Applying NATO Strategic Foresight Analysis to Canadian Arctic Defence and Security 2020

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UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT Applying NATO Strategic Foresight Analysis to Canadian Arctic Defence and Security 2020

FOREWORD

This report by the North American and policy, Strong, Secure, Engaged. This pol- Arctic Defence and Security Network icy recognizes the need to enhance the (NAADSN) applies NATO’s Strategic Fore- CAF’s presence in the region over the sight Analysis (SFA) 2017 Report, created to long term by setting out the capability support NATO leadership’s visualization of investments that will give our armed the future security environment, to Cana- forces the mobility, reach, and foot- da’s Arctic security environment in its inter- print required to project force across the national, regional, and domestic contexts. region in ways that further our national Highlighting the rapid rate of change, interests. To be strong at home, we seek complexity, uncertainty, and interconnect- to defend the North and work with our edness, it reinforces the need for creative Arctic partners to plan and coordinate and systematic thinking so that the Cana- operations to enable defence, safety, dian Armed Forces (CAF) can anticipate and security in this austere environment. potential threats to Canada and Canadian interests, act proactively to emerging chal- This report, like the 2017 NATO SFA lenges, and adapt with decisive military Report that inspires it, is not intended to capability across the spectrum of opera- predict the future but to suggest poten- tions to defend Canada, protect Canadian tial trajectories for several trends and interests and values, and contribute to highlight their implications for the Cana- global stability. dian Defence Team, its partners, and its allies. Not everyone will agree with all The Arctic, integral to Canada and an ave- of the observations, suggestions, and nue of approach to North America, neces- potentialities suggested in this docu- sitates defence across all domains enabled ment, but offering them in a transpar- by partnerships. The CAF must be prepared ent format is useful to invite deeper to counter hostile foreign state and non- reflection, discussion, and debate. By state actors, or respond anywhere in our providing a foundation upon which vast area of responsibility (AOR) if help is to contemplate potential futures, this requested, whether intervention for disas- report seeks to propel future deliber- ter relief, support in critical incidents, or for ations beyond general descriptions of search and rescue in the region. well-documented trends and instead to encourage more coordinated strategies As the area’s strategic importance grows, to anticipate and respond to potential the Government of Canada continues to risks, seize opportunities, and develop increase its Arctic and Northern footprint an appropriate mix of capabilities to in support of defence safety, and security. respond to rapidly changing global and This effort is anchored in Canada’s defence Arctic environments.

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT Contents FOREWORD I EXECUTIVE SUMMARY V INTRODUCTION IX 0.1 AIM IX 0.2 CONCEPT IX 0.3 OBJECTIVES XI 0.4 METHODOLOGY XI 0.5 BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT XII 0.6 TERMINOLOGY XVIII 0.7 STRUCTURE XVIII CHARACTERISTICS OF THE FUTURE 1 1.1 GLOBAL CONTEXT: STRONG, SECURE, ENGAGED 2 1.2 THE CANADIAN ARCTIC: TOWARDS A WHOLE-OF-SOCIETY APPROACH 5 1.3 COMPLEXITY AND UNCERTAINTY 8 1.4 CONFLUENCE AND INTERCONNECTEDNESS 11 POLITICAL 15 2.1 SHIFTS IN GEOSTRATEGIC POWER 17 2.2 USE OF POWER POLITICS 19 2.3 DEVOLUTION OF GOVERNANCE AND RECONCILIATION WITH INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 23 2.4 NON-ARCTIC STATE AND NON-STATE ACTOR INFLUENCE IN DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 26 2.5 REGIONAL GOVERNANCE ANDTHE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL REGIME 31 2.6 PUBLIC DISCONTENT/DISAFFECTION AND POLARIZATION 35 ENVIRONMENT 39 3.1 ENVIRONMENT 41 3.2 NATURAL DISASTERS 47 3.3 HUMAN-MADE DISASTERS 50

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT ECONOMICS AND RESOURCES 53 4.1 ARCTIC SHIPPING 54 4.2 RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT 56 4.3 THE CANADIAN ARCTIC AS A RESOURCE: TOURISM 58 4.4 THE CONSERVATION ECONOMY 60 4.5 FISHERIES 62 HUMAN 65 5.1 DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE 67 5.2 SETTLEMENT PATTERNS AND URBANIZATION 69 5.3 INFRASTRUCTURE GAPS 71 5.4 SOCIAL AND HEALTH INEQUALITIES 73 5.5 HUMAN NETWORKS AND INCREASINGLY FRACTURED OR POLARIZED SOCIETIES 76 TECHNOLOGY 81 6.1 RATE OF MILITARY TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCEMENT 81 6.2 UNMANNED AUTONOMOUS SYSTEMS (UAS) 84 6.3 THE DEPENDENCY ON INDUSTRY TO PROVIDE TECHNOLOGICAL SOLUTIONS TO THE ARCTIC 85 6.4 TECHNOLOGY AND THE ENVIRONMENT 86 6.5 TECHNOLOGY AND SOCIETY 88 6.6 OVER-RELIANCE ON TECHNOLOGICAL SOLUTIONS 89 CONCLUSIONS 93 ENDNOTES 95 APPENDIX: ARCTIC THEMES, TRENDS, AND IMPLICATIONS 97 SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY 104 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 114 IMAGE CREDITS 114

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. This NAADSN activity adopts in October 2020. Although COVID-19 the NATO Strategic Foresight Analy- constraints forced changes to planned sis (SFA) 2017 model to help frame a engagement activities and delayed conceptual model that anticipates and the release of the report, the process conveys an understanding of the future demonstrated the response capabilities Canadian Arctic security environment, of NAADSN to anticipate and identify and to assess the applicability of its emerging risks and threats to Canada findings to Canadian Arctic defence and analyze these risks. and security policy. Our goal is to assist the Defence Team, the Government of 3. Canada’s defence policy, Strong, Canada more generally, and academic Secure, Engaged, highlights three key stakeholders in testing assumptions, security trends that will continue to focusing future lines of research effort, shape events: the evolving balance of and developing coordinated strategies power, the changing nature of conflict, to anticipate and respond to potential and the rapid evolution of technol- risks, as well as taking advantage of ogy. These trends have a direct bear- opportunities that arise from a coming when contemplating future Arctic plex security environment out to 2035. security environments, vulnerabilities, and requirements. Like the 2017 NATO 2. This project succeeded in SFA, this report visualizes a future Arc- achieving the main objectives of tic security environment characterized NAADSN’s Understanding the Future by a rapid rate of change, complexity, Arctic Security Environment assess- uncertainty, and interconnectedness. ment project, leveraging the exper- Most of the drivers and implications tise of the network team (members, identified in this report highlight “soft” postdoctoral and graduate fellows, security and safety challenges in the and student associates) in the draft- Arctic rather than “hard” military kinetic ing and review phases. A draft ver- threats to the Arctic, thus confirming sion was circulated to academic and the line of reasoning that has become government experts for feedback well entrenched in Canadian defence during the Advancing Collaboration planning over the last decade. in Canada-U.S. Arctic Regional Security (ACCUSARS) workshop, co-hosted with 4. This report retains the structure the Arctic Domain Awareness Center of the NATO SFA by organizing ideas (ADAC) in September 2020, and at a around main political, social, techno- series of small NAADSN virtual events logical, economic, and environmental

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT trends. While this proved relevant to assessing 7. Environment. Environmental and Arctic defence and security futures, partici- ecological changes in the Canadian pants in the project (both authors and review- Arctic are being driven predominantly by ers of drafts) noted the limitations of a siloed climate change, which exacerbates emerg- approach that can conceal the cross-cutting ing regional challenges. The likelihood and nature of drivers and themes. Future work will prevalence of natural disasters is expected to further articulate the interaction of trends, increase, straining the capacities of all levels identify instability situations, and clarify impli- of government. Furthermore, the Canadian cations for defence and security practitioners. Arctic is at significant risk of human-made disasters that pose serious prospective 5. Political. The resurgence of great challenges for Northerners and federal and power competition, and particularly dynamics territorial governments. related to Chinese and Russian interests and activities, poses new or renewed risks related 8. Economics and Resources. Ship- to strategic delivery systems passing through ping activity in and through the Canadian or over the Arctic to reach targets outside of Arctic is increasing in volume, and there are the region. It may also bring new threats to signs of future interest by foreign actors. If or in the region, although these are likely to shipping in the region becomes more eco- take non-kinetic forms. In a complex security nomical, resources will represent a more environment characterized by trans-regional, attractive development opportunity. Canada multi-domain, and multi-functional threats, will require foreign partners and significant Canada will continue to work with its allies to private sector investment to address its Arctic understand the broader effects of the return infrastructure deficit, which raises concerns of major power competition to the interna about foreign actors’ influence. Before COVID- tional system and to regions like the Arctic, 19, tourism was on the rise throughout the and what this means for Canadian defence circumpolar world, ranging from large-scale relationships and partnerships. Canada’s full cruise ships, to sport fishing and hunting, to contribution to continental defence efforts adventure and eco expeditions, to cultural to detect, deter, and defend against threats tourism. This is likely to resume after a vaccine in all domains remains to be determined, but is widely available, and an expanding tourism its Arctic will inevitably factor heavily. Further- industry increases the risk of human-made more, Canada’s cooperation with other Arctic disasters and amplifies search and rescue and states and partners is likely to reflect more emergency response requirements. Cana- direct involvement of Northern territorial and da’s Arctic and Northern Policy Framework also Indigenous governments and organizations. highlights the idea of a conservation economy, which the federal government is slowly 6. A growing interest in Arctic affairs by growing in the Canadian Arctic in collabora- non-Arctic state and non-state actors has sig- tion with Northern Indigenous stakehold- nificant implications for the evolving Arctic ers. It is uncertain how climate change will security environment. Regional governance impact the Arctic’s fisheries over the next two systems will face pressures from heightened decades, but this has implications for food international interest and strategic competi- security, the enforcement of regulations, and tion, and the international legal regime will political and jurisdictional challenges. play a pivotal role in guiding state-to-state relations. Adversarial actors may also foment 9. Human. There is uneven popula- or amplify political polarization through social tion growth across Canada’s North, and this media and the spreading of disinformation or is expected to continue over the next fifteen “fake news,” which can undermine political years. Differences in population distributions and social cohesion. are likely to continue to strain resources, and youth disenfranchisement could worsen vi

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT health indicators, increase political instability, 11. In most analyses of the region, climate and lead to out-migration. The populations change and technological advancements of many smaller settlements are expected point to an increasingly accessible Arctic. to decline over the next two decades, while While sections of this report highlight how urban centres are expected to grow. Deficits limited infrastructure and geophysical con- in critical infrastructure keep communities ditions continue to constrain certain activi- isolated, inhibit the delivery of health and ties during certain times of the year (and will social services, and limit economic opportu- do so into the future), the global demand for nities. Northern and Indigenous communities resources, desire for efficient shipping routes, are particularly susceptible and vulnerable tourism, and geostrategic position of the to emerging health threats, and limitations Circumpolar North portend enhanced interest or interruptions to an already strained food in the region. Accordingly, strategic forecast- supply chain pose acute risks for Northern ers must situate the Canadian Arctic in global, communities. Furthermore, climate change regional, and domestic contexts to anticipate poses a growing threat to the health of new challenges, promote effective adapta- Northern populations. The amplification of tions to changing circumstances, and identify socio-economic, cultural, and political divi- how the CAF should be trained and equipped sions may become an unstable fault line as to act decisively with effective military capa- human networks in the Canadian Arctic con- bility in concert with its allies. This includes tinue to evolve. Fractures in Northern Cana- not just kinetic operations, but also being dian societies and between the North and prepared to respond effectively to safety South may undermine existing governance and security challenges such as search and systems, and while polarization between rescue and natural or human-created disas- Canadians is likely to erode social cohesion it is ters. As this report demonstrates, anticipating unlikely to produce major societal disruption. and addressing twenty-first century challenges requires a whole-of-society approach: 10. Technology. Technology is expected to be a force multiplier and the single best coordinated action that leverages the broad predictor of deterrence in the future. Com- and deep expertise and capacity of both the munication challenges, gaps in situational modern state and civil society. awareness, and cyber threats will need to be 12. By encouraging experts to contem- addressed. plate a long-term perspective of the future Choke points for improvements in the Arctic Canadian Arctic security environment, we from a technological perspective are almost hope that the information consolidated in this wholly dependent on industry to see the report – and the future discussions stimulated cost-benefit of hours of research and produc- by it – contribute to the development of coor- tion. Technological development will have dinated strategies that mitigate potential risks positive and negative implications for the and seize opportunities arising in a dynamic, Arctic environment and must be considered complex region. Furthermore, by comple- in partnership with Northern stakeholders menting a forthcoming NATO Regional Per- and rightsholders. Advancements in technol- spective Report on the Arctic and High North ogy can also help to address Northern social which identifies trends across the Circumpolar and economic challenges and reduce regional North as a whole, this Canadian-centred disparities. Conversely, an increasing depen- report can serve as a foundation for com- dency on technology to conduct certain parison to discern common challenges and operations has led to an assumption that tech- opportunities facing Canada and its allies. nology can solve most problems, which could lead to inadequate government responses to social problems or create new vulnerabilities.

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INTRODUCTION

INTRODUCTION P. WHITNEY LACKENBAUER

The aim of the Strategic Foresight Analysis (SFA) The Arctic region represents an risk or threat levels. It is also designed 2017 Report is to important international crossroads to test the capabilities of NAADSN as a identify trends where issues of climate change, research network that can effectively that will shape the international trade, and global secu- and efficiently parcel out discrete work future strategic rity meet…. Arctic states have long packages to small teams, consolidate context and derive cooperated on economic, environ- findings, and produce timely, relevant implications for the mental, and safety issues, particu- results to Defence Team stakeholders. larly through the Arctic Council, the Alliance out to 2035 premier body for cooperation in and beyond. The SFA the region. All Arctic states have an 0.2 CONCEPT does not attempt to enduring interest in continuing this The MINDS Policy Challenges for 2020- predict the future, productive collaboration…. This rise 21 highlight how Canada’s defence pol- for the future is in [commercial, research, and tour- icy “values the ability to anticipate new neither predictable ism] activity will also bring increased challenges in order to better prepare nor predetermined. safety and security demands related for, and respond to, threats to Canadian It provides an to search and rescue and natural or defence and security.” By anticipating iterative assessment [humanitarian] disasters to which emerging threats and challenges, and of trends and their Canada must be ready to respond. better understanding the defence and Strong, Secure, Engaged (2017) implications to security environment, the Defence understand and Team can provide timely and relevant visualize the nature 0.1 AIM information to decision-makers, thus “allowing the Government to identify of the dynamic and The purpose of this NAADSN activity is and understand emerging issues, complex security to analyze and apply the NATO Strategic events and crises in the global security environment. Foresight Analysis (SFA) 2017 findings to environment, and to respond appropri- NATO SFA 2017 determine their applicability to Canadian ately and effectively.” Report, 11 Arctic defence and security policy and Strong, Secure, Engaged (SSE), Canada’s to help frame a conceptual model that 2017 defence policy, emphasizes how anticipates and conveys an understanding trends in global economic develop- of the future Arctic security environment. ment are shifting the relative power This will assist NAADSN and the Defence of states from the West to the East and Team in creating indicators of changing

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT how major power competition has returned to the international system. “The Arctic is also becoming more relevant to the international community,” the white paper observes. With climate change “opening new access” to the region, “Arctic and non-Arctic states alike are looking to benefit from the potential economic opportunities associated with new resource development and transportation “Together the territories repre- routes.” Rather than promoting a narrative of inherent competition or impending conflict, sent a vast geographic area en- however, the narrative points out that “Arctic compassing 3.9 million square states have long cooperated on economic, kilometers. This accounts for environmental, and safety issues, particularly nearly 40% of Canada’s landmass through the Arctic Council, the premier body for cooperation in the region. All Arctic states and comprises a large part of the have an enduring interest in continuing this longest coastline in the world, productive collaboration.” This last sentence with tremendous untapped eco- suggests that Russia (described elsewhere nomic opportunities including in the policy document as a state “willing to test the international security environment” unparalleled natural resource that had reintroduced “a degree of major development potential. The ter- power competition”) does not inherently ritories’ geographic expanse also threaten Arctic stability given its vested interests in the region. Accordingly, the drivers of represent centuries of Indige- Arctic change cited in SSE emphasize the nous history, Canada’s northern rise of security and safety challenges in the identity and actual sovereign- Arctic rather than conventional defence ty in the Arctic, both at home threats to the Arctic, thus confirming the line of reasoning that has become well entrenched and on the international stage.” in defence planning over the last decade. - Pan-Territorial Vision and Principles Furthermore, it also highlights how interna- for Sustainable Development (2017) tional threats may pass through the Arctic to reach targets outside of the region. Are these assumptions correct? What do we anticipate being the emerging defence and security risks or threats in, to, and through the Canadian Arctic in the short-, medium-, and long-term? We use NATO’s Strategic Fore- sight Analysis 2017 Report as a baseline to address these general questions. This NATO report visualizes a future security environment characterized by a rapid rate of change, complexity, uncertainty, and interconnectedness, offering military advice and informing alliance and national defence planning processes that are based on assessments of the long-term future. The report highlights that: x

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT • polarization within and between upon, the NATO SFA theme chapters) states, power politics, and com- describing relationships between NATO petition between major powers SFA trends and Arctic defence and security have increased the potential for implications across the various scales instability (global, regional, national). Contributors • state and non-state actors are using were asked to identify key indicators that hybrid and cyber tools to impact might suggest changing risk or threat the security environment in the levels in the defence and security domains. grey zone under the threshold of Where possible, the teams were also asked conflict to indicate potential time horizons. • other transnational challenges such as organized crime, climate change, and economic instability might 0.3 OBJECTIVES further deepen the uncertainty, The objectives of NAADSN’s Understand- disorder, and complexity that is ing the Future Arctic Security Environment now called the “new normal” assessment project were to: Rather than conducting a full strategic fore- • Plan and execute a collective sight exercise from the proverbial ground research project by leveraging up, I proposed that NAADSN members test the expertise of the network team the applicability of the SFA to the Canadian (members, postdoctoral and gradu- Arctic. Building upon a presentation that I ate fellows, and student associates) gave to the Arctic Security Working Group • Test the response capabilities of (ASWG) in Yellowknife, Northwest Territo- NAADSN to anticipate and identify ries, in November 2019, teams were asked emerging risks and threats to Can- to specifically analyze themes and trends ada, provide robust analysis of these across various levels of analysis: risks, and disseminate findings in a • Grand strategic threats to the inter- timely, concise, and conceptually national system with an Arctic coherent way to the Defence Team nexus (thus best considered by • Produce a report on the applica- starting with general strategic bility of NATO SFA trends to Arctic analysis and then discerning if defence and security futures, with Arctic-specific responses are a goal of helping to develop coor- required outside of broader defence dinated strategies to anticipate and and security postures) respond to potential risks, as well as • Circumpolar threats applying to the taking advantage of opportunities entire Arctic region (NATO) that arise from a rapidly changing, • Continental Arctic threats (eg. complex security environment North American Arctic/NORAD; European Arctic/NATO; Eurasian 0.4 METHODOLOGY Arctic/Russia) • Domestic Arctic threats (Canada) Small teams analyzed one theme described Although there is overlap between these in the 2017 NATO SFA (political, human, levels, we hoped that an attentiveness technology, economics/resources, and to the various scales may help to reduce environment) in detail. They then assessed analytical imprecision and conceptual the Arctic defence and security implica- sloppiness in this exercise. tions of their theme. Some teams chose to meet in person, while others convened Teams were asked to produce a short by teleconference or videoconference. narrative (akin to, and in some cases based Each team or a designated author then xi

2020 REPORT submitted a series of narrative paragraphs, implications are derived from trend akin to the chapters in the SFA Report, analysis using professional military describing the relationships between the judgement, academic expertise and trends and defence and security implica- outcomes of workshops, and are not tions. Each of these draft documents was intended to be prescriptive or neces- circulated to elicit input, suggest other sarily linked to any specific capability. considerations or implications, and offer critiques. This final report offers a consoli- dation of the various recommendations. 0.5 BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT Like the NATO SFA, this effort is “designed As an Arctic state with 40% of its landmass to be a regularly updated, collaborative north of 60° latitude and 162,000 km of and transparent effort, which encour- Arctic coastline, Canada’s interest in the ages meaningful discourse and an open region is obvious. Its emphasis on the exchange of ideas,” and that seeks to iden- human dimensions of the Arctic, and tify “a range of defence and security impli- particularly those related to its Northern cations based upon current recognized Indigenous peoples, also reflect national trends likely to shape events in the fore- realities. Canada’s three northern territories seeable future out to 2035 and beyond.” are home to over 126,000 people, more It is not intended to be predictive, but to than half of whom are Aboriginal (Inuit, identify particular trends that might influ- First Nations, or Métis). Social indicators in ence future events and have implications Canada’s Indigenous North are abysmal, for Canada. As the NATO report explained: reflecting the challenges of providing social services and infrastructure to small, The SFA does not imply a particular isolated settlements spread out over a vast or specified future. This report pro- area. Northern Indigenous peoples face vides a balanced view of the future, many challenges associated with rapid describing challenges, but also iden- changes to their homelands, including tifying potential opportunities. It threats to language and culture, erosion is based on analysis of the past to of traditional support networks, poorer help the Alliance understand today health than the rest of Canadians, and as well as visualize the future, estab- changes to traditional diet and communal lishing a bridge between the two, food practices. These challenges represent thereby enabling NATO to adapt, Canada’s most acute Arctic imperative. ensuring it remains fit for purpose. The trends and implications iden- Canadian governments have recognized tified in this report are not simply and grappled with the challenge important short-term events and of balancing the needs of Northern issues of today; they are projected Canadians with economic development to have relevance for the next two and environmental protection for fifty decades, describing the future secu- years. Under Conservative Prime Minister rity environment. They are perti- Stephen Harper (2006-15), the balance nent worldwide, to developed and seemed to tip in favour of resource developing regions and nations. The development and hard-line messaging about defending sovereignty. A more careful reading reveals that The Defence Team uses the following planning horizons: the federal government’s Horizon 1 – short term (1-5 years) – 2020-25 sovereignty-security rhetoric became more nuanced over Horizon 2 – medium term (6-15 years) – 2026-35 time, reflecting an attempt xii Horizon 3 – long term (16-30 years) – 2036-50

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT “ANTICIPATING emerging threats and challenges is fundamental to Canada’s security. The Defence team will improve its ability to provide timely information to decision-makers, allowing the Government to identify and understand emerging events and crises, respond appropriately, and minimize the destructive effects of prolonged conflict.” – Department of National Defence (DND), Strong, Secure, Engaged (2017)

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2020 REPORT to balance messaging that promised to “soft security” issues and abandoned the “defend” Canada’s Arctic sovereignty classic sovereignty-focused messaging (intended primarily for domestic audiences) of his predecessor. Similarly, the federal with a growing awareness that the most government’s Arctic and Northern Policy likely challenges were “soft” security- and Framework (ANPF), released in September safety-related issues that required “whole 2019, indicates a concerted emphasis on of government” responses.1 environmental conservation and improving the socio-cultural health of Northern Although the election of Justin Trudeau’s Indigenous peoples. The decision to link Liberal party in October 2015 represented the domestic and international dimen- a significant departure from the political sions of Canada’s Arctic and Northern strat- previous government’s approach, the main egy in a single policy framework reaffirms substantive elements of Canada’s Arctic the inter-connectivity between national, policy (which have remained remarkably regional, and global dynamics. consistent since the 1970s) have not fun- damentally changed. A domestic focus SSE confirms that the Arctic remains an on Indigenous rights, conservation, and area of particular interest and focus for the health and resiliency of Northern Canada’s Defence Team. The policy high- communities has been complemented lights the region’s cultural and economic by a renewed commitment to global importance to Canada as well as its state climate change mitigation and the bene- of rapid environmental, economic, and fits of co-developing policy with Northern social change. While this change presents stakeholders and rightsholders. Through opportunities, it has also spawned new bilateral statements with President Barack defence, safety, and security challenges. Obama in 2016, Prime Minister Trudeau To meet those challenges and “succeed offered a model for Arctic leadership that in an unpredictable and complex security placed a clear priority on Indigenous and environment,” SSE committed the country

“CLIMATE CHANGE, COMBINED WITH ADVANCEMENTS IN TECHNOLOGY, IS LEADING TO AN INCREASINGLY ACCESSIBLE ARCTIC. A DECADE AGO, FEW STATES OR FIRMS HAD THE ABILITY TO OPERATE IN THE ARCTIC. TODAY, STATE AND COMMERCIAL ACTORS FROM AROUND THE WORLD SEEK TO SHARE IN THE LONGER TERM BENEFITS OF AN ACCESSIBLE ARCTIC.” – STRONG, SECURE, ENGAGED, 67

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UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT to an ambitious program of naval con- Given the evolving balance of power, struction, capacity enhancements, and changing nature of conflict, and rapid evo- technological upgrades to improve situ- lution of technology globally over the last ational awareness, communications, and decade, National Defence recognizes the the ability of the Canadian Armed Forces need for new approaches to anticipate (CAF) to operate across the Arctic. How can and confront threats and challenges in the and should the CAF work with partners to years ahead. To remain effective in a highly address long-term challenges in the Cana- dynamic, complex global and regional dian Arctic, including those posed by rapid environment, policymakers and planners climate and environmental change? How must develop mechanisms to continuously should Canada prepare to meet shifting test their assessments, ideas, and assump- power dynamics associated with increased tions to ensure that they do not become “militarization,” Chinese interest and limiting or outdated. This logic underpins activity, and Russian actions in the region? Strong, Secure, Engaged, which commits Should the Arctic be a region where the CAF to: Canada engages with “partners” considered adversaries in other venues? Should ANTICIPATE and better understand Canada focus on threats in, to, or through potential threats to Canada and the Arctic? How much attention and Canadian interests so as to enhance resources should NORAD and NATO ded- our ability to identify, prevent or pre- icate to the region, and what role should pare for, and respond to a wide range they play to best serve the interests of of contingencies; Canada and its allies? Beyond the military ADAPT proactively to emerging domain, what emerging defence and secu- challenges by harnessing new tech- rity threats might Canada face in and to its nologies, fostering a resilient work- Arctic over the next two decades? force, and leveraging innovation, The safety, security, and defence chap- knowledge, and new ways of doing ter of the 2019 Arctic and Northern Policy business; Framework (ANPF) lays out the Govern- ACT with decisive military capability ment of Canada’s objectives to ensure a across the spectrum of operations safe, secure, and well-defended Arctic and to defend Canada, protect Canadian North through to 2030. “While Canada sees interests and values, and contribute no immediate threat in the Arctic and the to global stability. North, as the region’s physical environment changes, the Circumpolar North is Major power competition, challenges to becoming an area of strategic international an increasingly fragile international order, importance, with both Arctic and non- and global shock wrought by the COVID- Arctic states expressing a variety of eco- 19 pandemic invite reflections on what nomic and military interests in the region,” assumptions in SSE should be revisited the policy framework emphasizes. “As the to ensure that the CAF is prepared and Arctic becomes more accessible, these capable of meeting Canada’s defence needs states are poised to conduct research, now and into the future. As recent events transit through, and engage in more trade in Ukraine, Syria, and Libya have revealed, in the region. Given the growing inter- state adversaries are taking actions national interest and competition in the “below the threshold” of conventional Arctic, continued security and defence of kinetic warfare that could escalate into Canada’s Arctic requires effective safety conventional, high-intensity war unless and security frameworks, national defence, Canada and its allies discern proportionate and deterrence.” ways to defend against and deter such xvii

2020 REPORT practices. The post-Cold War liberal 0.6 TERMINOLOGY international system appears increasingly vulnerable to stresses emanating from As per the NATO SFA 2017 report, we adopt both within increasingly polarized liberal the following definitions: democratic states and from autocratic THEME. A collection of similar or regimes issuing explicit critiques of US related trends. hegemony and Western worldviews. The 2017 NATO SFA Report observes that: TREND. A discernible pattern or a specified direction of change. The world is transforming in multiple, yet connected, areas at an expo- IMPLICATION. A significant effect nential rate. Driven mostly by rapid on the defence and security of one or changes in technology, the world more NATO nations that results from is becoming more interconnected. one or more particular trends. As people communicate within and across national boundaries more 0.7 STRUCTURE than ever before, the events and decisions in one region influence the We have deliberately mirrored the structure lives of others across the rest of the of the NATO SFA 2017 report. The first world. Ageing populations, with their chapter filters the general characteristics attendant health and pension costs, of the future suggested in that earlier are gradually straining social welfare report through a Canadian lens, providing systems that are already stressed an overview of what recent Canadian with mounting public debt in both policy documents highlight as some core developed and developing econ- assumptions and drivers. The subsequent omies. The global power shift con- chapters apply the principal themes tinues toward multi-polarity. While framed in the SFA Report, seek to discern an information society is evolving main trends of Arctic change, and derive globally and economic globalization potential defence and security implications is intensifying, nationalist reactions for Canada. We have re-ordered the and anti-globalization sentiments chapters, which appear as follows: are also growing. Additionally, the a. Political: Includes the re-distri- effects of climate change are more bution of geostrategic power, evident and pervasive than ever challenges to governance, non- before. While these developments state actor influence in domestic increase uncertainty and complex- and international affairs, power ity, they present challenges to the politics, public discontent and capacity of individual states to man- disaffection, interconnected- age a mounting set of intercon- ness, and polycentrism. nected problems. b. Environment: Includes cli- Accordingly, contemplating strategic mate change, climate adapta- futures in Canada’s Arctic requires attention and mitigation measures, tiveness to global, circumpolar regional, water and food stresses, and continental, and domestic drivers – across natural and human-made multiple themes and domains – that could disasters. affect the CAF’s mission to make Canada c. Economics/Resources: strong at home, secure in North America, Includes globalization of finan- and engaged in the world to promote cial resources, geopolitical xviii peace and stability. dimension of resources (rare

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT earth elements, water, food, and energy), asymmetric change in defence expendi- tures, and increased global inequality. d. Human: Includes asymmetric demographic change, increasing urbanization, fractured and/or polarized societies, gender norms and relations, and increasingly connected human networks. e. Technology: Includes rate of technology advancement, access to technology, global network development, domi- nance of the commercial sector in technological development, and dependence on certain technologies.

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2020 REPORT EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE NATO 2017 SFA REPORT (EXCERPTS) 1. The Strategic Foresight Analysis (SFA) 2. The SFA is the initial phase of the 2017 Report … provides a wide-ranging ongoing Long-Term Military Transformation shared understanding of the future secu- (LTMT) efforts at Allied Command Trans- rity environment. The SFA describes the formation (ACT) and sets the intellectual future NATO expects to unfold to 2035 and foundation for a follow-on report, the beyond, depicted as political, social, tech- Framework for Future Alliance Operations nological, economic, and environmental (FFAO). The FFAO looks into the interaction of trends. Where trends may move in diverging trends, identifies instability situations then directions, an alternative view is provided to develops military implications. Together, maintain utmost objectivity. the SFA and FFAO are designed to improve the Alliance’s long-term perspective of the future security environment to support and inform the NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP), as well as other NATO and national processes that require an assessment of the long-term future.

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT 3. The confluence of several political, public discontent and increasing challenges to social, technological, economic, and envi- governance. ronmental trends is redefining the global a. The redistribution of economic and military security context. Some trends driven by power, most notably towards Asia, contin- technological innovation may offer oppor- ues to contribute to the relative decline of tunities to address global problems. But the West. The predominance of NATO and the confluence of trends has also created the West is likely to be increasingly chal- complexity, disorder and uncertainty that lenged by emerging and resurgent powers. are now called the new normal. Western b. Non-state actors, benign and malign alike, countries and institutions, such as NATO are expected to exert greater influence and the EU, can benefit from the informa- over national governments and interna- tion provided in the document to develop tional institutions. coordinated strategies in order to respond c. Power politics and competition between to potential risks, and take advantage of major powers may intensify, increasing opportunities that arise from this new the likelihood of confrontation and con- normal. flict in the future, thus highlighting the 4. Political. Fundamental changes importance of commitment to collective in the international security environ- defence. ment, driven by power transitions among d. Alternative global governance institu- states from West to East and power tions, championed by emerging and diffusions from governments to non-state resurgent powers, are likely to challenge actors worldwide, have created strategic the existing international organization shocks resulting in increasing instabil- as they seek a voice in decision-making ity within the post-Cold War world order. structures. These shocks have contributed to greater e. Public discontent has led to increasing polarization between political and social groups, further eroding trust in governments and traditional institutions.

