rather than to see the country for what it was. the earlier years of the Cold War and also of This included a great many people who the period in the 1980s when US President traveled to the Soviet Union during some of its Ronald Reagan engaged in constant aggressive most repressive and disruptive years and yet posturing, as well as “upping the nuclear saw only what they were allowed to see, what ante.” Of course, during both the 1950s and they were told by those who organized their 1980s the US government itself used the visits, and what they wanted to believe. David increased militarization of the Soviet Union to Caute has written of many of these “fellow justify its own increased expenditures on travellers” as having had “commitment at a weaponry and on the military sector generally. distance,” the distance being not only geo- Each military escalation would justify the graphical but emotional and intellectual.96 The other’s paranoia about its objectives, thereby Soviet Union, during its darkest years, made plunging each into a spiral of increased risk of good use of such people, pointing out that their war. While both the East and West paid objectivity was beyond question since they dramatically in terms of loss of social welfare usually belonged to no political party, or at and other more useful programs to which the least not the Communist Party.97 expenditure could have been redirected, the But, as Adam Hochschild points out, the Soviet Union, with its constantly troubled split between those who saw clearly and those economy, arguably paid a greater price with who chose to deny did not always lie along little left over for much needed social im-

96 David Caute, The Fellow-Travellers: A Post- script to the Enlightenment (London: Weidenfeld 95 D. F. Fleming, The Cold War and Its Origins, and Nicolson, 1973), p. 3. 1917–1960, Vol. 1, (London: Allen & Unwin, 1961). 97 Caute, The Fellow-Travellers, p. 7. Nonviolent resistance to Soviet repression 53 ideological lines. He identifies two of the the other that there could be nothing bad about worst deniers as being major US establishment it. This polarization stifled any possible figures. New York Times correspondent Walter understanding of the real situation there. It Duranty and US ambassador Joseph Davies also fed into the Cold War and the military each sent home messages from the Soviet build-up both in the Soviet Bloc and else- Union that all was well there. Acknowledging where. If we speak of relatively low levels of that there had at least been some sort of action in opposition to repression in the Soviet purging, they both agreed that this had been Union, then part of the responsibility lies with necessary and served the country well by Western governments and the Western left. cleansing it and ridding it of treason. Only during the Brezhnev years, as Moreover, these men were not tourists. They mentioned, did the West prove useful to Soviet lived in Russia and must have had more first dissidents and even then it was often the hand knowledge than some who simply flitted enemies of socialism who took up the cause through the country, being shown what was while left wingers preferred to close their eyes deemed that they should see.98 to Soviet repression or at least insist that it was Others who chose to overlook the situa- a low priority on the scale of global oppres- tion in the Soviet Union during its terrors of sion. The role of the West faded somewhat forced collectivization and the Great Purge under glasnost as the nation was liberalized, were believers in the ideal of communism. although US leaders often liked to think that They wished to see the Soviet Union as a the liberalization was due to the history of country moving forward with the blessing of Western belligerence rather than despite it. all its citizens. The reality was so far different from their constructed view that they chose to Conclusion ignore it. Some of these had good reason to know about the reality, whereas others may The Soviet people may have been their own have had less understanding of the situation. savior in the defeat of the 1991 coup but Many reports about the Soviet Union were repressed people around the world request, presented from an anti-communist perspective, expect, and deserve assistance in their strug- giving supporters of the Soviet government gles. The end to apartheid came because of the some reason — though not necessarily struggle of the South African majority but, sufficient reason — to doubt what they heard. arguably, it came more quickly due to the Others chose not to know. solidarity shown on the international stage — Directly after the Second World War, and probably would have come more quickly when the Soviet government geared up for a again had that support been greater earlier. new wave of terror, similar to that unleashed Solidarity strikes us as being one of the major in the late 1930s, there was much ill feeling in factors in social struggles. the Western world about socialism and those Glancing back at the different periods of who wished to defend it in principle felt that, Soviet repression, we can glean that networks, in the polarized ideological environment, they where and when they existed, were particu- must defend it also in practice, no matter what larly useful, and that actions with well thought warped practices came from socialist states. through goals had the best chance of success. Among the pro-Soviet left in the West, there If one ingredient for resistance was missing was little honest and free discussion and more than any other during the Stalinist apparently no strategy to promote greater Terror, it was networks of resistance. The freedom in the Soviet Union. NKVD had formed a massive and powerful There were, in essence, two polarized apparatus of repression, while individuals blocs in the West, one saying that there could lived in either fear or denial, both seriously be nothing good about the Soviet Union and isolating frames of mind. Often family members dared not speak among themselves of their concerns, for fear that children might 98 Hochschild, The Unquiet Ghost, p. 271.

54 Nonviolence Speaks report them to their teachers or unwittingly lenges can lie ahead. Social struggle is clearly repeat something said at the dinner table. Both an ongoing process. Citizens of the ex-Soviet networks and open communications had Union are today trying to come to grips with a obviously broken down at their most funda- society with very different sorts of problems. mental level. They can be both proud of their 1991 Networks of dissidents, the kompanii achievement and bewildered that they must founded in the 1950s, were among the most start afresh, finding new ways of having a important developments in the Soviet dissident voice. movement. From them grew widespread samizdat, international pressure for human rights, and an imposing dissident literature that laid the foundation for glasnost. Glasnost itself played an important role in providing psycho- logical preparation for resisting the coup. Another lesson comes from dissident Vladimir Bukovsky who recommends using systems against themselves. Pointing out the extremely bureaucratic nature of the Soviet system, he has described how even those in Soviet prisons could turn the system against itself. He and his fellow prisoners nearly brought their prison to a standstill with an avalanche of complaints which, under Soviet law, they were entitled to make. Because of the highly bureaucratized rules and rituals surrounding the receipt of complaints and dealing with them, this caused huge prob- lems.99 The message is to know each system and its weaknesses and to think creatively about how these might be utilized towards one’s goals. Nonviolent goals should always involve nonviolent means to their achievement. It is telling that, during the 1991 Soviet coup, the three deaths of protesters in Moscow were at a venue where Molotov cocktails (home-made explosives) had been thrown. For even just a few people to use violence can create fear and confusion and hinder the winning over of guards, soldiers, or other potential oppressors. But perhaps the greatest lesson is about the nature of social struggle. Both 1917 and 1991 can be seen as successes for nonviolent action. Yet they remind us that, following social change brought about by mass actions (whether violent or nonviolent) major chal-

99 Vladimir Bukovsky, To Build a Castle — My Life as a Dissenter (Washington, DC: Ethics and Public Policy Center, 1978), pp. 35–39. 4 Resisting global corporate domination

The defeat of the proposed Multilateral The MAI and its likely impacts Agreement on Investment (MAI) in October 1998 stands out as a striking example of For at least several decades there has been a successful nonviolent action, one in which concerted push on the part of multinational global resistance and democratic networking corporations to liberalize trade. Some of the truly worked. The success can be attributed trends that formed part of that general thrust largely to commitment and effective cam- towards liberalization included structural paigning techniques, in which communication adjustment as demanded by the IMF; the and good use of communication technology direction taken by the European Economic were important factors, with activists using the Community’s Internal Market in the 1980s; Internet to alert each other initially of the and the setting up of the WTO in 1995.1 The proposed treaty and later of key developments establishment of an MAI was meant to be a as they occurred. major platform — if not the final destination In marked contrast, there appears to have — on the road to trade liberalization. Its been less effective resistance in a number of grandiosity can be gleaned from the boast by other cases where global institutions have Renato Ruggiero, Director-General of the promoted policies that have harmed the WTO, that “We are writing the constitution of world’s most disadvantaged people. While a single global economy.”2 there certainly has been resistance to such In 1995 the Organization for Economic policies, until the 1990s it has not generally Cooperation and Development (OECD) been effectively coordinated on a global scale. announced the decision to draft an MAI, with Starting with a discussion of the draft MAI the purpose of achieving “liberalization of and why it triggered such widespread con- investment regimes and investment protection, cerns, this chapter explores how the campaign with effective dispute-settlement procedures.”3 against the MAI toppled the proposed treaty, The treaty was meant to complement other what insights can be gleaned from the bodies already in existence such as the IMF campaign and how the push for the treaty was and the WTO. The latter had been recently part of a broader corporate goal, with its seeds established to oversee global trade in goods, at Bretton Woods and in institutions such as services, and intellectual property rights by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) which long preceded the MAI. We then pose some questions as to why a momentum like that against the MAI did not build up significantly and until more 1 Colin Hines, “Invisible hand of the ERT,” recently around other comparable issues such Ecologist, Vol. 27, No. 6, November/December as structural adjustment and the eventual 1997, pp. 249–251. formation of the World Trade Organization 2 Renate Ruggiero, Director-General of the World (WTO). There had been widespread critiques Trade Organization, speech to the United Nations but relatively little coordinated action until Conference on Trade and Development events in Seattle in November-December (UNCTAD), 8 October 1996. 1999. This was despite grave consequences surrounding these measures. 3 OECD, “Mandate for MAI negotiations,” press release, Paris, May 1995, quoted in James Goodman and Patricia Ranald (eds.), Stopping the Juggernaut: Public Interest Versus the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (Sydney: Pluto, 1999), p. ix.

55 56 Nonviolence Speaks setting rules for foreign direct investment.4 “impaired” from “operation, management, use, The MAI, for its part, was being designed to enjoyment or disposal of investments by increase the mobility of all forms of invest- unreasonable or discriminatory measures.”6 ment and financial transactions, including These clauses alarmed critics of the draft direct investment, portfolio investment, loans, agreement due to their breadth, ambiguity, and bonds, and other forms of international terminology.7 finance.5 The implementation of such an agreement The effect of such a treaty would have would have had far-reaching implications for been to tie governments’ hands in enacting social welfare, the arts, research, non-profit legislation in a vast range of areas that might organizations, and much more. It would have impinge on transnational investment. Although jeopardized governments’ ability to maintain there were some areas of “exception” that some control over matters such as local could be nominated by governments, the aim investment, technology transfer, training, and was to eventually eliminate and roll back these export requirements. The draft limited many “non-conforming measures,” as the exceptions aspects of industry policy, regional develop- were to be called. Moreover, the exceptions ment, and government procurement policy, so had to be listed up-front, with standstill that governments could not, for instance, clauses making no provision for later intro- require corporations to have joint ventures ducing any additional exceptions. Govern- with local investors or to have specified levels ments would have been prevented from of local ownership.8 Nor could they insist that regulating with regard to environmental, local people be trained or that research and employment, consumer, and other issues development be undertaken locally. Laws where multinational corporations (MNCs) limiting foreign ownership in vital services or deemed that such regulations interfered with setting minimum national content in film and their freedom to compete in the marketplace. television would also have been seen as In an attempt to remove all barriers to free discriminatory, as would assistance given to flow of capital, the agreement would have local television and film industries. forced signatory countries to treat foreign Socialist or green governments, if coming competitors and investors as the equals of to office in countries that had signed the national companies and investors. Of course, agreement, would have found it impossible to these are not equals as MNCs already enjoy live up to their names, since the agreement enormous privileges and power that give them sought to reformulate states and give them a huge advantage over small local competitors. new roles, so that they would simply become Yet under the MAI any legislation that favored de facto servants of MNCs, able to act only in local investment, restricted foreign investment, the interests of global capital. Of course, many or required foreign investors to contribute to governments do this already. The MAI would local development could be regarded as ensure that they did. discriminatory. Under clauses relating to As an exercise in working towards equaliz- “investment protection” and “expropriation,” ing the investment conditions faced by MNCs transnational investors could not have been across the globe, the MAI would have been likely to bring about a “lowest common denominator” or “race to the bottom” in the 4 David Wood, “The international campaign areas of environmental, consumer, and labor against the Multilateral Agreement on Investment: a test case for the future of globalization?,” Ethics, Place and Environment, Vol. 3, No. 1, 2000, pp. 6 OECD, Multilateral Agreement on Investment: 25–45. The MAI Negotiating Text, as of 24 April, 1998, 5 Patricia Ranald, “Disciplining governments: the OECD, Paris, p. 57, article IV. MAI in the international and Australian contexts,” 7 Ranald, “Disciplining governments,” p. 17. in Goodman and Ranald, Stopping the Juggernaut, pp. 15–32, at p. 17. 8 Ranald, “Disciplining governments,” p. 23.

Resisting global corporate domination 57 laws. While the proposal spelt out more tional Chamber of Commerce.10 The thrust of certainty for investors, it held much more the legally binding document was certainly uncertainty for workers and for the poor in that MNCs’ privileges would be vastly ex- general. Indeed, the poor would have been tended and the rights and jurisdictions of states among the worst affected. To cite just one correspondingly constrained in matters where example, the MAI would put a question mark there was seen to be conflict between the two. over much assistance to the poor such as This assumption — that MNCs should be free subsidized food, which is an imperative in from accountability to elected governments — many poorer countries. was noted as the proposed agreement’s most Because the draft MAI made no mention salient feature and was attacked by critics as of equity provisions based on gender, ethnic- undemocratic.11 ity, or race, anti-discrimination or affirmative Further highlighting its undemocratic na- action legislation could have been challenged ture, from 1995 the draft MAI was prepared under the investment protection provisions. with substantial secrecy by the OECD, which Hard-earned legislation could have been represents the 29 wealthiest countries. It was effectively erased with the stroke of a pen. A chiefly aimed at poor countries, with The similar situation existed with indigenous rights Economist noting “The more significant laws and, because in many cases indigenous barriers to foreign investment lie in developing peoples are still struggling for legislation to countries.”12 Already deregulation and privati- ensure their rights, positive outcomes to those zation had deepened the gulf between rich and struggles would have been thwarted. poor both between and within countries. The The production of arms was one of the few MAI seemed destined to ensure more of the areas singled out for exemptions from the same. MAI. Critics feared that research and Even from an economic point of view and development funding for economically and within the framework of its own stated socially productive research would be fun- objectives, many critics pointed out that the neled into military and weapons development. proposed treaty was flawed. According to the Meanwhile, the sorts of trade sanctions that Network of Women in Further Education, for contributed to ending apartheid in South instance, the MAI would have further Africa would have been illegal under the entrenched the type of conditions under which MAI.9 multinational investors set up export produc- Once they were signatories to the treaty, tion plants characterized by poor working countries would have been bound by its terms conditions, dismally low wages, and few, if for at least 20 years. Furthermore, the any, labor rights. However, on a macro- proposed agreement had provisions for MNCs economic level, the trend towards these sorts to sue governments. Corporations could chal- of conditions, encouraged by treaties such as lenge laws that they felt were inconsistent with the MAI, does not comprise a viable strategy the MAI or they could sue governments for for economic development, the Network damages, for instance for “lost opportunity to profit from a planned investment.” The complainant would also be given the right to 10 Paul Rauber, “All hail the multinationals!” nominate a tribunal of its choice to hear the Sierra, Vol. 83, No. 4, July-August 1998, pp. 16– case and could opt for a body as sympathetic 17. to corporations as, for example, the Interna- 11 Ted Wheelwright, “Carte blanche for global corporations,” Arena, No. 34, April-May 1998, pp. 38–40; John Pilger, “The rise of the ‘new democracy’,” Ecologist, Vol. 24, No. 4, July 1999, pp. 242–243. 9 Steven Staples, “Militarism and MAI,” Earth Island Journal, Vol. 14, issue 1, Winter-Spring 12 Anon, “The sinking of the MAI,” Economist, 1999, p. 36. Vol. 346, 14 March 1998, pp. 81–82.

58 Nonviolence Speaks insisted. “Rather, it consistently frustrates groups around the world. The campaign was local and national economic development immediately underway. objectives.”13 Much of the initial impetus came from Little wonder, then, that the draft treaty well-organized groups in Canada where sent shivers down the spines of those who had citizens had already had a taste of life under struggled long and hard for social justice. It the North American Free Trade Agreement would not only have presented an impediment (NAFTA). This investment agreement was to the struggle by placing direct limits on new similar in many respects to the proposed MAI, legislation sorely needed to ensure social with the aim of eliminating export perform- justice, but it would have eroded much of what ance conditions, requirements pertaining to had been won and provided the very condi- hiring certain numbers of local residents and tions for further social impoverishment and purchasing inputs locally, and other perceived corporate enrichment. Many people thought barriers to investment. Both treaties were this treaty should be opposed. designed in the same spirit of shifting towards decreased obligations and increased rights for The campaign against the MAI MNCs. Both had very similar ramifications across a range of areas, for example the The diversity of organizations that made environment, where the Environmental submissions to the Joint Standing Committee Defender’s Office in Australia noted that both on Treaties in Australia demonstrates the range NAFTA and MAI offered gravely deficient of concerns and the depth of feeling engen- environmental protection.14 dered by the proposed MAI. Nine hundred The case of a dispute between the Cana- submissions were made to that inquiry, 95% dian government and a US multinational opposing the MAI. The submissions included corporation, Ethyl Corporation, highlights this many from environmental groups, women’s point. Due to serious health and air pollution groups, Aboriginal groups, unions, aid agen- concerns regarding MMT — a controversial cies, and church organizations, as well as from manganese fuel additive — the Canadian the Public Interest Advocacy Centre, Amnesty government banned the importation and inter- International, the Australian Industry Group, provincial transport of this substance. and individuals, verifying the widespread However, Ethyl, as the only North American nature of the opposition. This was fairly manufacturer of MMT, claimed this to be typical of the concerns expressed worldwide discriminatory against its product and filed a about the proposed treaty. claim under NAFTA against the Canadian Unlike the OECD, which attempted to government for $250 million in damages. conduct its MAI negotiations in secret and as Ethyl claimed that Canada’s regulations would far removed from public scrutiny as possible, effectively force it out of business. It wanted the campaign against the MAI was character- the Canadian government to formulate its ized by networking and a commitment to environmental and health policies around democratic principles. The campaign com- Ethyl’s business preferences rather than Ethyl menced in 1997 when a photocopy of the draft having to meet the environmental standards was leaked to Global Tradewatch, a citizens’ applicable in the country to which it exported organization in the US. Using the net, Global its product. The Canadian government, its Tradewatch disseminated the information to sovereignty greatly diminished under the numerous organizations, starting a chain reaction that would involve more than 600

13 “Submission by Network of Women in Further 14 “Submission by Environmental Defender’s Education to the Joint Standing Committee on Office Ltd to the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties,” reproduced in Goodman and Ranald, Treaties,” reproduced in Goodman and Ranald, Stopping the Juggernaut, pp. 152–158. Stopping the Juggernaut, pp. 206–219.

Resisting global corporate domination 59 treaty, lifted the ban and paid limited costs to with the MAI regardless of how much or what Ethyl.15 level of public dissent was evident. This is Similar claims and demands could have amply shown by the tactics of the very pro- been made through the MAI, which was to be MAI Australian Treasury Department. When more all-encompassing in terms of the areas the Australian Conservation Foundation covered and more global in that it would apply (ACF), a prominent environmental organiza- to all signatories, not just Canada, the US, and tion, filed a freedom-of-information request Mexico. Canadian activists quickly realized for information relating to the MAI from from the leaked draft that the MAI had even Treasury, it unwittingly embarked on a further scope than NAFTA for environmental protracted bureaucratic process that would last and social damage, and threw themselves into 18 months and test its patience and resources the campaign accordingly. to the limit. Another country where there was particu- The Treasury claimed first that its “limited larly strong resistance was France, where film resources” made the request, as it stood, and television interests hotly opposed the MAI impossible to meet. It asked the ACF to since it could have been used to dismantle restrict its request to just one document plus special government support given to keep some basic information already sent to the them viable against overseas cultural rivals. ACF. The ACF would not agree to such But such motivations for opposing the MAI curtailment, though it did narrow its request. were less prevalent than global justice Nearly three months after its initial request and concerns, even in France.16 While other OECD following numerous telephone calls, the ACF governments were busily promoting the MAI, was told that the request was still being dealt the French government was the only OECD with. By then Treasury had exceeded the time member to reassess the MAI, no doubt taking set by the Freedom of Information Act. A note of popular disquiet. The French govern- month later the ACF was able to contact a ment commissioned a thorough report, which Treasury official who said that a letter was concluded that the agreement should be either being drafted to refuse the ACF’s request but transformed radically or cancelled entirely. that it might take a further two weeks. The When the French government withdrew from ACF responded with a letter demanding a the OECD’s MAI negotiations, stating that it substantive response and setting a deadline to would not be wise to “allow private interests receive this. After the deadline’s expiry, the to chew away at the sovereignty of states,” this ACF lodged an appeal with the Administrative virtually signaled the death of the treaty, at Appeals Tribunal. Only then did Treasury least in that form.17 release the requested documents — but only But in most cases, MAI opponents could some of them. The dispute over the remaining not rely on governments. On the contrary, documents was still ongoing in June 1999, many governments and their bureaucracies when the MAI had already been buried. seemed determined to push full steam ahead Treasury’s dealings with the ACF were characterized by delays, stalling, blustering, red tape, changing tack, ignoring phone calls 15 Wood, “The international campaign against the and letters, claims of inability, cries of “too Multilateral Agreement on Investment.” hard to do,” and generally keeping opponents in the dark. These sorts of tactics obstruct and 16 Joe Taglieri, “Pressure from citizens’ groups demoralize activists and waste enormous kills trade treaty for now,” National Catholic amounts of their time, energy, and resources. Reporter, Vol. 35, No. 13, 29 January 1999, p. 4. That is precisely the point of such tactics. 17 James Goodman, “Stopping a juggernaut: the Treasury would have known that time was of anti-MAI campaign,” in Goodman and Ranald, the essence, with the OECD looking to finalize Stopping the Juggernaut, pp. 33–52, at pp. 42–43; the treaty in 1998. Anon, “Bye-bye to MAI?” Maclean’s, 26 October 1998, p. 51.

60 Nonviolence Speaks

Treasury’s dealings with the ACF also available on the MAI to make networking and display arrogance and contempt for democratic lobbying easier and more efficient. However, processes. The Joint Standing Committee on there were numerous other ways in which e- Treaties — a parliamentary committee with mail and the web proved useful: members drawn from both houses of federal parliament — also criticized Treasury, claim- • Getting information onto the web. People ing that it “seemed to believe that it owned this could make use of this information in their document [the MAI].” Referring to Treasury’s own time, in their own way, at their own pace, “excessive zeal” for the MAI which, it noted, and in accordance with their own abilities and “can sometimes blind an organization,” the concerns. Because information on the web is committee expressed concern that Treasury not linear but can be accessed in different refused to accept the validity of the concern of ways, this can suit activists with their own those who opposed the Treaty.18 focuses and philosophies. Canadian groups This suggests that defending state sover- opposing the MAI were praised by activists eignty against corporate domination certainly elsewhere for their particularly useful and has its downside, leaving activists wondering informative anti-MAI web sites, as well as for their commitment to the cause. why they would possibly want to protect the sovereignty of governments that clearly and • E-mailing other activists. This was crucial, as frequently act against the interests of citizens the information on the web is only useful if and the environment, including when sup- people are alerted to its existence. E-mail is porting local capitalist interests. Most social quick, relatively easy, and can handle multiple justice activists involved in the anti-MAI messages, allowing numerous warnings to be campaign would oppose both national and sent to other activists who then e-mailed other global oppression, but feel amply justified in contacts or networked in other ways. This was targeting the MAI because it would undermine done very rapidly so that a momentum built socially beneficial national legislation while up; without e-mail, activists might not have doing little to reduce state-level oppression. been able to cope with the OECD’s deadline Also, the MAI had serious implications even for pushing through the MAI. for local government. Activists have had some success in democratizing at least some local • Countering secrecy. Maude Barlow of the government bodies and would hope to Council of Canadians said “If we know continue to do so in the future. something that is sensitive to one government, Thus far we have seen who was involved we get it to our ally in that country instantly.” in the campaign and why, but these alone do She claims that governments will never again not make for effective campaigning. The issue be able to conduct such secret trade negotia- of how campaigning took place in resisting the tions, explaining “If a negotiator says MAI is crucial. something to someone over a glass of wine, we’ll have it on the Internet within an hour, all The role of the Internet over the world.”19

• Forcing governments’ hand in regard to The net was central to the campaign. When information. Governments’ elaborate commu- activists discovered the OECD’s secret nego- nication resources often far exceed their tiations, the draft MAI was quickly put on the willingness to involve citizens in decision World Wide Web, where it could be popularly making, as was seen with the ACF’s dealings accessed. Activists in Canada worked to synthesize and analyze the information

19 Madelaine Drohan, “How the net killed the 18 James Goodman, “Conclusion,” in Goodman MAI: grassroots groups used their own globaliza- and Ranald, Stopping the Juggernaut, pp. 221–228, tion to derail deal,” Globe & Mail (Toronto), 29 at pp. 224–225. April 1998.

Resisting global corporate domination 61 with Treasury. Nonetheless, Australian anti- inadequate news coverage, judged the push for MAI activists claimed that it was difficult for the MAI as the most important under-reported the federal government to maintain the levels story of 1998.21 of secrecy they desired once news of the MAI It could almost be argued that the mass was spread. Activists were able to pressure the media’s neglect of the MAI allowed the government to make relevant documents, such campaign to stay much more focused on core as transcripts of sittings of parliament and issues. Mass media coverage sometimes can reports of the Joint Standing Committee on defuse or deflect campaigns by emphasizing Treaties, available on the web. side issues and turning a struggle into a spectator sport in which citizen activists are • Lobbying. Activists were able to instigate typecast as being on the fringe. Politicians and and deliver sign-on letters to the OECD and to bureaucrats in Australia — and no doubt obtain confirmation that they had been printed elsewhere — attempted to stereotype anti-MAI and delivered by hand to the chairperson. activists as “conspiracy theorists” advocating a Being able to document meetings, phone calls, cause not worthy of media attention.22 Politi- and conversations on the web also made it cians and bureaucrats enjoy some special more difficult for politicians and bureaucrats relations with journalists and editors who rely to “fob off” activists. on their media releases and co-operation in • Sharing. There is much more shared over the order to assemble the news. The relationship, net than data and information. Activists were though having its complexities, has a substan- able to document their particular experiences, tial degree of symbiosis to it, something not establish credibility, and gain insights, as well present in the net. as support each other. Nevertheless, governments and corpora- tions can also use the net, so it is not • Discussion and initiation of alternatives. immediately apparent why the net should have Many anti-MAI activists realized the weakness proved more beneficial to anti-MAI of campaigns that are primarily negative, so campaigners. The reason is that the network they used the net to broaden discussion, for form of the campaign meshed much better example through discussion forums. The with the net — which, as its name indicates, is Polaris Institute and Citizens’ Public Trust, a network — than the bureaucratic structure of among others, developed websites addressing governments and corporations. In a bureauc- alternative proposals. racy, most official communication out of the organization is tightly controlled at the top. A newspaper article entitled “How the net Uncontrolled lateral e-mail is a potential threat killed the MAI” describes the extent to which to the organizational hierarchy and often is the net was used successfully by MAI oppo- discouraged in spite of rhetoric about flattened nents.20 That the article itself came to be hierarchies, the network organization, and the widely circulated on the net suggests that its like. Given that the MAI was being promoted assessment resonated with activists. in secrecy, leaks had the potential to under- The mass media, overall, were not an mine the operation. Therefore, employees especially useful channel for activists, not could not be trusted to communicate without being under popular control and displaying being overseen. little interest in the issue. Although the alter- native media covered the MAI, it was remarkably absent from the mainstream media. Indeed, Project Censored, a media watchdog 21 Peter Phillips and Project Censored, Censored organization that compiles annual lists of the 1999: The News That Didn’t Make the News — The Year’s Top 25 Censored Stories (New York: Seven most important stories in the US that received Stories Press, 1999); http://www.projectcensored. org/. 20 Drohan, “How the net killed the MAI.” 22 Goodman, “Conclusion,” pp. 225–226.

62 Nonviolence Speaks

It was not simply the goals of the MAI Goodman also points out that “internet lobbyists and anti-MAI campaigners that were campaigning, as opposed to internet co- opposite but the organizational structures ordination, is no substitute for paper-based within which each group was trying to achieve dissemination; neither could the ‘networked its goal. Anti-MAI campaigners, most of NGOs’ afford to ignore the more formal party- whom had commitments to democracy and political channels.”24 The Australian situation equity, were attempting to disseminate infor- illustrates how campaigning and co-ordination mation whereas those hoping to push through worked together. One person in each state was the agreement were using tactics of careful given the task of coordinating a stop-MAI containment of information and lobbying of a group. Contact names were circulated and a very private nature. The bureaucratic structure national campaign set up via e-mail. The of the governments and corporate proponents Western Australian co-ordination was par- of the MAI meant that they could not obtain ticularly active, initiating a national petition to the full benefit of the swift lateral networking the OECD. In such cases it is the spread of made possible by the net. information via the petition, as a point of This suggests a lesson for global activists: focus, and the publicity that are important. The avoid being bogged down in movement OECD is not likely, of its own volition, to be bureaucracies. If rapid, flexible, and innova- receptive to the views of Australian citizens or tive responses are needed to oppose the push citizens from anywhere else. for corporate globalization, this can best occur One important contribution was by Austra- through ad hoc alliances of local groups and lian academic Patricia Ranald who wrote the networks. To have a few peak organizations first account of the likely impact of the MAI speaking for local groups can adversely affect on Australian policy-making. This was response time, reduce flexibility, and increase launched by the president of the Australian risk of co-optation. On the other hand, peak Council of Trade Unions and became the organizations can play their part too. The ACF definitive statement on the issue, proving most was able to pursue Treasury through formal useful for the campaign in Australia.25 There administrative channels and obtain at least were also public meetings, campaign meet- some of the desired documents where indi- ings, ringing up radio stations, writing to viduals and smaller groups may have failed. newspapers, fundraising, rallies, and much Also, there are some disadvantages to more. using the net. Goodman claims that news- Some differences were apparent in the groups can become an irritating distraction and campaign from one country to another. In that there is a need for filtering. “International Britain, for instance, the Green Party of lists were moderated from the start, mainly England and Wales instigated the campaign, with North American-based NGOs [nongov- whereas in Canada unconnected concerned ernment organizations] filtering the informa- citizens are claimed to have started and tion.”23 There is, therefore, scope for some to maintained the Canadian anti-MAI campaign. claim that some level of censorship occurs. To the unease of many activists, racist groups However, one of the ongoing problems with played some part, albeit small, in the campaign the net is that the huge amount of information in some countries. The MAI coordinator for and discussion can be extremely daunting, not Public Citizens’ Global Tradewatch campaign to mention time-consuming. Most activists noted that the organization worked on the MAI with limited amounts of time, which they hope issue with groups with which they would not to use as effectively as possible, would normally work and who “represent a very welcome filtering as part of the overall co- different group of people from the normal ordination efforts.

24 Goodman, “Stopping a juggernaut,” p. 44. 23 Goodman, “Stopping a juggernaut,” p. 44. 25 Goodman, “Stopping a juggernaut,” p. 45.

Resisting global corporate domination 63

Public Citizen activists,” who can be generally corporate domination, helps in mobilizing described as “left-progressives.”26 In Australia, opposition. however, from the very start the campaign The campaigns involved in the MAI issue made a concerted effort to distance itself from illustrate two types of globalization: one based right-wing nationalists, in particular One on large hierarchical organizations operating Nation, which was enjoying some electoral in secrecy and the other based on a variety of popularity at the time. The anti-MAI campaign community groups promoting public education was particular about defining itself as being and citizen action. The two seem destined to about something very different. Although be pitted against each other for quite some representatives from both One Nation and the time yet. right-wing National Civic Council attempted The MAI was only part of a much larger to gain some influence over the campaign, agenda that powerful institutions are still they failed to do so and were quickly pushing. The forging ahead of liberalized marginalized.27 The net, however, seems to markets, even at heavy human cost, can be have been universally embraced. seen in a range of other measures, including Can a corporate push for something like structural adjustment programs (SAPs) and the the MAI be imagined as an open campaign, setting up of the World Trade Organization. using paid staff to promote a corporate cause Yet neither of these met anywhere near the using the net? This would require a drastic organized opposition that they might have. We shift from the model of bureaucratic planning. need to ask why. Movement in this direction is conceivable, given the existence of corporate front groups The wider context used for anti-environmental campaigning.28 However, even in these cases, the fake The operation of global capital has instigated citizens’ groups have nothing like the enthusi- numerous changes throughout the world, both asm and autonomy of genuine activists. in rich and poor countries, and in almost every The MAI was only one element in the push area of life. For instance, mass advertising has for corporate global domination, and not spread its tentacles widely into education, necessarily the most dangerous. Because it sport, and most areas of leisure. Property and was promoted in secret and was a proposal currency speculation, both attractive areas for with a name and aim against which people global capital, have led to instability of could organize, it provided an ideal target for national economies, as well as pushing the opposition. Other processes of globalization price of land way beyond the reach of many in are more incremental, such as transnational numerous cities. In rural areas, the poor have corporate mergers, global marketing strategies, usually fared no better, existing within and the transfer of production to regions with disrupted communities characterized by cheaper labor. Creeping corporate domination decreased security and self-reliance. In Third is more difficult to oppose than identifiable World countries rural people are sometimes initiatives such as the MAI. The existence of pushed off the land altogether or forced on to the name “globalization”, in as much as it has marginal land to make way for cash crops, become shorthand for the process of global often with environmentally damaging impli- cations. Yet there have not generally been the levels of resistance that were witnessed in the

case of opposition to the MAI. This is despite 26 Wood, “The international campaign against the many aspects of the MAI being an intensifica- Multilateral Agreement on Investment.” tion of inequalities already in evidence. 27 Goodman, “Stopping a juggernaut,” pp. 43–44. Among the most significant shifts brought about by global capital has been increased 28 Sharon Beder, Global Spin: The Corporate trade, along with associated infrastructure Assault on Environmentalism (Melbourne: Scribe, development and technological innovation, 1997).

64 Nonviolence Speaks especially in transport, computers, and expansion of world trade but favored MNCs. communication. This echoes many of the With the use of the US dollar as the world’s social disruptions caused by colonialism but carrier currency, MNCs were allowed to steam on a greater scale. In particular, social activists ahead with eyes set on cheaper labor and raw have been concerned that the ability of MNCs’ materials, lower taxes, and global markets.31 highly mobile capital to scour the globe Many perceived that the US dollar was highly seeking the cheapest labor and raw materials overvalued, allowing US-based MNCs to has led to environmental degradation and expand into overseas markets and buy up jeopardized access to food and other essential national industries relatively cheaply. items for many of the world’s poor. Never- Even before the setting up of the system, theless, until fairly recently that concern has the terms of trade were already working not been channeled into action as effective as increasingly against Third World countries and its opponents would have hoped. in favor of the heavily industrialized countries. The current globalization of capital has This largely resulted from the international many roots going back to Bretton Woods division of labor whereby the great majority of where the Allied powers met in 1944, laying manufacturing industry was in the wealthy the framework for what has been called “the countries. The Bretton Woods institutions and global shopping center.”29 The Bretton Woods arrangements merely formalized that, so that system was set up with the expressed purpose by 1980 these countries accounted for 90 per of ensuring capitalist economic stability and cent of such industry.32 Exacerbating this was stopping the sorts of nationalist trade rivalries the tendency, over the years, for the price of that helped set the stage for World War II. primary products to decline in relation to the Following the conclusion of the war, the price of manufactured goods. This is evident International Monetary Fund and the World from an example from the 1970s and 1980s. Bank were set up, both located in Washington President Nyerere of Tanzania claimed that, and both playing strong parts in pushing a US whereas it used to be possible to purchase a government point of view.30 tractor with the earnings from 17.25 tons of The specific aim of the IMF was to sisal, seven years later 42 tons of sisal were monitor and help manage the operation and needed to buy exactly the same model adjustment of the international monetary tractor.33 system. As well as supporting fixed exchange While MNCs have long bemoaned trade rates and ensuring that governments managed barriers, they were quick to erect their own their balance of payments, the IMF was also a where it suited their purposes. These included "lender of last resort" to its member nations. the hoarding of mineral deposits so as to affect The World Bank, set up to channel funds for pricing; limiting technological diffusion; and reconstruction and development, often was the establishing exclusive marketing networks.34 lender. The international monetary system that emerged from Bretton Woods, along with the principles of free trade embodied in the 31 Barnet and Müller, Global Reach, p. 456. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 32 Willy Brandt, North-South: A Program for (GATT), was geared towards encouraging Survival (London: Pan, 1980), p. 32.

