1st CAVALRY DIVISION 29 28 INTERIM REPORT OF OPERATIONS The defeat of the Field Front, or 630 NYA political support organizations have grown so When the battle area cleared the next morning, cadre concluded there were traitors within the Division, in the Pleiku Campaign, blocked his rapidly they now collect four times as much taxes the enemy had once again been defeated. In this regiment providing target information to the first attempt to move into the Central Highlands as does the constituted government of South case it was thethe 8th Bo, 66th Regiment which had Americans. in strength. We will see later that the enemy Vietnam. The logistical requirements for food and halted in hasty positions on its way to the artil­ had placed considerable emphaSis on gaining a weapons have also greatly increased. As a result lery positions and was eating lunch when outposts LESSONS foothold in the western portion of the II crz. "Olarlie" is supported in the field by an incred· brought word of the approach of a large US unit. The PLEIKU Campaign was the division's ible logistical organization beginning with the In some cases enemy machine guns were fired baptism of fire inin thethe Vienam War; itit marked THE THE ENEMY L<>cal V.C. tax collector and extending many miles from exposed positions and many NVA then to North Vien8.m over trails and roads worn FIRST TEAM's participation in each of the three This first major engagement with the enemy entered the fight wearing their heavy forage smooth by the feet of thousands of porters. Major Conflicts our nation has been involved in taught the cavalrymen a great deal about the packs. To say the enemy was completely unpre­ Literally translated, the phrase Viet Cong since the division's formation in 1921. It meant training and discipline of the NVA regulars. It pared would not be a understatement. This means VietnameSe Communist and those who are that thethe 1st Cavalry was one of thethe twotwo US Army also proved the elusiveness of the supporting Viet state of unreadiness meant thethe enemy lostlost 403 members of the V.C. army employ all the com­ Divisions entitled to two stars on the Combat Cong guerrillas. We had learned a lot about the killed by body count as well as substantial weap­ munist tricks of deceit and violence. Viet Cong Infantryman's Badge. It also meant some new enemy. We know that there were two nominally ons and equipment. It would be safe to say that also applies to the military or to the civilian "firsts" in FIRST TEAM history. It was the distinct enemy military organizations-the NVA this 8th Battalion was no longer an effective components of the "Front;' Of the National Front first time a large American unit operated con· and the Viet Cong forces. More convincingly fighting unit. for the Liberation of South Vietnam, more popu. tinuouslytinuously over difficult terrain,terrain, devoid of roads, though we knew each was controlled by the Hanoi relying extensively on heliborne tactics. It was larly known as the NFL. THE BLACK KNIGHTS based Communist Party led by Ho chi Minh. the first time American units met and defeated These NVA units infiltrated into South Vietnam "The war in Vietnam is a different kind -of On 20 Nov the 3d Brigade terminated SILVER consistently large NVA units fighting as battalions through the demilitarized zone at the 17th parallel war" said President Johnson on July 28, 1965. BAYONET I and was replaced by thethe men of and regiments under Field Front control. Also and along the Ho Chi Minh trail in Laos and 'There are no marching armies of solemn thethe Blackharse Brigade with thethe initiationinitiation of particularly noteworthy were thethe repeated moves Cambodia, a system of roads and foot trails mean· declaration. Some citizens of South Vietnam, SILVER BAYONEr II. Included in the 2d Bri­ of the l05mm howitzers by means of the Chinook dering southward before turning east tov.rard the at times with understandable grievances, have gade task force were four cavalry battalions­ helicopter to provide constant fire support to fast sparsely populated frontiers of South Vietnam. joined in the attack on their own government. the 1/5, 2/5, 2112 and 1/8 and elements of four moving airmobile infantry, the reconnaisance by In addition to these NVA units other Com· But we must not let this mark the central artillery battalions-lI77, lI21,~lI2I,~ and 2/20. fire techniquestechniques developed by thethe Air Cavalry munist fighting forces in South Vietnam include fact that this'this is really war. It is guided by The remainder of the operation was spent at­ Squadron, the coming of age of the aerial artillery the VC'sve's Main Force, District Force, and Village North Vietnam and it is spurred by Com­ tempting to regain contact with large bcxlies of tactics, and the perfection of massive logistical Defense Force Organizations. munist China. Its goal is to conquer the the enemy and was characterized by constant efforts. There was an unprecedented use of air­ Significantly and most dangerous is the VC south, to defeat American power and to extend harrassment of small groups attempting toto avoid mobility and fire power as over 400 helicopters pretense of a truly South Vietnamese "people's the Asiatic domination of Communism." contact. AIl told,told, thethe enemy lostlost 1,519 killed by consumed 85,000 gallons of fuel daily. anny." 'This facade rapidly crumbled beginning body count with another 2,000 estimated killed. In another respect these 37 days of combat had in 1965 with the increased introduction on a grow~ While NVA units are usually found wearing There were 57 captured. His material losses were proven something of even greater importance. ing scale of North Vietnamese forces and equip­ khakis and carrying packs, the local guerrilla or comparable, with 897 individual weapons captured They had shown beyond a doubt that the air ment and stepped up operations by regular North old charlie is clad in Calico Noir. the traditional and more thanthan 400 others destroyed; 126 crew assault concept was valid under actual battlefield Vietnamese divisions. The Main Force units are black P.J.'s of the Vietnamese peasant. The anns served weapons captured, as well as a great deal conditions. The campaign had been the acid test the VC Shock Troops and are composed of well for main force and district force units may range of communication equipment and grenades. of combat for the airmobile division and there trained and equipped men who are capable of from 75mm recoilless rifles and 82mm mortars to There is no doubt that the ARVN relief force can be no question that it fully carried its weight. fighting conventional battles of limited durations, Communist and French manufactured machine would ha'\1e been defeated en route to Plei Me, The accolades· paid toto thethe division reflect thisthis although they are reluctant to do so. The District and submachine guns. The individual soldier may and thethe camp itselfitself overrun. without thethe inter­inter­ splendid success. General Westmoreland declared Forces and Village Defense Forces are usually be armed, however, with nothing more than a few vention of the 1st Cav. What made the inter­ it "the most significant defeat inflicted upon the paramilitary forces and are generally made up of potato masher grenades. He is ingenious, a master vention even more unique was the maJUler in enemy in this war." Other congratulatory mes­ local civilians who are part-time soldiers or at camouflage, and an expert in living and moving which THE FIRST TEAM conducted the initial sages followed: General Harold K. Johnson, Anny guerrillas and whose military duties do not take underground. His elaborate tunnel complexes support operation and eventually thethe pursuit. Chief of Staff, sent a message toto General Kinnard them far from home. They are often seen as stretch for miles and are used for both cover and The enemy was no stranger to the helicopter which recited in part: farmers and merchants by day-terrorists­ for concealment from ground and air surveillance. and the advantages it offers its allies. What he He knows the insidious effectiveness of booby "On behalf of all members of the United guerrillas at night. Among them the less well· failed to grasp was the use of the helicopter in a trained and equipped serve as guides, guards, traps, poisonous punji stakes, spike boards, Malay­ role other than as mover of supplies, other than States Anny. I salute the intrepid officers and men of thethe lst cav Div (AM) for theirtheir messengers, bearers, and informants for the reg· sian gates, and trip·wired cross bows. Each has as an airborne 2¥.1 tonton truck.truck. For thethe first timetime superb action in the battle of the la Drang ular military units. taken its toll in American casualties. His adept he found his withdrawal routes blocked, his Valley.... The Anny and the nation take The enemy, whether he be NVNYA or local goer· use of terrorism has controlled great numbers of columns attacked, artillery fire adjusted on routes pride in your display of courage, determina· rilla, is collectively referred to as "Victor Charlie," Vietnamese. for he thinks nothing of torturing or of exfiltration-allexfiltration-aU because of the third dimension tion and fighting skill." V.C., "81d Charlie" or just "Charlie." The small killing village and Province Chiefs, teachers and which thethe 1st Cavalry added toto thethe war. So guerrilla army which existed in 1960 had matured other influential citizenry. As a result many Viet­ baffled was the enemy during the pursuit of the Secretary of Defense McNamara. usually con· into a formidable force by 1966. CorresJX)ndingIy,CorresJX)ndingly, namese support the Front only because of fear. 33rd Regiment from Plei Me by constant harrass­ servative with compliments, declared. 'There was the demands on local civilians have increased to Because of the militia and the 'secret agents of ment and rapid compromise of "secure" way sta· no other outfit in the world that .could have support these larger units. The military and the Communist organization, more than a third tionstions that a captured document revealed thethe NYA accomplished wbat thisthis Division did." 1st CAVALRY DIVISION 31 30 INTERIM REPORT OF OPERATIONS followed by phase II with search and destroy campaign, lasted for 41 consecutive days as the DECEMBER of the people of South Vietnam were paying taxes operations along the Cambodian border. MATA­ division moved into the northeast and eastern to the Front by the end of 1966 even while they Following the PLEIKU Campaign, division at­ DOR I took place between 31 December 65 - 13 portions of Binh Dinh Province. (Map 8). Although continued to pay taxes to the legitimate govern­ tention was again directed to the east of An Khe, January 1966 with the commitment of the "All the division had operated east of An Khe before, ment of South Vietnam. first to provide security for the establishment of the Way," 1st Brigade. Highway security today this was the first time we had penetrated so far He fights well but often more for fear of thethe Republic of Korea Capitol Division's base camp is merely a routine mission, but a year ago it into the eastern sections of the enemy's domain. capture thanthan from ideologicalideological conviction. His at Binh Khe and -then intointo an area we have come was considered a major operation. The enemy Reliable intelligence had built up over several cadre keep him isolated from contacts which would to know well--the Soui Ca Valley. G-2 Intelli­ had controlled the road system and territory months that eastern and northeastern Binh Dinh tend to counter their propaganda and indoctrina­ gence indicated that as many as 1500 hard core between the major cities for many years. It was Province contained another NVA Field Front, tion. Main Force battalions have carried out well­ VC and local guerrilla forces were in the valley. along ''The Street without Joy," as Highway 19 the Sao VangYang (Yellow Star) Division, then known planned attacks and ambushes with NVA counter­ The 3rd Brigade was tasked wi th finding and has been called, that the French Group Mobile as the 61Oth, but recently renumbered the 3d parts. Utilizing an explicit tactical doctrine sum­ destroying therrLtherrL 100 suffered 2,000 killed out of 3,600 men in an NVA Division.' As the operation developed it marized inin four words, "Four fast, one slow," thethe Operation CLEAN HOUSE was conducted inin armored convoy in 1953 in the mountain pass became apparent that there were three regiments V.C. carefully -plan every move. His credo is three phases from the 17th of December until the separating An Khe and Pleiku. During the eight in the area-two NVA and one ve, all part of the "Fast advance, fast assault, fast clearance of the end of that month. After moving into assembly days between January 4 and 12th the 2/12 Cav Yellow Star Division. These units were primarily battlefield and fast withdrawal" based on "slow areas on the 17th, the In Cav began its search escorted 37 convoys into Pleiku with a total of concentrated in the central;eoastal plain north of preparation." on the 18th along with the 1/8 Cav in an Opera­ 2913 vehicles. Each trip was made without inci­ Bong Son, situated on the Lai Giang River, and As described. his usual tactic is to hit and run. tiontion called SCALPING MUSTANG. The 2/7 dent. As the convoys carried much needed sup­ in the mountains to the north, west, and south­ He will exfUtrate an area when he feels his began itsits search thethe following day. These bat­ plies into the central highland, they broke the east of Bong Son. The plains area to the north security is endangered, only to return when his talions were supported by elements of the ROK hold the VC had established on the logistical flow was known to contain main supply routes as well enemy has withdrawn. As will be seen he is a Capitol Division which were in blocking positions through the area. The entire portion of the road as providing good recruiting areas. To the north­ master at this exfiltration especially under the near the mouth of the valley. Although there was protected by various artillery positions along west is the An Lao Valley, an enemy held strong­ cover of darkness. When he is trapped, however, were 137 enemy killed during the three phases, its length. Phase II began on 13 January and hold for 15 years, except for a brief period in he will fight and fight viciously for his life. He the losses were suffered mostly inin short fierce lasted for four days while 2/5 Cav and 115 cav 1954 when peace was restored between the Viet will not initiateinitiate engagement thoughthough unless forced engagements with thethe enemy attempting toto break conducted spoiling attacks along the Cambodian Minh and the French. To the southwest were the to or unless he feels he has the upper hand­ contact whenever possible to exfiltrate the area. border to demonstrate that significant enemy Kim Son and Soui Ca Valleys also rich rice pro­ which is usually a numerically superior force or On December 29 a unique system was used. In­ fortifications were not in Pleiku and Kontum ducing areas and under VC domination. he is in well-prepared, camouflaged defensive posi­ telligence indicated that "Charlie" was departing Provinces. The 2nd Brigade which had entered The mission assigned the division once again tions. If he does undertake an offensive attack, the valley through a particularly forbidding piece the operatIOn set up its command post at the Polei gave maximum freedom of action to General Kin­ it mayor may not be preceded by mortar and of heavily wooded terrain. To counteract this Djereng US Special Forces Camp