Dale and South Africa

AUTUMN 1984 o South Afrlcan Uprlslngs, see page 7 dale and South Africa s violence escalates in strife-torn South Africa, an in creased in South Africa. Pretoria continues to defy the inter creasing number of Americans are looking at the No national community by refusing to withdraw from its illegal vember presidential election and what it will mean for occupation of Namibia. And South Africa has escalated its brutal future US policy toward that racially divided country. military attacks into neighboring states. Reagan's radical shift in Traditionally, Africa policy receives scant attention in presi US policy has generated outrage in Congress and among the dential campaigns. Certainly in 1984, issues of arms control and American people as a whole as the US is seen to be supporting US military involvement in Central America and the Middle East the most racist regime on earth. have overshadowed other foreign policy concerns. Foreign Second, spurred by this policy, the American anti-apartheid policy issues, in general, have taken a backseat to the domestic movement has significantly expanded its influence and activities pocketbook issues that the candidates assume will determine across the US. On the locallevel, the divestment movement has the winner in this election. won significant victories in the last two years. Legislation But the system of white minority rule and racial oppression in divesting billions of dollars in public funds from banks and South Africa and the US response to it have gained new corporations doing business with South Africa has been passed prominence, particularly for the Democrats. US policy toward in the states of Massachusetts, Connecticut, Michigan, and South Africa was discussed in ail six Democratic primary Nebraska, as weil as the cities of Philadelphia, Boston, and debates and the issue was brought up several times at the Washington, DC. On the national level, the House of Repre Democratic convention. There are a number of reasons for the sentatives approved several strong sanctions, including a ban heightened interest in African issues in this election, but three on new US corporate investment in South Africa and a prohi factors stand out as especially important: bition on new bank loans. These sanctions are now pending in First, the Reagan Administration's policy of "constructive a House-Senate conference committee. Last year the Congress engagement" has aligned the US more closely with the also passed into law strong restrictions on US support for future white South African government than it has been in over a IMF loans to South Africa. This Congressional action reflects decade. As part of this closer alliance, the administration has the American public's growing awareness of apartheid and US extended to Pretoria economic, political, and military support. involvement. Since 1981, this administration has lifted controls on certain Third, the presidential candidacy of Jesse Jackson suc exports to the South African military and police; allowed several cessfully brought African and other Third World issues into the critical nuclear exports; permitted over $100 million in exports of campaign debate. Jackson condemned the Reagan Administra goods on the State Department Munitions List to South Africa; tion's "official partnership with the racist regime," calling it a supported a $1.1 billion International Monetary Fund (IMF) loan "moral stain" on this country. While there was a tendency to to the South African government; set up a trade promotion office treat Africa as a non-issue on the part of former Vice President in Johannesburg; linked a settlement for Namibian indepen Walter Mondale and Senator Gary Hart, Jackson continued to dence to withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola; and vetoed push for a more progressive Africa policy from the other UN 5ecurity Council resolutions condemning South African candidates and from the party. invasions into neighboring countries. In the words of Chester The Africa plank in the Democratic Party platform approved at Crocker, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, "con the July convention in San Francisco reflected the influence of structive engagement" has sought to work toward "a future in Jackson and the anti-apartheid movement. Compared to the which South Africa returns to a place within the regional 1980 and 1976 party platforms, the 1984 Africa position is much framework of Western security interests" and an end to "South more forthright, more specific, and less imbued with East-West Africa's polecat status" in the world community. concerns. It calls for "a policy of substantial increases in Violence, unrest, and repression have simultaneously in- humanitarian assistance," and a "cessation of the unfortunate ®~67 k88gX8XXX88&SgX88SgggSg8gggggggX8SggS88&XXX&X88XXXX8XXXXX8& tendency to hold such aid hostage to East-West confrontation or a key policy player on Africa, in a recent interview., "The other geopolitical aims," in order to help alleviate Africa's discussion which took place [during the primary campaign] is, hunger, drought, and famine. from my point of view, not indicative of anything, not worth On South Africa, the platform states that a Mondale Admini anything." stration will "reverse the Reagan Administration's failed policy of With that note of realism, what would Mondale's Africa policy 'constructive engagement' and strongly and unequivocally op look like? Interviews with Mondale foreign policy advisers and pose the apartheid regime in South Africa." Specific sanctions top officiais who made Africa policy during the Carter Admini are promised: stration have yielded some light on this question. • "maximum pressure" on South Africa to establish a "demo • Official friendliness toward South Africa, evident in Reagan cratic, unitary political system within South Africa"; Administration policy, would probablyend. Gerald Funk, former • "scrupulous enforcement" of the mandatory arms embargo, Africa adviser on Carter's National Security Council (NSC) and including a ban on "dual use" equipment exports; the man who is presently the Mondale campaign's key adviser on • a ban on new bank loans to the South African government and African issues, told us there would be a "reversai" of "constructive private sector, and a prohibition on new corporate investment engagement." "People see policies ofthe Reagan Administration in South Africa; with respect to Africa and 'constructive engagement' as being • a ban on exports of sophisticated computers and nuclear basically anti-human rights," said Funk, who is frequently technology; and a ban on the importation of South African mentioned as a candidate for Chester Crocker's job in a Mondale goId coins; and Administration. Mondale, Funk argued, would state clearly his • withdrawal of landing rights to South African aircraft. opposition to apartheid. The platform also demands the release of Nelson Mandela, Anthony Lake, Director of the State Department's Office for imprisoned leader of the banned African National Congress, his Policy Planning under Carter, and someone likely to take an wife, Winnie, who is under house arrest, and other political prisoners. On Namibia, the party promises to demand compliance with UN Security Council Resolution 435, the formerly agreed upon The differences between plan for Namibian independence, the imposition of severe fines for US firms doing business in Namibia, and finally, "pro Monda/e and Reagan are clear. gressively increasing effective sanctions against South Africa unless and until it grants independence to Namibia and abolishes Sut how different will Monda/e its own abhorrent apartheid system." The Democratic platform's Africa plank is in open conflict with be from Carter? the one passed in Dallas one month later. The Republican Party platform begins by placing the continent in the context ofthe US struggle with the Soviet Union. Africa as an arena for East-West important State Department position under Mondale, agrees. In ideological struggle, in fact, seems to dominate the Republicans' a recent article in Foreign Policy, Lake argues that "unless and statement, including reaffirmation of the need to link the issues until real progress is made within South Africa, Washington of the Cubans in Angola to Namibian independence. Certainly should conduct only a cool and limited official relationship with Africa policy is one area where the Democrats and Republicans Pretoria." seem very far apart. • Diplomatie "carrots," such as the relaxation on export controis, extended ta Pretoria by the Republicans would be Will Mondale Do Il? rescinded. • The Reagan Administration's linkage of Namibian indepen But does the Democratic platform portend a bold, new dence ta Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola would be Mondale policy on Southern Africa? Not necessarily. Platforms abandoned. "We would very politely but firmly insist," said Funk, often reflect the contending balance of forces during a campaign "that the South Africans get back to the business of UN more than a prediction of future policy. "1 don't think a platform Resolution 435 on Namibia and quit stalling and quittrotting out is, in John Garner's immortal words, worth a bucket of warm the phony issue of Cuban presence in Angola as an excuse for spit," said Donald McHenry, Carter's ambassador to the UN and not giving independence to Namibia." • The fundamental blame for regional violence will be laid at Pretoria's door. McHenry predicted that a Mondale Admini stration would not be "quiet and seeking

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