33 William D. Graf, “Anti-Brandt: a critique of 29 Richard J. Barnet and Ronald E. Müller, Global northwestern prescriptions for world order,” in Reach: The Power of the Multinational Corpora- Ralph Miliband and John Seville (eds.), The tions (London: Jonathan Cape, 1974), p. 67. Socialist Register 1981 (London: Merlin, 1981), pp. 20–40, at p. 36. 30 For a full account of the World Bank and its workings, see Susan George and Fabrizio Sabelli, 34 G. K. Helleiner, “World market imperfections Faith and Credit: The World Bank’s Secular and the developing countries,” in William R. Cline Empire (London: Penguin, 1994). (ed.), Policy Alternatives for a New International

Resisting global corporate domination 65

Patents were also used as barriers. As of 1981, the character and location of future of invest- 90 per cent of foreign-held patents in devel- ment, have made for “international trade and oping countries were never worked in those factor flows that are not governed by the countries.35 Thus in various ways MNCs can spontaneous and impersonal forces of have a stifling impact on local development markets.”38 and competition. Home governments of MNCs have also It has also been noted that certain provided assistance for them in relation to both provisions found in numerous technology trade and aid, as was the case during the 1965– contracts introduced by foreign firms in Third 1966 famine in India. The US government World countries would have been illegal under withheld food aid until the Indian government antitrust laws, had they been introduced in agreed to the penetration of US capital into the their home countries. Such provisions included field of fertilizers.39 The US petrochemical “tie-in clauses requiring the licensee or corporations, and in particular the Rockefeller purchaser to buy inputs from particular Group, did well financially from this arrange- sources; prohibitions of export sales without ment. The order and structures which the the permission of the technology owner; Bretton Woods arrangements formalized and assignment of rights to modifications or perpetuated were claimed to be of universal improvements by the licensee to the licenser, benefit but in practice mainly served the etc.”36 Less developed countries have also interests of the industrialized countries and been disadvantaged by the restrictive practices particularly the MNCs whose home bases that operate between firms, such as allocation were in these countries. of territorial markets, pooling and allocation of Nevertheless, by the 1970s the Bretton patents, trademarks, and copyrights, fixing of Woods system had met a range of problems, price relationships (including discriminatory more numerous and complex than can be dealt pricing), allocation of total amounts of export with here.40 Certainly the international business, and establishment of reciprocal monetary system being tied to the success of exclusion or preferential dealing.37 That such the US economy and especially to mainte- practices have contributed substantially to the nance of a US balance of payments surplus build-up by MNCs of their own businesses in was a problem. In August 1971, US President Third World countries puts the activities of the Richard Nixon suspended the convertibility of WTO and the efforts to achieve an MAI in an US dollars into gold. Soon after, the system of interesting light. fixed exchange rates finally collapsed. It simply cannot be assumed, therefore, Although it had contributed to Japan and that supply and demand are the key determi- Europe’s economic recovery, many leaders of nants of prices and levels of output, nor that the less developed countries felt that the the market will find its own equilibrium. It has Bretton Woods monetary, trade, and financial been pointed out that the centralized decisions system had exacerbated their underdevelop- of MNCs with relation to the physical ment and subordination to the more developed movement of goods and services among their countries and they were becoming increasingly various subsidiaries, for instance, along with

38 Helleiner, “World market imperfections and the Economic Order (New York: Praeger, 1979), pp. developing countries,” pp. 362–363. 357–389, at p. 369. 39 Geoffrey Barraclough, “The great world crisis 35 Helleiner, “World market imperfections and the I,” New York Review, 23 January 1975, pp. 20–29, developing countries,” pp. 372–379. at p. 25. 36 Helleiner, “World market imperfections and the 40 See Joan Edelman Spero, The Politics of developing countries,” p. 379. International Economic Relations (London: Allen 37 Helleiner, “World market imperfections and the & Unwin, 1982, 2nd ed), pp. 27–30, for a developing countries,” p. 376. discussion of these.

66 Nonviolence Speaks vociferous on this point.41 The other major Banks and the international financial institu- events were the floating of the US dollar in tions were worried that the Third World states 1973, oil price rises from 1974, and the would renege on their loans, as the Mexican deregulation of financial markets. government threatened to do in 1982. They A new international economic order arose were desperate to work out some solution that but it was far from the more equitable model would ensure repayment to the banks. Rene- for which numerous Third World leaders had gotiations were therefore offered but under been calling. Rather it was anchored by strict conditions. The IMF and the World Bank market-oriented economic policies, global insisted that loan repayments could not be technology based on information, and new renegotiated until the borrower-state in roles for the old Bretton Woods institutions question had adopted a structural adjustment whose major tasks were now seen as designing program (SAP). Mexico, where there had been new economic policies and supervising inter- popular anger at the huge debts incurred and national debt agreements.42 the heavy-handed tactics of the industrialized countries, was the first country to have a SAP Structural Adjustment Programs imposed on it. Many national leaders felt they were forced to sign since otherwise, they Many post-colonial states became heavily believed, their country’s economy would be indebted to foreign governments and banks even more drastically hurt. during the 1970s when interest rates were low Typically, a SAP would include: and loans were particularly easy to obtain due to the hike in oil prices and consequently the • liberalization of agricultural markets, oil-exporting countries having more money foreign exchange, trade, interests rates, and than could be quickly absorbed domestically. prices; Many of the Third World governments that • deregulating the labor market and creat- took advantage of these loans were not ing labor “flexibility”; popularly elected. Numerous repressive • liberalizing and deregulating the financial regimes used loan funds to build up massive system; and armaments, many to be later used against their • reducing and restructuring state involve- own people. ment by means of eliminating subsidies, By the 1980s interest rates were much privatizing public firms, and reducing state personnel and functions.44 higher than they had been in the 1970s, causing a crisis which the IMF stepped in to The effects of the reforms and restructur- resolve by means of structural adjustment.43 ing imposed at the IMF’s insistence were usually jettisoning of large parts of welfare 41 Spero, The Politics of International Economic

Relations, pp. 28–29. (Homeward, IL: Dow Jones-Irwin, 1986); Chris C. 42 Oscar Ugarteche, “The structural adjustment Carvounis, The Foreign Debt/National Develop- stranglehold: debt and underdevelopment in the ment Conflict: External Adjustments and Internal Americas,” NACLA Report on the Americas, Vol. Disorder in the Developing Nations (New York: 33, Issue 1, July-August 1999, pp. 21–23. Quorum Books, 1986). 43 For a full account of structural adjustment and 44 Suresh Chandra Babu, Review of Structural its implications, see Susan George, A Fate Worse Adjustment Reconsidered: Economic Policy and Than Debt (London: Penguin, 1994); George and Poverty in Africa, American Journal of Agricul- Sabelli, Faith and Credit; Susan George, The Debt tural Economics, Vol. 81, No. 3, August 1999, pp. Boomerang: How Third World Debt Harms Us All 756–758, at p. 756; Walden Bello, with Shea (London: Pluto with the Transnational Institute, Cunningham and Bill Rau, Dark Victory: The 1992); Morris Miller, Coping Is Not Enough!: The United States, Structural Adjustment, and Global International Debt Crisis and the Roles of the Poverty (London: Pluto, 1994); Ugarteche, “The World Bank and International Monetary Fund structural adjustment stranglehold.”

Resisting global corporate domination 67 and social services as well as deregulation. for many people.47 Also the SAP reforms were Very often this involved weakening of labor supposed to lower India’s budget deficit and legislation. Argentina, Ecuador, and India reduce inflation, whereas they triggered the were among the countries whose governments opposite. The increased cost of imported raw weakened their labor legislation or amended materials, along with an influx of luxury their land laws to qualify for a loan with the imports enjoyed by the wealthy minority who conditions imposed under structural adjust- benefited from tax cuts and other measures, ment arrangements.45 What unfolded in India aggravated the balance of payments crisis.48 as a result of its reforms in compliance with Another major stated aim was to rapidly these conditions paints a grim picture of the open up the economy to make space for reality of structural adjustment. globalization. On one hand, there was The Indian government was forced to increasing reliance on new technologies, often adopt a SAP in 1991, along the lines drawn up involving foreign collaboration or imports. by the IMF and the World Bank. The measures Competition was “not necessarily in terms of demanded included: quality and/or costs of production but also in terms of shaping tastes and choices to carve • cutting expenditure on social programs out a wider reach of the products.” This led to and infrastructure; a large number of retrenchments.49 But other • eliminating state subsidies and price units were not in a position to modernize and support programs, including food and fertilizer had difficulties competing with those that did, subsidies; which also resulted in large numbers of job • privatization of the more profitable losses. Then there was the flow of capital into public enterprises; new industries, invariably in areas where there • closure of a large number of other public was little scope for employment growth due to enterprises; technology intensiveness. Labor expansion • devaluation of the currency; was largely confined to the informal sector, • liberalization of trade to encourage entry resulting in workers becoming increasingly of foreign capital; dispersed, disconnected, and exploited, leading • major reforms of banks and financial to greater marginalization and difficulties for institutions, in particular a reduction of subsi- the poor. dized loans in rural areas; Particularly affected were women, many of • alteration of tax structures, including whom suffered the negative outcomes of abolition of wealth tax and reduction of capital structural adjustment silently, sometimes even gains tax.46 voluntarily to reduce the burden on others. In A study of the effects showed that the many cases women served as “shock absorb- rhetoric of what was supposed to occur as a ers” for the worst aspects of the reforms and result of this SAP was vastly different from were badly affected by new forms of control, the actual impact. For instance, the rhetoric new emphases on property rights, and tech- emphasized integration with global opportuni- nologies that facilitated centralization and ties, market freedom, and empowerment, whereas the reality was marginalization, ex- clusion, scarcity, and shrinking opportunities 47 Dooly Arora, “Structural adjustment program and gender concerns in India,” Journal of Contemporary Asia, Vol. 29, Issue 3, August 1999, 45 Kamran Abbasi, “Under fire,” British Medical pp. 328–361, at p. 328. Journal, Vol. 318, 1998, pp. 1003–1006, at p. 1003. 48 Chossudovsky, “India under IMF rule,” p. 271. 46 Michel Chossudovsky, “India under IMF rule,” Ecologist, Vol. 22, No. 6, November/December 49 Arora, “Structural adjustment program and 1992, pp. 271–275. gender concerns in India,” p. 332.

68 Nonviolence Speaks control over various economic processes.50 is responsible for a drop of 10–25% in average Indian women had long been oppressed and incomes, a 25% reduction in spending per affirmative action and policies aimed at allevi- capita on health, and a 50% reduction in ating some of women’s worst difficulties were spending per capita on education in the poorest essential. The Indian SAP made it virtually countries of the world. UNICEF claims that impossible for the bulk of women to overcome this has led directly to the deaths of half a their gender-related impoverishment. million young children.54 Moreover, the gap Jamaican women, given the chance, may between rich and poor countries has widened have been able to tell Indian women that it enormously rather than narrowed. At the same would be so, for that was also their experience time as the per capita gross domestic product after Jamaican Prime Minister Michael Manly fell by 30% in the world’s ten poorest signed a $74 million emergency loans agree- countries, it doubled in the ten richest.55 Not ment with the IMF in 1977. The following surprisingly, the process of structural adjust- year, in a precursor to the formal SAPs that ment as it has been applied in Africa has been were to come in the 1980s, the World Bank described as “recolonization.”56 demanded that the government favor exports Nor have the SAPs resulted in pegging over domestic needs in exchange for loans to back the debt. Total Third World debt rose the Jamaican Public Service Company and the from $751 billion in 1981 to $1,355 billion in Sugar Industry Authority. A sharp decline in 1990.57 The struggle to pay off the debt can be living standards followed, largely resulting crippling as is seen by the case of Guyana from the collapse of the local garment where, since the late 1980s, nearly 80 per cent industry. Few women could be absorbed in the of government revenues and 60 per cent of new export industries; those who found work export earnings have gone to service and repay in the Free Trade Zone were classified as foreign debt. Since essential services have unskilled and paid pitiful wages. There were been starved of funding, malnutrition, infant also cutbacks in health and education.51 mortality, disease, unemployment, and poverty In Uganda one third of the public sector have all soared.58 Since the 1980s, SAPs have work force was laid off, such were the contributed to a new outflow of wealth from enforced cuts in that area.52 Russia is among Third World countries that have paid out five the latest countries to be affected by a program times as much capital to the industrialized that included drastic cuts in services and countries as they have received.59 The US subsidies, devaluation of the rouble, and Treasury Department has calculated that for massive privatization. This has resulted in a every dollar the United States contributes to rise in electoral support for right-wing international development banks, US exporters nationalism.53 According to a study published in the British Medical Journal, structural adjustment 54 Abbasi, “Under fire,” p. 1003. 55 Ugarteche, “The structural adjustment strangle- hold,” p. 21. 50 Arora, “Structural adjustment program and gender concerns in India,” p. 329. 56 Wayne Ellwood, “Pinstripes and poverty: inside the World Bank,” New Internationalist, December 51 Joan Ross Frankson, “Hagglers, higgles and 1990, pp. 4–6, at p. 6. empty stomachs,” New Internationalist, December 1990, pp. 20–21. 57 Swift, “Squeezing the South.” 52 Richard Swift, “Squeezing the South: 50 Years 58. Susan Meeker-Lowry, “Removing the noose,” is enough,” New Internationalist, July 1994, pp. 4– New Internationalist, April 1996, pp. 15–16, at p. 7. 15. 53 “Adjusting structures, destroying lives — an NI 59 U.S. Network for Global Economic Justice, “50 map,” supplement to New Internationalist, July Years is Enough,” http://www.50years.org/, at 1994. http://www.50years.org/update/questions.html.

Resisting global corporate domination 69 win more than two dollars in bank-financed so, to radically deregulate international trade.62 procurement contracts.60 It has gone about this ruthlessly.63 Even where some people within the coun- The WTO oversees more than a dozen try do well, the “trickle-down effect” has distinct trade agreements whose articles spell proved either negligible or non-existent. As out serious threats to the environment, world wealth gets rechanneled into the hands of health, small-scale agriculture, and those elites, they tend to buy more imported goods, schemes and national laws aimed at alleviating adding to their country's deficit while provid- poverty. It attempts to make the lowest ing few opportunities for small businesses and environmental standards the general standards, marginalized workers who, in contrast, would as has been the plan with NAFTA. The WTO usually spend their money locally. Critics has sought to overturn national laws that point to the vast social problems created by MNCs claim to be barriers to trade. For SAPs but there appear to be few successes, in instance, in 1997 the WTO overturned part of terms of helping the poor, to which the the US Clean Air Act that had prevented the advocates of SAPs can point. import of low quality fuel with a higher than normal potential for air pollution. The The World Trade Organization following year the organization declared illegal a US regulation requiring that imported The World Trade Organization embraces the shrimp be caught by methods that minimized same philosophies and economic hopes as the harm to endangered sea turtles.64 engineers of SAPs. Established on 1 January Bans on the import of dangerous materials 1995 after an eight-year process of trade can be overturned, as well as pollution control negotiations known as the Uruguay Round of regulations.65 Canada initiated proceedings in GATT, the WTO is probably as aggressive an the WTO tribunal to overturn a French ban on advocate of global capital as the world has import of chrysolite asbestos, of which Canada seen, being described as “the policy voice, the is a major producer.66 Following heavy lobby- muscle, and ultimately the fist of transnational ing by Monsanto, the US National Cattlemen’s corporations.”61 Association, and other organizations, the US The WTO replaced GATT but with a much Trade Representative initiated action against a wider brief. Whereas GATT was concerned European Union ban on hormone-treated beef. principally with repealing tariffs — although The ban hurt US exporters, since 90 per cent seeking to expand its scope during its Uruguay of US cattle were being treated with some type Round — the WTO is concerned with a range of growth hormone by 1995. The WTO ruled of issues which it perceives as barriers to against the ban, thereby making it illegal to trade. Essentially its brief is to codify the rules use the precautionary principle, as the upon which a global system of investment, European Union had, to ban products on production, and trade depends and, in doing

62 Steven Shrybman, “The World Trade Organiza- tion: the New World Order laid bare,” Ecologist, Vol. 29, No. 4, July 1999, pp. 270–275. 60 U.S. Network for Global Economic Justice, “50 63 Lori Wallach and Michelle Sforza, Whose Years is Enough.” Trade Organization? Corporate Globalization and 61 Peter Montague, “The WTO and free trade,” the Erosion of Democracy (Washington, DC: Rachel's Environment and Health News, #673 & Public Citizen, 1999). #674, 21 & 28 October 1999, http://www.rach 64 Montague, “The WTO and free trade.” el.org/. 65 Shrybman, “The World Trade Organization.” 66 Wood, “The international campaign against the Multilateral Agreement on Investment.”

70 Nonviolence Speaks health grounds.67 At least one other ruling by Some have claimed hypocrisy in relation the WTO has similarly made it illegal to to the WTO’s insistence that there be no penalize products from manufacturers favoritism shown for local or small businesses. involved financially or otherwise in regimes The corporations based in highly developed where human rights are abused.68 Altogether countries have mostly enjoyed considerable during the first four years of the WTO’s support from their home governments, existence, there were 177 cases in which a especially in their early days. This included government challenged a law or practice of public investments, state partnerships with another country by invoking WTO rules.69 infant industries, and explicit favoritism for At a macro level, the WTO has an obvious national as opposed to foreign-owned enter- impact on state sovereignty, not dissimilar to prise. These are the very tactics that the WTO the proposed MAI. It also has significant has declared illegal. impact at the micro level, with small farmers, But now the WTO wants the exact for example, faring poorly under the 700 pages opposite for Third World countries, as is seen of rules written by the WTO. The elimination by one of the agreements negotiated within its of trade barriers has seen Third World framework in 1997, relating to the liberaliza- economies inundated with cheap food from tion of financial services sectors, including major grain-exporting countries, driving down banking and insurance. Many Third World the prices local farmers receive for their countries, until recently, had policies in place produce. Small farmers are finding it increas- to protect the domestic banking and insurance ingly difficult to compete against highly sectors. mechanized, large-scale intensive farming. Yet, the problems brought about by the There is a social as well as economic loss from WTO are not confined to Third World coun- the swallowing up of small holdings, leaving tries, as is clear from the threats to national local economies in tatters. On the other hand, health care schemes in industrialized countries. land reform, when pursued, not only creates a In its attempts to incorporate traditional areas small-farm economy which is beneficial for of public services into the free market, the local economic development but has social WTO is forcing the dismantling of socialized benefits, since the poor are not driven off the healthcare in Europe and elsewhere. Policy land and into burgeoning cities.70 Small initiatives such as compulsory competitive holdings are generally also less environmen- tendering and public infrastructure privatiza- tally harmful and yet usually produce more tion are threatening the health safety nets agricultural output than an equivalent area of previously put in place and breaking down the larger farms, now widely known as the systems whereby society at large took some “inverse relationship between farm size and share of the economic responsibility for the output.”71 costs of ill health.72 As usual, this is being done with little public debate and virtually no attempts to scrutinize likely health outcomes. The goals of universality of healthcare and 67 Public Citizen Global Trade Watch, “The MAI equity in access are being replaced by the shell game: the World Trade Organization (WTO),” rhetoric of consumer sovereignty, which is http://www.tradewatch.org/Shell_Game/Wto.htm another way of saying that ultimately the health care one receives is dependent on what Ted Bardacke, “American boycotts start to bite,” 68 one can afford. Financial Times, 2 June 1997. 69 Public Citizen Global Trade Watch, “The MAI shell game.” 72 Jean Shaoul, “How the World Trade Organiza- 70 Peter Rosset, “Small is bountiful,” Ecologist, tion is shaping domestic policies in health care,” Vol. 29, No. 8, December 1999, pp. 452–456. The Lancet, Vol. 345, 27 November 1999, pp. 71 Rosset, “Small is bountiful,” p. 453. 1889–1892.

Resisting global corporate domination 71

Moreover, many of the actions of the Resistance and barriers to resistance World Bank, IMF, and WTO, despite their rhetorical concern for efficiency, are counter- The implications of both structural adjustment productive in a wider social sense. Their drive programs and the WTO’s ravenous appetite for for micro-efficiency leads to what has been liberalization at any cost are so enormous that called macro-insufficiency, as small and one might expect them to have been chal- medium sized enterprises are driven into lenged with widespread campaigns of civil bankruptcy and large amounts of human and disobedience and mass actions. Yet, arguably, physical resources stand idle, laid off, or by- resistance was more sporadic and sometimes passed by the global policies.73 Their actions less focused on the institutions than might be also frequently defy logic, even of their own expected to have been the case. Reflecting the economically narrow kind. For instance, in disadvantages of attempting to take on global 1992 the World Bank made $US$ million institutions and MNCs, it took a number of available to China for greenhouse gas years to build up to the enormous public reduction but at the same time proposed $630 outrage expressed on the streets of Seattle in million in loans to the same country for fossil November-December 1999 coinciding with the fuel development.74 scheduled WTO meeting. Subsequent major An important aspect of the WTO is its protest in Washington, DC, Prague, disciplinary measures, enforced through Melbourne, and other cities at meetings of dispute tribunals that meet in secret and global economic elites reveal that substantial consist of undemocratically selected represen- momentum has built up. Certainly, since the tatives from corporations. These tribunals are early 1990s NGOs and activists world-wide under no obligation to publish their findings have been attempting to target many of these and their rulings are final and not subject to problems at their source rather than concen- appeal.75 Their capacity for demanding annual trating solely on the local symptoms. compensation for victors in their rulings or to However, prior to the campaign against the impose non-negotiated trade sanctions adds to MAI, there was relatively little effective and the power of the WTO and its ability to highly visible action directed at the institutions demand compliance in accord with its own responsible for many of the problems. For agenda. Although the WTO does not have its instance, Dooly Arora has noted in relation to own troops to exercise coercive force, violence SAPs that the schemes had not generated as is definitely involved in implementation of its much active resistance as their nature war- policies by governments, as well as structural rants.77 A brief overview of the resistance is violence associated with inequitable economic useful here. arrangements.76 The resistance has been both local and later global. From the early days of structural adjustment, Mexicans took to the streets, as they did later against NAFTA and GATT. Women also held demonstrations against the effects of structural adjustment in Jamaica. 73 Michel Chossudovsky, “Global poverty in the Voters have supported candidates standing on late 20th century,” Journal of International Affairs, anti-SAP platforms in Venezuela, Argentina, Vol. 52, Issue 1, Fall 1998, pp. 293–311. and Brazil, but it has made little difference. 74 Lorraine Elliott, The Global Politics of the “Those who buy and sell government bonds Environment (London: Macmillan, 1998), p. 203. and hold the nation’s debt will see to it that 75 Wood, “The international campaign against the SAPs get implemented anyway,” one observer Multilateral Agreement on Investment.”

76 On structural violence see, for example, Johan Galtung, The True Worlds: A Transnational 77 Arora, “Structural adjustment program and Perspective (New York: Free Press, 1980). gender concerns in India,” p. 329.

72 Nonviolence Speaks lamented.78 This suggests that relying on in response to its aggressive marketing politicians to challenge institutions such as the practices that were misleading mothers in World Bank and IMF is unwise and must, at Third World countries to believing that baby the very least, be accompanied by other milk formula was a better option than breast strategies involving networks and grassroots milk for their children. activism. In Australia there was a boycott of the More visible and better publicized interna- fishing company SAFCOL because its tionally have been some of the major protests operations in South-East Asia disrupted local against World Bank projects, especially those communities through insensitive and environ- to do with dams such as the Narmada Dam mentally unsound operations. Boycotts are no project in India. Once again women’s groups doubt useful and can be highly effective, but were heavily involved in the protests. They they do need to be well thought through and to attempted first to establish the rights of the be instigated in response to requests from local directly affected people before moving to a people, who can be detrimentally affected by campaign that involved hunger strikes and boycotts.81 They can also be difficult to other activities for which protesters were enforce. For instance it is much more difficult arrested.79 The movement against the Narmada to carry out a boycott against Nestles in Dam, called Narmada Bachao Andolan, was Australia nowadays as the MNC has bought up characterized by its diversity and its support numerous previously Australian companies for communities that were dislocated and and has a virtual monopoly in some food lines. dispersed by the project.80 These campaigns Operating under the original names of the were inspiring and even partially effective, as products’ manufacturers, it is also difficult for some claim that the World Bank has shown activists to spread the information that these more trepidation in funding large-scale dams companies are now part of the Nestles group. since the bad publicity generated by resistance Activists face ever-new challenges. groups such as Narmada Bachao Andolan. What were the problems confronting Nevertheless, they have been of a somewhat activists that resulted in resistance being reactive nature, opposing individual projects initially somewhat sporadic and less focused that are the symptoms of globalization, even on global institutions and the unjust frame- while fully understanding the wider picture work within which they operated? This is a and having a very thorough analysis. Mean- difficult question and we can only suggest while, campaigns addressing the roots of some possible answers. It does seem that globalization seemed to be lagging behind. global institutions enjoyed enormous benefit Similarly, there have been a number of from being so integral to global directions and actions taken against MNCs in relation to their yet playing an apparent “backseat” role in that global practices, if not in respect to their they were less visible, less well known, and globalization per se. Most well-known among were able to go about their business while these was the boycott of Nestles, particularly heads of governments — if not the victims themselves — took the major blame. If this is a huge advantage for the global 78 Swift, “Squeezing the South,” p. 7. institutions and those who benefit from their strategies, it makes resistance correspondingly 79 Medha Patkar, “Armada against Narmada,” New harder for those worst affected. According to Internationalist, April 1992, pp. 16–17.

80 Gustavo Esteva and Madhu Suri Prakash, “Grassroots resistance to sustainable development: 81 William Kaempfer, Anton D. Lowenberg, H. lessons from the banks of the Narmada,” Ecologist, Naci Mocan, and Lynne Bennett, “Foreign threats Vol. 22, No. 2, March/April 1992, pp. 45–51; Uday and domestic actions: sanctions against South Turaga, “Damming waters and wisdom: protest in Africa,” in Paul Wehr, Heidi Burgess, and Guy the Narmada River Valley,” Technology in Society, Burgess (eds.), Justice Without Violence (Boulder, Vol. 22, No. 2, April 2000, pp. 237–253. CO: Lynne Rienner, 1994), pp. 191–215.

Resisting global corporate domination 73

Arora, the SAPs themselves make it difficult Despite Arora’s valid points, there was for the worst sufferers to offer much resistance massive resistance in India when the SAP was as they are busily tied up with new problems imposed there. In 1992, on the anniversary of in making ends meet.82 Obviously these are Gandhi’s birth, half a million farmers gathered also the people who are already most poorly in Hospet, Karnataka, to protest the SAP and resourced. The dispersion and casualization of the government’s economic policies that work have made it extremely difficult for the accorded with it. The demonstrators pledged to most exploited workers and newly unem- struggle for Gandhi’s concept of swaraj (self ployed to organize. rule) and to resist policies aimed at handing Some NGOs have seen their task as giving over food and seed production to MNCs.85 In a voice to these exploited people. Arguably, the state of Uttar Pradesh, thousands of while being vociferous, most of them have not farmers were arrested after protesting the been as active, coordinated, or focused on the removal of subsidies. At Ramkola in Uttar central problems as early as they might have Pradesh, police shot four protesters. Protests been. Of course, NGOs themselves face continued, as did arrests, with demonstrators considerable difficulties. If we take the case of taking up the chant “A government that rules India again, which has been described as with bullets and batons will not last.”86 having entrenched and elaborate ideological Another reason for there being less resis- systems that legitimize inequality and exploi- tance against SAPs than has been warranted is tation, NGO workers at the grassroots level that the contradictory rhetoric of structural have noted numerous hindrances facing them adjustment actually generates hope. It is made and the impoverished people with whom they to sound so attractive that people are not work. These include illiteracy, poor health, sufficiently suspicious of it from the start, traditions, addictions, superstitions, fear, and coming as it does with the endorsement of a internal divisions. It has been noted, too, that coterie of experts and economists who say, as the remnants of semi-feudal patron-client does the World Bank, that their aim is to relationships and the mentality that has long abolish world poverty and that public services accompanied such relationships still persist and regulations are barriers to this.87 By and provide the framework through which instilling such confidence in their measures, many people understand their position and the World Bank and IMF are thereby able to envisage solutions.83 These difficulties and provide time “to the beneficiaries of policies to cultural overlays are not unique to India. strengthen the hold over the reality.”88 It is James C. Scott, conducting research in always easier to oppose trends from the very Malaysia, confronted at least some of them.84 start than to later try to turn back the tide of While these difficulties existed before SAPs, changes in that direction. The institutions and they interact with the harsher conditions those enforcing their policies have also created imposed by structural adjustment and help the illusion of participation in the policy obfuscate the many interrelated factors of processes through symbolic association with poverty, as well as hindering resistance.

85 Vandana Shiva, “Structural adjustment and Indian agriculture,” Ecologist, Vol. 22, No. 6, 82 Arora, “Structural adjustment program and November/December 1992, p. 274. gender concerns in India,” p. 329. 86 Shiva, “Structural adjustment and Indian agri- 83 Elizabeth Mathiot, “Attaining justice through culture,” p. 274. development organizations in India,” in Wehr et al., Justice Without Violencee, pp. 233–256. 87 Shaoul, “How the World Trade Organization is shaping domestic policies in health care.” 84 James C. Scott, Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance (New Haven, CT: 88 Arora, “Structural adjustment program and Yale University Press, 1985). gender concerns in India,” p. 329.

74 Nonviolence Speaks decision-making structures. All these methods with the 50th anniversary of Bretton Woods, work to delay or weaken resistance.89 which sought to publicize how the further The IMF, World Bank, and WTO have impoverishment of many of the world’s people also sought to create a different picture of their was tied up with the strategies of the IMF and efforts by manipulating figures. This is starkly the World Bank. shown in the threshold adopted by the World As indicated by this campaign, numerous Bank to categorize who is poor and who is not NGOs acknowledge the need to initiate and, more importantly from its own point of transformative programs and to play a part in view, to be able to minimize the overall the resistance to the widening global gap picture of poverty. In the Third World between rich and poor. Accordingly a number anybody who is living on any more than the of them have skewed their efforts in this area. equivalent of one dollar a day is “non-poor” One person who has worked among grassroots according to the World Bank definition. organizations in India notes that there is “the Simply ignoring the real cost of living faced unfolding of a new nonviolent movement in by the victims of SAPs, the global institutions India” and that many of the grassroots organi- are then able to devise, from their simple but zations involved have goals of participation, socially meaningless arithmetic, glossy tables emancipation, decentralization, democracy, suggesting that poverty is on the decline. This nonviolence, and self-sufficiency.91 adds to the propaganda-created perceptions In terms of what might have been done, that the policies are working. The institutions many of the nonviolent strategies that could be are helped in this by media that are often recommended were in fact used, though enthusiastic about the policies and talk excit- perhaps not on a large enough scale nor with edly about “sustained and increasingly global quite the timing, co-ordination, and solidarity economic growth.”90 that might have enhanced effectiveness. In Critics have not been sitting on their Malaysia, when landowners brought in hands, for there was much criticism of the IMF machinery for harvesting, thereby denying and World Bank policies right from the start traditional work to the laborers, women within and much concern at the establishment of a villages banded together to enforce a cautious WTO which would zealously oversee not only boycott on transplanting, hoping to force the trade in commodities but also in services and owners to revert to hand harvesting so as to be intellectual property rights. (Also many NGOs assured of their services. However, landown- were doing important work at the grassroots ers would bring in labor from nearby villages level. To help raise the standard of health and so that the boycott was easily broken. Indeed, education is to prepare the groundwork for those who would boycott transplanting in their people to become active.) But initially the own area would sometimes take part in criticism seemed to suffer from not being “strike-breaking” in nearby villages, making sufficiently joined with effective actions on a the whole boycott effort virtually futile. large enough scale to really make a visible Actions that could have been extremely impact. powerful, if undertaken collectively and across A concerted effort was made to change the much wider regions, collapsed for lack of focus from the symptoms to the institutional support outside of their immediate vicinity.92 and global causes in 1994, with the launch of a Resistance to corporate globalization has “Fifty Years Is Enough” campaign to coincide not always been nonviolent, as shown by the response to the SAP imposed on Venezuela, which took the form of street riots in 1989. In 89 Arora, “Structural adjustment program and gender concerns in India,” p. 329. 91 Mathiot, “Attaining justice through development 90 Chossudovsky, “Global poverty in the late 20th organizations in India,” pp. 233–238. century,” p. 298, quoting a Financial Times editorial. 92 Scott, Weapons of the Weak, pp. 248–255.

