TITLE OF THE THESIS

HONG KONG & THE PRESS, 1997 & PRESS FREEDOM

NAME: FU YUK-SZE

DEPT.: POLITICS DEPARTMENT, THE ADELAIDE UMVERSITY

DATE OF SUBMISSION: 30th Januny 2003 CONTENTS

Abstract

Declaration

Acknowledgements

Introduction... ..

The first period (1842-1949)...... p.8

Consolidatingperiod (L949-1984)...... p.21

The transition period (1984-L997)...... p.32

After the handover...... p53

Conclusion...... p60

Appendix

Bibliography ABSTRACT

The return of Hong Kong's sovereignty back to China aroused great anxiety amongst the Hong Kong people who enjoyed quite a high degree of freedom. And the press, apart from that in Japan, enjoyed arare degree of independency found. Enormous concern was raised both locally and internationally on the likely threat on the local press freedom highly regarded worldwide, with the unlikely compatibility of the capitalist Hong Kong and the communist China. The worry is understandable when one considers the huge difference of the press systems practised in the two places concerned. With a journey of Hong Kong from the time it became a British colony to the present time when it is back to be part of China: it began with a period of immense Chinese political influence, it slowly entered into a consolidating period which saw the development of the press and the Hong Kong society with the formation of a relatively "free" press and a distinguishing Hong Kong identity, subsequently it went into the transitional period with all the fear and anxiety, and "adjustment" shown by the society and the press when the imminent fate of going back to China was fixed, and finally it came into the new phrase when Hong Kong was tumed into a Special Administrative Region under China.

Independent the local press seemed to be under the instrumental British rule; the author would like to show the inadequacy of the press independency found in the territory. Nevertheless, when the relatively unrestricted Hong Kong press meets the rather restrictive Chinese press, clash is unavoidable with the tremendous different ideology and theory working behind the respective press systems. Indeed, the promise of "One country, two systems",formula could not really allay the fear of the Hong Kong people.

But the press and the pragmatic public chose to adopt the accommodating gesture, instead of the confronting one, to deal with the "ne\ry" master. In a way, this helped smooth the transition. And we could not deny an emergence of a possible more open press on the mainland with the consideration of all the positive factors. DECLARATION

This work contains no material which has been accepted for the award of any other degree or diploma in any university or other tertiary institution and, to the best of my knowledge and belief, contains no material previously published or written by another person, except where due reference has been made in the text. I give consent to this copy of my thesis, when deposited in the University library, being available for loan and photocopying.

Sign: ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am indebted to my supervisor, Mr. Felix Patrikeeff of the Politics Department in the Adelaide University for his patience and assistance. With his expertise in Hong Kong, Mr. Patrikeeff offered valuable ideas during the thinking process. And I appreciate very much for his generous advice during the writing process.

I must also thank the staff members in the office of the Politics Department who offered tremendous help, in particular with technical computer problems. Last but not lest, I must thank my friend, Mr. John McCarron and my husband in providing psychological and financial support, without which I could not be able to finish writing this thesis.

Adelaide, Australia, January, 2003 CONTENTS

Introduction...... p.1

The first period (1842-1949)...... p.8

Consolidating period (1949-1984)...... p.2l

Thetransitionperiod (L984-1997)...... p.3:2

After the handover...... p.53

Conclusion p.60

Appendix

Bibliography INTRODUCTION

Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opiníons without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.

This is article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed by the United Nations in 1948 protecting people worldwide their freedom of expression. Press freedom is one of the main concerns. In an ideal world, journalists are supposed to be independent in arriving at the truth, and in conveying this to the public without being interfered with. Political stance or cofitmercial interest should not alter what a journalist writes. In the real world, however, absolute press freedom never exits. The press industry is constantly under different forms of pressure. Editors, spurred on by demands of the market place, may exert pressure on reporters to focus on certain topics and discard others. Newspaper owners may exert pressure on editors to refrain from being critical of certain people or companies because of commercial interests, whether of these result from direct investment or pressure from their advertisers. Governments too may exert pressure on the press through rules or regulations in guiding the industry. Such constraints are to be found anywhere in the world, including nations which are supposed to have achieved a higher level of freedom.