while the units nard: attack and destroy enemy elements in the recoilless rifle fire toto "unsettle" thethe enemy. possibility and toto reconnoiter thethe area quickly, operated from company sized bases along the area of operations, reduce VC influence in the As an individual, he is strong but small (usually 300 riot control agent (CS) grenades were dropped border. The heavily forested area required the coastal areas, and return the fertile lands and not over 100 pounds), raised in the jungles and by Huey helicopters on the suspected area from a use of the trooper ladder from Chinooks for the the local people to GVN control. accustomed to the severest rigors of life. He locally built grenade dispenser. An area of 300 first time to introduce engineer troops through MASHER/WHIT'E WING was conducted in five stores food, weapons, ammunition, and medical meters by 350 meters was effectively denied by the thick canopy. LZ would then be cleared with phases in which each one of the division's brigades supplies in caches throughout his base areas. He the agent. No VC were seen moving, and thus chain saws in order to accommodate one or two participated in one or more. We were not alone, needs littlelittle more thanthan twotwo pounds of rice a day with relatively littlelittle effort, it was determined choppers so that heavier heliborne engineer equip­ however, THE FIRST TEAM worked in conjunc­ to keep him going. there were no enemy occupying the area. ment could be lifted in. Although contact was tion with other Free World Forces. Additional His actions under fire have led some to suspect Psy-ops efforts continued throughout CLEAN limited to occaSional encounters with small groups support came from the ill Marine Amphibious use of narcotics before battle, as reflected in this HOUSE, and 306,000 leaflets were dropped on the of local forces, MATADOR I and II served several Force, the 22nd ARVN Division, and the ROK report: objective area to explain the presence of US useful purposes. In the first place it convinced Capitol Division, each working toward the ulti­ troops, appeal for surrender and to get the people the CIDG forces in the vicinity that there were mate goal-Pacification. Mainly the 220022nd Divi­ " ... theythey started charging me with 10 toto not toto aid thethe VC. In order toto deflate thethe value no large enemy forces along that portion of the sion secured National Route 1 which ran from 15 man waves, on a regular skirmish line, of VC "payment certificates" given to indigenous border. With their morale bolstered, it encouraged Bong Son to Qui Nbon, while their airborne bri­ hollering and screaming. I hit some of them civilians for work performed, Psy-Ops dropped their offensive operations. It also provided mutual gade attacked east of NR 1. The Capitol ROK two or three times with bullets and they 30,(0) reproductions of the VC 1,000 Dong notes. experience for US and CIDG forces in working Division provided highway 19 security between would keep coming at me, stop, turn around We attempted to defeat tlW enemy and undermine together. Moreover, the division gained further An Khe and Qui Nhon. and then I could see big blood splotches on his resources in every way possible. Several cap­ detailed knowledge of the trails in western Pleiku Although phase I began as a 3rd Brigade opera­ theirtheir backs as theythey tooktook twotwo or steps thr~e turedtured documents added toto our rapidly building files and Kontum Provinces, while it destroyed VC way tion, the situation soon developed that required towardtoward thethe rear and thenthen fell over. When on enemy formations in the area. stations, training areas, and generally disrupted division Wide participation. This initial phase they were charging me they were yelling, and the enemy's logistical support facilities. lasted for only 3 days and was geared at deceiv­ even after I hit them they were laughing." MATADOR ing the enemy as well as increasing the security BONG SON on N.R. 1. The 1/9 cav operated with excessive This is what the Cavalrymen learned of his After CLEAN HOUSE the division returned to It was only eight days later, on January 25, activity along the southern portions of the Chop adversary. There is no doubt thethe enemy isis a p~ more effectively secure itsits base camp and highway that the division launched its longest and largest Chai Hill Mass, southeast of Bong Son for decep­ fessional, at leastleast inin his typetype of warfare. Much 19 between An Khe and Pleiku. Operation MAMATA­TA­ operation to that date. Operations MASHERI tion purposes. of what the troopers were told at Fort Benning DOR was conducted in two phases. the first of WHITE WING, also known as the BONG SON The first contact was established however, on they now knew was true from personal experience. which was to open this portion of the highway 32 INTERIM REPORT OF OPERATIONS 1st CAVALRY DIVISION 33

28 January, the beginning of Phase II, when the 2.75 inch rockets. This flexible and responsive 3rd Brigade conducted air assaults and overland system has added greatly to the ARA helicopter attacks north of Bong Son. The ARVN Airborne capability. 7 Feb brigade was to the east and along the coast while elements of the 3rd Brigade attacked to the west PHASE In of Route 1. Because of these attacks two enemy Phase III found the 2nd Brigade moving into battalions, the 7th and 9th of the 22 NVA Regi­ the operational area with three additional infantry ment Were found, fixed and destroyed. The' divi­ battalions-the 1/5 Cav, 2/5 Cav, and 2/12 Cav. sion attempted to cut off enemy retreat by land­ The division had escalated to two brigades and ing in blocking positions to the west and north six infantry battalions in preparation for its entry SOUTH CHINA of the areas of contact along expected routes of into the An Lao Valley. The plan called for the SEA withdrawal. Fighting was heavy and by 1500 US Marine Corps toto block enemy escape routes hours on the 28th, 28 aircraft had been hit by to the north of the An Lao as part of its Opera­ ground fire and four CH-47 Chinooks were tion DOUBLE EAGLE. The 22 ARVN Division inoperable. Heavy fighting continued for the next was to block to the south. The brigades of THE two days until the 30th when the enemy broke FIRST TEAM were to estaQIish blocking positions OPERATION contact and withdrew to the adjoining-high ground east of the valley on the dominant terrain, assault MASHER/WHITE WING to the north and west. Phase II terminated on three battalions west of the Valley, and then FIVE PHASES the 3rd of February at which time the enemy had attack east into and through the Valley. D-Day already suffered dearly-566 killed by body count was 4 February; however, bad weather required and 215 captured. a two-day delay during which time the enemy was able to escape. This was the only time in six NEW FIRSTS months of fighting that inclement weather had It was during Phase n that two unique firsts caused a delay in 1st cavalry airmobile operations. were established for both Army Aviation and for As a result, the attack into the An Lao was dis­ Army Artillery history. One was the operational appointing and met with only slight resistance. displacement of the 155mm towed howitzer by During the third phase, the division's Psy Ops CH-54A "Flying Crane" helicopters of the attached personnel were busy broadcasting and dropping 478th Aviation Company. By means of a special leaflets to inform the people of the An Lao that sling fabricated by members of thethe Division 8up­ thethe division would not remain there,there, and ifif theythey port Command, we were able to reposition thethe chose to leaveleave thethe valley thethe opportunity was 155mm howitzer pennitting it to occupy firing presented. Approximately 4,500 of a total popu­ positions that would otherwise have been inac­ lation of 8000 elected to leave, and of those 4,500, cessible. Unheard of until recently is the high over 3,300 were flown to freedom in division ground artillery emplacement which has been Chinooks. used with considerable success by the division's artillery. The howitzer, which weighs about 13,000 KIM SON VALLEY pounds, gives the division a 3000 meter range The fourth phase of the operation was initiated bonus over the l05mm howitzer and greatly in­ to exploit intelligence reportS of an enemy buildup creases the amount of steel that can be placed in the Kim Son Valley, dubbed the "Eagle's on a target. The second historical "first" was the Claws" or "Crow's Foot" because of the seven successful firing of the combination 58-1188-11 missilel valley configuration on the map. In this phase 2.75 inch rocket weapon on February 2, 1966. This the division perfected a new technique for finding weapon system which is now standard in the 2/20 and fixing the enemy. The 3rd Brigade air aerial rocket artillery battalion was devised, man­ assaulted elements of three battalions onto the ufactured, and promoted by one individual, War­ high ground and on exfiltration routes of these rant Officer Robert W. Maxwell of B Battery various valleys, establishing ambush positions. 2/20 Artillery. It isis properly known as thethe Max­ Simultaneously, thethe remainder of the brigade well system. Theretofore, thethe helicopters of thethe assaulted intointo thethe center of thethe valley along thethe 2/20 had either one or the other of these two valley floor and began sweeping outward toward systems, but not both and to change systems for these ambushes. These "beater" forces flushed attack on different targets took precious time. the enemy into the kill zones of the ambush posi­ Mr. Maxwell decided to eliminate this problem, tions; the tactics worked as well as it -was planned. and. his invention substantially increased the For more than three days ambushes were sprung effectiveness of his battalion. The Maxwell which resulted in two heavy contacts. system provides the point-target capability of the On February 17th, B Company 2/5 C8v air MAP 8 S8-11 missile and the area fire superiority of the assaulted into an LZ and by 9:15 a.m. had found 34 INTERIM REPORT OF OPERATIONS 1st CAVALRY DIVISION 35

and fixed a VC company armed with heavy Brigade captured ten of the twelve 12.7mm AA BASE SECURITY the other and perhaps both would be purchased..purchased. One COUldn't help but feel compassion in seeing weapons and a large number of automatic weap­ machine guns and nearly all of the recoilless One can now appreciate that the overall scheme One COUldn't help but feel compassion in seeing the dirt and sores allover their bodies. But then ons. Two additional companies of the battalion rifles of the regiment. of the way the Air Cavalry operates in Vietnam the dirt and sores allover their bodies. But then merely having money would not help the situa­situa· were quickly committed to exploit the contact. The fifth phase of the campaign from 1-6 March is not too dissimilar from that of the old cavalry A third placed under OPCON of LTC Edward C. was aimed at destroying the enemy forces in the days during the Indian Wars. In the Indian days, tion. It is only accu:m.te to say that base camp and Meyer, CO, 2/5 Cay assaulted to the southeast Cay Giep Mountains. This is a forest covered the troopers operated from a centrally-located, is only accu:m.te to say that base camp and the TAOR are relatively secure, for the troops of this contact and ~ediately engaged another mountain stronghold where air assaults were well·fortified base area, a base area which would in each are constantly alert to the possibility of heavily armed unit. ~n~nsive TAC AIR and tube made by bombing holes through the canopy before be secure. It was here that they would refit and enemy mortar attacks. Such was the case at and aerial artillery fires were delivered on the Skytroopers could live up to their name and maintain their equipment, plan their operations 20 minutes after midnight during the night of area throughout the day. And by 6;00 p.m. enter combat by means of i'appelling from Hueys and return for rest. That pattern is remarkably 19-2019.20 February when elements of the 407th VC "Charlie" had had enough. A sweep through the and descending on the trooper Jadder from Chi­ clear today, for inin a war like Vietnam's where Battalion initiatedinitiated a well planned attack on base enemy's defensive position revealed 127 of his nooks. Once on the dominant high ground they there are no front lineslines and resultingly no rear camp to include an assault of Hong Cong moun­ lx>dies. A large number of mortars and recoilless swept down the hills, into the 22 ARVN Division areas, it is also necessary to have a secure area tain as the main thrust, an infiltration of the rifles were left behind. It was concluded that the which blocked together with two battalions of to which the troops can return; hence, a base barrier on the opposite side of camp as a diver­ 2/5 had fought and decimated the anti-aircraft the 2nd Brigade along the low ground south· of camp. The modern operational areas are, of barrier on the opposite side of camp as a diver­ sion, and a mortar attack." The V.C. company battalion of the Yellow Star Division as well as the mountains. Simultaneously, the ARVN junk course, farther apart and each of greater dimen­ which attacked Hong Cong used one platoon in the signal company of the 2nd VC Main Force fleet established a screen to the east. Contact sion than those of old due to nothing else than the actual assault of the communications facility Regiment. was light, but the division did succeed in driving the means of mobility involved. In the case of with two platoons positioned in ambush posture a large enemy force into the ARVN which resulted THE FIRST TEAM, the most secure area of all to attack any ground relief forces which might IRON TRIANGLE in 50 enemy killed and another 30 captured. is its large base camp, with a nine and a half be committed. All reinforcements for the facility, On March 6, MASHERIWHITE WING ended mile circumference, which encompasses an area The capture of a ba ttalian commander in the however, were effected by helicopter and the with 1st cavalry forces back in the area south one third as large as Manhattan 1sland. While 22 NYA Regiment led to the second significant enemy ambush sites were successfully avoided. of Bong Son where the initial mission had begun subdued and camouflaged patches black and aD action on the eastern edge of the Crow's Foot Although the attack on the communications-signal 41 days earlier. The diVision had operated in 360 for black and gold, OD name tags, ranks and area and about 12 miles south of Bong Son, facility did not succeed in destroying any of the degrees around Bong Son in which enemy contact insignia were sewn on the field uniforms,unifonns, con­ where an elaborate,defensive position called the vans or transmission's facilities, friendly losses was maintained during each day of the forty-one tinued improvement was visible in base camp. mON TRIANGLE, was discovered on 19 Febru­ did include the death of a few men, the destruc­ days. The barrier defense system underwent complete ary. The captured battalion commander directed tion of four generators, and the loss of one M-60 The BONG SON Campaign dissipated any resid. planning, as it was envisioned by next fall to elements of the 2nd Brigade to a meeting place machine gun. Elsewhere, the diversionary attack ual doubts of an airmobile division's capability have a string of powerful lights completely ringing where the prisoner had met his regimental com­ accomplished very little,little, for of thethe few enemy to conduct sustained operations, for at least four thethe barrier and floodlighting avenues of approach mander two