Resisting global corporate domination 75 the same country military dissidents threatened alternative methods and social relationships. by the cutbacks from the SAP staged two Several countries, suffering under the weight violent coup attempts. We can, therefore, of SAPs, have requested assistance from the retrospectively identify this as one area where Bretton Woods Reform Organization. For additional effort might have been made to instance, in Papua New Guinea a coalition of develop and demonstrate the advantages of 35 organizations, including trade unions and nonviolent responses. church, student, women’s, and other commu- Most responses, though, have been nonvio- nity groups, has called for the renegotiation of lent, often taking the forms of civil disobedi- that country’s SAP and hopes that the Bretton ence and disruption of the system. For Woods Reform Organization will be able to instance, in Karnataka in India small farmers, help.96 anticipating that the eucalyptus trees planted Meanwhile activists in industrialized under an IMF-supported program would countries have organized to resist the jettison- benefit lumber industry interests but not the ing of labor laws and other social benefits. community, pulled up the tree seedlings.93 In Across France, demonstrations took place to Argentina when pension plans were drastically defend labor legislation, with masses of people scaled down under an SAP in 1992, there were chanting “We fought to win it, we will fight to mass demonstrations and a series of individual protect it.” Similarly, in South Korea workers protests.94 demanded new and improved labor laws and If one goal of action is to win over people received them, in spite of trends working in from the opposition, then some effort should the opposite direction elsewhere.97 be made to “convert” workers at the World Perhaps the opposition to NAFTA and the Bank, the IMF, and the WTO. Very occasion- Uruguay round of GATT marked a watershed. ally, one or two of them “change their minds,” In response to these developments an Interna- as was the case with Davison Budhoo. He had tional Forum on Globalization was formed. been a senior economist with the IMF and had Based in San Francisco, this campaign used e- been responsible for implementing SAPs in mail networking and held regular meetings and Africa, Latin American, and the Caribbean. teach-ins through which strategies and Eventually he resigned, disgusted and hoping programs of action were developed. It can be to “wash my hands of the blood of millions of seen as a trial run for the campaign against the poor and starving people.”95 He helped launch MAI.98 the Bretton Woods Reform Organization Furthermore, there has been a keen which seeks to design Alternative Structural acknowledgement that the struggle is not yet Adjustment Programs that combine direct over. This was evident from the mass actions grassroots involvement with the technical in Seattle and other cities. That the fight skills of government officials and other against the MAI is seen as ongoing is evident interest groups, towards the goal of meeting from a court case being brought in Canada the basic needs of the entire population. where citizens are suing the government for This is, of course, another important part preparing to sign away its powers under the of nonviolent action, namely to actually build MAI. The Defence of Canadian Liberty the alternative structures needed to replace the Committee claims that the MAI is unconstitu- structures of oppression. People’s involvement tional under Canadian law, as “it gives in these alternative structures gives them entrenched rights to international banks and experience and hope in the practicalities of the

96 Meeker-Lowry, “Removing the noose,” p. 16. 93 Ellwood, “Pinstripes and poverty,” p. 6. 97 Richard Swift, “Just do it!” New International- 94 “Adjusting structures, destroying lives — an NI ist, November 1997, pp. 14–16. map.” 98 Wood, “The international campaign against the 95 Meeker-Lowry, “Removing the noose,” p. 15. Multilateral Agreement on Investment.”

76 Nonviolence Speaks foreign corporations guaranteed by interna- ing a range of actions, such as small farmers in tional law which Canadian citizens do not Uttar Pradesh with their commitment to justice have,” thus breaching the principles of equity and Gandhian principles, even in the face of before the law enshrined in the Charter of grave violence by the state. It has been action Rights and Freedoms.99 Although the Cana- by NGOs networking across the globe that has dian government has tried to assert that it is no captured world attention, especially in the longer relevant since MAI negotiations broke success against the MAI, a success that down, the citizens are keen to pursue the court appears to have been unmatched in any prior case, since it has ramifications for future resistance against the offending global trends. treaties, calling into question the legitimacy of However, it is important not to presume politicians and bureaucrats to enter into such that the activities of the NGOs in industrial- arrangements with far-reaching implications ized countries, with their better resources and that have not been endorsed by the citizenry. the advantage of mostly speaking a common The court case seeks to challenge the language (even if as a second language), are legitimacy generally of international rules, more imperative than nonviolent actions by financial mechanisms, and regulations peasants and workers “at the coal face.” They governing the movement of capital. are complementary, with the everyday action Activists know, however, that they cannot of those in Third World countries providing afford to have all their eggs in “legal baskets.” the foundation of the struggle. Successful They must gather more grassroots support and collaboration between NGOs in rich countries pay careful attention to strategy. For example, and grassroots movements in poor countries is the demonstrations in Seattle were only part of not guaranteed. As Miriam Solomon points a much larger event that involved teach-ins, out, there are vast discrepancies in the resource workshops, and strategy sessions. In Canada bases of these organizations and those whose community groups, unions, student, and causes they purport to espouse. This can lead environmental groups took part in a Cross- to various breakdowns at different levels, as Canada Caravan that toured the country those who feel better positioned attempt to spreading information about the WTO and the speak for others.101 broader picture of injustice in which it is Sometimes collaboration itself is not embedded.100 Following Seattle, these activi- certain, even where deserving and sought. ties continued. Just as Canadians led the way When representatives of Nigeria's Ogoni in the campaign against the MAI, their contin- people approached Greenpeace and Amnesty ued actions can be expected to be replicated by International about the grave environmental activists globally. and human rights abuses against which they were nonviolently struggling, they were Conclusion initially told that these organizations could not help. Fortunately, the organizations later came Corporate globalization has been promoted by to provide international assistance.102 institutions such as the World Bank, IMF, and WTO as well as by MNCs and governments of rich countries. Numerous activists have op- 101 Miriam Solomon, “Lap-tops against communi- posed this form of globalization by undertak- cative democracy: international non-governmental organisations and the World Bank,” in Brian Martin (ed.), Technology and Public Participation (Wollongong: Science and Technology Studies, 99 Michel Chossudovsky, “Fighting MAIgaloma- University of Wollongong; http://www.bmartin.cc/ nia: Canadian citizens sue their government,” pubs/99tpp/, 1999), pp. 61–81. Ecologist, Vol. 29, No. 8, December 1999, pp. 102 Joshua Cooper, “The Ogoni struggle for 449–451. human rights and a civil society in Nigeria,” in 100 Cross-Canada WTO Caravan, http://wtocara Stephen Zunes, Lester R. Kurtz, and Sarah Beth van.org/default.htm Asher (eds), Nonviolent Social Movements: A

Resisting global corporate domination 77

Nevertheless, activists know they must were the resources and global power of the build on struggles. One major reason for the opponents, a multitude of different languages success of the campaign against the MAI was spoken by the people most affected, divisions that it built on the nonviolent actions that went between campaigners, sometimes harsh before it. Much of this was simply collecting repression for resisters, and the constant day- and disseminating data and stories of real to-day problems faced by those whose first experiences so that the myths associated with priority is to feed themselves and their World Bank, IMF, and WTO policies were families. As Scott noted of the people he challenged at last. studied in a Malaysian village, “Lacking any One of the most intriguing aspects of the realistic possibility, for the time being, of movement against the MAI is that the protests directly and collectively redressing their and actions appear to have been so coordinated situation, the village poor have little choice but and organized, even within such non-hierar- to adjust, as best they can, to the circum- chical and informal structures, giving heart stances they confront daily.”103 Thus, one of that hierarchies are not necessary for good the biggest challenges is to help empower communication. This was accomplished be- those people so that they are in a position to cause all had in common a well defined goal directly, collectively, and nonviolently redress and because communication, being crucial, their situation. was a strong focus. This allowed people to Even with the campaign against the MAI take their own individual actions towards the and the Seattle and subsequent protests serving broader goals within configurations of as reminders of the potential of nonviolent agreement. Activists shared a consensus that action, much still remains to be achieved. The the cause was worthy without being overbur- WTO’s powers have not been reduced. Its dened by bureaucratic constraints. interventions have forced reversals of socially Another major factor was that anti-MAI beneficial laws in several countries. activists employed efficacious communication The challenge is for activists to use the techniques and technologies to achieve their best possible tactics, the most appropriate desired goals. This made the campaign stand technology, and the best possible use of their out above ongoing struggles against the World talents in an innovative manner to aim at key Bank, IMF, and structural adjustment. targets in their campaigning efforts. They need The campaign shares many similarities to undermine individual policies and treaties, with the successes of the forced resignation of the institutions responsible for them, and the Suharto and the defeat of the Soviet coup myths underlying both policies and institu- described in chapters 2 and 3. In the cases of tions. These myths include the idea that the MAI and Suharto, resisters appear to have freeing up trade is necessarily good for paid close attention to co-ordination and competition and that the benefits trickle down communication. Both knew what they were up to all sections of society. Activists also need to against, having had previous experience of confront the power of the MNCs, which what their opponents were capable of and the already control more than one third of the way they worked. In this much, they learned world’s productive assets but now want to from the campaigns that went before them. control all government policies as well.104 The earlier barriers to action included Solidarity will be crucial. There have been insufficient interest in the issue from many attempts to divide the opposition by holding people around the world. Activists face a talks with some NGOs on specific issues, with constant struggle to build campaigning the potential to create resentment between momentum that can most likely be effective when more people are involved. Other barriers 103 Scott, Weapons of the Weak, p. 246.

Geographical Perspective (Oxford: Blackwell, 104 Shrybman, “The World Trade Organization,” 1999), pp. 189–202, at pp. 192–193. p. 270.

78 Nonviolence Speaks those who resist co-optation and those who are flattered at being “consulted.”105 That solidar- ity will need to stand firm in the face of coercion, as it has already been seen that some governments are willing — and eager — to use their police forces to counter, intimidate, and break up opposition. A seminar on globalization being held in Geneva in 1998, for instance, was raided by Swiss police and everyone present was arrested, the police claiming their action was “preventative” as a joint conference of the UN and the Interna- tional Chamber of Commerce was shortly to take place. Further police raids followed on the offices of People’s Global Action, with computer equipment and discs being seized.106 Global institutions and supporting governments take the opposition very seriously and can be expected to act accordingly. The secretary-general of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Develop- ment expressed his concern that “Having once tasted blood, the NGOs involved [in the anti- MAI campaign] will not relax their bite. On the contrary, the clash would grow and could end up infecting other related aspects of the WTO’s agenda … to the detriment of the broader process of trade liberalization and possibly damaging the credibility of the WTO itself.”107 Nonviolent activists opposed to global corporate domination will want to ensure that his worst fears come true.

105 Chossudovsky, “Fighting MAIgalomania,” p. 451. 106 Wood, “The international campaign against the Multilateral Agreement on Investment.” 107 Cited in Goodman, “Conclusion,” p. 228.

5 Nonviolence theory: insights for communication

How can nonviolent action against repression, who followed him.1 During his time in South aggression, and oppression be improved? Our Africa in the early 1900s, he became involved focus here is on the role of communication. In in campaigns against discrimination, gradually fast-breaking events such as the 1991 Soviet developing his experience and understanding coup, communication is obviously important of nonviolent action. On returning to India, he for mobilizing and coordinating resistance, soon became a leader in the country’s struggle winning over opponents, and alerting people against British colonial rule. outside the immediate situation. Just as im- Perhaps the most famous campaign led by portant to consider are times when action is Gandhi was the 1930 salt march.2 The British needed but little or none occurs, such as claimed a monopoly on the manufacture of salt periods in Soviet history when serious and taxed its sale. Following extensive prepa- repression occurred but there was insufficient ration and nonviolence training, Gandhi led a or ineffective opposition. In such situations, it 24-day march to the sea with the express intent may be useful to focus on barriers to effective of making salt from seawater, a form of civil communication and action. disobedience. The salt laws provided an ex- In this chapter we approach this issue cellent target, since they symbolized British through scrutinizing ideas from a number of oppression and could be challenged by popular theorists of nonviolent action and social action. The march itself provided a potent defense. We look specifically at how commu- means of mobilizing support along the way, so nication fits into their frameworks and how that momentum could be gathered before they might deal with the problem of absence engaging in the civil disobedience. There were of action. In the next chapter we look at parallel salt law disobedience actions around communication theories. Through these two the country. chapters we canvass a wide range of ideas, The British responded with mass arrests, always seeking what can help opponents of beatings of demonstrators with lathis (wooden repression, aggression, and oppression. batons), and firing on unarmed crowds. The Note that this is not a complete survey of salt campaign was followed by negotiations, nonviolence theory. Nor do we attempt to give but the British reneged on some of their a comprehensive treatment of the work of any promises. Nevertheless, the campaign gener- particular theorist. Rather, our aim is to ated great support for the independence examine some key perspectives to draw out movement both in India and around the world. insights relevant to communication and non- The effectiveness of nonviolent action in violence. In some cases, the lessons may be challenging and ending British colonial rule is primarily negative: namely, the approach might not be a useful one for the purposes here. Even then, there can be value in ruling 1 Mohandas K. Gandhi, An Autobiography or the out certain directions and hence needing to Story of My Experiments with Truth (Ahmedabad: search elsewhere. Navajivan, 1927); Richard B. Gregg, The Power of Nonviolence (New York: Schocken Books, [1935] Gandhi 1966); Krishnalal Shridharani, War Without Violence: A Study of Gandhi’s Method and its Mohandas K. Gandhi was the foremost practi- Accomplishments (London: Victor Gollancz, tioner of nonviolent action in the twentieth 1939). century and the inspiration for many of those 2 Thomas Weber, On the Salt March: The Histori- ography of Gandhi’s March to Dandi (New Delhi: HarperCollins, 1997).

79 80 Nonviolence Speaks sometimes belittled by the claim that the tory ones. Furthermore, Gandhi’s “theory of British were benign colonialists. However, the nonviolence” is not necessarily identical to the effects on India were hardly benign. In 1760, way nonviolence worked in his own cam- at the beginning of the industrial revolution, paigns. India’s wealth and industry were equal to or Gandhi’s approach included personal non- better than England’s. Things were difficult violence as a way of life, constructive work, for the poor in each country. But while wealth and the use of nonviolence against direct and increased dramatically in England over the structural violence. His approach to conflict decades, India remained shackled and impov- included a belief that means cannot be erished. Indeed, British colonial rule destroyed separated from ends (good goals do not justify the foundation for Indian economic develop- bad methods), a belief in the unity of all life, ment and fostered social rifts. The overall cost and a willingness to suffer for one’s beliefs. of imperialism in terms of lost and blighted Gandhi saw nonviolence as a matter of lives was enormous.3 principle: it was a moral necessity. It was Furthermore, British imperialists were necessary because violence, oppression, and hardly soft-hearted humanitarians. In Kenya, exploitation are evils that must be opposed: to another British colony, the violent Mau Mau tolerate or ignore them is to support them. The rebellion was met by horrendous killing and best way to challenge evil is by opening the torture, with prison camps set up around the eyes of those who cause it. Violence is not a country.4 Arguably, there were relatively few good method since, as well as causing harm direct killings in India in large part because the itself, it shuts down the dialogue that is the resistance was nonviolent, not because the best way to bring about a change of heart in British were especially kind. the oppressor.5 Nonviolence is a moral neces- Gandhi was concerned with much more sity because it is the best way to bring about a than independence from Britain. He cam- genuine change in attitude. paigned against oppression from the Indian In contrast to the Gandhian approach of caste system, especially discrimination against principled nonviolence is the pragmatic so-called “untouchables.” He promoted eco- approach, in which nonviolence is preferred nomic self-reliance, for example through because, or when, it is more effective than spinning of cotton to produce the home-made violence. Most of the other theorists whose cloth khadi. He opposed the system of monop- work we will examine adopt the pragmatic oly capitalism and powerful government, approach. instead supporting village democracy. Although Gandhi supported nonviolence as However, our aim here is not to assess a matter of principle, he believed it was the Gandhi’s practice but rather to extract insights most effective way to bring about beneficial from his framework for conceptualizing change. However, in undertaking nonviolent nonviolent action. This is not so easy. Gandhi action the focus is on carrying out the action in expounded his ideas in a vast quantity of a principled manner, even at the expense of writing, but seldom in a systematic, well- immediate effectiveness. For example, the organized fashion. It is possible to draw many attitudes of nonviolent activists must be purely ideas from his writings, sometimes contradic- moral, and absolutely no violence is allowed. On occasion Gandhi called off major cam- paigns because of a lapse into violence by some participants. 3 Paul A. Baran, The Political Economy of Growth (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1957), pp. Underlying Gandhi’s approach is an as- 144–150. sumption that the commitment and voluntary suffering of nonviolent activists will change 4 Robert B. Edgerton, Mau Mau: An African Crucible (New York: Free Press, 1989). This comparison between British imperialism in India 5 If the choice was between doing nothing or using and Kenya was drawn by Robert Burrowes. violence, Gandhi preferred violence against evil. Nonviolence theory 81 the fundamental attitudes of others, whether it We will return in a later section to a discus- is police beating protesters, rich landowners sion of how communication actually operated who exploit those who work their land, or in some of Gandhi’s campaigns. For now we British colonial administrators. This is an as- summarize the strengths and weaknesses of sumption about communication: nonviolent Gandhi’s framework in relation to communi- action will “melt the hearts” of those support- cation. ing evil. A central strength of principled nonviolence Gandhi saw nonviolent action as a means of is its focus on persuasion via dialogue. fostering dialogue. In any campaign, he would Nonviolent action is seen as a means of first seek to approach authorities to request opening dialogue, by impressing on opponents that they voluntarily change their policies or the commitment and sincerity of activists. behavior. If this was unsuccessful, campaigns Violence is avoided in part because it shuts of nonviolent action would be launched in down dialogue. (At the extreme, a dead order to demonstrate, through the commitment opponent cannot be persuaded.) In a search for and sacrifice of activists, their strong concern truth, dialogue is an essential tool. Nonviolent about the issue in question. This was seen by action is a means by which those with less Gandhi as a way of opening the hearts of the power can open a more balanced dialogue with oppressors. He was ready to reopen dialogue at those with more power. Demanding sacrifice any time, often at the expense of a campaign’s and purity of motive from nonviolent activists momentum and coherence. minimizes the chance that activists will serve For Gandhi, nonviolent action was a search their own interests and oppress others. for truth. He introduced the term “satyagraha,” A central weakness of principled nonvio- literally “truth-force,” which is often translated lence is that it has no framework for conceiv- as nonviolent action. The idea of truth has ing change beyond direct persuasion. When come under sustained critical attack in recent oppressors are far away from the action, for decades and would seem to undermine the example, it is not obvious how persuasion is foundation of Gandhi’s approach.6 supposed to operate. It is well known that crew Communication is central to Gandhi’s ap- on military aircraft are far less affected by the proach, which is based on persuading remote effects of the bombs they drop than are opponents through a moral commitment to a soldiers by the impact of hand-to-hand search for truth. Gandhi assumes that persua- combat.7 It is not immediately obvious how to sion occurs through direct dialogue or obser- adapt Gandhi’s framework to deal with vation and that the responsibility for making bombers and other threats that seem to restrict this happen lies with nonviolent activists, who opportunities for direct persuasion of oppo- must be selfless and willing to accept suffering nents. This is an increasingly important issue, — including beatings, imprisonment, and even given that innovations in military technology death — in support of their beliefs. are distancing victims ever further from the instigators and executors of violence. The model of principled nonviolence also has no obvious way for dealing with absence 6 F. G. Bailey, The Prevalence of Deceit (Ithaca, of action. If no one is creating dialogue with NY: Cornell University Press, 1991), pp. 19–26, oppressors through discussion or direct action, argues that Gandhi’s approach is built on the then the principled nonviolent activist will assumption that there is a single truth. Hence, simply say that efforts should be made to do satyagraha contains an unspoken coercive element, so. The theory’s conceptual tools are not well in that its adherents believe they have access to this truth and will not compromise until they obtain it. The postmodern view is that there are multiple 7 For an insightful treatment, see Dave Grossman, truths, a perspective compatible with the pragmatic On Killing: The Psychological Cost of Learning to approach to nonviolence discussed in the rest of Kill in War and Society (Boston: Little, Brown, this chapter. 1995).

82 Nonviolence Speaks suited for analyzing why action is not Gandhi as a Political Strategist.10 He has occurring. written other books and numerous articles, given talks around the world, and been a high- Gene Sharp profile figure in the field for decades. Theoretically speaking, Sharp’s key role We now turn to the pragmatic approach to has been to systematize the study of nonvio- nonviolent action, which is the most com- lent action in two ways. First, he classified monly held approach, especially outside India. methods of nonviolent action and catalogued Pragmatic supporters or users of nonviolent hundreds of different techniques along with an action believe it is superior to violence, either extensive array of historical examples. In The at all times or for a specific campaign or Politics of Nonviolent Action Sharp listed 198 purpose. When social activists use violence, it different methods of nonviolent action.11 These often alienates supporters and third parties and include: solidifies opposition. To be seen to use vio- lence against nonviolent resisters can be very • protest and persuasion, such as public damaging. That police resort to using infiltra- statements, slogans, leaflets, banners, demon- tors (agents provocateurs) to foment violence strations, marches, disrobings, vigils, mock in dissident movements shows the drawback funerals, teach-ins, and renouncing honors; of being seen to be violent. • noncooperation, such as ostracism, stay- However, the distinction between princi- at-home, protest emigration, consumer pled and pragmatic approaches to nonviolence boycotts, embargoes, strikes, bans, working to is often blurred in practice. Many principled rule, refusal to pay tax or debts, withdrawal of adherents of nonviolence argue that it is prag- bank deposits, boycotts of government institu- matically superior as well, while pragmatic tions, civil disobedience, evasions, delays, and supporters of nonviolence may raise principled mock incapability; objections to violence as a way of building and • intervention and alternative institutions, maintaining adherence to their preferred such as fasts (a psychological intervention), tactics. sit-ins, nonviolent obstructions and occupa- Of all the theorists of nonviolent action tions, and establishment of alternative institu- since Gandhi, undoubtedly the pivotal figure is tions for markets, government, transport, media, welfare, health, and education. Gene Sharp, the world’s foremost writer on 8 the subject. Sharp’s 1973 epic book The For each of the 198 methods of nonviolent Politics of Nonviolent Action is the unrivalled action, Sharp listed historical examples. Since 9 classic in the field. His other books include his book was published, Sharp has discovered Social Power and Political Freedom and hundreds of additional methods. Sharp’s classification has produced conceptual order out of the scattered experiences of and writings on nonviolent action. 8 Portions of the following are adapted from Brian Sharp’s second pioneering contribution is Martin, “Gene Sharp’s theory of power,” Journal his consent theory of power, which he uses to of Peace Research, Vol. 26, No. 2, 1989, pp. 213– 222. For other assessments of Sharp’s work, see Lewis Lipsitz and Herbert M. Kritzer, “Unconven- tional approaches to conflict resolution: Erikson 10 Gene Sharp, Gandhi as a Political Strategist and Sharp on nonviolence,” Journal of Conflict (Boston: Porter Sargent, 1979); Gene Sharp, Social Resolution, Vol. 19, No. 4, December 1975, pp. Power and Political Freedom (Boston: Porter 713–733; Ralph Summy, “One person’s search for Sargent, 1980). a functional alternative to violence,” Gandhi Marg, 11 Sharp, The Politics of Nonviolent Action, pp. Vol. 5, No. 1, April 1983, pp. 26–44. 107–445. This is Part Two of the book, sometimes 9 Gene Sharp, The Politics of Nonviolent Action published as a separate volume titled The Methods (Boston: Porter Sargent, 1973). of Nonviolent Action. Nonviolence theory 83 explain how nonviolent action works. While • achieving success by conversion, accom- Sharp’s theory has been given relatively little modation, or nonviolent coercion; scholarly attention, it has had an enormous • redistributing power. influence among nonviolent activists. In activist circles, it is often taught as part of For Gandhi, nonviolence was a moral nonviolent action training, along with such imperative. For Sharp, nonviolence is a topics as social analysis, group dynamics, pragmatic imperative: by withdrawing consent consensus decision making, role playing of and using the powerful dynamics of nonvio- direct action, and practical information about lent action, major problems including dictator- laws, safety, supplies, and the like. Sharp’s ship, war, genocide, and systems of oppression theoretical ideas, more than any others, have can be challenged and transformed. Sharp been incorporated into activist thinking and aims to provide a solid, indeed exhaustive, practice. treatment of nonviolent action, demonstrating The basic ideas of Sharp’s theory of power its superiority to violent methods, in order to are quite simple: convince people, including political and military leaders, to adopt it. However, neither • people in society may be divided into scholars, politicians, nor military commanders rulers and subjects; have rushed to follow Sharp, whose ideas have • the power of rulers derives from consent been adopted to a far greater extent by social by the subjects; activists.13 • nonviolent action is a process of with- Sharp’s model is individualistic and volun- drawing consent and thus is a way to challenge taristic. These characteristics provide both its problems of dictatorship, genocide, war, and greatest strength and its greatest weakness. systems of oppression. By focusing on withdrawal of consent, Sharp’s theory of power provides a framework Nonviolent action constitutes a refusal by for activists that is simple, congenial, and subjects to obey. The power of the ruler will empowering. It implies that anyone can collapse if consent is withdrawn in an active contribute to opposing repression and oppres- way. The “active” here is vital. The ruler will sion: the means are at hand, namely symbolic not be threatened by grumbling, alienation, or actions, noncooperation, intervention, and critical analyses alone. Sharp is not concerned setting up alternative institutions. Since the with passivity and submissiveness, but instead key is withdrawing consent, action can be with activity, challenge, and struggle. taken by anyone and begin at any time. Sharp’s consent theory of power provides Sharp’s analysis of the dynamics of nonviolent the theoretical foundation for his analysis of action provides a way of understanding the nonviolent action. He analyses the “dynamics evolution of campaigns, in which nonviolent of nonviolent action,”12 which includes: action provides the tools for challenge and • laying the groundwork for nonviolent eventual transformation of oppressive systems. action; Actual campaigns can be readily analyzed • making challenges, which usually brings using Sharp’s framework of the dynamics of on repression; nonviolent action. Consider the case of 1998 • building solidarity and discipline to Indonesian popular opposition to the Suharto oppose repression; regime.

• building support; Laying the groundwork for nonviolent action. There had always been critics of the

12 Sharp, The Politics of Nonviolent Action, pp. 447–814. This is Part Three of the book, some- 13 This is ironic, given Sharp’s attempts to dis- times published as a separate volume titled The tance civilian-based defense from groups such as Dynamics of Nonviolent Action. pacifists, feminists, and environmentalists.

84 Nonviolence Speaks regime, but due to repression and divide-and- through the experience of collective action, rule techniques, they had been weak and especially when the process is participatory isolated. With the economic downturn, oppo- and when the action is direct. In participatory sition groups became emboldened. actions, those involved gain skills in group dynamics, decision-making, and mutual sup- Making challenges, which usually brings on port, whereas hierarchical processes can repression. Student protests, the most visible perpetuate dependence. In direct action — sign of opposition, were met by armed force. such as attending a banned meeting, working- Building solidarity and discipline to oppose in at a workplace, or squatting in a vacant repression. Students maintained nonviolent building — participants themselves help discipline. They took stringent measures to achieve a goal, whereas in much conventional keep out infiltrators who might have provoked citizen action, such as voting, lobbying, violence to discredit the student protest. writing to politicians, or holding protest Building support. When four students were meetings, the aim is to get someone else, such killed in one protest, this caused a dramatic as politicians or administrators, to take action. backlash against the government, demonstrat- Although Sharp and others recognize these ing the importance of “political jiu-jitsu” in empowering effects of nonviolent action on which violence by the regime is used by its participants, most of their attention has been nonviolent opponents to generate greater on the effects on opponents.15 resistance. The individualistic and voluntaristic Achieving success by conversion, accom- features of Sharp’s model are also a weakness. modation, or nonviolent coercion. A few The model works best when applied to members of the elite were persuaded about the systems where the distinction between ruler need for change. Others supported limited and subjects is most obvious and accentuated, change to protect their positions, a form of such as military dictatorships. It does not work accommodation. Suharto himself was essen- nearly so well when applied to oppressive tially coerced, using nonviolent means, to systems in which people are embedded in resign. 14 complex relationships, sometimes as subordi- Redistributing power. The nonviolent nates and sometimes as superordinates. For struggle against the regime built self-esteem in example, in most large organizations, such as the opposition movement and reduced cen- corporations and government departments, tralization of political power. many employees are both bosses to their Empowerment of activists is a feature of subordinates and subordinates to their own nonviolent action whether undertaken on a bosses. Many workers have multiple roles, principled or pragmatic basis. This occurs having different degrees and types of power depending on whether they are dealing with clients or other workers. Consumers in the marketplace are implicated in a complex Sharp’s discussion of the redistribution of 14 system of exchange in which the power power (The Politics of Nonviolent Action, pp. 777– 810) is very general and does not discuss the sorts exercised by sellers and buyers often varies of structural changes common in literature on from transaction to transaction. Only a very revolution. However, other writers on nonviolence few managers or capitalists could unambigu- give more attention to revolutionary transforma- ously be said to be rulers, whereas nearly tions of social structures through nonviolent everyone else is sometimes more a “ruler” and action: George Lakey, Strategy for a Living Revo- sometimes more a “subject.” Patriarchy, the lution (New York: Grossman, 1974); Brian Martin, Uprooting War (London: Freedom Press, 1984); Martin Oppenheimer, The Urban Guerilla (Chi- 15. Julia Kraft and Andreas Speck, “Nonviolence cago: Quadrangle, 1969); Geoffrey Ostergaard, and social empowerment,” http://www.wri- Nonviolent Revolution in India (New Delhi: irg.org/nvse/nvse-2.htm, translated from an article Gandhi Peace Foundation, 1985). in Gewaltfreie Aktion, Vol. 32, No. 123, 2000. Nonviolence theory 85 system of male domination, is similarly More generally, it appears that Sharp’s complex in its power relationships, so that the model works best when applied to systems of ruler-subject distinction provides little repression, where overt physical violence is a conceptual leverage.16 When dealing with prominent means of maintaining unequal complex systems of power, the idea of power, and is less helpful for analyzing subjects withdrawing consent from rulers does systems of oppression, where overt violence is not provide nearly as much useful guidance as less salient. Ironically, the concept of hegem- in cases where there are obvious rulers. This ony is commonly deployed in explaining the can be illustrated by using Sharp’s framework persistence of oppressive systems, and hegem- to examine the anti-MAI campaign. ony essentially involves people believing in or acquiescing to a way of doing things that does Laying the groundwork for nonviolent not best serve their own real interests.18 While action. Analysis of globalization initiatives consent — or some related process of psy- and building of networks were the most chological adjustment — may be involved in effective means of preparation hegemony, the problem is that withdrawal of Making challenges, which usually brings on consent is more problematical when power repression. The challenge was primarily by relations are not neatly captured by a ruler- mobilizing popular opinion against the MAI. subject dichotomy. Repression against opponents of the MAI did In summary, as a general theory of power, not play a significant role. consent theory has serious weaknesses, but as Building solidarity and discipline to oppose a theory of withdrawal of consent to challenge repression. Since repression was never a major repression, it has enormous strengths. factor, this stage is not very relevant. Concerning absence of action, Sharp’s Building support. Winning over uncon- framework gives little help. His major works verted parties was vital to the anti-MAI focus almost entirely on nonviolent action, campaign, but the role of “political jiu-jitsu,” with relatively little attention to explaining in which third parties are outraged by repres- why action might not be occurring, except sion, was minimal. when he examines obedience, a central Achieving success by conversion, accom- concept in his theory of power: “the most modation, or nonviolent coercion. Conversion, important single quality of any government, accommodation, and coercion all played a without which it would not exist, must be the role. obedience and submission of its subjects. Redistributing power. The campaign helped Obedience is at the heart of political power.”19 to prevent a redistribution of power to multi- He suggests that there is no single answer to national corporations. the question of why people obey, but that Because the ruler-subject dichotomy is not habit, fear of sanctions, moral obligation, self- so obviously applicable to capitalism as a interest, psychological identification with the system of power, Sharp’s model of the ruler, zones of indifference, and absence of dynamics of nonviolent action provides less insight into the operation of the anti-MAI reasonably well, whereas the case of global campaign than into the campaign against the corporate domination does not. Suharto regime.17 18 On hegemony, see Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1971). The idea of hegemony usually 16 Kate McGuinness, “Gene Sharp’s theory of implies false consciousness, namely that people do power: a feminist critique of consent,” Journal of not fully realize their real interests. For an argu- Peace Research, Vol. 30, No. 1, 1993, pp. 101– ment against this, see James C. Scott, Domination 115. and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1990). 17 Of our three case studies, the Indonesian and Soviet cases fit Sharp’s ruler-subject model 19 Sharp, The Politics of Nonviolent Action, p. 16.

86 Nonviolence Speaks self-confidence among subjects are important. At first glance, it might seem that social A major weakness is that these explanations defense is an absolutely hopeless proposition. are at the level of individual psychology. The How can rallies, strikes, and the like deter or interaction of psychology with social systems defeat an armed aggressor? That this is so such as capitalism and patriarchy is absent difficult to imagine shows how deeply the from Sharp’s model.20 Likewise, Sharp does military model has penetrated standard ways not analyze systems of communication such as of thinking. The very word “defense” in the mass media. conventional discussions is taken to imply In summary, Sharp’s analysis of the dynam- military defense. Furthermore, the word ics of nonviolent action is excellent for “defense” usually implies the capacity for examining immediate struggles such as the (military) offense too. Decades ago, before resistance to the Soviet coup, but is far less euphemisms became so standard, what are effective for dealing with systems such as now called departments of defense were called capitalism in which people are enmeshed in departments of war. complex webs of power. By focusing on Social defense operates not by conquering withdrawal of consent, Sharp’s framework is an opponent but by undermining it. This can tremendously empowering to activists but happen at several locations. Invading or provides little guidance for explaining the occupying soldiers are more easily mobilized absence of action. against a violent resistance. Nonviolent resistance is more likely to weaken their Social defense resolve or even win them over. This was apparent in the resistance to the Soviet coup, So far we have discussed nonviolent action as when some soldiers resisted orders to attack. a general-purpose method, typically used by A second location for resistance is the social activists to oppose social problems such population of the attacking or occupying as racism, male domination, environmentally country. A government normally finds it far damaging practices, war, and economic easier to mobilize popular support for military exploitation. It is also possible to imagine action against an armed opponent than against nonviolent action used in a more systemati- an unarmed one. As already noted, the British cally organized fashion as an alternative to colonialists ruling Kenya could use prison military defense. Instead of relying on military camps and torture with relative impunity forces for defense, a community would instead against the armed resistance, whereas the defend itself using rallies, strikes, boycotts, sit- colonial government in India felt more con- ins, alternative institutions, and many other strained, with the nonviolent resistance having methods of noncooperation. This alternative to generated support from British people. military defense goes by many names, Yet another location for resistance is among including nonviolent defense, social defense, people in other parts of the world, aside from civilian defense, civilian-based defense, and the two countries that are involved in the defense by civil resistance.21 We normally use “war.” Concerned citizens can exert pressure the term social defense here. via a range of channels, for example through churches, trade unions, governments, nongov- ernment organizations, and direct contact. The 20 On the psychology of oppression, see Philip Palestinian intifada, an unarmed struggle Lichtenberg, Community and Confluence: Undoing against Israeli occupiers from 1987 to 1993, the Clinch of Oppression (Cleveland: Gestalt was far more successful in gaining interna- Institute of Cleveland Press, 1994). tional support than terrorism by the Palestinian 21 It is important to distinguish social defense Liberation Organization had been previously. from civil defense, which is protection against military attack, for example using gas masks and bomb shelters. A social defense system might of social defense is nonviolent resistance by include civil defense preparations, but the essence civilians. Nonviolence theory 87

Arguably, a completely nonviolent struggle, multiple systems for communication, such as avoiding the throwing of stones, might well e-mail, telephone, and short-wave radio. It have been even more effective in stimulating could include education in how opinion can be support.22 manipulated by appeals to racism and xeno- In terms of Sharp’s theory of power, social phobia, and how to counter this. defense relies on systematic withdrawal of Social defense does not mean just dispens- consent as a comprehensive strategy to deter ing with military defense and then just and undermine aggression: consent of soldiers, refusing to cooperate with an aggressor. consent of citizens of the aggressor state, and Rather, to have a reasonable chance of consent of people around the world. success, it must be as carefully and systemati- No country has ever adopted social defense cally organized as military defense but in a as a matter of policy, except as a small very different manner. Military forces are only supplement to military defense. Therefore, in the tip of the iceberg of a military defense historical terms, there is no firm evidence of system, which also includes such things as its viability and effectiveness. The cases that economic infrastructure, arms manufacture, give the closest approximation to social military bases, spy operations, education and defense in operation are the 1923 German training, alliances, training exercises, and resistance to French and Belgian occupation public opinion formation and manipulation. and the 1968 Czechoslovak resistance to the Similarly, methods of nonviolent action such Warsaw Pact invasion. In neither of these as strikes and boycotts are just the visible cases was there any preparation or training. To manifestations of a social defense system, assess social defense by using these cases which would have an analogous set of social would be like assessing military defense by and technological supports. using a case of spontaneous armed resistance While social defense has quite a number of in which there was no planning or preparation, structural similarities to military defense, there no training, and no special equipment. are some fundamental differences, of which Social defense, as a policy option, could the absence of violence is just the most require just as much planning, preparation, obvious. Another important difference is that training, and investment as military defense. social defense is, by necessity, people’s Possible threats would be investigated and defense. Military forces involve only a small plans made for countering them. People would proportion of the population. In rich countries, participate in training, which might include many armies are now largely professional, nonviolent discipline, decision-making, with little or no reliance on conscription.23 communication systems, and many other Social defense, to be successful, must have skills. Preparations could include setting up widespread support — though not necessarily self-reliant systems for energy, agriculture, universal backing — and a high level of water supply, and transport, so that enemies popular participation. (It is sometimes called could not shut them down by attack or “popular nonviolent defense” for this reason.) sabotage. It could include learning foreign Most soldiers in most countries are young fit languages and customs in order to communi- men. Participation in nonviolent resistance, in cate effectively with people in other parts of comparison, can readily involve women, the world. It could include establishing links people with disabilities, children, and the with pro-democracy groups in potential elderly. Nearly every sector of the population aggressor countries. It could include setting up

22 Souad R. Dajani, Eyes Without Country: Searching for a Palestinian Strategy of Liberation 23 Economic pressures and discrimination in (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1995); employment may result in a form of de facto Andrew Rigby, Living the Intifada (London: Zed conscription, typically of those who are poor or in Books, 1991). ethnic minorities.