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2020 REPORT 5. Human. Social trends that and human enhancement, are will most profoundly shape the not yet widely accepted and will future are asymmetric demographic expose divergent ethical and change, rapid urbanization and legal interpretations. increasingly polarized societies. b. Individuals, state actors and a. In societies with an ageing popu- non-state actors have greater lation, the demand on resources opportunity to exploit readily for medical and social welfare available technologies in an will grow, nations’ ability to innovative and potentially dis- allocate necessary funds for ruptive manner. defence and security will be c. The scale and speed of global increasingly strained and networks allow individuals changes in demography may and groups immediate access limit recruitment for security to information and knowl- forces. edge but may also enable the b. In developing countries, high dissemination of false or mis- fertility rates lead to youth leading information. Addi- bulges resulting in unemploy- tionally, data will increasingly ment and insufficient edu- become a strategic resource. cation opportunities for the d. Commercial innovation has young that will foster perceived outpaced traditional defence disenfranchisement and may Research and Development lead to social unrest. (R&D). Reductions in defence c. Rapid urbanization might lead budgets have led to over- to resource scarcity and chal- reliance on commercially lenge the distribution of avail- available solutions, the loss able resources. of defence-focused R&D skills d. Fractured and polarized soci- and may increase security risks. eties and growing intercon- e. Operational effectiveness has nected human networks are become overly dependent likely to present unprece- on advanced technology and dented opportunities and chal- civilian infrastructure without lenges in the next two decades. redundant systems. Techno- logical advancements will con- 6. Technology. Technology tinue to open new domains of will continue to shape the social, warfighting such as cyber and cultural, and economic fabrics space. of our societies at all levels. New and emerging technologies offer 7. Economics/Resources. Glo- enormous opportunities, but also balization has opened markets and present new vulnerabilities and intensified economic integration, challenges as the world pivots while increasing the influence of towards digitalization. developing countries and straining natural resources. The advent of a. The increasing rate of technol- emerging markets has also shifted ogy advancement will challenge jobs to countries and regions with acquisition management pro- cheap labour and eroded the eco- cesses and the interoperability nomic base for the working middle between nations and institu- class in Western countries, fuelling tions. New technologies, such social inequality. as offensive cyber, artificial intelligence, autonomous systems a. An increasingly interconnected xxii global financial system is more

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT vulnerable to attacks by both state and non-state actors. Through the exploitation of decentralized networks, financial origins and transactions supporting terrorism and organized crime will become less visible and traceable. b. The demand for resources will increase with population and economic growth particularly in developing countries. c. Access to and control over natural resources will play an increasing role in power politics. d. Increased inequality is a cat- alyst for migration and can have second-order effects such as fractured and conflict- ual societies, violent extremism, nationalism, isolationism, and protectionism. c. Governments and international e. The existing burden on national institutions will be expected to economies will grow due to the provide humanitarian assis- rise in competing demands for tance and relief with increasing limited resources. frequency.

8. Environment. Environmental 9. The SFA is a collaborative effort issues are dominated by climate drawing on expertise and resources change and its far-reaching and from NATO and partner nations, cross-cutting impacts. Climate international organizations, think change may also lead to increas- tanks, industry and academia to ing incidences of natural disasters. identify trends and implications that The demand for natural resources is are likely to shape the future secu- increasing. Water and food security rity environment. The SFA is built are growing concerns along with upon analysis of commonalities and losses to biodiversity. These stresses differences in trends while focusing on eco-system services may reduce on the future challenges, opportuni- resilience. ties and other relevant implications facing the Alliance. (See Appendix a. Changes to the climate will of this NAADSN report for the list of impose stresses on current trends and implications produced in ways of life, on individuals’ the SFA.) ability to subsist and on governments’ abilities to keep pace and 10. NATO will remain the key provide for the needs of their security alliance for the Euro-Atlan- populations. tic region for the foreseeable future. b. Natural disasters will have an Accordingly, it behoves NATO to fur- increasing impact, particularly ther explore and prepare for these in those areas unaccustomed possibilities, to best posture for a to such events. dynamic future and to effectively meet its core tasks. xxiii

2020 REPORT

CHAPTER ONE

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE FUTURE P. WHITNEY LACKENBAUER

The NATO SFA observes that, “for the Unresolved boundary disputes. New past two decades, the world has been investments in military capabilities to experiencing a period of significant “defend” sovereignty. Arctic defence changes in political, social, economic and security have emerged as a core and environmental areas substantially topic in international and domes- influenced by exponential developments tic circles over the past decade, in technology.” This produces a different spawning persistent debates about global security context marked by whether the region’s future is likely complexity, disorder, and uncertainty. to continue along cooperative lines Readers are encouraged to look to that or transform into unbridled compe- document for general discussions of the tition and conflict…. These frame- current period of transition marked by the works are very significant in shaping rising influence of developing countries expectations for the Government of and alternative international organization Canada and for the Canadian Armed led by rising powers; an exponential rate Forces more specifically.1 of change in an increasingly complex international system; growing polarization, In most analyses of the region, climate regionalization, and fragmentation, as well change and technological advancements as globalization and interconnectedness; point to an increasingly accessible Arctic. and the proliferation of disruptive While geophysical conditions continue to technologies and the potential for strategic constrain certain activities during certain shocks. times of the year (and will do so into the future), the global demand for resources, Although the Arctic is a region that desire for efficient shipping routes, and academics and politicians have often her- geostrategic position of the Circumpo- alded as an “exceptional” space of inter- lar North portend enhanced interest in national cooperation since the end of the the region. In imagining the future for Cold War, it is increasingly acknowledged Canada, the Arctic and Northern Policy as an area of competition as well. As I sum- Framework (ANPF) suggests that “climate marized in 2014: change and technology are making the Arctic more accessible,” with diminish- Climate change. Newly accessible ing sea ice “open[ing] shipping routes … resources. New maritime routes.

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT [and] putting the rich wealth of northern emphasizes that “Canada is not immune natural resources within reach. Increased from these concerns, and we must be part commercial and tourism interests also of the solution – a force for security, stability, bring increased safety and security chal- prosperity and social justice in the world.” lenges that include search and rescue Furthermore, “climate change threatens to and human-created disasters.” This echoes disrupt the lives and livelihoods of millions assumptions articulated in Canada’s 2017 around the world. It also presents us with an defence policy, which emphasizes that urgent call to innovate, to foster collective “new actors are pursuing economic and action, to work hand-in-hand with like- military activities, some of which may minded partners around the world to meet pose a threat to Canadian security and this threat and defeat it, rather than stand sovereignty.” To address risk and meet passively by.” emerging threats, Strong, Secure, Engaged Within this broader context, SSE highlights recognizes that working cooperatively three key security trends that will continue with allies and partners will be essential in to shape events: the evolving balance of a complex security environment. power, the changing nature of conflict, Drawing excerpts from broader Canadian and the rapid evolution of technology. and allied policy statements, this chap- All of these trends have direct and ter frames some general characteristics of indirect application when contemplating the future related to defence and security and imagining future Arctic security issues and threats facing DND/CAF from a environments, vulnerabilities, and forecasting perspective. Individual chap- requirements. The ANPF emphasizes that: ters provide more robust context and elab- oration of implications on specific themes The international order is not static; and issues introduced in this general it evolves over time to address overview. new opportunities and challenges. The Arctic and the North is in a period of rapid change that is the 1.1 GLOBAL CONTEXT: STRONG, SECURE, product of both climate change ENGAGED and changing geopolitical trends. As such, international rules and Canada has a long-standing, institutions will need to evolve to honourable tradition of robust address the new challenges and engagement in support of global opportunities facing the region. As stability, peace and prosperity. We are it has done in the past, Canada will uniquely positioned now to further bolster its international leadership this role. Arguably, our engagement at this critical time, in partnership has never been more necessary, or with Northerners and Indigenous valued by our international allies and peoples, to ensure that the evolving partners. international order is shaped in a Canada’s defence policy notes that manner that protects and promotes economic inequality is on the rise globally, Canadian interests and values. with an attendant rise in instability and For nearly a century, Canada has invested violent extremism. Mass migration, in building and sustaining an international radicalization and hateful ideologies, weak system that reflects its values and interests, or undemocratic governance, and political carving out a functional role as a “middle polarization stress individual countries, power” to promote peace and prosperity regions, alliances, and the international around the world. The balance of power 2 system as a whole. Strong, Secure, Engaged

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT is shifting, however, as the re-emergence environmental issues, over the past decade of major power competition threatens to significant international interest and atten- undermine or strain the established inter- tion has turned to oil, gas and minerals, fish- national order and rules-based system. eries, shipping, and Arctic governance. In China’s rise as an economic superpower turn, this has generated debates amongst and its aspirations to have a global role Arctic states about non-Arctic states’ inten- proportionate to its economic weight, tions and their receptiveness to welcoming population, and self-perception as the Asian countries in particular “into the Arctic Middle Kingdom portend a return to cold.”2 multipolarity. Russian President Vladimir In a complex security environment char- Putin’s recent declaration that liberalism is acterized by trans-regional, multi-domain, “obsolete” affirms that the former super- and multi-functional threats, Canada will power has deviated from its early post-Cold continue to work with its allies to under- War path and its revisionist behaviour in stand the broader effects of the return of Georgia, Ukraine, and Syria are examples major power competition to the interna- of its willingness to test the international tional system and to regions like the Arc- security environment. Consequently, Can- tic, and what this means for Canadian ada’s role is less obvious in the emerging defence relationships and partnerships. multipolar world, which challenges the Emerging threats to North America, across Western-designed security system, than all domains, must be situated in the con- it was in the bipolar Cold War order or the text of continental defence and the long- unipolar moment that followed it. This standing Canada-US defence partnership creates more space for emerging state exemplified by the North American Aero- and non-state actors to exercise influence, space Defence Command (NORAD). This including in the Arctic. binational command has proven effec- The growing realization of the dispro- tive in deterring, detecting, and defend- portionate impact of climate change on ing North America’s approaches since the the circumpolar region, and concomi- 1950s, and it remains “the cornerstone tant social, economic, and environmental of Canada’s defence relationship with consequences for the rest of the world, the US, and provides both countries with also command global attention. Canada’s greater continental security than could ANPF notes that “the Canadian North be achieved individually.” NORAD com- is warming at about 3 times the global mander General Terrence O’Shaugnessy average rate, which is affecting the land, told the Senate Strategic Forces Subcom- biodiversity, cultures and traditions.” This mittee in April 2019 that “the six decades of rapid change is “having far-reaching effects NORAD’s unmatched experience and on the lives and well-being of northerners, shared history are proving more vital than threatening food security and the trans- ever as we face the most complex secu- portation of essential goods and endan- rity environment in generations,” and gering the stability and functioning of that “this unique and longstanding com- delicate ecosystems and critical infrastruc- mand serves as both a formidable deter- ture.” There is extensive Canadian interest rent to our adversaries and a clear symbol in how these changes affect Northern peo- of the unbreakable bond between the ples and the environment that sustains United States and Canada.” Resurgent them at local and domestic scales, as well major power competition and advances as the implications of rising international in weapons technology pose new threats interest in the region. Although non-Arctic to continental security, however, which observers have traditionally confined their require NORAD to modernize and evolve polar interest to scientific research and to meet current and future threats. Both 3

2020 REPORT IMPLICATIONS FOR CANADA OF A CHANGING SECURITY ENVIRONMENT • The global security environment transcends national borders, requiring Canada to help promote peace and stability abroad in order to maintain security at home. • In a global security environment defined by complexity and unpredict- ability, Canada requires an agile, well-educated, flexible, diverse, and combat-ready military capable of conducting a wide range of operations at home and internationally. • The interrelated nature of global security challenges puts a premium on deep knowledge and understanding. Using a range of analytical tools, Canada must develop sophisticated awareness of the information and operating environment and the human dimension of conflict to better predict and respond to crises. • To keep pace, Canada must develop advanced space and cyber capabilities, and expand cutting-edge research and development. • Canada must continue to be a responsible partner that adds value to traditional alliances, including NORAD, NATO, and the Five Eyes community. • Canada must balance these fundamental relationships with the need to engage with emerging powers, particularly in the Asia-Pacific region. • Canada must address the threat stemming from terrorism and the actions of violent extremist organizations, including in ungoverned spaces. • Recognizing the devastating effects of climate change, Canada must bolster its ability to respond to severe weather events and other natural disasters, both at home and abroad. • Acknowledging rising international interest in the Arctic, Canada must enhance its ability to operate in the North and work closely with allies and partners. • Canada and the United States must work closely together on NORAD modernization in order to defend North America.

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT SSE and the ANPF underscore the impor- with diplomacy and development.” Taken tance of NORAD modernization efforts, the together, the opportunities, challenges, integration of layered sensor and defeat increased competition, and risks associ- systems, and improving the CAF’s reach ated with a more accessible Arctic require a and mobility in the Arctic within this alli- greater presence of security organizations, ance construct. strengthened emergency management, effective military capability, and improved Strategic forecasters must situate the situational awareness. Meeting these Canadian Arctic in global, regional, and demands necessitates a collaborative domestic contexts to anticipate new chal- approach among all levels of government, lenges, promote effective adaptations to as well as with Northerners, including changing circumstances, and identify how Indigenous peoples, and in cooperation the CAF should be trained and equipped with the private sector where relevant to to act decisively with effective military ensure that the region can prosper and capability in concert with its allies. Cana- that it continues to be a zone of peace and da’s Defence Investment Plan 2018 notes cooperation. that “Canada has an agile, multi-purpose, combat-ready military that is operated by Canada’s defence and security policies and highly-trained, well-equipped, and profes- practices must also fit within its broader sional personnel.” It also emphasizes how, national strategy for the Canadian Arctic “given the uncertainty and complexity of and the Circumpolar North. The ANPF pro- the global security environment, now and motes “a shared vision of the future where into the future,” it must continue to build northern and Arctic people are thriving, and refine “a flexible and versatile Force strong and safe.” Priorities include actions that can take informed, decisive action to to: accomplish the Government’s objectives • nurture healthy families and [which] is essential to the military’s opera- communities tional effectiveness and long-term success.” • invest in the energy, transportation and communications infrastructure 1.2 THE CANADIAN ARCTIC: TOWARDS A that northern and Arctic govern- WHOLE-OF-SOCIETY APPROACH ments, economies and communities need ‘Nothing about us, without us’ is • create jobs, foster innovation the essential principle that weaves and grow Arctic and northern federal, territorial, provincial and economies Indigenous institutions and interests • support science, knowledge and together for mutual success. research that is meaningful for com- Canada’s Arctic and Northern munities and for decision-making Policy Framework (2019) • face the effects of climate change and support healthy ecosystems in Anticipating and addressing twenty-first the Arctic and North century challenges requires coordinated • ensure that Canada and our north- action rather than siloed thinking in order ern and Arctic residents are safe, to leverage the broad and deep expertise secure and well-defended of the modern state and civil society. In the • restore Canada’s place as an inter- defence and security realm, SSE empha- national Arctic leader sizes that meeting “enormous collective • advance reconciliation and improve challenges requires coordinated action relationships between Indigenous across the whole-of-government – mil- and non-Indigenous peoples itary capabilities working hand in hand 5

2020 REPORT Consistent with a whole-of-society highlights the importance of modernizing approach, SSE emphasizes the importance and “streamlining the procurement pro- of “exploiting defence innovation by ensur- cess, adopting innovative ways of deliv- ing that the Defence Team can tap into ering critical infrastructure services, and creativity and expertise available outside working as efficiently and effectively as of government” and leverage the research, possible to deliver results. It also means development, and “ground-breaking con- being a responsible steward of the envi- cepts generated by academics, universities, ronment by reducing the environmental and the private sector.” These efforts can footprint of National Defence, minimizing help to identify and meet the challenges the impact of its activities on the natural associated with emerging domains, con- environment, and managing resources ceptualize multi- and all-domain threats responsibly.” ANPF Goal 7: The Canadian Arctic and North across the spectrum of operations, and and its people are safe, secure and well-de- In a Canadian Arctic context, a key chal- the need to analyze and fuse intelligence fended. Objectives: lenge will involve co-developing practical and other data at “speed of relevance.” 1. Strengthen Canada’s coopera- implementation plans that meet the needs The Defence Investment Plan 2018 also tion and collaboration with domestic and international partners on safety, Arctic and Northern Policy Framework vision: “Strong, self-reliant people and communities working security and defence issues together for a vibrant, prosperous and sustainable Arctic and northern region at home and abroad, 2. Enhance Canada’s military pres- while expressing Canada’s enduring Arctic sovereignty.” ence as well as prevent and respond to safety and security incidents in the Arctic and the North 3. Strengthen Canada’s domain awareness, surveillance and control capabilities in the Arctic and the North 4. Enforce Canada’s legislative and regulatory frameworks that govern transportation, border integrity and environmental protection in the Arctic and the North 5. Increase the whole-of-society emergency management capabilities in Arctic and northern communities 6. Support community safety through effective and culturally-appropriate crime prevention initiatives and policing services

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT highlights the importance of modernizing of DND/CAF, our allies, and of Northern Canadians, and “streamlining the procurement pro- in light of accelerating rates of change “in many cess, adopting innovative ways of deliv- aspects of human society [that are] expected to con- ering critical infrastructure services, and tinue increasing complexity and uncertainty while working as efficiently and effectively as creating concurrent opportunities and risks.” As the possible to deliver results. It also means NATO SFA notes, disruptive technologies, Artificial being a responsible steward of the envi- Intelligence (AI) and machine learning, biotechnol- ronment by reducing the environmental ogy, and autonomous systems “could be considered footprint of National Defence, minimizing as game changers that might help humanity solve the impact of its activities on the natural problems at a global level,” but they also create dis- environment, and managing resources ruption and introduce new challenges at all levels. responsibly.” Furthermore, new technologies and their applica- ANPF Goal 7: The Canadian Arctic and North tion in layered offensive and defensive systems also and its people are safe, secure and well-de- In a Canadian Arctic context, a key chal- give rise to moral, ethical, and legal issues that are fended. Objectives: lenge will involve co-developing practical likely to play out in debates about Arctic defence 1. Strengthen Canada’s coopera- implementation plans that meet the needs and security as well as more generalized ones. tion and collaboration with domestic General O’Shaughnessy told the U.S. Senate Armed and international partners on safety, Services Committee in February 2020 that “geo- security and defence issues graphic barriers that kept our homeland beyond the 2. Enhance Canada’s military pres- reach of most conventional threats” no longer offer ence as well as prevent and respond protection and “the Arctic is no longer a fortress to safety and security incidents in the wall … [but an avenue] of approach for advanced Arctic and the North conventional weapons and the platforms that carry them.” What does this mean for Northern policies 3. Strengthen Canada’s domain predicated on the idea of the Arctic as a “distinct” awareness, surveillance and control homeland that is inherently conceived of as a mate- capabilities in the Arctic and the North rial place rather than a threat vector? How do mea- 4. Enforce Canada’s legislative and sures to address strategic threats to North America regulatory frameworks that govern passing through the Canadian Arctic relate to threats transportation, border integrity and to the region or in the region? environmental protection in the Arctic and the North Northern Canadian economic futures are also tied to global drivers in terms of supply and demand 5. Increase the whole-of-society for non-renewable resources, maritime (in)accessi- emergency management capabilities bility, and climate change. The intrinsic dilemma or in Arctic and northern communities contradiction between Arctic state support for the 6. Support community safety exploitation of Arctic hydrocarbon resources (given through effective and culturally-ap- the direct economic benefits of doing so) and the propriate crime prevention initiatives desire to mitigate global climate change (with its and policing services clear effects on the Arctic) is likely to persist. The implications of heightened regional activity on core socio-economic areas such as population demo- graphics, gross domestic product, urbanization, energy options, transportation, and communications remain sources of both optimism in some circles and concern in others. The Inuit Circumpolar Council’s A Circumpolar Inuit Declaration on Sovereignty in the Arctic (2015) notes that “as states increasingly focus on the Arctic and its resources, and as climate change continues to create easier access to the 7

2020 REPORT Arctic, Inuit inclusion as active partners comprehensive, flexible and adaptive is central to all national and international decision-making system.” The NATO doc- deliberations on Arctic sovereignty and ument also suggests that “complexity is related questions, such as who owns the likely to increase the divergence of national Arctic, who has the right to traverse the interests and fuel greater differences in the Arctic, who has the right to develop the perception of risks and threats.” Arctic, and who will be responsible for the Complexity and uncertainty are also defin- social and environmental impacts increasing features of Canada’s Arctic, reflecting ingly facing the Arctic.” It also insists that unique political, socio-economic, demo- states must ensure sustainable economic graphic, geographic, and physiographic development that increases standards of considerations. The ANPF notes that “the living for Inuit, and that they “deflect sud- qualities that make the Canadian Arctic den and far-reaching demographic shifts and North such a special place, its size, that would overwhelm and marginalize climate, and small but vibrant and resil- indigenous peoples where we are rooted ient populations, also pose unique security and have endured.” challenges, making it difficult to maintain situational awareness and respond 1.3 COMPLEXITY AND UNCERTAINTY to emergencies or military threats when While the Canadian Arctic has his- and where they occur.” Climate change torically been — and continues to compounds these challenges, reshaping be — a region of stability and peace, the regional environment and, in some growing competition and increased contexts and seasons, facilitating greater access brings safety and security access to an increasingly “broad range of challenges to which Canada must be actors and interests” (both Canadian and ready to respond. international). Accordingly, – ANPF (2019) To protect the safety and security The NATO SFA notes that “the growing of people in the region and safe- number of stakeholders combined with the guard the ability to defend the Cana- interconnected nature of the international dian Arctic and North, and North system, the exponential rate of change and America now and into the future, a the confluence of trends has continued multi-faceted and holistic approach to increase the potential for disorder and is required. The complexity of the uncertainty in every aspect of world affairs.” regional security environment places The Arctic is far from immune to these a premium on collaboration amongst changes. In an increasingly complex (rather all levels of government, Indigenous than complicated) environment, “there are peoples and local communities, as too many interactions to comprehend all well as with trusted international the possible outcomes, increasing the risk partners…. of surprise or even failure.” Accordingly, Canadians must look to more comprehen- Given the high proportion of Indigenous sive approaches that accept and incorpo- people (Inuit, First Nations, and Métis) rate complexity and uncertainty in world in Canada’s Arctic population, as well as affairs as a pervasive reality. Doing so will Ottawa’s acute political focus on improv- require projections that anticipate future ing Indigenous-Crown relations and pro- trends which are not simple extensions of moting reconciliation, the region enjoys a previous curves but reflect several “trajec- much higher political profile than simple tories of potential outcomes, which in turn population statistics and parliamentary representation numbers might suggest. 8 will require leadership to utilize a more

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT Annex: Principles for the Arctic and Northern Policy Framework The principles below were developed to provide tools such as Gender-Based Analysis Plus continuing guidance on implementation of the to assess potential impacts on diverse framework. groups of people • The framework will respect a distinc- • Decisions about the Arctic and the North tions-based approach to ensure that will be made in partnership with and the unique rights, interests and circum- with the participation of northerners, to stances of Inuit, Arctic and northern reflect the rights, needs and perspectives First Nations and Métis are acknowl- of northerners edged, affirmed and implemented • The rights and jurisdictions of Canada’s • The Government of Canada federal, territorial, provincial Indige- recognizes Inuit, First Nations, nous and municipal governments will be and Métis as the Indigenous respected peoples of Canada, consist- • Development should be sustainable and ing of distinct, rights-bearing holistic, integrating social, cultural, eco- communities with their own nomic and environmental considerations histories, including with the • Ongoing reconciliation with Indigenous Crown peoples, using the work of the Truth and • The work of forming renewed Reconciliation Commission as a starting relationships based on the point, is foundational to success recognition of rights, respect, • As climate change is a lived reality in the co-operation and partnership region, initiatives will take into account its must reflect the unique interests, various impacts, including its impact on priorities and circumstances of Indigenous northerners, who continue each people to rely on the land and wildlife for their • Every sector of society, from culture, traditional economy, and food the private sector to uni- security versities and colleges, the • Policy and programming will reflect a not-for-profit sector, commitment to diversity and equal- community-based ity, and to the employment of analytical organizations and individual Canadians, has an important part to play in building a strong Canadian Arctic and North.

2020 REPORT As the Arctic Human Development Report (2015) notes, Indigenous peoples’ “efforts to secure self-determination and self-government are influencing Arctic governance in ways that will have a profound impact on the region and its inhabitants in the years to come.” Countless reports highlight long- “Hybrid Warfare is a military strat- standing inequalities in transportation, egy that employs political warfare energy, communications, employment, com- and blends conventional war- munity infrastructure, health, and education fare, irregular warfare and cyber that continue to disadvantage Northerners compared to other Canadians. Furthermore, warfare with other influencing poor socio-economic and health indicators methods. Hybrid warfare can be also point to significant gaps between North- a tactical subset of grey-zone con- ern Canadian jurisdictions and their southern flict deployed under certain con- counterparts. Population density, poor econ- ditions and in varying degrees. “ omies of scale, high costs, and myriad other - DND website factors often limit the applicability or utility of conventional economic models to Arctic contexts. Exogenous variables also complicate the Canadian Arctic security landscape. As non- state actors and non-Arctic state actors seek greater influence on Arctic affairs, the Govern- ment of Canada may face direct and indirect challenges to its legitimacy and credibility. The Government of Canada may also be pre- sented with opportunities for constructive engagement and co-operation that could strengthen its Arctic position. Furthermore, increasing polarization, regionalization, and fragmentation within North American society could deepen distrust in conventional politics and politicians, exposing vulnerabilities that are susceptible to outside influence and can be exploited to disrupt the social fabric and sow seeds of disunity. A declining sense of fate control, lingering anxieties about sovereignty, and concerns about an increasingly complex future could also prove sources of greater uncertainty and social and political division. In an increasingly globalized information and social media environment, adversaries are likely to use disinformation and misinformation strategies to influence Canadian opinion, undermine sources of strength, and com- 10 plicate decision-making. The NATO SFA also

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT notes that “although socio-economic, political and environmental changes will continue to create uncertainty at individual, organizational, local, regional and global levels, new methods and tools, in particular big data, technological literacy and AI, have the potential to provide new ways of managing uncertainty and complexity. This will require a shift Close Engagement: Land Power in an from an organizational culture that takes an Age of Uncertainty (2019) summarizes incremental approach, has stove-piped work- that conflict over the next ten to fifteen ing practices and waits for greater clarity, to years will take place in the context of the one that has a more collaborative approach following trends: that supports bold and innovative decisions.” • increasingly rapid technological Current discussions about the future of North change; American defence and security architec- • an increase in the number of ture, including new “ecosystem” approaches actors willing and able to use to integrating layered defences, anticipate organized force to achieve their a future where NORAD might achieve all- objectives; domain awareness from the seabed to outer • an ever more pervasive glo- space and have the ability to fuse the data balized information and social from these sensors into a common operat- media environment; ing picture that decision-makers can use to • increasing resource shortages defend against adversarial actions.3 and population movements driven by climate change; 1.4 CONFLUENCE AND • rising economic inequality; • weapons systems with radically INTERCONNECTEDNESS increased lethality; In a globalized world, many of the • greater power and reach of issues facing Canada, including in transnational organized crime; the Arctic and the North, cannot be • democratization of advanced addressed effectively through domestic weaponry; action alone. A whole-of-government • greater proliferation of evolved effort that leverages both domestic hybrid threats; and international policy levers is • increased likelihood of great therefore required. For example, power / regional power conflict, economic growth in Canada’s Arctic whether directly or by proxy, and North can be facilitated through including an increased risk of infrastructure investments that increase nuclear conflict; and access to world markets, along with • more rapid emergence and esca- trade commissioner services to help lation of conflicts. businesses based in the region access international markets and attract and retain foreign direct investment that benefits Northerners and respects Canada’s national interest. – ANPF (2019)

The Arctic is inextricably tied to the rest of Canada, to North America, and to the 11

2020 REPORT international system as a whole. This inter- partners; embrace adaptability and agility; connectedness brings opportunities for and establish robust networks while retain- communities, governance, and economic ing the ability to operate effectively in a development, and also poses complex, degraded or austere environment. multifaceted challenges. The Canadian The NATO SFA notes that “confluence refers Army’s capstone future land operating to the interactions and intersection of dif- concept, Close Engagement: Land Power ferent trends causing a multiplication of in an Age of Uncertainty (2019), highlights the effects, the outcomes of which may how “globalization, social connectivity, be very challenging to predict but should climate change, and empowered non- be considered nonetheless.” Technological state actors are working to blur the dis- advances that bring together people can tinction between homeland and overseas also have sweeping (and sometimes highly threats.” The complex, dynamic, volatile, disruptive) political, socio-economic, and uncertain future operating environ- cultural, and environmental implications. ment, where the risk of miscalculation New connections between people within and escalation is acute, requires compre- and across national boundaries can pro- hensive approaches that can draw upon duce greater empathy and cohesion, but all of the levers of national power, includ- they also provide pathways for groups ing military power. Accordingly, it empha- harbouring grievances and radical ideas sizes that the Canadian Army needs to to recruit and mobilize members and foster a culture and tools to interoperate can threaten traditional forms of cultural with joint, interagency, and multinational

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT expression, social organization, and polit- emanate from “a rapid, unanticipated, less ical control. Furthermore, technology predictable event, such as the 9/11 attacks,” is an enabler for innovation, education, or can be a scenario that strategists have improved health outcomes, and positive contemplated but transpires much earlier social change, but can also exacerbate gaps than expected. In an Arctic context, exam- between people with access to advanced ples could be the complete collapse of the technology and training and people with- Greenland ice sheet, a nuclear disaster, a out such access. terrorist attack on critical infrastructure, or the immediate closure of other stra- The confluence of these factors, and many tegic straits around the world that force others, changes the nature of conflict.SSE risky transits of Northern sea routes on a highlights the increasing prevalence of massive scale. “coordinated hostile activities across all spheres of state power (i.e., diplomatic, Other problems have long-term conse- economic, information, military) that are quences but the temporal or geographi- deliberately crafted to fall below the tra- cal horizon over which they unfold make ditional threshold of armed conflict.” This it difficult to secure support for specific “grey zone” encompasses a broader and initiatives to counter them or resources to opaquer spectrum of threats than estab- address them, given competing priorities. lished policy and legal frameworks were Climate change is the most obvious – and, designed to address, and are difficult to arguably, the most existential – example identify, attribute, categorize, and counter. facing humanity as a whole. While the “The linkages between disparate spheres overwhelming preponderance of evidence of activity are also difficult to understand proves that climate change will have dev- and can mask broader strategic objectives,” astating, long-term effects on the planet, the defence policy notes. “Below thresh- it is difficult to discern specific “tipping old tactics and hybrid warfare also intro- points” that will cause a major disruption duce questions regarding the appropriate in non-linear, complex systems. Similarly, distribution of responsibilities to respond disruptive technologies, the growing role across government, including DND/CAF’s of non-state actors and super-empowered role when defence equities are threatened individuals in domestic and international through non-military spheres.” affairs, and violent extremism simmer- ing in unexpected sectors of society all Adversaries are discerning new opportuni- require careful monitoring to ensure that ties to attack Canada’s vulnerabilities and responses do not undermine innovation or contest our narratives at all levels, “wea- the democratic values that animate Cana- ponizing” information operations to sow dian society. Continuous horizon-scanning confusion and discord, creating ambiguity and ongoing (re)assessment of political, about intent, and preserving deniability. environmental, economic, societal, and These activities are difficult to deter, detect, technological trends are important to and attribute, and calibrated responses provide credible, advance warning of dis- must be appropriate and proportionate, ruptive changes in a complex, uncertain, balancing the risk of escalation and the and potentially volatile future security failure to deter future malicious activity. environment. The NATO SFA also anticipates that “the confluence of trends, compounded with uncertainty, is more likely to create strategic shocks and problems of great magni- tude.” These strategic shocks (sometimes referred to as “black swan” events) can 13

2020 REPORT

CHAPTER TWO

POLITICAL

LEAD AUTHOR: P. WHITNEY LACKENBAUER; WITH CONTRIBUTIONS BY JUSTIN BARNES, ALDO CHIRCOP, RYAN DEAN, SUZANNE LALONDE, AND ANDREAS ØSTHAGEN

Broadening international awareness and how Canada continues to leverage exist- acceptance of the heightened impacts of ing multilateral organizations – such as the global climate change in the Arctic, most Arctic Council, Arctic Economic Council, poignantly depicted in the accelerated United Nations Commission on the Lim- melting of the polar ice cap, have gener- its of the Continental Shelf, International ated sweeping debates about present and Maritime Organization (IMO), the North future security and safety challenges and Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Arctic threats in the region. Visions of increas- Coast Guard Forum, and the Arctic “5+5” ingly accessible natural resources and dialogue on Central Arctic Ocean fisher- navigable polar passages connecting ies – to promote its interests in the cir- Asian, European, and North American mar- cumpolar world. These multilateral tools kets have resurrected age-old ideas about have proven resilient even with the down- the region as a resource and maritime fron- turn in relations between the West and tier—as well as concomitant insecurities Russia since 2014, with complex interde- about the geopolitical and geostrategic pendence sustaining regional coopera- impacts of growing global attentiveness tion on search and rescue, transboundary to the region’s possibilities. Accordingly, fisheries, extended continental shelves, debates about whether the region’s future navigation, a mandatory polar code, and is likely to follow a cooperative trend or science. spiral into military competition and even Defence cooperation, however, has felt the conflict rage on. direct effects of resurgent major power Scholars have well established how a robust competition internationally – perhaps inev- array of rules, norms, and institutions guide itably, given that five of the Arctic Coun- international interactions in the Circumpo- cil’s eight members are NATO members. lar North. This rules-based order not only The alliance’s role in “Arctic” defence and advances Canada’s national interests but security has been contested over the last its global ones as well, offering opportu- decade, with Canada typically oppos- nities to shape international agendas on ing appeals by countries like Norway climate change, contaminants, and other to have NATO assume a more explicit environmental threats with a global scope Arctic role because this would unnecessar- that have a disproportionate impact on the ily antagonize Russia (or at least play into Arctic. Furthermore, it is well documented Putin’s hands by appearing to validate his