days earlier. As these elements began who were able toto penetrate thethe barrier each was infantry battalions were effectively supported out for a distance of several hundred meters. to move into the area, a fierce fire fight developed immediately killed. The mortar attack delivered over the 37 miles from base camp throughout The TAOR and highway 19 were also relatively with what was estimated to be a regimental head­ 106 x 82mm mortars which landed in the vicinity the operation. Also of particular interest was secure as the stay·behind battalions, supported quarters and supporting troops. When units of the of division headquarters, the division's helipad. the first time elements of the division success­ by a reinforced artillery battalion, made their 22 Regiment attempted to reinforce the regimental and the 1st Bn, 7th Cavalry with little damage. fully completed an air assault into a riot control presence felt. While there had been no major headquarters, they became caught in the cross Artillery and ARA fired more than 1,700 rounds permeated area with all personnel, including contacts in the TAOR, the mission demands every fire of two companies of the 1st Bn, 12 Cav. in a counter mortar program but without estimate pilots, masked. bit as much preparation and effort as does an For the next three days, the Iron Triangle was of damage to the attacking enemy. hit by wave upon wave of B-52 bombers and large BONG SON was a crucial operation for the divi­ air assault in the operational area. sion, for it offered additional proof, if skeptics The town of An Khe itself had grown rapidly concentrations of artillery. Finally by February CAMP RADCLIFF 21st, the division had devised and implemented remained, that the victory in the PLEIKU cam­ as eager bUSinessmen and local merchants capital­ its own one-two combination. The area was paign was no fluke. Undoubtedly the new 1st Air ized on the services they had to offer. The The next day, Monday, February 21st, was also saturated with CS (a riot control agent) to drive Cavalry bad what was necessary to find, fix, and laundry business probably grew the fastest and an important one in base camp history. For that the enemy from his fortifications and was fol­ finish Charlie wherever and whenever the oppor­ the Vietnamese were introduced to something day Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge flew from lowed by a B-52 strike. Enemy resistance ceased, tunity presented itself. new called. starch. There were good laundries in Saigon to officially dedicate Camp Radcliff. The and the final enemy body count was 313. The statistics of the operation are impressive: which one could be fairly sure he would get commemoration of base camp honored' Major Don~ Meanwhile, the 1st Brigade had replaced the 1,342 enemy killed by body count and a total back the same clothes he handed in and in a ald G. Radcliff, one of the division's first fatal 3rd Brigade in the Kim Son Valley on February of 2,150 killed by all participating Free World reasonable state of cleanliness. And then there casualties of the Vietnam war. 16 to allow the 3rd Brigade to return for base Forces. A hard blow was struck at the three were thethe bad ones. It didn't taketake longlong toto make Major Radcliff was a member of thethe advance camp security and the TAOR mission. As ele­ enemy regiments which had long threatened Bong a decision. Other way-sideway.side shops along route 19 liaison party and departed Fort Benning on ments of the 1st Brigade moved along the high Son and the stretch of National Route 1 to Qui offered the usual trinkets, scarves, folding chairs, August second for his orientation flying in this Nhon. Intelligence sources indicated five of the ground on the eastern and southern portions of Nbon. Intelligence sources indicated five of the cabinets in addition to many other items on which country. On the 18th of August General Kinnard nine enemy battalions engaged were ineffective. the Son Long Valley, the southwestern finger of one could spend money. A G.I. could not avoid sent a personal message to Lieutenant Colonel Three. field hospitals had been captured. Another John B. Stockton, CO, 1 Squadron, 9th Cavalry the Kim Son, they encountered the headquarters the small girls running up with small cones of John B. Stockton, CO, 1 Squadron, 9th Cavalry encouraging sign wasWas revealed from the fact that company and the heavy weapons company of the in care of the USNS DARBY; company and the heavy weapons company of the 140,000 Vietnamese civilians volunteered to leave peanuts to sell, "Hello, G.I."-"you buy?" Then 18 NVA Regiment. After a heavily contested their hamlets in the An Lao and Son Long Valleys the little boys would crowd and compete for the "Regret to inform you Major Donald Rad· engagement the airborne troopers of the 1st to return to GVN control. shoe shine. More often than not either one or cliff KIA 17 August 1965." 1st CAVALRY DIVISION 37 36 INTERIM REPORT OF OPERATIONS certain direction the force must remain head­ logistical units proceeded into the operational logistically supported directly from base camp. Maj. Radcliff. executive officer of the 1/9 Cav. logistically supported directly from base camp. ed in that direction, reverse itself and return area by combat convoy made up of over 450 lostlost his lifelife at thethe controls of a gunshipgunshlp after he 36 miles away. The skytroopers troopers also gained valu­ whence it started, or leave the road and vehicles as well as 24 C-l30 sorties. The division's volunteered toto fly a combat mission inin thethe relief able experience inin perfecting assault techniquestechniques attempt to move cross country at the gen­ aviation group and the helicopters of the 1/9 into extremely dense and mountainous jungle ter­ of a US Special Forces camp. For his heroism erally accepted rate of 400-500 meters per Cavalry supported LINCOLN from the "Turkey that day he was awarded. posthwnously. the Dis­ rain. for the terrain around Kon True was perhaps hour. By our telegraphing the punch the Farm," near II Corps Headquarters at Pleiku, tinguished Flying Cross and the Purple Heart. some of the most difficult yet encountered by the enemy has in the past had all the time he and so named because of its appearance from the His courage was in the highest tradition of the division. Otaracteristic are steep hills rising 3,215 needed to decide whether to stand and fight air with the many choppers irregularly spaced on United States Army and it was only fitting that feet on the eastern side of the DAK KRON Bung on terrain of his own choosing, or to avoid the ground. his name should be inextricably woven into the River and 2,000 feet on the western bank. Nu­ a fight. side-step the punch and counter punch Meanwhile, the division's 3d Brigade continued history of THE FIRST TEAM in Vietnam. merous streams flow through deep ravines. Heavy as he saw fit. In essence, the enemy had Operation JIM BOWIE, northwest of the divi­ At thethe solemn dedication ceremony that Feb­ vegetation covers the area. found himself with many of the advantages sion's base, but planned for commitment into the ruary 21st. General Kinnard humbly explained. Another innovationinnovation inin thethe use of artillery was which traditionally are supposed to accrue LINCOLN Area. The 2nd Brigade maintained "In bestowing his name upon this camp we carve perfected during JIM BOWIE. the piggy-back sling to the defense on interior lines. This is base. TAOR. and hlghwayhighway 19 security. The 3rd into history our recognition and appreciation for which allows simultaneous displacement by Chi­ particularly true when considering the plan­ Brigade, 25th Infantry Division conducted Opera­ his sacrifice." nook helicopters of a l05mm howitzer, its firing ning required before Free World Forces could tion GARFIELD. south of tlje LINCOLN AO. but section, and 30 rounds of ammunition. With the prepared for commitment into LINCOLN on JIM BOWIE mass enough troops to take the offensive. artillery crew in the aircraft, the l05mm ammu­ With the appearance of the cavalry, we have order of I Field Force Vietnam. The next significant operation began on March nition is carried in a sling load beneath the a division capable of seizing the initiative For the five days before March 30th, the 1st 13th and was of a search and destroy nature howitzer itself, thereby saving a great deal of from the enemy, of placing him on the defen­ Brigade conducted small unit reconnaissance mis­ executed by the lst and 3rd Brigades inin the VinhVinb precious timetime inin turn-aroundturn-around by allowing thethe crew sive with no advance warning, of swooping sions north and east of the Chu Pong Massif, while Than and An Tuc Districts toto thethe north and east toto have a quick reacting package for irmnediateirmnediate into previously invulnerable secret bases in the 1/9 Cav screened along the Cambodian border of Camp Radcliff. It was planned as a follow-up operation once displaced. In the field of tactics, multi-battalion strength, prepared to stay in zone, north and south of the Chu Pong. Only to the BONG SON Campaign. as intelligence the use of a "ncrfire box" around a unit in dense until the enemy is killed or abandons his light and sporadic contact was established. reports indicated a VC headquarters and its serv­ jungle when the unit was unable to pinpoint its sanctuary. In short, we have carried the The tempo of action increased sharply on the ice facilities were in the Kon TrucTrue area. Units ground location.location, proved to be an effective means fight to the enemy and forced him, prepared 30th, however, when the aircraft of the 1/9 Cav from Bong Son may have entered the area to rest of fire support coordination. The box served as or unprepared to settle the issue. Finally, by sighted three enemy in an open area south of the and refit. Since the Kon True base area was also a fire support coordination line and limited fire smashing the enemy whenever his concentra­ Chu Pong and observedobserved. thirty more hiding in pre­ adjacent to the TAOR, operations there would also inside the box to the artillery battalion with the tion of forces justifies committing our battal­ pared positions. Weapons ships of the 1/9 made mission of primary fire support for the unit. eJ:IIhance our security. D-Day for Operation JIM ions, the Cav. has given the lie to those gun runs and TAC AIR took them under fire BOWIE was originally scheduled for March 10th Other fires could only be delivered insideinside thethe box prophets of doom who say the VC is all but with napalm. The 1st Brigade was notified of a but low ceilings and heavy rains once again forced at the request of the unit and under control by invincible. The ARVN have taken heart from possible significant target. To develop the situa­ a three day postponement. The two brigade its direct support artillery. this, and in the II crz have turned in some tion, in true 1/9 fashion, the infantry platoon, assault was still made on the 13th at less than The air assault technique is, of course, much spectacular results against the enemy in bat­ A Troop. 1/9 Cav assaulted into the area. The desirable conditions with a broken ceiling of 1,200 in evidence throughout all the operations. To talion size operations." platoon captured a prisoner who incredulously feet instead of the preferred 4.000 feet absolute. place our operations in proper perspective, Major stated, "There are 1,000 troops in the area." Sure There was only light resistance with limited and John J. Madigan of the division's G-3 training LINCOLN enough, shortly thereafter, this platoon became sporadic contact, as captured documents and and operations office explained the alternative On the 25th of March, the 1st Brigade with heavily engaged with a much larger force. An prisoner interrogation revealed that the enemy toto thethe helicopter: three battalions had returned to the scene of the attempt was made to extract the platoon, but two unit had made an orderly departure on 8 March. PLEIKU Campaign to begin Operation LlNCOLN lift ships of the 1/9 were dowoeddowned by heavy fire. On March 21st. the 1st Brigade was returned to "In the first place,place. our movements to com­ also a search and destroy operation. LINCOLN Fifteen men were killed in these crashes including Camp Radcliff where it proceeded to the Pleiku­ bat would be to a great extent roadbound. was initiated to avert an enemy offensive, be­ the recently captured prisoner. Plei Me area again to commence Operation LIN­ with all that such moves entail in South Viet­ lieved in progress, or pending in the immediate Reinforcements were on the way as A/1/12 Cav COLN on March 25th. The 3rd Brigade continued nam-clearing the road, which slows the future. Although no specific enemy units were was enroute from Pleiku to assist the beleaguered JIM BOWIE with ground sweeps and heliborne column, which in tum makes it more sus­ • forecasted as a result of prior reconnaissance in platoon. Having closed into the area -about 5:00 assaults from the Kon TrueTruc area, through the ceptible to ambush. By remaining on the road force operations, the Division G-2 still carried that afternoon, Alpha Company also became old U.8.U.s. Special Forces Camp at Kannack. back we would be subject to diversionary attack in the area the 32d, 33d, and 66th NVA Regiments, heavily engaged. ARA.ARA, close air support.support, and con­ to division base at An Khe, terminating the effort and the relief column ambush technique which which were encountered in November 1965 as tinuous illumination from SMOKEY BEAR, an on March 28th. Although thisthis operation saw cost thethe ARVN so heavily inin thethe period justjust well as an additional transportation com~ny. Air Force flare ship, were provided throughout prior to the intervention of allied troops. relatively little contact, there were many way prior to the intervention of allied troops. These units were supported by the usual signal, the night. Also at 11:00 PM a CV-2 Caribou stations, training areas, and supply caches de­ Second. the VC and NVA drive to dominate medical, and engineer troops. made a low-level ammunition and ration drop to stroyed. There was wide-spread disappointment the western portion of II CIZ and its subse­ On the morning of the 25th, the 1/8 Cav air the units. This marked the 1st Cavalry's first over the fact. however, that no engagements quent penetration to the sea to link up with assaulted directly from An Khe to an LZ near attempt in making such a resupply at night. It were made with units of the 407th VC Battalion forces in BinhBinb Dinh Province, could not have Duc Co. This 78 mile air assault was one of the was completely successful. A few minutes after which were believed to have withdrawn into that been countered by a road-bound force. The largest combat assaults of an entire battalion 1:00 AM on the 31st. A Company of the Jumping area after the attack on Camp Radcliff on Feb­ conventional force in this war must of neces­neces~ undertaken by THE FIRST TEAM. The 1/12 Mustangs 1/8 Cav and B!2/19B12119 Artillery. executed ruary 20th. sity telegraph its punch. simply by being Cav,cav, the 2/8 Cav, and the supporting artillery and a night air assault into LZ CAT to provide tube Of interestinterest isis thethe fact that thisthis operation was Channelized by road net. Once headed inin a 38 INTERIM REPORT OF OPERATIONS 1st CAVALRY DIVISION 39 artillery support for the blue platoon and A/l/12. helping the Vietnamese people to help themselves. with the work in the hamlets and villages. They Their mission completed, the infantry companies This was another first for the division-the first It has been called "nation building" and is a cam­ will show you how to build with the material were withdrawn from the area by 12:00 noon night combat assault by a rifle company and an paign "to win the hearts and minds of the people" we will provide. But you must do much of the and returned by helicopter to Camp Radcliff. artillery battery successfully planned and executed over to their legally constituted government. As work yourself." BROWNING is typical of the type operation into an LZ not previously reconnoitered. The the Division's G-5 office, headed by LTC Harry J. The Chief nodded. However, he had additional which we have repeatedly conducted on short enemy broke contact prior to sunrise, on the 31st. Phelps, has overall supervisory responsibility for requests such as the needs for wells and pumps, notice to exploit intelligence. He left behind 197 bodies and there were over the Civic Action affairs, the large portion of the culverts so that their dirt roads would not be 200 more estimated killed. implementation of the projects are left to the washed out with each monsoon rain, small bridges LEWIS AND CLARK At 10:00 AM on the 31st, the decision was made Civil Affairs Officers appointed by the respective so that they could cross raging waters during Operation LEWIS AND CLARK, 3-16 May, to advance the operation's time schedule. This subordinate units. These efforts have magnified the rainy seasons, and finally, they wanted the found the 2/12 Cav air assault near Plateau Gi, was done by the division's assuming operational since the initial attempts during Operation Friend­ knowledge to bring an end to disease which for 48 miles nort1"!west of base camp, and return in control of the 3d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division ship in the last days of October. scores of years had been running rampant. leaps and bounds to An Khe. Only six enemy and by moving the 1st Cay's 3d Brigade into the This is the battle without bullets. It is the Meanwhile, other Cavalrymen independently were killed, but the battalion discovered an operational area at Plei Me. These deployments battle to fight disease, ignorance, and poverty. took up the civic action cause of their own voli­ ordnance station, an aid station, a training area marked the initiation of Phase II of the opera­ Each of the various Civil Affairs Teams uses its tion. Captain Warren E. Mullan, a platoon leader with a bayonet assault course, and the location tion, which lasted until the 4th of April without own method-although the goal is always the in the 2/20 ARA Battalion was asked by a Viet­ of an enemy battalion headquarters. Of impor­ significant contact. same. Medical assistance is rendered to hundreds namese school teacher if he would take time to tance, we were insured no major enemy forces Phase III began on April 4th as all units of persons a day-sometimes thousands. Clothing, teach a few words of English to a class of young­ were in the north and northwest of the Division's reacted to division OPORD 6611, issued on March food and soap are distributed. When time pennits, sters. The father of four children could not refuse. TAOR. 29th, by assaulting into the Chu Pong itself. The diVision members show local civilians how dig The first visit was followed by additional and 29th, by assaulting into the Chu Pong itself. The diVision members show local civilians how to dig DAVY CROCKETT 3d Brigade, 25th Irtfantry Division attacked from and use wells, how to build schools and hospitals, longer visits until Captain Mullen began spending the north, the 1st Brigade from the south and the and generally to improve their economic and social several hours a week in An Khe-as a school While LEWIS AND CLARK was undelWay, the 3d Brigade from the east. For the next four days, development. There are many things to be done. teacher. His explanation: "I just love kids." Division moved the 3rd Brigade into a second operational area, once again to the territory cov­ until the tennination of LINCOLN, the entire In the hamlet of An Son, Major Wilmot Hall, MOSBY Chu Pong was traversed with light to heavy con­ the 1st Brigade Civil Affairs Officer rose to his ered by MASHERIWHITE WING in northeastern Operations MOSBY I, 11-17 April, and MOSBY tact. No new bunker or cave systems were dis­ feet before a meeting with the hamlet and began Binh Dinh Province. DAVY CROCKETT, con­ II, 21 April-03 May, were search and destroy and covered.. LZ's X-Ray and Albany, sites of heavy to speak, carefully and slowly and in short sen­ ducted simultaneously with LEWIS AND CLARK reconnaissance in force operations north and contact during the November 1965 PLEIKU Cam­ tences so there would be no errors in the inter­ from the 4 to the 16th of May, was diVided into northeast of LINCOLN, respectively. Little or no paign, showed no signs of occupation or use by pretation to those present. two phases each of which claimed major enemy contact was established by the committed units, the enemy since the division's departure. Further contact. "We come from the United States of Ameri­ but the division gained valuable intelligence of proof that the enemy had not thoroughly combed During the month of May the central high­ ca. We are soldiers, but we want to do other infiltration routes, rest stations, as well as un­ the area is the fact that when an Air Force plane lands near Pleiku extending to the coastal areas the area is the fact that when an Air Force plane things than just shoot the Viet Cong. We covering a few sizeable caches. which had been shot down during the PLEIKU around Bong Son undergoes a seasonal weather want to help your people and all the people The next operations, While not significant in campaign was located by the Division's 3d Bri­ transition. The northeast monsoon weakens and. of Vietnam. We want to help you to help tenns of raw numbers, are included to demon­ gade, the six .50 caliber machine guns and over the southwest monsoon winds strengthen, result­ yourselves so that everyone will enjoy a bet­ strate the unique capabilities of the division. The 1800 ammunition rounds had not been removed. ing in a decrease in precipitation, accompanied 1800 ammunition rounds had not been removed. ter life. But first, we must know what you first of these, Operation BEE BEE, 26-28 April, In total the enemy lost 480 killed, with roughly by rising temperatures. During both phases of total the enemy lost 480 killed, with roughly need." was a show of force executed near Bong Son in 200 of this number credited to the division's DAVY CROCKETT the temperatures ranged from conjunction with elements of the 40th Regiment, artillery. The light-weight M-I02 howitzer was The hamlet chief, the spokesman present, pro­ 94 to 110 degrees heat with little rainfall and 22d ARVN Division. An air assault by C/2/7 Cav first used by the 1I21st Artillery and proved duced a list of needs so basic that it staggered high humidity. Each man was told to carry salt into an LZ in that viCinity had apparently flushed to be a valuable asset for the Airmobile Division the officer for a moment because of its simpliCity. tablets keeping heat exhaustion cases to a mini· into the open a company-sized unit of the 22 NVA with its lightweight and 6400 mil traverse. Also "We need a place for women to have babies," mum. In general, the weather was very favor­ (Quyet Tam) Regiment. They were caught in the Division's 8th Engineer Battalion built a the Chief said. able for air assault techniques. the open by the gun ships of C Troop, 119 Cav 3500 foot C-130 airstrip in 96 hours and covered Major Hall replied seriously. "A doctor will Prior to the 3rd Brigade's entry into phase I and ARA ships of C Btry 2/20 Arty (ARA) in it with the new T -17 membrane in another 18 visit your hamlet once a week to treat the sick • around Bong Son and the confluence of the An what is popularly known as the ''Turkey Shoot" hours. A total of 2300 man hours and 7f51 equip­ and examine the women who are heavy with child. Lao and Kim Son Rivers, reliable intelligence for the Cavalry helicopters. The aircraft killed ment hours were required. In related engineer An engineer officer who knows how to build a located two battalions of the 22 NVA Regiment, 58 enemy without touching ground and without activity, two airstrips were built using the section­ hospital will draw up a plan for your own medical the objective of the 3rd Brigade's mission. On a single American loss. BROWNING, on 29 April, alized bulldozer, which was delivered piecemeal center. But can you give us a person from the the 4th of May the In and the 2n assaulted was a daylight raid with the mission of locating by helicopter, assembled on the ground at the hamlet whom we can teach how to nurse those into the northern part of the operational area and a VC rice husking machine reported to be operat­ site location, and put to use. of your people who are ill?" were in blocking positions when D Troop, 1/9 Cav, ing in the Vinh Thanh Valley within the division The Chief nodded. ing in the Vinh Thanh Valley within the division and ARVN APC Troops launched an overland TAOR. Two infantry companies, with ARA sup. NATION BUILDING Rather than clispense the largesse for which attack to the north to drive the enemy into the port, air assaulted into the area where the trap. The attack northward was characterized Although the division was heavily burd~ned with the U.S. Army is known the world over, Major machine had been reported. There was light con­ searching for and destroying the enemy from the Hall held up his hand for silence and attention. by light sporadic contact until early in the after­ tact with the enemy, and the machine was found SOuth China Sea to the Cambodian border, it was 'We will help you help yourselves," he continued. noon of the 5th when the 1/9 Cav received heavy in a building which had been set afire by ARA. waging an equally important war-the war of "Our soldiers will not always be available to help automatic weapons fire. (Map 9). In reaction, 1st CAVALRY DIVISION 41 40 INTERIM REPORT OF OPERATIONS the 2/7 and 1/7 moved to the area of contact to mate was dropped from one battalion to 40 NVA encircle what was estimated as an enemy bat­ troops operating with 25 local guenillas. Never­ talion. Tube and aerial artillery maintained con­ theless this contact netted thirty-eight enemy tinuous fires, expending 806 rounds of all caliber dead from the sixty-five man force. within forty minutes. to fix the enemy while the The second phase of DAVY CROCKE"IT saw maneuver elements encircled. Although high extensive use of the Hunter-Killer airmobile tech­ losses were known to have been inflicted on the nique as developed by Colonel Moore. This tech­ enemy, the major part of the battalion was able nique is just one of the many ways the air assault to elude the encirclement through a gap left capability can be used effectively and ingeniously. open in the south. The well-coordinated attack To avoid tiring inordinate numbers of infantry the next morning fell short of expectations as in looking for "Charlie," the concept calls for a the enemy was no longer there. Shortly there­ small lightly eQuipped force to scout an opera­ after, at 9:55 AM an element of the 1/9 Cay tional area with the mission of searching and went to secure a helicopter downed by enemy hunting down the enemy. Once located, and this ground fire near the hamlet Thanh Son (2) which is often the most difficult part of this war, a was south of the previous evening's encirclement. larger combat-prepared "kiUer" team, on stand-by The 1/9 Cay received heavy fire from the hamlet alert at a nearby LZ, can be rushed into the and concluded that it was there to which the area to close with and destroy the force. When enemy battalion retreated and had held up. the terrain and weather permit, the hunter-killer The 117 Cav was ordered to attack south from concept employs the inherent advantages of the its present position. D Troop 1/9 with the Air Cavalry; it relieves the infantry from the attached ARVN APC Troop attacked to the east. constant demanding jungle patrolling, and reduces 217, in classic example of airmobility, was as­ unnecessary flying hours on our aircraft. sembled, given its mission, and air assaulted into new positions south of the hamlet all within the ttAIR ASSAULT" space of less than an hour. Forty minutes after This is only one particular airmobile technique, the battalion had been found, the enemy dis­ but throughout there has been the repeated term covered the aggressive 1st Cavalry soldiers had "air assault," around which the continued success once again surrpunded him. The threat of the of THE FIRST TEAM revolves. But what exactly DAVY CROCKETI closing noose forced the enemy to dig in and that is an air assault and what are the components 4 and 5 May was the last mistake he was pennitted to make. of such a maneuver?maneuver! Once again, Major Madigan ... Ordnance from twelve sorties of F -4C fighter­ of G-3 Training and Operations explains it this bombers pounded the area combined with re­ way: lentless artillery fire. At one point an enemy "First, of course, comes intelligence information SOUTH CHINA company, caught between two 3d Brigade com­ pinpointing an enemy unit. Map study of the SEA panies which were separated by only 300 yards, area will isolate a few likely LZ's; or perhaps was bombed With 750 lb. bombs, in what Colonel we have been in the area previously and already Harold G. Moore, then 3d Brigade CO, described know where we want to land. In any case a as "the most accurate display of tactical air pre­ careful reconnaissance is made without attracting cision bombing I have ever seen." The enemy attention to the spot selected for the assault; the positions had not been breached by nightfall but commander may have two or three long looks the division maintained the encirclement, and from a helicopter casually flying at various alti­ contact continued throughout the night as small tudes past the LZ. Plans are made for the groups attempted to exfiltrate. The enemy lost assault as responsibility for initial security of the over 140 killed on the 5 and 6, and a captured LZ is assigned, and equipment is issued and prisoner subsequently revealed that the entire checked. Liaison is established with the helicopter 9th Battalion, of the 22 NVA Regiment had been company conunander, who has probably been engaged and destroyed as a fighting unit. through a number of these assaults in support )1/9CaVo The second phase of DAVY CROCKErT took of one or another of our battalions. Fire support place in the Crow's Foot between 11-16 May. is laid on and perhaps TAC AIR will have a few The only significant contact was made on the 11th planes in the area. Certainly ARA will be with Bong Son. when aircraft of the 1/9 spotted what was thought the aerial column, to provide final preparatory to be an enemy.battalion moving south-southwest fires on the LZ and then to remain in orbit on in the valley. Once again air strikes and artillery call with half their armament. As the troopers were called in to hold the enemy while elements load the choppers, a complex system of communi­ of the 1/9, 117, and 1/5 maneuvered into blocking cation is activated, linking artillery observers MAP 9 positions on routes of withdrawal. Later the esti- with their units, Conunanders, pilots and other 42 INTERIM REPORT OF OPERATIONS 1st CAVALRY DIVISION 43 contributors to the operation, to insure a rapid plish a similar task. The men who envisioned he served on the Howze Board, which gave birth Officer estimated to be a VC hattalion. A & C flow of information. AS the troop carrying heli­ the dreams of airborne tactics were not the