88 Nonviolence Speaks can participate in methods such as rallies, attack. Soldiers can defend or attack, and strikes, and boycotts.24 likewise weapons such as rifles, tanks, Military defense is normally taken to be bombers, and missiles have dual capacities. defense of a state. The well-known definition One school of (military) defense thinking by classic sociologist Max Weber is that a advocates “nonoffensive defense” or “defen- state is a set of social institutions based on a sive defense”: weapons with offensive capaci- monopoly, within a territory, over the ties, such as bombers, and long-range missiles, legitimate use of force.25 The “legitimate” are eschewed, with emphasis on technologies force is exercised by the police and the that are mainly useful for defense, such as military, which are the ultimate defenders of fighter aircraft, short-range missiles, and the state. If social defense is a direct replace- fortifications. The aim of defensive defense is ment for military defense, then social defense to reduce the threat perceived by potential is also a defense of the state, though with such enemies and thus reduce the likelihood of an alternative the definition of the state being attacked. Social defense takes this becomes problematic, given that the legitimate process one step further, at least as regards use of force within a territory is no longer such weapons systems. Because there are no a defining characteristic. In conventional weapons, there is absolutely no capacity for parlance, states are identified with countries, military attack, and thus potential enemies can such as Angola, Germany, and Peru, so social be reassured that there is no military threat. defense could be taken to be defense of the However, social defense can include the country and its people from aggression or capacity for nonviolent offense or attack.26 repression. This could involve attempts to undermine a However, a broader interpretation of social foreign government or reverse one of its defense sees it as defense of a “community,” policies, for example by building links with namely a group of people with a conception of foreign opposition movements, distributing itself as having certain common interests. information via e-mail, sending nonviolent Communities are often geographically defined, change agents as visitors, and coordinating but they could be narrower or wider than international pressure through letter-writing, countries. Furthermore, communities can also boycotts, fasts, and rallies.27 Social defense is be defined nongeographically, such as a social limited if it means only preparing for defense class, religious group, political group, or and leaving potential aggressors to prepare an ethnic group. assault. By supplementing social defense with As noted earlier, systems for military social attack, potential aggressors may be defense commonly can be used for military undermined before their preparations become dangerous. Australian military defense thinking has 24 On participation by people with disabilities, see long included preparation to deal with the Brian Martin and Wendy Varney, “Nonviolent “Indonesian threat,” namely the potential for action and people with disabilities,” Civilian- military attack from Indonesia. The assump- Based Defense, Vol. 15, No. 3, Year-End 2000, pp. tion is that Australia needs military defense to 4–17. While nearly everyone can participate in defend against this threat. Social defense for many types of nonviolent action, there are limits to Australia would involve preparations for and differences in participation depending on the method and group involved. For example, some risky methods, such as swimming or kayaking in front of a ship, require high levels of fitness and 26 In English, the expression “social offense” alertness. implies a breach of propriety, so “social attack” perhaps better conveys what is involved here. 25 This definition is not quite accurate since, in most states, male violence against women within 27 Brian Martin, “Revolutionary social defence,” marriage, and some other contexts, is legal and Bulletin of Peace Proposals, Vol. 22, No. 1, 1991, thus considered “legitimate” by the state. pp. 97–105. Nonviolence theory 89 nonviolent resistance to any attack from Social defense is not a guarantee of just Indonesia, but also involve support for behavior, since nonviolent action can be used prodemocracy forces in Indonesia. Ironically, for unjust purposes, for example when a the Australian government has given consider- dominant ethnic group uses ostracism against able support to the Indonesian military, thus minorities. Though both violent and nonvio- fostering the foreign military capacity that lent action can be used for just and unjust provides the rationale for having Australian purposes, there is an asymmetry in their military forces. application. The consequences of violence are The anti-MAI campaign can be conceived usually far more severe (and often permanent, of as a form of social defense against an in the case of killing), participation in violence assault by the capitalist class. Antiglobalists is far more limited, and violence is more could take the attack in any of a number of readily used by elite groups to protect their ways, for example by campaigns to undermine interests. Some of the most serious problems, the loyalty of employees of transnational including war and genocide, cannot be under- corporations. taken using social defense. Military defense is normally justified as Prior to the 1950s, a number of writers, of necessary for defending against attack, but whom the most well known names are what good is military defense when there is a Bertrand Russell and Gandhi, suggested that military coup? There are numerous coups and militaries could be replaced by nonviolent attempted coups around the world every year, resistance. However, it was not until 1958, not to mention military dictatorships. Indeed, with the publication of Stephen King-Hall’s military forces are more likely to be used book Defense in the Nuclear Age, that social against their own people than against a foreign defense was presented systematically as a full- enemy. Militaries are central to the power of scale alternative.28 A number of other authors the state and are used against both internal and have made important contributions, such as external threats. A coup is a change of the Theodor Ebert, Johan Galtung and Stephen guard of the state elite. It does not change the King-Hall.29 In order to proceed with our system of state power, though it may have serious ramifications for the population. Social defense provides a ready solution to 28 Stephen King-Hall, Defence in the Nuclear Age the problem of coups: since there is no (London: Victor Gollancz, 1958). military, there can be no military coups. 29 Anders Boserup and Andrew Mack, War With- Furthermore, since social defense by necessity out Weapons: Non-violence in National Defence must be based on widespread support, a (London: Frances Pinter, 1974); Robert J. nonviolent coup could be readily challenged Burrowes, The Strategy of Nonviolent Defense: A through popular action. Gandhian Approach (Albany: State University of The radical implications of social defense New York Press, 1996); Giliam de Valk in coop- become apparent here. By preparing a popula- eration with Johan Niezing, Research on Civilian- tion to be able to use a variety of methods of Based Defence (Amsterdam: SISWO, 1993); Theodor Ebert, Gewaltfreier Aufstand: Alternative nonviolent action against aggression and zum Bürgerkrieg [Nonviolent Insurrection: Alter- repression, the population is given the skills to native to Civil War] (Freiburg: Rombach, 1968); use those same methods against others: Gustaaf Geeraerts (ed.), Possibilities of Civilian unpopular laws, exploitative employers, elite Defence in Western Europe (Amsterdam: Swets corruption, and unjust privilege. A population and Zeitlinger, 1977); Bradford Lyttle, National equipped with the capacity for nonviolent Defense Thru Nonviolent Resistance (Chicago, IL: struggle is one that can take on any govern- Shahn-ti Sena, 1958); Brian Martin, Social ment or powerful interest group. In compari- Defence, Social Change (London: Freedom Press, son, military and police forces are used, for the 1993); Johan Niezing, Sociale Verdediging als most part, to support ruling groups, often in Logisch Alternatief: Van Utopie naar Optie the face of popular opposition. [Social Defense as a Logical Alternative: From Utopia Towards Option] (Assen, Netherlands: Van

90 Nonviolence Speaks examination of nonviolence and communica- The third part presents four East European tion, we analyze the works of a few social case studies: Lithuanian resistance against defense theorists. Soviet reoccupation (1944 to about 1952), East Germany 1953, Hungary 1956, and Czecho- Conditions for the success of social slovakia 1968. In each case, the events are defense? compared with ten “conditions” for social defense to infer whether social defense would In 1982, the Netherlands government commis- have been more successful than the resistance sioned a report on social defense from the that actually occurred. State University of Leiden. A few years later, The final part of the book looks at social the report, a book entitled Social Defense and defense as part of a more comprehensive Soviet Military Power, was published; the lead defense system, examines Sweden’s psycho- author was Alex P. Schmid.30 Its conclusion is logical defense, and presents resource mobili- that social defense would not be a viable zation theory (used by social scientists to method to oppose a Soviet invasion, then the analyze social movements) as an alternative to threat considered most likely in Western the social defense perspective. Europe. The book is perhaps the most care- Schmid’s basic conclusion is that social fully argued case against social defense ever defense would not work against a Soviet produced and hence is worthy of consid- invasion because the Soviet government was eration.31 mostly immune to persuasion, publicity, and The book contains four parts. The first is a economic pressures: “the Soviet military short survey of concepts of nonviolence and power instrument cannot be balanced by social defense. The second is a major study of economic noncooperation and cultural persua- Soviet military interventions and nuclear sion alone as the USSR is economically threats since 1945, including conflicts within invulnerable and culturally impenetrable. It the Soviet bloc, conflicts between the Soviet can be matched only by military power.”32 Union and the West, and Soviet involvement With the benefit of hindsight — namely, in Third World conflicts. the collapse of the Soviet Union and Eastern European communist regimes, largely without 33 Gorcum, 1987); Michael Randle, Civil Resistance outside pressure — it is easy to criticize this (London: Fontana, 1994); Adam Roberts (ed.), The conclusion. The Soviet Union had serious Strategy of Civilian Defence: Non-violent internal weaknesses, few of which were ever Resistance to Aggression (London: Faber and exploited by opponents in the West, as we Faber, 1967); Gene Sharp, Making Europe argued in chapter 3. In spite of this, it is useful Unconquerable: The Potential of Civilian-based to examine Social Defence and Soviet Military Deterrence and Defense (Cambridge, MA: Power in order to see what insights can be Ballinger, 1985); Gene Sharp with the assistance gleaned. In this case negative insights, namely of Bruce Jenkins, Civilian-Based Defense: A Post- knowledge that certain approaches are unfruit- Military Weapons System (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990). ful, may be of greater interest. An important point made in the study is that 30 Alex P. Schmid, with E. Berends and L. the outcome of many struggles, whether Zonneveld, Social Defence and Soviet Military violent or nonviolent, depends only in a Power: An Inquiry into the Relevance of an limited fashion on the methods used and the Alternative Defence Concept (Leiden: Center for the Study of Social Conflict, State University of strength of the resistance. At least as important Leiden, 1985). 31 Portions of this section are adapted from a 32 Schmid, p. 209. review of Social Defence and Soviet Military Power by Brian Martin, Civilian-Based Defense: 33 Ralph Summy and Michael E. Salla (eds.), Why News & Opinion, Vol. 4, No. 4, May 1988, pp. 6– the Cold War Ended: A Range of Interpretations 11. (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1995). Nonviolence theory 91 is the wider configuration of power interna- conditions is weakened by Schmid’s assump- tionally. For example, the Lithuanian partisans tions about the nature of social defense. never had much of a chance without the West First, he assumes that social defense is coming to their aid. This was only likely in the national defense that would occur in one context of a World War Three, which is what country (the Netherlands) without accompa- many of them hoped for; with the conclusion nying changes in other countries. The Soviet of the Korean war, their remaining hopes for military threat, which is his prime concern, and illusions about Western support were would remain a potent one in this circum- dashed. stance. An alternative is to see the introduction Schmid presents ten conditions that must be of social defense as a part of a process that satisfied in order for social defense to be a transcends national boundaries, leading to viable option.34 change in the Soviet Union as well as the Netherlands and other countries. 1. There must be an organization or Second, Schmid assumes that social movement to promote nonviolent resistance. defense has no offensive capacity. As noted 2. The community being defended must earlier, nonviolent attack is certainly possible, have a degree of independence for the purpose for example through radio broadcasts, visits by of preparing for defense. activists, boycotts, and interventions by peace 3. The defenders must be able to communi- brigades. cate with each other, with third parties, and Third, Schmid assumes that social defense with the attacker (including the attacker’s must substitute for all the strengths of military community). defense, including withstanding a Soviet 4. Resistance is aided by a tradition of invasion. He makes little mention of the democracy and diffusion of political power. failures of military approaches, nor of the 5. The political system of the defenders capabilities of social defense that are not must have greater legitimacy than the political possible using violent methods. The dangers of system of the attackers. military coups, attacks on civil liberties, 6. The defending community must have a militarization of the economy, and weapons of high level of social cohesion. mass destruction are not attributed to military 7. The attacker must be dependent, to some approaches but rather accepted as parts of the extent, on the defenders or on an ally of the present world order. For example, Schmid defenders. notes that social defense provides no defense 8. Interaction must be possible between against nuclear attack; he thinks that a nuclear individual attackers and defenders. deterrent is essential. This ignores the fact that 9. The community being defended must possessing nuclear weapons is precisely what have some legitimacy with public opinion, is most likely to make one a nuclear target and foreign governments, or the attacker. to stimulate the “enemy” towards building its 10. The attacker “must be rational and not own nuclear weapons. permanently fanatical or crazy.” Fourth, Schmid assumes that social defense Many of these conditions seem to be would be introduced without any other signifi- common sense. Condition 3 is especially cant changes in society. He presents social relevant to our interest in communication. But defense as a sort of “social fix,” a pragmatic whether they are sensible as a means of alternative to the present system. Yet the judging whether social defense is a viable vulnerability of a society to attack or takeover option is another question. The value of the ten depends on more than just formal defense measures. For example, decentralized energy systems are less vulnerable than centralized 34 Schmid, pp. 27–29. The conditions have been ones. A society that systematically opposes liberally rewritten from their original rather techni- racism, sexism, and large inequalities in cal mode of expression, with the intention of wealth is less vulnerable than one split along maintaining their spirit.

92 Nonviolence Speaks these lines. Factories controlled by workers are 5. The attacker “must be rational and not less vulnerable than ones controlled by owners permanently fanatical or crazy.” or bureaucrats. Schmid’s negative conclusions about social Other conditions could be specified if desired, defense reflect the very restrictive assumptions including many of Schmid’s conditions which he makes about its implementation. One could be imported without change. Military insight that can be drawn from his study is that defense fails on all five of these counts. Specifically: social defense, to be effective, cannot be just a narrow replacement for military defense. In 1. The stated goal of military defense is particular, peace, but its methods are war and the threat of • introducing social defense ideally should violence. be part of a global process, rather than an 2. Military forces are internally autocratic exercise of “nonviolence in one country”; rather than democratic. • social defense is best supplemented by 3. Military preparations threaten other social attack; societies. • social defense has a qualitatively different 4. Military forces can be used against the set of strengths and weaknesses than military society they are ostensibly intended to defend. defense; 5. Military defense is not very effective • introducing social defense involves con- against “permanently fanatical or crazy” siderable social change outside the strict ambit opponents. For example, nuclear weapons can of what is commonly thought of as defense be smuggled into a country in a suitcase, with issues. military interdiction all but powerless to stop It is worth nothing that the option of this short of a total blockade of commerce. defense by military forces is never assessed Agents from an enemy can deploy biological according to “conditions” before deciding or radiological weapons with relative ease, for whether to use it as a defense option; rather, example by releasing them via the air military defense is unquestioningly assumed to conditioning system of a large office building. be required, and a military system is set up to Enemy agents who are or become members of be as effective as possible within constraints the armed forces can use a military’s weapons such as resources and social values. If social against itself.35 defense is a fundamentally different option — as we have argued — then it does not make Social defense strategy sense to “choose” it according to whether it satisfies a set of criteria that take military Rather than assess social defense by a set of success as the standard. conditions, an alternative is to choose social Consider the converse process. Take the virtues of social defense as the standard and establish a set of criteria that military defense (or some other defense system) must satisfy 35 Schmid’s assumption in talking about perma- nently fanatical or crazy opponents is that they are before being considered a viable option. Here, commanders of foreign states who use conven- we note a few possibilities of special interest: tional military methods. An alternative assumption 1. The defense system must reflect its goals is that nonconventional methods are used. Any in its methods. society that relies on dangerous technologies for 2. The defense system must be internally defense or other purposes — such as risky nuclear democratic. or biological materials — could find that they are 3. The defense system must pose a low used against it. For example, a few “crazy” threat to other democratic societies. opponents could make it their aim to spend 4. The defense system must not be a threat however many years is necessary to gain employ- to the society it is intended to defend. ment in a nuclear or biological facility and then cause a major “accident” of Chernobyl or greater proportions. Nonviolence theory 93 defense because it is compatible with social warfare. These are different, of course, in that values and aspirations and then to develop it to guerrilla warfare uses violence (as well as be as effective as possible. We examine here nonviolent means). However, in certain some key studies that focus on social defense respects there are considerable similarities, strategy. notably the requirement to wage struggle Stephen King-Hall, in his pioneering book against an opponent that has overwhelming Defense in the Nuclear Age, asked what was superiority in armed force in a situation where being defended by social defense.36 His answer there may be no secure haven for launching was “a way of life.” This is quite different attacks. Like social defense, guerrilla warfare from military systems which aim primarily to generally relies on support from the society. defend territory, plus troops, materièl, The most important contribution by civilians, and the like. By “a way of life,” Boserup and Mack is their discussion of King-Hall primarily meant British parliamen- strategy, drawing on the classical contribution tary democracy. Although people may rea- by Clausewitz.37 One major element of sonably have differences about what is worth Clausewitz’s theory is the concept of the defending, the idea of defending a way of life center of gravity, namely the opponent’s captures the essence of social defense, which central source of strength, which should be the can be said to be defense of the social fabric. main target for destruction. The center of Resisters of the 1991 Soviet coup were gravity of the defense is determined by the defending only some aspects — and fairly mode of defense, which is the basis for recent ones — of their way of life, but there Clausewitz’s idea of the superiority of the was nevertheless considerable resolve about defense over the offense. Working out the the worth of defending them. center of gravity is important since it should Thinking about the fundamental features of be the basis for designing campaigns, choosing a society is helpful for focusing on what tactics, building alliances, and many other people really should be defending, but it aspects of the defense system. provides little guidance for actually organizing Boserup and Mack conclude that for a and running the defense. For this, it is useful to social defense system, the center of gravity is turn to studies of social defense strategy. the unity of the resistance: “It is against this A key work in the field is War Without point that the whole thrust of the attack must Weapons: Non-Violence in National Defence be directed and to its preservation that all by Anders Boserup and Andrew Mack. The efforts of the defense must tend.”38 If the book describes the methods of civilian defense defense is able to absorb the attack, then its — classified as symbolic, denial, and under- next task is to mount a counterattack against mining activities — and analyzes organiza- the center of gravity of the opponent. Boserup tional issues, especially coordination of the and Mack say that in the case of military resistance and the appropriate role for its attack against a social defense system, the leadership. The authors analyze two classic center of gravity of the offense depends on the cases of nonviolent resistance to occupation — mode of attack. Generally speaking, the center Germany in 1923 and Czechoslovakia in 1968 of gravity for the counteroffensive will be — and two classic cases of nonviolent resis- those things that allow the offense to continue, tance to military coups — the 1920 Kapp such as the willingness of troops to exercise putsch and the 1961 Algerian Generals’ repression, political support in their home Revolt. War Without Weapons contains two innova- tive discussions of special note. The first is a comparison of social defense with guerrilla 37 Carl von Clausewitz, Vom Kriege [On War] (Berlin: Ferdinand Dümmler, 1832).

38 Boserup and Mack, War Without Weapons, p. 36 King-Hall, Defence in the Nuclear Age. 163.

94 Nonviolence Speaks country for the leaders of the offense, and strategic aims, one each for the defense and for international support or noninterference.39 the counteroffensive. For the defense, the Other social defense theorists have built on strategic aim is “to consolidate the power and Boserup and Mack’s analysis but differed will of the defending population to resist the about the precise nature of the center of aggression.”43 This includes mobilization of gravity. Gene Keyes, who made a major study “key social groups” including worker organi- of the Danish nonviolent resistance to the Nazi zations, women’s groups, religious bodies, and occupation during World War II, decided that ethnic communities. the center of gravity should be maintaining the This might sound deceptively easy but it morale of the resistance.40 Keyes summarizes has significant implications. For example, in his position thus: “I suggest that the center of choosing whether to hold mass rallies, the key gravity might better be identified — for the thing is not how many people will attend, aggressor and defender alike — as morale. Let whether there will be media coverage, or unity be impaired if it comes to that. But let whether police and troops are likely to use the parties bearing the burden of defense carry violence, but whether the action will on with morale unshaken, and national strengthen the power and will of the popula- integrity will remain intact. If unity frays, let it tion. Burrowes traces the consequences of his be; I would not admit defeat. But if morale general framework through a range of areas, collapses, all is over: for us if it’s our morale; including the time frame of the struggle, for them if it’s theirs.”41 communication with the opponent, selection of A different center of gravity is identified by nonviolent tactics, secrecy, sabotage, main- Robert Burrowes in his book The Strategy of taining nonviolent discipline, and making Nonviolence Defense: A Gandhian Approach, defenders less vulnerable in the face of an a major contribution to the field.42 It presents a extremely ruthless opponent. closely argued and highly principled perspec- Parallel to the strategic aim of the defense tive, beginning with a critique of classical is the strategic aim of the counteroffensive: “to ideas about strategy and culminating in several alter the will of the opponent elite to conduct chapters laying out strategy of nonviolent the aggression, and to undermine their power defense. to do so.” This has three components. First is In Burrowes’ framework, the political altering the will of the troops of the opponent purpose of nonviolent defense is “to create the elite. In the case of the Palestinian intifada, for policy, process, structural, and systemic example, this would mean winning over Israeli conditions that will satisfy human needs.” troops or at least weakening their commitment Within this general purpose, there are two to serve the repression. Throwing rocks at them is less likely to achieve this than engaging them in dialogue and demonstrating 39 Boserup and Mack, War Without Weapons, p. Palestinian commitment. The second compo- 169. nent is altering “the will of key social groups who support the opponent elite’s act of 40. Gene Keyes, “Strategic non-violent defense: 44 the construct of an option,” Journal of Strategic aggression.” For the intifada to be effective, Studies, Vol. 4, No. 2, June 1981, pp. 125–151. it was necessary to undermine support within Israel for the Israeli occupation. The third 41 Keyes, “Strategic non-violent defense,” p. 133. component is altering the will of allies of the Emphasis in the original. opponent elite. For the intifada, this means, for 42. Robert J. Burrowes, The Strategy of Nonvio- lence Defense: A Gandhian Approach (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1996). 43 Burrowes, The Strategy of Nonviolence Portions of the following discussion are adapted Defense, p. 209. from Brian Martin, “Nonviolent defence: Robert Burrowes’ approach,” Nonviolence Today, No. 55, 44 Burrowes, The Strategy of Nonviolence July/August 1997, pp. 19–22. Defense, p. 209. Emphasis in the original. Nonviolence theory 95 example, challenging the support given to nonviolent revolution. Israel by the US government.45 Social defense strategy is a vital topic, Burrowes’ formulation of the political worthy of much further study and practical purpose and strategic aims of nonviolent development. However, communication is our defense has two components: will and power. central concern here. Although communication This can be most easily understood in relation is an essential requirement for social defense, to the counteroffensive. One component of this the discussions by Boserup and Mack, Keyes, is altering the commitment of opponent troops and Burrowes give little explicit attention to it. to their assigned tasks. If their commitment or The vital role of communication is implicit in “will” can be altered, then the opponent cannot the center of gravity of a social defense succeed, except by bringing in other troops. system, which these authors variously con- But even if the troops remain committed to clude to be the unity, morale, or will/power of their tasks, they can be nonviolently coerced. the defenders. For any of these — unity, This is the factor of “power.” For example, in morale, or will/power — communication is the 1986 “people power” revolution in the obviously essential, especially among the Philippines, some soldiers were won over to resisters, in order to provide mutual support, the resistance by talking with people opposed overcome appeals and propaganda from the to the dictatorship — undermining their will opponent, coordinate actions, maintain contact — whereas others were primarily influenced with third parties, support maximum partici- by the massive demonstration — undermining pation in decision making and action, and their power. prevent divisive internal splits and divide-and- Approaches to nonviolence can be divided rule tactics. along two axes: principled versus pragmatic In discussing strategy, these authors assume and revolutionary versus reformist. Gandhi’s a basic level of communication and do not nonviolence was principled and revolutionary. focus on what can make that communication Many other writers on social defense, such as more or less effective. This may reflect an Gene Sharp, are better described as pragmatic assumption that a social defense system is “up and reformist. They justify nonviolence on the and running,” with full popular support, and basis of its effectiveness — the pragmatic that the main task is dealing with the oppo- approach — and they see nonviolent defense nent, who is assumed to be coming from the primarily as a way to defend society as it outside. This is the traditional model of exists — the reformist approach. Burrowes warfare, in which contending military forces strongly criticizes non-Gandhian approaches. are conceptually and physically distinct and He criticizes Sharp’s approach for being based operate within separate geographical areas. on a faulty strategic theory (the indirect These assumptions, which can be traced to approach of Liddell Hart, subject of a critique the use of Clausewitz’s model, must be earlier in Burrowes’ book), for relying on a questioned. It can be argued that the conditions conception of society oriented to elites, and for underlying Clausewitz’s analysis are satisfied failing to focus on satisfying human needs. less and less frequently in contemporary wars. Burrowes’ approach is principled and Rather than wars being between states, each revolutionary, and perhaps his sort of princi- deploying troops under unified command — pled nonviolence is inevitably revolutionary. such as in World War II — most armed Although the title of the book uses the word struggles in recent decades have taken a “defense,” this is not national defense the way different form, including such dimensions as most people think of it. It is more akin to paramilitary forces, civil war, shifting alli- ances, lack of a continuous front, guerrilla warfare, military coups, and attacks on and 45 This brief mention of the intifada is for illustra- purposeful displacement of civilian popula- tive purposes. A sophisticated study of nonviolent tions — such as in the wars in former strategy for Palestinian liberation is given by Dajani, Eyes Without Country.

96 Nonviolence Speaks

Yugoslavia.46 dominant states that would enforce laws and Even when Clausewitzean assumptions are repress challenges to property and the market. not satisfied, the idea of the center of gravity Whether or not the anti-MAI campaign is can be useful. However, the role of communi- considered to be a form of social defense, the cation becomes more important in these cases. key point here is that the campaigners were not In a Clausewitzean model, communication is located in a defined geographical area, but assumed to be unproblematic among the forces rather dispersed over the globe. Hence on either side. But in other circumstances — communication was absolutely fundamental to such as, in the case of social defense, when a the campaigners. Note that the idea of the fully operative system is not (yet) in place — center of gravity of the resistance applies communication may be a source of problems. nicely to this campaign. In the case of coups, communication systems None of the writers on social defense are vitally important, since they are primary strategy consider the issue of absence of action means by which contending forces attempt to or what measures might be taken to overcome win loyalty from the population. Symbols, it. Burrowes gives an insightful analysis of language, stated goals, modes of participation, social defense strategies but does not address and other aspects of communication are vital the question of how to create a social defense to maintaining unity, morale, and will/power system or to promote action when people are of resisters. ignorant of or indifferent to social problems or Attack cannot be assumed to come from the where other circumstances impede organiza- “outside.” Again, coups provide a threat in tion of resistance. which the “opponent” may include neighbors or co-workers. When the enemy is separate Strategic nonviolent conflict and distant, internal communication poses far fewer complexities than when opponents are A different approach to strategy is taken by mixed among “us.” Maintaining unity, morale, Peter Ackerman and Christopher Kruegler in and will/power in the face of “intimate” strug- their book Strategic Nonviolent Conflict.47 gles is a far greater challenge. After examining a number of major conflicts These considerations obviously apply to the in which one side relied primarily on nonvio- case of the Soviet coup. Of course, there was lent action, they formulated a set of 12 princi- no social defense system in place, but even so ples for waging such conflicts (Table 1). the idea of the center of gravity of the resis- tance can be usefully applied. The point is that Table 1 communication issues should be given a much Principles of Strategic Nonviolent Conflict48 higher profile in analyses. Principles of development The center of gravity is also relevant to 1. Formulate functional objectives. campaigns such as anti-MAI which was not 2. Develop organizational strengths. social defense in the strict sense. However, the 3. Secure access to critical material re- anti-MAI campaign could be considered sources. community resistance to corporate oppression 4. Cultivate external assistance. and exploitation which itself was backed up by 5. Expand the repertoire of sanctions. force, namely the police and military of Principles of engagement

46 For an overview, see Mary Kaldor, “Introduc- 47 Peter Ackerman and Christopher Kruegler, tion,” in Mary Kaldor and Basker Vashee (eds.), Strategic Nonviolent Conflict: The Dynamics of Restructuring the Global Military Sector. Volume People Power in the Twentieth Century (Westport, 1: New Wars (London: Pinter, 1997), pp. 3–33; CT: Praeger, 1994). Mary Kaldor, New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era (Cambridge: Polity, 48 Ackerman and Kruegler, Strategic Nonviolent 1999). Conflict, p. 23. Nonviolence theory 97

6. Attack the opponents’ strategy for Boserup and Mack, Keyes, and others also consolidating control. focused on strategy, but with special attention 7. Mute the impact of the opponents’ to the center of gravity. Instead of taking this violent weapons. road of looking for a central organizing 8. Alienate opponents from expected bases principle,49 Ackerman and Kruegler are in a of support. sense more eclectic theoretically, looking 9. Maintain nonviolent discipline. primarily for things that work. They also take Principles of conception a broader ambit by looking at “strategic 10. Assess events and options in light of nonviolent conflict” rather than social defense. levels of strategic decision making. Even so, their work shares assumptions with 11. Adjust offensive and defensive opera- studies of social defense strategy, notably that tions according to the relative vulnerabilities the nonviolent activists are sufficiently well of the protagonists. organized to be able to formulate and imple- 12. Sustain continuity between sanctions, ment a strategy. mechanisms, and objectives. It would be a valuable exercise to test the case studies in this book using Ackerman and These principles, as stated, are rather abstract. Kruegler’s against 12 principles. However, for Their meaning comes alive in application to our purposes here we look at the two key case studies. Ackerman and Kruegler analyze issues raised in earlier chapters: the role of six well-documented cases of nonviolent communication and the absence of action. conflict, assessing to what degree each of the Communication issues play only an inci- 12 principles was followed: dental role in Ackerman and Kruegler’s picture. For example, principle 1, “formulate • the Russian revolution of 1904–1906; functional objectives,” means articulating an • the Ruhrkampf (German resistance to ultimate goal “toward which all levels of French and Belgian occupation of the Ruhr), decision making are directed,” as well as 1923; subordinate objectives. The objectives, they • the Indian independence movement, say, should be clear, concrete, specific, and 1930–1931; attainable. Among the criteria for selecting • Danish resistance to Nazi occupation, objectives, they say that “the goals must attract 1940–1945; the widest possible support within the societies • toppling of the El Salvadoran dictatorship affected by the conflict” and “objectives by civic strike, 1944; should resonate with the values or interests of • Solidarity’s campaigns against the Polish external parties, in order to attract their support communist government, 1980–1981. 50 and potential assistance.” This suggests the This approach might seem reminiscent of importance not only of symbolic considera- Schmid’s ten conditions for the success of tions — the way objectives are embedded and social defense, but actually it is quite different. expressed in systems of meaning — but of Ackerman and Kruegler’s aim is to see how methods of communicating them, whether campaigns using nonviolent action can be through pictures, broadcasts, graffiti, slogans, made more effective. They assume that non- or whatever. However, Ackerman and violent action is a potent option whose success Kruegler do not devote much attention to this does not depend entirely on conditions such as side of the issue, instead focusing on the the strength of the opponent. They note that sometimes nonviolent action works when conditions seem very unfavorable and 49 Ackerman and Kruegler do not cite the work of sometime fails when prospects look good. Boserup and Mack or Keyes, suggesting that they They are concerned about a variable over are not aware of it. which the activists have considerable control: 50 Ackerman and Kruegler, Strategic Nonviolent strategy. Conflict, p. 24.