And in Asia where human rights are not generally observed and cultural consideration and respect of sovereignty are used as 'pretext' by the Asian government to prevent international interference of human rights abuse cases (as affirmed by the Bangkok

1 Declaration).1 Press, with one of its function as an expressing forum of the public, is strictly controlled by a number of Asian governments. For instance, joumalists in

Indonesia, Singapore, and Malaysia have to apply for licences and special visas from the governments.2 Nevertheless, one has to admit the relative press freedom enjoyed by the journalists in Hong Kong which has a degree of press freedom only second to

Japan in the Asian region.3 The flourishing press industry in Hong Kong has more than seventy newspapers and sixty periodicals serving about six million people in an area of around 1000 square kilometre. Approximately 300 copies of newspapers are printed for every 1000 Hong Kong readers, compared to the world average of 102 for every 1000 people.o Itt fact, Hong Kong also serves as a communication hub in the

Asian region which houses a number of international publications - Time, Newsweek,

Business Week, UPI, The AsianWalI Street Journal, CNN, etc, as they believe press freedom is treasured and safeguarded in the territory.s In addition to the relatively free intellectual environment, there is also a well-developed infrastructure and the easy access to the world-atJarge.

However, the advent of 1997 and the return of sovereignty of Hong Kong to China, where journalists operate under a completely different logic has aroused enorTnous concerns both locally and, indeed, worldwide on the issue of preservation of press freedom. Amongst the organisations which raised the concern are the Hong Kong

1 "Reaffirming the principles ofrespect for national sovereignty, territorial integrity and non- interference in the international affairs of the State", see Asia-Pacific Human Riqhts Documents and Resources. Vol. 1, Fernand de Varennes, ed. (Maritinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1998) pp.88-92 2 A.LinNeumann, '?ress freedom under the Dragon-Can Hong Kong's media still breathe fire?", The Committee to Protect Journalists, September 1997,

2 Journalists Association, the Canadian Committee to Protect Journalists and Human

Rights in China.6 Whereas media are treated as a propaganda tool and are regarded as being subordinate to the state in the People's Republic of China (PRC)7, the capitalist territory earns its reputation as a financial hub and communications hub, at the heart of which is a freewheeling press. Despite China's repeated guarantees of the autonomy of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR, Hong Kong's name after 1997), as enshrined in the "one countr/, two systems" formula, fear of the loss of press freedom is most evident in the territory where freedom of expression is perceived as an inalienable part of the way of life of Hong Kong people.

This paper would argue the enormous press freedom problem is essentially a clash of the differences of the two press systems operating on the mainland and in the territory. And the author would like to argue the Hong Kong press is not genuinely independent or "free" according to the Libertarian press theory. After an introduction of the spectrum of the four press theories which are the Authoritarian, Libertarian,

Social responsibility and the Soviet Communist systems, the analysis is then broadly divided into four periods, based on the palpable changes in the political environment within which the territory's society functioned, and functions. The first period starts in

18428 (when Hong Kong became a British colony) to Ig4g (when the PRC was established on the mainland). The focus would be on the early press industry, the early colony, and later the social movements caused by the Sino-French War in the territory and Hong Kong involvement in the Republican revolution on the mainland.

6 See ,< http://www.cjfe.org/releases/1998/hone.html> and

7 Ruoshui Wang, "China's media also needs an open reform", Human Rishts Forum (Fall 1998) pp. 35-37 &47 8 But it was not until 1843 that Hong Kong was officially confrrmed to be a British colony

J^ As the Republican press was influential and closely connected to the Hong Kong press before the establishment of the PRC, the distinguishing Republican press would also be discussed. The second period commences with the establishment of the PRC and ends in 1984, when the Joint Sino-British Declaration was signed. This section would discuss the emergence of aparty press and popular centrist press in the territory in an atmosphere of increasing economic development, sheltered by a laissez-faire colonial policy. The third period is characterised by the transition of the territory from

British to Chinese sovereignty, which starts at the conclusion of the Joint Sino-British

Declaration in 1984 and ends in 1997, when Hong Kong people had to confront the imminent prospect of going back to China. A new socio-political landscape evolved in this period with the proliferation of pressure and political groups. In 1989, the June

4 tragedy had a tremendous impact on the territory, the reporting of communist press in the territory would be analysed to demonstrate the journalists' conflicting role in following party ideology, while performing their duties by informing the public of what they see to be the truth of a situation. Whereas self-censorship was said to be the norTn in the period, this paper would also discuss how the press reacted and adjusted to the new phase, with particular analysis on press reporting during the last

Legislative Council (Legco) elections in 1994-95 during the colonial era; elections which were of paramount significance to the potential democratisation of the colony.