divi­ to the Air Mobile concept. Companies, 1/12 Cav, assaulted to reinforce, copters near the LZ, artiHery fires, which have sion commanders in combat. When Operation CRAZY HORSE kicked off on landinglanding latelate inin thethe afternoon. Contact broke at been hammering at the clearing and the trees With all the pomp and circwnstance afforded May 16th, General Norton was at the helm of 10:45 that night. During the subsequent four days surrounding it are lifted. ARA swoops in to a man of General Kinnard's caliber, the division what would be a very rewarding and successful there was light to heavy contact throughout the deliver rocket fire on the enemy on any likely went all out to deliver a proper send off to the year for the lst Cavalry. Ironically, 1966 was the operational areas, as the Cavalry units hopped positions and is followed by escorting armed soft-spoken CG. The sunny weather helped cap­ Year of the Horse in the annual Vietnamese New and skipped from LZ to LZ. Early in the after­ Hueys which spray the area with machine gun ture the panorama of color of the massed battle­ Year, or TEI', tradition of naming each year in noon on the 21st of May the mortar platoon of fire. The gunships go in on the deck to entice streamered flags and guidons whose military tra­ succession after one of twelve animals. It was C/1I12, which remained at LZ Hereford while the the enemy into firing at them and· revealing his ditions reflected an encyclopedia of American surely not going to be an ordinary "Year of the company's rifle platoon swept down ridges to the position. The troop ships arrive, sometimes land­ History. Horse," for the 1st Cavalry was there to insure west was attacked and overrun by a company ing, more often hovering a foot or two in the air In true air assault fashion, the ceremony began itit would be a year of hope and new found freedom size force of 'enemy.'enemy. Killed that day with thethe and sometimes as high as ten feet, as the infantry with a simulated combat assault by ARA rocket for the Vietnamese. weapons platoon was Sam Castan, a Senior Editor hit the ground and head full speed for the edge ships which, after flYing low overhead, released of Look Magazine who was on an assignment CRAZY HORSE of the lZ. The fOIWard artillery observerII by now a thundering volley of rockets which exploded with the division. on the ground with his Company Commander, outside the Camp Radcliff perimeter. The recon­ The ffiISSlon during CRAZY HORSE was to The operation went intp its second phase on is in contact with his battalion either through naisance twin-engined Mohawks made a fly-by to search and destroy in the rugged hill mass be­ May 24 which lasted until the termination of the artillery liaison officer or an orbiting chop­ pay their respects, after which followed the air­ tween the Suoi Ca and the Vinh Thanh'lbanh Valleys CRAZY HORSE on 5 June. The concept during per, or directly to the battalion from his own craft from the 1/9 Cav, trailed by the gun and south of the Crow's Foot area. While not an this phase was to surround the area with Cav·Cav­ radio. He is prepared to bring fire right up to "slick" ships of the 229th "Stacked Deck" Assault obstaCle to airmobile movements, the density of aIryalry and ARVN units to prevent exfiltration while the perimeter. ARA remains on station as suc­ Helicopter Battalion. A trio of CH-47 Cbinooks thethe junglejungle represented many problems inin thethe con­ all available TAC AIR and artillery blasted thethe ceeding waves of helicopters hit the LZ. Once brought up the rear, with a piggy-back sling load struction and selection of LZ's. The area was also center to destroy or drive out to the blocking the LZ has been secured, artillery must be moved of l05mm howitzer and ammunition pallets slung effectively split into a northern and southern forces the remaining enemy elements. Following in and the Sky Troopers are prepared to continue below. portion by a natural corridor between the two three days of this intensive fire power the area their mission on foot. By now they may be There was the usual "trooping the line" of valleys. The "Oregon Trail," as this corridor is would be swept again to destroy totally the last 15-25 kilometers from the battalion CP they left massed colors and the deserved praise by Lt. called, was used consistentlyCOnsistently by the enemy as an remaining enemy forces. not over 30 minutes earlier. They may have General S. R. Larsen, ex; I Field Force Vietnam. avenue of approach into and egress out of the During the last days of the operation, heavy crossed a mountain and a couple of rivers enroute As the day drew to a close, guidons bearers repre­ Vinh Thanh Valley. Intelligence indicated the casualties were inflicted on the enemy both from to their objective with not even a second thought. senting all the units in the division, took their enemy was in the area, and a -captured document fire support and by the infantry units. During Small wonder the shock actions of the air assault, positions along the path leading from the general's revealed thethe possibility of an attack on thethe Vinh thisthis timetime ROK forces maintained contact withwtth an as executed by this division, have proven to be quarters on the hill, past the twin Quonset huts Thanh Special Forces Camp in the northern end enemy battalion for 4 days, inflicting serious more than the enemy can counter." of the Command Headquarters, to the CG's wait­ of the valley on May 19th, Ho Chi Minh's birth­ casualties. In total figures, CRAZY HORSE cost ing chopper on Skytrooper pad. After final fare­ day. The period around the 19th was also to be the enemy 507 killed by body count with an GENERAL KINNARD LEAVES wells, General Kinnard once again trooped the one of no moon. additional 380 dead. He lost 97 individual weapons The lst Brigade prepared for commitment It was on the 5th of May, Justjust after the initia­ line of colors, this time shaking the head of each and 16 crew served weapons. The division evacu­ against what we had determined to be the 2nd tion of LEWIS AND CLARK and DAVY CROCK­ and every one of the division's sergeant majors. against what we had determined to be the 2nd ated or destroyed 45 tons of rice and 10 tons of ETr, that the Airmobile Division experienced its The band played "Auld Lang Syne," for an era VC Regiment. Its mission was to continue the salt. Captured docwnents provided valuable in­ first change of command. General Kinnard, who was ending and on the morrow a new one would attack in zone to destroy the 2nd VC Regiment, fonnation for the first time on the VC infra­ and pursue the enemy regardless of his direction pioneered the air assault concept with the experi­ begin. The roar of the Mohawks signalled the and pursue the enemy regardless of his direction structure of Hinh Dinh Province. Too much credit mental division at Fort Benning and who bril­ final fly-by with all aircraft units of the division of movement. MaximumMaxinmrn effort was toto be made cannot be given toto thethe logisticallogistical support side of to capture prisoners for intelligence purposes. liantly led the Air Cavalry in its first months of represented. Three bubble-nosed OH-13's trailed CRAZY HORSE. The FOlWard Support Elements The possibility of the overrunning of the Vinh war, relinquished command to Major General John in the order of succession and hovered as they carefully insured there was always enough artil­ Thanh Valley Special Forces Camp brought about Norton, also a knowledgeable expert on airmobile turned and displayed individual placards which Thanh Valley Special Forces Camp brought about lery ammunition on hand. Because there were tactics. read in sequence: ALL THE WAY; ****(four an Harassment and Interdictory (H&I> artillery no roads in the operational area, the air line of program and massed TOT fire missions on a scale General Kinnard was to return to the Pentagon stars); HWOK. And so departed Major General communications (ALOC) perfonned superbly in unit resupply. for his new assignment as US Anny Deputy Chief Harry W. O. Kinnard, formerly of THE FIRST not aChieved since MASHER!WHITE WING. An of Staff for Force Development. But there was TEAM. indication that the artillery H&I fires did signifi­ Meanwhile, by early June, improvements were cantly hurt thethe enemy was revealed by a soldier visibly affecting thethe comforts of lifelife inin base camp. the old cav tradition for a colorful farewell GENERAL NORTON COMMANDS subsequently captured during an attack on thethe The semi-pennanent 20'x 80' buildings, with con­ ceremony to be given a departing Commanding The following morning, General Norton, the co-location of the 1st Brigade's forward CP and crete floors and 2"x4 H frames with tin roofs, had General. And a most important ceremony it was cav's new CG trooped the line of colors and a the 2/19 Artillery. Under inteITogation, the pris­ sprung up throughout the unit areas. Most of the going to be, for never before has one man been new era for the division began. General Norton oner volunteered that the attack had been staged men, however, still lived in tents with dirt floors able to fashion an operational reality from a was no stranger to the Cav, nor to the air­ primarily in revenge for casualties suffered by the but they could now see hope for things to come. vision and a dream and then continue to com­ mobile concept. In 1959-60, he served in Korea artillery H&I Program. More and more men had electricity in their mand it in combat. Not even in the hey-day of as a Battle Group Commander with THE FIRSrFIRSI' Our initial contact was made on 16 May when hoaches, as generators became more readily avail­ the birth and development of the airborne divi­ TEAM, and in the early '60's, as an Army· Avia­ H/2/8 Cav touched down at LZ Hereford and able. Roads in base camp were wider, and were sions in World War n did one individual accom-accoin- tion Officer to the Continental Army Command, became engaged with What thethe Commanding periodically sprayed with an oil-based substance 44 INTERIM REPORT OF OPERATIONS 1st CAVALRY DIVISION 45 to keep the dust down in the drier seasons. A target and was largely ineffective. The enemy Provinces. As the lst cavalry was moving west Infantry Division. An enemy battalion attempted swimming area with floats and wonderful place breached the friendly lines and took cover in the during HENRY CLAY intelligence sources indi­ to overnm the company base, but was halted to relax was completed in a portion of the Song defensive foxholes only to be routed in violent cated a significant enemy build up in this area short of the objective with the amlor platoon Ba River which flowed through camp Radcliff. hand-to-hand fighting by the reserve platoon of during the period 10-26 July. Reports reflected firing cannister. The one sided. nature of the Yes, life had become more comfortable than B/1/8. The enemy broke contact later that morn­ the possibility of a repeat of the circumstances battle is evident from the fact that the Koreans during those days of late September. ing leaving behind 134 of its dead. For the out­ during the early stages of the PLEIKU CAM­ suffered only seven killed and fifteen wounded, standing display of unit courage and gallantry PAIGN; that is, a diversionary attack on a forti­ while the enemy lost 197 by body count with an ROTATION that morning, B/1/8 Cav has been recommended fied area, with the enemy in position to ambush untold number of killed and wounded dragged It was also during the next three months of for the highest award for unit bravery-The.. Presi­ relief forces on a highway or at likely LZ's. In away. June, July, and August that the "old" FIRST dential Unit Citation. particular, IT Corps intelligence estimated that The final major contact of the operation found TEAM would be rotating back to the States­ On June 24th, elements of the 2/7 cav en­ the 32nd, 33rd, and 66th NYA Regiments were the division on~ again at the Chu Pong massif, the new replacements would soon arrive for their countered what was estimated to be a company still in the area and planned to attack CIDG this time at Hill 534, on the southern portion of year with the cay. Most of the "short timers" at Plateau Cay Song 6 miles southeast of Dong camps at Duc Co, Plei Me, and also the city of the hill mass. On August 14, A/1/5 Cav en­ were on a count down, as each day they struck Tre Special Forces Camp. Later that afternoon Pleiku. Using strategy on a grand scale, the countered forces at least in battalion and possibly another day from their FIGMO Calendar (FOR­ the estimate was revised upward to an enemy Communist invaders hoped that these attacks regimental strength as it pursued a group of VC GET it, I Got My Orders!). This calendar is a battalion. Elements of the 2/7 took blocking would draw major U. S. Forces away from Tuy on foot. While attempting ~o link up with Alpha massive cardboard cut-out of a voluptuous "round positions to the south while the 1/8 assaulted Hoa and the eastern coast, thereby enabling the Company 115, Bravo 215 also became engaged eye" whose anatomy is ingeniously subdivided into to the north. The cordon could not be completely Viet Cong to secure the rice harvest in that area with a large enemy force likewise in prepared, 365 days. This points to the fact that there are sealed before nightfall, and the enemy managed at that time of year. bunkered positions. As the size of the fortifica­ three things every GI knows in Vietnam: his once again to escape by fragmenting his forces By August 2, sufficient forces had been com­ tion became known additional companies were rotational date, the number of days left before and slipping through the jungle to predesignated mitted for PAUL REVERE II so that General committed until two battalions were positioned that date, and that another week has passed when rendezvous areas. Norton was given control of the AO. The opera­ around the enemy. The fierce close-in fighting he takes the weekly Chloroquine-Primaquine On the 26th, 1st cavalry Division Headquarters tion followed the now-familiar pattern of extensive continued throughout the night and well into the malaria prophylaxis tablet. The usual question assumed. control of the operation until its termina­ search and maneuver interspersed with brief morning of the 15th. By morning, a total of 138 during the waning months of one's tour was often tion on July 1st. The remainder of NATHAN periods of intense contact. As already seen the NVA dead were COWlted on the slope of Hill 534. repeated, "Has your turtle arrived yet 1" Once HALE was characterized by extensive hunter­ division had covered the AO extensively during By 24 August, 1st Cavalry elements had begun one's replacements has arrived, the comment fol­ killer operations with very few enemy found and the PLEIKU CAMPAIGN in Oct-Nov 1965, movement of OASIS, the foxward Division CP lows, "Oh, I see you've got your turtle! Now only sporadic contact made. The final tally on MATADOR 11-17 January, and in LINCOLN 25 area, in preparation for return to Camp Radcliff. you can stack arms!" A "turtle" is no more than 1 July showed enemy losses at 459 with an addi­ March-l! April. We had a good idea of what to Within the next two days all units had closed one's replacement, as seen from the rotating man's tional 291 estimated. killed. expect in both the enemy and the terrain. It was into An Khe, and PAUL REVERE II had ter­ eye-it seems like it will take forever before he The influx of new personel became noticeable the weather, however, that was unexpected and minated. will arrive! during the operation. These replacements from unusually severe. General Norton