98 Nonviolence Speaks choice of objectives as ideas rather than their hypothesis, though not couched in terms of mode of expression. communication, is readily adapted to a Communication is overtly relevant espe- communication perspective, and thus deserves cially to principle 3, “secure access to critical our close attention. material resources.” One of the critical mate- Galtung starts with the Gandhian goal of rial resources (along with food, water, cloth- using nonviolent action to bring about a ing, energy, transport, and medical supplies) is “change of heart.” He notes that direct persua- communication infrastructure. They comment sion is often extremely difficult or unlikely that “Deep redundancy of both quantity and because there is a great social distance type of communications gear is vital. A stock- between the parties in conflict; sometimes the pile of quality fax machines, cellular phone, nonviolent activists are dehumanized, so that inexpensive short-wave radios, video and their actions do not prick the consciences of audio cassette players gives strategists the the oppressors. Galtung thus sees the obstacle ability to make, disseminate, execute, and being psychological distance. This might adjust their plans.”51 However, aside from this apply, for example, in the case of East mention of communication technology as a Timorese resistance to the Indonesian invasion vital material resource, Ackerman and and occupation. The Javanese rulers of Indo- Kruegler give little attention to communi- nesia looked down on other ethnic groups as cation. lesser people whose aspirations were inconse- Ackerman and Kruegler do not address quential compared to Javanese hegemony. In absence of action. Like the analysts of social the massacres of 1965–1966, communists defense strategy, they assume the existence of were demonized and dehumanized, making an organized group of nonviolent activists, killing easier and nonviolent resistance far less including strategists. effective. Galtung’s key idea is that liberation is not The great chain of nonviolence necessarily only the responsibility of the oppressed. Intermediate groups, especially Johan Galtung, one of the world’s foremost those that have an identification with both the peace researchers, has presented the “great oppressor and the oppressed, can play a key chain of nonviolence hypothesis.”52 This role. Intermediate groups are links in the chain of nonviolence. If the oppressed cannot through their own actions persuade the oppres- sors to change their views and actions, they 51 Ackerman and Kruegler, Strategic Nonviolent Conflict, p. 31. This list suggests that Ackerman may nevertheless be able to create sympathy and Kruegler are aware that network communica- among third parties who themselves have tion media (such as telephone) are more valuable more influence with the oppressors. Some- to nonviolent campaigners than are broadcast times the chain will be a long one, with several media (such as television). However, they intermediaries along the way between the comment that “The same tools can be used for oppressed and oppressor. domination and repression” (p. xxiii), missing the Galtung gives a table summarizing seven point that while tools commonly have multiple case studies of nonviolent action, showing in uses, they are more easily used for some purposes each case the oppressor, the oppressed, and than others, and hence it is to be expected that intermediate groups. We reproduce the table some communication technologies are more useful here, adding our own case studies. to nonviolent activists than to oppressors, and vice versa. 52 Johan Galtung, “Principles of nonviolent action: the great chain of nonviolence hypothesis,” in Nonviolence and Israel/Palestine (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Institute for Peace, 1989), pp. 13–33. Nonviolence theory 99

Table 1. Case studies of the great chain of nonviolence hypothesis53

Oppressor Intermediate groups Oppressed Vietnam war US state US people, “doves,” Vietnamese people including soldiers India British colonial state (1) Other Britons; Indian poor liberals; socialists (2) Gandhi, high-caste Indians Nazi Germany: Nazis, Gestapo Non-German wives of German Jews Holocaust German Jews54 South Africa: apartheid South African white (1) Other South South African blacks establishment African whites (2) Famous South African blacks Israel/Palestine Israeli establishment (1) “Moderate” Israelis Palestinians (2) “Moderate” Palestinians US South: civil rights US white establishment (1) US whites US blacks (2) Famous US blacks Philippines Philippine elite Manila bourgeoisie; Filipino poor; (supported by US “leftists” rural/urban proletariat government) Indonesia 1998 Suharto and ruling Indonesian students Indonesian people clique Soviet Union 1991 Coup perpetrators Media; armed forces; Soviet people sections of KGB; government officials MAI Multinational Workers and middle- Poor people, especially corporations and class activists in rich in poor countries governments of major countries capitalist states

As described in chapter 2, Indonesian of groups, mainly in key cities, such as students, a relatively privileged group in journalists, soldiers, and members of the Indonesian society, played a leading role in government apparatus, including the KGB. challenging the Suharto government in 1998. These groups all had links to coup leaders and The students had links with workers, peasants, the mass of the population. and dissidents, but also had connections with Campaigning against the MAI, described in members of the ruling elite. chapter 4, was spearheaded by a range of During the Soviet coup, most citizens activist groups, mainly in developed countries. remained inactive. Important contributing They had links with workers’ movements on roles in the opposition were taken by a number the one hand and with establishment figures on

53 Adapted from Galtung, “Principles of nonviolent action,” p. 27. Note that disagreement is possible over what groups fit under the categories of oppressor, intermediate groups, and oppressed. For example, nonviolence scholar Ralph Summy (personal communication, 21 February 2001) thinks that some of the intermediate groups listed in Table 1 should be classified under “oppressed,” such as US people and soldiers in the case of the Vietnam war and Gandhi and high caste Indians in the case of India. 54 In 1943 in Berlin, the Gestapo arrested German Jews, in preparation for transportation to concentration or death camps. Following a long public protest by spouses (mainly wives) of those arrested, the arrested Jews were released.

99 100 Nonviolence Speaks the other. Each of these cases thus fits nicely Although Galtung does not explicitly deal into the great chain model. with the issue of absence of action, the chain Galtung argues that the main danger in of nonviolence can be readily adapted for this these cases is that the struggle benefits the in- purpose by attributing absence of action to between group, not the more severely missing or flawed links in the chain of oppressed one. For example, in the liberation nonviolence. In other words, if appropriate of India from British colonial rule, the main messages cannot “get through” from the beneficiaries were the Indian elite; the lives of oppressed to the oppressor, the problem may Indian poor did not greatly benefit. Galtung’s lie in the absence or shortcomings of interme- recommendation is that more struggles are diate groups. needed. The great chain of nonviolence is a tool for liberation, but repeated uses are required. Events (repression, Of all the perspectives on nonviolence, the issues, nonviolent action great chain hypothesis is the most amenable to development using communication perspec- Participants, tives. Whereas Galtung conceives the gap observers between oppressor and oppressed as one of social distance, it can also be interpreted as a communication failure. We will develop this Intermediaries idea in the next chapter. Intermediaries One application of the great chain model is to the 1930 salt satyagraha, described at the • beginning of this chapter. Thomas Weber • • analyzed the campaign to see if suffering by • • satyagrahis converted the lathi-wielding • • police. Quite the contrary: despite extensive • injuries to protesters, with hundreds taken to • hospitals, the beatings became worse. The Intermediaries British colonial government brazenly denied any police brutality, claiming that protesters Intermediaries had faked being injured. The campaign was a success not due to Oppressors direct conversion, as postulated by Gandhi, but because of indirect conversion. United Press journalist Webb Miller reported on the campaign to an international audience, telling Figure 5.1. The great chain of nonviolence. about the gallant and disciplined Indian protesters and challenging British government disinformation. This reporting helped turn Are there enough links to form a great international opinion against British colonial chain? Recent research on “small world rule in India. Webb Miller and the interna- theory” shows that in a network, if there are tional press served as vital links in a great even just a few random connections, then it chain of nonviolence between Indians and takes remarkably few links to span the gap 55 British rulers. between any two parties in the network.56 The

55 Thomas Weber, “‘The marchers simply walked 56 Robert Matthews, “Get connected,” New forward until struck down’: nonviolent suffering Scientist, Vol. 164, 4 December 1999, pp. 24–28. and conversion,” Peace & Change, Vol. 18, No. 3, For a more comprehensive and mathematical 1993, pp. 267–289. treatment, see Duncan J. Watts, Small Worlds: The Nonviolence theory 101 world population can certainly be conceived of pragmatic approach, using nonviolent action to as a network of people, of which oppressors pressure or coerce opponents, with conversion and the oppressed are members. Small world an optional bonus. Yet in all cases it is essen- theory suggests that in communicating against tial to build support, both among those subject repression, there are plenty of potential to attack or oppression and among third intermediaries to make a fairly short chain, and parties, and, in building support, the process of hence that absence of action is likely to be due communication is vital. Access to information to weaknesses in links rather than their and struggles over meanings are absolutely unavailability. crucial in nonviolent campaigns but have This conclusion is further supported by received relatively little attention. In particu- noting that, as well as using existing chains, lar, absence of action has been off the agenda. new ones can be forged. One of the important The great chain of nonviolence as formulated activities of Amnesty International groups is to by Galtung provides the most promising write to governments on behalf of prisoners of foundation for dealing with communication for conscience. This can be interpreted as a nonviolence. strategy to build a communication chain Our examination of perspectives on nonvio- between concerned citizens in one country and lent action has shown that there is considerable oppressors in another. The challenge is to scope for further exploration of the role of increase the strength of the citizen-oppressor communication. We next turn to perspectives links. on communication to see what they might contribute to an improvement in the effective- Conclusion ness of nonviolent action.

How can communication be used more effec- tively against repression and oppression in active nonviolent struggles? What can be done, in the face of repression and oppression, when there is a relative absence of action? In this chapter we have canvassed perspectives on nonviolent action and social defense in seeking answers to these questions. This tour of ideas has revealed the rich history and repertoire of nonviolent action, as well as its potential for improvement. Our case studies in chapters 2 to 4 can be seen as part of a long tradition of nonviolent action, about which much is known but far more is yet to be discovered through both research and further action. Considering that nonviolent action is above all a struggle for loyalties, it is surprising that communication has such a low profile in theories about it. Gandhi assumed that princi- pled nonviolent action would speak directly to opponents, helping to convert them. Most theorists and activists, though, have taken a

Dynamics of Networks between Order and Randomness (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999).

6 Communication theory: insights for nonviolent action

In the previous chapter we surveyed a range of aim is not necessarily theoretical sophistica- perspectives on nonviolent action and social tion, and certainly not just for its own sake, but defense, looking for insights into improving rather “useful theory” — in this case, useful communication in struggles against repression, for activists and sympathetic researchers.3 A aggression, and oppression. Communication is model that has some theoretical shortcomings fundamental to nonviolent action, centrally in may nevertheless be more valuable to activists the sense that nonviolent action is itself a form than a “theoreticians’ theory” that cannot be of communication and secondarily in the role easily understood or applied in the field.4 For of communication to coordinate nonviolent example, Gene Sharp’s theory of power, resistance and win over third parties. However, discussed in the previous chapter, has theoreti- researchers on nonviolent action have not cal inadequacies but is very useful for placed communication at the center of their nonviolent activists. In the following survey of analyses. So, while research provides a wealth theories, we aim at presenting core ideas in a of insight into the dynamics and strategy of simple manner, seeking to extract insights nonviolent action, there is much less available relevant to communication against repression, about how to develop effective communication aggression, and oppression. strategies. In particular, situations in which there is relatively little action receive virtually The transmission model no attention. Johan Galtung’s idea of the great chain of nonviolence seems to be the best In the late 1940s, Claude Shannon developed a starting point from within the nonviolence mathematical theory of communication aimed literature for a closer look at communication at solving the technical problem of working and nonviolence.1 out how much information can be sent down a In this chapter we continue this quest by transmission channel. In the famous book The examining a range of perspectives on Mathematical Theory of Communication, communication, seeing what they can offer to Shannon’s analysis is supplemented by a nonviolent activists, especially in dealing with commentary by Warren Weaver that presented the problem of ebbs of action. We look at the Shannon’s ideas as a general model of transmission model, media effects theory, semiotics, medium theory, political economy, and organizational theory. Our aim is not a comprehensive overview of communication theory2 — a mammoth task — but rather 3 A superb activist-oriented approach to communi- scrutiny of various perspectives in an attempt cation is given by Charlotte Ryan, Prime Time to draw out insights that can provide guidance Activism: Media Strategies for Grassroots Organ- izing (Boston: South End Press, 1991). We follow for nonviolent activists. This means that our Ryan’s example in canvassing a series of perspec- tives on communication theory, looking for relevant insights. Whereas Ryan focuses on media 1 Johan Galtung, “Principles of nonviolent action: strategies for US social activists, we look for the great chain of nonviolence hypothesis,” in insights specifically relevant to fostering nonvio- Nonviolence and Israel/Palestine (Honolulu: lent action against repression, aggression, and University of Hawaii Institute for Peace, 1989), pp. oppression. 13–33. 4 See Brian Martin, “On the value of simple 2 For a useful overview, see Denis McQuail, Mass ideas,” in Information Liberation (London: Communication Theory: An Introduction (London: Freedom Press, 1998), pp. 143–163, on building Sage, 1994, 3rd ed). theory that is useful to activists.

102 Communication theory 103 communication.5 This model, which can be government control and censorship of com- called signal transmission theory or message munication — as occurred routinely in the transmission theory, is encapsulated in Figure Soviet Union and in Indonesia under Suharto 6.1. — are more readily conceptualized in a trans- In the case of nonviolent action, the infor- mission model than in a cultural model that mation source might be nonviolent activists highlights issues of meaning. and the destination could be the opponent William Leiss demonstrates how the trans- (especially in a Gandhian attempt at conver- mission model has been adapted to study sion), other activists, or noncommitted observ- communication of information about health ers, including people in another country. There and environmental risks, by speaking of are various transmitters and receivers along the problems of communication associated with way, such as telephones, journalists, and the source, transmitter, channel, and message.7 government officials. Thinking more broadly, This is shown in Figure 6.2. an action group or an entire social movement Difficulties in gaining support can be might be said to be a transmitter too. Finally, mapped onto the model. Consider, for the noise source can include things such as example, the Stalinist purges in the Soviet interference on telephone lines, government Union in the 1930s, and the challenge of disinformation, journalists’ news values, cul- alerting people around the world who might tural mismatches, and preconceived ideas. have taken action. The limitations of the transmission model are many, including difficulty in dealing with • Source problems would include fear of interactive communication, difficulty in deal- reprisals, self-censorship due to belief in the ing with the meaning of messages (rather than socialist project, and lack of understanding of just the quantity of information), and difficulty what was occurring. in incorporating the social context (such as • Transmitter problems would include lack organizational culture). From the point of view of technology for communicating directly with of many in cultural studies, the transmission people outside the Soviet Union. model is primitive, tainted, and better rele- • Channel problems would include Soviet gated to technical arenas from whence it came. censorship as well as censorship by Western Nevertheless, for all its limitations, it is possi- spy agencies and foreign affairs departments. ble to extract valuable insights from the • Message problems would include lan- model, at least for our purposes.6 In particular, guage and cultural differences, and difficulties in explaining the dynamics of purges. • Receiver problems would include milita- rist anticommunism in the West (causing 5 Claude E. Shannon and Warren Weaver, The receivers to use information to condemn Mathematical Theory of Communication (Urbana: communism rather than act effectively to stop University of Illinois Press, 1949). the purges) and leftwing procommunism in the 6 We are encouraged in this endeavor by three West (leading receivers to dismiss the cultural studies scholars, Lawrence Grossberg, information). Ellen Wartella, and D. Charles Whitney, Media- Making: Mass Media in a Popular Culture think of the two models as complementary per- (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1998), who state (p. spectives.” 25), “Although many scholars assume that the transmission and cultural models of communica- 7 William Leiss, “Risk communication and public tion contradict each other — that they have to knowledge,” in David Crowley and David Mitchell choose one model or the other — we strongly (eds.), Communication Theory Today (Cambridge: disagree. We believe that each model has some- Polity Press, 1994), pp. 127–139. For an applica- thing important to say about the complexities of tion of the model to information inequality, see communication in the contemporary world; the William Wresch, Disconnected: Haves and Have- usefulness of each model depends on our particular Nots in the Information Age (New Brunswick, NJ: questions about communication. Thus, we prefer to Rutgers University Press, 1996).

104 Nonviolence Speaks

information source transmitter receiver destination received message signal signal message

noise source Figure 6.1. The transmission model of communication

source transmitter receiver problems problems problems destination

message message problems problems

channel problems

Figure 6.2. Problems in communication, in the framework of the transmission model

Similar applications can readily be made to Timor under Indonesian occupation, the other cases, for example problems in getting seizing of a radio transmitter in northern information about East Timor to potential Australia was an obvious communication supporters in other countries, and problems in blockage, and can be conceptualized as a getting information about the MAI to con- channel problem or, appropriately in this case, cerned citizens. a transmitter problem, and seems straightfor- There is a fair bit of arbitrariness involved ward. (Although called a channel or transmit- in applying the model to cases of repression ter problem, the problem in this case was not and nonviolent action, especially in complex technical breakdown but political instruc- cases involving a chain of sources and receiv- tion/obstruction.) In contrast, the process by ers. For example, there is no rule on how to which information about Indonesian oppres- judge whether Soviet censorship is best sion and atrocities in East Timor were inter- described as a channel problem or a transmit- preted in the Australian Department of Foreign ter problem or some combination. However, Affairs — namely as not requiring action or this is not a major drawback, since the main further dissemination — can be conceptualized value of the model is as a heuristic device to as a receiver problem, but this is to simplify a highlight communication blockages. complex process that needs unpacking. The This approach is most effective in dealing receiver and transmitter problems in this with interruptions in information flow and example are linked, both arising from Austra- least effective in dealing with issues of lian government policy. meaning. For example, in the case of East Communication theory 105

The transmission model meshes very well working in a family business or participating with the great chain of nonviolence model, in a tightly knit congregation will likely take which can be conceived of as a chain of precedence over challenging messages from senders and receivers, with each link in the the media. For example, advertising promoting chain subject to source, transmitter, message, consumerism may not be able to overturn a channel, and receiver problems. family culture of frugality or a church culture One of the greatest values of the transmis- of charity. sion model is its relevance to absence of action. If we start with the assumption that action against oppression is more likely when people know about it and have a means of Events (repression, taking action, then the transmission model issues, nonviolent action draws attention to where, between the oppres- sion and the people who might take action, Participants, observers there is a blockage. As we will see in the following sections, other communication theories provide insight into particular types of blockages. Mass media Media effects theory (news, celebrities, ads, etc.) The mass media — television, radio, major newspapers — are truly “mass” in the sense that they are consumed by large numbers of people. Since the messages contained in the mass media are similar, it is to be expected that media consumers will end up with similar understandings of the world. Or such, at least, Mass audience was the conclusion of many researchers adopting the mass audience model.8 A simple representation of this model is given in Figure 6.3. It is based on the idea that messages are Figure 6.3 “injected” directly into audiences. A simple picture of mass communication Closely aligned to this model is the concep- tion of “mass society.” Let us first describe “non-mass society.” When people are tightly A number of processes have led to a linked to each other through local social weakening of tight community bonds. For institutions such as the family, churches, example, industrialization undermined the workplaces, trade unions, sporting clubs, family farm and family business, leading to a political parties, and community groups, they more anonymous industrial workforce. are likely to formulate their views of the world Consumerism has fostered individualism, through frameworks drawn from those institu- reducing concern for others. Secularization has tions. The perspectives developed through challenged the cultural role of churches. The women’s movement has contributed to a weakening of the patriarchal extended family. 8 For a discussion of work in the field, see for example W. Russell Neuman, The Future of the Multiculturalism has undermined ethnic exclu- Mass Audience (Cambridge: Cambridge University sivity. There are various diagnoses of these Press, 1991). We thank Chris Barker and an trends, but in any case the observation is that anonymous referee for helpful comments about individuals are less tied to local social insti- terminology. tutions.

106 Nonviolence Speaks

When local social connections that give First, no society has ever come close to meaning to life are drastically weakened, being a “mass society.” Most people are still individuals can be said to be part of an connected to each other in families, work- anonymous mass. This is “mass society.” In places, and a variety of groups. Though some mass society, the individual is more suscepti- social institutions, such as churches, have ble to viewpoints presented in the mass media. declined in significance, others have arisen Mass media in turn help to create a mass such as women’s groups and environmental society since, for the first time, large numbers organizations. While job mobility has undercut of people from different regions and different solidarity built around localities, there are new, walks of life were exposed to identical constantly evolving networks of association messages. The classic case of concern is based on technologies of mobility and Germany under Nazi rule. Germany’s defeat in communication, such as cars, planes, the World War I, the collapse of the currency in telephone, and e-mail. the early 1920s and then the depression Second, the mass media have never been devastated the middle and working classes, the only source of information and continue to especially by destroying economic security. be challenged. Word of mouth, leaflets, After coming to power in 1933, the Nazis specialty newsletters and magazines, tele- systematically smashed or intimidated organi- phone, and alternative radio are some of the zations that could pose a threat to them, means by which people are exposed to especially left-wing parties, trade unions, and divergent viewpoints about the world. With dissenting voices. Finally, Hitler brilliantly the increasing capacity of industry to produce tapped into collective fears and fantasies, a diversity of products at relatively low cost, using mass rallies and radio, while the there is ever more targeting and creation of government stifled alternative views from niche markets. With vast numbers of television appearing in mass forums. channels, for example, there is more “narrow- The idea that the population is an undiffer- casting” and less broadcasting. entiated mass susceptible to pitches in the Third, the influence of the mass media on mass media is of little practical value to social individuals is far weaker than postulated in the activists. After all, activists as a rule do not stronger versions of media effects theory. want to manipulate the population, but rather Most people do not just soak up whatever to encourage them to become informed and appears in the mass media, but instead actively active on issues of concern. Nevertheless, the filter, interpret, and transform the material idea of the mass audience can give insights from their own perspectives and for their own into the ways that mass media promote collec- purposes.9 For example, minority cultural tive passivity. Our aim here is to see what can groups may adopt corporate symbols — such be learned from the mass audience perspective as slogans or logos — as an ironic statement of — commonly called media effects theory — their own identity.10 for the purpose of developing nonviolent challenges to repression, aggression, and oppression. The focus in this theory is on the effects that media have on audiences, as 9 The classic statement of the possibility of opposed to the activity of audiences in inter- messages being read in ways differing from the preting and using media for their own encoded meaning, and more generally the impor- purposes. tance of analyzing systems of meaning production, discourse, and decoding, is Stuart Hall, “Encod- Before proceeding, it is important to note ing/decoding,” in Stuart Hall, Dorothy Hobson, the severe limitations of media effects theory. Andrew Lowe, and Paul Willis (eds.), Culture, Although this theory was once the dominant Media, Language (London: Hutchinson, 1980), pp. framework for media studies, it has come 128–138. under sustained attack and is largely discred- ited in many circles. 10 Rosemary J. Coombe, The Cultural Life of Intellectual Properties: Authorship, Appropriation, Communication theory 107

Cultural studies scholars focus their atten- ings of these issues for large sections of the tion on difference and resistance, and are population. rightly critical of the simplifications inherent One area where few people have direct in the idea of mass society. However, it is experience is politics at the level of govern- possible to become preoccupied with differ- ment, including policy formation, election ence and resistance to such an extent that campaigning, and, especially, international processes fostering conformity and acquies- affairs. Nearly everything most people learn cence are downplayed or overlooked. Heavy about national and international politicians and viewing of mainstream television is still activities is via the media. We read about or commonplace. Some individuals seem to let see television footage about a coup in their views be dictated by radio talk show Pakistan; we rely on the media because few hosts. Many of the new links that people make people have friends or workmates with through e-mail and long-distance travel are personal experience in Pakistani politics. quite superficial. Many people have only a (Even in Pakistan itself, few people have direct limited capacity to reinterpret media messages. personal experience in national-level politics.) When atrocities occur but few people become Some critics have argued that the mass media aware or take action, it is time to ask why. create artificial political realities which are so Media effects theory may be able to offer divorced from what is understood by those some insights.11 close to the events that they can be said to be It stands to reason that mass media will “political fantasies.” Dan Nimmo and James have the greatest influence on people con- E. Combs argue that “Few people learn about cerning issues about which they have the least politics through direct experience; for most personal experience. If farmers know that persons political realities are mediated through prices have been disastrously low for years mass and group communication, a process and that many of their neighbors are going resulting as much in the creation, transmission broke and being bought out by city-based and adoption of political fantasies as realistic corporations, they are not likely to be views of what takes place.”12 convinced by newspaper reports about the Various groups participate in the creation of virtues of tariff cuts or how deregulation has political fantasies, especially governments and led to a more responsive banking sector. City the media. We will look more closely at the dwellers are more likely to be receptive to processes by which this occurs in the discus- understanding rural issues using frameworks sion of organizational theory later in this underlying media stories. Few people have chapter. For now, we look at some character- personal experience of terrorism or high-tech istic features of mass media framing of reality, warfare. Therefore, media portrayals are likely concentrating on aspects of particular rele- to play a big role in constructing understand- vance to nonviolent struggle. We examine in

and the Law (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, Dan Nimmo and James E. Combs, Mediated 1998). 12 Political Realities (New York: Longman, 1983), p. 11 For a critique of the cultural studies approach of xv. We follow Nimmo and Combs in our choice to the active audience, see Robert Kubey, “On not examine news, Hollywood, celebrities, and sport. finding media effects: conceptual problems in the They also look at election campaigns and media notion of an ‘active’ audience (with a reply to melodramas. See also Murray Edelman, Politics as Elihu Katz),” in James Hay, Lawrence Grossberg, Symbolic Action: Mass Arousal and Quiescence and Ellen Wartella (eds.), The Audience and its (Chicago: Markham, 1971); David L. Paletz and Landscape (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1996), pp. Robert M. Entman, Media • Power • Politics (New 187–205; William R. Seaman, “Active audience York: Free Press, 1981); Michael Parenti, theory: pointless populism,” Media, Culture & Inventing Reality: The Politics of the Mass Media Society, Vol. 14, No. 2, April 1992, pp. 301–311. (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1986).

108 Nonviolence Speaks turn news, Hollywood, celebrities, sport, and tional organizations such as the United advertising.13 Nations. If citizens are called to participate, it is usually to contribute money or goods for News. In principle, the news provides an relief efforts, as in the wake of “natural ideal platform for informing people about disasters” such as floods and earthquakes.16 what is happening in the world and offering For many people, the news becomes a opportunities for intervening against repres- spectacle, to be observed but with no implica- sion, aggression, and oppression. In practice, tions for personal behavior.17 The values that news often turns people into spectators, govern selection of stories (discussed later making them aware of problems but with little under organizational theory) lead to an sense of responsibility or power to do anything emphasis on violence. Wars and violent about them or any vision of an alternative. clashes often receive attention in the media, Consider any of the many horrific events whereas peaceful protests receive far less reported in the mass media, such as the wars in attention and patient trust-building efforts in former Yugoslavia, the killing fields of local communities are virtually invisible. Cambodia, or the Iran-Iraq war. In these cases, Especially in the case of international news, there was quite a lot of reporting on what was governments are presented as the key actors, happening. (Many equivalent wars and atroci- often via top politicians. The implication is ties receive little media attention, such as the 14 that if action needs to be taken, it is govern- 1965-1966 massacres in Indonesia. ) How- ments that should be doing it. Therefore the ever, knowing about a problem and doing news encourages appeals to governments. something about it are two different things. However, there are many exceptions to this The news, in almost all cases, only tells about tendency. Many citizen protests are reported in the problem. It seldom provides any encour- the news, providing an example for viewers. agement for ordinary viewers or readers to do Furthermore, news reports can be used crea- something.15 Especially for international events, news reports assume that action is the responsibility of governments and interna- 16 This is implicit in the discussion by Moeller, Compassion Fatigue. She comments that 13 An anonymous referee correctly pointed out “Compassion fatigue is a result of inaction and that many of the points made in this section can itself causes inaction” (p. 52). In other words, also be examined through a cultural studies lens. being unable to act makes people less receptive to Our placement of this material in the media effects images of suffering. section is what we found convenient and is not intended as an endorsement of one approach over 17 For assessments of the replacement of reality by another. Since no body of communication theory images, in the media and elsewhere, see Daniel J. has paid much attention to nonviolent action, it Boorstin, The Image or What Happened to the would be unwise to rule out or endorse any American Dream (New York: Atheneum, 1962); approach to communication. Ian I. Mitroff and Warren Bennis, The Unreality Industry: The Deliberate Manufacturing of 14 For a detailed treatment of the US mass media’s Falsehood and What It Is Doing to Our Lives international news coverage of war and other (New York: Carol, 1989). On the media specifi- crises, see Susan D. Moeller, Compassion Fatigue: cally, see for example Robert Cirino, Don’t Blame How the Media Sell Disease, Famine, War and the People: How the News Media Use Bias, Death (New York: Routledge, 1999). Distortion and Censorship to Manipulate Public 15 This point is well made by Eesha Williams, Opinion (Los Angeles, Diversity Press, 1971); Grassroots Journalism (New York: Apex Press, Donna Woolfolk Cross, Mediaspeak: How 2000), p. 53: “More than anything, mainstream Television Makes Up Your Mind (New York: news coverage advocates passivity; next time you Coward-McCann, 1983); Bruce I. Newman, The read the paper look for how many articles cover Mass Marketing of Politics: Democracy in an Age news that matters directly to your life and that you of Manufactured Images (Thousand Oaks, CA: can act on. Not many.” Sage, 1999). Communication theory 109 tively by activist constituencies to mobilize of reality, Hollywood portrayals can be as further action. significant as those of the news desks and Different groups respond to the news in sometimes more so. different ways. For example, western reports Violence is far more prevalent in of war in former Yugoslavia were interpreted Hollywood creations than in everyday life. In very differently by Serbians, Croatians, and some genres, such as family comedies and others who had emigrated to other countries. It game shows, violence is rare, but it is standard is at this point that the mass audience model in others such as police dramas. Although the clearly breaks down: media consumers are far average member of the police never discharges from a passive homogeneous mass when it a firearm in duty through their entire career, an comes to the news. While this point is vitally episode in a police drama without use of guns important, especially for nonviolent activists, is an exception. Other forms of violence, media effects theory is still useful in pointing including fighting and beatings, are routine in to features of the news that encourage specta- television and films, again depending on the torship and passivity: genre. Most worrisome, from the point of view of • news is often presented and accepted as a nonviolent activists, is Hollywood’s require- spectacle that is separate from day-to-day ment for a happy ending in which good activities; triumphs over evil — very frequently by force. • news emphasizes violence and downplays The message is that violence is acceptable so nonviolent action; long as it is for a good cause; sometimes a • news encourages the idea that world good cause even seems to be defined by the problems are the responsibility of governments more effective use of violence. The star wars and seldom mentions the option of direct epics and James Bond fantasies are familiar action by citizens; examples. • news reports on what is happening and Violence is often portrayed in a stylized and seldom provides a vision of alternatives artificial fashion that has little connection to outside the political mainstream. everyday realities. In fist fights on the screen, Eesha Williams advocates “grassroots there are prolonged exchanges of blows, any journalism,” aimed at inspiring action, as an one of which would normally be enough to alternative to conventional mass media news.18 knock out or disable an opponent, accompa- This sort of journalism is relevant to people’s nied by unrealistic sound effects that dramatize lives, emphasizes quiet as well as dramatic the hits. Victims of gunfire are often killed grassroots victories (and failures), stimulates outright or injured “cleanly,” with few realistic action, and indicates what can be done, portrayals of permanent disability or suffering without preaching. Thus in every respect for more than a short scene. Screen violence is grassroots journalism is contrary to news that curiously antiseptic, as if it does not really hurt promotes passivity. and any “good guy” is bound to survive to fight again. Screen violence is almost entirely Hollywood. News is normally conceived of a masculine activity — one of its more realis- as reporting of facts, whereas Hollywood tic aspects. productions for television and film are, with Evidence about the effects of viewing some exceptions, fictional. Yet in the con- violence on the screen is mixed. If it contrib- sumption of media, especially television, these utes to violence by viewers, the impact may be distinctions become less salient. If news is a relatively small and may affect only a minority spectacle, it is simply another form of of viewers, since otherwise we would see entertainment, to be followed by a popular punch-ups in the street every day following the television program. In the media construction previous evening’s screen violence. On the other hand, exposure to media violence may have effects on psychological development, 18 Williams, Grassroots Journalism.

110 Nonviolence Speaks interpersonal relations, and behavior under There are a few celebrities known primarily stress that are important but hard to quantify. for their association with violence, such as However, sidestepping the long-running General Norman Schwartzkopf and movie star debate over the effects of viewing screen Sylvester Stallone. However, far more impor- violence, we can make a simple point: there tant than this is the way that celebrity culture are very few Hollywood portrayals of nonvio- emphasizes the significance of prominent lent action as a method of social struggle. individuals, so that collective social action is There are a few films that fill this role, thrown into a shadow. including Gandhi (by far the best known Nonviolent action does not need celebrities. example), Milagro, and The Mission. For the None came to the fore in the collapse of most part, nonviolence as a method is off the Eastern European communist regimes in 1989, Hollywood agenda. The message coming out except possibly dissident Vaclav Havel who of Hollywood is that the way to obtain results became president of Czechoslovakia. The anti- is through violence, and the only way to MAI campaign was a grassroots effort; none overcome violence from bad guys is more of the grassroots activists became celebrities. effective use of violence by good guys. The toppling of Suharto was the result of Again, not everyone interprets Hollywood people’s action; no celebrities were needed. the same way, and Hollywood fantasies can be Some nonviolent activists and leaders do used by viewers for their own purposes. become celebrities. The two most prominent Furthermore, film and television production are Mohandas K. Gandhi and Martin Luther outside of Hollywood often departs from or King, Jr.20 Others include Cesar Chavez and directly challenges the Hollywood formula. Danilo Dolci.21 As we write, the most promi- Nevertheless, the mass audience perspective nent figure is Burmese leader and Nobel Peace can alert us to the impact of Hollywood Prize winner Aung San Suu Kyi. portrayals on the way many viewers conceive Celebrities in the nonviolence area perform the world. Nonviolent activists need to take contradictory functions. On the positive side, this into account in developing communication their visibility helps promote the idea of strategies. nonviolence. Their example, by being widely circulated, provides an inspiration to others Celebrities. Hollywood, through films and and helps recruit new activists. television, is the primary force behind the rise of celebrity culture in the 1900s. By bringing images of particular individuals onto the large screen or into living rooms, these individuals industry that is little recognized, see Irving J. Rein, become “larger than life” and personally Philip Kotler, and Martin R. Stoller, High Visibility familiar. It is now hard to imagine the time (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1987). just a century ago when there were no celebri- ties in the current sense and when prominent 20 Gandhi and King are perhaps the two most prominent leaders in the twentieth century who figures were primarily known for what they were never heads of state. An excellent treatment did rather than who they were. Celebrities of nonviolent action, building on the life and words today include TV and movie stars, sporting of these two figures, is Mary King, Mahatma heroes, politicians, prominent news readers, Gandhi and Martin Luther King Jr: The Power of and many others.19 Nonviolent Action (Paris: UNESCO, 1999). We thank Tom Weber for helpful comments on Gandhi as celebrity. 19 On celebrity culture, see P. David Marshall, 21 Susan Ferriss and Ricardo Sandoval, The Fight Celebrity and Power: Fame in Contemporary in the Fields: Cesar Chavez and the Farmworkers Culture (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Movement (edited by Diana Hembree) (New York: Press, 1997); Richard Schickel, Common Fame: Harcourt Brace, 1997); James McNeish, Fire The Culture of Celebrity (London: Pavilion Books, under the Ashes: The Life of Danilo Dolci 1985). On the manufacturing of celebrity, a major (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1965). Communication theory 111

On the negative side, emphasis on celebrity extent through the creation of a mass audience, activists draws attention away from the especially via television. The Olympics, collective, participatory nature of nonviolent originally set up as an amateur movement, action and away from the importance of quiet, have been transformed into a professional, rational, behind-the-scenes leadership roles.22 commercial operation, with opportunities for Inequalities in media attention can cause earning money through the mass media resentment among other nonviolence leaders. responsible for much of the change.25 In deal- Any personal flaw or misjudgment by a ing with sport in relation to media effects celebrity activist holds the potential for serious theory, we are primarily interested in the damage to the movement. Finally, the presence impact of sport on spectators rather than on of celebrity activists can distort campaigning participants. by emphasizing media values at the expense of Although sport is normally conceived of as movement building and giving too great an a “separate world,” bounded by its own rules orientation to charisma.23 — which is one reason for its popularity — it As a consequence of the mass media has a number of connections with politics, creation of celebrities, many people are aware economics, psychology, and so forth. Here, of nonviolent action only through the names of with our focus on nonviolence, we look briefly Gandhi and King. Whatever the pluses and at sport as a metaphor or model for human minuses of this state of affairs, it needs to be relations. taken into account by nonviolent activists. Sport, in its most popular forms, is a competition between individuals or teams, in Sport. One of the most popular things which, ideally, the rules are fair, adversaries disseminated by mass media is sport, which use the same methods, and the better side has been transformed dramatically by profes- wins. This provides a model for warfare and sionalization and commercialization over the 24 business competition, with the ideological past century. Sport is big business to a large advantage of obscuring the great inequalities in the strength of armies and corporations. The 22 Ralph Summy, “Ordinary mortals of nonvio- assumptions underlying sport are less congru- lence,” Gandhi Marg, Vol. 22, No. 3, Oct-Dec ent with the dynamics of nonviolent action. A 2000, pp. 279–290, powerfully argues that some nonviolent struggle is, in a sense, a competi- nonviolence “heroes” operate out of the public eye, tion between two (or more) sides, but the using political analysis and rational argument, adversaries do not use the same methods, at rather than being highly visible figures with formal least when one side is willing to use violence. status, charisma, or celebrityhood. The “rules” are not fair, since there is no 23 Too great an orientation to the mass media can umpire to prevent destruction, torture, and be a problem for social movements even when killing by the side using violence. celebrities are not involved. For studies of A nonviolent struggle is certainly a form of movements and the mass media, see Stephen Dale, conflict, like sport, but typically a desired McLuhan’s Children: The Greenpeace Message outcome is cooperation and a win-win solution and the Media (Toronto: Between the Lines, to the conflict rather than outright defeat of the 1996); Todd Gitlin, The Whole World is Watching: opponent. Such a cooperative result is not Mass Media in the Making and Unmaking of the possible in competitive sport, where winning New Left (Berkeley: University of California Press, and losing are integral to the contest. Finally, 1980); Marc Raboy, Movements and Messages: Media and Radical Politics in Quebec (Toronto: Between the Lines, 1984); Andrew Rojecki, Culture and the Media: The Unruly Trinity Silencing the Opposition: Antinuclear Movements (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1999). and the Media in the Cold War (Urbana: Univer- 25 See, for example, Andrew Jennings, The New sity of Illinois Press, 1999). Lords of the Rings: Olympic Corruption and How 24 One of the best accounts of the interactions to Buy Gold Medals (London: Pocket Books, between sport and media is David Rowe, Sport, 1996).