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT suggestion of Western aggressive inten- discussions, it still lingers in news media tions against Russia’s Arctic), draw non- and public perceptions, and “purveyors of Arctic European states more directly into polar peril” continue to point to the Arctic Arctic affairs writ large, and/or amplifying interests of Russia, a rising China, and the the misconception that Arctic regional United States as cause for Canadian alarm. dynamics are likely to precipitate conflict Other commentators argue that there between Arctic states. Others have pushed is no military threat to the Arctic and for stronger NATO involvement to meet a that defence resources should instead heightened Russian military threat, stand be directed to dealing with human and up to Russian intimidation, and show a environmental security issues associated strong deterrent. Since the Ukrainian crisis with climate change and the region as an of 2014, Western concerns about Russian Indigenous peoples’ homeland. intentions and behaviour on the international stage have reinforced a popular A third school of thought argues that, while image of that country as the wild card in strategic deterrence continues to have an the Arctic strategic equation and reignited Arctic dimension (and that this is best con- questions about regional security. ceptualized at an international rather than a regional level of analysis), Canada is not The Canadian debate on Arctic security likely to face conventional military threats reveals various schools of thought and in or to its Arctic region in the next decade. divergent threat assessments. Propo- Instead, members of this school suggest nents of the “sovereignty on thinning ice” that Canada should focus on building Arctic school suggest that Arctic sovereignty, military capabilities within an integrated, maritime disputes, and/or questions of “whole of government” framework, largely resource ownership will serve as catalysts directed towards supporting domestic for regional conflict. They associate the safety and “soft” security missions that need for military activities demonstrating represent the most likely incidents to occur effective control over Canadian territory in the Canadian Arctic. It should also invest and internal waters with the preserva- in sensors and capabilities in the Arctic tion or enhancement of the international that can contribute to broader defence- legal basis for Canada’s Arctic sovereignty. of-North-America missions, but these This thinking underpinned the “use it or should not be misconstrued as capabilities lose it” messaging that dominated during needed because the Canadian Arctic itself Prime Minister Stephen Harper’s first is specifically threatened by foreign adver- years in office in the mid-2000s. Although saries and vulnerable to attack. this idea no longer dominates academic

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT 2.1 SHIFTS IN GEOSTRATEGIC POWER debate about Russia’s apparent “revisionist position” towards what it views as a West- Canada’s defence policy acknowledges ern-dominated international system – and that “a degree of major power competition the implications for the Arctic. Some com- has returned to the international system.” mentators cast this as a new “cold war” The United States remains the world’s only between Russia and the West, a “resump- “superpower,” but China has emerged as a tion of great-power rivalry,” and a “return “rising economic power with an increasing of geopolitics,” while others decry these ability to project influence globally” and frames as outmoded or alarmist. Accord- “Russia has proven its willingness to test ingly, debates persist about the pace and the international security environment.” form of Russia’s military and security pos- More broadly, Strong, Secure, Engaged ture in the region, with some experts see- observes how “trends in global economic ing it as a dramatic build-up portending development are shifting the relative Russian aggression, and others suggesting power of states…, creating a more diffuse that its military modernization program environment in which an increasing num- represents reasonable defensive measures ber of state and non-state actors exercise aimed at protecting Russia’s economic influence.” While this shift brings benefits and sovereign interests in its Arctic and (such as the alleviation of poverty, democ- at addressing security and safety threats ratization, and empowerment), it “has also (such as search and rescue, safe navigation, been accompanied by weak governance and responding to natural and humanitar- and increasing uncertainty.” As an exten- ian emergencies). sion of these broader shifts and heightened global competition, the actions of a The NATO SFA Report highlights that resurgent power (Russia) and the increas- “the redistribution of economic and mil- ing presence of extra-regional powers itary power, most notably towards Asia, (including China) are likely to influence continues to contribute to the relative perceptions of the strategic balance in the decline of the West.” General Western Arctic. We contend that changing power concerns about the rise of Asia, and partic- dynamics in the Arctic are unlikely to ularly China’s use of hard and soft power derive from regional disputes over bound- to reshape the geostrategic power bal- aries, resources, or governance in the next ance globally, has extended to the Arctic. fifteen years, and instead will be a reflec- China’s desire to access strategic resources tion of broader international forces and located in the Arctic, the pivotal impor- dynamics. Although the evolving balance tance of maritime commerce to Asia-Pacific of power may undermine global peace and economies, and China’s peculiar interpreta- security, we also highlight that this is not tions of international laws and treaties all necessarily a zero-sum game in terms of make the growing polar interests of this Arctic regional stability. self-proclaimed “near-Arctic state” both significant and, in some circles, disconcerting. While careful to acknowledge Russia’s rights and interests as an Arctic state, Implications Canada’s defence policy notes that coun- a. Challenges to the rule-based try’s role in the resurgence of major order in the Arctic. Canada is a power competition globally and concom- responsible international player itant implications for peace and security. committed to upholding univer- Russian aggression in annexing Crimea sal liberal values, contributing to and fomenting the war in Eastern Ukraine, peace-building, and working with as well as its military intervention in the allies and partners to address secu- Syrian civil war, has sparked international rity challenges and build resiliency. 17

2020 REPORT Some other countries, however, are and control of the Canadian Arctic testing the international security will be complemented by close col- environment and challenging the laboration with select Arctic part- rules-based order. Canada cannot ners, including the United States, assume that the Arctic is inherently Norway and Denmark, to increase immune to such challenges, most surveillance and monitoring of the likely in an indirect way. broader Arctic region.” b. Increased requirement for coop- c. Challenges to NORAD. The United eration with other actors. Strong, States is pressuring Canada and Secure, Engaged affirms the com- its other allies to assume a greater patibility between Canada exercis- share of the overall defence burden. ing sovereignty and collaborating SSE commitments to renew the with international partners. “Can- North Warning System (NWS) and ada remains committed to exercis- modernize elements of NORAD ing the full extent of its sovereignty flow from Canada’s longstanding in Canada’s North, and will con- bilateral defence arrangements tinue to carefully monitor mili- with the US to jointly monitor tary activities in the region and and control the air and maritime conduct defence operations and approaches to the continent. exercises as required,” the policy New commitments, however, will explains. Concurrently, “Canada’s require creative thinking and new 18 renewed focus on the surveillance approaches about infrastructure,

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT surveillance and detection, inter- 2.2 USE OF POWER POLITICS ception capabilities, and command and control relationships. Further- Canadian political scientist Rob Huebert more, despite sharing common recently argued that “a New Arctic security interests and concerns in Strategic Triangle Environment (or NASTE) the North, Canadian and American is forming, in which the core strategic inter- academic and “think tank” experts ests of Russia, China and United States are tend to operate in distinct spheres, now converging at the top of the world.” often limiting the exchange of He suggests that this new “great game” is knowledge and the sharing of best not about conflict over the Arctic but rather practices and new ideas. occurring through the Arctic. “This does not d. Challenges to NATO. Canada is make the threat any less dangerous,” he working with its NATO allies to suggests, “but it does make it more com- re-examine conventional deter- plicated.” With tensions growing between rence. The statement in SSE that Russia and the West, and China’s relation- “NATO has also increased its atten- ships evolving with both the West and tion to Russia’s ability to project Russia, Huebert asserts that “the primary force from its Arctic territory into security requirements of the three most the North Atlantic, and its poten- powerful states are now overlapping in the tial to challenge NATO’s collective Arctic region, producing new challenges defence posture” mark a measured and threats.” shift in Canada’s official position. Huebert finds support in US Northern Despite Canada’s reticence to have Command/NORAD Commander General NATO adopt an explicit Arctic role Terrence O’Shaughnessy’s statement to over the past decade, the inclu- the Senate Armed Services subcommittee sion of this reference – as well as on readiness in March 2020, which insists the commitment to “support the that “the threats facing the United States strengthening of situational aware- and Canada are real and significant,” and ness and information sharing in that “the Arctic is no longer a fortress wall, the Arctic, including with NATO” – and our oceans are no longer protective indicates a newfound openness to moats; they are now avenues of approach multilateral engagement on “hard for advanced conventional weapons and security” in the Arctic with our the platforms that carry them.” Instead, European allies. NATO is the corner- O’Shaughnessy describes the Arctic as “the stone of both Danish and Norwe- new frontline of our homeland defense as gian defence and security policy, it provides our adversaries with a direct which also opens opportunities avenue of approach to the homeland and for enhanced bilateral relation- is representative of the changing strategic ships. How this newfound interest environment in our area of responsibility.” in NATO’s Arctic posture interacts Blending images of “more consistently nav- with Canada’s longstanding prefer- igable waters, mounting demand for natu- ence to partner bilaterally with the ral resources, and Russia’s military buildup US on North American continental in the region” with Russia’s ability to field defence remains to be clarified in “advanced, long-range cruise missiles - the next decade. to include land attack missiles capable of striking the United States and Canada from Russian territory,” O’Shaughnessy concludes that “Russia has left us with no choice but to improve our homeland 19

2020 REPORT defense capability and capacity. In the North America is through the Arctic.” In meantime, China has taken a number of light of advanced technologies and capa- incremental steps toward expanding its bilities that adversaries can use to strike own Arctic presence.” As a solution, he from multiple directions, the binational emphasizes the importance of advanced command has turned its focus to “all- sensors that can “detect, track, and discrim- domain” awareness, improved command inate advanced cruise missiles, ballistic and control, and enhancing targeting missiles, hypersonics, and small unmanned capabilities that can allow decision-mak- aerial systems at the full ranges from which ers to respond “at the speed of relevance.” they are employed,” as well as “detect and Canada has committed to modernizing track the platforms - aircraft, ships, and the North Warning System (NWS) and submarines - that carry those weapons.” including the air and maritime approaches Evoking the phrase that “the Homeland is to North America in any effort to mod- not a sanctuary,” he emphasizes the need ernize the overall system, and is devel- for “new defeat mechanisms for advance oping new space-based systems to track threat systems - to include the advanced threats, improve situational awareness, cruise missiles capable of striking the and improve communications globally – homeland from launch boxes in the Arctic.” and with specific application throughout Talk of the need to “harden the shield” to the Arctic region. The full extent of its con- project a credible deterrent against conven- tribution to continental defence efforts to tional and below-the-threshold attacks on detect, deter, and defend against or defeat North America anticipates new approaches threats from all domains remains to be that will incorporate Arctic sensors and sys- determined, but its Arctic will inevitably tems in a layered “ecosystem” of sensors, factor heavily given that the polar region fusion functions, and defeat mechanisms. remains the fastest avenue of approach to Strong, Secure, Engaged explains that “the North America for various delivery systems re-emergence of major power competi- emanating from major power competitors. tion has reminded Canada and its allies of In the “state competition” section that the importance of deterrence.” At its core, immediately precedes the discussion deterrence is about discouraging a poten- about “a changing Arctic,” SSE observes that tial adversary from doing something harm- “NATO Allies and other like-minded states ful before they do it. Accordingly, a credible have been re-examining how to deter a military deterrent serves as a diplomatic wide spectrum of challenges to the inter- tool which, in concert with dialogue, can national order by maintaining advanced help to prevent conflict. While deterrence conventional military capabilities that theory has traditionally focused on conven- could be used in the event of a conflict tional and nuclear capabilities, the concept with a ‘near-peer.’” Accordingly, debates is also relevant in the space, cyber, infor- about NATO’s role in the Arctic are inextri- mation, and cognitive domains – although cably linked to broader discussions about the means to achieve it remain less clear in the alliance. these domains. Implications NORAD plays a central role in the protection of North American security and has a. Increased potential of “spillover” always been closely associated with Arc- from confrontation and competi- tic defences. As political scientist Andrea tion elsewhere. Although recent Charron observes, “its crest includes a scholarship seeks to explain the broad sword facing due north, suggesting lack of direct spillover from the war that the avenue of potential attack against in Ukraine in 2014 and from ensu- 20 ing Western sanctions into general

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT Arctic relations (although it has law, leading to coercion and other affected some specific ones), legit- actions that could spillover into the imate concerns linger that Russia’s Arctic or see China use the circum- “increasingly confrontational, rule polar region as a theatre for diver- breaking and assertive” behaviour sionary activities. will eventually manifest in the b. Growing requirement for new Arctic. As the prospect of Western forms of robust and credible economic cooperation fades and deterrence. Recent events in companies cut ties with Russian Ukraine, Syria, and other parts of partners, the motivations to retain the world reinforce the ongoing the rules-based approach to the importance of territory and the circumpolar region may fray. In this traditional roles of deterrence and scenario, Canada could be faced defence, with a particular focus on with an increasingly aggressive collective defence. Future conflicts, Russia, willing to use its growing however, could range from hybrid Arctic military might to challenge wars, to selective military opera- the rules to secure its objectives tions by major powers, to precise in the circumpolar world. Further- long-range strikes using conven- more, aggressive Chinese activities tional weapons, to the use of small in the South China Sea might under- mobile units in special opera- mine the ability of states to peace- tions to disrupt communications. fully manage and resolve disputes Canada and its allies will have to in accordance with international determine how best they can deter

2020 REPORT enemy attacks with specific, limited more strident measures that upset objectives that adversaries seek established relationships and chal- to achieve using select elements lenge alliance cohesion. Accord- of power across all domains. The ingly, Canada will need to strike a Arctic cannot be excluded from balance between national and col- these deliberations. lective efforts to strengthen Arctic c. Deterrence by punishment still defence and security. Furthermore, has its place. Changes in nuclear it will have to ensure that over- strategy and the modernization of inflated or misplaced fears about nuclear and conventional forces by military threats to and in the major and regional powers have Arctic do not become strategic significant implications for strate- distractions that divert Canada’s gic stability. NORAD officials’ recent attention and defence resources emphasis on the need to defeat any from elsewhere, thus opening delivery systems or threats travel- other windows of opportunity for ling through the Arctic (deterrence adversaries. by denial), in all domains, could e. Discerning Russia’s Arctic think- destabilize the deterrence-by- ing. North American analysts punishment regime that has safe- must deliberately consider Russia’s guarded North America against Arctic interests, motivations, and a nuclear or conventional mili- fears through more systematic and tary attack since the early Cold culturally-attuned lenses, avoiding War. It could also divert unnec- the temptation to simply import essary resources from domains assumptions about that country’s where defeating threats may be revisionist designs elsewhere into essential (eg. cyber) and to deter their assessments of the interna- below-threshold tactics and tional Arctic. They must also bal- hybrid warfare in the “grey zone.” ance Russian claims that dual-use Messaging associated with NORAD Arctic infrastructure is inherently modernization over the next defensive with potential offensive decade should be carefully situated uses and implications for broader in deterrence logic and clearly com- deterrence. Furthermore, Russia municated to not unintentionally is likely to become increasingly escalate tensions with adversaries dependent economically upon or invite strategic miscalculations. Arctic resources and politically reli- d. Nationalism and divergent risk ant on its imagined “besiegement” and threat perception. Resur- by the West over the next decade. gent nationalism worldwide, Managing polar relationships expressed in forms like the “Amer- requires multilateral and bilateral ica First” and BREXIT movements, engagement that reflects nuanced changes national risk and threat understandings of defence and for- assessments. This, in turn, may eign policies, as well as the history, drive some of Canada’s key allies to economic drivers, and national cul- look inwards. On the other hand, tures which contribute (sometimes divergent perceptions of Arctic imperceptibly) to policy. risks and threats could cause Can- f. Discerning China’s Arctic think- ada’s NATO allies to shuffle their ing. Chinese declarations that it is a defence priorities, either pivoting “near Arctic state” and that it aspires 22 away from the Arctic or adopting to become a “great polar power”

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT indicate that the country has stra- full implementation of land claims and tegic interests in the Arctic – but self-government agreements, which are it does not inherently mean that it modern forms of treaty-making, are con- will seek to achieve them through sidered key components of this process. revisionist behaviour or military Over the past half century, the settlement force, or that the region really rep- of land claims and the devolution of gov- resents a core “strategic direction” ernance have also seen the federal gov- for China. Instead, its aspirations ernment transfer much responsibility for and possible behaviours must land and renewable resource management be considered as part of a larger in the Canadian Arctic to territorial and global game in which the Arctic Indigenous governments and organiza- represents a minor – but poten- tions. The process remains incomplete, tially important – piece. however, and Indigenous leaders frequently highlight uneven implementation 2.3 DEVOLUTION OF GOVERNANCE AND of land claim commitments and other gov- RECONCILIATION WITH INDIGENOUS ernment promises. Furthermore, Northern leaders express concern about a lack of PEOPLES capacity to manage myriad issues (both Reconciliation in the North is also linked existing and anticipated) associated with with political evolution, including the rapid regional change, much of it driven or devolution of governance and self- compounded by climate change. determination. The negotiation and

2020 REPORT The Northern devolution process has been rights, environmental management, parks underway since the early 1970s, high- and conservation areas, social and cultural lighted by the creation of Nunavut in 1999 enhancements, and infrastructure have and agreements on land and resource man- brought decision-making over land and agement with the governments of Yukon territories closer to Northern communi- and the Northwest Territories. “When com- ties. Indigenous leadership and participa- bined with the signing of modern treaties tion within co-management structures has across much of the North and the expan- created regulatory regimes that consider sion of Aboriginal self-government, devo- Indigenous knowledge and scientific evi- lution is an integral part of an extensive dence to make decisions on wildlife man- process of regional empowerment and agement, land use, and environmental local control,” scholars Ken Coates and Greg protection. These collaborative arrange- Poelzer explain. “The process has been sur- ments will continue to evolve through prisingly smooth and without controversy, to 2035, deepening linkages between despite the complex financial, human rightsholders. resource, and other issues that have to be Respect for and reconciliation with Indige- addressed when transferring authority nous peoples lies at the heart of the federal to another jurisdiction. Problems remain, government’s agenda, and reconciliation however, particularly in terms of capacity is likely to be a long-term process given of northern governments to absorb the the deep history and ongoing legacies of rapid transitions, disagreements about the colonialism in the region. “It is time for a appropriate levels of funding for devolved renewed, nation-to-nation relationship responsibilities, and the complex chal- with Indigenous Peoples, based on recog- lenges of delivering government services nition of rights, respect, co-operation, and in the Far North.” partnership,” Prime Minister Justin Trudeau Over the last three decades, co-man- instructed to each of his Cabinet minis- agement structures that share jurisdic- ters after taking office in 2015. Accord- tion over lands and resources, harvesting ingly, Canada places the highest priority

“Canada’s Arctic and Northern governments and communities are at the heart of security in the region. Partnership, cooperation and shared leadership are essential to promoting security in this diverse, complex and expansive area. Working in partnership with trusted international allies and all levels of government, including Indigenous communities, organizations and governments, Canada will continue to protect the safety and security of the people in the Arctic and the North, now and into the future.” - ANPF Safety, Security, and Defence chapter (2019)

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT on ensuring that its domestic and interna- policy needs. Nevertheless, adopting the tional activities in the Arctic acknowledge, ANPF idea of “Nothing about us [Northern- protect, and promote Indigenous peoples’ ers], without us” as an “essential principle rights—and Canada insists that other Arctic that weaves federal, territorial, provincial stakeholders do the same. and Indigenous institutions and interests together for mutual success” offers import- In May 2016, Canada officially lifted the ant guidance for what Arctic and Northern qualifications to its endorsement of the people – and their institutions, municipal- United Nations Declaration on the Rights ities, organizations, and governments – of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP), affirm- will expect in the coming decades. It also ing its strong commitment to welcoming resonates in an era of reconciliation with “Indigenous peoples into the co-produc- Indigenous peoples. tion of policy and joint priority-setting.” The ANPF commits Canada to “honour, Implementing reconciliation is a complex uphold, and implement the rights of Arctic process which includes recognition of Can- and northern Indigenous peoples, includ- ada’s colonial legacy for Indigenous peo- ing those outlined in historic and modern ples and the intergenerational impacts of treaties and in the United Nations Declara- attempts at assimilation and other destruc- tion on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.” tive practices; the acknowledgement of Obligations of UNDRIP include the need and respect for Indigenous rights and for free, prior, and informed consent (FPIC) self-determination; and supporting Indige- by Indigenous peoples before projects can nous peoples’ efforts to reclaim their iden- take place on lands which they inhabit or tity, language, culture, and nationhood. In have a claim. UNDRIP offers guidance on 2015, Prime Minister Trudeau accepted the cooperative relationships with Indigenous Truth and Reconciliation Commission’s final peoples to states, the United Nations, and report and its “94 Calls to Action” on behalf other international organizations based of Canada and committed his government on the principles of equality, partnership, to implementing the recommendations. good faith, and mutual respect. Canada’s In the future, Canada’s cooperation with implementation of UNDRIP remains a work other Arctic states and partners is likely in progress, and bringing all of its domes- to reflect more direct involvement of tic and international practices into work- Northern territorial and Indigenous gov- able alignment with the declaration (some ernments and organizations. For exam- provisions of which are subject to radically ple, pursuant to its efforts to promote different interpretations, such as FPIC) is sustainable marine spatial management likely to remain so over the next fifteen of shared ocean areas, Canada has com- years. mitted to playing an “active role in sup- The Government of Canada’s dedicated porting the development of a pan-Arctic efforts to engage Northerners (particu- network of marine protected areas at the larly Indigenous peoples) as co-creators Arctic Council and to partner with Indig- of an Arctic and Northern policy vision enous peoples to recognize and manage that seeks to reflect their lived realities culturally and environmentally significant and desires has confirmed a people- areas and pursue additional conservation centric strategy that places human and measures, including those led through environmental security at the forefront.1 Indigenous management authorities.” The clear focus on Indigenous consulta- Establishing transboundary marine pro- tion and leadership in policy-making also tected areas, such as the one covering resulted in a protracted policy-develop- North Water Polynya in northern Baffin Bay ment process that cannot serve as a work- between Nunavut and Greenland that the 25 able model to discern more immediate Pikialasorsuaq Commission recommended

2020 REPORT in 2017, will entail partnerships with Inuit of community-based military communities and organizations, territorial presence in the North, and also and foreign governments, and the Inuit Cir- “expressed appreciation for the cumpolar Council. way in which the Canadian Armed Forces consult local communities Implications and Indigenous groups.” Continu- a. The roles and influence of Indige- ing and enhancing these forms nous peoples in the development of collaboration are likely to yield of domestic and international important dividends. policy are likely to expand over d. An increasing focus on Indig- the next fifteen years. Accord- enous distinctiveness will con- ingly, Canada’s declared intent to tinue to promote Indigenous play a leadership role in circum- rights and self-determination polar affairs is likely to become and produce new Crown-Indig- even further invested in advancing enous relationships through col- domestic priorities related to social laborative processes (such as and economic development, envi- negotiation, facilitation, and media- ronmental protection, scientific tion) as well as litigation. Heightened and traditional Indigenous knowl- frustrations with governments’ edge, and diversity. The extent to inabilities to address core human which this involvement carries into needs in a timely manner are also the defence and national security likely to erode political cohesion, realm remains to be determined. with the potential to inhibit prog- b. Indigenous and territorial gov- ress towards achieving improved ernments will expect to play key socio-economic outcomes. Per- roles in the co-management of sistent “we/they” messaging may all Arctic activities and decisions. also increasingly divide Canadi- For example, Inuit leaders consider ans and lead to political friction Inuit Nunangat – the Arctic waters, or alienation over the next fifteen ice, and land above the treeline – to years. be their homeland, and assert their Indigenous rights to be involved 2.4 NON-ARCTIC STATE AND NON-STATE in every decision relating to it. Pre- ACTOR INFLUENCE IN DOMESTIC AND sumably this includes foreign and defence affairs. INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS c. Reconciliation is a process in The safety, security, and defence chapter of which all Canadian institutions the ANPF notes that a growing interest in are expected to engage. Grow- Arctic affairs by non-Arctic state and non- ing awareness and concern about state actors has significant implications for the impacts of colonial legacies the evolving Arctic security environment. in the Arctic will colour expecta- “Easier access to the Arctic may contribute tions about future relationships to greater foreign presence in Canadian between Northern peoples and Arctic waterways,” requiring that Canada governments, including the mil- remains vigilant in enforcing its sover- itary. During the consultations eignty over its waters and ensuring that leading to the ANPF, Northern activities in the region do not pose security participants highlighted the Cana- or safety risks to Canada and to Canadians. dian Rangers as an important 26 and culturally-appropriate form

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT The policy framework also emphasizes investments that could impact the that: well-being of Northerners. Canada will continue to balance needed eco- Canada’s Arctic and natural resources nomic development while ensuring are attracting interest from for- that security in the Arctic and the eign states and enterprises. Foreign North is maintained. investment, research, and science have the potential to improve the Discerning ways to proactively engage lives of Northerners. However, some non-Arctic states and non-state actors that of these investments and related are expressing commercial, scientific, and economic activities could seek to military interest in the region – and bal- advance interests that may be in ancing new economic opportunities with opposition to those of Canada. Rec- impacts that activities have on Northern- ognizing that economic growth ers, Arctic ecosystems, and defence and and investment in the Arctic sup- security – remain central international con- ports good jobs, healthy people and siderations to any Arctic policy. strong communities, there are also Narratives of China’s rising interests as a security risks associated with these “near-Arctic state” and its future designs for

The Canadian Rangers, a sub-component of the CAF Reserves in isolated northern and coastal communities, are widely celebrated as a military organization that has balanced both the needs of local communities and the federal government, and has contributed to the revitalization of cultural and traditional practices in Northern communities. The Rangers provide an important outlet for Northern Indigenous peoples who wish to serve in the defence of their country without having to leave their communities. Ranger activities allow members of Indigenous communities to practice and share traditional skills, such as living off the land, not only with people from outside their cultures but also inter-generationally within them. By celebrating traditional knowledge and skills, as well as encouraging and enabling community members to go out on the land and share their knowledge and expertise, the Rangers can play an important role in supporting the retention or expansion of core cultural competencies. In turn, the Ranger concept is inherently rooted in the idea that the unique knowledge of Northern Indigenous peoples can make an important contribution to effective military operations. It is this partnership, rooted in mutual learning and sharing, that has made the Rangers a long-term success on the local and national scale.

2020 REPORT the region are regular features in the bur- promises to respect in its 2018 Arctic policy. geoning literature on Arctic security and China’s growing interest in polar scientific governance over the last decade. Many research can contribute to enhanced inter- of these Arctic narratives cast suspicion national understanding of Arctic dynamics, at China, based on concern that the Asian particularly in the natural sciences. Height- power will seek to undermine the sover- ened but appropriate Chinese involvement eignty of Arctic states and co-opt regional in Arctic governance, with due respect for governance mechanisms to facilitate Arctic states, can also bolster regional sta- access to resources and new sea routes to bility. Foreign investments from non-Arc- fuel and connect its growing global empire. tic sources, including Asian investors, hold Other scholars have laid out the conditions the potential to increase the relative pros- under which China might play a construc- perity of Arctic regions within Arctic states tive role in circumpolar affairs and Cana- like Canada. As a source of investment dian Arctic development. Positive relations capital to advance resource development are inherently predicated on China respect- projects, China would have to respect the ing Canadian sovereignty as an Arctic state rule of law, Canadian regulations, and the and, in terms of the maritime domain, as an rights of Northern Canadians (particularly Arctic coastal state with extensive historic Indigenous peoples). internal waters as well as sovereign rights Non-state actors include benign and to an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and non-benign entities from Non-Govern- extended continental shelf. This is consis- mental Organizations (NGOs), Multina- tent with international law, which China tional Corporations (MNCs), advocacy networks, transnational activ- ists, super-empowered or rogue individuals, and terrorist and criminal organizations. As the NATO SFA notes, these actors exercise significant economic, political, or social power and influence at national and at international levels. In the future, non-state actors “are expected to exert greater influence over national governments and international institutions and their role is likely to expand,” heightening the “complexity of addressing issues such as corruption, social and economic inequality and effectiveness of state institutions.” Although Canada’s Northern economy remains disproportionately reliant on the public sector, the private sector is an essential driver of economic growth and prosperity, and business interests and 28 priorities must be considered

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT in contemplating Arctic futures. Further- Canada and its allies will need to more, NGOs will continue to exert pressure carefully discern what non-Arctic and wield influence on local and regional state behaviours are supportive or issues, demanding government and corpo- benign, and which signal revision- rate transparency, promoting environmen- ist or disruptive intent or possible tal and social justice and human rights, and outcomes, and potential risks or seeking to sway public opinion through threats they pose to Canadian and direct and indirect action, including social alliance interests. media. b. Analytical frameworks designed to anticipate non-Arctic state The ANPF explains that Canada will “con- actors’ roles in possible Arctic sider establishing Arctic dialogues with key futures should not just fixate non-Arctic states and actors, where practi- on material gains in the region cal, to discuss issues of mutual interest, … but also considerations related to prioritiz[ing] cooperation with non-Arctic broader international reputation states and actors whose values and sci- and possible moves to distract entific, environmental and/or economic Arctic states such as Canada. “Play- interests align with the priorities of Cana- ing by the rules” and exemplifying da’s Arctic and Northern peoples as well as “Arctic civility” can build political Canada’s national security interests.” It also capital to invest in other regions of emphasizes cooperation with “non-Arctic the globe that are of greater stra- states who uphold Arctic and Northern tegic importance. Furthermore, values and interests, such as sustainable foreign behaviour should be ana- harvesting of Arctic wildlife and the Indig- lyzed for the diversionary value enous right to self-determination.” What that it may hold in a global context, mechanisms government decision-makers rather than as a tool for power pro- will use to make these assessments, and jection designed to secure narrow, how they will respond to state and non- regional gains in the Arctic itself. state actors that do not conform to Cana- c. Opportunities for closer coopera- dian expectations or are deemed security tion with non-Arctic state actors. risks, remain to be seen. This includes non-Arctic state allies Implications and partners in multilateral contexts such as NATO and regional a. Growing complexity due to fora such as the Arctic Council, as non-Arctic state and non-state well as bilateral cooperation to actors articulating and assert- advance shared scientific, environ- ing interests in the Canadian mental, and/or economic inter- Arctic and circumpolar regions. ests. These collaborative efforts are The huge diversity of actors that likely to generate new legal instru- fall within this category creates ments to support sustainable a complex environment where it development, heighten aware- is difficult to comprehend each ness of Indigenous peoples’ rights player’s role in domestic and inter- and interests, and draw non-Arctic national affairs, whether their states into Arctic “ways of thinking.” underlying motivations are sin- On the other hand, science and cere and resonate with Canadian resource development projects can values, and their interactions with serve as vectors for non-Arctic state other actors. Furthermore, the line influence activities that are not between state and non-state actors aligned with Canadian interests or is unclear or blurred in some cases. 29

2020 REPORT that can serve to “normalize” a presence that may have unanticipated, long-term repercussions. d. Growing worries about the presence and influence of non-Arctic state-owned or state-Controlled enterprises in the region. Largely “SHIPPING THROUGH ARCTIC WATERS IS state-owned or -controlled corporations such as Russia’s Gazprom EXPECTED TO INCREASE, PRESENTING RISKS or the China National Petroleum TO THE FRAGILE ARCTIC MARINE ENVIRON- Corporation may not share the MENT IF NOT MANAGED CAREFULLY. INTER- same incentives and goals as their NATIONAL COOPERATION IS THEREFORE private counterparts, and they ESSENTIAL FOR MANAGING THESE RISKS may act as proxies extending the WHILE PROTECTING COMPETITIVENESS, political objectives of their countries. Roger Robinson Jr.’s “long con” GIVEN THE GLOBAL NATURE OF SHIPPING.” narrative posits that China’s Arctic – ANPF (2019) strategy is “based on a term of art used in the confidence racket – the “long con” – wherein it is making a sizeable investment of capital, time, and energy over an extended period to build a false sense of trust and achieve a more valuable “score” at the end of the scheme.” When China sees that it has an advantage, it will turn “the dial to its hard strategy.” Robinson argues that China’s “true intention is to position itself to influence heavily, if not outright control,” Arctic energy and fishing, as well as to shape “the rules and political arrangements governing the use of strategic waterways now gradually opening due to melting ice” for its benefit. For example, investing in a mining site could secure a footprint at a strategic location adjacent a shipping route or allow for the construction of infrastructure to gather intelligence. e. Opportunities for closer cooperation with non-state actors in the Arctic. A “whole-of-society” approach to comprehensive Arctic security, as espoused in the ANPF, reflects the value of engaging con- 30 structively with benign non-state