In the last period after the Chinese authority resumed sovereignty over the territory, the paper would discuss the section of Basic Law (which is the mini-constitution governing the territory for fifty years after L997) which guarantees freedom of speech to the Hong Kong residents. Other laws concerning freedom of expression would also be discussed. Although there is no obvious and serious erosion of press independency, a few issues have caused the public anxiety over the autonomy of Hong Kong SAR.

4 These would be discussed accordingly. In the concluding section, based on the analysis in the four period, the author will discuss in broader terms the role of press in the territory and how it helps smooth the integration of Hong Kong into the "one country, two systems" structure.

TFIE FOUR TTIEORIES OF THE PRESS

The Authoritarian Theory

The Authoritarian Theory is the first and the oldest press theory amongst the four theories being discussed. It was established soon after the invention of printing in the late Renaissance. Truth was perceived to be the product of a few wise men. The public was supposed to be led by the few who occupied the centre of power. The press was a tool of the rulers to direct and inform the people and functioned to facilitate government policy. Frequently, the press was controlled by the state with restrictive and demanding licence system and censorship mechanism as well. The

Authoritarian Theory grounded its theory in centuries of the political belief from Plato to Machiavelli.e

The Libertarian theory

In an atmosphere of growing political democracy and religious freedom with expanding trade and travel in the late seventeenth century, a new concept of press - the Libertarian Theory was evolving. While the Authoritarian Theory holds men a

e Sicbert S. Fred, Peterson Theodore and Schramm Wilbur, Four Theories of the Press (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1956) p.6

5 subordinate position to the state, the Libertarian Theory reverses the positions. Man is not perceived as dependent but rather rational being capable of distinguishing truth from falsehood. Truth is no longer the sole property of the powerful. "Rather, the right to search for truth is one of the inalienable natural rights of man."l0 The press is not a tool of the government but a forum for "presenting evidence and arguments on the basis of which the people can check on government and make up their minds as to policy".ll Thus, it is essential for the press to be independent from government intervention. The Libertarian theory grounded in Milton, Locke, Mill and the

Enlightenment.r2

The Social Responsibility Theory

The Social Responsibility Theory is in fact a modification of the Libertarian Theory.

With a trend of increasing concentration of ownership in the media industry in the twentieth century when a huge amount of money is needed for the setting-up of one's own publishing business, press and hence information is once again under the control of a few powerful people. Although these few press owners are usually not political leaders and frequently fight against government intervention, the fact that the media is in the charge of a few obviously poses a threat to the function of the press as afree market place of ideas.13 Hence, "the power and near monopoly position of the media impose on them an obligation to be socially responsible, to see that all sides are fairly presented and that the public has enough information to decide; and that if the media

to ibid., p.3 tt ibid t'ibid.,p.6 13 ibid.,p.4

6 do not take on themselves such responsibility it may be necessary for some other agency of the public to enforce it."l4

The Soviet Communist Theory

Although the Soviet Union disintegrated in 1989, its theory on press is still influencing the world in particular the few remaining communist nations. To a certain extent, the Soviet Communist Theory is the extreme case of the Authoritarian Theory with highly top-down control from the state or the party. Grounded in Marx, Lenin,

Stalin, and the Communist Party of the former Soviet Union, the press is treated as a tool of the party to convey the communist ideology. Instead of mostly privately owned as in the other press models, the Soviet Communist press system is always state owned. While the Libertarian and the Social Responsibility Theories treat their audiences as "rational men" who are capable of distinguishing truth from falsehood, the Soviet Communist Theory, as with the Authoritarian Theory, believes the people need to be guided. Hence, information flow is strictly regulated by the former Soviet

Union. "Perhaps no press in the history of the world has ever been so tightly controlled [.]"ls

Generally, not all press systems in the real world fit entirely into one of the four theories, most of the time they may lie somewhere in the spectrum of the press systems with the Libertarian Theory as the freest model, the Social Responsibility theory as the second freest, and the Soviet Communist Theory lies at the other end of the spectrum with the Authoritarian Theory somewhere in between. Nevertheless,

ra ibrd., p.5 t5 ibid

7 joumalists operate within the spectrum of the press systems which interact with the political and social environment of one's society.