112 Nonviolence Speaks it is worth mentioning that the most popular example competing for status. Nonviolent sports involve competitions between men, action, in contrast, is a participatory, collective often involving violence or at least heavy endeavor for addressing social problems. physical clashes. Thus, in as much as people adopt the Sport is widely watched and to some extent assumptions underlying the profusion of provides a shared model for understanding the advertising, they are made less receptive to world, as suggested by expressions such as collective, participatory action as an approach “scoring,” “level playing field,” “getting to to solving social problems. first base,” and “being a team player.” Elements of sport, seen as a separate world, Conclusion. The continuing displays of are used as a model for “real life.” Though this nonviolent action are a living testimony that provides some connections to nonviolent mass communication is not a universal action — especially the elements of communal pacifier. Social institutions such as the family, solidarity — to a greater extent the model of workplace, and community groups provide sport is uncongenial to the goal of helping sources of allegiance and meaning; mass people grasp the potential of nonviolent means media provide a range of messages that can be of social struggle. Thus the mass media interpreted in varying ways; and there are encourage an understanding of life as a form many alternative sources of information. These of sport, with an emphasis on competition and are among the reasons why media effects violence. theory is less than adequate, indeed mislead- ing, on its own. Advertising. Advertising is ubiquitous in However, although the theory has deep capitalist societies, with the average person flaws, it is still possible to gain insights from exposed to hundreds of messages daily. it. When there are reports of atrocities in Although some advertisements are tailored for foreign countries, few people join social action individuals or small groups, by far the groups to take action. There are a number of majority are aimed at a mass audience, possible explanations for this lack of response, especially using television, radio, newspapers, one of which relates to characteristics of mass magazines, leaflets, and billboards. How does communication. There is much more attention this barrage of commercial messages affect the to violence than nonviolence in news reports, willingness to take action against repression, Hollywood dramas, and sporting events. There aggression, and oppression? is an assumption underlying much advertising Advertisements are built on several as- that the only problems a person need be sumptions, two of which in particular are concerned about are ones for which a solution likely to hinder mobilization for citizen action. can be purchased. Most importantly, mass The first key assumption is that solutions to media position people as spectators rather than problems are for sale, rather than being readily an active participants, except for the role of solved without purchases. A related assump- consumer.26 While the mass media processes tion is that the most important problems are those for which purchases can provide a solution. Nonviolent action, in contrast, relies 26 While from one perspective mass media on people taking action themselves rather than encourage passivity, from another the mass media purchasing security or freedom (such as are only responding, in a competitive struggle for through professional military forces). The audiences, to what people want. The dilemma here is that what people want is not always what they second key assumption underlying advertising know is good for them. This dilemma appears in is that most problems are individual problems many areas. People want to be healthy, but they for which there are individual solutions, also want to avoid exercise, preferring to drive a namely purchased products and services. car rather than walk or ride a bicycle. They want to Indeed, people’s relationships with others are be healthy but will indulge their appetites for often insinuated to be competitive, for unhealthy food. They want to be healthy but want to smoke. In every case, government and corporate Communication theory 113 that encourage passivity, individualism, and tions), depending on the person and situation. belief in the value of violence can readily be A boycott might have a connotation of illegal- challenged, they do have considerable influ- ity or unfairness in some circles and a conno- ence. It is vital that those who see nonviolent tation of empowerment in others. action as a means of challenging repression, Semiotics is a huge field with its own aggression, and oppression are aware of the terminology and ways of viewing the world. dynamics involved. Our aim here is to indicate what insights can be drawn from the field for the purpose of Semiotics27 developing effective nonviolent strategies against repression, aggression, and oppression. Semiotics is the study of systems of meaning, The study of meaning provides an essential especially by analyzing signs, which are things complement (or challenge) to the transmission that produce meanings. Words are the most model, which looks at the transmission of obvious examples of signs, but there are also messages with no built-in attention to what pictures, gestures, physical objects, faces, film, meanings are involved. It does little good to and many others to consider. In most cases, ensure that a message gets from A to B if the meanings are not built into signs but are to a meaning as interpreted by B is quite different large extent arbitrary and socially constructed. from what A intended to convey. This is an For example, the word “boycott” is, in obvious point, but can easily be overlooked in English, arbitrarily used to refer to certain efforts to “get the message out.” actions involving refusals to purchase. Whereas media effects theory assumes that Meanings vary from person to person, and the impact of messages from the mass media from culture to culture. For many signs, there are similar, cultural studies researchers, who is a dominant meaning (the denotation) but use semiotics as a standard tool, emphasize also a range of associated meanings (connota- differences in response to the same message. Messages may be ignored, challenged, or transformed for different uses, though there interests have a stake in unhealthy habits, through are limits to what is likely and possible. Figure selling cars, fatty foods, and cigarettes. There is 6.4 illustrates this point, showing “audience less profit to be made, in the present system, in segments” — some of which may be as small town planning to encourage exercise, in food as one person — that respond differently to production geared toward healthy diets, or in messages from the mass media. In a sense, nonaddictive lifestyles. What might be said is that each audience segment has its own “filter” for it is in the interests of powerful organizations to encourage people to give in to their immediate interpreting and transforming the message. appetites (their wants) rather than collectively There is an enormous scope for application organize society to encourage activities and habits of semiotics to nonviolent action. Gene Sharp that lead to long-term health and satisfaction. The lists 54 different methods of nonviolent protest same applies to media. While it might be better for and persuasion, which are classified as people to develop a taste for in-depth analyses and symbolic action.28 They include public to link learning about the world to practical action speeches, banners, skywriting, mock awards, to improve people’s lives, the current system wearing of symbols, protest disrobings, encourages media organizations to pander to symbolic sounds, vigils, pilgrimages, demon- people’s immediate appetite for relaxation and strative funerals, teach-ins, renouncing honors, entertainment. From this point of view, blaming either media organizations or media consumers is beside the point: the challenge is to participatively design a system that encourages organizations and people to behave in a way that genuinely satisfies people’s needs in the long term. 27 We thank Mark Cerin and Tonya Stebbins for 28 Gene Sharp, The Politics of Nonviolent Action helpful discussions concerning this section. (Boston: Porter Sargent, 1973), pp. 117–182.

114 Nonviolence Speaks and many others.29 In each case the role of activists.30 The classic work in nonviolent meaning is crucial. Semiotics potentially action is Gene Sharp’s massive book The provides a means for understanding the Politics of Nonviolent Action, but there is no creation of meaning in past events and for corresponding work that might be called The developing more effective actions. Semiotics of Nonviolent Action or perhaps, more alliteratively, Satyagraha Semiotics. Why not? It is possible to speculate that cultural studies researchers, with their Events (repression, postmodernist rejection of universal narratives, issues, nonviolent action are not attracted to the area of nonviolent action which is commonly underpinned by a Participants, belief that certain problems (such as genocide, observers war, and oppression) can be unambiguously identified and should be opposed. A simpler explanation is that nonviolent action is “off the agenda” for most scholars and that it just Mass media happens that no activist-oriented semioticians (news, celebrities, have yet delved into the area. Another factor is ads, etc.) that cultural studies researchers often analyze what appears in the mass media and, since

30 There are some relevant articles, for example f5 f4 David William Low, “The greenie genre: noble saviours or planetary fools,” Australian Journal of audience Communication, Vol. 23, No. 2, 1996, pp. 101– f1 f2 segment 109. audience audience f3 segment segment A good example of discourse analysis oriented audience to activist concerns, though not directly related to segment nonviolent action, is studies of how citizens testified against a pulp mill in Canada, challenging experts: Mary Richardson, Joan Sherman and Figure 6.4. Michael Gismondi, Winning Back the Words: Illustration of different responses to a Confronting Experts in an Environmental Public similar message from the mass media. The Hearing (Toronto: Garamond, 1993); Joan interpretive filters of audience segments are Sherman and Michael Gismondi, “Jock talk, shown as f1, etc. Audiences can also receive goldfish, horse logging and star wars,” Alternatives messages directly, with a different filter, as Journal, Vol. 23, No. 1, Winter 1997, pp. 14–20. shown by f5. It is possible that nonviolent activists could gain insights from some cultural studies analyses that give much more attention to violence than However, despite a vast literature in lin- nonviolence, such as Begoña Aretxaga, Shattering guistics and cultural studies drawing on Silence: Women, Nationalism, and Political semiotics, there is very little to be found that Subjectivity in Northern Ireland (Princeton, NJ: explicitly addresses the concerns of nonviolent Princeton University Press, 1997), Chris Hables Gray, Postmodern War: The New Politics of Conflict (London: Routledge, 1997), and Carolyn Nordstrom and Antonius C. G. M. Robben (eds.), Fieldwork under Fire: Contemporary Studies of 29 Methods of noncooperation and intervention Violence and Survival (Berkeley: University of also involve issues of meaning. However, creation California Press, 1995). We thank an anonymous of meaning is more central to symbolic actions. referee for comments relating to this point. Communication theory 115 violence is featured far more prominently than spray cans. Sometimes they changed the nonviolence, give little attention to nonvio- wording very minimally, sometimes they lence. Deconstruction, after all, involves made very elaborate changes to both the text taking apart what exists and gives scant and illustrations, but always the original attention to constructing alternatives. meanings were challenged and replaced by Much of the scholarly literature using others. For instance, Benson and Hedges semiotics is very difficult to understand, and sought to appeal to upwardly mobile people the gulf between theory and activist applica- who liked to be seen as having good taste. One tion appears enormous. But studies with common advertisement for these cigarettes practical relevance are certainly possible, showed a famous painting. BUGA UP added given that semiotic analysis is regularly used the text: “What’s this, a Van Cough?” by advertisers. Just as technological develop- Although most BUGA UP targets were ment for defense is oriented by massive tobacco billboards, the group also challenged military expenditure with virtually none for advertisements for other unhealthy products social defense, so semiotic development is such as Coca-Cola. One billboard, enticing shaped largely by scholarly and commercial young people to “Smile ... with Coke” and imperatives, with little attention to activist showing young beautiful people, obviously concerns.31 Given the shortage of relevant part of the “in crowd”, with flashing smiles studies, we restrict ourselves here to outlining and drinking Coca Cola, had some of the teeth some possible applications of semiotics to blacked out by BUGA UP. This both under- nonviolent struggles. mined the alleged beauty which Coke was suggested to be conferring and reminded Anti-advertising. Advertising is a central observers of Coca Cola's high sugar content, feature of contemporary capitalism, providing detrimental for teeth. Sexist advertisements both the practical means for promoting were also targeted, with an advertisement for commercial goods and services as well as Lace Perfects panties, claiming to be “the conditioning people to think in terms of Perfect Billboard,” changed to read “the commodities as solutions to all problems. Pervert Billboard.” Campaigns to challenge advertising offer a Other similar groups started up elsewhere. means of challenging capitalism. Some actions In London there was COUGHIN (Campaign are based on noncooperation, for example on the Utilization of Graffiti for Health in the when individuals put “No junk mail” notices Neighborhood) and in Bristol AGHAST on mail boxes and when organizations refuse (Action Group to Halt Advertising and corporate sponsorships. However, since the Sponsorship of Tobacco).32 deeper effects of advertising are psychological, More recently a Canadian group called some of the most potent challenges aim to Adbusters started up. It runs “subvertise- undermine standard meanings attached to ads. ments” to expose consumerism. Adbusters Defacing billboards can be a creative exercise magazine details how advertising practices in altering meanings. Cigarette ads have been work and offers “culture jamming” strategies, prime targets. as well as running parodies of advertisements, In 1979 a group of Australian activists such as one for Nike which includes informa- calling themselves BUGA UP (Billboard tion about the appalling conditions under Utilizing Graffitists Against Unhealthy Pro- which Nike shoes are made in Third World motions) took to “refacing” billboards, using

31 On military influences on communication theory, see Christopher Simpson, Science of Coercion: Communication Research and 32 Bobbie Jacobson, Beating the Ladykillers: Psychological Warfare 1945–1960 (New York: Women and Smoking (London: Pluto, 1986), p. Oxford University Press, 1994). 134.

116 Nonviolence Speaks countries. Adbusters have also promoted Buy able people.”35 In other words, many of the US Nothing Day.33 men used the label “violent” when they Defaced ads and caricatures of ads are thought something was bad and “nonviolent” potent symbolic challenges to the commercial when they thought it was good. This is a culture. Many of the activists who undertake dramatic contrast to the way nonviolence this have a brilliant intuitive grasp of how to researchers use the words, namely “violent” best disrupt conventional interpretations of for actions that hurt or destroy and “nonvio- advertising messages. Surely semiotic analysis lent” for actions that do not. Researchers try to could contribute insight here, not just to avoid mixing judgment and meaning. decode ads34 but to give guidance on how best Suzette Haden Elgin draws on Blumenthal to challenge standard meanings and create et al.’s findings to propose a semantic break- alternative meanings. At a grander scale, down of the word “violence” for US males as analysis could be undertaken to suggest which being marked by five features: [+fierce], ads are the best targets for the purpose of [+strong], [+unnecessary], [+avoidable], and questioning commercialism altogether, or [+bad]. Elgin says that all five features need to building greater support for alternatives to be present before “violence” is seen as the capitalism. appropriate word. If US males think that burning draft cards is avoidable and bad, then The meaning of violence and nonviolence. it should be labeled violent, whereas if Nonviolence scholars have devoted consider- shooting looters is seen as unavoidable, then it able labors to classifying types of violent and is not violent.36 nonviolent action and to discussing the most Nonviolent activists are also tempted to mix appropriate terminology. However, much of judgement and meaning in speaking of this work is oriented to scholarly purposes, violence and nonviolence. Gandhian nonvio- with a primary aim being clarity of conceptu- lence is conceived of as much more than an alization as a foundation for further analysis absence of physical violence, but rather a way and insight. It is not designed specifically for of life committed to selflessness, service, and practical use. Sharp’s classification of types of the search for Truth. A semantic analysis of nonviolent action — symbolic action, nonco- “nonviolent action” as understood by operation, and intervention, with various Gandhians would include [+action], [-physical subcategories — is an exception, in that it has violence], [+good], and probably other fea- proved valuable for both intellectual and activist uses. In the early 1970s, Monica Blumenthal and colleagues investigated attitudes to violence by 35 Monica D. Blumenthal, Robert L. Kahn, Frank surveying over 1000 US men. Among their M. Andrews, and Kendra B. Head, Justifying revealing findings were that more than half the Violence: Attitudes of American Men (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1972), p. 86. men thought that burning draft cards was violence and more than half thought that 36 Suzette Haden Elgin, Success with the Gentle police shooting looters was not violence. The Art of Verbal Self-Defense (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: researchers concluded that “American men Prentice Hall, 1989), p. 114. The semantic tend to define acts of dissent as ‘violence’ differential, as used for example by Blumenthal et when they perceived the dissenters as undesir- al., is a standard method of investigation of features associated with words. In semiotic terms, the semantic differential is a way of studying the connotations that different people associate with words: see John Fiske, Introduction to Communi- 33 Kalle Lasn, Culture Jam: The Uncooling of cation Studies (London: Routledge, 1990, 2nd ed), America™ (New York: Eagle Brook, 1999). pp. 145–150. Elgin’s semantic assessment is based 34 Judith Williamson, Decoding Advertisements: on picking out characteristic connotations. Natu- Ideology and Meaning in Advertising (London: rally, her assessment does not apply to every Marion Boyars, 1978). individual. Communication theory 117 tures. (A survey or an analysis of usage would Whereas it may be suitable for scholars to be needed to make a full assessment.) Gandhi- choose terms that avoid mixing meanings and ans would be reluctant to refer to circulation of judgements, for activists a more suitable goal a leaflet advocating racial discrimination as may be to select terms that combine meanings “nonviolent action” even though this involves and judgements in the most effective fashion no physical violence. Activists refer to their for activist goals. Words with positive conno- own rallies, sit-ins, and strikes as nonviolent tations are likely candidates. Activists do not but do not normally think of any actions by control meanings but their choices have some corporations, such as withdrawal of capital impact. investment (a “capital strike”), as nonviolent. Semiotic analysis could also provide more The term “structural violence,” used by detailed guidance. What terms or other peace researcher Johan Galtung37 to refer to symbols are best for recruiting new members systems of oppression that cause harm without to action groups or attracting attendance at the necessity of direct physical attack — such events? What symbolic constructions serve as starvation resulting from the operation of best to encourage nonviolent discipline at capitalism — seems to have found a receptive actions? What conceptual frameworks are best audience among activists, perhaps because it for building solidarity in a major campaign? applies the label “violence,” with all its What logos, slogans, and T-shirts should be connotations, to complex systems.38 chosen? What types of dress and behavior are If many US men have one conception of most effective for winning over allies? In violence and nonviolent activists have quite a selecting the focus for a campaign, what target different one, this is fertile territory for further or goal has the greatest symbolic resonance? investigation. Given the divergent meanings Issues of meaning pervade nonviolent strug- attached to “violence” and “nonviolence,” are gles. Activists have come up with their own there alternatives that would serve activists practical solutions. Semiotic analysis may or better, especially when it is necessary to may not be able to provide improvements, but communicate to wider audiences? Is there any it is surely worth trying. good alternative to the term “nonviolence,” which unfortunately attempts to define Medium theory something through a negative? Is there any way to fully eradicate the misleading term What difference does it make whether “passive resistance” which has not been used messages about repression, aggression, and by nonviolent activists for decades but keeps oppression, or between activists, are conveyed popping into discussions?39 face to face, by telephone, in a newspaper, on television, or via e-mail? There are several ways to approach this question. We pick out 37 See, for example, Johan Galtung, The True two approaches here, which can be associated Worlds: A Transnational Perspective (New York: Free Press, 1980). 38 This conclusion is our own observation on talking to and corresponding with nonviolent activists. where this comes from. For a discussion of the 39 Gandhi originally used the then-standard change in terminology, and an argument for expression “passive resistance” but dropped it in resurrecting the expression “passive resistance,” at the 1920s. He and his followers have tried to least as an etymological tool for investigating pre- exorcise it ever since. Nonviolent activists use the Gandhian nonviolent action, see Steven Duncan term “nonviolent action,” which emphasizes action Huxley, Constitutionalist Insurgency in Finland: — the antithesis of passivity — as does Sharp in Finnish “Passive Resistance” against Russifica- all his writing. Yet it is our experience that many tion as a Case of Nonmilitary Struggle in the people unfamiliar with the area come up with the European Resistance Tradition (Helsinki: Finnish expression “passive resistance.” It is not clear Historical Society, 1990).

118 Nonviolence Speaks with the pioneering scholars Harold Innis and coup leaders. In contrast, opponents used e- Marshall McLuhan.40 mail, graffiti, leaflets, and word of mouth to Harold Innis developed a sweeping analysis great advantage, suggesting that these sorts of of civilization in terms of information media are more useful to nonviolent activists. monopolies. When a society’s elites have In the anti-MAI campaign, e-mail and the control over information, they are better able web were key tools internationally, supple- to exercise control. Part of the power of the mented by telephone in local organizing. In the Catholic Church in the Middle Ages stemmed early stages of the campaign, the mass media from its exclusive control over religious were largely uninterested in or impervious to information and hence its interpretation. The critical views about the MAI. Only after printing press helped break this monopoly and considerable opposition had developed, facili- enable a challenge to the Church. A more tated by the net, was there much mass media recent example is the Soviet Union, in which coverage. the Communist Party exercised control over The Indonesian government under Suharto the expression of political views, especially used information management as a central through newspapers, books, radio, and televi- element in its authoritarian rule, with censor- sion. Because unauthorized reproduction of ship of the mass media. In the development of information was a threat to the regime, new opposition in 1998, word of mouth was information technologies could not be fully crucial, supplemented by e-mail. exploited since they opened the gates for In each of these three cases, mass media expression of dissident views. For example, were tools of the dominant groups, with foreign broadcasts had to be jammed and opponents only able to use them in marginal guards were needed around photocopiers ways. In contrast, communication face to face (incidentally providing potent symbols of and by e-mail was extremely valuable to censorship). This restriction on open informa- opponents. This is a pattern found in many tion exchange hindered the development of the other struggles, and is readily explained. Soviet economy and can be seen as one factor Mass media — especially television, radio, in the collapse of the state socialist system. and large newspapers — are means of Following in the footsteps of Innis, but with communication in which a small number of a narrower focus, we can examine which people control what is conveyed to a very communication technologies are most useful large number of people. They are “one- for supporting repression, aggression, and directional”: messages controlled by a few oppression and which are most useful to flow to many others, with little return flow. nonviolent activists.41 In the 1991 Soviet coup, Therefore they are ideally designed for control the mass media were taken over by the coup by elites, of which repressive governments are leaders. Although opponents were able to the archetypal example. It is for this reason undermine the dominant message in some that in a military coup, one of the first tasks is cases — by including certain stories in to capture television and radio stations.42 In as newspapers or providing revealing shots on much as people are dependent on mass media television — by and large it can be said that for their understandings of political reality — the mass media were a great advantage to the as in the model of mass society discussed earlier — control over the mass media provides a powerful means of manipulating Our framework here draws on the convenient 40 and controlling the population. overview by Joshua Meyrowitz, “Medium theory,” in David Crowley and David Mitchell (eds.), Communication Theory Today (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994), pp. 50–77. 42 T. E. Finer, The Man on Horseback: The Role 41 Brian Martin, “Communication technology and of the Military in Politics (London: Pall Mall nonviolent action,” Media Development, Vol. 43, Press, 1962); Edward Luttwak, Coup d'Etat: A No. 2, 1996, pp. 3–9. Practical Handbook, (London: Allen Lane, 1968). Communication theory 119

In contrast, technologies that allow people controlled from the top. Therefore, while it is to communicate with each other independently certainly worthwhile to make great efforts to of central control and on a one-to-one or small use the mass media when possible, it is wise to group basis provide the most secure basis for make provision for getting the message out in resistance to repression, aggression, and other ways. In this, network media should be oppression. Face-to-face conversation is a the prime focus of attention. model for this sort of communication; Second, activists need to think beyond technological mediations include the post, simply using existing media; they need to leaflets, telephone, fax, short-wave radio, CB develop policy for communication technology. radio, and e-mail. There are various ways to Technologies do not simply develop of their characterize such media, including networks own accord, but are the product of intense (or network media), decentralized media, and investigation, development, investment, and one-to-one media. promotion.44 The dominant forces behind the Of course, the existence of network media introduction of communication technologies does not guarantee communication for libera- are governments and large corporations, with tion. After all, the telephone and e-mail are the primary considerations being control and widely used by military forces and, more profit. Fortunately, some technologies that are generally, they can be used for intimidation as introduced have liberatory aspects. Rather than well as dialogue. Furthermore, dominant just using what becomes available, activists groups attempt to control these media, for can seek to actively intervene in the process of example by restriction, regulation, and sur- technological choice and innovation. This is veillance. In the Soviet Union, surveillance of not easy but is necessary for the long-term telephone conversations was commonplace. In project of building a society that can defend the United States and other countries, govern- itself nonviolently. ment regulation has hindered the development A second approach to media is that of community radio, and micropower radio pioneered by Marshall McLuhan, who saw was made illegal, with challengers subject to media as extensions of human senses.45 government harassment.43 The connection Communication through the human sense of between media form and power is one of sight has different characteristics than tendency and potential rather than necessity. communication through hearing; hence, Mass media are more likely to be useful to communication through television has differ- elites and network media are more likely to be useful to grassroots activists, but the actual connections depend on particular circum- 44 On the values involved in technology, see for stances. example Michael Goldhaber, Reinventing From this analysis of media, several impor- Technology: Policies for Democratic Values (New tant lessons can be drawn. First, nonviolent York: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1986); Richard E. activists should not rely on mass media to get Sclove, Democracy and Technology (New York: their message out. While access to the mass Guilford Press, 1995). On the social movements media is incredibly powerful, it is precarious, behind the introduction of computers — a process precisely because mass media are so easily which is normally seen as resulting from techno- logical and efficiency considerations alone — see Rob Kling and Suzanne Iacono, “The mobilization of support for computerization: the role of comput- Peter M. Lewis and Jerry Booth, The Invisible 43 erization movements,” Social Problems, Vol. 35, Medium: Public, Commercial and Community No. 3, June 1988, pp. 226–243. Radio (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1989); Ron Sakolsky and Stephen Dunifer (eds.), Seizing the 45 Marshall McLuhan, The Gutenberg Galaxy: Airwaves: A Free Radio Handbook (Edinburgh: The Making of Typographic Man (Toronto: AK Press, 1998); Lawrence Soley, Free Radio: University of Toronto Press, 1962); Marshall Electronic Civil Disobedience (Boulder, CO: McLuhan, Understanding Media: The Extensions Westview, 1999). of Man (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964).

120 Nonviolence Speaks ent characteristics than communication assuming in each case a message appropriately through radio. To some extent, the nature of styled for the medium? Of course, activists the medium shapes or overlays the content of seldom have ready access to mass media, so the message, as dramatized in McLuhan’s this question is hypothetical. But the choice famous aphorism “The medium is the can be made meaningful by looking at what message” (or the later “the medium is the activists can produce, including leaflets, massage”). This is represented in Figure 6.5, articles, audio cassettes, and video cassettes, in which each medium has its own filter. which can be circulated to individuals and played at meetings. For example, Noam Chomsky has written many books and articles, many of which deal with repression and the Events (repression, role of elites in fostering it or allowing it to issues, nonviolent action continue.46 Chomsky is also available on audio cassette and there is a film featuring him, Participants, observers Manufacturing Consent. Which medium is most effective for providing understanding? Which is most effective for generating concern? Which stimulates the most action? These questions are of great significance to Television activists. There is a great deal of informal Newspapers knowledge about what is thought to work best in certain situations or for certain individuals, but we know of no studies addressing these email questions systematically. The question of the “choice” of medium is fnp made more difficult by the reality that the ftv biggest impact can come from mass media, fem which are not freely available to activists on Audience their own terms. This applies as well to sympathetic journalists, who cannot run any story they like. Crusading journalist John

Pilger, who has tried for decades to expose Figure 6.5. An audience responding Western government complicity in atrocities in differently to different media, with filter East Timor through both film and print, and “fem” for e-mail and so forth who has had an enormous impact, has never had anything approaching full access to the mainstream media and indeed has come under It is useful to activists to be aware that a fierce attack by ideological opponents. There- style of message that works well in print may fore, the issue of choice of medium is be unsuitable for television and that, in complicated by questions of access and size of general, messages should be tailored for the audience. medium, while media should be chosen for The choice of medium is perhaps especially their potential to carry certain types of important when addressing absence of action. messages as well as the “message” built into If there are massacres occurring somewhere the medium itself. However, beyond this but no coverage in the mass media, activists general insight, in medium theory it is hard to have to use their own channels. Which is find specific guidance for activists. To publicize repression in Indonesia or some 46 For example, Noam Chomsky and Edward S. other country, what is the most suitable Herman, The Political Economy of Human Rights medium: television, radio, or newspapers, (Boston: South End Press, 1979). Communication theory 121 likely to be more effective for generating groups can intervene to block or curtail concern and mobilizing action: videos, audio coverage of unwelcome stories; corporations cassettes, articles in newsletters, e-mail may threaten to withdraw advertising, while circulars, or public meetings? Is there some governments can threaten legislative reprisals optimal combination? How much does the or just loss of journalistic access. Government- choice depend on the nature of the repression, owned media are frequently subject to direct aggression, or oppression? (Are photo oppor- censorship or undertake their own self-censor- tunities available?) The answers to such ship to pre-empt reprisals. Most of all, media questions depend on a range of factors besides corporations seldom report critically about characteristics of different media, including themselves. In short, media empires, whether opportunities for gaining information, produc- government or corporate, have enormous tion skills, and financial and human resources. political and economic power, a fact that Medium theory potentially has much to offer, influences the sort of stories that are run. but so far little appears to have been done. One obvious consequence is that capitalist Activists can improve their chances of media are pro-capitalist, in quite a number of communicating effectively if they know their ways. Stories critical of capitalism, or de- audience really well: what they do, how they scribing the advantages of alternative think, what communication media they use economic systems, are scarce. There are and trust, and what moves them to action.47 numerous business stories, all of which With this sort of in-depth knowledge, a more assume the importance of business, and few informed choice of medium can be made. stories from workers’ points of view. There are vast amounts of both overt advertising — Political economy clearly defined advertisements — and covert advertising, in the form of stories based on The ownership and control of media have a big corporate public relations,49 corporate-spon- impact on their potential to be used to oppose sored “advertorials”, spin-doctoring (interven- repression, aggression, and oppression. Most tions to include or exclude certain material),50 mass media are owned by governments or and cash-for-comment deals (in which large corporations, and all are regulated by columnists or commentators receive covert governments. There is a large body of writing payments in return for making apparently about media monopolies and their influence on what is published and broadcast.48 Powerful unwelcome programs, and anticommunism, see Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of We thank an anonymous referee for this point. 47 the Mass Media (New York: Pantheon, 1988). For 48 See especially the now classic treatment by Ben global perspectives, see Cees J. Hamelink, Trends H. Bagdikian, The Media Monopoly (Boston: in World Communication: On Disempowerment Beacon Press, 1997, 5th edition). Hard-hitting and Self-Empowerment (Penang: Southbound and attacks on corporate domination of information Third World Network, 1994) and Edward S. and culture, focusing on the US, include Robert W. Herman and Robert W. McChesney, The Global McChesney, Rich Media, Poor Democracy: Media: The New Missionaries of Global Communication Politics in Dubious Times Capitalism (London: Cassell, 1997). For many (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1999); other sources, see James R. Bennett, Control of the Herbert I. Schiller, Culture, Inc.: The Corporate Media in the United States: An Annotated Takeover of Public Expression (New York: Oxford Bibliography (Hamden, CT: Garland, 1992). University Press, 1989); Gerald Sussman, 49 Stuart Ewen, PR! A Social History of Spin Communication, Technology, and Politics in the (New York: Basic Books, 1996). Information Age (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1997). For a propaganda model of the media, 50 David Michie, The Invisible Persuaders: How based on the five filters of ownership, advertising, Britain’s Spin Doctors Manipulate the Media sourcing from powerful organizations, attacks on (London: Bantam, 1998).