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT actors. Better leveraging the range of design, construction, equip- capacities and expertise of ment, operational, training, search NGOs and the private sector, and rescue, and environmental for example, can enhance the protection matters relevant to ships effectiveness and efficiency operating in polar waters. Over the of emergency responses. On next fifteen years, Canada may play a the other hand, the actions of leading role in addressing some of the malign non-state actors (such contentious issues deliberately left as terrorist organizations, out of the current Polar Code, such criminal organizations, and as the use of heavy fuel oil and its traffickers) have the potential impact on short-lived climate forcers to disrupt domestic and inter- like black carbon, mandatory invasive national affairs and undermine species protections, greywater restric- “With Russia’s grow- Arctic security. tions, and underwater noise abate- ment requirements. Furthermore, it ing drive toward increasing its dom- 2.5 REGIONAL GOVERNANCE AND could work to ensure that subsequent negotiations correct the almost com- ination in the Arctic THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL REGIME plete lack of consultation with Indig- and with Moscow Since 1996, Canada has consistently enous and coastal communities that seeing Canada as referred to the Arctic Council as the marked the previous IMO process. one of its chief adver- leading body for international coop- Other international bodies, like the saries in this pur- eration in the region. Preserving this Arctic Coast Guard Forum launched suit, Ottawa should role is a Canadian priority. While there in 2015, offer important venues for be ready for a new is no need or appetite for wholesale Arctic states to advance practical mar- surge of active itime cooperation at the operational “reform” of the Arctic Council, Canada measures levelled should continue to support general level, exemplifying how differences in other parts of the world do not against Canada in efforts to enhance its work, particu- the near future.” larly through its working groups and preclude collaboration on essential task forces, as well as resources to missions. – Sergey Sukhankin, enhance the capacity of Permanent Despite the prevalence of miscon- “The Western Alliance in Participants (PPs). Ongoing Arctic ceptions about the northern polar the Face of the Russian Council research on climate change, region as a “last frontier” without any (Dis)Information Machine: sustainable resource and ecosystem governing rules, the Arctic Ocean is Where Does Canada management, biodiversity, education, subject to a clear and widely-accepted Stand?” (2019) and connectivity also factors heav- international legal regime. With 168 ily into Canada’s international and state parties, the United Nations Con- domestic priorities. vention on the Law of the Sea, 1982 As climate change heightens inter- (UNCLOS) is regarded by the interna- national commercial interest and tional community as the constitution activity in the Arctic, Canadians have for the world’s oceans. Of the Arctic raised important questions about 5 states (Canada, Denmark, Norway, maritime environmental protection Russian Federation, and the United and response, safe regional transpor- States), only the U.S. is not party, but it tation, and search and rescue. Can- considers much of the convention to ada spearheaded efforts to create a be customary international law bind- mandatory Polar Code through the ing on all states. When senior ministers IMO (which entered into force on of the Arctic 5 states met in 2008 in 1 January 2017) that covers the full Ilulissat, Greenland (Kalaallit Nunaat), they committed to the Law of the Sea 31

2020 REPORT framework to ensure “the orderly settle- within its sovereignty. The United States ment of any possible overlapping claims” counterclaims that the passage is subject and to dismiss ideas that the Arctic needed to the right of international navigation, a new comprehensive international legal including the regime of transit passage regime. UNCLOS does not remove all con- through straits used for international nav- ceivable stressors, however, and compet- igation, and has protested mandatory ing claims and counterclaims to the legal reporting. In 1988, Canada and the United status of straits, overlapping continen- States entered into an agreement on tal shelf claims and unsettled maritime Arctic cooperation in which the United boundaries, and regulation of polar ship- States pledged that “all navigation by U.S. ping are likely to continue to raise concern. icebreakers within waters claimed by Can- ada to be internal will be undertaken with Canada maintains its position on the legal the consent of the Government of Canada,” status of the archipelagic waters enclosed but added the caveat that nothing in the by straight baselines (which includes much agreement affected either state’s position of the Northwest Passage) as internal on the Law of the Sea in this area. This waters, subject to a historic title, that fall “agree to disagree” arrangement remains intact, although some commentators worry whether this bilateral approach will be sustainable as international interest grows in Arctic shipping routes. The adoption of the Interna- tional Code for Ships Operat- ing in Polar Waters (Polar Code) by the International Maritime Organization (IMO) in 2014/15 provides an international standard for maritime safety and pollution prevention for ships navigating Arctic waters. The Polar Code has been domesti- cated or referentially incorpo- rated by all Arctic 5 states, and Canada and the Russian Feder- ation have retained some prior unilateral rules and procedures to protect domestic interests. Furthermore, Article 234 of UNCLOS provides coastal states bordering ice-covered areas with a unique legislative and enforcement jurisdiction for pollution prevention within their EEZ not enjoyed by any other marine region. States using this power may 32 raise environmental standards

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT for ships without prior resort to the IMO, low. A more substantial and longstanding but must do so in a non-discriminatory dispute concerns the maritime boundary manner and on the best available scientific between Canada and the United States evidence. in the Beaufort Sea, but neither country seems in a hurry to resolve it given the UNCLOS provides rules and procedures lengthy process of defining the outer limits for continental shelf claims through the of the extended continental shelves in the Commission on the Limits of the Conti- region. nental Shelf (CLCS), a scientific and technical review body for extended continental Implications shelf submissions (i.e., extending beyond a. Challenges to existing regional the 200-nautical mile limit) that provides governance structures. As recommendations on the outer limits pro- non-Arctic states, sub-national posed by submitting states. To date all Arctic governments, and non-state Arctic 5 states have conducted scientific actors seek a greater role in circum- research to support claims and, with the polar decision-making systems, exception of the United States, have made they may seek to create alternative partial submissions to the CLCS. Follow- structures to increase their leverage ing a submission for the Northwest Atlan- and/or ensure that their concerns tic continental shelf in 2013, Canada made and/or agendas are addressed. The a submission with respect to the Arctic creation of the Arctic Circle assem- in 2019. The extended continental shelf bly as an alternative platform for claim process has been largely coopera- Iceland, China, Alaska, and other tive to date. This is particularly interesting actors who perceived their voices given the substantial overlaps among the to be marginalized in Arctic Coun- Arctic states’ submissions made to the CLCS cil and “Arctic 5” coastal state meet- and the expectation of several future mari- ings is a case in point. While new time boundaries (including between states governance bodies or mechanisms located at the opposite ends of the Arctic), can supplement and complement but reflects cooperative marine scientific existing channels, they can also research and data exchange, consultations compete for legitimacy and seek to among the affected states prior to submis- usurp existing structures currently sion, expressions of non-objection to sub- dominated by the Arctic states. missions being entertained by the CLCS, b. Increased requirement for part- common understanding that the CLCS nership and inclusive gover- recommendations to a state were without nance. Although Canada and the prejudice to other states, and recognition other Arctic states might prefer that the CLCS recommendations would be to manage northern circumpolar without prejudice to the future delimita- affairs as a closed club, interna- tion of continental shelf boundaries. tional cooperation is increasingly Although Arctic sovereignty disputes necessary at various levels to attracted significant political and media address Arctic issues such as cli- attention a decade ago, there is now gen- mate change, fisheries beyond eral consensus that they are well-man- national jurisdictions, organized aged and unlikely to generate conflict in crime, safe shipping in interna- the next fifteen years. The low-level dis- tional waters, space and cyber- pute over the sovereignty of Hans Island space, and biodiversity. remains unresolved – largely because the practical stakes in doing so are very 33

2020 REPORT c. Projecting stability beyond the e. Safe shipping and search and Arctic region. While commenta- rescue (SAR). Despite their unilat- tors frequently refer to the danger eral requirements for mandatory of heightened strategic competi- reporting and some deviations tion or conflict “spilling over” into from IMO safety and pollution pre- the Arctic, stable circumpolar gov- vention standards, both Canada ernance and security could have and the Russian Federation are a positive spillover effect on other investing in infrastructure to pro- international relationships. This was mote safe and environmentally- part of the original intent of creat- responsible shipping. This is one ing the Arctic Council to “socialize” area where Canada is likely to post-Soviet Russia into Western restart a bilateral dialogue with liberal internationalist norms. Russia, given what the ANPF d. Upholding the Law of the Sea. describes as “common interests, At this time there appears to be lit- priorities and challenges faced by tle to no danger that the Arctic 5 Canada, Russia and our respective states will lose faith in the conven- Arctic and Northern communities tional and customary Law of the as they struggle to adapt to and Sea, because they are all net ben- thrive in rapidly changing condi- eficiaries. Other major maritime tions.” Domestically, Canada is likely powers, such as China, benefit from to introduce low-impact corridors international navigation rights in to concentrate infrastructure and Arctic waters. The adoption of the services in Canadian Arctic waters. Polar Code has promoted a sub- f. Resolving maritime boundaries. stantial degree of harmonization None of the Arctic 5 states appears of the national regimes for naviga- in a rush to resolve outstanding tion, although departures are also maritime boundaries in the Central visible and ostensibly justifiable in Arctic Ocean. CLCS consideration part under Article 234 of UNCLOS. of extended continental shelf sub- More of a concern for Canada and missions is a lengthy process. There the Russian Federation is the possi- does not appear to be any ten- bility that the United States might sion with respect to continental extend its Freedom of Navigation shelf submissions owing to good Operations (FONOP) program into levels of communication, cooper- Arctic waters. While the intention ation, and common understand- of the United States would be to ing of the rules and procedures. affirm its view on international Following completion of the CLCS navigation rights in the Northwest procedures, the process of nego- Passage and Northeast Passage, it tiating extended continental shelf could serve to harden the disputes boundaries where they overlap over the legal status of the waters is expected to occur. This process concerned. Given past Cana- could lead to friction but, more dian nationalistic reactions to the likely, may produce outcomes that Manhattan (1969/70) and Polar Sea affirm a message of mutual respect, (1985) voyages, a FONOP would stability, and rule of law in the likely have a negative impact on Circumpolar Arctic. If friction were bilateral Canada-US relations which to occur, it is likely that the source could disrupt progress on core ini- would be the lengthy time period 34 tiatives such as North American and significant resources required defence modernization.

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT to resolve overlaps, rather than the and specialised web sites to strategically overlaps themselves. reinforce and spread messages compatible with their own.” These messages tend 2.6 PUBLIC DISCONTENT/DISAFFECTION to be “anti-globalist, with a nationalist and AND POLARIZATION anti-immigration rhetoric that attracts elements of both the left and right.” NATO’s 2017 SFA posits that political dis- When citizens perceive that their govern- content arises when citizens perceive that ments are failing to overcome political government mandates fail to address impasses, this can erode the credibility or political impasses. Such impasses range legitimacy of the institutions upon which from chronic economic crises to per- the established political system is founded. sistent unemployment to inefficient SSE notes that this can drive Canadians to social and welfare systems. Governments view alternative organizations – empow- that are seen to successfully mitigate ered by social media – “as more legitimate these impasses earn or retain credibil- than the state.” ity, while those that are perceived as failing to address them lose credibility. This The NATO SFA notes international actors is tied to an increasingly polarized news can harness and amplify political polar- media that amplifies societal divisions.The ization through social media and the Canadian Security Intelligence Service spreading of disinformation or “fake news.” (CSIS) observes how politically disaffected This can undermine political and social Canadians are increasingly turning to cohesion. Canada’s ANPF notes that as social media as alternative news sources, economic development prospects and believing governments and traditional perceptions of regional “accessibility” media sources as untrustworthy. Accord- draw more attention to the region, foreign ingly, “independent actors use social media actors have more incentive to engage in 35

2020 REPORT subversive behaviour. CSIS notes that both confrontation. Similarly, greater Russia and China have “developed sophis- friction between economic regula- ticated information doctrines as part of tions and co-management boards their strategy to … advance foreign-policy could bring increasing polarization. objectives.” Their goals range from short- c. Competing visions of Nunavut term economic advantage to undermining and Inuit Nunangat. Increas- the political legitimacy of Canadian institu- ing frustration amongst some tions over the long term. Inuit leaders with the territorial public government in Iqaluit Implications has prompted some calls for the a. Widening North/South political entrenchment of Inuit Nunangat fault lines. Increasing polarization as a distinct political jurisdiction and political disaffection could delivering services within Canada. renew perennial strains between The perceived failure of Nunavut the territories and the federal gov- could undermine the credibility of ernment. Issues include territo- the federal state rooted in public rial control over public lands and governments that serve a diverse resource revenues, resentment population. Furthermore, the inde- about high federal transfer pay- pendence movement in Green- ments to the territories, and allega- land could influence Inuit political tions of governments shirking their discourse in the Eastern Canadian responsibilities to each other and Arctic. While the emergence of a to Canadian citizens. similar independence movement b. Frustrations about the non-re- in Inuit Nunangat is unlikely in the newable resource economy. next fifteen years, voices calling for Although non-renewable resource greater autonomy (and potentially development is a key tenet of the supported by foreign interests) Pan-Territorial Vision For Sustain- could undermine political cohe- able Development, the political sion in the Canadian North. prioritization of the economy over d. Russia as the disaffected Arc- the environment could lead to tic state. Russia is the non-liberal heightened political tension and democratic nation amongst the Arctic states. Growing NATO attention to the Arctic and North Atlantic in response to Russia’s revisionist actions elsewhere in the world has led Moscow to express its discontent and invigorate popular concerns about NATO encirclement and aggression. Russia could use Arctic security as a wedge issue to undermine and divide NATO members, also placing regional governance norms and mechanisms in jeopardy. 36

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2020 REPORT

CHAPTER THREE

ENVIRONMENT

LEAD AUTHORS: JUSTIN BARNES, JACKSON BELLAMY, WILFRID GREAVES, AND P. WHITNEY LACKENBAUER

Climate change, combined with unforeseen and dangerous consequences, advancements in technology, is with one recent projection predicting leading to an increasingly accessible that a business-as-usual approach to GHG Arctic. A decade ago, few states or emissions will exceed the planetary thresh- firms had the ability to operate in the olds that maintain our familiar and stable Arctic. Today, state and commercial climatic conditions. actors from around the world seek Climate change is occurring rapidly in the to share in the longer term benefits Arctic and will continue for the foreseeable of an accessible Arctic. Over time, future, even if Paris targets are met. Science this interest is expected to gener- shows that the Arctic is warming at a faster ate a corresponding rise in commer- rate than the rest of the globe, with cur- cial interest, research and tourism rent and future implications for the region. in and around Canada’s northern While climate change may open new territory. This rise in activity will also opportunities for increased access and bring increased safety and security economic activity in the Arctic, changing demands related to search and res- environmental and ecological conditions cue and natural or man-made disas- also pose serious challenges, especially ters to which Canada must be ready for Indigenous populations that rely on a to respond. mixed subsistence-wage economy. Strong, Secure, Engaged (2017) The U.S.-Canada Joint Statement on Envi- Environmental and ecological changes in ronment, Climate Change, and Arctic the Canadian Arctic are being driven pre- Leadership of March 2016 articulated “a dominantly by climate change: a glob- common vision of a prosperous and sus- ally important issue that requires a global tainable North American economy, and solution. Countries recently entered into the opportunities afforded by advancing the Paris Agreement in an attempt to mit- clean growth.” Both countries also prom- igate climate change and limit warming ised to “continue to respect and promote to 2°C above pre-industrial levels (ideally the rights of Indigenous peoples in all 1.5°C) by reducing their greenhouse gas climate change decision making.” Prime (GHG) emissions which are the main driver Minister Justin Trudeau and President of climate change. Unchecked or unmiti- Barack Obama’s Joint Arctic Leaders’ gated climate change has the potential for

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT Statement that December directed con- as enabling economic activity and facili- crete actions to ensure “a strong, sus- tating certain forms of access for military tainable and viable Arctic economy and activities. Accordingly, the ANPF empha- ecosystem, with low-impact shipping, sizes “the need for transformative invest- science based management of marine ments in infrastructure, rather than a resources, and free from the risks of off- remedial approach that only perpetuates a shore oil and gas activity,” that would “set state of crisis.” While the Framework notes the stage for deeper partnerships with how “partnering with communities and other Arctic nations, including through the investing in regional infrastructure will Arctic Council.” solidify Canada’s regional presence while exercising its sovereignty,” adapting exist- While the Trump administration has ing and new infrastructure to withstand changed the course of the U.S. (includ- changing environmental conditions will be ing outright denial of climate change), expensive and difficult, compounded by these joint statements continue to reflect uncertainty about the timing, forms, and Canada’s priorities and various commit- full spectrum of climate change impacts. ments reiterated in the ANPF and other policy statements. Moreover, the incom- During the engagement process leading ing Biden administration has called up to the ANPF, Northern stakeholders climate change a threat to national security and rightsholders raised critical ques- and highlighted climate policy in its tran- tions about environmental protection sition planning, suggesting a likely return and response, safe regional transporta- to pre-2017 cooperation on Arctic climate tion, and search and rescue capabilities in change. Security threats in the region will the context of a rapidly changing climate. be compounded by the effects of climate To respond effectively to these emerging change and the disproportionate impact it challenges, they called for a whole-of- will have on Indigenous populations in the government approach to safety, security, region. Northerners are already experienc- and defence that would include a height- ing more extreme weather events, such as ened CAF and Canadian Coast Guard pres- intense storms, wildfires, and floods, which ence in the region. This presence not only threaten their lives and property. Other responds to environmental challenges, climate change effects, including increas- it may also entail a larger environmental ingly unpredictable weather patterns, footprint in the region. thawing permafrost, and changing sea ice The DND/CAF code of environmental stew- conditions, threaten food security, inhibit ardship requires that the military “integrate transportation and travel, endanger eco- environmental concerns with other rele- systems, and impede traditional practices vant concerns including those from opera- and ways of life. tions, finance, safety, health and economic Climate change also exacerbates emerg- development in decision-making,” and that ing challenges with respect to critical infra- it “meet or exceed the letter and spirit of all structure. Existing infrastructure deficits federal laws.” SSE’s emphasis on “greening in the Canadian North – from housing, to defence” and on advancing government broadband access, to energy supply, to commitments to be a responsible environ- ports, airports, and roads – are linked to mental steward resonates with the United poor health and social outcomes and lim- Nations 2030 Sustainable Development ited economic possibilities. For example, Goals, which call upon governments to take transportation infrastructure connects urgent action to combat climate change Northern communities to each other and and its impacts, and to protect, restore, and 40 to goods and services in the South, as well promote sustainable use of maritime and

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT terrestrial ecosystems. Accordingly, Cana- dians will increasingly expect that military activities in the Arctic reflect and support Canada’s expressed intent to play a leadership role on the global stage when it comes to addressing climate change, contaminants, and other environmental challenges that have disproportionate impacts on and in the Arctic.

3.1 ENVIRONMENT The ANPF notes that “the current lack of baseline data poses major challenges to evidence-based decision-making. The responsible use of data can help cultivate a better understanding of the ‘big picture’ of environmental issues, contributing to the development of informed, data-driven policy and decisions that can help Arctic and northern communities build resiliency in the face of climate change.” Accordingly, as we gain more knowledge and are better able to understand climate change in the Arctic and globally, climate modelling and predictions will become more accurate. The global impacts of climate change are readily discernable through general trends in sea ice loss, permafrost melt, and warming temperatures. The impacts of climate change on the Arctic are also highly regionalized, and the impacts of phenomena such as relative sea level rise (a combination of the effects of actual rising sea levels and isostatic rebound) and wildfires are not experienced equally in all regions. That stated, the accelerated rate at which climate change is occurring in the Arctic is causing rapid and significant environmental and ecosystem changes across the region. The extent and thickness of sea ice is decreasing in the Arctic Ocean. Glaciers and ice caps are also melting, contributing to sea level rise, as does thermal expansion owing to warming temperatures. Thawing permafrost is causing major changes to the landscape and threatens the integrity of 41

2020 REPORT infrastructure. Species ranges are shifting In the eastern Canadian Arctic, isostatic in response to warming, creating new eco- rebound is lifting the land more rapidly systems, and pest and diseases (zoonotic) than the sea level is rising, resulting in an are being introduced to areas where they overall reduction in sea level. Where the were previously not found. relative sea level is falling, coastal infrastructure may become less accessible and Ongoing climate change is resulting in the channels and harbours shallower, neces- reduction in the thickness and extent of sitating the use of ships with shallower sea ice, with scientists projecting an ice- draughts and lighter loads. More open free summer in the Central Arctic Ocean water will mean increased frequency and as soon as 2035. Given that sea ice is an intensity of storms which combined with important habitat feature for marine eco- sea level rise will cause larger storm surges systems upon which many Arctic marine and more severe flooding and erosion of species rely, changes from an ice-covered coastal areas. habitat to an open water habitat for longer parts of the year are highly significant. Permafrost is thawing in response to warm- Warming trends also result in a north- ing temperatures, and projected warming ward shift in the ranges of more south- trends suggest that permafrost will be lost erly marine species into Arctic waters that in half of the areas where it currently exists they previously did not inhabit. Further- in the Canadian Arctic. In this case, regional more, sea ice is critical for Inuit to hunt and differences in permafrost thawing and deg- move between islands. Similarly, seasonal radation also correlate with regional differ- travel over lake and river ice will be limited ences in warming surface air temperature by later freeze-up, earlier break-up, and and ground temperature, with ice-rich per- reduced thickness. mafrost most vulnerable to thawing and degradation. Permafrost thawing and deg- Melting ice caps and glaciers are contribut- radation on the landscape causes slump- ing to sea level rise in the Arctic and glob- ing, erosion, settling, and collapse, with ally. Rising sea levels will threaten low-lying obvious implications for current and future communities and coastal infrastructure, infrastructure projects. Landscape changes particularly in the western Canadian Arctic.

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT may also alter surface and groundwater flows and distribution. In some cases, this may result in the draining or creation of wetlands and lakes or the rerouting of rivers. All of these dynamics directly affect the operating environment. Biodiversity in terrestrial, freshwater. and marine ecosystems also shows a strong response to warming, with species ranges shifting and new ecosystems emerging as a result. Species that are more nar- rowly adapted to colder Arctic conditions will be less abundant and more limited in their distribution, whereas more south- erly-adapted species will expand to higher Improving resilience to climate change latitudes. Terrestrial vegetation will show through investments in infrastructure and a strong and rapid response to warming, equipment will be essential in the com- particularly in species limited by tempera- ing decades. Permafrost degradation is ture gradients (rather than those limited by damaging older (legacy) infrastructure other factors like latitude or light regimes, and causing it to fail in some cases. Simply which may not change). The treeline will trying to repair and replace failing infra- advance northwards and replace between structure will not adequately address the 11 and 50% of all Arctic tundra, with impli- Arctic infrastructure deficit nor build the cations for infrastructure and operations. necessary capacity for increased human presence in the region. Adding to this Conservation, including the establish- complexity, adaptation measures must be ment of protected areas and the co- assessed regionally due to the differential management of resources, is a key priority ways in which climate change is impacting in the ANPF, and Canadian governments different parts of the Canadian Arctic. are likely to undertake additional measures to protect species that are important Inequalities between Arctic inhabitants, for subsistence and conservation tour- particularly Indigenous populations, ism, such as caribou and polar bears. Cer- and the rest of Canadians persist. These tain activities or projects may conflict with inequalities, the rapid and pronounced conservation objectives, and the vulnera- effects of climate change on the Arctic, bility of certain species to human activities and the reliance on changing ecosys- may constrain the location of infrastructure tems for subsistence make Arctic peoples or when and where operations and activi- particularly vulnerable to the impacts of ties are conducted on land, at sea, and in climate change. Socio-economic inequal- the air. ities between Arctic residents and other 43

2020 REPORT “Although the warming of the Arctic and the North offers economic opportunities, which would bring much needed socio-economic development, employment and infrastructure investments that are acutely lacking in the region, higher levels of activity could bring the potential for damage to unique ecosystems and may also increase the risks associated with increased movement of people and goods, the pursuit of interests by foreign state and non-state actors in Canada’s Arctic and northern territory, and human-induced disasters. It is not difficult to imagine, for example, how a naturally-occurring or human-induced disaster in the Arctic Archipelago would place tremendous strain on the capacities of all levels of government, as well as on local communities, to support affected people and minimize the damage to affected wildlife, infrastructure, and ecosystems.” - Arctic and Northern Policy Framework: Safety, Security, and Defence chapter (September 2019)

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT Canadians mean that residents have a and the environment, compounding the reduced capacity to adapt to change and impacts of climate change. The fast-grow- that they may not be able to fully benefit ing Indigenous population in the Arctic, from opportunities associated with climate concentrated in settlements (and increas- change. ingly in urban hubs), will put more pressure Although the transition to more efficient on species that are hunted for subsistence and renewable energy technologies is most and which are already stressed by the often associated with mitigating climate impacts of climate change and increasing change through reducing GHG emissions, regional activity. Economic activities, such these technologies can also be applied in as non-renewable resource extraction, also the Arctic to make communities more resil- have significant environmental impacts ient to climate change. Many communities that can have a deleterious effect on in the Canadian Arctic rely solely on diesel human and ecosystem health. generators for heat and electricity. While Implications emissions from these generators do not contribute significantly to global climate a. The Arctic will become increas- change, they do have more localized envi- ingly accessible to a range ronmental impacts and the transportation of activities. Although hype of diesel to these communities also poses a about the so-called “scramble for significant risk to the environment through Arctic resources” has proven wildly fuel spills. Furthermore, the impacts of cli- over-inflated over the last fifteen mate change are making transporting die- years, climate change is expected sel to these communities more challenging to open the Arctic to a widening and expensive. Renewable technologies range of economic activities in the may heighten community resilience to cli- mining, oil and gas extraction, fish- mate change, and more efficient generat- ing, and tourism sectors. Both Arctic ing technologies can reduce local adverse and non-Arctic states express a environmental impacts associated with growing interest in the region. conventional diesel generation. The mili- There will be a need to increase tary and other security practitioners would capacity to respond to a variety also benefit from more efficient, abundant, of needs and incidents to support and reliable energy sources in the region. activity in the region. There will also be increased military use and Population growth and increasing human access to the Arctic region. Extend- activity due to climate change place ing sovereignty and security to the increased pressure and stress on the sen- Arctic and environmental protec- sitive Arctic environment and ecosystems. tion will continue to be priorities in Longstanding concerns about the fate of a changing Arctic. global contaminants in the Arctic and the b. There will be both challenges implications for human health are likely and opportunities associated to continue and grow as climate change with climate change in the Arc- introduces new contaminants into the tic. Arctic warming is likely to food web. Furthermore, growing human mean increased access to Arctic activity in the region will likely increase the resources. Critical infrastructure will incidence of contamination and pollution, be necessary to support economic particularly in the marine environment activity in the Arctic and adapt to if Arctic waters see a dramatic increase climate change. Infrastructure con- in traffic. Population growth in the Arctic struction and maintenance will will put increasing stress on ecosystems be challenged by environmental 45

2020 REPORT factors such as thawing permafrost suffer the adverse effects of climate and changing sea levels. DND/CAF change. Indigenous populations will be expected to construct and that rely on subsidence hunting are maintain its share of infrastructure especially vulnerable to ecosystem in the Arctic, some of which will be change. Investments in the region dual-use. Across the Arctic, meet- that increase adaptability and ing the needs of Arctic communi- resilience to climate change and ties under changing environmental improve environmental security conditions with existing transpor- will reduce the risk that the pop- tation infrastructure is increasingly ulation of the Arctic will suffer the challenging. Alternatives will have adverse effects of climate change. to be explored. Changing ecosys- d. Addressing climate change and tems are a challenge for both Indig- environmental issues in the Arc- enous subsistence economies and tic could be a source of stability ecotourism. Conservation of spe- in the region. Climate change is cies in the face of climate change having a disproportionate impact will be a significant challenge. on the Arctic. The Arctic is warming c. Inequalities between the Arc- tic and the rest of Canada are compounded by the effects of climate change. There are significant inequalities between the Arctic and the rest of Canada. The Government of Canada has recently committed to addressing these inequalities in the ANPF. Populations with low levels of socioeconomic development are more likely to suffer the adverse effects of climate change. Consid- ering the inequalities that currently exist between the Arctic and the rest of Canadians and the rapid rate at which climate change is occurring in the Arctic, the population of the Arctic is at an increased risk to

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT at more than twice the rate of the and ecosystems (ANPF). As shown by pre- rest of the world and will continue vious natural disasters in the North, some to warm for the foreseeable future regional or territorial governments would despite efforts to mitigate climate likely require assistance to respond to a change. Growing international severe natural disaster. collaboration to address climate Emergency risks are most common at the change and environmental issues local level, with effects of natural disasters in the Arctic could be a source of differing throughout the region. The most stability in international Arctic rela- prominent risks in Yukon and the North- tions. The willingness of countries west Territories are forest fires and flooding. to engage in international rela- In Nunavut, extreme weather emergencies tions to address important envi- including storms and blizzards are high. ronmental issues in the Arctic is exemplified by the success of the The likelihood and prevalence of natural Arctic Council. Climate and envi- disasters are expected to increase partly ronmental change will be at the due to escalations in the severity and prev- forefront as this region warms and alence of severe weather events; changes becomes of increasing geopolitical to storm seasons and storm strengths due significance. to lengthening periods of open water; e. Geoengineering and runaway and cumulative effects of climate change climate change. Some commen- impacts including permafrost melt, land- tators suggest that global geoen- slides, flooding, wildfires, storm surges, gineering solutions which remove and coastal erosion. Since 1918, there carbon dioxide from the atmo- have been 34 incidents across the territo- sphere or block solar radiation ries that have qualified as natural disasters may be needed to stabilize the cli- according to Public Safety Canada, costing mate in the future if we do not take an estimated $94,503,620 and resulting in effective action to mitigate it. How- 4,545 evacuees over fourteen events. ever, these technologies also carry with them significant risks of dangerous unforeseen consequences. The effects Natural Disasters of either runaway climate Event Group Event Type Occurrence change or geoengineering (or both) would have enor- Meteorological Flood 18 mous geopolitical impli- Hydrological Wildfire cations globally and in the 6 Arctic. Cold Event 3 3.2 NATURAL DISASTERS Storm Surge 1 Storms and Severe A naturally-occurring disaster in 1 Thunderstorms the Canadian Arctic would place tremendous strain on the capac- Biological Epidemic 3 ities of all levels of government, Pandemic as well as on local communi- 1 ties, to support affected people Geological Earthquake 1 and minimize the damage to affected wildlife, infrastructure, Total 34 47

2020 REPORT Of the 34 disasters tracked over the 102- Threats from a natural disaster are ampli- year period, 20 disasters (or 58.8% of total) fied by a lack of infrastructure, outdated have occurred in the past 32 years. Climate or fragile infrastructure, and generally low change, along with people’s increasing response capabilities to repair or replace exposure and vulnerability, are expected to damaged infrastructure. Thawing of ice- magnify the impact of natural disasters as rich permafrost and increased coastal extreme weather events become increas- erosion also threaten coastal settlements, ingly frequent and intense in the coming risking damage to already deficient infra- decades. structure, including road networks used for travel, transport, and access to traditional Natural disasters are likely to have differ- food sources. The rise of severe weather ing effects throughout the Arctic. There events coupled with accelerated landscape are regional geography and population changes is making it difficult to actively density differences across the North which adapt and prepare for potential natural influence the vulnerability and resilience of disasters. Additionally, the high costs of communities to natural disasters. Regions adapting current infrastructure and build- in the Canadian Arctic will be able to cope ing new infrastructure have proven to be a with natural disasters differently based on significant barrier. their location, remoteness, infrastructure, and reliance on supply networks. The remoteness of most communities in the region leaves infrastructure and assets exposed. A severe natural disaster would be disruptive for remote communities as a heavy reliance on critical infrastructure and networks for supplies, energy, healthcare, and food exists. A natural disaster which inter- rupts or threatens the availability of country foods, which are integral to food security in communities outside of urban centres, through increased barriers or contamination, would require outside assistance. A natural disaster that impacts the region’s already limited communication 48 infrastructure and