THE FrRST PERTOD (1842 - 1949)

TI{E PRESS INDUSTRY AND TFIE EARLY PART OF THE COLONY'S

HISTORY

The press industry in the territory started basically from scratch, when in 1842 the island became a British colony with just a few thousands inhabitants living there, of which most were farmers and fishermen.t6 Before the mid nineteenth century, the earliest newspapers in the territory were published in Canton.lT Then three regular newspapers began the early press history of the colony: The Friend of China, established in 1842 and published twice weekly; The Hongkong Register, which was named after The Canton Register, which moved its base from Canton to Hong Kong in 1843, andThe China MaiI, which established in 1845, and was initially published in one weekly edition. Later, a daily newspaper, The Hongkong Daily Press,joined this already crowded English-language newspaper market in 1857. The China MaiI changed to be a daily format as well in 1867, "[s]ustained by expensive subscriptions, advertisements, printing contracts, merchant patronage, and contributions from readers, these newspapers helped shape a colonial identity."l8 The press also assumed itself to be.the watchdog of the non-representative colonial government. The London

16 Ian Scott, Political change and the crisis of legitimacy in Hong Kong (London: Hurst & Company, 1989) p.4l tt Eliot S. Parker, "Hong Kong", World Press Encyclopedia (New York: Facts On File, 1982) P.448 18 Christopher Munn, Anglo-China Chinese People and British Rule in Hong Kong 1841-1880 (Great Britain: Curzon Press, 2001) pp.62-3

8 Weekly Dispatch commented that the press in the colony as "our Imperial Polico", reports on the Hong Kong scandals making their presence felt in the Supreme Court.le

In addition to the watchdog function, the press in the territory also hoped to be able to fill the deficiency of the lack of a free flow of public opinion in Chinese society as perceived by many sinologists. By planning to print a Chinese-language newspaper,

The Friend of China wished to change the phenomenon and to promote the idea of freedom of expression in the territory.20

The establishment of such a Print would be 'strongly indicative of the enterprising enlightenment which we hope will ever characterize the Capital of Anglo-China, It is right that a Native Free Press should spring into congenial existence on the soil of the first British settlement in China. We would indulge the expectation, that this powerful organ of social and moral improvement will erelong lead all to acknowledge that hitherto hermetically sealed China, has become in verity and indeed 'China Opened'.21

The founders of the colony also expected the British government to serve a sacred role of enlightening the Chinese with the English civilisation as portrayed by the

"vision of Anglo-China" inThe Friend of China. Such vision was believed to be the basis for the formation of a rather benign governance in the territory. As put by

Christopher Mann, "[t]he theme that made up of this vision of Anglo-China have persisted, in one form or another, in British rhetoric on the colony almost to this duy j'"

More newspapers were subsequently launched in the territory. Equipped with local knowledge and connections with the British and colonial press, China Coast provided political as well as conìmercial news, served the merchants and the missionaries and

l9ibid 20 ibid.,p.37 2I ibid., p.37 quoted from Friend of China., 2 Jwe,7 July & 27 October 1842,42,63 ,I26;Davis, China During the War, I, 81 & II,II-12. 22 ibid.,p.34

9 supplied knowledge about China and the Chinese.23 The monthly Chinese Repository which provided learned articles on China as well as local news was published by missionary interests.2a Unable to accommodate so many papers in such a small market, several enterprises folded. These included the Hongkong Gazette, the short- lived Eastern Globe, Free Correspondent, Weekly Criminal Calender, Hong Kong

Chronicle andThe Canton Press .'5 Onthe other hand, The Friend of China survived much longer. "With its bombastic and jocular style, the [press] embodied the buoyant spirit of early Hong Kong."26 By coining the term 'capital of Anglo-China' , The

Friend of China projected the colony as the "vanguard of western knowledge and free

trade",27

In fact, the original role of the island was to serve as a great trading centre in the Far

East for the British business.2s The deep harbour and its good position in the midway between the East and the West provided the British with a very good trading poft.2e

Later,the island also served the function as a British military and naval base.3O These functions were more pronounced when there was continued unrest in other trading ports on the mainland, as a result of the anti-foreignism in China. Anti-foreign sentiment was dominant in Canton in the 1840s, as shown by the continued attacks on the foreign factories. And there were popular uprisings throughout southern China in the 1850s. Hong Kong therefore provided a far more secure trading environment, with the added benefits of the protection of the English court system and the much relaxed

23 ibid.,p.36 24 ibid., p.384 (note 68) 25 ibid., p.384 (note 69) 26Lbid.,p.36 27 tbid 28G.8. Endacott, Government and People in Hong Kong 1841-1962 (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1964) p.12 29 ibid., Lau, Society and Politics in Hong Kong, p. 7 30 ibid., Endacott, Government and people, p.12

10 trade regulations and policies, as compared to those imposed by the Chinese government in ports such as Canton. Missionary found the new colony a heaven as well. Previously, the Protestants had to operate off shore at Malacca or Singapore, or in a compromised and clandestine manner through Canton. Though the Catholics were more successful in China, they understood the advantage provided by the protection from the European rule. They quickly established churches, schools,

3l hospitals and other foundations in the territory.