described it Operation PAUL REVERE n was conducted in commanders, to aircraft pilots, to communications as some of the worst weather he had ever seen extremely dangerous weather, and great credit DECKHOUSE-NATHAN HALE personnel arrived. and began to learn the tactiCS for airmobile operations. Only a few hours a must be given to the division's aviators who braved On the 18th of June a company of CIDG forces and techniques essential to timely and successful day were available for lift and resupply and even very difficult flying conditions to accomplish their was overrun by an estimated battalion of NVA airmobile operations. NATHAN HALE was a during these periods flying was hazardous. mission. PAUL REVERE n witnessed the heaviest in an area southeast of camp Radcliff at the success in not only accomplishing the assigned. From 2 to 7 August efforts centered on finding commitment of the 8th Engineer Battalion in any Dong Tre Special Forces Camp, in Phu Yen mission but as a training vehicle for these recently the enemy. We knew he was in the area, but single operation to that date. All of the battalion's Province, south of Binh Dinh. The 2d Battalion, arrived men. most of the sightings and contacts were of indi­ resources and skills were fully required during 327th Infantry of the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Viduals and small groups. On August Sth, how­ this month-long operation to offset the effects of HENBY CLAY Division began Operation DECKHOUSE I, a day ever, A/1/7 cav came under heavy fire at LZ the prevailing rains of southwest monsoon. They later on the 19th to close with and destroy the Operation HENRY CLAY began the next day, Juliet and withstood mass assaults by a rein­ did a superior job in keeping the roads in the attackers of the CIDG force. When these elements on July 2nd and lasted for twenty-eight days. forced.forced battalion for several hours. An attempt area open as well as maintaining the respective of the 101st became heavily engaged on three sides It was merely a continuation of NATHAN HALE to encircle the company was beaten back by airfields in operational condition. These two tasks with the lSth B NYA Regiment, the IFFORCEV to the west and toward the cambodian border. heavy artillery aod TAC Air Support. The com­ alone required twenty-four hour attention. Artil­ reserve-reaction force, Task Force Colt, with B & Contact was sporadic and very light with only pany was reinforced. by two companies of the 1/12 lery, as usual, played a major part in the opera­ C/l/S Cav and B/2/17 Artillery were committed 33 enemy killed. The division took advantage of cav which were diverted, in a classic example of tion, as over 100,000 rounds of various calibers the opportWlity to integrate replacements at all on June 20 !rOm Rontum to reinforce. Thus flexibility, while in the air to conduct another were fired in support of the infantry. One inn~ levels, while it compiled additional data on ter­ began the 1st Cavalry's Operation NATHAN assault several miles away. When the helicopters vation was the Air Force aerial re-supply of 6,100 rain throughout the area of operations. HALE in the vicinity of Tuy Boa. That same with the reinforcements appeared on the LZ, the artillery rounds for the l05mm and 155mm how­ day the 3rd Brigade Headquarters assumed con­ PAUL REVERE n enemy broke leaving 106 dead. He was pursued itzers and the 175nun gun. Particular credit must trol of the 2/327 still in contact aod the liS Cav be given the ability of the aircrews to find and The stage was now set for another major effort until contact was lost after dark. to after it deployed into the operational area. On On the night of 9-10 August, the 9th Company, hit the LZ. Because of the terrain involved and June 22 at 5:43 AM BillS Cav and C/2/327 Inf in the west-PAUL REVERE II. The 3d Brigade, 3rd Battalion, 1st ROK Cavalry Regiment was the inherent lack of vehicles in Ute airmobile came under a heavy two pronged enemy ground 25th Infantry Division had had a cont.inuing mis­ working an area near the border, reinforced by division, a wide dispersion in any airdrop would attack at position Eagle. There was also sustained sion, beginning in May 1966, to interdict infiltra­ a platoon from 1116 Armor, 3d Brigade, 25th mean retrieving the cargo load and its packing enemy mortar fire which fortunately overshot the tion and supply routes in the Pleiku and Kontwn a platoon from 1116 Armor, Brigade, 25th -----

1st CAVALRY DIVISION 46 INTERIM REPORT OF OPERATIONS 47 material, and in most cases by hand, round by 1st Cavalry in the II Corps area and how in MAP: VIETNAM round. The accuracy of the drops kept these less than a year its many operations had com­ 1:250,000 LaoN~2{NVA extra efforts to a minimum. pletely taken the initiative away from the enemy. ND 49-5 Valley The enemy lost 861 dead to the allied forces The ceremony terminated solemnly with a roll during PAUL REVERE II. There were 83 NVA call of those cavalrymen who were killed in captured and 43 VC captured. There is little doubt PAUL REVERE II which was followed by a that the enemy was seeking a victory just before minute of silent prayer. SOUTH CHINA the Vietnamese ~ational elections on September At 9:50 that evening the enemy launched an­ SEA 11th. His defeat and withdrawal from the area other mortar attack against Camp Radcliff, only not only deprived him of that victory, but further this time there was no ground attack. The degraded his image in the Pleiku Province. casualties were light to both personnel and to As PAUL REVERE II was drawing to a close, the helicopters ~"hich were parked on the Golf a task force with the 2/7 Cay was placed under Course. the operational control of IFFORCEV on Opera­ THAYER tion BYRD and was sent to the southernmost part THAYER of the II CIZ to support the Vietnamese Revolu­ Ten days later, the 13th. of September, the tionary Development Program in Phan Thiet, day of the Division's actual organizational day, Binh Thuan Province. This task force remained THAYER I conunenced in what banner headlines on this mission through the close of 1966. in the Division's weekly, The Cavalair, proclaimed as the largest air assault undertaken to date. ORGANIZATION DAY THAYER I initiated the first phase of the Binh On September 300, the division celebrated ten Dinh Province Pacification Campaign, a grand days early (because of tactical considerations) its strategy to clean up, once and for all, all regular 45th anniversary since the 1st Cavalry was acti­ VC and NVA units in the area as well as uproot­ vated in 1921. Brigadier General William A. ing the long established VC infrastructure. Al­ Becker, Assistant Division Conunander-A,Conunander-A. was though this Campaign was still continuing after commander of the several thousand troops massed the first of the year, 1967, there were three on the Golf Course air strip parking ramp. His separate, but closely allied division operations staff was the Division's General Staff Officers: prior to 31 Dec 1966-THAYER I, ffiVING, and LTC Ardie E. McClure Jr, ACofS G-1; LTC Wil­ THAYER n. In sequence, each one covered sub­ liam B. Ray, ACofS G-2; LTC James H. Mapp, stantially the same territory; northeastern and ACofS G-3; LTC Robert A. Tolar, ACofS G-4; central-coastal Binh Dinh Province, and had the and LTC Harry J. Phelps, ACofS G-S. Behind same mission---complete pacification of the Prov­ them were massed the Division colors with the ince. This campaign marked this division's first colors and guidons representative of each unit in opportunity to move into an area in force and the Division. These new Cavalrymen, many of remain there in force until the job was done. them with the Division less than a month, had To accomplish this mission, it was not enough already become combat tested in PAUL REVERE merely to find the enemy. (Map 10). The division II; they now listened to the glories of the past, badhad to seek out and find the base areas of the to the traditions and honors that have come to 2nd VC and 18th NVA Regiments. By locating the Cavalry, to its battlebattie record: the purge of the these vital stockpiles of food, arms and ammu·ammu­ Indian crises, the island hopping heroics through nition, equipment, and medical supplies he had Hammond 0 the Pacific, and the gallantry in the Pusan Perim­ worked so hard to build uP.up, we would definitely eter before the northern thrust across the 38th complicate his capability to continue as an effec­ parallel. They also heard recounted the historical tive fighting force. Enemy Disposition birth of the airmobile division only a little over THAYER I began with five infantry battalions with initiation a year ago and the hard-fought battles that en­ air assaulting into a circular configuration around of Thayer I sued in Vietnam. They could feel exceptionally the Crow'sCrows Foot area, landing on 14 high ground proud of this heritage which was handed to them, LZ's, after which they searched the ridge lines but even more so from the fact that they were down toward the Kim Son VaHey floor. (Msp(Map 11). contributing to it, making a new, a most important Meanwhile, two ARVN airborne battalions de­ 10km TOQUINHON chapter in the history of THE FIRST TEAM. ployed into the THAYER I AO and positioned I" \ 20 Km. After the reading of the division history, Gen­ themselves in the north of the valley to prevent eral Norton spoke of his pride in THE FmST enemy exflltrationexfiltration as the noose grew tighter. TEAM and the need to carryon in this tradi­ Ground contact was sporadic, but there was no CENTRAL-COASTAL AND NORTHEASTERN BINH DINH PROVINCE tional manner; LT General Larsen, CG question about locating rear supply areas, for on IFFORCEV,IFFORCEV. emphasized the importance 'of the September 16th elements of the 1st Brigade MAP 10 1st CAVALRY DIVISION 49 48 INTERIM REPORT OF OPERATIONS 1st CAVALRY DIVISION

MAP: VIETNAM MAP: VIETNAM 1:250,000 1:250,000 ND 49-5 ND 49-5

SOUTH CHINA SEA SOUTH CHINA SEA SEA

Hammond 0

Phu Cat Phu cat

lOkm TO QUINHON lOkm lOkm TO QUINHON \ 20 KmaKms ~I \.20~.20 KmsKma CENTRAL-COASTAL AND NORTHEASTERN BINH DINH PROVINCE CENTRAL-COASTAL AND NORTHEASTERN BINH DINH PROVINCE MAP 11 MAP 11 50 INTERIM REPORT OF OPERATIONS 1st CAVALRY DIVISION 51 located an anti-personnel mine and grenade fac­ after enemy battalions---the 7th and 8th Bns, 18th in the rugged mountail}S and were located in the Population control was put into effect as part tory. 3000 mines and 1377 grenades were in NVA Regiment. This further confirmed that the coastal plains to the east. Routes of egress west cf the Psy-Ops program, and, unlike previous various stages of completion. That same day, enemy had moved east. Confused and unsure were blocked, and contact on the plains confirmed operations, control measures were required the 1st Brigade came across a major regimental of which way to go, the two battalions decided that sizeable enemy forces were there in a throughout the operation and varied only in sized hospital with specialized surgical equipment to attack ARVN and achieve a victory on their natural pocket, bounded generally by the NUl BA degree. In all, Psy-Ops dropped 12,261,000 leaflets and accommodations for 50 patients. A weapons way out. Consequently, at 3 :40 AM in the morn­ hill mass on the south. and the coast line on the and expended 154.5 broadcast hours during cache on 17 September revealed 75 rifles, to ing on the 23rd, the ARVN position was attacked, east, the NUl lVIIED hill mass on the north, and IRVING, most of which was directed toward this include 16 M-16's and 200 Ibs. of TNT. These but the enemy had underestimated ARVN's re­ National Route 1 on the west. As most of the control. Furthermore, both means were used to were just a few of many. The number of these sources. The ARVN soldiers gave a tremendous contact took place within this pocket. it is under­ establish curfews and to instruct the villagers to caches and their contents fully indicated that account of themselves and, with artillery and air standable why IRVING has been called a battle­ remain in place until more specific instructions the Division was astride an important regimental support from the 1st Cavalry, counter-attacked field within a much larger battlefield. were given. "Stay put. If movement is necessary trains area. By thoroughly dominating the valley, at 6:00 AM, forcing the NVA battalions off the The enemy, uprooted from his mountain sanctu­ move only in our direction when the battle must the Division prevented the enemy from using these battlefield, leaving behind 137 of their dead. They ary and supplies during THAYER 1 found him­ be carried to a hamlet, file out of the hamlet in bases he needed to remain combat effective. He departed the battle area in an easterly direction, self forced with the choice of fighting at a dis­ the specified direction." had one of two choices: to stand and fight or to and, although there were strong elements of the advantage during IRVING, or exfiltrating from Civic Action was also carefully planned. By exfiltrate. He decided to run and headed east­ 2nd VC Regiment in area TIGER, it is probable the area in small groups. Exfiltration was made holding refugee flow belo", anticipated levels, all ward toward the coastal regions. that the nearby presence of the 1/5 Cav and difficult because of the already mentioned screen combat units were able to concentrate on fighting On the 19th of September, elements of the 2/Sth 2/5 Cav presented too great a threat to any established in the later stages of THAYER I. the enemy without serious concern for inflicting cay became heavily engaged with two enemy enemy link up. Based on intelligence from cap­ One can now appreciate that what was to be casualties on non-combatants. In spite of this combat support companies in the highway 506 tives of the ARVN contact, the Division reacted the great success of IRVING began when effort, there were still 19,000 refugees, most of Valley situated to the east of the the KIM SON by committing elements of three battalions by THAYER I was launched, for it was during whom were from the PHU MY District. Their Valley. Taken in light of other intelligence, this air assault into a cordon operation in area September that the Division was building the movement was controlled by refugee forward col­ contact was significant for it pointed to the fact PANTHER. During the following days, the divi­ subsequent battlefield. Favorable conditions had lection points, established in each Brigade area. that some of the enemy forces had left the valleys sion continued to search in area PANTHER and been established, although it was impossible to A central collection station under Division control and were in fact moving east. Consequently, on TIGER but to no avail, as local sweeps failed to predict results. Tactically, IRVING was a logical was located in the vicinity of PHU MY District September 20th, the 2nd Bde was given the mis­ locate the enemy units. As subsequently pieced continuation of THAYER I, but the name was Headquarters. Care, feeding, and medical treat­ sion of conducting a reconnaissance in force opera­ together, the battalions moved north of Lake changed to distinguish it as part of a Free World ment were administered at every echelon. tion in area PANI'HER with the 115 Cav. This DAM TRA 0 and headed south along the coast, Force effort from THAYER I, a lst Air Cavalry battalion's assault to the NUl HON GIANG hill arriving at a location northeast of the Nui Mieu Operation. THE ALLIES mass, east of the 506 Valley, was unopposed. Mountains on 27 September. They then began to In IRVING, the two enemy units primarily Actually, the 1st Cavalry's Operation