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT transportation infrastructure would be be better understood, including harmful for disaster response during an disturbances to supply and dis- emergency. Communication infrastructure tribution systems of food, water, is inconsistent across the North, and and key resources. Changes to should the system be compromised or the socio-economic environment overwhelmed by a natural disaster or over- of the North, including possible loading during an emergency response, increases in tourism and shipping, there could be a breakdown in emergency pose additional vulnerabilities for response to a natural disaster. Responding emergency management policies to a natural disaster would be challenged to address. by limited mobility and transportation in c. Infrastructure deficits need to the region. For example, less than 1% of be addressed. Infrastructure defi- Canada’s two-lane roads are located in the cits in the North have the poten- territories, and 0.2% of Canada’s rail lines. tial to curtail effective emergency Numerous fly-in communities can only response and management. Crit- be accessed by air: ten in the Northwest ical infrastructure requirements Territories, one in Yukon, and all 25 com- will increasingly need to consider munities in Nunavut. A serious natural a changing demography and envi- disaster could force displacement or tem- ronment to ensure continued pro- porary relocation, putting increased pres- vision of essential services and sure on existing infrastructure. capabilities. Specifically, robust critical infrastructure is required in The region has a history of biological natural order to support communications, disasters (as defined by Public Safety Can- emergency management and mili- ada), including previous instances of epi- tary capabilities, and safe transpor- demic and pandemic diseases. COVID-19 tation in the region. poses a serious threat to Northern commu- d. Increased need for situational nities and the already strained healthcare awareness. Meteorological mon- network in the region. Should a commu- itoring and communications will nity become seriously impacted by this dis- become increasingly important ease, responding to the outbreak would be for natural disaster mitigation and challenging. response. Monitoring capabilities Implications of ice conditions and icebergs will need to be augmented to sup- a. Increased requirement for port the increased marine traffic humanitarian support. As natural through Northern waterways and disasters become more frequent, to proactively limit emergency cooperation between military, gov- management response requests ernmental, and non-governmental through cohesive mitigation bodies will be required. Trust will and prevention efforts. Canada’s be needed between civilian and involvement in and obligations for military entities to ensure effective aeronautical and maritime search strategic coordination and plan- and rescue in the Arctic highlight ning during the execution of disas- the continued importance of inter- ter response operations. national cooperation and Canada’s b. Increased requirement to ability to comprehensively respond improve resilience. Civil and to incidents. military vulnerabilities to environmental, climate, and natural disaster-related disturbances must 49

2020 REPORT 3.3 HUMAN-MADE DISASTERS for emergency response in the region are limited and would be inadequate to deal In addition to natural disasters, the with any sizeable accident. It would likely Canadian Arctic is at significant risk of take days for sufficient marine and aerial human-made disasters that pose serious assets to be deployed from the Atlantic prospective challenges for Northerners and Pacific coasts and southern Canada to and for federal and territorial governments. the North. Akin to the 1989 Exxon Valdez oil The rapid pace of warming and environ- spill in Alaska, a major accident in the High mental change in the Arctic has encour- Arctic would be devastating to marine life aged increased shipping, destinational and ecosystems in the region. tourism, and natural resource extraction. While providing some benefits to North- To that end, a major focus of Arctic govern economies, such activities involve ernance in the last decade has been on increased risks, including the possibility enhancing transnational cooperation on of a nautical disaster, air accident, or an oil issues such as search and rescue (SAR) and spill, either on land or offshore. The risks of marine oil pollution preparedness and such an event to the delicate Arctic ecosys- response, each of which have been the tem – alongside more quotidian concerns subject of new multilateral agreements such as shipboard pollutants, wastewater negotiated under the auspices of the dumping, and invasive species transported Arctic Council to improve collaboration, in ballast water and on vessels’ hulls – have information sharing, and technical coop- long concerned Canadian officials. Canada eration between Arctic militaries, coast first enacted the Arctic Waters Pollution Pre- guards, and other responding agencies. vention Act in 1970 so that vessels entering The joint Canada-US moratorium on the Northwest Passage would be required new Arctic offshore oil and gas drilling, to abide by regulations to limit pollution in announced in 2016 and likely to be sup- Canada’s Northern waters. ported by the incoming Biden Adminis- tration, also points to efforts to eliminate The ability of Canadian governments to the possibility of an oil spill by prohibiting respond to a human-made environmental underlying practices such as oil and gas disaster in the Arctic would be hampered in drilling that carry serious environmental similar ways as their response to a natural risks. disaster, in that resources and capabilities Industrialized resource extraction, significant increases in marine traffic, and human activities such as road and highway construction and growth of settlements and urban areas are inherently damaging or disruptive to the natural environment. Particularly in delicate Arctic ecosystems, decision- makers must balance other objectives with conservation and environmental protection. Environmental changes that make certain activities increasingly possible or economically viable in the Arctic also make those activities riskier, whether from physical instability of buildings and infrastructure due to thawing permafrost, greater exposure to more frequent extreme weather events, or the navigability 50

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT of “ice-free” Arctic waters heightening the Sea Ice and the Northwest Passage: More or Less risks of maritime accidents. Accessible? Implications The Northwest Passage example illustrates the complex relationship between pollution, environmental change, a. Ongoing need for transnational and the emergence of new Arctic security issues. Although cooperation and multilateral the dispute over the legal status of the NWP is a long- governance. The predicted increase standing issue between Canada and the United States, in maritime and economic activities the urgency to resolve the issue has been minimal. in the Arctic makes strengthening and deepening sub-national and In response to the 1969 Manhattan voyage, the federal international cooperation between government passed the Arctic Waters Pollution Preven- Arctic governments and stakehold- tion Act (AWPPA) which regulated ships within 100 nau- ers essential to enforce regulations tical miles (now extended to 200 n.m.) of Canada’s Arctic and minimize risk. coastline and established a new legal standard later incor- b. Necessary trade-offs between porated into the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. environmental protection and The 1985 Polar Sea voyage led to the signing of the 1988 economic development. As Canada-US Arctic Cooperation Agreement, wherein both climate change and local envi- countries agree to disagree over their legal claims while ronmental conditions worsen, cooperating on practical use of these waters. With thick policymakers will have to make sea ice inhibiting access to these waters, this arrangement difficult decisions when consider- has proven sufficient. ing incompatible environmental and economic goals. Some pro- Owing to climate change, Arctic sea ice has declined by posals, particularly around large- approximately 50% over the last forty years. This is pre- scale resource extraction projects, dicted to result in ice-free Arctic summers as soon as will likely prove untenable without 2035, which generates some predictions that the NWP causing severe and irremediable will become a major conduit for transit shipping between environmental and social harm. Asia and Europe. The actual data about sea ice melt, com- c. Emergency preparedness and bined with unusual weather patterns, produce high lev- disaster response resources els of uncertainty about ice conditions and navigability must be increased. Governments in the NWP. Far from being ice-free, floating ice that has and stakeholders across all levels broken from larger ice packs gets trapped in the relatively must increase their preparedness narrower passages of the Arctic Archipelago, impeding for disaster mitigation and passage and producing unpredictable conditions. Accord- response, and enhance local emer- ingly, large increases in annual volumes of trans-Arctic gency management resources so shipping in North America (predicted by some commen- that Northern communities are less tators over the past fifteen years) have not materialized. reliant on resources deployed from Conversely, the loss of multi-year sea ice in the High Arc- elsewhere. tic, increasingly variable weather, and the damage to d. Remote monitoring and surveil- critical infrastructure such as roads and airstrips due to lance capabilities are needed. coastal erosion and permafrost thawing may serve to As with naturally-occurring disas- reduce accessibility to many isolated Arctic communi- ters, some human-made disasters ties. Inuit have traditionally travelled across ice and water can be prevented or mitigated as well as land, and greater constraints on their ability to through effective and comprehen- do so safely may result in less accessibility for many Arc- sive remote monitoring and sur- tic residents. Thus, contrary to expectations that climate veillance of Arctic lands and waters. change is increasing access to the Arctic, in some contexts Such tools will be critical to enable it can have the effect of further isolating Northerners from responsible economic develop- service centres located further south and inhibiting their ment without compromising envi- mobility within the Arctic. ronmental safety. 51

2020 REPORT

CHAPTER FOUR

ECONOMICS AND RESOURCES

LEAD AUTHORS: ADAM LAJEUNESSE, PETER KIKKERT, ADAM MACDONALD, ALDO CHIRCOP, AND BRIAN BOW

.Over the past several decades the Arctic Arctics are sites of large-scale resource has undergone a dramatic physical change. development and shipping activity. Sea ice loss caused by climate change has This increase in shipping and development accelerated, gradually stripping away the activity, along with the arrival of main- ice which has long limited shipping and stream Arctic tourism, has led to new and resource development – particularly in the expanded safety and security challenges North American Arctic. The year 2019 saw for the Government of Canada centred a September ice minimum tied with 2007 around search and rescue (SAR), surveil- and 2016 for second lowest in the satel- lance, aid to the civilian power, regula- lite record. The 2010 decade, as a whole, tory enforcement, and new constabulary witnessed consistently low and steadily duties. New national security challenges declining ice thickness and concentration. are also expected to accompany foreign This trend has opened the Northwest Pas- investment as state-owned companies sage and the waters of the Circumpolar from countries like China increase their North to an unprecedented extent and investments in the region. the result has been a significant increase in shipping activity and growing interest in The receding sea ice and warming waters resource development. of the region may also encourage new fishing activity, both within Canada’s EEZ and The circumpolar economy, valued at the Arctic Basin, possibly leading to future roughly $450 billion, is undergoing large- political challenges as Arctic and non- scale but uneven growth because of sig- Arctic states establish fisheries regulations nificant environmental change, new and agreements stretching across different technologies, and growing interest from jurisdictions. those inside and outside the region. The variation in economic development across Canada’s Arctic and Northern Policy Frame- the Arctic is owed in part to differences in work (2019) highlights the need for “strong, climatic conditions, demographic dynam- sustainable, diversified, and inclusive local ics, levels of industrialization, as well as and regional economies,” particularly Arctic states’ priorities. The Canadian North through increased Indigenous ownership has seen growing but still limited invest- and participation, the reduction of income ment, while the Russian and Scandinavian inequality, the optimization of resource

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT development, economic diversification Slovakia, the Bahamas, the United States, (including land-based, traditional eco- Malta, France, the Cayman Islands, and nomic activities), and the enhancement of Norway. These were cargo ships carrying trade and investment opportunities. The pulp and carbon anodes to China, private Framework also highlights the idea of a cutters, and large cruise ships. This kind of “conservation economy,” which the federal shipping will likely increase as mining oper- government is slowly growing in the Arctic ations expand in the Canadian North and in collaboration with Northern Indigenous the need to import supplies and export stakeholders. How will the government product rises. Cruise activity is also on an approach the debate between those who upward trajectory, with growing interest in want to heavily regulate resource devel- polar destinations leading to widespread opment and those who believe regula- construction of polar vessels, purpose-built tions are strangling the Northern economy for the Arctic and Antarctic. – a conflict that the framework explicitly acknowledges? The consultations that Foreign government activity in Canadian led to the ANPF highlighted “co-manage- Arctic waters has been minimal, but there ment of renewable resources … as a venue are signs of future interest. While Amer- for collaborative management that can ican icebreaker operations in the North- help integrate different viewpoints,” but it west Passage are covered by the 1988 remains to be seen how this will work in Canada-US Arctic Cooperation Agree- practice. ment, statements by the US Navy in recent years indicate a new interest in deploying warships into the Arctic – perhaps even 4.1 ARCTIC SHIPPING as a challenge to Canada’s legal position. In 2018, China sent its icebreaker Xue Long Shipping activity in and through the through the Northwest Passage on short Canadian Arctic has seen a steady increase notice, leading Canada to alter its clearance in volume over the past three decades, processes. China has recently completed with a rapid acceleration becoming clear in a second icebreaker and has announced 2015. Most of the new shipping activity is plans for a third, nuclear-powered vessel. centred on fishing, cargo, and tanker craft. This fleet would give China the capabil- There has also been a dramatic increase in ity to access areas of the Canadian Arctic cruise activity, with three large ships tra- which the Canadian Coast Guard cannot. versing the Northwest Passage between 2017 and 2019. In Canadian waters this China’s declaration to help develop “polar activity has largely been destinational, with silk roads” for mutual benefit appears to be ships travelling to and from Canadian des- an attempt at tethering the region’s devel- tinations, rather than using the Northwest opment to its larger Belt and Road Initiative Passage as a route between the Atlantic (BRI), a bilaterally-based economic strategy and Pacific. This limited use is largely due designed to reconfigure and develop trade to the route’s shallow waters, poor hydro- networks and infrastructure throughout graphic surveying, and unpredictable ice Eurasia, largely through Chinese invest- conditions. The 2019 shipping season, for ment. The United States is vocal in its dis- instance, saw 24 transits while 2018 saw approval over Chinese investment in the only two – the result of considerable vari- Arctic, specifically over concerns that this is ation in ice coverage.1 motivated by strategic and military considerations. Other Arctic states are monitoring Of the ships entering Canadian Arctic the nature, motives, and impacts of Chi- waters, an increasing percentage are for- nese investment on Arctic domestic and eign vessels. The 2019 season included regional politics, including possible sup- 54 transits from Belgium, the Netherlands, port to military goals and capabilities.

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT Implications Passage. That country’s 2019 Arctic a. Interest in the legal status of the policy guidelines were more cir- Arctic waters has increased as cumspect on the matter – backing the Arctic ice has receded. Since away from any outright challenge at least 1969 the United States has to Canadian sovereignty. China’s challenged Canada’s legal posi- 2019 Arctic policy statement was tion that the Canadian sections of similarly ambiguous, highlighting the Northwest Passage in its Arctic the importance of Arctic shipping Archipelago constitute historical routes without decisively weigh- internal waters. This position was ing in on their legal status. As the reiterated in the U.S. Arctic poli- sea ice continues to melt, and more cies of 2009 and 2013, and most states show an interest in asserting recently by Secretary of State Mike perceived transit shipping rights Pompeo in May 2019. The Commis- through the Northwest Passage, sion of the European Parliament these legal disputes may take on adopted a similar position in 2008, heightened salience. strongly implying its disagreement b. Increased shipping activity will with Canadian ownership – if not require improved situational outright challenging it. In 2013, awareness. This new capability will Germany released a national Arctic come in the form of improved sen- policy statement calling for inter- sors and satellite reconnaissance, national regulation of Arctic sea which reflects the priorities for lay- lanes and freedom of navigation ered sensor systems articulated by in the Arctic Ocean. According to Canada and the United States in the Germans, these international terms of North American defence sea lanes included the Northwest modernization.

2020 REPORT c. Improved situational aware- mines while the Northwest Territories has ness will have to be paired with three. Despite the increase in interest and new platforms and resources. activity over the last decade, mining devel- If shipping in the Northwest Pas- opment remains relatively subdued and sage continues to increase, so too the large percentage increases in invest- will the state’s need for a presence ment are taken from a low starting point to enforce Canadian law and juris- and limited to a handful of major projects. diction, and to respond to disas- This slow pace stems from the extremely ters and accidents. Large cruise high costs of Northern operations and the ships offer a particular challenge, limited transport and energy infrastructure and an accident involving such a in the region. ship would require immediate and Difficult logistics and high costs are the large-scale response. principal drags on Northern investment; however, industry-specific limitations have 4.2 RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT also contributed to the slow growth. The If Arctic shipping becomes more economi- collapse of oil prices over the past sev- cal, Canadian Arctic resources will represent eral years, as well as the Canadian ban on a more attractive development oppor- offshore oil and gas drilling in 2016, have tunity. Nunavut currently has four active effectively ended hydrocarbon exploration in the Canadian North for the time being.

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT This is unlikely to continue in perpetuity, Russia’s Northern Sea Route (NSR), and presuming that global demand for hydro- COSCO aims to become a major partner in carbon energy sources will rebound and the transport of LNG on the route. lead to resurgent prices at some point in Implications the future. a. Increased Chinese shipping and By contrast, the Russian and Eurasian investment in the Arctic contin- Arctic has seen more dramatic economic ues to generate concern. While development, with an emphasis on oil and no explicit security threat has been gas and resource extraction. Much of this tied to Chinese activity in the Arc- activity, particularly in the offshore area, tic, U.S. defence policy ties China’s slowed in the wake of the Russian invasion presence to surreptitious efforts of Ukraine as Western sanctions removed to “support a strengthened, future Russian access to vital partnerships with Chinese military presence in the American and European oil companies. Arctic Ocean, potentially including Consequently, they have sought invest- deployment of submarines to the ment and access to technologies from else- region.” where, particularly China. b. Chinese investment in Arctic All Arctic states face a dearth of develop- projects could produce danger- ment capital. It is estimated that $1 trillion ous levels of foreign influence. will be needed over the next two decades Given the limited economic activity to fund over 900 projects across the circum- across much of Northern Canada, polar region. This has created an opportu- and the low levels of investment nity for Chinese state-owned companies from Canadian sources, Chinese and banks to finance much of this activity, investment in resource or infra- primarily in Russia and Greenland. China’s structure projects is an appealing Arctic investments from 2005-17 have been prospect for Northerners. Such roughly $1.4 trillion and largely dedicated investment could, however, pro- to Russian hydrocarbon projects.2 The $27 vide a Chinese state-owned com- billion Yamal gas project, for instance, was pany with undue influence over financed through a partnership with the the lives and prosperity of entire Chinese state-owned oil and gas company regions, and even entire Canadian China National Petroleum Corporation territories. (CNPC) and the Silk Road Fund. Concern Despite concerns over Chinese influ- over Chinese investment in North America ence, most experts agree that Canada will is growing, leading American Secretary of require foreign partners and significant State Mike Pompeo to openly denounce private sector investment in addressing its Beijing’s Arctic investments in his May 2019 Arctic infrastructure deficit – specifically its speech. dearth of ports, overland transportation Chinese shipping activity in the Arctic may routes, and telecommunications. The chal- increase in parallel with its investments. lenge will be to attract investment but also Both commercial Chinese shipping as well to create appropriate systems and mea- as state icebreaker activity is expected to sures to manage them to ensure they do increase. The China Shipping Ocean Com- not undermine national security or broader pany (COSCO) is increasing its activity Canadian security relations with key allies. along the Northern Sea Route and operate nine out of fifteen Arc7 liquified natural gas (LNG) carriers. This makes China by far the largest foreign operator of vessels along 57

2020 REPORT 4.3 THE CANADIAN ARCTIC AS A anticipated to continue. By 2022, at least RESOURCE: TOURISM 28 new expedition ships designed for polar conditions are expected to come into ser- Tourism is on the rise throughout the cir- vice, adding to the 80 already in opera- cumpolar world, ranging from large-scale tion. Several of these will meet Polar Class cruise ships, to sport fishing and hunt- requirements, and the operators construct- ing, to adventure and eco expeditions, to ing these expedition vessels are offering cultural tourism. As climate change and trips to more remote places, deeper in the reduced transportation costs increase the Arctic. For example, Ponant announced accessibility of the Arctic, the number of plans to dispatch Le Commandant Charcot cruise and tour operators involved in the on the first non-nuclear-powered voyage region grows, and marketing campaigns to the North Pole in 2021. If demand con- sell the public on the “last chance” oppor- tinues to rise, the cruise industry may also tunity to see the polar environment before consider consistently employing larger it disappears, experts anticipate that this ships in the region to boost profits. While multi-billion dollar industry will continue cruise ship traffic in the Canadian Arctic is to expand. The massive tourist boom expe- much less than in the European Arctic and rienced by Iceland over the last decade is in the waters off Greenland, it has experi- also driving tourists to look for other, less enced a 70% increase in expedition cruise crowded Arctic destinations, including tourism over the last decade – although Greenland and Svalbard. In light of these severe and unpredictable ice conditions trends, Canada’s Arctic and Northern Policy have led to route and voyage cancellations. Framework identified tourism as one of the While the media tends to focus on cruise key pillars of Northern development mov- tourism, there has also been a signif- ing forward. icant increase in cultural, adventure, Conventional and expedition cruises to and ecotourism in the Arctic – every- the Arctic have increased dramatically thing from sport fishing and hunting, over the last two decades – a trend that is to hiking, dog-sledding, and ski trips, to

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT bird-watching, camping, and Northern future MROs demands improved Lights tours. A wide array of these kinds of situational awareness, interdepart- activities are offered in the Canadian North mental cooperation, training and – many by local companies. Independently exercises, and the use of commu- owned and operated pleasure craft, gen- nity-based assets as force multi- erally sailboats and motor yachts, are also pliers. Increased SAR cases from carrying tourists into the waters of Cana- small-vessel tourism and adventure da’s Arctic Archipelago. These vessels rep- tourism should also be anticipated. resent the fastest growing shipping sector b. An expanding tourism indus- in Nunavut, with a 400% increase over the try calls for strong communi- last decade. ty-based SAR and emergency response assets. Through the There are indications that heightened tour- Oceans Protection Plan, the Cana- ism is starting to generate greater infra- dian Coast Guard is currently structure investment around the Arctic. expanding the Coast Guard Aux- Airport renovations are currently under- iliary in the Arctic, is applying the way in Nuuk and Ilulissat to attract nonstop Indigenous Community Boat Pilot international flights from North America Program to Northern communi- and Europe. The deep water port currently ties, and has established an inshore under construction in Iqaluit and the port rescue boat station at Rankin Inlet. proposed for Nome, Alaska, have also been These community-based assets tied, in part, to the expansion of cruise have already been used to respond tourism. to incidents involving small-ves- Please note that, although this section was sel tourism and their importance written before COVID-19 pandemic travel will grow with increased human restrictions led to the cancellation of the activity in the region. Future invest- 2020 summer cruise tourism season in the ments in initiatives along these Canadian Arctic, we anticipate that cruise lines, which seek to address safety tourism will resume following the discov- concerns and build local capacity, ery of a vaccine. are likely. c. Cruise tourism increases the Implications risk of environmental pollu- a. An expanding tourism indus- tion, calling for increased local try increases the risk of human- and regional environmental made disasters and amplifies response capabilities. Commu- SAR requirements. In the last nity members have been vocal three decades, several marine about their concerns over the envi- incidents involving cruise ships in ronmental pollution that could Canada’s Arctic waters could have result from a cruise ship running escalated into Mass Rescue Oper- aground in the Arctic. Currently, ations (MROs). Two notable exam- limited fuel and oil spill response ples include MV Clipper Adventurer capabilities exist in the North, mak- (2010) and Akademik Ioffe (2018), ing response to such an incident both of which ran aground in Nun- even more difficult. avut’s Kitikmeot Region. In both d. An expanding tourism indus- situations good sea and weather try and small vessel tourism conditions prevailed, which raise a wide range of regula- allowed passengers to be success- tory, safety, and security issues. fully offloaded. The possibility of Increased tourist activity in the 59

2020 REPORT North produces challenges to Can- Search and Rescue Agreement (for- ada’s regulations; increased crim- mally the Agreement on Coopera- inal activity, ranging from illegal tion on Aeronautical and Maritime immigration and human traffick- Search and Rescue in the Arctic) ing to bootlegging; and a range of is an international treaty con- safety issues, from outbreaks of dis- cluded among the member states ease on cruise ships to missing pas- of the Arctic Council that coordi- sengers. It is particularly difficult nates international search and res- to regulate and monitor pleasure cue coverage and response in the craft, which community mem- region, establishes the areas of bers have reported for breaking responsibility for each state, and environmental regulations, illegal ensures that states will aid one hunting, stealing archaeological another in situations that demand artefacts, and selling alcohol in dry cooperation and collaboration. Pur- communities. Canadian agencies suant to this agreement, Canada will have to ensure that the legis- is likely to continue to engage with lative and regulatory frameworks Arctic partners through the Arctic that govern transport are followed Council’s Emergency Prevention, in the North, preserve the integrity Preparedness, and Response (EPPR) of Canada’s Northern borders, and Working Group and the Arctic Coast bolster the clearance process of Guard Forum, as well as bi-national pleasure craft looking to operate in and regional SAR exercises. Canada’s Arctic waters. g. As the world’s largest source of e. An expanding tourism industry outbound tourism, China is likely demands close interdepartmen- to dominate Arctic tourism. This tal cooperation, partnership with has led to pushback in several Northern communities, and rela- Arctic states – for instance, local tionships with private industry. opposition to the plans of Chinese To effectively regulate increased entrepreneur Huang Nubo’s plans human activity in the region and to build luxury resorts in remote address the array of safety and parts of Iceland and Svalbard led security implications this creates, to the rejection of these projects. federal and territorial departments Given China’s complex relationship will have to adopt a whole-of- with several Arctic states, China’s government approach, engage role in Arctic tourism will continue with Northerners, and work with to raise security concerns, partic- private industry. In the case of an ularly as China is now among the emergency, such as a Mass Rescue top three source countries for tour- Operation, these partners will have ists to the North and the number of to work together. Government Chinese tourists is likely to grow in agencies will need to work with the future. private industry to establish how industry assets and infrastruc- 4.4 THE CONSERVATION ECONOMY ture can be used to address the challenges created by increased Canada’s Arctic and Northern Policy Frame- tourism. work highlights the idea of a conservation f. Arctic tourism highlights Cana- economy, which the federal government da’s international commitments is slowly growing in the Canadian Arctic in collaboration with Northern Indigenous 60 and responsibilities. The Arctic

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT stakeholders. The Qikiqtani Inuit Associa- Association, with the support of Parks Can- tion’s vision for a conservation economy ada and the Government of Nunavut, has entails “economic wealth derived from local established a Guardians program to mon- natural resources in a way that respects itor and manage the protected area. (An and preserves Inuit Qaujimajatuqangit, Inuit Guardians program has also been meets local needs and restores rather than established for the Wrecks of HMS Erebus depletes natural resources and social cap- and HMS Terror National Historic Site near ital.” Within such a system, Indigenous Gjoa Haven, Nunavut.) The federal gov- peoples assume roles and responsibilities ernment has also provided $76.5 million in “environmental and wildlife monitoring; toward building community harbours in vessel management; emergency prepared- Grise Fiord and Resolute Bay to support the ness and response, search and rescue and developing conservation economy in the tourism.” Support for a conservation econ- region. Other initiatives, like the Inuit-led omy should also include the development Nunavut Inuit Marine Monitoring Program of local marine and community infrastruc- which collects information on shipping ture. Mary Simon suggests that a conserva- activities, environmental conditions, and tion economy “will support communities wildlife, are likely models for future initia- and individuals in regaining land-based tives led by Northerners that embody the life skills, reconnect with their cultural tra- ANPF vision of strong partnerships. ditions, collect indigenous knowledge, and have the confidence that there will always Implications be ‘places that are theirs.’” a. Enhanced situational awareness, marine monitoring, and emer- The most explicit application of the con- gency response capabilities. servation economy in the Canadian Arc- Given Northern residents’ knowl- tic has come with the creation of the edge of the land and presence 109,000-square-kilometre Tallurutiup in potential high traffic areas, as Imanga National Marine Conservation well as the political commitment Area (Lancaster Sound). The Qikiqtani Inuit to improving Indigenous-Crown 61

2020 REPORT relations, the Government of Can- mackerel in Greenland is a prime exam- ada is likely to increasingly partner ple of the possibilities – between 2011 with Indigenous organizations and and 2014, it moved from 0% to 23% of the communities to fund and support island’s fisheries exports.3 On the other community-based programs to hand, climate change could also dimin- improve situational awareness and ish species due to new predators, invasive bolster the on-the-ground intel- species, and other changes to the marine ligence available to federal and environment, including increased ocean territorial agencies responsible acidity. Cost of travel to remote areas in the for safety and security portfolios. High Arctic might also outweigh the possi- These groups also represent poten- ble revenues from a catch.4 tial assets for emergency response. Currently, the Canadian Arctic has had little exposure to large-scale commercial fisher- 4.5 FISHERIES ies, although certain projections have forecast that climate change might increase It is uncertain how climate change will the number of commercially valuable impact Arctic fisheries over the next two species in the region. The Government of decades. Changing environmental condi- Nunavut has listed commercial fisheries as tions could lead to fortuitous conditions a vital pillar of its economic development for some fish stocks, cause commercially plan. Fishing operations are expanding for valuable species to shift to higher lati- turbot, Arctic char, and northern shrimp tudes, lengthen fishing seasons, and open (at this point mostly in Baffin Bay, Davis new fishing grounds. The arrival of Atlantic Strait, and Hudson Bay and Strait), and

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT other communities such as Gjoa Haven, b. Illegal fishing. Monitoring ille- Taloyoak, Cape Dorset, and Qikiqtarjuaq gal or “dark fishing” activities will are establishing test fisheries. require effective situational awareness and surveillance as Canada’s Several international and domestic ini- Arctic waters and adjacent parts of tiatives have set moratoriums on fishing the Arctic Ocean become increas- activities in parts of the Arctic Ocean. In ing accessible. 2014, for instance, the Inuvialuit Regional c. The political and jurisdictional Corporation, the Inuvialuit Game Council, challenges of expanding fish- the Fisheries Joint Management Com- eries. The potential expansion mittee, and Fisheries and Oceans Canada of commercial fishing activity in agreed that, while small-scale community- Canada’s EEZ and in the Central based fisheries should be encouraged Arctic when the current morato- in the Beaufort Sea, large-scale offshore rium expires could lead to political operations should be barred. The agree- challenges and jurisdictional issues ment prevents the start of commercial as new regulations and agree- fisheries in over 831,000 square kilometres ments are developed between of the Canadian Beaufort. On the interna- Arctic and non-Arctic states. Coun- tional level, a December 2017 agreement tries with large and efficient fish- (signed in October 2018) between Can- ing fleets, such as Japan and China, ada, Russia, the United States, Greenland, are likely to seek a major role in Norway, China, South Korea, Iceland, Japan, the development of Arctic fisher- and the European Union set a moratorium ies, heightening the jurisdictional on commercial fishing in the Central Arc- complexity involved in regulating tic and launched a joint program of scien- regional fishing activities. tific research in the region to ascertain the sustainability of a fishery. The agreement takes a “proactive and precautionary approach” to future fishing activities in the area and provides a framework for the establishment of conservation and management measures and the participation of Arctic Indigenous peoples. Implications a. Food security in Inuit Nunangat. The prospective expansion and sustainability of Arctic fisheries are “RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT: RESPONSIBLE, SUSTAINABLE a direct concern to the 53 coastal RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT AND JOB CREATION IS THE COR- communities of Inuit Nunangat NERSTONE OF THE TERRITORIAL ECONOMIES. INDIGENOUS for which community-based fish- OWNERSHIP, INVESTMENT AND PARTICIPATION IN THE eries provide an important source RESOURCE INDUSTRY ARE KEY TO THE SUCCESS OF THIS SEC- of country foods. New commer- TOR. RESOURCE PROJECTS PROVIDE EDUCATION, TRAINING cial opportunities associated with AND EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES IN COMMUNITIES AS fisheries are likely to generate WELL AS DIRECT INDIGENOUS PARTICIPATION IN SUPPLY AND significant domestic and interna- SERVICES BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT.” tional interest, thus amplifying the - Pan-Territorial Vision and Principl for importance of scientific research Sustainable Development (2017) and monitoring in partnership with Northern community members. 63

2020 REPORT

CHAPTER FIVE

HUMAN

LEAD AUTHORS: JUSTIN BARNES AND P. WHITNEY LACKENBAUER

. from infectious diseases. However, changes in lifestyle brought on by Strong, self-reliant people and com- the move away from traditional munities working together for a subsistence hunting and gathering vibrant, prosperous and sustainable and societal changes brought on Arctic and northern region at home by modernization have resulted in and abroad, while expressing Cana- an increase in prevalence of chronic da’s enduring Arctic sovereignty. diseases such as diabetes, hyper- – Arctic and Northern Policy Framework tension, obesity and cardiovascular (ANPF) Vision (2019) diseases. In addition, child abuse, The rapid pace of change in the Arctic alcohol abuse, drug abuse, domes- presents new challenges to the health and tic violence, suicide, unintentional wellbeing of residents across the circum- injury are also associated with rapid polar world. As a 2010 Circumpolar Health cultural change, as well as loss of Survey observed: cultural identity and self-esteem.