To be able to fulfil the functions of serving as a free trading port and the ideal of civilising the east by the west, the adoption of good government suggested the uplifting of three principles: preservation of the benefits enjoyed by the British in the colony; the spreading of protection and rights to the entire population of the territory including European and Chinese; and the firm enforcement of British rule in the colony, and especially so against mainland's intrusion.32 Both The Friend of China and the Chinese Repository emphasized the necessity of using the English law in granting the protection and rights to the Chinese on the island.33

However, the colony did not seem to fulfil the functions expected by its founders.

Instead of attracting business, the island observed an influx of bad element into the newly found colony as shown in the following article of Canton Register on 10 May t842:

In a new settlement, wrested from the Chinese by force of arms, although England be at open wil with the Chinese government and the Chinese population, yet the latter are invited to hold lands, to build houses, and to become denizens; with such an invitation, under the state of war between the two countries, we have long and often said that only the worst spirits of the worn-out time would flock to Hongkong; - our prediction has

31 ibid., Munn, Anglo-china, pp.35-36 32lbid,p.39 33 ibid., pp.39-40

11 been fulfilled to the very letter; all that there is of bad and worst in China have flocked and are flocking to Hongkong.3a

The colony was heaven to pirates due to the absence of naval control along the coastline in the early 1840s. The territory was also refuge both to rebels and criminals from China by the protection of English law. Not surprisingly, instead of benign governance, as projected by the Anglo-China vision, the government used rather high- hand policy of control in the early colonial period. Facing a growing flow of people fleeing from the mainland, the authority employed the largest police forces in the

British Empire to keep the subjects under control. "Chinese residents were subject to a nightly curfew, to registration schemes, to annual census and to police searches conducted for a variety of purposes."35 And the trade in the colony was also subject to various constraints such as monopolies, licences, fees and charges and so forth, whether legal or illegal. 36

Indeed, it was not easy for the colonial government to keep the social order under control when it did not have a well-constructed conduit to facilitate communication with the general public in the early period of colonisation. Unlike the situation in

Singapore, where the channel between the authority and public had already established by the elite Chinese coÍrmunity, such connection could not be found in

Hong Kong, when it was abruptly turned into a British colony by the Nanking

Treaty.37 A class of stable, influential, distinguishing and "respectable" Chinese elite was not well formed until the 1870s.38 The dramatic increase of population from a

34 ibid., p.53 35 ibid., p.3 36 ibid 37 ibid 38 ibid",p.14

12 few thousands in L842 to over one hundred and twenty thousands in 18703e also augmented the difficulty in maintaining social order. Nevertheless, amongst the incoming refugees were people from the more wealthy business sector who later constituted the elite community in the territory. And some were integrated into the government power structure when the Legislative Council opened its non-official seats to Chinese from 1888 onwards.aO

Formed in the early 1870s by the elite Chinese conìmunity, both the Tung Wah

Hospital and Po Leung Kuk served to promote social control, as well as to dispense social welfare. And the District Watch Committee was formed in the late 1860s to maintain order, to enforce sanitary regulations and to help collect data in census at a local level.ot The overlapping economic and political interests between the colonial authority and the elite community elicited a common goal of stable and controlled society. The Chinese elite merchants were thus able to exert their influence and shaped the colonial policy according to their interest with their instrumental value to the colonial government.a2

Though a more peaceful society, with decreasing prosecution rate recorded in the late nineteenth century, the colonial government had no intention in relaxing its controls on the public. In fact, the high-profile police force was still frequently employed by the authorities to suppress riots and strikes, which became a common phenomenon in the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century.a3 Often, the press especially those with Canton connection had a mobilising effect on the population of Hong

39 ibid., p.69 40 ibid., p.61 41 ibid., Ian, Political change, p.46 42 ibid.,p.39 43 ibid., Munn, Anglo-China,p.376

t3 Kong, by informing them about the events happening on the mainland and also by arousing their nationalistic consciousness of their Chinese origin as exemplified in the popular insurrection in 1884 during the Sino-French War, which will be discussed in the forthcoming section.