122 Nonviolence Speaks sincere endorsements). So it is no surprise that address under organizational theory below). opposition to the MAI received little attention Political economy is good at explaining in the mass media until well down the track hegemony — the dominance of certain ways after activists had mobilized significant grass- of thinking — but not so good at explaining roots concern. resistance. Specifically, political economy The political economy approach is most helps to explain absence of action, for example valuable in examining the influence of power- the relative absence of action against adver- ful interest groups on media dynamics. For tising, but is weak at providing clues for example, in the 1990s the governments of generating action. In short, political economy Serbia and Croatia controlled the dominant gives little guidance to activists on how to mass media through a variety of means, such generate concern about repression, aggression, as restricting competition and pushing out and oppression. dissident journalists, and used them to power- If powerful groups control the mass media, ful effect to promote national chauvinism, one implication is that activists should not rely while allowing a marginal dissident media on these media, but instead use and promote with little impact. The Serbian and Croatian alternative media such as community radio, media used selective reporting and disinfor- the alternative press, leaflets, telephone, and e- mation to serve their respective governments’ mail, that are not so easily controlled cen- positions, and were a key tool for the two trally.53 This conclusion is exactly the same as governments’ forging of centralized power and that drawn from medium theory. Medium pursuit of war aims.51 Another example, on a theory shows that mass media are more easily lesser scale, was the concerted attempt to controlled by elites; political economy docu- discredit Arthur Scargill, President of the ments the empirical reality of this control. National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) and the most prominent trade unionist in Britain, Organizational theory which involved the Conservative government, the spy agency MI5, and media proprietors, The different theories we have canvassed so editors, and journalists who were willing to lie far give a variety of insights into barriers to and then, as facts appeared, move on to new communication. The transmission model read- lies. The Scargill affair is best understood as ily captures physical barriers such as seizing of part of the Conservative government’s a transmitter. Media effects theory helps campaign to destroy the NUM.52 explain the passivity of audiences in the face While political economy has great value for of information. Semiotics points to processes analyzing the dynamics of the mass media, it of meaning creation that can vary from issue to also has significant limitations. Understanding issue and person to person. Medium theory patterns of ownership and control at the top shows that some types of media are more gives insight into driving forces but is too blunt to grasp what happens on a day-to-day basis in news rooms (something we will 53 Tony Dowmunt (ed.), Channels of Resistance: Global Television and Local Empowerment (London: British Film Institute in association with 51 Mark Thompson, Forging War: The Media in Channel Four Television, 1993); John Downing, Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia and Hercegovina (Luton: Radical Media: The Political Experience of University of Luton Press, 1999). For a similar Alternative Communication (Boston: South End case, see Article 19 [Linda Kirschke], Broadcast- Press, 1984); Bruce Girard (ed.), A Passion for ing Genocide: Censorship, Propaganda and State- Radio: Radio Waves and Community (Montreal: Sponsored Violence in Rwanda 1990–1994 Black Rose Books, 1992); Edward Herman, (London: Article 19, 1996). “Democratic media,” Z Papers, Vol. 1, No. 1, 52 Seumas Milne, The Enemy Within: MI5, January-March 1992, pp. 23–30; Sakolsky and Maxwell and the Scargill Affair (London: Verso, Dunifer, Seizing the Airwaves; Soley, Free Radio; 1994). Williams, Grassroots Journalism. Communication theory 123 useful for elites and others more useful for friends, co-workers, or complete strangers, dissidents. Political economy highlights the finding some family-specific understandings power of those who own and control media to unavailable but being able to discuss certain shape messages. If we look at a diagram of topics openly that are off limits in the family. potential information flow from events of Thus we may say that the family is an concern to members of audiences who might environment that acts as a communication take action, the different theories provide filter, facilitating some messages while insights at a range of points along the way. blocking others. Alternatively, the family can Two areas that still require examination are be said to be a framework for meaning portrayed as the boxes “mass media” and construction, providing tools for understanding “government,” acting as filters between events certain types of messages (including very and recipients. To delve into what happens in subtle and family-specific ones) while lacking these boxes, we turn to organizational theory. tools for grasping other types of messages. Within any organization, some sorts of The key point is that the family, as an organi- messages are easier to convey than others. zational unit, is not a neutral conveyor of Within families, for example, members have messages and meanings. Quite the contrary: deep understandings about each other and messages and meanings are shaped by the group dynamics that have been cultivated from family environment, in all stages from creation birth. A “message” can be interpreted in a to interpretation and action in response. particular family unerringly whereas the same Organizational theory proposes that com- message in another family would be mean- munication is shaped by an organization’s ingless. While watching television, particular structure and dynamics. Besides families, this tone of voice by one individual may signal applies to corporations, government depart- pleasure; another may indicate a wish to ments, trade unions, churches, sporting clubs, switch channels. While preparing breakfast, a and activist groups. There is great potential certain smile by an individual may suggest an value in applying this approach to problems of interest in talking, whereas a certain move- communication about repression, aggression, ment of shoulders may mean “leave me and oppression. Groups undertaking nonvio- alone.” Family members are especially adept lent action need to understand their own at reading danger signs when an individual is internal communication dynamics as well as likely to verbally abuse or physically assault the way they filter messages received and the others. way they construct messages to others. While some “messages,” invisible or very However, we are not aware of much work subtle to outsiders, are read easily, there are done along these lines. Hence we concentrate usually areas of discourse that are off limits on two areas where there is research and where within families. Topics that are not discussed there are obvious implications for communi- might include a child’s low self-esteem, cating about repression, aggression, and parents’ unequal attention for different oppression: groupthink in government bodies children, habits in the bathroom, certain and news values in the mass media. decisions about money and jobs, or sexual Figure 6.6 illustrates the processes in- fantasies. Sometimes dialogue is denied by volved. The mass media and government each assertions that there is nothing to discuss, as filter incoming information and, through their when parents say “We love you all equally,” organizational dynamics, shape their outputs. precluding a discussion of perceptions of Filters should be assumed at the end of all unequal love. arrows in the figure. So, inside a family, communication can be amazingly subtle and precise in some areas Groupthink. Irving Janis in his classic book and be denied or blocked off entirely in others. Groupthink argued that several major disasters A family member may find things quite differ- in US foreign policy were due to a cohesive ent in other circumstances, for example with group of government decision makers aligning

124 Nonviolence Speaks their thoughts around a single way of thinking The invasion, at the Bay of Pigs, was quickly and excluding dissenting views. He called this defeated, resulting in a propaganda victory for phenomenon “groupthink,” which he defined Castro, a major embarrassment for Kennedy, as “a mode of thinking that people engage in and the consequence of driving Cuba towards when they are deeply involved in a cohesive the Soviet Union. in-group, when the members’ strivings for Within the policy-making elite, there was unanimity override their motivation to realisti- no shortage of information: reports and critical cally appraise alternative courses of action.” 54 perspectives casting serious doubt on assump- tions underlying the invasion were readily available. The problem was not lack of information, but rather a systematic rejection Events (repression, issues, nonviolent action of information and ideas that ran contrary to the prevailing consensus, which was main- Participants, tained through an illusion of invulnerability observers and unanimity and by suppression of personal doubts and those of others. A certain way of fg viewing the world had become dominant — in fmm Government: this case, a belief that the Cuban government Mass media: politicians, was detested and fragile and that the invasion editors, owners, bureaucrats would not fail or rebound against the US journalists government — and was not easily dislodged by contrary information or viewpoints. Every person interprets the world through a set of assumptions or filters, screening out incompatible information. That is essential if one is to draw a conclusion or take an action. Activists, Groupthink is simply the same process sympathisers “General public” operating with a group of people who, through a collective process, develop a common framework for understanding the world. There

is nothing unusual about this: it goes on all the Figure 6.6. Government and mass media as time. Janis highlighted foreign policy fiascoes communication filters. The filters are the that sometimes result from this process, but his result of psychological, organizational, and concept of groupthink applies in many other political economy factors. situations. Groupthink is to be expected in any group, and is especially likely in bureaucratically For example, in the lead-up to the 1961 US- structured organizations, characterized by 55 sponsored invasion of Cuba, US president hierarchy and a division of labor. In bureauc- John F. Kennedy and his closest advisers racies, orders are communicated down the became convinced that the invasion would be hierarchy and information communicated a success. Contrary information, for example, intelligence reports that there was little support within Cuba for a challenge to the Cuban 55 We use here the sociological conception of government led by Fidel Castro, was rejected. bureaucracy, in which characteristic features are hierarchy, division of labor, standard operating procedures and rules, advancement by merit, and impersonal relations between workers. In this 54 Irving L. Janis, Groupthink: Psychological sense, most large corporations, churches, and Studies in Policy Decisions and Fiascoes (Boston: environmental groups are bureaucracies just as Houghton Mifflin, 1983, 2nd ed), p. 9. much as government bodies. Communication theory 125 upwards, with little genuine dialogue. with proper investigation and penalties for Although information flows upward, it is often wrongdoers, would be a major threat to the tailored to what workers think bosses want to hierarchy, since it would mean that informa- hear. Therefore the top management may have tion from lower down could be used to a very distorted view of conditions at the coal undermine those higher up. face. Thus, in a hierarchical organization, Groupthink is one way in which those with communication is structured by the hierarchy, power in organizations protect against a process that has serious ramifications.56 challengers. Dissenting views are ruled out of The problems of communicating “against bounds by the prevailing way of thinking.58 the hierarchy” are shown by the fate of This allows whistleblowers to be crushed with whistleblowers, who are workers who speak a clean conscience — they are simply workers out, typically about corruption or dangers to who do not understand how things work. It the public.57 A typical whistleblower is a also allows a wide range of other disconcerting conscientious worker who discovers a problem information to be filtered out, such as that — such as misuse of funds, bias in promo- morale is poor due to bad management, that tions, violations of procedures, or cheating of executive salaries are undeserved, or that clients — and reports it through proper sexual harassment is rife. channels, such as notifying the boss or using a From the point of view of mobilizing grievance procedure. However, the whistle- concern about repression, aggression, and blower’s communication is unwelcome since it oppression, various organizations act as filters challenges established ways of doing things along the communication chain. An organiza- and sometimes threatens to expose crime, tion may receive information: the question is negligence, or incompetence by managers. what to do about it. For example, consider a Hence, the usual response by management is church that receives information about Indone- to attack the whistleblower, with reprisals sian repression in East Timor.59 This might be including ostracism, threats, petty harassment, via the mass media, through letters from an reprimands, punitive transfer, and dismissal. East Timor support group, or from church Rather than deal with the message, the members who raise the issue in discussion. response is to “shoot the messenger.” For a There are various things that could be done by whistleblower’s charges to be taken seriously, the church:

• distribute information to all members; • address the issue in a church service; 56 Fred Emery and Merrelyn Emery, A Choice of • make a formal statement, circulated to the Futures (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 1976), pp. media; 150–165. The authoritarian dynamics of large • encourage other churches to take a stand; organizations have long been known, with Michels’ “iron law of oligarchy” being a classic treatment: Robert Michels, Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies 58 On the psychological dynamics of bureaucra- of Modern Democracies, translated by Eden & cies, in particular the interaction of hierarchy and Cedar Paul (New York: Dover, [1915] 1959). employee psychology, see Robert Jackall, Moral Mazes: The World of Corporate Managers (New 57 David W. Ewing, Freedom Inside the Organi- York: Oxford University Press, 1988); Howard S. zation: Bringing Civil Liberties to the Workplace Schwartz, Narcissistic Process and Corporate (New York: Dutton, 1977); Myron Peretz Glazer Decay: The Theory of the Organization Ideal (New and Penina Migdal Glazer, The Whistleblowers: York: New York University Press, 1990). Exposing Corruption in Government and Industry (New York: Basic Books, 1989); Marcia P. Miceli 59 In practice, the Catholic Church was one of the and Janet P. Near, Blowing the Whistle: The main routes for getting information out of East Organizational and Legal Implications for Timor during the period of greatest Indonesian Companies and Employees (New York: Lexington government control over outside media, 1975– Books, 1992). 1989.

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• provide financial support for East people understand the world.61 When people Timorese victims of repression; who have been blind from birth gain their • invite church representatives from East sight through an operation, they cannot Timor to visit; immediately “see,” since they have no way of • provide asylum for East Timorese refu- conceptualizing the sensory inputs coming gees; through their eyes. To decide whether • support protests against Indonesian re- something is a triangle, for example, they may pression. have to count the number of points or sides. “Seeing” is a skill that must be learned, and These are just a sample of possible actions; the since this learning takes place in an environ- point is that there is no shortage of ways to ment built on certain assumptions about the expose and oppose the repression. Concerted world, seeing is a social as well as a physical action is most likely when it is supported by process. Much learning is required to under- church leaders, but some actions can be taken stand the significance of the images on a on the initiative of church members or affiliate television screen, for example. Africans who organizations. have lived their entire life in the forest may not On the other hand, it is also possible that be able to correctly interpret the visual nothing is done. This is the case that is our panorama of open spaces, for example not concern here. For example: believing that buffalo observed at a great • information about repression is discounted distance are actually insects since, without as incorrect or misleading; trees for comparison, they appear to be tiny.62 • information is set aside because church Similarly, viewing television requires a set of leaders do not consider repression in East acquired skills. Timor to be their concern; If learning is required to make sense of • information is set aside because church sensory inputs — and assumptions about the leaders do not think there is anything they can nature of reality are involved at this level — do about repression in East Timor; then it should be no surprise that more • information is not acted on because complex conceptions, such as the dynamics of church leaders are afraid that action might organizations, foreign policy, and human generate opposition or bad publicity among rights, are “social constructions.” Each members, the church hierarchy, media, the person’s ideas about how the world operates government, or some other group. are an outcome of personal experiences, prior learning, and, not least, the ideas of those with How can such lack of action be explained? whom one interacts. It is to be expected that Groupthink is one way: it captures the cohe- the organization where one works will have a siveness of perspective that can develop in a strong influence on one’s conceptions of the policy-making elite but also in all sorts of world. Furthermore, it is to be expected that other organizations. Another term, adopted the dominant conceptual framework in an from the history of science, is “paradigm,” organization will reflect the interests of which has come to mean a dominant way of dominant individuals or groups both inside conceiving the world and guiding interactions 60 and outside the organization. This is the old with it. idea that material conditions influence — At a more general level, we can talk about though do not determine — conceptions of the the “social construction of reality,” namely the social processes that help to shape the way 61 The classic statement is Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1966). 60 Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: University of Chicago 62 Colin M. Turnbull, The Forest People (New Press, 1970, 2nd ed). York: Simon and Schuster, 1962), pp. 252–253. Communication theory 127 world. Those who are rich are likely to believe record in social activism.) But for most that the economic system is fair and, through a Catholics, East Timor is far away, physically complex set of processes, the idea that the and mentally. Without some stronger link, it is economic system is fair is likely to become the easy to say that repression there is not our dominant view, so that cheating by welfare concern. recipients is seen as a serious offense whereas In Argentina, for example, Catholics would massive government handouts to the super- be much more concerned about attacks on rich, or systemic corporate fraud, are ignored. Argentine Catholics. There is no historical link The social construction of reality is the with East Timorese Catholics. In Portugal, most general process, applying to individuals, though, there is a strong historical link, since groups, and entire societies. Within this East Timor was colonized by Portugal, which process, particular frameworks for under- indeed is the main reason most East Timorese standing and dealing with the world, which are Catholic. can be called paradigms, develop and are Another possible connection would be an perpetuated within specific domains. Organi- East Timorese refugee in an Argentine zations are important shapers of social reality, congregation, or an Argentine priest working so many paradigms are specific to certain in East Timor. Such personal links are power- types of organizations. In a government ful means of overcoming physical and psy- department, we can talk of a “policy chological distance. They also illustrate the paradigm” that sees certain issues as unim- operation of the great chain of nonviolence. portant or out of bounds and certain actions as Finally, there is the role of authorities. If inadmissible. Groupthink is perhaps a more the Pope takes a strong line on East Timor, appropriate term for smaller groups dealing this may encourage more churches to take with specific issues, whereas paradigm is more stands themselves. With the backing of the appropriate for deep-seated frameworks for Pope or the head of a country’s Catholic understanding the world. church, a priest or church members are likely The options for action and explanations for to have less difficulty taking initiatives. non-action that we have outlined for a church However, there are limits to the power of apply as well to many other organizations authoritative endorsement. In the Catholic including trade unions, corporations, govern- church, the Pope’s edicts no longer command ment bodies, community service organizations automatic obedience. (such as Rotary), and professional associa- In international affairs, another source of tions. From simple observation, it is apparent authority is the United Nations. In the case of that most organizations do little or nothing East Timor, the General Assembly condemned against repression except sometimes when it is the 1975 invasion and repeatedly condemned close to home. The usual assumption is that the Indonesian occupation. However, this did what is happening somewhere else to someone not cause the Indonesian government to else is not our business. Action is much more withdraw. Unlike the case of Iraq, whose likely when there is a bond or if authorities invasion of Kuwait led to a massive UN- expect it. endorsed military operation in 1990-1991, the In the case of a church, one powerful bond UN took no action against the Indonesian is when those subjected to repression are invasion and occupation of East Timor until members of the same religion. Most of the 1999, as described in chapter 2. East Timorese are Catholic, so it is to be The most important source of legitimacy expected that Catholics and Catholic churches for action or non-action against repression around the world would be more likely to act remains governments. Other organizations can than would Moslems, Hindus, Buddhists, take action on their own but usually don’t. But Jews, or Baptists. (This generalization needs to if called into action by their government, be qualified by the observation that some things are very different. This is most obvious religious groups, such as Quakers, have a in wartime. Corporations, for example, which

128 Nonviolence Speaks normally are happy to make a profit in any Table 1 country, may be instructed to withdraw Elements of a foreign policy paradigm investments or to produce certain products. 1. The influence of the foreign policy elites Even in so-called peacetime, government must be maintained. regulations and policies vis-a-vis other 2. Serving the interests of the government is countries are strong factors in corporate the foremost consideration, subject to point 1. decision making. Similar considerations apply 3. Friendly foreign governments should be to trade unions, community service organiza- supported, subject to points 1 and 2. tions, professional associations, and many 4. Domestic corporate interests should be other organizations. Therefore special atten- supported, subject to points 1 and 2 and tion should be given to governments, espe- sometimes 3. cially foreign policy elites, as filters of information about repression, aggression, and This is essentially the paradigm of “real- oppression. politik,” in which international relations is a Exactly who are the foreign policy elites? game of strategy in which power and influence This will depend on the issue, what political are the key considerations and moral or party is in power, insider networks, and humanitarian issues are primarily of symbolic personalities. They are likely to include a few rather than substantive importance. key politicians, personal advisers, and Foreign policy elites, naturally enough, government bureaucrats, especially diplomats. have developed a view of the world that puts For example, in the period just before the them in a key position of power and influence. Indonesian invasion of East Timor in Decem- By keeping international relations a matter of ber 1975, key Australian foreign policy elites government-to-government interaction, for- included the Prime Minister Gough Whitlam, eign policy elites maintain their own role. The the Australian ambassador to Indonesia United Nations is not a strong challenge to this Richard Woolcott, the Minister for Foreign model, since it is essentially a meeting place Affairs Don Willesee, and the head of the for states, where nongovernment groups are Department of Foreign Affairs Alan Renouf.63 outsiders. US and Australian foreign policy In order to gain insight into government elites supported the Suharto government in foreign policy elites as information filters, it is Indonesia for more than three decades because useful to try to elucidate elements of the policy it was friendly to the West, namely paradigm underlying their operations. Policy anticommunist and open to Western invest- paradigms are bound to be somewhat different ment. between countries, historical periods, and even Nonviolent action is potentially a deep issues. To focus the discussion, we look at the challenge to the foreign policy paradigm. To sort of assumptions that can explain US and challenge repression in Indonesia, a nonviolent Australian foreign policy in relation to Indone- action strategy would involve grassroots action sia from 1965 to 1998, characterized by open within Indonesia plus grassroots support from or de facto support for the Indonesian govern- outside the country through broadcasts, ment even when it was responsible for massive boycotts, personal links, and many other killings and other human rights violations. options. This would marginalize foreign policy elites: rather than being at the center of influence, they would be simply one player 63 Rodney Tiffen, Diplomatic Deceits: Govern- among a host of activists. Rather than inter- ment, Media and East Timor (Sydney: University acting with elite counterparts in Indonesia, of New South Wales Press, 2001). Detailed they would have to interact with workers, analyses of foreign policy elites and their opera- peasants, and imprisoned dissidents. A tions are unusual except for the most prominent strategy to encourage nonviolent action against issues. For a classic treatment of US policy making a foreign tyrant would provide skills to people on Vietnam, see David Halberstam, The Best and that might be used to challenge the govern- the Brightest (New York: Random House, 1972). Communication theory 129 ment at home, reducing its power and, in turn, crucial in this alignment, but also involved the influence of the foreign policy elite. It is seems to have been a desire to align the not surprising that the idea of social transfor- Australian government with other powerful mation through nonviolent action is unthink- governments, especially allies of the US able within the policy paradigm of real-politik. government. The entire Cold War was waged using the In this consistent policy over many decades, conceptual framework of real-politik, with anything that threatened the Australia- communist states treated as the enemy to be Indonesia government alliance was ignored, countered by military might. The 1989 downplayed, denigrated, or, if the pressure to revolutions in Eastern Europe were totally act was too great, given lip service. The 1965- unexpected because the significance of 1966 bloodbath in Indonesia was largely nonviolent action was not grasped. ignored, as were Indonesian political prisoners Let us now turn to the government as a and the practice of imprisonment without trial. communication filter. When it comes to Indonesian internal colonialist policy, involv- foreign affairs, government pronouncements ing repression of movements for independence usually reflect the framework of foreign policy or autonomy in East Timor, Irian Jaya, Aceh, elites. Governments collect massive amounts and elsewhere, was supported. Suharto’s of information, including diplomatic corre- repression of potential challengers and grass- spondence, spy reports, commercial informa- roots movements was accepted and its democ- tion, news reports, and much else. All of this is ratic facade left unchallenged. Exploitation of interpreted through the foreign policy workers was ignored, as was massive corrup- paradigm. So while lots of information goes tion linked to Suharto. into the government, what comes out is quite The task of Foreign Affairs was not easy, small by comparison and usually reflects the since many voices within Australia challenged foreign policy orthodoxy. When it came to the government’s policy of accommodation Indonesia, the US and Australian governments and appeasement. There was enormous commented on government-to-government popular support for the East Timorese cause, talks, and sometimes on investment issues, but including a strong support from within the seldom if ever reported on long-term political Australian Labor Party, with some parliamen- prisoners or exploitation of workers by tarians taking a leading role. There was multinational corporations. committed and persistent action groups Consider the case of the Australian supportive of freedom in Indonesia. There was Department of Foreign Affairs64 and Austra- media coverage of atrocities in East Timor and lian government policy on Indonesia. Ever other regions (including the killing of five since Suharto came to power in the late 1960s, Australian journalists in 1975 by Indonesian the department pursued a line of support for soldiers), exposés of Indonesian corruption, the Indonesian government, including foster- and other abuses. In the face of popular ing high level diplomatic meetings, Australian agitation for change, Foreign Affairs worked corporate investment in Indonesia, Australian hard to convince Australian governments to arms sales to the Indonesian military, training maintain its support for the Indonesian of Indonesian military officers, and, later, government, and was remarkably successful at recognition of Indonesian sovereignty over this. Only in 1999 did this change. Following East Timor. The basic premise of Foreign the overwhelming East Timorese vote for Affairs policy on East Timor was that keeping independence and the immediate Indonesian on good terms with the Indonesian govern- government-sponsored scorched earth policy, ment was the top priority. That it was an there was an enormous outpouring of concern anticommunist, procapitalist government was and rage in Australia, aided by saturation media coverage, leading to a change in government policy that overturned the Foreign 64 The name of this department has varied; we use Affairs model. “Department of Foreign Affairs” for convenience.

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It would be possible to go more deeply into ment, standard ways of understanding the how Foreign Affairs developed and main- world develop in any organization, which tained such a cohesive worldview about persist while being gradually modified by Indonesian foreign policy. This would involve various influences such as new staff, environ- a long tradition of anticommunism, the mental changes, and imposed structural influence of a small number of pro-Indonesian changes. These standard ways of understand- government intellectuals who trained a whole ing constitute a socially constructed reality. At generation of diplomats, elitism in the Austra- a general level, a cohesive framework of ideas lian public service — Foreign Affairs per- and practices can be called a paradigm, while ceives itself as “superior” to most other for making decisions about a particular departments — and the acquiescence by most purpose, cohesiveness can be called cabinet ministers to department advice.65 Also groupthink. Those who challenge paradigms important is the role of dissident voices within or groupthink are commonly ignored, dis- Foreign Affairs, and how they have been missed, or attacked. silenced or marginalized. As a result of these processes, it can be said It is time to step back from specifics and that organizations act as communication summarize what a study of organizations can filters. From the great diversity of information reveal about communication about repression, that comes into the organization through many aggression, and oppression. Communication in channels, only a tiny portion is treated as any organization is shaped by the structure of relevant or important. Outputs from organiza- the organization: certain things are said easily tions reflect organizational structures and and some not expressed at all. In a hierarchical paradigms. In the case of hierarchical organi- organization, it is difficult to express view- zations, elites control key outputs, especially points that challenge the interests of elites or the ones treated authoritatively by most others. question the hierarchical structure itself. In Those who communicate in defiance of the addition, organizational elites may have access chain of command, such as whistleblowers, to information unavailable to others, and have are attacked ruthlessly. control over official statements from the In communication about repression, aggres- organization. Communication is also shaped sion, and oppression, government bodies are by the organization's environment, especially crucial. A repressive government typically other organizations and controllers of or makes every effort to present its activities in a stakeholders in the organization itself. favorable light, as in the case of the Indonesian Communication practices tend to develop to government under Suharto. Other governments reflect what aids the organization's survival in can hide or expose repressive actions in other its current form in its environment. In the case countries. In either case, communication is of hierarchical organizations, this means inter- usually based on the assumption that action, acting via elites, control over unofficial and decisions about action, should be by information transfer and acute sensitivity to governments alone. Repression in foreign what is required to maintain power and countries with “friendly” governments is influence. Within the constraints and influ- generally ignored, denied, or downplayed, ences of organizational structure and environ- whereas repression in countries that are con- sidered “enemies” are treated as a tremendous scandal. The option of encouraging nonviolent 65 The key figures are the Minister for Foreign action by citizens is almost always off the Affairs and the Prime Minister. The power of government agenda, and communication government departments over ministers is a well- outputs reflect this assumption. known phenomenon that is brilliantly portrayed in The challenge for nonviolent activists, in the British television series “Yes, Minister.” Public relation to communication, is to figure out servants in Canberra have told us that watching what strategies have a chance of transforming this series is the best way to understand how the or sidestepping organizational filters, espe- government works. Communication theory 131 cially those in government. There are several concerned about repression. There is one other options. type of organization that is vitally important in • Use alternative media to sidestep organi- this picture: mass media organizations, espe- zational control. This has the advantage that cially those that report news. activists retain control of their messages, but Organizationally, the mass media are quite does not directly challenge the organizational similar to government departments and corpo- filtering process. rations: they are large and bureaucratically • Attempt to influence or use the organiza- structured. In fact, mass media are corpora- tional filtering process, for example by tions or government bodies themselves, so it is building links with sympathetic insiders and more accurate to say they are quite similar to by developing methods for obtaining informa- other government departments and corpora- tion and influencing outputs. This undermines tions. Therefore, it is to be expected that organizational control from within but leaves information is controlled by organizational elites intact. Sympathetic insiders are always elites with a special brief to serve the elites. at risk of exposure, attack, or co-optation. However, there is one vital difference: it is • Attack the organization's paradigm and part of the mass media’s brief to report news, power directly through open critique, public and media organizations compete with each campaigns, and pressure on the organization's other to supply it. (This does not apply in controllers. This provides the only real countries where the government monopolizes prospect of long-lasting change to an existing the media.) This creates a very different organization, but is extremely difficult to carry dynamic from that occurring in other govern- off. ment bodies and corporations, where elites • Set up alternative systems that replicate seek as a matter of course to control informa- what the organization does but with structures tion and restrict outputs, and where public that promote open communication. In the case relations — the official output from an organi- of foreign affairs, this would include systems zation — is routinely designed to serve for person-to-person diplomacy, grassroots organizational interests. The key point is that gathering of “intelligence,” and networks to corporations and government bodies control support popular participation and nonviolent their own communication outputs: there is no action. This strategy is necessarily long-term internal competition. They are, in this sense, and would have to be part of a wider process like authoritarian governments.66 of structural change. News media are no different in regard to their own internal operations — they are as News values. We have described how reluctant as any other organization to expose organizations, through their structure and what happens on the inside — but for all other operations, shape the form and content of activities have as a mandate the reporting of communication within and through the organi- news. The question is, what counts as news? zation. Concerning communication about What everyone sees on television, hears on the repression, organizational shaping by govern- radio or reads in the newspaper is so familiar ments is especially important, since they are that it seems like a fact of nature: political both responsible for much repression and controversy, wars, natural disasters, accidents, authoritative commentators on repression that and sporting and celebrity highlights. happens elsewhere. Organizational shaping of However, what is selected out as news — communication is also important in a range of other bodies, including corporations, churches, trade unions, and other bodies for which 66 Deena Weinstein, Bureaucratic Opposition: repression is not normally a primary concern Challenging Abuses at the Workplace (New York: but which potentially can play a strong role Pergamon, 1979), argues generally that bureaucra- (positive or negative), and social action groups cies are similar to authoritarian states, notably in such as Amnesty International that are directly their treatment of dissidents. We apply this idea here to organizational communication.

132 Nonviolence Speaks especially in the five-minute or half-hour on the media, our interest is in the actual and broadcasts that most people use as the basis potential role of mass media in communication for their understanding of what is happening against repression, aggression, and oppression. around the country and the world — is just a Even with this brief, there are many fruitful tiny fraction of what is reported and is only directions for investigation. Here we just one special way of approaching events. mention a few key observations. Journalists and editors learn through experi- • Mass media are far more likely to report ence what makes a good story, so much so that 67 they have an intuitive grasp of what will or violence than nonviolence. Violence provides action (especially for television) and is a won’t work. In principle, any story, told in any 68 way, could lead the evening news or hit the visible indicator for conflict. Nonviolent headlines. In practice, what is selected by action, especially when it involves resolution editors is tightly constrained by experience, of conflict, is less newsworthy. The campaign competition, expectations of audiences, and against the MAI, involving no violence, had responses of powerful interest groups. The low media visibility. Reporting on events in constraints are the result of the complex Indonesia in 1998 emphasized rioting and environment of news-making. One way to talk gave little attention to opposition to Suharto by artists. about them is in terms of “news values,” which are the criteria for what makes a good • Mass media sometimes report atrocities, story. They include prominence, proximity, massacres, genocide, and other horrors, but conflict, timeliness, action, human interest, sometimes do not, depending on their rele- and perceived consequences. For example, the vance to the media’s own country, the cost of O. J. Simpson saga scored highly on several of coverage, the availability of graphic image, the these criteria: it involved prominence scale of horror, and whether other crises are (Simpson was a well-known sports star and happening at the same time.69 Governments media figure before the murders), human interest (Simpson himself), conflict (a murder), action (Simpson’s flight from the 67 For example, Herbert J. Gans, Deciding What’s scene), and timeliness (the court case was News: A Study of CBS Evening News, NBC Nightly reported as it occurred). In contrast, a small News, Newsweek, and Time (New York: Random community initiative to arrange visits to House, 1979), p. 35, states of US media’s coverage people living alone would rate very lowly in of foreign news about political conflict and protest terms of news values. There is no prominent that “foreign conflicts must be more dramatic and person involved, there is no conflict, there is usually more violent than their domestic equiva- nothing that makes it timely (since the visits lents in order to break into the news. By and large, are an ongoing process), and there is no peaceful demonstrations are rarely covered, unless “action” (for television purposes). In terms of they are anti-American.” consequences, the visits might well provide 68 This is most dramatically the case with terror- support that prevents illness or even death due ism, which can be interpreted as communication to neglect, but such potential benefits are not activated and amplified by violence. See Alex P. visible, so the initiative rates low on perceived Schmid and Janny de Graaf, Violence as consequences. Communication: Insurgent Terrorism and the The impacts of the news and the conse- Western News Media (London: Sage, 1982). quences of news values have been analyzed at 69 For excellent discussions of news media and length by media analysts. The news is both war reporting, see Susan L. Carruthers, The Media lauded as providing unexcelled insight into at War: Communication and Conflict in the what is happening in the world and con- Twentieth Century (Basingstoke: Macmillan, demned as selective, biased, overly violent, 2000); Peter Young and Peter Jesser, The Media giving only a superficial understanding, and and the Military: From the Crimea to Desert Strike much else. Out of the vast amount of material (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1997). See also Bruce Cumings, War and Television (London: Verso, Communication theory 133 usually try to cover up their own violence; this sometimes, though their message will was routine practice in the Soviet Union. normally be configured within reporting Media coverage is one of the best ways to conventions. overcome government censorship. A range of factors determine media attention and slants. In a study that highlights the problems of Some mass killing receives little critical media relying on mass media coverage to stimulate coverage, such as in the Soviet Union in the action, Peter Viggo Jakobsen analyzed “CNN 1930s and in Indonesia in 1965-1966. Other effect,” namely the idea that media coverage forces western government intervention into mass killing receives saturation coverage, such 71 as Kosova in 1998 and East Timor in 1999. conflicts. Jakobsen points out that actually most conflicts are ignored by the media, that • As described earlier in the discussion of pre-violence and post-violence stages receive media effects theory, mass media coverage little attention, that government decisions to often presents events as a spectacle, namely as intervene are only marginally influenced by something to be watched with no implications media coverage, that governments favor for personal action. Nevertheless, action symbolic involvement to give the appearance groups can build on awareness of events of action without the substance, and that generated through the media. emphasis is shifted from long-term prevention work to short-term emergency work. Jakobsen • Mass media are part of the culture and focuses on the difficulties of stimulating subscribe to dominant values, so that some government action. He notes that nongovern- alternative views cannot obtain visibility. For ment organizations usually can’t get issues on example, terrorism is almost always portrayed the media agenda unless there is significant as something done by small political or killing. Thus for NGOs to push governments religious radicals or by stigmatized govern- to act via media coverage, they must get their ments and virtually never as state policy by 70 message through two stringent filters: the mass powerful governments. When news is pre- media filter based on news values and the sented in tiny sound-bites, the only sort of government filter based on groupthink. message that can be easily gotten across is one Our account of the shaping of communica- that resonates with the listener’s pre-existing tion by the organizational form of the news conceptual framework. To present an alterna- media is built around the idea of news values, tive perspective requires more time, which is themselves an outcome of the structure of seldom available. media organizations in the context of other • Although the mass media virtually never powerful organizations.72 Explaining the orga- express some viewpoints, nevertheless the nizational shaping of communication in terms mass media are relatively open to divergent of news values has the advantage of being views, certainly in comparison to organiza- close to the way journalists and editors tions such as governments and corporations. actually conceive of what they are doing. Therefore nonviolent activists, human rights Understanding organizational influences on groups and many others can obtain coverage communication is one thing; doing something

1992); Phillip Knightley, The First Casualty: The 71 Peter Viggo Jakobsen, “Focus on the CNN War Correspondent as Hero and Myth-Maker from effect misses the point: the real media impact on the Crimea to Kosovo (London: Prion, 2000); conflict management is invisible and indirect,” Moeller, Compassion Fatigue. Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 37, No. 2, March 2000, pp. 131–143. 70 For the view that terrorism by dominant states is by far more important than the type of terrorism 72 See W. Lance Bennett, News: The Politics of reported in the media, see Edward S. Herman, The Illusion (New York: Longman, 1988, 2nd edition) Real Terror Network: Terrorism in Fact and and Rodney Tiffen, News and Power (Sydney: Propaganda (Boston: South End Press, 1982). Allen and Unwin, 1989), among others.

134 Nonviolence Speaks about them is another. Those who are con- messages. A basic driving force in government cerned about repression, aggression, and bodies is control of information by elites in oppression and want to mobilize action against order to serve elite interests. Media organiza- it have several options. tions have as a basic rationale the dissemina- tion of information; the processes by which • Use the mass media by adopting actions this occurs are shaped by government and and messages so that they make good stories, corporations, but with considerable opportuni- or in other words rate highly in terms of news ties for insertion of alternative or challenging values. This is a common approach used by messages. nonviolent activists but it only works for We have only touched on shaping of certain types of issues and actions. communication by other types of organiza- • Build links with sympathetic journalists tions: churches, trade unions, professional and editors so that normal reactions to what associations, charities, sporting clubs, neigh- counts as a story are modified. This can be borhood groups, and many others. In every helpful but the influence of individuals is case, there is the potential to mobilize or limited in the face of the wider organizational dampen concern and action. Understanding the dynamics. way the organization shapes communication, and perhaps changing this process, can lead to • Educate members of the public to be more greater mobilization. informed about how news is constructed and One type of organization is especially 73 more willing to take action. This is essential important: social action groups. Some of them, but does not by itself challenge the way news such as Amnesty International, seem to be is constructed. especially good at mobilizing concern among

• Challenge the driving forces behind the lots of people over a long period through media: government and corporate power, formal organizational structures and rules. including media power. This is vital for the Others, such as affinity groups, can motivate long term but exceedingly difficult. high-level nonviolent direct action, such as civil disobedience to blockade arms ship- • Use alternative media, such as community ments. How do different structures shape radio and e-mail, that are more participatory. communication? How do they encourage (or Alternative media are not a major challenge to sometimes inhibit) action? Which structures the mass media in the short term but are the are best suited to challenging or circumventing only long-term solution to problems of media control over communication by governments, power. corporations, and mass media? These ques- tions deserve considerable investigation. In our discussion of organizational theory, we have focused on two types of organizations Conclusion that are crucial in communication about repression, aggression, and oppression: gov- In our whistle-stop tour of communication ernments (especially foreign affairs depart- theories, we have found much of value for the ments) and mass media (especially the news). task of challenging repression, aggression, and The organizational perspective is a powerful oppression, as well as much that needs to be one in showing how organizations shape investigated.