Living conditions are changing The report notes that improvements in from an economy based on subsis- transportation infrastructure and commu- tence hunting and gathering to a nications technologies (such as the inter- cash-based economy. Across the cir- net and telemedicine), which are linked cumpolar north there is increasing to globalization, connected previously activity towards sustainable devel- isolated communities to larger urban cen- opment via local resource develop- tres. Increased connectivity has also intro- ment and widening involvement in duced new vulnerabilities to infectious the global economy. The influence diseases (such as influenza, acute respi- of such changes on the physical ratory infections, and antibiotic-resistant health of Arctic residents on the one pathogens) which might be imported into hand have been positive, resulting the Arctic by visitors to the region. Further- in improved housing conditions, a more, transboundary environmental con- more stable supply of food, increased taminants which originate in mid-latitude access to more western goods, and industrial and agricultural regions of the decreases in morbidity and mortality world continue to migrate to the Arctic via

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT atmospheric, river, and ocean transport. Their subsequent bio-magnification in Arc- tic food webs and appearance in subsistence “WHO WE ARE AND WHERE WE LIVE: THE TOTAL foods pose great concerns to Northerners. POPULATION OF THE TERRITORIES IS CURRENTLY Furthermore, climate change is introduc- SOME 113,000 PERSONS, WHICH IS ABOUT 1% OF ing new economic and health threats to CANADA’S POPULATION, LIVING IN 75 REMOTE Arctic communities, with the most vulner- AND RURAL COMMUNITIES. THE TERRITORIES able people likely to be those following ARE HOME TO A VAST AND RICH DIVERSITY OF a traditional lifestyle close to the land in CULTURES AND LANGUAGES, WITH INDIGE- remote communities. Direct health-related NOUS PEOPLES MAKING UP 86 PERCENT OF THE impacts might include more injuries, hypo- thermia, and frostbite related to travel, POPULATION OF NUNAVUT, 50 PERCENT IN THE unpredictable ice and weather conditions, NORTHWEST TERRITORIES AND 25 PERCENT IN and heat stress in summer. Changes in THE YUKON. “ access to safe drinking water and to coun- - Pan-Territorial Vision and Principles for try foods due to shifting migration pat- Sustainable Development (2017) terns of species also raise concern amongst Northerners. Canada’s Arctic is experiencing all of these dynamics. In framing her 2017 report proposing a new Shared Arctic Leadership Model, Inuit leader Mary Simon highlighted that the Canadian Arctic continues “to exhibit among the worst national social indicators for basic wellness” and that, despite “all the hard-earned tools of empowerment, … many individuals and families do not feel empowered and healthy.” Many statistics bear out her observation about poor living standards. For example: • 50% of Inuit households do not have acceptable housing, and the incidence of core housing need in the NWT is the second highest in Canada (with almost one in five households reporting the need for adequate, accessible, and affordable housing). • There is almost a 10% gap between NWT residents and other Canadi- ans about their perceived physical and mental health, with Indigenous populations reporting significantly poorer health and mental health. • In 2019, Nunavut had the highest unemployment rate in Canada (13.4%), with Yukon the lowest at 3.6%. 66

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT • High rates of alcoholism, sexual and 2016, the population of Yukon was 37,860 physical abuse including domes- and it is projected to grow by 19.5% to tic violence, criminal incarceration, reach 45,230 in 2030. The Northwest Ter- and suicide. ritories is projected to grow by only 3.5%, • In 2016, the tuberculosis rate from 44,469 in 2016 to 46,026 in 2035. Nun- amongst Inuit was over 290 avut had the highest rate of population times higher than that of the growth in all of Canada from 2001-17, and Canadian-born non-Indigenous it is expected to remain the highest in the population. territories and grow by 31% from 37,667 in • As a 2017 study by the Conference 2017 to 48,042 in 2035.1 Board of Canada on “How Can- Diverse populations of Inuit, First Nation, ada Performs” observed, Canada’s and Métis citizens in Canada’s Northern Northern territories generally fall territories and provincial norths also give behind the Canadian average on the regions distinct characteristics. Accord- measures of equity (eg. poverty, ing to 2016 census data, Indigenous peoples income distribution, gender and represent 23.3% of Yukon’s population, racial wage gaps) and social cohe- 50.7% of the NWT, 85.9% of Nunavut, 91.4% sion (eg. unemployment rate, homi- of Nunavik, and 90.2% of Nunatsiavut. cides, suicides). Given these challenges, it is not surpris- Opportunities and challenges also stem ing that the federal government adopted from the North’s comparatively youthful “strong Arctic and northern people and population compared to the rest of Canada. communities” as a central theme for its In Nunavut, for example, the median age co-developed Arctic and Northern Policy is just over 26 (compared to just over 40 Framework. Although the overall popu- in Canada as a whole). Providing oppor- lation of Canada’s Northern territories is tunities for education, employment, and small compared to the northern popula- competitive wages in a comparatively tions in other Arctic states, it includes sub- underdeveloped region dominated by pub- stantial Indigenous populations that face lic sector employment is likely to remain a distinct historical, cultural, and socio-eco- significant challenge for governments. nomic challenges. First Nations, Métis, and Education and skill development will con- Inuit populations in Northern Canada are tinue to pose significant challenges in the culturally diverse, but also share demographic features that dis- Cultural Identity tinguish them from non-Indige- nous populations. Longstanding Aboriginal First Métis Inuk Non- inequalities generate politi- Identity Nations Aboriginal cal pressure for Northerners to Yukon 23.3 19.1 2.9 0.6 76.7 receive comparable services, Northwest opportunities, and standards of 50.7 32.1 8.2 9.9 49.3 living as those enjoyed by other Territories Canadians. Nunavut 85.9 0.5 0.5 84.7 14.1

Nunavik 91.4 1.0 0.2 90.0 8.6 5.1 DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE Nunatsiavut 92.0 1.0 1.4 89.4 8.2 There is uneven population growth across Canada’s North, Labrador 8.9 5.5 1.5 1.4 91.1 and this is expected to continue over the next fifteen years. In 67

2020 REPORT “Youth across the Arctic understand that education is a portal to opportunity. They aspire to a quality education equivalent to other Canadians: an education that also reaffirms the central role of their culture and Indigenous languages in their identity as Canadians. A new Arctic Policy Framework, if it is to separate itself from many previous documents on the future of the Arctic, must speak to these young voices in this era of reconciliation.” – Mary Simon, A New Shared Arctic Leadership Model (2017)

North. Many reports identify early child- by the Territorial governments to expand hood education, improvements in ele- post-secondary education options for mentary, secondary, and post-secondary Northerners in the region are likely to help education, and access to higher educa- curb some of this out-migration, but econ- tion as essential preconditions to improv- omies of scale mean that comparatively ing socio-economic and health indicators. small Northern colleges and universities The significant disparity in education levels are unlikely to compete with the breadth between the North and the rest of Canada and depth of academic and professional (eg. 34% of Inuit in Inuit Nunangat aged 25 programs available at well-established to 64 have a high school diploma compared Southern institutions. to 86% of Canadians in the same group) continues to limit opportunities for North- Implications erners. Furthermore, persistent differences a. Differences in population dis- between Indigenous and non-Indigenous tributions continue to strain education rates (e.g. 74% of Northwest Ter- resources. Providing the same or ritories non-Indigenous residents aged 25 similar levels of services across the to 64 years old have a postsecondary certif- North has proven to be challeng- icate, diploma, or degree, compared to 43% ing for governments, and this is of Indigenous peoples) expose ongoing expected to continue. The diverse divisions within the Northern population. population of the North also has differing needs, values, and priori- Persistent economic, social, and gender ties that require a situation-based inequalities, limited employment oppor- approach, rather than blanket pol- tunities, and environmental concerns icies which cover the entire North. could drive potential out-migration from b. Youth disenfranchisement could the Canadian North over the next two worsen health indicators, decades. As Northerners look to other parts increase political instability, and of Canada for education and employment lead to out-migration. North- opportunities, the North could continue ern young people’s frustration to experience a “brain drain” with which it with under-education and lack 68 has struggled for decades. Ongoing efforts

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT of training opportunities, unem- drawn Northerners increasingly into urban ployment and underemployment, centres. and disenfranchisement could Canadian scholars Chris Southcott and lead to instability if their realities Valoree Walker categorize three main types and needs are not acknowledged of communities in the Canadian North: or met. Additionally, migration of educated youth out of the North 1. urban centres such as White- is likely to continue because of a horse, Yellowknife, and Iqaluit comparative lack of diversity in contain the largest concentra- employment opportunities in the tions of population and have Arctic. the highest percentages of non- c. Conflict could arise due to dif- Indigenous residents, the high- fering political, economic, and est levels of education, and their environmental interests within economies are primarily dedi- “Canada sees a the Inuit, Métis, and First Nations cated to providing services to future in which the communities and between Indig- their surrounding areas; people of the Arc- enous groups and the federal 2. isolated and/or remote commu- tic and North are government. Differing employ- nities are primarily Indigenous, full participants ment opportunities and prospects have the highest percentages of in Canadian soci- across the North, including factors overcrowded housing, highest involved with land claim nego- unemployment rates, and lowest ety, with access to tiations and impact and benefit levels of formal education; and the same services, agreements, could increase friction 3. communities established for opportunities and between groups over priorities and the resource-extraction indus- standards of living desired futures, thus eroding politi- try have, over time, been estab- as those enjoyed cal and social cohesion. lished as company towns to by other Canadi- support resource extraction ans. This ambition 5.2 SETTLEMENT PATTERNS AND activities. These communities will require greater URBANIZATION are in decline, however, as fly-in/ effort, focus, trust fly-out work camps have become and collaboration Over the last century, scholar Marlene increasingly popular and as exist- amongst partners.” Laruelle observes that three primary ing resource-dependent commu- drivers led to waves of settlement and nities gradually converge with Arctic and Northern urbanization in the Circumpolar Arctic: Indigenous communities.2 Policy Framework 1) industrial activities; 2) the militariza- (2019) tion of the Arctic; and 3) the development Half of the world’s population is now urban- of regional administrative centres. The ized and the United Nations predicts that first driver, large-scale industrial activities by 2050, 85.9% of the developed world and (including fishing, forestry, energy, and 64.1% of the developing world will live in mineral extraction) led to the establish- cities. About two-thirds of the global Arc- ment of small cities and towns across the tic population lives in urban conditions, Canadian North. The construction of mil- and Indigenous peoples are progressively itary infrastructure during the Cold War moving from smaller to larger settlements (particularly the Distant Early Warning or for educational and job opportunities and DEW Line) played a significant role in draw- for amenities which smaller settlements ing many Inuit into coastal settlements lack. Canada’s North is following this trend, in the 1950s and 1960s. Since that time, with most of the territorial populations in access to social services, public jobs, and Yukon and the NWT concentrated in their other enticements and inducements have capital cities (70% in Whitehorse and 50% 69

2020 REPORT in Yellowknife), while 78% of Nunavum- miut live in the 24 communities outside of Nunavut’s capital city of Iqaluit. The populations of many smaller settlements are expected to decline over the next two decades, leading to questions about their viability and further out-mi- “In addition to the recognition of rights and gration. Whitehorse is expected to grow innovative forms of governance and collabora- to 78.5% of Yukon’s population by 2030, tion, reconciliation in Canada’s Arctic and north and Yellowknife’s share of the NWT’s pop- means closing the socio-economic gaps that ulation is expected to increase to 52.3% by 2030. Unlike the other territories, Nunavut exist between Arctic and northern Indigenous has a deliberate policy of diffusing public peoples and other Canadians. Canada will work sector jobs to smaller communities outside with Indigenous governments and organiza- the capital of Iqaluit, which has only 21% tions, territories, provinces and other partners of the territory’s population. Thus, while to close these gaps.” Iqaluit is expected to grow, Nunavut’s pop- - Arctic and Northern Policy Framework (2019) ulation distribution is projected to remain similar up to 2035. Implications a. Urbanization and changing settlement patterns could change the distribution of services. As urban centres grow and smaller remote settlements shrink, the distribution of services to smaller communities could become increasingly expensive and difficult. Officials at national and regional levels need to be aware of centralizing and urbanizing trends and anticipate their effects on services. Furthermore, questions remain about the economic role of large settlements in supporting diversified economic growth in Northern regions. b. Rapid urbanization and resource scarcity could exacerbate pressures on already strained and expensive food networks in the North. As more people move into urban centres, urban Northerners may rely less on country foods and become increasingly dependent on other food networks. Interrup- tions to food networks, the high 70 costs of food, and an increase in the

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT consumption of processed foods highlights how communities and organiza- could lead to increased food inse- tions desire “partnerships and opportuni- curity and other health issues. ties to play an active and constructive role c. Urbanization could lead to the in infrastructure investments through … concentration of illicit activities financial partnership, as well as the devel- and vulnerabilities. More con- opment of business capacity and skills.” centrated criminal activities could Accordingly, federal investment in North- necessitate a greater role for the ern infrastructure seeks to leverage private Royal Canadian Mounted Police sector investment and is often justified in (RCMP), as well as other defence terms of regional economic development. and intelligence partners. Further- Frequently cited infrastructure needs more, settlements and urban cen- include broadband connectivity, housing, tres that rely heavily on outside energy infrastructure, improved charting networks are vulnerable to natural and mapping, port facilities, better airport and environmental disasters from facilities, and all-season roads to access human activities (e.g. cruise ships, communities and mineral resources. The resource extraction) and from deterioration of existing community and impacts of climate change on com- transportation infrastructure, which is munities and infrastructure. vulnerable to thawing permafrost and extreme weather events, further com- 5.3 INFRASTRUCTURE GAPS pounds the issue. The Conference Board of Canada explains Implications that deficits in critical infrastructure keep communities isolated, inhibit the deliv- a. Poor community infrastruc- ery of health and social services, and limit ture limits Northern develop- economic opportunities. For example, lim- ment and inhibits the delivery of ited broadband access in Nunavut and the essential services such as health NWT restrict their citizens’ ability to par- care and education. Commu- ticipate in the digital economy or to take nity infrastructure, along with air advantage of e-learning opportunities. and ground transport and energy “Given that new workplace skills, such as infrastructure, is needed to attract problem-solving in technology-rich envi- investment and facilitate business development in order to grow the ronments, depend on access to adequate computing infrastructure and connectivity,” Arctic economy and raise the stan- the report notes, “many remote Northern dard of living for Arctic residents. and Indigenous communities continue to Discerning new models to entice be at an economic disadvantage.” these investments should be a priority over the next fifteen years. The ANPF echoes many Canadian studies b. Strategic investments in North- that highlight the need for “transformative ern telecommunications infra- investments” in Arctic and Northern infrastructure are likely to support structure, “rather than a remedial approach improved education outcomes, that only perpetuates a state of crisis.” open economic opportunities, For example, the Territorial governments’ stimulate Northern-based innova- Pan-Territorial Vision for Sustainable Devel- tion and technology, and improve opment conceptualizes large-scale infra- the well-being of Northern Cana- structure investments as foundational to dians (particularly those living in creating economic opportunity and pros- physically isolated communities) perity for communities. In turn, the ANPF over the next decade. This form of 71

2020 REPORT Social and Economic Inequity in Inuit Nunangat Many Inuit face social and economic inequities that impact our health and wellbeing Inuit Nunangat All Canadians

52% of Inuit in Inuit Nunangat 9% of all Canadians live in live in crowded homes*1 crowded homes*1

34% of Inuit aged 25 to 64 in 86% of all Canadians aged 25 to Inuit Nunangat have earned a high 64 have earned a high school diploma1 school diploma1

70% of Inuit households 8% of all households in Nunavut are food insecure 2 in Canada are food insecure 3

$23,485 The median $92,011 The median before before tax individual income for Inuit tax individual income for non-Indigenous in Inuit Nunangat 1 people in Inuit Nunangat 1

30 The number of physicians per 119The number of physicians 100,000 population in Nunavut 4 per 100,000 population in Urban Health Authorities 4

47.5% of Inuit in Inuit 60.2% of all Canadians Nunangat are employed1 are employed1 72.4 years 82.9 years The projected life expectancy The projected life expectancy for for Inuit in Canada† 5 non-Indigenous people in Canada5

12.3 The infant mortality rate 4.4 The non-indigenous infant 6 IMR 6 per 1,000 for Inuit infants in Canada. mortality rate per 1,000 for Canada.

* Should not be compared with crowding data for previous years. Based on the suitability definition (whether the dwelling has enough bedrooms for the size and composition of the household). The previous figure was based on the number of persons per room definition. † Should not be compared with previous life expectancy data. The figure is a national 2017 projection of life expectancy for Inuit. Previous figures were for 2004-2008 for all residents of Inuit Nunangat, including non-Inuit.

1 Statistics Canada, 2016 Census. (crowded homes: 98-400-X2016163; high school diploma 98-400-X2016265; income: unpublished custom table provided to ITK; employment: 98-400-X2016266) 2 Grace M. Egeland, Inuit Health Survey 2007-2008: Nunavut (Ste-Anne-de-Bellevue, QC: Centre for Indigenous Peoples’ Nutrition and Environment, May 2010), 12. 3 Shirin Roshanafshar and Emma Hawkins. Health at a Glance: Food Insecurity in Canada (Ottawa, ON: Statistics Canada, March 25, 2015). 4 Canadian Institute for Health Information, Supply, Distribution and Migration of Physicians in Canada, 2014 (Ottawa, ON: Canadian Institute for Health Information, September 2015). 5 Custom table based on Statistics Canada’s Projections of the Aboriginal Population and Households in Canada, 2011 to 2036. 6 Sheppard et al 2017. “Birth outcomes among First Nations, Inuit and Metis populations.” Health Reports Vol. 28. No. 11 72

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

79 www.itk.ca 3 Social and Economic Inequity in Inuit Nunangat Many Inuit face social and economic inequities that impact our health and wellbeing connectivity may also have signifi- and objectives of this framework cant effects on identities and social point the way to a vibrant, sus- Inuit Nunangat All Canadians cohesion (discussed below). tainable and prosperous future.” It c. Addressing Arctic infrastruc- also promises that “in our shared 52% of Inuit in Inuit Nunangat 9% of all Canadians live in ture gaps invites investments future, Canada’s Arctic and North live in crowded homes*1 crowded homes*1 in “dual-use” capabilities that will no longer be pushed to the enhance defence and security as margins of the national commu- well as social and economic appli- nity,” and that “its people will be full 34% of Inuit aged 25 to 64 in 86% of all Canadians aged 25 to Inuit Nunangat have earned a high 64 have earned a high school diploma1 cations. Clean, affordable energy participants in Canadian society, school diploma1 options, improved transportation with access to the same services, links, and robust telecommunica- opportunities and standards of liv- tions are examples of shared pri- ing as those enjoyed by other Cana- of Inuit households of all households 70% 8% ority areas. This should encourage dians” (emphasis added). Given in Nunavut are food insecure 2 in Canada are food insecure 3 new approaches to create and existing gaps, this is an outcome leverage innovative technologies that the Government of Canada will $23,485 The median $92,011 The median before and modernized systems. be hard-pressed to realize over the before tax individual income for Inuit tax individual income for non-Indigenous d. Competition for high-cost invest- next fifteen years – and, even with in Inuit Nunangat 1 people in Inuit Nunangat 1 ments in infrastructure could also promised investments, the inability divide Northerners. While pub- to deliver on this strong commit- 30 The number of physicians per 119The number of physicians lic and Indigenous governments ment is likely to continue to feed dis- 100,000 population in Nunavut 4 per 100,000 population in in the Canadian North, and myr- illusionment with governments and Urban Health Authorities 4 iad lobbying organizations, agree weaken social cohesion. on the need for infrastructure, Poor socio-economic health indi- there is no consensus on how to of Inuit in Inuit of all Canadians cators reflect deeply entrenched 47.5% 60.2% queue specific priorities and where Nunangat are employed1 are employed1 problems and legacies of coloniza- investments should focus. The tion. The residential school system, Pan-Territorial Vision for Sustain- relocation programs, and the rejec- 72.4 years 82.9 years able Development suggests that tion of Indigenous consultation The projected life expectancy The projected life expectancy for “these types of investment oppor- 5 5 over resource extraction have had for Inuit in Canada† non-Indigenous people in Canada tunities are not about dividing the damaging effects on mental and pie, but working in true partner- physical health, language, culture, ship, to make a better economic 12.3 The infant mortality rate 4.4 The non-indigenous infant education, and Indigenous knowl- 6 IMR 6 pie that will achieve a broader, per 1,000 for Inuit infants in Canada. mortality rate per 1,000 for Canada. edge. High rates of substance abuse deeper and sustained prosperity and suicide in Indigenous popu- across all regions and territories.” * Should not be compared with crowding data for previous years. Based on the suitability definition (whether the lations have been linked to inter- While this common vision of long- dwelling has enough bedrooms for the size and composition of the household). The previous figure was based on the generational trauma caused by the term payoff is inspiring, it does not number of persons per room definition. impacts of colonialism. Concerns † Should not be compared with previous life expectancy data. The figure is a national 2017 projection of life expectancy preclude competition for scarce about the erosion of Indigenous for Inuit. Previous figures were for 2004-2008 for all residents of Inuit Nunangat, including non-Inuit. resources (with potential implica- languages and cultures also factor tions for political and social cohe- 1 Statistics Canada, 2016 Census. (crowded homes: 98-400-X2016163; high school diploma 98-400-X2016265; income: heavily into Northern Indigenous sion) over the next fifteen years. unpublished custom table provided to ITK; employment: 98-400-X2016266) peoples’ future-oriented strategies, 2 Grace M. Egeland, Inuit Health Survey 2007-2008: Nunavut (Ste-Anne-de-Bellevue, QC: Centre for Indigenous Peoples’ which request government support Nutrition and Environment, May 2010), 12. 5.4 SOCIAL AND HEALTH INEQUALITIES for cultural revitalization efforts. 3 Shirin Roshanafshar and Emma Hawkins. Health at a Glance: Food Insecurity in Canada (Ottawa, ON: Statistics Canada, March 25, 2015). The ANPF boldly states that “the Govern- Violence against Indigenous women 4 Canadian Institute for Health Information, Supply, Distribution and Migration of Physicians in Canada, 2014 (Ottawa, ON: ment of Canada and its partners will close and girls also remains a significant Canadian Institute for Health Information, September 2015). the gaps and divides that exist between problem, with Indigenous women 5 Custom table based on Statistics Canada’s Projections of the Aboriginal Population and Households in Canada, 2011 this region, particularly in relation to its having a much higher likelihood of a to 2036. violent death than non-Indigenous 6 Sheppard et al 2017. “Birth outcomes among First Nations, Inuit and Metis populations.” Health Reports Vol. 28. No. 11 Indigenous peoples, and the rest of the country. The clear and ambitious goals women, according to statistics cited 73

2020 REPORT

79 www.itk.ca 3 in the 2019 final report of theNational considered a fundamental indicator of a Inquiry into Missing and Murdered Indige- population’s overall health and wellness) in nous Women and Girls. the North reveals gaps in a range of health factors including access to health care, The delivery of health care services is nutrition, living conditions, and lifestyle. challenging in the Arctic, producing dis- Life expectancy in the North is notably proportionate health challenges for resi- lower than that of the rest of Canada (e.g. dents of the region. Additional hurdles for life expectancy for Inuit in Canada is 72.4 healthcare delivery in the North include years, compared to 82.9 years for Canada’s a lack of infrastructure and trained pro- non-Indigenous population). fessionals; small, often isolated populations spread out over vast distances; and High rates of food insecurity in the Arctic the need to deliver services in culturally- are exacerbated by climate change and appropriate ways. Hospitals and special- environmental contamination. The three ized health services are often not available highest levels of household food inse- locally and many people are forced to fly curity in Canada in 2017-18 were in Nun- from their home communities to access avut (57% of households), the Northwest specialized care in regional or southern Territories (21% of households), and Yukon Canadian hubs. Improved medical tech- (16.9% of households). Housing challenges nologies, communications (which support in the North, including a lack of quality tele-health and other forms of remote housing and overcrowding, are associated delivery), pharmaceuticals, and treatment with high rates of communicable disease options are expected to improve the deliv- such as tuberculosis. In Inuit Nunangat, ery of some services over the next fifteen for example, 52% of Inuit live in crowded years but are unlikely to overcome the full homes, compared to 9% of Canadians range of obstacles that lead to differentials overall. in services between northern and southern The Conference Board of Canada also Canada. reports that costs of living and rates of Reports also highlight the severity of poverty in the Territorial North are among mental health challenges in Northern the highest in the country. Although aver- communities compared to those in the age incomes in the Territories appear to be rest of Canada, coupled with a lack of high, these numbers do not factor in sig- mental health facilities and services at the nificantly higher costs of living and goods community level. The high rate of suicide compared to southern Canada. It also among Indigenous peoples (particularly conceals the striking difference in income amongst youth) is a source of significant distribution between Indigenous and concern. For example, the ANPF reports non-Indigenous people in the territories, that the rate of self-injury hospitalizations which affects related measures of social in Labrador is 231 per 100,000, which is cohesion, including crime rates and life sat- three times the Canadian average. Address- isfaction. The Board cites the Organisation ing mental health is a prerequisite for for Economic Co-operation and Develop- addressing other social challenges and for ment’s observation that “the more unequal building strong people and communities. a society is, the more difficult it is to move up the social ladder, simply because Comparatively poor health outcomes in children have a greater gap to make up.” Canada’s North are complicated by social determinants such as poor food security, Despite relatively high unemployment, overcrowded housing, high unemploy- crime rates, and poverty compared with ment, and low formal education levels. the Canadian average, the Conference 74 Shorter life expectancy (which is often Board of Canada reports that the territories

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT measure high in life satisfaction scores. Nunavut’s rating of 8.15 places it above the Canadian average (7.98), which is partly explained by the role of networks of family and other kinship ties that provide stability, share food, and contribute to a sense of belonging. Accordingly, culturally-specific measures of social cohesion are particularly relevant in remote Northern Indigenous communities, including the proportion of the population that participates in traditional activities such as hunting, fishing, trapping, and arts and crafts. Nunavut has the highest rate of Indigenous participation in traditional activities in Canada, and the Indigenous populations in both Yukon and the NWT had higher rates of participation in traditional activities than the national average. Participation in these types of activities is encouraged by land- based education programs, as well as the Canadian Rangers and Junior Canadian Ranger program. Implications a. Northern and Indigenous communities are particularly susceptible and vulnerable to emerging health threats. In a region with already limited resources and strained healthcare networks, responding to emerging threats such as pandemics will require more resources per capita than southern populations. The resource intensity associated with delivering services to small, dispersed populations compounds the challenges of addressing social determinants of health and improving quality of life. b. Limitations or interruptions to an already strained food supply chain pose acute risks for Northern communities. Com- munities that rely on limited food distribution networks are vulnerable to a serious interruption and require outside assistance. While various Northern strategies call for 75

2020 REPORT increased “food sovereignty” which focus. Despite a proliferation of new innovative solutions such as com- formal and informal institutions and munity greenhouses may help to groups claiming to offer solutions to support, the combination of cli- persistent gaps and problems, offi- mate change and growing pop- cials will be increasingly pressed to ulations concentrated in specific discern and reinforce best practices areas is likely to increase pressures on how to improve the social and on flora and fauna proximate to economic well-being of Northerners. communities and heighten (rather than reduce) dependence on sup- 5.5 HUMAN NETWORKS AND INCREAS- ply chains that bring in food from outside of the region over the next INGLY FRACTURED OR POLARIZED fifteen years. SOCIETIES c. Climate change poses a growing The NATO SFA explains that polarization can threat to the health of North- “originate from the differences in a wide ern populations. Climate change variety of areas from political (ideological, impacts on Arctic ecosystems, populist/mainstream) and social (ethnic, reli- traditional food sources, and infra- gious, racial, gender, urban/rural, young/old, structure will cause various issues educated/uneducated) to economic (rich/ for Northern communities in the poor, employed/unemployed, etc.). The short, medium, and long terms. common denominator is the differing and Permafrost melt and coastal ero- possibly diverging interests of individuals.” sion will continue to change the The heightened empowerment of individ- landscape of the North, affect infra- uals, diffusion of information sources, and structure, and alter transportation interest group politics that seek advantages patterns. A changing climate and for specific segments rather than for soci- environment also impact migra- ety as a whole can be progressive forces as tion patterns for Arctic fauna upon well as sources of dangerous division that which Northerners rely, which can fracture social cohesion and foment could reduce food security in some extremism. regions. For communities that rely on shipments of food, health The broader phenomenon of political polar- products, and other supplies, an ization in North America and the broader increasingly unpredictable climate world has been introduced in previous could prevent or limit the use of ice chapters. By contrast, Canada’s self-image roads or waterways for the trans- as a tolerant, open society that embraces portation of needed goods. human and viewpoint diversity is an import- d. High disparities in income, for- ant source of strength. The NATO SFA notes mal education, and incarcera- that “authoritarian societies/countries may tion rates between Indigenous try to hide these unpleasant fractures and and non-Indigenous Canadians appear to be more stable, but they may living in the North are likely to shatter rather quickly; whereas democratic persist. Longstanding structural societies, because of greater transparency, factors make these disparities diffi- seem to be more fragile, but are in fact more cult, if not impossible, to overcome resilient due to their openness to discuss in the short term. Managing expec- and address challenges/differences.” Using tations will be difficult. Further- this logic, Canada is likely to remain a highly more, the gendered dimensions of resilient and cohesive society in the next 76 these challenges require deliberate fifteen years.

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT That stated, a growing awareness and ampli- between communities as well as with the fication of socio-economic, cultural, and rest of Canada and the world are changing political divisions that help to explain the dif- through influences of the cyber domain, ferential social and health outcomes between industry, social media, education, and glo- Indigenous and non-Indigenous Canadians, balization. These linkages are also reshaping if left unaddressed, may become an unstable definitions of spaces, places, and connec- fault line in the future. The political empha- tions, producing new forms of interaction sis on reconciliation with Indigenous peoples and social identities that may not conform which involves apologizing for past wrongs to previous geographical or ethnic deter- committed against them, addressing current minants. The ongoing expansion of human deficits, and co-defining a shared, prosper- networks can also create new threat vec- ous future seeks to avoid this outcome. Along tors which allow malicious actors (often similar lines, distinctions between Northern acting under false pretences) to influence and Southern Canadians – and who has the and undermine social and democratic right to speak about Northern issues – have systems. the potential to marginalize key stakeholders and rightsholders who could otherwise Implications offer solutions and support to address core a. Human networks in the Canadian challenges. Arctic are evolving. While images of Indigenous peoples wearing tradi- Connections and interactions within and tional clothing and using traditional

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UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT tools are important representations channels. Furthermore, viewpoint of identities and cultural resilience, diversity on issues such as resource they should be complemented by development, conservation, and images depicting Northerners as political representation is likely avid users of Facebook and other to foment polarization amongst social media, advanced technol- Arctic regions and groups and ogies, and blending traditional societies. This may make groups and Western scientific knowledge. increasingly susceptible to exter- While the adoption of global social nal influence and pressures seek- media applications may promote ing to exploit or create fractures in the erosion of place-specific forms Canadian society. of human interaction, social media d. Polarization between Canadi- tools (such as the Instagram feed ans is likely to erode social cohe- of Inuktitut Ilinniaqta paired with sion, but is unlikely to produce Inuktut vocabulary) can lead to a major societal disruption. Hard- cultural and “linguistic renaissance.” ening partisan political allegiances, b. The emergence of Arctic/North- peaceful direct action by pro- ern identities and Indigeneity as testers against pipeline projects, assets. The Arctic Human Develop- and assertions of Indigenous sov- ment Report II notes that “culture, ereignty can be read as forms of especially Indigenous culture in dissatisfaction and sources of dis- the North, has increasingly become ruption, but they can also be seen a resource, both in the sense of a as legitimate expressions of dem- commodity and in the sense of a ocratic freedoms. Widespread tool that makes external recog- acceptance of the conventional nition easier.” This may introduce rule of law in Canada is unlikely to new advantages to living in the diminish in the next fifteen years, North, bolster cultural resilience, despite recent media amplifica- and entrench distinct Arctic/ tion of “defund police” and other Northern identities. The growing anti-government movements. recognition of the importance of e. Understanding the needs of local and Indigenous knowledge in youth and elderly persons. The many aspects of Arctic life (includ- Arctic Human Development Report II ing its applications in education, and many Northern Canadian science/ways of knowing, and gov- reports highlight the need to bet- ernance) is likely to continue in the ter understand the socio-cultural, next fifteen years. economic, and political roles that c. Fractures in Northern Canadian these segments of the Northern societies and between the North population currently play and and South may undermine pub- could play in the future. The ANPF lic trust and legitimacy in exist- includes promises to include youth ing governance systems, alienate more deliberately in devising pub- segments of the population, lic policy and foreign policies that and lessen political participation are reflective of their aspirations through established democratic and ambitions, but mechanisms to do so remain to be defined.