TFIE EFFECT OF SINO-FRENCH WAR ON TFIE TERRITORY

The French aggression in China in 1884 saw a number of riots and strikes in Hong

Kong which began since early September. Dockworkers refused to repair French ships. Coolies (labourers) refused to load French cargo. The impact was significant as the entrepôt trade, the principal industry of the colony at that time, was greatly impaired. British trade suffered obviously. The colonial government ordered the workers to resume their work or they would be fined, resulting in series of labour strikes. While national consciousness was obviously in the background here, other factors made up the rest of the picture. Firstly, although the battlefield was in China, the attack threatened family members and properties on the mainland of the local residents. Secondly, Canton issued a patriotic proclamation, exhorting the Chinese to devote themselves to the motherland instead of foreign powers, and threatened the traitors with the death penalty and their relatives with other forms of severe punishment.44 Thirdly, the repressive measure of imposing heavy fines by the colonial regime on workers who refused to work for the French further infuriated the public against alien power.as Lastly, the vernacular press surely played its influential role in fostering national sentiment. "Chinese newspapers published in Hong Kong and

Canton had avidly carried battlefield reports and propagated the cause of

44 Jung-fang Tsai, Hong Kong in Chinese History (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993) pp.126-31 45 ibid

T4 patriotism."46 The colonial government had in fact prosecuted local editors who published the patriotic proclamation.aT

However, the general public did not share a consensus on the issue. Albeit by having the same patriotic feeling, the elite community did not support the strikes as a valid way to help save their motherland from the devastating state under the Manchu rule.

From their perspective of 'elitist nationalism', they believed trade and commerce rather than destructive strikes or riots would strengthen China. The riots and strikes disrupted social stability and their economic interest as well. They preferred to co- operate with the colonial government, and sought to resume former levels of law and order.as Tung Wah Building ,was offered for the quartering of the British troops when the British government decided to rely on military force to end the disturbance on 3'd

October.ae The situation was finally under control when order was restored in late

November with riot leaders banished and hundreds of triad (who were partly responsible for organising the strikes and riots) left the colony as a result of the proclamation of the Peace Preservation Ordinance.so And the workers achieved the right to refuse to work for the French.sl

TFIE II\N/OLVEMENT OF HONG KONG IN TTIE REPUBLICAN REVOLUTION

Back in China, the French hostility had a more profound impact, and served to cultivate a series of nationalist, reformist movement in 1880s and 1890s by arousing

46 ibid.,p.I4I 47 ibid.,p.l29 48 ibid., p.130 49 ibid.,p.135 50 ibid., p.144 as quoted from Daily Press, October 25, November 1, 1884; COI29.218.20862, Marsh to Derby, no. 358, November 1, 1884 51 ibid., p.144

15 public concerns, and hence initiating public debate on the inefficient officialdom of the Manchu rule,s2 which eventually led to the Republican revolution in lgll-l2.The nationalistic sentiment strongly politicised the Chinese population in Hong Kong, as shown by the remarks appearing in the press:s3 "they avail themselves of the newspapers to keep themselves acquainted with the latest happenings....[M]ost of the lower class Chinese in the Colony are sympathetic towards the revolutionaries."S4

In fact, a number of revolutionaries and their organisations were based in the territory, where money was gathered and supporters recruited. The patriotic sentiment of the locals was again flared up as a result of the revolutions on the mainland.55 It was later translated into popular civil disobedience, in the form of "hooliganism" and

"rowdyism", and strikes.56 To deal with the social unrest, the colonial government again turned to direct control by imposing more restrict ru1e.57 While the government relied on high-handed control, the elite Chinese conìmunity turned to Confucianism, in the hope that it would be able to help restore social order. Although it seemed paradoxical to revive this traditional political/social belief, which ran against the grain of the reformist viewpoint proposed by the revolutionaries, "Confucianism provided a focus for the Chinese people in their search for identity as a nation".58 ft did not really worked. Confucian teaching did not seem to bring back social order into the territory.se And the colonial government had, in fact, a difficult time in finding a pretext to suppress the social unrest. Unlike the riots and strikes in earlier years when

52lbid.,p.I25 53 ibid.,p.243 54 ibid.,p.243 quoted from Daily Press, Octobe¡ 23, L9Il 55 ibid., pp.238-49 56 ibid.,pp.256-60 57 ibid.,p.257 58 ibid.,pp.255-6 59 ibid.,p.256

16 the grievance and demands were more well defined and hence more manageable, the revolution in 1911-12 aggravated general hostility towards the alien regime, and especially so after the revolution had freed their Chinese counterparts from the

Manchu ru1e.60 "The Chinese revolution therefore served as a vehicle for accentuating the anti-colonial discontentment of the people as well as fostering nationalistic sentiment [.]"61