IRVING, That same day elements of the 2/5 Cav also move in a southwesterly direction intending to encountered were once again the 18th NVA Regi­ 2-24 October, was one of three separate, but deployed to the low ground further east of this cross National Route 1 on 30 September at a ment and the 2nd VC Regiment. Prior operations closely coordinated operations of three allied hill mass to block routes of egress. The Division point just north of the PHU LY Bridge. The plan -MASHERIWlllTE WING, January through nations. The stated mission was to continue the now operated in two areas of the THAYER I AO: was to return to their base areas in the SOUl CA March 1966, and CRAZY HORSE, May and June Pacification Campaign in the Province and to the 1st Bde continued search operations in the and KIM SON Valleys. A captured soldier re­ 1966-saw the division engage and defeat elements uproot the long established VC infrastructure KIM SON Valley while the 2nd Ede operated in vealed the plan, and as reaction a company of of these Regiments. In addition, there were nu­ along its coastal region. The 22nd ARVN Division the PANTHER AO. On the 21st, a day later, the 1/5 Cav was dispatched from HAMMOND to merous local VC forces as well as two other main and the Capitol ROK Division participated in two companies of the 1/5 Cav air assaulted move along the highway in force, thereby giving force VC battalions located within the area of operations DAI BANG (EAGLE) 800 and MANG toward the northeast into area TIGER in response the impression of a larger number of troops. The operation. HO 6, respectively, and it was the tri-national to reports that the Regimental Headquarters as company also established blocking positions west In planning for IRVING, the Division concen­ cooperation throughout the operations which was well as the 9th Bn, 18th NVA Regiment were of National Route 1. This rapid reaction dis­ trated on Psy-Ops programs, population control, most significant. in that area. It is believed these units were couraged the enemy from attempting to force and Civic Action projects. Each was essential for On D-Day, 2 October, the US Forces, encom­ attempting to exfiltrate to join other elements a crossing; instead, he returned east and was the successful accomplishment of the mission. passing the north and west, had planned to pare of the 3rd NVA Div located to the north in the reported on the flatlands south of the NUl M1EU Although BINH DINH Province itself is about down an effective portion of the fairly large AO AN LAO Valley. Sporadic contact was made on Mountains on 30 September. This retreat pro­ the size of Connecticut with a total population of by landing forward. Five Air Cavalry Battalions the 21st and 22nd of September which apparently vided what proved to be the Division's first major 860,000, the IRVING AO encompassed only the were to assault in objectives 506A, 506B, 506C, forced these enemy units farther north. Signifi­ contact on D-Day of Operation IRVING. Province's central-coastal sector. However, there and 507. (Map 11a). This forward strategy would cant contact with these forces was not established was a population of 300,000 in the operational enable the Division to put massive force on the during the remainder of the operation. mVING area, 85% of which was concentrated along the enemy's heartline within a few hours. Simul­ Meanwhile other lst Cavalry units moved east coastal region and engaged in rice farming and taneously, the ARVN and ROK deployments would ELUSIVE VC from the valleys and maneuvered into position to salt production. push northward in the southern portion of the On 22 September, elements of the 22nd ARVN trap the enemy in a coastal pocket. There evolved As the Free World Forces were required to AO so that all three schemes of maneuver would Division joined the 1st Cavalry'S search and a screen around the proposed IRVING AO, to operate in this heavily populated area, it was reinforce and complement one another. The 22nd destroy mission in THAYER I. Fortuitously, the prevent enemy exfiltration back to the western imperative that an effective population control ARVN Division was to launch an overland attack 2nd Bn, 41st Regiment and the Regimental CP valleys. Therefore, as THAYER I drew to a close, program be planned and executed. It was through to the northeast with two infantry battalions and of the ARVN Div entered the AO in the Crescent it was concluded that the bulk of the enemy forces these precautions that non-combatant casualties two airborne battalions. Their APC's would work area, a position near the location of two sought- in the AO had been forced. out of their base areas were kept to a minimum. between the ROK's on the southeast and the --

52 INTERIM REPORT OF OPERATIONS 1st CAVALRY DIVISION 53

US on the west over suitable terrain and in an continuous illumination as well as 685 supporting ROK Infantry Division swept through the PHU ing the following letter to US Forces by Vo Phouc, area that was familiar to them. The Capitol ROK rounds from the Division's 2nd Battalion, 19th CAT Mountains and sealed off the northern one of these captives. (The translation is as close Division was to push northward through the Artillery. sector inin support of thethe ARVN operation. It toto thethe original as possible,) PHU CAT Mountains, clearing mountain sanctu­ Two sweep-throughs followed the next morning. flushed the enemy from natural caves as well as aries and coastal hideouts in its advance. Another 40 enemy were routed from their pro­ from rice paddies on the coastal plains. Republic of Vietnam On the South China Sea, the ARVN junk fleet tective bunkers. By noon on October 3rd, the Tqe search continued in three areas: The SOUl To the Commanding Officers of the US Army and the US Navy in swift boats conducted patrols. enemy had lost over 250 killed or wounded While CA, the HUNG LAC Peninsula, and the NUl Naval support was important, for without the the US losses remained relatively light. This par­ MIEU Mountains. From the beginning the Free Dear Gentlemen: ability to seal escape routes to the sea, the enemy ticular engagement confirmed the presence of the World Forces concentrated Onon searching for, find­ I am Vo Phouc from Hung Lac Hamlet, By could have avoided encirclement. 7th and 8th Battalions of the 18th NVA Regiment, ing, and uprooting the VC. To accomplish this, Thanh Village, Phu My District, Binh Dinh Prov­ Operation IRVING opened with elements of the the two battalions that had planned to exfiltrate all able bodied males between the ages of 14-60 ince. I am representing 157 people of good will division air assaulting across PL WHIP into the lRVING AO into the SOUl CA on September were takentaken intointo custody for processing. Some and National cadres who were captured by thethe assigned areas beginning at 7:00 AM on the 2nd. 29th. 3,857 suspects were interrogated and just less Viet Cong and kept in the rock cave at Chanh On D-Day the 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry was Meanwhile, also, on D-Day, the two battalions than 20% of these suspects were identified as Giao Mountain. My An, some of whom had been assigned its usual reconnaissance mission, dis­ of the 3rd Brigade, 117 and 517, assaulted all hard core VC. The search continued to find the held 2 to 3 years; I was held for 20 months. On patching one White Team (Scout ships) and one companies into objective 507. Once on the ground enemy in· small, fragmented groups. 9 October 1966, we Were fteed by the US Army Red Team (Gunships) in the vicinity of HOA all forces established blocking positions and then On October 9th, the 2nd Battalion, 20th Artil­ to return to the National Government. Thanks HOI. While surveying the area, the White Team began to conduct search and destroy movement lery (Aerial Rocket Artillery) fired two 88-11 to you who freed us and restored us to life, spotted. seven NVA soldiers in the hamlet, received toward the sea. missiles at bWlkers on the HUNG LAC Peninsula. gratitude like the sky and ocean we feel for you, fire from them, and requested the gunships' sup­ Population control Onon D-Day included OVerover The missiles proved extremely effective in destroy­ we will never forget that great feat which can port. The aircraft then called for A Troop's 2,000,000 leaflets and 14 hours of aerial broad­ inging thethe bunkers and ledled toto thethe capture of 55 VC never be repaid by us. infantry unit to develop the situation. This Blue casting resulting in fewer refugees and civilian without a fight. Also on that day, the 1st Bat­ Now we return to our families and the National Team, on stand-by alert at HAMMOND, was casualties than antiCipated. Elsewhere, a B-52 talion, 5th cavalry was released from Division cadres are very happy and I send my regards promptly notified and was on the groWld at strike covered a portion of the NUl WEU Moun­ control to become OPCON to 3rd Brigade and to you gentlemen and please send our regards to HOA HOI within 15 minutes of the initial sight­ tains in objective 506A, after which a follow-up thereby assumed the searching mission of the the American government and people who are ing. Although the enemy force was originally reconnaissance on the 3rd revealed documents 1st Battalion, 12th Cavalry in the SOUl CA trying to help us, trying to kill the savage com­ estimated as a platoon, the Blue Team became and seven enemy dead, confinning the presence Valley. munist despotism. heavily engaged with an obviously larger force. of elements of the 2nd VC Regiment at the time On 10 October, the 2nd Battalion, 8th Cavalry Advised of the situation, Colonel Archie R. of the strike. reported that a fourteen year old Vietnamese boy One more time, we sincerely thank you, Ameri­ Hyle, CO 1st Brigade, decided to commit the 1st All forces advanced on schedule gradually de­ had walked intointo itsits positions at LZ PLAYBOY can Anny, people and government who are help­ Battalion, 12th Cavalry. While airborne to an­ creasing the circumference of the pocket. The in the NUl MIEU Mountains. The boy claimed inging thethe Vietnamese people eject thethe savage Com­ other location, LTC James T. Root, CO 1/12 Cav, sweep to the sea continued in-coordinated overland to have been a prisoner of the VC until 5:00 that munist despotism and are building a strong Viet­ received the change of mission, requiring him to movement and air assaults to destroy the enemy morning. The boy believed he was the only sur­ namese nation. divert his companies from the planned assault in and around the coastal flats. vivor as that morning the VC threw hand grenades Respectfully yours, into objective 506B. Relying extensively on heli­ On the 4th of October the 1st Battalion, 12th and fired into a pit in which he and eighteen other Vo Phouc lsi borne assault, the 1st Battalion, 12th Cavalry had Cavalry air assaulted into the HUNG LAC Penin­ prisoners were held. After the enemy's departure, VO PHOUC It! maneuvered five rifle companies within a few sula to clear that area of enemy. B Company he had managed to escape. 14 Oct 1966 hours to completely surroWld the hamlet. In a landed north to sweep south and C Company Believing his story, the 2nd Battalion, 8th Cav­ classic example of airmobility, the enemy was landed south to sweep north to link up with B alry proceeded toto systematically search thethe area Contact began toto diminish on thethe coast as thethe sealed within the perimeter, effectively cut off Company. Enemy were forced out of caves and in which the boy thought the POW camp was units completed searching to the sea and doubled from any escape. While establishing this cordon underground hideouts. The Division cavalry located. Four more survivors were encountered back to catch the enemy as he came out of hiding. and, before artillery was called in, the battalion Squadron continued its air and ground recon­ during the search and each verified the young Meanwhile, a new picture began to develop in made a maximum effort to remove all non-com­ naisance throughout the operational area. '!be boy's story. the west. Several substantial ammunition caches batants from the battle area. A temporary lull naval blockade was effective in sealing escape With the help of theestbees survivors, the main camp were located in the sour CA Valley. On 12 in offensive action was called in order that these routes and in preventing enemy departure in was located on October 11th to the northwest of October intelligence reports indicated that at least civilians, mostly women and children, could safely sampans. LZ PLAYBOY. An old man with badly burned two battalions of the 2nd VC Regiment were re­ depart. A broadcast ship had anived on station On D-Day plus three (5 October) the 1st Bat­ feet was found and evacuated; he had been left grouping in the KIM SON Valley aod that the and issued speCific instructions for the villagers. talion, 12th cavalry air assaulted back into the behind by thethe VC because he could not walk. regimental headquarters had moved therethere with As a result, they gathered in four district areas SOUl CA Valley to' exploit another B-52 strike At 2 :30 that afternoon, a short distance away one of the battalions from the CAY GIEP Moun­ outside the perimeter for control and screening and to prevent enemy surprise from the west, from the main camp, the bcxIies of 12 Vietnamese tains. Plans were made to exploit the intelligence during the fight. or rear, of the operation. were found. Their hands were tied behind their with air-ground reconnaissance and long range The contact lasted throughout the day and into While other cavalry units continued search and backs before they were killed. patrols in the KIM SON and SOUl CA Valleys. the night. Artillery fired numerous missions and destroy missions in assigned areas, the ARVN These atrocities were specifically condemned in Then on October 13, forces were repositioned TAC Air strikes poWlded the area. Durnig the 22nd Division completed its attack to the north­ a division Psy-Ops leaflet. nusThis leaflet was re­ as once again we entered the KIM SON Valley hours of darkness a C-47 (USAF), anned with west and began a systematic sweep of their POrted by two returnees to have encouraged their with two battalions. The 2/8 Cav remained along 7.62 miniguns and aircraft flares, remained over­ assigned AOAD concentrating two battalions in both return to the govenunent. The real meaning of the sea coast. Operations continued in and around head to support the troops in contact. There was the northeast and the southwest. The Capitol thisthis discovery can perhaps be appreciated by read- thethe SOUl CA Where thethe U5 Cav had undoubtedly 54 INTERIM REPORT OF OPERATIONS 1st CAVALRY DIVISION 55