2020 REPORT

CHAPTER SIX

TECHNOLOGY

LEAD AUTHORS: ANDREA CHARRON, LAURA CONRAD, ROMAN ELLIS, NICHOLAS GLESBY, NANCY TEEPLE, AND ROB HUEBERT

A new decade means a new generation of Arctic, especially within Canada’s Arctic; technological advancements. Public and the Arctic environment could both benefit private innovations have led to rapid soci- from and be further harmed by technology; etal changes (such as the uptake of smart- and dependency on industry to provide phones), affected various industries via technological solutions for the Arctic will automation, and, in some cases, influenced be greater than elsewhere in the world. geographical landscapes via the extraction Unmanned Autonomous Systems (UAS) of needed resources (such as the open pit are becoming increasingly relevant for tantalite mines) or by innovation (such as defence and security considerations, but the dyke systems of the Netherlands). also for social purposes. Technological advancements bring both solutions and The advancement and increased usage of vulnerabilities, making cyber defence an technology will continue to shape soci- increasingly important consideration in ety in the Canadian Arctic. Technologi- enhancing security and privacy. Accord- cal advancements are being harnessed ingly, this chapter considers the technolog- to address Northern and Arctic issues. ical trends that have direct relevance in the In Canada’s Arctic, however, the federal Arctic to Canada and its allies. government expects less technological development given the current lack of infrastructure and small population as well 6.1 RATE OF MILITARY TECHNOLOGICAL as increased challenges associated with ADVANCEMENT operating in harsh climates and the distance from larger centres where backup Interoperability among allies could present systems, parts, and skilled personnel are challenges given disproportionate rates more likely to reside. This lack of critical of technological development. The North infrastructure will slow implementation American Arctic, however, is currently of new and useful technologies as they defended jointly by Canada and the United emerge. States via the binational North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD) In the coming decades, it is expected and dozens of bilateral Canada-US arrange- that the Arctic will be challenged spe- ments. In theory, interoperability is not a cifically by uneven rates of technologi- particular challenge for Canada and the US. cal advancements across and within the Upgrading old technology and the rate of

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT advancement of new capabilities, however, vulnerability. Offensive cyber operations are issues. The United States and Canada against networked ground-to-aerial-to- are laggards in terms of defence capabili- space systems could result in communica- ties measured by year-round access and tion and system failures and are potential projection of power when compared to threats. Both militaries desire data fusion the other Arctic states, except Iceland. The capabilities, data analytics, AI, machine North American Arctic has not required a learning, and edge computing to outpace year-round, persistent presence in the form new threats. Neither military has these of large military installations and standing capabilities at a fully-integrated and suffi- armies because of factors assumed to make ciently mature state to use them in deci- the Arctic a less likely direct target of attack. sion-making, especially with respect to the The Arctic has been, and is still thought to Arctic. be, however, an avenue of approach, likely For needed technological advances to be via the air/aerospace domain. realized, cable or satellite-based high-band- For both the United States and Canada, width internet access is needed and gaps despite the different sizes and capabilities in other local infrastructure, including cell of the two militaries, keeping pace with towers and access to cell phones and com- new technology has been a problem of puters, must be filled to enable significant priority and budgets. Today’s defence chal- technological advancement. For exam- lenges do not require bigger bases or more ple, states using Unmanned Autonomous personnel. Rather, technology is expected Systems in the Arctic without connectivity to be a force multiplier and the single best options are only able to accumulate infor- predictor of deterrence in the future. mation and not distribute it. Canada’s new RADARSAT Constellation is expected to In order to deter and defeat potential generate vital data, but there are concerns threats in the Arctic, detection is key. The the data generated and analyzed cannot discrepancy between the Arctic and south- be pushed from the South and received in ern Canada in terms of surveillance and the Arctic in a timely and readable format. situational awareness is the biggest technological gap that exists from a defence Despite these identified needs, Canada’s perspective. The North Warning System Arctic is likely to experience less techno- (NWS) is increasingly obsolete and new logical development than other jurisdic- technologies, including space-based, tions owing to its lack of infrastructure, ground-based, and maritime-based parts, small population, and challenges associ- are needed to augment current NWS ated with operating in harsh climates and systems. Thus, both the Canadian and in areas without large cities where backup American militaries, as well as NATO, are systems, parts, and skilled personnel are calling for sensors that can detect, distract, more likely to reside. and discriminate targets and have robust While sensors may be the current priority sensing capabilities in all domains. From of the US military, Canada requires more the most sophisticated hypersonic weap- basic systems, such as fast and reliable ons, to small Unmanned Autonomous telecommunications that will benefit both Systems (UAS), new sensors must be able local residents as well as national agen- to discern the most sophisticated as well as cies. Therefore, we anticipate that dual-use simple threats and keep pace with the new technology, whenever possible, will have high-speed decision-making tempo “at the the greatest impact in the Canadian North. speed of relevance.” The rise in alarmism in response to devel- Technological advancement makes data opments in advanced weapons technology 82 a force multiplier as well as a particular

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT by strategic competitors that pose security threats to North America and the Arctic region must be tempered with the low risk of conflict. Accidents, incidents, and miscalculations are more likely to result from miscommunication and misperception, and be compounded by uncertainty and mistrust. Thus, technological gaps in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) must be filled in the short term (over the next 5-10 years) in order to provide adequate situational awareness of the region to avoid misperceiving foreign activity. Implications a. Compatibility issues and difficulties in communicating between alliance members regarding the Arctic could arise if southern areas have more advanced technology compared to the Arctic. b. Gaps in situational awareness place challenges on interoperability between militaries, via ISR gaps, which could prevent critical data from being effectively communi- cated or transmitted to relevant security and defence partners in the future. c. Near- to long-term modernization of ISR capabilities – radars, sensors, satellites, and other networked systems – need to be protected from cyber operations intended to degrade, disrupt, and destroy data collection, analysis, information sharing, and communications. Due to these vulnerabilities, redundancy and older systems and processes not prone to exploitation by adversaries will also be needed (e.g. paper maps). d. The cyber threat against networked systems may involve adversaries using cyber capabilities to steal information and/or eavesdrop to gain knowledge of plans, operations, and positions of CAF 83

2020 REPORT and defence partners’ assets in the the transportation of any technolo- region. These challenges impact gy-related projects and this cannot the effectiveness of interoperability come at the expense of helping among the branches of the CAF and local inhabitants with the cost of with its defence allies, in addition living generally, such as with the to other government departments, transportation of foodstuffs.1 partners, and local governments and agencies involved in Arctic 6.2 UNMANNED AUTONOMOUS SYS- exercises and operations. TEMS (UAS) e. Diplomacy may be needed to de-escalate tensions resulting UAS are a low-cost technology that can from the advancement of capa- easily be used for a wide variety of func- bilities that enhance knowledge of tions, including natural disaster response, the region. Gaps in ISR could also environmental monitoring, search and lead to increased misperception of rescue, agriculture, or as intentional or foreign activity in the region and unintentional weapons. UAS are systems could lead to an escalation of crises which have the capability to undertake otherwise avoidable. a predetermined or prescribed task with f. Local residents near ground- little to no human intervention. This tech- based systems (or any systems nology is available to state and non-state for that matter) must be involved actors, including individuals, which leads in planning to ensure that Indig- to security concerns regarding the risk of enous-Crown agreements are not individuals using UAS for nefarious pur- violated. Given the cost of shipping poses. Militaries (including the CAF) have any equipment to the Arctic, the deployed UAS in the Arctic for various government will need to subsidize purposes. The Government of Canada is expanding its uptake of UAS in other areas as well, with Transport Canada and Environment and Climate Change Canada releasing tenders for a variety of UAS applications in the North. While the North Warning System’s (NWS) effectiveness has been declining as men- tioned, situational awareness and monitoring of UAS have become issues in the Canadian Arctic. UAS provide a potential opportunity to amplify a reimagined NWS that constitutes a system of systems with space-based, ground-based, and maritime-based parts. Additionally, the NWS currently does not have the acuity or capability, for example, to detect UAS flying at lower speeds and lower altitudes, nor for other vehicles flying at higher speeds and altitudes. Greater use of UAS in search and rescue scenarios may bring needed lifesaving equip- 84 ment to communities and individuals in

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT distress while providing safety experts with d. UAS activity could potentially valuable information on the condition of interfere with aviation and dis- the injured, the terrain, and the like, which rupt local wildlife. Evidence may save precious time prior to SAR techs includes a change in mating and being deployed. UAS are also providing migration patterns which have sec- opportunities for enhanced environmental ond-order impacts on controlling monitoring and remediation, ecosystem animal populations in areas, in management, and monitoring climate addition to changing the locations change impacts which could have signifi- and times of year for the hunting cant social benefits as well. traditions of Northern peoples. The impact on wildlife has become Implications an issue of public concern after a. An increase in UAS use could a video went viral in 2018 which lead to greater surveillance depicted a cub struggling to climb capabilities for states in the a snow wall. Alternatively, if used air/near-space, land, and mari- correctly, UAS may help us better time domains. This surveillance study and understand wildlife. role adds to existing situational awareness capabilities, provided 6.3 THE DEPENDENCY ON INDUSTRY TO by aviation, satellite imagery, and PROVIDE TECHNOLOGICAL SOLUTIONS sensors, potentially filling a gap in detecting unusual phenomena in TO THE ARCTIC the region, including foreign intru- All technological improvements are highly sions, changing environmental dependent on industry to develop, install, conditions, and situations requir- maintain, and replace the technology. ing an emergency response. Choke points for improvements in the b. UAS require a means to transmit Arctic from a technological perspective are data to operators at the speed almost wholly dependent on industry to of relevance. Transmissions of see the cost-benefit of hours of research large packets of data of both a and production. Whereas the military used classified and unclassified nature to be on the leading edge of technology are vulnerable to exploitation and that was later adapted to civilian use, it is manipulation. As the usage of this now the other way around. technology in the North increases, so too does the demand for infra- The development of 5G wireless capa- structure to support its benefits bilities has resulted in a worldwide com- and regulations to manage its mercial technology race amongst China’s usage. Huawei and Europe’s Ericsson and Nokia. c. Given that communities north of With Five Eyes states mulling over con- the tree line are more visible from tracts in domestic legislatures, the Gov- the air, considerations must be ernment of Canada must coordinate with made in balancing security and its international partners to ensure proper privacy in the Canadian North. interoperability with data distribution, UAS are vulnerable to exploitation while trusting the secureness and stabil- and manipulation and these sys- ity of the network. That such an important tems could be used by adversar- capability is wholly in the hands of industry ies or governments in ways that is an important consideration. violate the privacy of Northern At the national level, interoperability communities. between different manufacturers of these 85

2020 REPORT services must be regulated in order to cre- more difficult to maintain and ate a private sector equilibrium in pricing achieve with higher prices imposed and connectivity. Without private and by monopolies. public cooperation, there will be vastly different levels of access to capabilities cre- 6.4 TECHNOLOGY AND THE ating the potential for mass confusion and ENVIRONMENT under-preparedness in unforeseen emergency circumstances. Technology development will have a vari- Not only is it expensive to ship goods to ety of positive and negative implications for the Arctic, but those expenses soar when the environment in the Arctic. Technologi- one company has full control over pricing. cal advancements could be used to more Similar concerns may be drawn from a effectively respond to an oil spill or remove technological development perspective. harmful plastics from the ocean. Recent Due to the high cost of entry to develop in advancements in energy technology are the North, one may only find a few wealthy providing options for more renewable corporations with the means to begin or efficient sources of energy. Although investing. Individuals should be aware these technologies are not exclusive to the of the negative ramifications of private Arctic, the rate of climate change in the monopolies in the region. Public/private Arctic demands immediate solutions. Any partnerships may help dilute the con- technology that can reduce the Canadian centration of industry monopolies and Arctic’s dependency on diesel as a main encourage more local participation in fuel source would aid the health of resi- decision-making. dents and the environment. Technology also can have negative envi- Implications ronmental impacts. Technology can result a. Militaries are highly dependent in more toxic waste and new generations on industries for technological of technology often last for a limited time advancement, which can often before they become obsolete or parts come with unknown foreign back- malfunction. While programs do exist to ing and investors – knowing the recycle e-waste, they are limited across “customers’ customers” matters. the Arctic. Older technology is more likely b. 5G networks create a prob- to end up in landfills or burned, which is lem with the Five Eyes intel- extremely harmful to the environment. ligence-sharing relationship From legions of abandoned oil drums regarding the security and sta- to leftover waste from the soon-to-be- bility of networks. Cyber vulner- obsolete North Warning System, waste abilities, especially espionage and management of old and outdated technol- disruption attacks, are relevant in ogy is an important consideration. the Arctic as communication technology infrastructure advances. Technology has aided ice scientists’ under- c. Industry monopolies could have standing of the life-cycle of ice in the Arctic. notable negative implications in LIDAR (Light Detection and Ranging) is a the North. Monopolies may chal- remote sensing method that uses light in lenge interoperability between the form of a pulsed laser to measure vari- service companies needed for able distances and can be used to measure both strategic and societal pur- the thickness of ice. This means, however, poses. Access to emerging tech- that more UAS are used and more air traffic nologies elsewhere in the country control will be needed. For example, the air 86 and affordable living may become and maritime space around the Canadian

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT High Arctic Research Centre (CHARS) c. Environmental degradation and located in Cambridge Bay would be an area climate change are both issues of in which to concentrate traffic control sys- significant importance to com- tems and monitoring. munities in the Arctic. With growing interest in resource extraction Implications and tourism, any technology that a. With advancements in technol- can make travel more efficient will ogy, a growing obligation exists to also help to connect communities identify and utilize technologies more reliably while polluting less. that decrease pollutants and d. Negative impacts of technology emissions, can be applied to envi- in the Arctic, including technolo- ronmental cleanups, and can lead gies that use fossil fuels and pro- to cleaner oceans and waterways. duce C02 emissions or toxic waste b. Technologies that increase resulting from inadequate disposal understanding of the age and of obsolete or malfunctioning thickness of sea ice in the region technology, would have negative have an immense ecological effects on the Arctic environment impact, but also raise important and its communities. strategic questions for the region. Identifying overlap between strategic and societal challenges could increase uptake in new technologies with applications in both realms.

2020 REPORT 6.5 TECHNOLOGY AND SOCIETY Individual access to technology has significantly increased globally. In the Arctic At the regional level, the cost of living in however, the availability of technology has the Canadian Arctic is much higher com- been less consistent. Many individuals liv- pared to their southern counterparts ing in the Arctic still do not have access to despite existing government subsidies. broadband internet. Those that do have Food, housing, energy, and health costs access pay high prices for it and service is can reach exorbitant levels because of often very slow.3 It is the goal of the cur- distance and shipping costs. Advance- rent federal government to increase tech- ments in technology, including geodesic nology acquisition in the Arctic over the dome greenhouses and better asphalt, coming years. concrete, and new composite materials, can help to address some of these import- Implications ant social challenges. a. With research and development also come large private commer- Access to affordable, healthy food options cial interests and vast amounts is essential to the prosperity of any soci- of financial capital. Without regu- ety, and is an important building-block for latory assistance or public develop- modernization of the North that can be ment, Canadians living in the Arctic aided by technology. At the regional level, could fall prey to unaffordable and advancements in technology can lead unsustainable pricing models lead- to greater food security via better greening to poor qualities of life. house technology, hydroponic systems, b. Benefits of technology to and even future possibilities from cloning, Northern individuals include which could lower the cost of food and dis- improved communications, faster tance travelled. Greenhouses developed transmission of data, and greater from recycled sea containers and powered regional, national, and global by renewable energy resources, such as engagement for Northern peoples. solar panels and wind turbines, like those c. An increase in access to tech- in Gjoa Haven, Nunavut, could improve the nology could in turn lead to an quality of life and have employment bene- increase in the ability of individ- fits for Arctic populations.2 uals to participate in criminal The Canadian Arctic is sparsely populated activity, such as buying and sell- and has a shortage of health experts. There ing on the dark web and in black is also a lack of medical training institutions markets. The dark web will pose in the Arctic. Mobile clinics and diagnostic challenges for law enforcement services are an alternative to be explored. working to prevent individuals or With the development and implementa- groups from facilitating criminal tion of high-speed broadband and satel- activity online. As internet usage lite internet, medical advice via tele-health increases in the Arctic, individuals and telerobotic surgery could become will increasingly be able to access more accessible. Providing some manner the dark web or be influenced by of accessible medical treatment is impera- misinformation and disinformation tive for inhabitants in order to receive diag- campaigns. noses, and referrals. Access to prescriptions d. Increased access to technology and more sophisticated diagnostic equip- could lead to a greater ability to ment, however, is not likely to be solved connect individuals in times of until there are sufficient numbers of crisis or emergency, and allow inhabitants. for more training and education 88 opportunities, as well as greater

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT understandings of differences. As reliance on technology continues to More consistent connections with increase, the Government of Canada must people living in the Arctic provide begin to prepare for adversarial targeting opportunities for better representa- of key industries and equipment. A focus tion in government decision-mak- on strategic cyber-warfare defences should ing and improved delivery of social be considered. In Canada and other NATO services to the region. states, a general investment in cyber warfare defences will be key to creating new 6.6 OVER-RELIANCE ON TECHNOLOGICAL security assurances as the nature of global SOLUTIONS warfare changes and evolves. Over-reliance on new technology could An increasing dependency on technol- create vulnerabilities in the Arctic. Thus, as ogy to conduct certain operations has the NATO Strategic Foresight Assessment led to an assumption that technology can highlights, relearning “old skills” that are solve most problems. In the context of the “less vulnerable” in cases of emergency Arctic, this assumption could lead to inad- can increase resilience. By working with equate government responses to social Inuit communities and the Canadian Rang- problems that exist in the Arctic. Address- ers, integrating traditional knowledge into ing high suicide rates and the prominence the military lexicon can instill the CAF and of substance abuse in the Arctic requires a other government departments and agen- multi-dimensional approach as these are cies with knowledge of how to operate issues that technology cannot solve alone. in the Arctic without being solely reliant The world is rapidly digitizing and advanc- on technologies which may not always ing in technological capabilities. With this be available. The uniqueness of Canada’s comes the concern of over-reliance on Arctic, with less infrastructure and larger these services. As technological advance- Indigenous populations compared to ments reshape every sector of society other Arctic states, allows for new training – from power grids, wireless telecommuni- opportunities within the alliance for sur- cations, agriculture, government, military – viving and operating in the North without ensuring the protection of this equipment southern technologies. is key. Protective assurances will provide Similar to the global level, exposing indi- stability, continuity of services, and reliabil- viduals to Indigenous cultures will help ity in cases of unforeseen emergencies. break down longstanding misperceptions 89

2020 REPORT of the North. Adapting to Indigenous strat- c. Some issues cannot be solved by egies of navigation and survival in the technology – social problems may Arctic may serve as a research opportunity continue regardless of technolo- to overcome many technological vulnera- gies deployed and there could be bilities elsewhere in Canada and abroad, negative impacts on populations pulling Canada away from technological that might see no government dependencies. follow-up. d. Involving Indigenous peoples and Implications integrating traditional know- a. The assumption that technol- ledge in Arctic operations with ogy can solve large-scale social allies are reminders to the world problems could lead to a lack of that the Arctic is not a desolate development in the Arctic. At the wasteland, but rather the home- national level this could lead to a land to rich Indigenous cultures. false sense of having solved social At both the regional and national problems or assuming that nothing levels, greater cooperation with else can be done to address them. Indigenous peoples as partners At the regional level this could will increase relations with the fed- lead to resentment of the southern eral government. By using tradi- regions and increased isolation. It tional knowledge in conjunction could also result in the presence of with scientific knowledge, Indig- technology that no one knows how enous peoples will not only feel to use due to never being trained in more respected by the Canadian such areas. government but may be more will- b. Over-reliance on networked sys- ing to grant the Canadian Armed tems linking society creates vul- Forces and NATO allies access to nerabilities in key industries and their homelands. equipment to disruption by accidents or individuals.

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT Related MINDS Policy Challenges MINDS Policy Challenges for 2020-2021 those non-military in nature, are we reflect policy challenges for the Department investing in the right capabilities? of National Defence and the Canadian Are there other capabilities that Armed Forces (DND/CAF) and are the result would support Canada’s objectives of consultations with senior leadership in the Arctic? across the Defence Team. These challenges • Are our policies and strategies com- represent key issues areas where DND/CAF patible with other Arctic partners? could benefit from external expertise to How does Canada work with allies challenge or complement their thinking. and partners who may have a dif- One challenge area is to better understand ferent interpretation of the level of how Canada can work with both Arctic and risk associated with activities in the non-Arctic partners to identify and address non-military realm? risks in the Arctic, including those in the non- • What is the realistic scope of respon- military realm. sibility the Defence Team can assume • Beyond the military domain, what in the Arctic, particularly given exist- threats exist in the Arctic? What are ing resources? What additional the foreign economic and military resources might be required to meet interests in Canada’s North? current and future expectations? • DND/CAF works closely with part- • How could climate change alter ners (e.g. government, other Cana- future defence requirements in the dian partners, other Arctic countries, North and how could DND/CAF NATO, non-Arctic partners) in the Arc- address climatic changes in the tic. How can these relationships be region? more effective at delivering benefits • What other infrastructure does Can- and services? ada need in the Arctic? How can CAF • What is/will be the role of land, sea, and other government departments air, and/or special operations forces leverage each other’s capabilities to in demonstrating Canadian sover- achieve a holistic presence and situ- eignty and exercising deterrence ational awareness in the North? against activities undermining Cana- • Canada has recently released the dian interests in the North? How do Arctic and Northern Policy Frame- we operate in this environment to work (ANPF) to help focus and guide achieve these effects? Government of Canada engage- • Through SSE, Canada has committed ment in the North. How does this to acquiring various technologies to framework compare to similar Arctic increase its reach and mobility in the strategic frameworks of Arctic and Arctic. Given the changing nature of near-Arctic states? the threats in the region, including • How does Canada’s involvement with US, Five Eyes, and NATO affect other cooperative relationships in the Arctic?

2020 REPORT

CONCLUSIONS CONCLUSIONS P. WHITNEY LACKENBAUER

New interpretive frameworks are region, we see the opposite. Commen- essential in order to respond effec- tators often draw a false correlation by tively to changes occurring in the conflating Arctic issues (those threats region. Until these frameworks have emerging in and from the region itself) been established, it may be difficult with strategic issues that may have an to understand what is happening Arctic dimension but are best framed at in the Arctic, and provide options the international rather than regional on how best to respond to crisis or level. Doing so may create the very mis- emerging threats to Canadian secu- conceptions that build mistrust and rity or sovereignty. sow the seeds of conflict. Dialogue and – Canadian Forces Arctic deterrence are compatible in a complex Integrating Concept (2010) Arctic region that features both competition and cooperation. This report sought to apply the NATO Strategic Foresight Analysis (SFA) to a Accelerating environmental change, Canadian Arctic context. Academics surging international interest, tech- associated with the North American and nological and social change, and the Arctic Defence and Security Network emergence of all-domain threats have (NAADSN) were asked to identify key trends direct and indirect implications for and implications that may shape the future Canadian defence and security. So do security environment in the region. This internal dynamics within the Canadian product does not purport to predict the North, which present both opportuni- future as much as to offer visualizations of ties and challenges for policymakers possible future challenges, opportunities, and practitioners. Recent efforts by and relevant implications for Canada and the Government of Canada to co- its allies in a dynamic region that represents create policies with Northerners, and “an important international crossroads particularly Indigenous peoples, por- where issues of climate change, interna- tend a future guided by a philosophy of tional trade, and global security meet.” “nothing about us without us.” Charting a future path also requires attentive- Canada has committed to asserting inter- ness to evolving international realities, national leadership to ensure that the where other states’ and actors’ priorities Arctic remains a region characterized by and interests are not always synony- peace, stability, and low tension where mous with Canada’s. Furthermore, as states can exercise their sovereign rights the global order continues to shift, Can- and responsibilities. Strategic competition ada must remain attuned to the rising outside of the Circumpolar Arctic is likely power and influence of non-Arctic state to continue to complicate relations within and non-state actors that are reshaping it, but our assessments suggest that this Arctic affairs – and blurring the bound- does not preclude cooperation where this aries between what is safety, security, serves Canada’s national and regional inter- and defence and what is trade, invest- ests. Despite ideas from the Trump admin- ment, development, economic, social, istration that the Arctic is a conflict-ridden and foreign policy.

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UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT ENDNOTES INTRODUCTION 1 See P. Whitney Lackenbauer, “‘Use It or Lose It,’ History, and the Fourth Surge,” in Canadian Arctic Sovereignty and Security: Historical Perspectives, ed. Lackenbauer (Calgary: Centre for Military and Strategic Studies, 2011), 423-36; Lackenbauer, “Afterword,” in Franklyn Griffiths, Rob Huebert, and Lackenbauer, Canada and the Changing Arctic: Sovereignty, Security, and Stewardship (Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2011), 227-32; Lackenbauer and Ryan Dean, eds., Canada’s Northern Strategy under the Harper Conservatives: Key Speeches and Documents on Sover- eignty, Security, and Governance, 2006-15, Documents on Canadian Arctic Sovereignty and Security (DCASS) No. 6 (Calgary and Waterloo: Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies/Centre on Foreign Policy and Federalism/ Arctic Institute of North America, 2016); and Lackenbauer, “From ‘Defending Sovereignty’ to Comprehensive Secu- rity in a Whole of Government Framework: Government Narratives of Arctic Sovereignty and Security in the Harper Era,” in Breaking Through: Understanding Sovereignty and Security in the Circumpolar Arctic, eds. Wilfrid Greaves and Lackenbauer (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, forthcoming 2021). On this era, see also Petra Dolata, “A New Canada in the Arctic? Arctic Policies under Harper,” Études canadiennes/Canadian Studies : Revue interdisciplinaire des études canadiennes en France 78 (2015): 131-54; Klaus Dodds, “We Are a Northern Country: Stephen Harper and the Canadian Arctic,” Polar Record 47/4 (2011): 371-74; and Philippe Genest and Frederic Lasserre, “Souveraineté, sécurité, identité: éléments-clés du discours du gouvernement canadien sur l’Arctique,” Canadian Foreign Policy Journal 21/1 (2015): 64-84. CHAPTER ONE 1 P. Whitney Lackenbauer to Standing Committee on National Defence, 2nd Session, 41st Parliament, 9 December 2014. 2 See, for example, Per Erik Solli, Elana Wilson Rowe, and Wrenn Yennie Lindgren, “Coming into the Cold: Asia’s Arctic Interests,” Polar Geography 36/4 (2013): 253-70; Kimie Hara and Ken Coates, eds., East Asia-Arctic Relations: Boundary, Security and International Politics (Waterloo: Centre for International Governance Innovation, 2014); and P. Whitney Lackenbauer, Adam Lajeunesse, James Manicom, and Frédéric Lasserre, China’s Arctic Ambitions and What They Mean for Canada (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 2018). 3 See, for example, Terrence J. O’Shaughnessy and Peter M. Fesler, “Hardening the Shield: A Credible Deterrent & Capable Defense for North America” (Washington: Canada Institute, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, September 2020). CHAPTER TWO 1 The process leading to the Arctic and Northern Policy Framework was a “whole of government” initiative led by Crown-In- digenous Relations and Northern Affairs Canada (CIRNAC) that involved unprecedented policy-making collaboration across 33 federal departments, as well as partnerships with Northerners and other stakeholders, featuring new approaches to deep and meaningful consultation. “The days of writing up policy papers and shopping them around town for comments are gone,” the director general of Northern strategic policy, Wayne Walsh, explained. “We were tasked with the development of a policy framework and vision from Northerners and for Northerners.” Quoted in P. Whitney Lackenbauer and Peter Kikkert, “An Import- ant International Crossroads”: Implementing Canada’s Arctic Priorities in Strong, Secure, Engaged (Toronto: Centre for National Security Studies, Canadian Forces College, 2018), 11. CHAPTER FOUR 1 R.K. Headland et al., “Transits of the Northwest Passage to End of the 2019 Navigation Season,” Scott Polar Institute (Decem- ber 2019). See also Jackie Dawson et al., “Temporal and Spatial Patterns of Ship Traffic in the Canadian Arctic from 1990 to 2015,” Arctic 71/1 (2018): 19; and Whitney Lackenbauer and Adam Lajeunesse, “On Uncertain Ice: The Future of Arctic Shipping and the Northwest Passage,” Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute/University of Calgary School for Public Policy Paper (December 2014), 3-4. 95

2020 REPORT 2 Mark E. Rosen and Cara B. Thuringer, “Unconstrained Foreign Direct Investment: An Emerging Challenge to Arctic Security,” Center for Naval Analyses (November 2017). 3 T. Jansen et al., “Ocean warming expands habitat of a rich natural resource and benefits a national economy,”Ecological Applications 26 (2016): 2021-32; and Jimena Alvarez, Dmitry Yumashev, and Gail Whiteman, “A framework for assessing the economic impacts of Arctic change,” Ambio 49 (2020): 407-18. 4 E. Sala, J. Mayorga, C. Costello, D. Kroodsma, M.L.D. Palomares, D. Pauly, U. Rashid Sumaila, and D. Zeller, “The economics of fishing the high seas,”Science Advances 4 (2018): 1-14; and T.I. Van Pelt, H.P. Huntington, O.V. Romanenko, and F.J. Mueter, “The missing middle: Central Arctic Ocean gaps in fishery research and science coordination,”Marine Policy 85 (2017): 79-86. CHAPTER FIVE 1 Timothy Heleniak, “The future of the Arctic populations,” Polar Geography (2020), DOI: 10.1080/1088937X.2019.1707316. 2 Chris Southcott and Valoree Walker, “A Portrait of the Social Economy of Northern Canada,” in Northern Communities Working Together: The Social Economy of Canada‘s North, ed. Chris Southcott (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2015). CONCLUSIONS 1 Arctic Council Task Force on Improved Connectivity in the Arctic, Report: Improving Connectivity in the Arctic (Tromso: Arctic Council Secretariat, 2019).

2 Jill Macyshon and Jonathan Forani, “‘Anything is possible’: Nunavut greenhouses bring food, jobs to tundra,” CTV News, 28 January 2020. 3 See Qiniq, “Internet Designed for Nunavut,” accessed 10 January 2020, and “Internet Plans,” BellMTS, accessed 10 January 2020.

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT APPENDIX: ARCTIC THEMES, TRENDS, AND IMPLICATIONS TRENDS Implications 2.1 SHIFTS IN GEOSTRATEGIC POWER a. Challenges to the rule-based order in the The resurgence of major power competition glob- Arctic. ally has implications for peace and security, and b. Increased requirement for cooperation general Western concerns about the rise of Asia also with other actors. extend to the Arctic. c. Challenges to NORAD. d. Challenges to NATO. 2.2 USE OF POWER POLITICS a. Increased potential of “spillover” from con- Canada’s full contributions to continental defence frontation and competition elsewhere. efforts to detect, deter, defend against, or defeat b. Growing requirement for new forms of threats from all domains remain to be determined, robust and credible deterrence. but its Arctic will inevitably factor heavily. c. Deterrence by punishment still has its place. d. Nationalism and divergent risk and threat perception. e. Discerning Russia’s Arctic thinking. f. Discerning China’s Arctic thinking. 2.3 DEVOLUTION OF GOVERNANCE AND REC- a. The roles and influence of Indigenous peo- ONCILIATION WITH INDIGENOUS PEOPLES ples in the development of domestic and Canada’s cooperation with other Arctic states and international policy are likely to expand partners is likely to reflect more direct involvement over the next fifteen years. of Northern territorial and Indigenous governments b. Indigenous and territorial governments will and organizations. expect to play key roles in the co-management of all Arctic activities and decisions. c. Reconciliation is a process in which all Cana- dian institutions are expected to engage.

POLITICAL d. An increasing focus on Indigenous distinctiveness. 2.4 NON-ARCTIC STATE AND NON-STATE a. Growing complexity due to non-Arctic ACTOR INFLUENCE IN DOMESTIC AND INTERNA- state and non-state actors articulating and TIONAL AFFAIRS asserting interests in the Canadian Arctic A growing interest in Arctic affairs by non-Arctic and circumpolar regions. state and non-state actors has significant b. Analytical frameworks designed to antici- implications for the evolving Arctic security pate non-Arctic state actors’ roles in possi- environment. ble Arctic futures should not just fixate on material gains in the region. c. Opportunities for closer cooperation with non-Arctic state actors. d. Growing worries about the presence and influence of non-Arctic State-Owned or State-Controlled Enterprises in the region. e. Opportunities for closer cooperation with non-state actors in the Arctic.

2020 REPORT TRENDS Implications 2.5 REGIONAL GOVERNANCE AND THE INTER- a. Challenges to existing regional governance NATIONAL LEGAL REGIME structures. b. Increased requirement for partnership and Regional governance systems will face pressures inclusive governance. from heightened international interest and strategic c. Projecting stability beyond the Arctic competition, and the international legal regime will region. play a pivotal role in guiding state-to-state relations. d. Upholding the Law of the Sea. e. Safe shipping and search and rescue (SAR). f. Resolving maritime boundaries.

2.6 PUBLIC DISCONTENT/DISAFFECTION AND a. Widening North/South political fault lines. POLARIZATION b. Frustrations about the non-renewable resource economy. Nefarious actors can harness and amplify political c. Competing visions of Nunavut and Inuit POLITICAL polarization through social media and the spread- Nunangat. ing of disinformation or “fake news,” which can d. Russia as the disaffected Arctic state. undermine political and social cohesion.

3.1 CLIMATE AND ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE a. The Arctic will become increasingly accessible to a range of activities. Environmental and ecological changes in the Cana- b. There will be both challenges and oppor- dian Arctic are being driven predominantly by cli- tunities associated with climate change in mate change, which exacerbates emerging regional the Arctic. challenges. c. Inequalities between the Arctic and the rest of Canada are compounded by the effects of climate change. d. Addressing climate change and environmental issues in the Arctic could be a source of stability in the region. e. Geoengineering and runaway climate change. 3.2 NATURAL DISASTERS a. Increased requirement for humanitarian support. The likelihood and prevalence of natural disasters b. Increased requirement to improve are expected to increase, straining the capacities of resilience. all levels of government. c. Infrastructure deficits need to be addressed. d. Increased need for situational awareness. 3.3 HUMAN-MADE DISASTERS a. Ongoing need for transnational coopera-

ENVIRONMENT tion and multilateral governance. The Canadian Arctic is at significant risk of human- b. Necessary trade-offs between environmen- made disasters that pose serious prospective chal- tal protection and economic development. lenges for Northerners and federal and territorial c. Emergency preparedness and disaster governments. response resources must be increased. d. Remote monitoring and surveillance capabilities are needed.

UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT TRENDS Implications 4.1 ARCTIC SHIPPING a. Interest in the legal status of the Arctic waters has increased as the Arctic ice has Shipping activity in and through the Canadian Arc- receded. tic has seen a steady increase in volume, centred on b. Increased shipping activity will require fishing, cargo, and tanker craft, and there are signs improved situational awareness. of future interest by foreign actors. c. Improved situational awareness will have to be paired with new platforms and resources. 4.2 RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT a. Increased Chinese shipping and investment in the Arctic continues to generate If Arctic shipping becomes more economical, Cana- concern. dian Arctic resources will represent a more attrac- b. Chinese investment into Arctic projects tive development opportunity. could produce dangerous levels of foreign influence. c. Canada will require foreign partners and significant private sector investment in addressing its Arctic infrastructure deficit. 4.3 TOURISM a. An expanding tourism industry increases the risk of human-made disasters and Tourism is on the rise throughout the circumpo- amplifies SAR requirements. lar world, ranging from large-scale cruise ships, to b. An expanding tourism industry calls for sport fishing and hunting, to adventure and eco strong community-based SAR and emer- expeditions, to cultural tourism. gency response assets. c. Cruise tourism increases the risk of environmental pollution, calling for increased local and regional environmental response capabilities. d. An expanding tourism industry and small vessel tourism raise a wide range of regulatory, safety, and security issues. e. An expanding tourism industry demands close interdepartmental cooperation, partnership with Northern communities, and relationships with private industry. f. Arctic tourism highlights Canada’s international commitments and responsibilities. g. As the world’s largest source of outbound tourism, China is likely to dominate Arctic

ECONOMICS AND RESOURCES RESOURCES AND ECONOMICS tourism. 4.4 THE CONSERVATION ECONOMY a. Enhanced situational awareness, marine monitoring, and emergency response Canada’s Arctic and Northern Policy Framework capabilities. highlights the idea of a conservation economy that the federal government is slowly growing in the Canadian Arctic in collaboration with northern Indigenous stakeholders. 4.5 FISHERIES a. Food security in Inuit Nunangat. b. Illegal fishing. It is uncertain how climate change will impact the c. The political and jurisdictional challenges Arctic’s fisheries over the next two decades. of fisheries expansion.

2020 REPORT TRENDS Implications 5.1 DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE a. Differences in population distributions continue to strain resources. There is uneven population growth across Canada’s b. Youth disenfranchisement could worsen North, and this is expected to continue over the health indicators, increase political instabil- next fifteen years. ity, and lead to out-migration. c. Conflict could arise due to differing political, economic, and environmental interests. 5.2 SETTLEMENT PATTERNS AND URBANIZATION a. Urbanization and changing settlement patterns could change the distribution of The populations of many smaller settlements are services. expected to decline over the next two decades, b. Rapid urbanization and resource scarcity while urban centres are expected to grow. could exacerbate pressures on already strained and expensive food networks in the North. c. Urbanization could lead to the concentration of illicit activities and vulnerabilities. 5.3 INFRASTRUCTURE GAPS a. Poor community infrastructure limits Northern development and inhibits the Deficits in critical infrastructure keep communities delivery of essential services. isolated, inhibit the delivery of health and social ser- b. Strategic investments in Northern telecom- vices, and limit economic opportunities. munications infrastructure. c. Addressing Arctic infrastructure gaps invites investments in “dual-use” capabilities. d. Competition for high-cost investments in infrastructure. 5.4 SOCIAL AND HEALTH INEQUALITIES a. Northern and Indigenous communities are particularly susceptible and vulnerable to The Government of Canada and its partners have emerging health threats.

HUMAN committed to closing the gaps and divides that b. Limitations or interruptions to an already exist between this region, particularly in relation to strained food supply chain pose acute risks its Indigenous peoples, and the rest of the country. for Northern communities. c. Climate change poses a growing threat to the health of Northern populations. d. High disparities in income, formal education, and incarceration rates between Indigenous and non-Indigenous Canadians living in the North are likely to persist. 5.5 HUMAN NETWORKS AND INCREASINGLY a. Human networks in the Canadian Arctic are FRACTURED OR POLARIZED SOCIETY evolving. b. The emergence of Arctic/Northern identi- The amplification of socio-economic, cultural, and ties and Indigeneity as assets. political divisions may become an unstable fault c. Fractures in Northern Canadian societies line. and between the North and South may undermine public trust in and legitimacy of existing governance systems. d. Polarization between Canadians is likely to erode social cohesion, but is unlikely to produce major societal disruption. e. Understanding the needs of youth and elderly persons.

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UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT TRENDS Implications 6.1 RATE OF MILITARY TECHNOLOGICAL a. Compatibility issues and difficulties in com- ADVANCEMENT municating between alliance members. b. Gaps in situational awareness place chal- Technology is expected to be a force multiplier and lenges on interoperability between the single best predictor of deterrence in the future. militaries. c. Near- to long-term modernization of ISR capabilities need to be protected from cyber operations. d. Adversaries may use cyber capabilities to steal information and/or eavesdrop. e. Diplomacy may be needed to de-escalate tensions. f. Local residents proximate to any systems must be involved in planning. 6.2 UNMANNED AUTONOMOUS SYSTEMS (UAS) a. An increase in UAS use could lead to greater surveillance capabilities for states in the air/ UAS are a low-cost technology that can easily be near-space, land, and maritime domains. used for a wide variety of functions. b. UAS require a means to transmit data to operators at the speed of relevance. c. Considerations must be made in balancing security and privacy in the Canadian North. UAS are vulnerable to exploitation and manipulation and these systems could be used by adversaries or governments in ways that violate the privacy of Northern communities. d. UAS activity could potentially interfere with aviation and disrupt local wildlife. 6.3 THE DEPENDENCEY ON INDUSTRY TO PRO- a. Militaries are highly dependent on indus- VIDE TECHNOLOGICAL SOLUTIONS TO THE tries for technological advancement, which ARCTIC can often come with unknown foreign TECHNOLOGY backing and investors. Choke points for improvements in the Arctic from a b. 5G networks create a problem with the Five technological perspective are almost wholly depen- Eyes intelligence sharing relationship. dent on industry to see the cost-benefit of hours of c. Industry monopolies could have notable research and production. negative implications in the North. 6.4 TECHNOLOGY AND THE ENVIRONMENT a. A growing obligation exists to identify and utilize technologies that decrease pol- Technological development will have positive and lutants and emissions, can be applied to negative implications for the Arctic environment. environmental cleanups, and can lead to cleaner oceans and waterways. b. Technologies that increase understanding of the age and thickness of sea ice raise important strategic questions. c. Technology that can make travel more efficient will help to connect communities while reducing pollution. d. Negative impacts of technology in the Arctic on the Arctic environment and its communities.

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2020 REPORT TRENDS Implications 6.5 TECHNOLOGY AND SOCIETY a. Without regulatory assistance or public development, Canadians living in the Advancements in technology can help to address Arctic could fall prey to unaffordable and some of these important social challenges and unsustainable pricing models leading to reduce regional disparities. poor qualities of life. b. Benefits of technology to Northern individuals include improved communications, faster transmission of data, and increased engagement. c. An increase in access to technology could in turn lead to an increase in the ability of individuals to participate in criminal activity. d. Increased access to technology could lead to a greater ability to connect individuals in times of crisis or emergency. 6.6 OVER-RELIANCE ON TECHNOLOGICAL a. The assumption that technology can solve SOLUTIONS large-scale social problems could lead to a lack of development in the Arctic. An increasing dependency on technology to con- b. Over-reliance on networked systems link- TECHNOLOGY duct certain operations has led to an assumption ing society creates vulnerabilities. that technology can solve most problems, which c. Negative impacts on populations when could lead to inadequate government responses to technology does not produce solutions social problems or create new vulnerabilities. promised by government. d. Involving Indigenous peoples and integrating traditional knowledge in Arctic operations.

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2020 REPORT Dolata, Petra. “A New Canada in the Arctic? Arctic Policies under Harper.” Revue Etudes Canadiennes 78 (2015): 131-154. Doyon, Jean-François, Frédéric Lasserre, Pauline Pic, Pierre-Louis Têtu, Mélanie Fournier, Linyan Huang, and Leah Beveridge. « Perceptions et stratégies de l’industrie maritime de vrac relativement à l’ouverture des passages arctiques. » Géotransports 8 (2017): 5-22. Duxbury, Charles. “The 5 most important races for the Arctic.” Politico, 1 January 2020. Edgar, Courtney. “Nunavut government strikes new tourism partnerships.” Nunatsiaq News, 18 April 2019. English, John. Ice and Water: Politics, Peoples, and the Arctic Council. Toronto: Allen Lane, 2013. Exner-Pirot, Heather. “Canada’s Arctic Council Chairmanship (2013–2015): A Post-Mortem.” Canadian Foreign Policy Journal 22/1 (2016): 84-96. Exner-Pirot, Heather, and Rob Huebert. “Arctic Security: The Canadian Context.” In Routledge Handbook of Arctic Security, eds. Gunhild Hoogensen Gjorv, Marc Lanteigne, and Horatio Sam Aggrey, 140-151. Oxon: Routledge, 2020. Eyre, Kenneth. Custos Borealis: The Military in the Canadian North, ed. P. Whitney Lackenbauer. Peterborough: North American and Arctic Defence and Security Network, 2020. Fisheries and Oceans Canada. Departmental Plan 2019-20. Fisheries and Oceans Canada. International Agreement to Prevent Unregulated High Seas Fisheries in the Central Arctic Ocean (2018). Gavrilov, Viatcheslav. “Delimitation of the Continental Shelf in the Arctic Ocean: Present State and Possible Legal Solutions.” In A Bridge Over Troubled Waters: Dispute Resolution in the Law of International Watercourses and the Law of the Sea, eds. Helene Fabri, Erik Franckx, Marco Benatar, and Tamal Meshel, 416-444. Leiden: Brill Nijhoff, 2020. Gill, Alan and David Sevingy. “Sustainable Northern Development: The Case for an Arctic Development Bank.” Waterloo: Centre for International Governance Innovation Papers Series, 27 January 2015. Global Affairs Canada. Canadian“ Arctic Capabilities by Sector – Canada.” Gosnell, Rachel. “What Will the Future Hold for Arctic Economics?” Center for International Maritime Security Papers, 3 July 2018. Government of Nunavut, Department of Economic Development and Transportation. Annual Tourism Report, 2018-2019. Government of Yukon. “2018 another record year for Yukon tourism.” Grant, Shelagh. Polar Imperative: A History of Arctic Sovereignty in North America. Vancouver: Douglas & McIntyre, 2010. Greaves, Wilfrid. “Arctic Break Up: Climate Change, Geopolitics, and the Fragmenting Arctic Security Region.” In Redefining Arctic Security: Arctic Yearbook 2019, eds. Lassi Heininen, Heather Exner-Pirot, and Justin Barnes, 1-17. Akureyri: Northern Research Forum, 2019. Greaves, Wilfrid. “Arctic (In)Security and Indigenous Peoples: Comparing Inuit in Canada and Sámi in Norway.” Security Dialogue 47/6 (2016): 461-480. Greaves, Wilfrid. “Cities and Human Security in a Warming Arctic.” In Climate Change and Arctic Security: Searching for a Paradigm Shift, eds. Lassi Heininen and Heather Exner-Pirot, 61-89. London: Palgrave, 2020. Greaves, Wilfrid. “Indigenous Peoples.” In Routledge Handbook of Arctic Security, eds. Gunhild Hoogensen Gjørv, Marc Lanteigne, and Horatio Sam-Aggrey, 363-376. London: Routledge, 2020. Greaves, Wilfrid. “What a Biden presidency means for climate change and Canada.” Policy Options (10 November 2020). Greaves, Wilfrid, and P. Whitney Lackenbauer, eds. Breaking Through: Understanding Sovereignty and Security in the Circumpolar Arctic. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, forthcoming 2021. Griffiths, Franklyn. “The Shipping News: Canada’s Arctic Sovereignty Not on Thinning Ice.” International Journal 58/2 (2003): 257-282. Griffiths, Franklyn, Rob Huebert, and P. Whitney Lackenbauer.Canada and the Changing Arctic: Sovereignty, Security, and Stew- ardship. Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2011. Gritsenko, Daria. “Vodka on Ice? Unveiling Russian Media Perceptions of the Arctic.” Energy Research & Social Science 16 (2016): 8-12.

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UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT Headland, R.K., et al. “Transits of the Northwest Passage to End of the 2019 Navigation Season,” Scott Polar Institute InfoSheets (17 March 2020). Heininen, Lassi, Karen Everett, Barbora Padrtova, and Anni Reissell. Arctic Policies and Strategies—Analysis, Synthesis, and Trends. Laxenburg: International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, 2020. Henderson, James Youngblood. Indigenous Diplomacy and the Rights of Peoples: Achieving UN Recognition. Winnipeg: Purich, 2016. Hønneland, Geir. Russia and the Arctic: Environment, Identity and Foreign Policy. New York: I.B. Tauris, 2015. Huebert, Rob. “Arctic Security, Global Challenges in the Arctic Region.” In Global Challenges in the Arctic Region: Sovereignty, Envi- ronment and Geopolitical Balance, eds. Elena Conde and Sara Iglesias Sanchez, 364-384. Oxon: Routledge, 2017. Huebert, Rob. “Canada and NATO in the Arctic: Responding to Russia?” In Canada’s Arctic Agenda: Into the Vortex, eds. John Hig- ginbotham and Jennifer Spence, 85-92. Waterloo: Centre for International Governance Innovation, 2019. Huebert, Rob. “Climate Change and Canadian Sovereignty in the Northwest Passage.” Isuma: Canadian Journal of Policy Research 2/4 (2001): 86-94. Huebert, Rob. “Mahan and Understanding the Future of Naval Competition in the Arctic Ocean.” Canadian Naval Review 14/3 (2019): 10-15. Huebert, Rob. “The Melting Ice and the Transforming Arctic Ocean.” Ocean Yearbook 31/1 (2017): 57-79. Huebert, Rob. “A New Cold War in the Arctic?! The old one never ended!” In Redefining Arctic Security: Arctic Yearbook 2019, eds. Lassi Heininen, Heather Exner-Pirot, and Justin Barnes. Akureyri: Northern Research Forum, 2019. Huebert, Rob. “The Shipping News Part II: How Canada’s Arctic Sovereignty is on Thinning Ice.” International Journal 58/3 (2003): 295-308. Huebert, Rob, Heather Exner-Pirot, Adam Lajeunesse, and Jay Gulledge. Climate Change & International Security: The Arctic as a Bellwether. Arlington: Center for Climate and Energy Solutions, 2012. Humpert, Malte. “COSCO continues to step up its operations in the Arctic.” High North News, 13 June 2019. Humpert, Malte. “French Cruise Ship Set to Travel to North Pole in 2021.” High North News, 22 May 2019. Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada. “High-Speed Access for All: Canada’s Connectivity Strategy.” Press release, 16 July 2019. Jansen, Teunis, Søren Post, Trond Kristiansen, Gudmundur Óskarsson, Jesper Boje, Brian MacKenzie, Mala Broberg, and Helle Siegstad. “Ocean warming expands habitat of a rich natural resource and benefits a national economy.” Ecological Applications 26/7 (2016): 2021-2032. Johnston, Margaret, Jackie Dawson, and Emma Stewart. “Marine Tourism in Nunavut: Issues and Opportunities for Economic Development in Arctic Canada.” In Perspectives on Rural Tourism Geographies: Case Studies from Developed Nations on the Exotic, the Fringe and teh Boring Bits in Between, eds. Rhonda Koster and Doris Carson, 115-136. Cham: Springer, 2019. Kikkert, Peter. “Rising Above the Rhetoric: Northern Voices and the Strengthening of Canada’s Capacity to Maintain a Stable Cir- cumpolar World.” Northern Review 33 (2011): 29-45. Kikkert, Peter, and P. Whitney Lackenbauer. “The Militarization of the Arctic to 1990.” In The Palgrave Handbook of Arctic Policy and Politics, eds. Ken Coates and Carin Holroyd, 487-506. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2020. Kikkert, Peter, and P. Whitney Lackenbauer. “A Better Road Map Needed for Arctic and Northern Policy Framework.” Policy Options (17 September 2019). Kikkert, Peter, and P. Whitney Lackenbauer. “Canada’s Arctic and Northern Policy Framework: A Roadmap for the Future?” in Arc- tic Yearbook 2019, eds. Lassi Heininen and Heather Exner-Pirot, 332-39. Akureyri: Northern Forum. Kikkert, Peter, and P. Whitney Lackenbauer. Using Civil-Military Operations to “Expand and Deepen” Relationships with Northern Communities: Examples from Alaska and Australia. NAADSN Special Reports (July 2020). Kikkert, Peter, P. Whitney Lackenbauer, and Angulalik Pedersen. Kitikmeot Roundtable on Search and Rescue – General Report and Findings. Report from a workshop hosted at the Canadian High Arctic Research Station (CHARS) in Cambridge Bay, Nunavut, 31 January – 1 February 2020.

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2020 REPORT Klimenko, Ekaterina. Russia’s Evolving Arctic Strategy: Drivers, Challenges and New Opportunities. SIPRI Policy Paper 42. Stock- holm: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2014. Konyshev, Valery, and Alexander Sergunin. “The Changing Role of Military Power in the Arctic.” In The GlobalArctic Handbook, eds. Matthias Finger and Lassi Heininen, 171-195. Cham: Springer, 2019. Kraska, James, ed. Arctic Security in an Age of Climate Change. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011. Kraska, James. “International Security and International Law in the Northwest Passage.” Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 42 (2009): 1109-1132. Krueger, Hanna. “Arctic tourism is potential threat to environment as ice melts.” NBC News, 11 January 2018. Lackenbauer, P. Whitney. “Arctic Defence and Security: Transitioning to the Trudeau Government.” In Whole of Government through an Arctic Lens, eds. P. Whitney Lackenbauer and Heather Nicol, 308-340. Antigonish: Mulroney Institute of Govern- ment, 2017. Lackenbauer, P. Whitney. “Canada and Russia: Toward an Arctic Agenda.” Global Brief (Summer/Fall 2016): 21-25. Lackenbauer, P. Whitney. The Canadian Rangers: A Living History. Vancouver: UBC Press, 2013. Lackenbauer, P. Whitney. “Global Arctic Leadership in an Era of Cooperation and Competition.” In Canada’s Arctic Agenda: Into the Vortex, eds. John Higginbotham and Jennifer Spence, 67-73. Waterloo: Centre for International Governance Innovation, 2019. Lackenbauer, P. Whitney. “Mirror Images? Canada, Russia, and the Circumpolar World.” International Journal 65/4 (2010): 879-897. Lackenbauer, P. Whitney. “The North’s Canadian Rangers.” In Strengthening the Canadian Armed Forces through Diversity and Inclusion, eds. Alistair Edgar, Rupinder Mangat, and Bessma Momani, 67-86. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2019. Lackenbauer, P. Whitney. “Polar Race or Polar Saga? Canada and the Circumpolar World.” In Arctic Security in an Age of Climate Change ed. James Kraska, 218-43. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011. Lackenbauer, P. Whitney. “Why Fear Russia in the Arctic? Contemplating Scenarios as an Exercise in Assumption-Testing and ‘Red Teaming.’” NAADSN Strategic Perspectives (4 May 2020). Lackenbauer, P. Whitney, and Ryan Dean, eds. Canada’s Northern Strategy under the Harper Conservatives: Key Speeches and Doc- uments on Sovereignty, Security, and Governance, 2006-15. Documents on Canadian Arctic Sovereignty and Security (DCASS) No. 6. Calgary and Waterloo: Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies/Centre on Foreign Policy and Federalism/Arctic Institute of North America, 2016. Lackenbauer, P. Whitney, Ryan Dean, and Rob Huebert, eds. (Re)Conceptualizing Arctic Security: Selected Articles from the Jour- nal of Military and Security Studies. Calgary: Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies, 2017. Lackenbauer, P. Whitney, and Rob Huebert. “Premier Partners: Canada, the United States and Arctic Security.” Canadian Foreign Policy Journal 20/3 (2014): 320-333. Lackenbauer, P. Whitney, and Peter Kikkert. “The Canadian Rangers and COVID-19.” NAADSN Policy Brief (June 2020). Lackenbauer, P. Whitney, and Peter Kikkert. Measuring the Success of the Canadian Rangers. Peterborough: NAADSN, 2020. Lackenbauer, P. Whitney, and Adam Lajeunesse. “On Uncertain Ice: The Future of Arctic Shipping and the Northwest Passage.” Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute and University of Calgary School for the Public Policy Paper (December 2014). Lackenbauer, P. Whitney, and Adam Lajeunesse. “The Canadian Armed Forces in the Arctic: Building Appropriate Capabilities.” Journal of Military and Strategic Studies 16/4 (2016): 7-66. Lackenbauer, P. Whitney, Adam Lajeunesse, James Manicom, and Frédéric Lasserre. China’s Arctic Ambitions and What They Mean for Canada. Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 2018. Lackenbauer, P. Whitney, and Suzanne Lalonde, eds. Breaking the Ice Curtain? Russia, Canada, and Arctic Security in a Changing Circumpolar World. Calgary: Canadian Global Affairs Institute, 2019. Lackenbauer, P. Whitney, and Suzanne Lalonde. “Canada, Sovereignty, and ‘Disputed’ Arctic Boundaries: Myths, Misconcep- tions, and Legal Realities.” In The Networked North: Borders and Borderlands in the Canadian Arctic Region, eds. Heather Nicol and P. Whitney Lackenbauer, 95-113. Victoria and Waterloo: Borders in Globalization/Centre on Foreign Policy and Federalism, 2017.

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UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE ARCTIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT Lackenbauer, P. Whitney, Suzanne Lalonde, and Elizabeth Riddell-Dixon. Canada and the Maritime Arctic: Boundaries, Shelves, and Waters. Peterborough: North American and Arctic Defence and Security Network, 2020. Lackenbauer, P. Whitney, and Heather Nicol, eds. Whole of Government through an Arctic Lens. Antigonish: Mulroney Institute of Government, 2017. Lackenbauer, P. Whitney, Heather Nicol, and Wilfrid Greaves, eds. One Arctic: The Arctic Council and Circumpolar Governance. Ottawa and Waterloo: Canadian Arctic Resources Committee/Centre on Foreign Policy and Federalism, 2017. Lajeunesse, Adam. Lock, Stock, and Icebergs: The Evolution of Canada’s Arctic Maritime Sovereignty. Vancouver: UBC Press, 2016. Lajeunesse, Adam. “Arctic Geopolitics and Security from the Canadian Perspective.” In Handbook on Geopolitics and Security in the Arctic, ed. Joachim Weber. Cham: Springer, 2020. Lajeunesse, Adam, and Rob Huebert. “Preparing for the Next Arctic Sovereignty Crisis: The Northwest Passage in the Age of Donald Trump.” International Journal 74/2 (2019): 225-239. Lajeunesse, Adam, and P. Whitney Lackenbauer, eds. Canadian Armed Forces Arctic Operations, 1945-2015: Historical and Con- temporary Lessons Learned. Fredericton: Gregg Centre for the Study of War and Society, 2017. Lajeunesse, Adam, and P. Whitney Lackenbauer. “China’s Mining Interests in the North American Arctic.” In Governing the North American Arctic: Lessons from the Past, Prospects for the Future, eds. Dawn Berry and Halbert Jones, 74-99. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017. Lajeunesse, Adam, and P. Whitney Lackenbauer. “Defence Policy in the Canadian Arctic: From Jean Chrétien to Justin Trudeau.” In Canadian Defence Policy in Theory and Practice, eds. Thomas Juneau, Philippe Lagassé, and Srdjan Vucetic, 365-382. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019. Lalonde, Suzanne. “Canadian Arctic Maritime Sovereignty During the Trudeau Years.” In Canada’s Arctic Agenda: Into the Vortex, eds. John Higginbotham and Jennifer Spence, 75-82. Waterloo: Centre for International Governance Innovation, 2019. Lalonde, Suzanne. “Increased Traffic through Canadian Arctic Waters: Canada’s State of Readiness.” Revue juridique Thémis 38/1 (2004): 49-124. Lalonde, Suzanne. “La frontière maritime dans l’archipel arctique : un garde-fou essentiel pour le Canada.” Annuaire français de droit international 53 (2007): 609-639. Lalonde, Suzanne, and Ted L. McDorman, eds. International Law and Politics of the Arctic Ocean: Essays in Honor of Donat Pha- rand. Leiden: Brill, 2015. Lalonde, Suzanne, and Clive Schofield. “Rising Seas and Retreating Coasts: Implications for the Arctic.”International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 35/3 (2020): 468-497. Lam, Vicky, William Cheung, and Rashid Sumaila. “Marine capture fisheries in the Arctic: Winners or losers under climate change and ocean acidification?” Fish and Fisheries 17/2 (2014): 335-357. Landriault, Mathieu, ed. L’année arctique 2019. Montreal : Observatoire de la politique et la sécurité de l’arctique (OPSA), 2019. Landriault, Mathieu. Media, Security and Sovereignty in the Canadian Arctic: From the Manhattan to the Crystal Serenity. New York: Routledge, 2019. Landriault, Mathieu. “Public Opinion on Canadian Arctic Sovereignty and Security.” Arctic 69/2 (2016): 160-168. Landriault, Mathieu. La Sécurité Arctique 2000-2010 : Une décennie turbulente? Peterborough: North American and Arctic Defence and Security Network, 2020. Landriault, Mathieu, Andrew Chater, Elana Wilson Rowe, and P. Whitney Lackenbauer. Governing Complexity in the Arctic Region. Abingdon: Routledge, 2020. Landriault, Mathieu, and Paul Minard. “Does Standing Up for Sovereignty Pay Off Politically? Arctic Military Announcements and Governing Party Support in Canada from 2006 to 2014.” International Journal 71/1 (2016): 41-61. Laruelle, Marlene. Russia’s Arctic Strategies and the Future of the Far North. London: ME Sharpe, 2013. Lasserre, Frédéric. « Arctique : le passage du Nord-Ouest sous tension. » Politique étrangère (2017): 141-153. Lasserre, Frédéric. « Géopolitique du passage du Nord-Ouest. Une perspective de relations internationales. » Relations internationales 170 (2017): 107-124.

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2020 REPORT Lasserre, Frédéric, ed. Passages et mers arctiques: Géopolitique d’une région en mutation. Québec: Presses de l’Université du Québec, 2010. Lasserre, Frédéric. « Le retour du mythe des passages arctiques : quel trafic maritime dans l’Arctique au XXIe siècle? » Nordiques 37 (2019): 9-24. Lasserre, Frédéric, Leah Beveridge, Melanie Fournier, Pierre-Louis Têtu, and Linyan Huang. “Polar Seaways? Maritime Transport in the Arctic: An Analysis of Shipowners’ Intentions II.” Journal of Transport Geography 57 (2016): 105-114. Lasserre, Frédéric, Jérôme Le Roy, and Richard Garon. “Is there an Arms Race in the Arctic?” Journal of Military and Strategic Studies 14/3-4 (2012): 1-56. Lasserre, Frédéric, and Stéphane Roussel. « La question du passage du Nord-Ouest: un enjeu réellement stratégique entre Canada et Etats-Unis? » Paix et Sécurité Européenne et Internationale 4 (2016): 1-30. Lasserre, Frédéric, and Pierre-Louis Têtu. “Russian Air Patrols in the Arctic: Are Long-Range Bomber Patrols a Challenge to Canadian Security and Sovereignty?” Arctic Yearbook 2016, 305–27. Akureyri: Northern Forum. Lemelin, Harvey, Jackie Dawson, Emma Stewart, Patrick Maher, and Michael Lueck. “Last-chance tourism: The boom, doom, and gloom of visiting vanishing destinations.” Current Issues in Tourism 13 (2010): 477-493. Levinson-King, Robin. “Huawei heats up the battle for internet in Canada’s North.” BBC News, 8 September 2019. Loukacheva, Natalia. The Arctic Promise: Legal and Political Autonomy of Greenland and Nunavut. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007. Luedi, Jeremy. “Chinese tourists flock to Canada’s Far North.” True North, Far East, 8 August 2019. Macyshon, Jill and Jonathan Forani. “‘Anything is possible’: Nunavut greenhouses bring food, jobs to tundra.” CTV News, 28 January 2020. McDorman, Ted. “The Northwest Passage: International Law, Politics and Cooperation.” In Changes in the Arctic Environment and the Law of the Sea, eds. Myron Nordquist, John Norton Moore, and Tomas Heidar, 227-50. Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2010. McDorman, Ted. “Old Issues and New Developments Respecting International Navigational Rights and Obligations in Arctic Waters.” In The Belt and Road Initiative and the Law of the Sea, ed. Keyuan Zou, 41-55. Leiden: Brill Nijhoff, 2020. McDorman, Ted. “Regulation of Foreign Commercial Vessel Navigation in Canadian Waters: Issues of International Law.” In Reg- ulation on Navigation of Foreign Vessels, eds. Ted McDorman, Keyuan Zou, and Seokwoo Lee, 167-179. Brill Nijhoff, 2019. McDorman, Ted. Salt Water Neighbors: International Ocean Law Relations between the United States and Canada. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009. McRae, Donald. “Arctic Sovereignty: What is at Stake?” Behind the Headlines 64/1 (2007): 1-23. National Snow & Ice Data Centre. “That’s a Wrap: A Look Back at 2019 and the Past Decade.” 7 January 2020. Nickels, Scot, ed. Nilliajut: Inuit Perspectives on Security, Patriotism and Sovereignty. Ottawa: Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami, 2013. Nicol, Heather. “The Evolving North American Arctic Security Context: Can Security Be Traditional?” In The Palgrave Handbook of Arctic Policy and Politics, eds. Ken Coates and Carin Holroyd, 455-472. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2020. Nicol, Heather. “Rescaling Borders of Investment: The Arctic Council and the Economic Development Policies.” Journal of Bor- derlands Studies 33/2 (2018): 225-238. Nicol, Heather, and P. Whitney Lackenbauer, eds. The Networked North: Borders and Borderlands in the Canadian Arctic Region. Waterloo: Borders in Globalization/Centre on Foreign Policy and Federalism, 2017. Nicol, Heather, Adam Lajeunesse, P. Whitney Lackenbauer, and Karen Everett. “Regional Border Security Management in the Territorial North.” In The North American Arctic: Themes in Regional Security, eds. Dwayne Menezes and Heather Nicol, 134-154. London: University College London Press, 2019. Nikel, David. “Achieving the Impossible: Growing Food in the High Arctic.” Forbes, 13 April 2019. Oceans North. “Fisheries.” Østhagen, Andreas. Coast Guards and Ocean Politics in the Arctic. Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan, 2020. Østhagen, Andreas. “High North, Low Politics—Maritime Cooperation with Russia in the Arctic.” Arctic Review on Law and Pol- itics 7/1 (2016): 83-100.

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2020 REPORT ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

First and foremost, we would like to thank the support of the Mobilizing Insights in National Defence and Security (MINDS) program of the Canadian Department of National Defence which provides core funding for the North American and Arctic Defence and Security Network (NAADSN) from 2019-22. Lead author Whitney Lackenbauer would also like to thank the Canada Research Chair program and Trent University for enabling his research activities. This Canadian strategic foresight analysis report was inspired by the NATO Transformation Strategic Foresight Anal- ysis (SFA) Team’s work, and particularly the SFA Regional Perspective Workshop on the “Arctic and the High North” convened in Oslo in September 2019. We offer our particular thanks to Lieutenant Colonel Adam Rutherford, GBR Royal Marines, an analyst with the Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate, for his support and encouragement. We are grateful to the participants in NAADSN virtual events held in October 2020 to solicit feedback on the draft report. These conversations not only strengthened the report, they also portend future discussions and debates about the themes and implications included herein. Thanks to Dr. Shannon Nash, the NAADSN network manager, for organizing these events, and to Jill Barclay for her notes as rapporteur. Finally, our special thanks to Jennifer Arthur-Lackenbauer for designing and laying out this publication under extraordinary time constraints, and to Corah Hodgson for her careful proofread of the report.

IMAGE CREDITS

Baffin Fisheries Coalition: 62 Canadian Northern Economic Development Agency (CANNOR): xiv, xv Crown-Indigenous Relations and Northern Affairs Canada (CIRNAC): 6, 23 Department of Fisheries and Oceans: 42 Department of National Defence: xiii, xvi, xix, xx-xxi, xxiii, 4, 14, 16, 27, 28, 35, 38, 41, 43, 44, 46, 47, 52, 58, 66, 68, 75, 77, 80, 83, 87, 89, 90, 91, 92 Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami: 36, 72 Library of Parliament: 18, 32 Natural Resources Canada: 37 NORAD: 21, 84 Oceans North: 56 Parks Canada: 61 Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment (PAME) Working Group, Arctic Council: 55 P. Whitney Lackenbauer: cover, ii, iii, iv, xxiv, 9, 10, 12, 24, 30, 64, 70, 78, 94, 103 Qikiqtani Inuit Association: 73

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