The political situation in China obviously had an influence on the local populace. And

Canton relations with the colony was particularly close.62 Most Hong Kong residents had relative and property back in Canton as a great majority of the local population was from the Canton ar"a.6'Secondly, the two cities were closely connected economically. While Hong Kong served as an entrepôt, getting goods for Canton merchants to distribute on the mainland, Canton collected goods from hinterland and exported these to Hong Kong. Finally, Hong Kong and Canton shared a number of newspapers also helped inform the populace situation in the two cities. In fact, Hong

Kong people were extremely joyful about the independence of Canton. The event was widely celebrated in the territory.6a But the zeal of the locals for Canton politics turned cold later. Indeed, the Canton government was eventually abandoned both morally and financially by the Hong Kong residents, when the latter saw an incapable government which was unable to maintain a stable financial and political situation in the newly-autonomous Canton. The colonial government's putting various measures

60 ibid.,p.258 6l lbid.,p.269 62 ibid., Endacott, Government and people in HK, p.1 63 ibid., Lau Siu-kai, Society and politics, p.65 64 ibid., Tsai, Hong Kong in Chinese History, pp.248-9

17 forward to hinder the Chinese revolution6s further extinguished the zeal of the local populace in following Canton politics.

TI{E REPUBLICAN PRESS

Nevertheless, the close relation between Hong Kong and China, in particular Canton, did have significant impact on the territory before the establishment of the PRC. In fact, the press industry of the history of Hong Kong and Canton was intertwined.66 As mentioned in the earlier section, the earliest papers in the territory were originated from Canton. And later in the first half of the twentieth century the constant movement of people including publishers and editors between the two places6T suggests an inevitable influence on the territory press from the mainland journalists.

While the press system practised at the moment on the mainland resembles rather closely to the Soviet Communist Theory, the Republican press, especially for those operated in the trading ports, was comparatively free and independent.

Several factors allowed the journalists during the Republican period worked in a rather free environment. Firstly, the Republican state was in a relatively weak political position to control the media with the Qing dynasty just gone and the communist party in the stage of consolidating.6s Secondly, within the trading ports, the prosperous economic factor enhanced the commercialisation of the press released the press owners to be more concerned'about the market need of the audiences instead of

65ilbid.,p.287 66 Elliot S. Parker, "Hong Kong", World Press Encyl:lopedia (New York: Facts On File, 1982) p.448 67 ibid 68 Stephen R. Mackinnon, "Tolvard a History of the Chinese Press in the Republican Period", Modern China (Vol. 23, No. 1, January L997) p.5

18 the political need of the state.6e Governed by foreign law, the trading ports also protected the journalists against the Chinese press laws which forbade any writing or drawing that were perceived to have an adverse effect on the stability and peace of the government.T0 In fact, Shanghai became the refuge of Chinese revolutionaries after the May Fourth movement in l9I9.7r Thirdly, the influence from the West on journalists through their training and extensive travel abroad equipped the Chinese journalists with the'Western liberal ideas on press professionalism as represented by the Libertarian Theory .7'For instance, the Dagong bao often criticised Chiang military dictatorship of the Republican government in its commentaries.T3

However, the Republican press did not fit the Libertarian Theory. It was not free from state censorship and it always used by the state for propaganda function.T4 "On the other hand, the press as a major agent of political and cultural change in Republican

China. Its role has been critical to the democratic upsurges and nationalistic movements of 191l,IgIg,Ig27, and 1938."ts And the nationalistic appeal on the press has also aroused significant influence on Hong Kong society during the period of Sino-French war and Republican revolution on the mainland.

Indeed, Hong Kong in the first 100 years after the colonisation was heavily influenced by the situation in China. Large numbers of refugee flowing into the territory from the mainland were constantly recorded when the political environment in China was

6n ibid., p.7 70 L. Sophia Wang, "The Independent Press and Authoritarian Regimes: The Case of the Dagong bao in Republican China", Pacific Affairs (Vol. 67, No. 2, Summer L994) p.22I 71 ibid 72 lbid.,Mackinnon, Toward a history of the Chinese press, p.8 t' ibid., L. Sophia Wang, The independent press, p.217 ta ibid., Stephen R. Mackinnon, Toward a history of the Chinese press, p.15 ts ibid., p. t8

T9 adverse. The locals during that period of time did not have a strong sense of belongings. They rather identified themselves with the mainlanders than the locals. In fact, quite a substantial number of the refugees were sojourners in the colony, For instance in 1948, one year before the founding of the PRC, two millions people came into the colony and two millions left.16