located the VC Hoi Son secret base areas. For THAYER n Light sporadic contact with small groups con­ CO B/5/7 was nominated for the Distinguished seven consecutive days A and B Companies of tinued for the remainder of the operation. The Service Cross. There were forty-three enemy dead THAYER IT commenced on October 25, with the 115 CaY uncovered large enemy weapons, 1/5 Cav departed thethe ADAO on 6 December and thethe when contact broke at 6:00 PM that evening. the termination of IRVING, and continued the food, and medical caches. Found on the 15th were 2/5 Cav was withdrawn on the 22nd. PAUL On 1 December the infantry platoon from C successes realized during these first two phases four cameras, one of which Was owned by the REVERE IV terminated on the 27th when the Troop 1/9 Cav entered the hamlet of PHU HUU of the Binh Dinh Pacification Campaign. How­ Look Senior Editor, Sam CastanoCastan, and taken from 2nd Brigade Headquarters, the supporting ele­ (2) in search of the KIM SON Valley floor. 'l\vo ever, as the six battalions in the KIM SON and him when he was killed during CRAZY HORSE. ments and the 2/12 Cav closed into Base Camp squads became pinned down by a large volume SOUl CA Valleys and one battalion, the 2/8 Cay On the 18th, a major cache of ammunition, sup­ and prepared for commitment into the THAYER of machine gun and small arms fire. Captain in the NUl MIEU continued to look for and plies, and material was located by A/l/5 cay II AO. Hitti's company was once again nearby tb answer destroy elements of the 2nd VC and 18th NYA which reported that this particular cache was the call for help, and his 2nd platoon arrived at Regiments, the 2/5 Cav, the IFFORCEV reserve­ THAYER n found on platforms on a hill with apparently no the hamlet in an hour and a half after a double­ reaction force, was alerted at Camp Radcliff and attempt to camouflage, giving an indication of the During thethe period of PAUL REVERE IV, THE timetime overland movement. The 5/7's platoon pene­ committed to Pleiku on the 29th of October for sense of security the enemy felt in his rear area. FIRST TEAM maintained sustained operations in trated the hamlet and the well prepared defensive Operation PAUL REVERE IV. A recap of some of the more important items four distinct and widely separated areas of the position after close-in, fierce fighting for the Toward the end of October, agent reports, we located in these caches will show the devas­ II CI'Z. (Map 12), A brigade and three battalions remainder of the daylight and on into dark. It contacts and sightings by the 4th Infantry Divi­ tating effect op the Hoi Son base area. The were in PAUL REVERE IV, two brigades and was reinforced by a sister. platoon that evening sion, recently based at Pleiku, indicated a large thirty-three major finds in the som' CA and its four battalions were on THAYER n in Binh while other cavalry units positioned themselves scale buildup along the border, particularly in the surrounding high ground revealed 133 weapons, Dinh. a battalion was· at Camp Radcliff, and a in blocking positions to prevent exfiltration. Con­ Plei Djereng-Duc Co area. both individual and crew served, 330,500 rounds battalion task force at Phan Thiet on Operation tact broke that night, but a sweep through the of small and heavy caliber ammunition, 4 complete BYRD. One can only wonder at the massive next morning revealed sixty-seven enemy dead mortars and 43x57 RR rounds. The hospital com­ PAUL REVERE IV logisticallogistical support that was required for thethe daily and four wounded. Unknowingly thesethese twotwo pla­ plex uncovered on the 13th held in part, 1,400 On 31 October, the frag order Travis was issued necessities of food, ammunition, equipment, and toons had successfully fought an enemy battalion bottles of morphine. Other supply caches con­ requiring the 2nd Brigade and its CP to move into petroleum to keep the "birds" flying. Effectively when it was in well-concealed, well-planned, tained 5,000 reams of typing paper, 60 bolts of the PAUL REVERE IV AO where it would operating in these diverse areas once again points mutUally-supporting bunker positions. cloth, and numerous telephones and radios. operate until December 27th. With the 2nd Bri­ up the versatility of the Air Cavalry and the For the remaining days of ffiVING attempt gade CP deployed the 115 cay, the 2/12 cay, capability to react to the enemy whenever and ROVER was made to establish contact With sporadic suc­ B/1/9 Cav and 1/77 Artillery. Extensive search wherever he may appear. Determined to clear thoroughly the KIM SON cess. C/1!5 cav engaged a company from the and destroy operations followed in the Chu Pong­ Meanwhile at high noon on November 11th, Valley, the division began Operation ROVER on 2nd VC Regiment on the 15th resulting in 39 Ia Drang area and along the border. With the the Division Artillery acknowledged the firing of December 9th, which was a five day refugee enemy dead. Otherwise contact was light in the exception of heavy contact made by C/1/5 Cavcav itsits one-millionth round inin thethe Republic of Vietnam evacuation effort toto clear thethe valley of civilians. waning days of the operation. on the 21st of November, the 2nd Brigade units as one gun from a selected battery in each By doing so the valley was then designated a "free''free In 22 days THE FIRST TEAM had combined made only minimal contacts. On the 21st e/1/5 artillery battalion, organic and attached to the fire" zone which authorized massive artillery and efforts with other Free World Forces so that the had the mission to continue its search southward 1st Cavalry ,fired a TOT. These rounds were TAC Air ordnance bombardment at will Withoutwithout enemy had one alternative to fighting-surrender. along the Cambodian border from its position fired from the respective tactical positions in the regard for the Rules of Engagement. On D-Day, The statistics were overwhelming, for in total six miles from Duc Co. About 9:45 AM its various areas of operation and could be heard pamphlets and loudspeakers were used to inform figures for the three allied operations the enemy second platoon became engaged with a sizeable from the South China Sea to the Cambodian the indigenous populace that they had five days lost 2,063 killed, 1,930 captured, and there were enemy force. Approximately 15 minutes later, as border. to evacuate and specified the routes to follow 141 returnees to the GVN. In particular, Opera­ the 3rd platoon was coming to the 2nd platoon's In the THAYER II AO the division forces to arrive at collection and screening points. Over tion mVING was unique in that THE FIRST aid, it likewise became engaged in a separate ranged from a brigade with twotwo maneuver bat­ 1,100 of thethe locallocal peasants tooktook heed and were TEAM captured, interrogated, and.and processed more action 300 meters away and found itself sur­ talions to three brigades with eight maneuver resettled in secure areas. enemy than in any previous operation. Also for rounded on all sides. The men of the 3rd platoon battalions once PAUL REVERE IV terminated. The highway 506 Valley, just east of the KIM the first time since the division began operations fought for their lives but there was just no chance Emphasis continued on searching the KIM SON SON Valley was the location for heavy contact in Vietnam the number of enemy captured ex­ as the enemy filled the air with a heavy volume and SOUl CA Valleys, looking for the enemy on December 17th. CI11S on a ridge to the west ceeded the number killed. In round figures the of machine gun fire and hand grenades. Artillery which had fragmented after IRVING and at­ of the 506 Valley spotted and pursued an enemy lst Cavalry alone accounted for 681 enemy dead Was called in on top of the 3rd platoon's position tempted to avoid all contact unless he thought squad southeast into the valley. Subsequently and 741 captured. Not only did the enemy suffer Which still did not prevent the platoon from' being he had a decided advantage. The operation was numerous aircraft were fired on throughout this heavy personnel losses, but his vital logistical and overrun. The NVA closed in on the platoon and characterized by long periods of light and scat­ general vicinity. The infantry platoon from A support losses in the SOUl CA and KIM SON killed all but one wounded before fleeing the teredtered contact punctuated by sharp engagements Troop 1/9 Cavcav air assaulted toto exploit thethe contact Valleys-the life sustaining caches of food, ammu­ area. The 2nd and 3rd platoons of C/1/5 Cav with enemy units up to battalion size. and encountered heavy resistance on the valley nition, clothing and medical supplies were up­ suffered badly, but the enemy paid dearly Withwith On November lst, elements of the 1/9 Cav and floor. The 1/12 Cav was called upon to attempt rooted and.and either evacuated or destroyed. His his 147 killed. These two platoons from Charlie B/5/7 established contact with the 93rd Battalion to encircle what was determined to be at least political machine-the VC infrastructure-and his Company had engaged a battalion of the 101 C of the 2nd VC Regiment in the area between an enemy battalion in well-dug in defensive posi­ ability to control the population by terror had Regiment of the 10th NVA Division, a previously National Route 1 and the DAM TRA 0 Lake,Lake. tions. By dusk a total of five infantry companies dissolved. A significant step toward eliminating unencountered unit for the Cavalry. There is no south of the GAY GIEP Mountains. The fight and two platoons from the 1/9 were committed, VC influence in this fertile area had been taken question that Charlie will think twice aroutaoout strik­ lasted over nine hours, and for his heroism in but darkness prevented a shoulder to shoulder and we insured that an effective revolutionary ing the next time. One would think he should leading rus company that day by repeatedly cordon around the battalion. In spite of con­ project would follow the military victory. have learned this lesson a long time ago. jeopardizingjeopardizing his own life,life, Captaincaptain John L. Hitti, tinuoustinuous illuminationillumination from an Air Force flare ship, 56 INTERIM REPORT OF OPERATIONS 1st CAVALRY DIVISION 57

the enemy eluded during the night to the east nothing slow in its upbringing as it was forced and southeast. However, a final sweep of the into immediate full growth and maturity from the battle area on December 19th revealed a body very beginning. count of ninety-five enemy dead. Once again the Cav had brought the fight to the enemy and RECOGNITION forced him to show his hand. This unusual success certainly did not go un­ heralded, or without recognition. The achieve­ LZ BIRD ments of the division and pictures of Sky Troop­ The two day Christmas truce ended violently ers repeatedly adorned daily newspapers and when early in the morning of December Z7, weekly magazines throughout the United States. nineteen hours after the truce termination, the Colwnbia, South carolina took it unto itself to three battalions of the 22nd NVA Regiment adopt the lst Ail- Cavalry as its own and offered attacked C/1/12 and two artillery batteries at assistance in building materials and "hard-to-get" 12 Bird in the KIM SON Valley. The battalions items for civic action projects. The city was most had moved southward from their usual bases in willing to help this division which gave so much the AN LAO Valley taking advantage of the two of itself for the cause of f~om. The General days of truce to get into position for the mortar Assembly of the State of Georgia resolved in and infantry attack. As his mortar fires landed February, 1966 to erect a suitable monwnent in among the howitzers of B/2/19 Arty (105mm) Columbus, Georgia, in honor of all Cavalrymen, and C/6/16 Arty (l55mrn) the infantry assaulted living and dead, as an expression of gratitude by the defensive perimeter and were able, because. the people of Georgia for its supreme sacrifice in of sheer numbers alone, to reach several of the Vietnam. In October, 1966 the 1st Cavalry Divi­ firing positions in each one of the artillery bat­ sion (Ainnobile) was selected from a field of teries. Both the cavalry and the two artillery nominees as the "Outstanding Aviation Unit" for batteries fought desperately to hold the positions the period April, 1965 to March 1966 by the Army they still controlled. There was violent close-in Aviation Association of America. THE FIRST firing and hand-to-hand combat. This determined TEAM was cited for its innovation in the use stand, combined with the direct fire of the divi­ of Army aircraft above and beyond the usual sion's first two "bee hive" l05mm rounds from mission. B/2/19 Artillery and extremely accurate ARA fire Since arrival in Vietnam in September of 1965, drove the enemy from the position. The next the 1st Air Cavalry has conducted 12 operations morning 44 enemy were counted among the "gun" involving single or multi-company task forces; pits. Pursuit during the ensuing days brought 32 operations at battalion or brigade task force the enemy total losses for its attack on Bird to strength, and three operations it called campaigns over 200 killed. because of the duration and the forces committed. A few days later the division captured Senior These are the PLEIKU CAMPAIGN in October­ Captain PhuQC of the 22nd NVA Regiment. With November 1965, the BONG SON CAMPAIGN, him was the map depicting the enemy's version January-March 1966; and the BlNH DlNH PACI­ of the positions on LZ Bird, from which the attack FICATION CAMPAIGN. had been planned. Senior Captain PhuQC was These operations have been costly to the NVA the operations officer of the Regiment and had and VC enemy-over 7,400 killed by body count planned and executed the attack. Subsequent with an additional 5,960 estibated killed, for a interrogations have revealed vital infonnation on total of over 13,360--3,206 captured, 2,476 indi­ enemy tactics and techniques. vidual weapons and 349 crew operated weapons 1966 closed during the second two day truce captured or destroyed, 1,295 tons of rice, and period around the U. S. New Year. On December 512 tons of salt captured or destroyed. When at 31st, THAYER II was in its sixty-eighth day, the all possible the division operated with ARVN and longest operation undertaken by the division in CIDG units to assist them in winning their war Vietnam. On that day, the 3rd NVA Division for self-detennination. Command emphasis' con­ had lost a total of 980 killed in THAYER II, tinually stressed the importance of the Civic representing each of its three regiments. 1967 Action projects and the Revolutionary Develop­ would see the continuation of THAYER n as it ment programs. exceeded 100 days and accounted for a division record for killed in one operation-1,757 dead by YEAR OF THE HORSE body count. It was a very promising note on which 1966 certainly was the year of the Horse as the MAP 12 to end the first eighteen months since the birth only way one could interpret the success of the of the Air Cavalry on July 1, 1965. There was 1st Cavalry. Each member of THE FIRST TEAM 58 INTERIM REPORT OF OPERATIONS 1st CAVALRY DIVISION 59 was inspired to an awareness of the importance embodies an ever prevailing esprit de corps. of our m ission to the people of Vietnam and of Corporal. Captain, Colonel, or Commanding Gen­ our unique capabili ty to accomplish tha t mjssion. era l- each is constantly learning from the other, This mission is the continuous orientation on the as we demonstrate the Airmobile Division is enemy, and the knowledge that we possess that uniquely equipped to defeat the enemy at any means to exploit decisively any contact by the pain t on the counterinsurgency scale, from the Sky Troopers or supporting forces. It is the exe­ local VC defense platoon to the well-armed NV A cution of the vertical envelopment and the pur­ Regiment. The 1st Cavalry Divjsion~THE FIRST suit, when our organic helicopters enable the TEAM~is proud of past achievements. Continu­ ccmmander to carTY the fight to the enemy and deny him the sa nctuary he needs when he breaks ous refinement of airmobile tactics and t.echniques contact. There is a flexibility, an ability to react will produce still more decisive victories in the to rapidly changing situations. The division days ahead.

A Sergeant of the 1st Cavalry Division (A.M:) direct;s the landing of a resupply helicopter in a dry rice field near the Cambodian border. Nov. 1965.

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CH-54 SKYCRANE lifting out a CH-47 CHINOOK Preparing to board assault helicopters. October 1965.