• The transmission model helps draw atten- 73 Martin A. Lee and Norman Solomon, Unreli- tion to communication blockages, including able Sources: A Guide to Detecting Bias in News censorship and absence of suitable information Media (New York: Carol, 1990); Eleanor technology. MacLean, Between the Lines: How to Detect Bias and Propaganda in the News and Everyday Life • Media effects theory points to the ways (Montreal: Black Rose Books, 1981). that passivity is induced in audiences, espe- Communication theory 135 cially by presenting news as a sort of specta- cle, something that is especially important in dealing with absence of action.

• Semiotics is vital in pointing to the ways in which meanings are constructed; informa- tion on its own is meaningless.

• Medium theory highlights the importance that the type of communication technology has on the ability to communicate.

• Political economy shows that the owner- ship and control of media greatly affect what sorts of messages are carried.

• Organizational theory reveals the potent influence of organizational structure on the form and content of communication, some- thing that is especially important in govern- ment bodies and the mass media.

As noted at the beginning of this chapter, we have not set out to develop a comprehen- sive theory, nor to deal thoroughly with any of the communication theories surveyed here. Rather, our aim has been to pick out insights, wherever they may be found, that may be helpful for opposing repression, aggression, and oppression. Every one of the theories we have discussed has deficiencies, some very substantial, yet even each contains useful insights for our purposes. As one example of how to apply these insights, in chapter 7 we propose a set of steps that nonviolent activists can use in developing a communication strategy.

7 Giving voice to nonviolence

In the previous two chapters we looked at philosophy of wisdom, drawing on the perspectives on nonviolent action and on material in previous chapters. After outlining communication in order to extract insights into this approach, we illustrate how it can be used how to improve communication in nonviolent to look at the case studies covered in chapters struggles against repression, aggression, and 2 to 4. oppression. It turns out that different commu- nication theories give different sorts of Steps to a communication strategy insights relevant to the specific issues involv- ing nonviolent action. How to use these Consider a situation in which there is repres- insights depends on the purpose of the investi- sion, aggression, or oppression that warrants gation. If the purpose is primarily theoretical, greater attention and action, in which commu- namely to understand communication dynam- nication is an important factor in inhibiting or ics in relation to nonviolent struggle, then the facilitating this attention and action. Individu- next step might be to construct a single als and groups concerned about this can theoretical model. If the purpose is primarily consider the following steps as a way to help empirical, then more evidence might be sought develop a communication strategy, which in in relation to the various insights. If the turn would be part of a more general nonvio- purpose is primarily social scientific, then a lence strategy. Note also that these steps deal process of iterative theory construction, only with getting information about a situation hypothesis formation, and empirical testing to an audience. Another whole dimension to could be pursued. However, here we take a communication strategy — not dealt with here different course. — is communication among members of a To pursue a “better” theory is to follow resistance or campaign. what Nicholas Maxwell calls the “philosophy of knowledge,” which presumes that knowl- STEP 1 List the major means by which people edge has a value in and of itself. Maxwell can, in principle, obtain reliable information argues instead for a “philosophy of wisdom” about the situation. This includes direct obser- in which scholarly endeavor is oriented to vation, direct reports (for example, telephone, dealing with major social problems such as e-mail), alternative media, mass media, and poverty and war.1 This book is an attempt to word of mouth. List the major chains through follow the philosophy of wisdom, in that it which information flows, such as government focuses on problems of repression, aggression, statements reported by the mass media. and oppression and examines how to support nonviolent action. Of course, this does not rule STEP 2 For each major chain, list the most out building better theory; however, theory- significant obstacles or barriers to reliable building is not the goal but only a means. information and action on the basis of it. In Rather than propose a better theory, in this particular, consider: chapter we outline a practical approach to • communication blockages, including cen- communication strategy, in the spirit of the sorship and absence of suitable information technology; • inducement of passivity in audiences; 1. Nicholas Maxwell, From Knowledge to • construction of meanings that distort Wisdom: A Revolution in the Aims and Methods of Science (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984); Nicholas understanding or inhibit effective action; Maxwell, “What kind of inquiry can best help us • control over communication processes; create a good world?,” Science, Technology, and Human Values, Vol. 17, 1992, pp. 205–227.

136 Giving voice to nonviolence 137

• shaping of messages through organiza- The key thing is to learn from the past in order tions, especially government bodies and the to do better in the future. mass media. Communication strategy against STEP 3 For each major chain, consider Indonesian repression in East Timor methods of overcoming the obstacles or barriers. In particular, consider: After the Indonesian invasion and occupation • using different communication media; of East Timor in 1975, control of communica- • targeting different audiences; tion was a key element in the Indonesian • changing the way messages are con- military’s operations. In order to mobilize structed; opposition to Indonesian atrocities and support • working through or challenging organiza- for East Timorese independence, it was crucial tions that shape messages. to obtain and disseminate reliable information about what was happening. Consider then the STEP 4 Undertake the approach under step 3 four steps. that is most likely to be effective, taking into account one’s own resources and social STEP 1 List the major means by which people location. can, in principle, obtain reliable information about the situation. Step 4 makes explicit the point that the choice Here are some chains through which of a course of action depends on who is taking information about the situation in East Timor the action. A religiously-based nonviolent could flow to people in Indonesia, Australia, action group has different opportunities to a United States, Portugal, and elsewhere. ginger group of journalists, a dissident within a government bureaucracy, or a network of • East Timorese directly observe events, telecommunications experts. Choosing a subsequently leave East Timor, and talk to course of action also depends on who else is people elsewhere. available to take action. In other words, action should be pursued in the context of what other • Indonesian troops directly observe events, action is occurring or likely to occur. subsequently leave East Timor, and talk to To illustrate the application of these steps, people elsewhere. we use examples drawn from the case studies in chapters 2, 3, and 4. For each example, we • Visitors directly observe events, subse- select several chains and explore obstacles and quently leave East Timor, and talk to people methods for overcoming them. elsewhere. Before beginning, it is important to empha- size that our intent with these examples is to • Indonesian government officials receive illustrate the steps, not to pass judgement on reports from East Timor and then make what people did or didn’t do in actual situa- official statements; journalists write stories for tions. In some cases, people might have tried Indonesian media based on the statements. some of the methods we suggest here; in others, they might have thought of these • Government officials from Australia, US, methods but rejected them for reasons known Portugal, and elsewhere receive reports from only to them. It is reasonable to expect that East Timor and receive Indonesian govern- participants often know more about a situation ment statements, and make statements of their than any outside observer does. On the other own; journalists write stories for the media hand, as commentators, we have the advantage based on the statements. of hindsight. Activists are not omniscient. They can misjudge situations and make • East Timorese directly observe events, mistakes. This is nothing to be ashamed about. subsequently leave East Timor and talk to

138 Nonviolence Speaks overseas spokespeople of the East Timorese against the East Timorese, since it would resistance, who make statements that are probably mean leaving family and friends and reported in Western media. going into permanent exile, with the possibil- ity of reprisals against family members. • East Timorese directly observe events, Limited language and public speaking skills then talk to members of the East Timorese would be additional obstacles. independence movement who send informa- tion by short-wave radio to receivers in • Visitors directly observe events, subse- Australia, who then pass the information to quently leave East Timor, and talk to people sympathizers and journalists. elsewhere. The primary obstacle in this case is getting • Visitors record events on video, smuggle permission to enter East Timor and be in a the videotape out of East Timor, and broadcast position to observe atrocities. There might be it on Western television. hesitation in speaking out due to possible reprisals on East Timorese informants. The We have listed only a selection of possible credibility of reports by visitors could be chains. It should be obvious that there are questioned. Finally, speaking directly to numerous other possibilities. The aim in step 1 individuals or groups (without using mass should be to list a wide variety of chains so media) has a limited impact. that diverse options can be considered. Step 1 can be revisited if desired. • Indonesian government officials receive reports from East Timor and then make STEP 2 For each major chain, list the most official statements; journalists write stories for significant obstacles or barriers to reliable Indonesian media based on the statements. information and action on the basis of it, Indonesian government officials almost focusing on communication blockages, in- invariably toed the government line; contrary ducement of passivity, construction of mean- information was censored or distorted. ings, control over communication, and organi- Officials who contemplated saying something zational shaping of messages. different — telling the truth — knew they For each of the chains listed in step 1, we could expect to be dismissed or imprisoned. comment on obstacles. Similar pressures operated on Indonesian journalists, who furthermore were hampered • East Timorese directly observe events, by lack of direct information. subsequently leave East Timor, and talk to people elsewhere. • Government officials from Australia, US, A major obstacle is that only some East Portugal, and elsewhere receive reports from Timorese were allowed to leave. Many who East Timor and receive Indonesian govern- did leave were afraid to speak widely due to ment statements, and make statements of their possible reprisals on relatives in East Timor. own; journalists write stories for the media Few had sufficient language and public based on the statements. speaking skills to make a big impact on The Western government line on East Western audiences. Finally, speaking directly Timor downplayed Indonesian repression. to individuals or groups (without using mass Individual officials who tried to buck the line media) has a limited impact. would have found their input censored or sidelined and possibly their careers put in • Indonesian troops directly observe events, jeopardy. Hence those journalists who relied subsequently leave East Timor, and talk to on Western government statements would people elsewhere. typically report a very watered down account Few Indonesian troops would have had an of events. incentive to expose atrocities committed Giving voice to nonviolence 139

• East Timorese directly observe events, constructed, and working through or chal- subsequently leave East Timor, and talk to lenging organizations that shape messages. overseas spokespeople of the East Timorese resistance, who make statements that are • East Timorese directly observe events, reported in Western media. subsequently leave East Timor, and talk to One obstacle is the perceived credibility of people elsewhere. the East Timorese representatives, who are There seems no easy way to get more East perceived as partisan. Second-hand reports are Timorese out of the country or to reduce the not as arresting as eye-witness accounts. risk of reprisals on relatives for speaking out. Another obstacle is that Western media give The obstacle of limited language and public more attention and credibility to government speaking skills potentially could be overcome statements than to statements by East by intensive training. Timorese representatives. • Indonesian troops directly observe events, • East Timorese directly observe events, subsequently leave East Timor, and talk to then talk to members of the East Timorese people elsewhere. independence movement who send informa- More troops might be induced to leave if tion by short-wave radio to receivers in given moral and financial support. Thinking Australia, who then pass the information to more generally about communication from sympathizers and journalists. troops, thought could be given to setting up a The availability and reliability of short- system for dissident troops to share their wave systems is a crucial barrier. Australian perceptions with outsiders, for example government intervention to shut down Austra- through anonymous postal or email routes. lian short-wave receivers is another. Setting up such a system would require considerable ingenuity, since it can be as- • Visitors record events on video, smuggle sumed that Indonesian officials would do the videotape out of East Timor, and broadcast everything possible to track down any military it on Western television. dissidents. Barriers include getting into East Timor, being able to film significant events, getting • Visitors directly observe events, subse- the videotape out of the country, and getting quently leave East Timor, and talk to people the mass media to broadcast it. elsewhere. More information could be obtained about Note that in focusing on obstacles, solid steps what sorts of people are given permission to in chains are not discussed — though they enter East Timor, and people recruited who fit should not be forgotten. For example, eye- the specifications. Perhaps bribery could be witness accounts by East Timorese have the used to gain entry, though some activists power of authenticity and are far more likely would surely have reservations about this. to trigger action in audiences than routine Those who are able to gain entry could be mass media stories. A videotape brought back trained in techniques of observation and by a Western journalist has a different power investigation and later in public speaking of authenticity: it is harder for Indonesian skills. government apologists to discredit. • Indonesian government officials receive STEP 3 For each major chain, consider reports from East Timor and then make methods of overcoming the obstacles or official statements; journalists write stories for barriers. In particular, consider using different Indonesian media based on the statements. communication media, targeting different The problem here is the imposition of the audiences, changing the way messages are government line and the acquiescence of most Indonesian media. One way around this would

140 Nonviolence Speaks be for dissident officials to leak information to Australia, who then pass the information to independent media. Another would be for sympathizers and journalists. concerned bureaucrats and journalists to Cheap and easy-to-use short-wave units, develop a manner of expression — a type of capable of transmitting great distances, could public code — that would reveal what was be smuggled into East Timor. As for the short- going on in East Timor to sophisticated wave transmitter in Australia, instead of or as readers. Yet another approach would be to well as going into hiding, activists could make push for greater editorial freedom and for more of a public issue of their efforts for hu- journalists to seek out East Timorese, Indone- man rights being illegal, thereby highlighting sian troops, or visitors to East Timor for first- the complicity of the Australian government. hand accounts, thereby overcoming reliance on government statements. • Visitors record events on video, smuggle the videotape out of East Timor, and broadcast • Government officials from Australia, US, it on Western television. Portugal, and elsewhere receive reports from Development of easy-to-conceal micro- East Timor and receive Indonesian govern- video systems — such as those used by spy ment statements, and make statements of their agencies — would make recording and smug- own; journalists write stories for the media gling of video recordings much easier. based on the statements. Production and distribution of large numbers Methods of getting around communication of such systems — so that East Timorese as obstacles in this chain are similar to those for well as visitors could use them — would make the Indonesian media: leaks by government it hard for any atrocities to occur without some insiders to independent media; a type of code, recording. understandable by journalists, in official releases; greater media support for investiga- In any one of these chains, there is much more tive journalism, including seeking out first- that could be said about methods of overcom- hand reports of events in East Timor. ing barriers to communication. Our comments here are intended to give an idea of the issues • East Timorese directly observe events, that can be traversed. subsequently leave East Timor and talk to In practice, many of these possibilities were overseas spokespeople of the East Timorese thought of and discussed by opponents of resistance, who make statements that are repression in East Timor. What we suggest reported in Western media. here is that more systematic attention be given To improve the credibility of spokespeople, to communication strategy and that this can be a study could be made of what factors aided by listing possible communication influence their credibility — appearance, chains, listing obstacles, and then considering speaking style, content of statements, etc. — methods of overcoming the obstacles. and steps taken to improve, assuming they are compatible with the values of the resistance. STEP 4 Undertake the approach under step 3 Methods for spokespeople to dramatize their that is most likely to be effective, taking into use of eye-witness accounts could be explored. account one’s own resources and social Pressure could be put on Western media to location. always provide “balance” by quoting East Implementing step 4 depends crucially on Timorese spokespeople alongside Indonesian “one’s own resources and social location,” government reports. namely who one is and what one can do. An East Timorese, for example, can contribute to • East Timorese directly observe events, some chains but not others. If emigration is then talk to members of the East Timorese possible, then leaving and subsequently independence movement who send informa- speaking about experiences and observations tion by short-wave radio to receivers in is an option. Another option is speaking to Giving voice to nonviolence 141 visitors. Learning another language, such as Communication strategy against Portuguese or English, and improving speak- Stalinist repression ing skills would be helpful for these options. Another possibility is to develop skills in using Far more than the case of East Timor, to talk short-wave equipment. Yet another possibility of communication strategy against Stalinist would be to befriend an alienated Indonesian repression is to speak hypothetically. As noted soldier who might, later, decide to leak before, our aim is to illustrate how the steps information to the media. for developing a strategy can be used, not to Choosing between such options involves pass judgement on what did or did not happen assessment of one’s situation and personal in a particular circumstance. values. There are no right or wrong answers, In the East Timor example, we started with but some choices are more likely to be effec- a series of complete chains, beginning with tive than others. It is at this point that access to observation or experience of events in East information and informed analysis becomes Timor and ending with audiences in other especially important. countries. After analyzing these chains — Imagine that there are activists who are specifically key barriers and ways to overcome carefully examining communication chains, these barriers — we noted that, for step 4, the scrutinizing obstacles, and creatively propos- choice of a chain should be made “taking into ing methods of overcoming them. For this account one’s own resources and social analysis to be really effective, it has to be location.” communicated to everyone who can contribute An alternative way to proceed is to begin to making chains effective. If the most the analysis specifying one’s resources and promising chains involve East Timorese, then social location, selecting chains from the very they need to know what they can do to make beginning with these in mind. To illustrate this those chains effective. The same applies to approach, we pick a challenging case: an Indonesian soldiers, Indonesian journalists and illiterate peasant in the Soviet Union in the editors, Australian government officials, and early 1930s who is witnessing brutality and so forth. famine due to forced collectivization. Making a communication strategy known to potential supporters raises an additional STEP 1 List the major means by which people complexity: it is likely that opponents will find can, in principle, obtain reliable information out about the strategy. That is a possibility about the situation. even when there is tight security, since there is In this case, “people” refers to those who always a risk of infiltrators or surveillance. may not know what is happening or how When a strategy becomes semi-public — serious it is and who are in a position to take which, if a much greater number of supporters action. Here are some possible chains. are to be involved, it must — then account needs to be taken of countermeasures by • Tell a Communist Party official about opponents. For example, if a strategy involves what is happening, asking for the message to smuggling of video recorders into East Timor, be passed on. This might be, for example, (a) a plus training in their use, then it is likely that personal story of hardship, (b) what is the Indonesian military will make greater happening to the village: a collective story of attempts to screen all incoming goods and to hardship, (c) negative consequences for the harass anyone suspected of providing video country in terms of lower productivity and the training. This needs to be factored into like, (d) negative impact of the Party’s policies assessment of this option. The basic point is on support for the Party and Communism that communication strategy cannot be devel- generally, or (e) tales of heroic resistance to oped in isolation from the opponent’s re- repression. sponses: strategy has to take account of what the other side is likely to do.

142 Nonviolence Speaks

• Tell a visitor about what is happening, traveling to a town and asking about contact- asking for the message to be passed on. ing influential people may generate suspicion.

• Travel to the largest accessible town and • Tell a trusted literate person who is seek out an influential person; tell the person willing to write a letter to Communist Party about what is happening, asking for action to officials in Moscow. be taken. There may be no person in the village who is both literate and trustworthy. Furthermore, • Tell a trusted literate person who is the literate person would have to be willing to willing to write a letter to Communist Party take the risk of writing a letter that could lead officials in Moscow. to reprisals. Communist Party officials in Moscow may just ignore a letter or see it as a • Tell a trusted literate person who is sign of rebellion. willing to write a letter to someone in another country. • Tell a trusted literate person who is willing to write a letter to someone in another STEP 2 For each major chain, list the most country. significant obstacles or barriers to reliable Again, there may be no person in the information and action on the basis of it, village who is both literate, trustworthy, and focusing on communication blockages, willing to take the risk of writing a letter that inducement of passivity, construction of could lead to reprisals. There may be difficulty meanings, control over communication, and in deciding to whom to write. The biggest organizational shaping of messages. obstacle would be getting the letter out of the country. • Tell a Communist Party official about what is happening, asking for the message to STEP 3 For each major chain, consider be passed on. methods of overcoming the obstacles or The biggest problem here is that the official barriers. In particular, consider using different will not pass on the message, due to fear or communication media, targeting different lack of sympathy. Even worse, the official audiences, changing the way messages are may organize reprisals. Alternatively, the constructed, and working through or official may pass on the message and as a challenging organizations that shape messages. result suffer reprisals. • Tell a Communist Party official about • Tell a visitor about what is happening, what is happening, asking for the message to asking for the message to be passed on. be passed on. Even though there may be some “visitors” To get around the problem that the official — traders, itinerants, relatives, or travelers — may be afraid or unwilling to pass on a their willingness and reliability for passing on message — not to mention organizing a message will probably be unknown. There is reprisals — it would be worth observing always the possibility that trying to pass on a officials and talking to trusted friends about message may lead to informing and reprisals. them, in order to figure out which ones are most open to an approach. Unfortunately this, • Travel to the largest accessible town and in itself, does not protect the officials from seek out an influential person; tell the person reprisals along the chain. about what is happening, asking for action to The next thing to consider is what sort of be taken. message to provide. As noted in step 1, some Who is influential and which influential possibilities are (a) a personal story of people can be trusted? It may be difficult to hardship, (b) what is happening to the village: find out. Again, reprisals are possible. Even a collective story of hardship, (c) negative Giving voice to nonviolence 143 consequences for the country in terms of lower Developing an account about lowered productivity and the like, (d) negative impact productivity or negative consequences for the of the Party’s policies on support for the Party Party requires yet a different process of and Communism generally, or (e) tales of information gathering, including figures on heroic resistance to repression. Which sort of yields, outputs, and attitudes. This is likely to story would be most effective may depend on be risky and may depend on co-operation of the individual. It might be possible to get an key individuals. idea by noticing how the official responds to After gathering information, developing a comments about hardship, about the Party, or story, rehearsing it, and picking out a seem- about resistance. An official who is sympa- ingly receptive Party official, care then needs thetic to the people’s struggles might respond to be taken in selecting the right occasion and best to personal or village stories, whereas an moment to talk to the official. If the official official concerned more about the achieve- seems suspicious, then the discussion can be ments of the Soviet Union might respond best terminated or side-tracked into safer ground. to arguments couched in terms of productivity On the other hand, if the official seems or support for the Party. Tales of resistance receptive, the full account can be given. Of seem unlikely to be the best approach unless course, there is always the risk that the official the official is actually an opponent of the may feign receptiveness in order to gather Party’s policies. information for later attack. To avoid this, Another possibility would be to change the observation of the official’s behavior in emphasis from stories of hardship and lowered previous circumstances may be helpful. productivity to a more positive angle: the From this single case, it is apparent that a benefits that would accrue if policies were seemingly simple thing — talking to an modified in certain ways. official — can involve lengthy preparation and By listening closely to the rhetoric of Party careful planning, with many difficult decisions officials, it should be possible to frame to be made. These same complexities apply to comments in language that does not overtly the other chains, but will not be spelled out in clash with the dominant discourse. This is such detail. where a semiotic analysis becomes useful. It may be possible to use the language of the • Tell a visitor about what is happening, oppressor to convey critical messages. asking for the message to be passed on. In order for any of the messages to be as A key issue here is the reliability of the effective as possible, it would be worthwhile visitor for passing on a message. Information collecting information, developing a persua- could be sought, discreetly, from anyone who sive story, practicing speaking, and rehearsing knows about visitors. The approach to the the approach to the official. To tell one’s own visitor could be planned with the same care personal story, a selection of episodes and that an approach to a Communist Party official facts needs to be made and then the raw might be. material put together into a touching or telling account. A lesson can be embedded in such a • Travel to the largest accessible town and story in a subtle fashion. seek out an influential person; tell the person To tell a story about a village, information about what is happening, asking for action to needs to be collected from others, including be taken. some personal stories as well as data about To begin, it would be valuable to get in a illness, deaths, loss of morale, and so forth. position where traveling to a town would not This could be a risky process since collecting arouse suspicion, for example through deliv- information may arouse suspicions. On the ering goods or accompanying an ill person other hand, collecting information may reveal seeing a doctor. Finding out who is influential others who are willing to speak out. could be accomplished by general conversa- tion about people in the town. Quite a lot of

144 Nonviolence Speaks such conversation might be needed. The next effective fashion is largely unknown. There- challenge is talking to the person. Some fore, to complete the analysis of chains, it pretext would be needed: the closer it is to a would be necessary to start again from the genuine reason, the better. Then, of course, perspective of a different link-person: a Party there is the choice of what story to tell. official, a visitor, or a foreign recipient of a letter. Any one of such individuals could • Tell a trusted literate person who is perform an analysis of chains in which they willing to write a letter to Communist Party are a link. But for their efforts to be effective, officials in Moscow. it is a great advantage for there to be peasants To find a trusted literate person, the same who tell their stories in an effective fashion. caution might be needed as finding out about a Party official who could be approached. The Communication strategy against the person could be tested by getting them to write MAI letters on less sensitive topics and seeing whether they can be relied upon. Ultimately, As described in chapter 4, the successful the person would have to be considered totally campaign against the MAI was a model of trustworthy before broaching the issue of effective communication, especially in using writing a letter to Communist Party officials. the net. Yet it is always possible to do better. Then comes the task of composing the letter As a contrast to the cases of Indonesian and and getting it delivered. Soviet repression, where we focused on communication chains in situations with • Tell a trusted literate person who is relatively little effective resistance, in the case willing to write a letter to someone in another of global corporate domination we look at country. communication chains early in the anti-MAI After finding a trusted literate person — as campaign. In order to illustrate examination of in the previous chain — the biggest obstacle is obstacles and methods to overcome them, we selecting a person in another country and select chains that were less commonly effec- getting a letter to that person. Any possible tive than the ones actually used. routes by which letters could be delivered would need to be explored and assessed. STEP 1 List the major means by which people Without knowledge of a moderately reliable can, in principle, obtain reliable information method of delivery, this chain has little chance about the situation. of success. • Local anti-MAI campaigners provide STEP 4 Undertake the approach under step 3 information about the issue to the families and that is most likely to be effective, taking into friends of politicians and government officials; account one’s own resources and social the families and friends then pass concerns on location. to the politicians and officials. (This is a After examining various options, a choice supplement to the normal approach of provid- needs to be made. Given that there are large ing information directly to politicians and uncertainties in every chain — especially the officials.) receptiveness of the individual to be ap- proached or written to — there is no guaran- • Local anti-MAI campaigners provide teed way of making the “best” choice. information to local media, which then report on the issues. This analysis has been from the viewpoint of an illiterate peasant, who is most unlikely to be • Anti-MAI campaigners provide informa- in a position to analyze chains all the way to tion to international media (such as wire their conclusion. For example, whether a services and CNN), which then report on the visitor can or will use a peasant’s story in an issues. Giving voice to nonviolence 145

• Anti-MAI campaigners provide informa- • Campaigners produce anti-MAI television tion to international media, which then report and radio spots and pay stations to broadcast on the issues. them. International media seldom recognize something as “news” when all they have is • Anti-MAI campaigners go door-to-door information provided by nongovernment providing information to residents about the organizations. They are highly responsive to issues. government agendas and perspectives.

STEP 2 For each major chain, list the most • Campaigners produce anti-MAI television significant obstacles or barriers to reliable and radio spots and pay stations to broadcast information and action on the basis of it, them. focusing on communication blockages, in- Producing quality spots can be expensive ducement of passivity, construction of and time-consuming. Costs for prime-time meanings, control over communication, and spots are very high. Stations may refuse to organizational shaping of messages. broadcast them. Tensions can arise among activists about the use of such tactics, which • Local anti-MAI campaigners provide support the commercial media. information about the issue to the families and friends of politicians and government officials; • Anti-MAI campaigners go door-to-door the families and friends then pass concerns on providing information to residents about the to the politicians and officials. issues. Influence on public officials via their Getting enough knowledgeable volunteers families and friends occurs quite often; when a willing to repeatedly approach strangers door- social movement raises the profile of an issue to-door would be a big challenge. In addition, sufficiently, then all sorts of people become many people who are approached would not concerned, including families and friends of see international economic treaties as immedi- even the most ardent opponents. To operate ately relevant to themselves. through families and friends as a conscious strategy, though, runs the risk of seeming to be STEP 3 For each major chain, consider intrusive and manipulative. methods of overcoming the obstacles or Another obstacle is getting access to barriers. In particular, consider using different families and friends of key officials. To be communication media, targeting different most effective, contacts should be already in audiences, changing the way messages are place rather than contrived. constructed, and working through or challenging organizations that shape messages. • Local anti-MAI campaigners provide information to local media, which then report • Local anti-MAI campaigners provide on the issues. information about the issue to the families and The obstacles here are that local media friends of politicians and government officials; often are reluctant to take up stories at the the families and friends then pass concerns on instigation of pressure groups, may be more to the politicians and officials. receptive to the government line, may not have One way to overcome the appearance of resources to undertake their own investiga- intrusiveness and manipulation would be to tions, and may perceive the MAI as a distant run targeted campaigns — leaflet drops, public international issue with little relevance to the meetings, talks at workplaces — in areas local audience. where families and friends of officials are known to live or work. Another approach is to make a special effort to recruit activists or supporters from areas where contacts with

146 Nonviolence Speaks families and friends of officials are more likely. • Anti-MAI campaigners go door-to-door providing information to residents about the • Local anti-MAI campaigners provide issues. information to local media, which then report Workshops can be run for volunteers to on the issues. improve their knowledge and door-to-door To overcome the resistance of local media canvassing skills. A careful analysis of the to an issue that is seen as remote, special images and issues in the MAI and how they efforts could be made to tap into news values might resonate with local people could be for local media. For example, impacts on a undertaken in order to develop the most effec- local business or individual workers could be tive approach for door-to-door canvassing. dramatized. Potentially sympathetic journalists and editors could be approached and asked STEP 4 Undertake the approach under step 3 what would make the issue relevant to local that is most likely to be effective, taking into audiences. account one’s own resources and social location. • Anti-MAI campaigners provide informa- It may be that the methods used by anti- tion to international media, which then report MAI campaigners were in fact the most on the issues. effective in the circumstances. However, by Contacts within the international media systematically analyzing a variety of commu- could be cultivated and used to find out the nication chains, including ones such as those most effective ways of putting globalization above, the possibility of overlooking a fruitful issues on the media agenda. The most recep- option is reduced. tive media organization, outlet, or program One risk of net-based activism is that some could be targeted with the most experienced activists become fixated on the net and and well prepared material, tailored exactly for become less receptive to using a variety of its requirements, and any coverage received media and associated options. Analyzing a might then be used to attract interest from variety of communication chains is an antidote other international media. to excessive reliance on the net — or on any other medium or type of approach, for that • Campaigners produce anti-MAI television matter. and radio spots and pay stations to broadcast them. Conclusion Sympathetic media workers can be ap- proached to produce spots on a volunteer We began this book with the claim that basis, at no cost to campaigners. Initially, nonviolent action is a potent and promising approaches could be made to purchase cheap option for challenging repression, aggression, broadcast time, for example during the night. and oppression, and that there is much to be If stations refuse to broadcast the spots, this learned and done to improve its effectiveness. can be made into a campaigning issue, with We presented three case studies demonstrating the spots shown at public meetings and put on that nonviolent action can work: the toppling the net as examples of what is not allowed to of Suharto in Indonesia in 1998, the thwarting be seen.2 of the 1991 Soviet coup, and the stopping of the Multilateral Agreement on Investment.

However, there is a risk in looking primarily at 2 Experience with this technique is described by successes of nonviolent action: the lessons of Kalle Lasn, Culture Jam: The Uncooling of failure or nonaction are less evident. So we America™ (New York: Eagle Brook, 1999), pp. also examined parallel cases where nonviolent 194–196. Lasn and friends produced “anti- action was lower profile, less effective, or commercials” and tried to buy TV advertising virtually absent: the 1965-1966 massacres in time, but TV stations refused to run them. Giving voice to nonviolence 147

Indonesia and the repression in East Timor in However, Johan Galtung’s idea of “the great the decade after 1975; Stalinist repression in chain of nonviolence” provides, with suitable the Soviet Union; and structural adjustment modification, a suitable foundation for programs. analyzing communication to support nonvio- Ideally, a nonviolent campaign should have lent struggle. succinctly set out goals that are clearly under- There are many perspectives on communi- stood and agreed upon by a sufficient number cation, but few have given any attention to of people who are willing to act. It is also nonviolence. Nevertheless, from nearly every important that the methods of achieving these type of communication theory it is possible to goals are discussed and agreed upon and that draw insights that are relevant to nonviolent these methods have been chosen both for their action. Building on these insights, we con- compatibility with the goals and for their structed a model of communication against chances of success. repression, aggression, and oppression in While there are no guarantees for the which there are various potential communica- success of nonviolent struggle — just as there tion chains, each subject to different obstacles. are no guarantees of the success of armed The combination of case studies and theory struggle — we believe that attention to can be used for a variety of purposes. One communication has the potential to greatly possibility is to undertake a detailed assess- enhance the chances of success. Communica- ment of nonviolent campaigns using a well- tion is vital within groups and for groups to developed theoretical framework. For exam- communicate with potential audiences and ple, using the communication framework we negotiate with or make demands of opponents. developed in chapter 6, it would be possible to We have focused on how to use communica- carry out a close analysis of the anti-MAI tion in order to promote one’s cause in an campaign or other antiglobalization initiatives. effort to overcome repression, aggression, and This would be a worthwhile endeavor, reveal- oppression. Communication is also important ing much about the power and limitations of in other areas of nonviolent struggle and needs activist communication practices and strate- to be thought about deeply and analyzed for gies, taken in political and organizational the best means of attaining goals in a self- context. Such analyses could then be used to consistent manner. modify, refine, and elaborate the theoretical Communication strategy should be one framework, with the aim of developing a component of any nonviolence strategy. The nuanced model of communication for nonvio- cases of Indonesian repression, Soviet repres- lent struggle. sion, and global corporate domination illus- We hope others will undertake such analy- trate the importance of communication both in ses. Our chosen path in this book was prominent, active, and successful campaigns somewhat different. Rather than attempt to as well as in circumstances when resistance is build up a comprehensive and sophisticated less developed or less successful. Activists model of communication against repression, have been remarkably resourceful as well as aggression, and repression, we chose in this courageous in their use of communication chapter to propose a series of steps that may methods. Yet there is always more to learn, help activists to examine their communication which is why a close analysis of previous strategies. These steps by themselves are not a campaigns and periods of repression is strategy but are intended to encourage activists worthwhile. to think systematically about how they use In order to understand better how to use communication to achieve their goals. The communication more effectively, in chapters 5 steps themselves are simple enough: list and 6 we surveyed perspectives on both potential communication chains, note the nonviolence and communication. We found barriers that may make them ineffective, that most analyses of nonviolent action give examine ways to overcome the barriers, and little overt attention to communication. then choose those chains that are most likely

148 Nonviolence Speaks to be effective. To make use of these steps Given the central and increasing importance of more effective, it is helpful to have knowledge communication, though, it is a component that of the role of communication in both success- deserves much greater attention. ful and unsuccessful actions — such as described in chapters 2 to 4 — and to understand basic ideas about nonviolent action and communication, as covered in chapters 5 and 6. The steps are themselves readily open to revision or replacement. The key thing is analyzing communication, not the precise method of doing it. The temptation for activ- ists is to rush to do something immediately without carefully assessing options. While the thing done immediately may be worthwhile, the risk is that better options are overlooked in the rush or by making implicit assumptions about what will or won’t work or what should or shouldn’t be done. The temptation for scholars, on the other hand, is to build impres- sive models or intricate analyses that are rigorous and satisfying intellectually but have little practical relevance. We have tried to steer a course between these temptations. There are two principal sources for future development of communication theory for nonviolent action. One is further theoretical work by scholars. There is certainly ample material to work with, both case studies and concepts, whose possibilities are largely untapped. The other source for theory devel- opment is nonviolence practice. As activists develop new communication strategies, and especially when they use, reflect on, and modify prior theory and practice, they provide rich new resources for theorizing. Of course, from the point of view of activists, the aim of action is not to contribute to theory develop- ment but to effectively confront injustice. For them, theory is a tool rather than a goal. Our preference is to emphasize “theory for activ- ists” over “theory for theorists,” recognizing that these categories are blurred and that each can enrich the other. Finally, it is always important to remember that, for the purposes of nonviolent action, communication is a means to an end rather than an end in itself. Communication strategy is but one component of the wider task of developing strategy for nonviolent action.