The local press, as well, was greatly connected to the mainland press, in particular, the press in Canton which enjoyed a rather higher degree of press freedom amongst the

Republican press in Chinese trading ports. While the local press did not or was unable to practise the independent spirit of the Libertarian system (government intervention

\ilas not uncommon when the colonial government found the social situation unstable), the author believes the relatively liberated environment enabled local journalists to work rather unrestrained. Both the trading port and civilisation envision by the British "compelled" the colonial government not to practise the authoritarian model. The adoption of English law instead of the Chinese law in the territory (which enables the separation of judicial from executive power of the government) also served to prevent concentration of power in the government which is not conducive for the establishment of an independent press. Nevertheless, the local press had not developed into a Libertarian model. Journalists either paid most of their attention on

China politics or were rather supportive of the colonial government. It was hard to find any papers devoting to provide a forum for discussion of the government policy, not to mention being critical of the colonial regime. Indeed, China politics had been the main topic of the local press until the late 1960s and 1970s when Hong Kong

76 ibid., Endacott, Government and people in HK, pp.4-5, quoted from the Annual Report L948,p.9

20 society began to be more well formed which would be discussed shortly in the forthcoming section.

CONSOLTDATTNG PERTOD (1949 - 1984)

With the founding of the PRC and the ending of the colony's century

The implementation of immigration restrictions policy on Chinese immigrants by other new Asian nations also had a stabilising effect on the local popul ace.77 A more localised Hong Kong identity emerged in especially the later half of this consolidating period, when the Hong Kong politics started to gain more weight in comparison to the increasing irrelevant China politics in an environment of affluent economic development in the colony. The press underwent a new phase of development as well.

The local press industry saw the formation of aparty press and later a popular centrist press.

TFIE PARTY PRESS

After the end of the Civil War and the founding of the PRC, China politics between the Nationalists or Kuomintang (KMT) and the Communists or the Chinese

Communist Party (CCP) manifested in the formation of politically oriented trade unions in the territory. "As a third party, the British were content with establishing the rules of the game, granting the rightist and leftist groups the freedom to organise trade unions, publish partisan newspapers, distribute propaganda, and engage in party

77 tbid.,p.5

2T polemics."78 The Federation of Trade Unions was a pro-cofirmunist labour organisation established in 1947 and the Trade Union Council was pro-nationalist established in 1948.7e The local newspapers aligned organizationally, financially or ideologically with political parties according to the changing political environment as proposed by Seymour-lJre's "press-party parallelism".s0In the first two decades after the founding of the PRC, local newspapers could be divided into two main groups, in relation to their ideological lines. Prominent pro-KMT or rightist papers in the territory were Kung Sheung Yat Pao, Hong Kong Times (Xíanggang Shibo) andWah

Kiu Yat Pao. And the two major pro-CCP or leftist papers were/are Ta Kung Pao and

Wen Wei Po.

The rightist papers established well before the founding of PRC. For instance,Wah

Kiu Yat Pao and Sing Tao Jih Pao were founded in 1925 and L939 respectively. Both had the official "Republic of China" chronological designation in their mastheads until the late 1980s. They celebrated the 10th October as the national day of the

Nationalist government instead of the l't October of the Communist government.8l

Indeed, the celebration was a cause of the "Double Tenth Riots" in 1956 when the

KMT supporters raged a large-scale attack of the communists who were believed to be responsible for the destruction of the Republican Nationalist flags in resettlement states and workers' quarters in Kowloon and Tsuen Wan.82 The highly ideological

78 Joseph Man Chan and Yiu Ming To, "Reunification and Press Freedom in Hong Kong: The Xi Yang Case", Chinese sovereignty (England: Ashgate, 2000) p.223 79 Tai-lok Lui and Stephen WK Chiu, "Social Movements and public discourse on politics", Hong Kong's History - State and society under colonial rule (London: Routledge, 1999) p.LO2 80 Lee Chin-chuan, "Media Structure and Regime Change in Hong Kong", The Challenge of Hong Kong 's Reintegration with China (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, L997)p.IIS, quoted from Seymour-Ure, The Political Impact of Mass Media 81 ibid.,p.124 82 ibid., Lui and Chiu, Social movements, p.103

22 charged riots resulted in 59 people died and 740 rioters arrested.s3 Nonetheless, the voice of pro-Taiwan papers was gradually weakened, with the recovery of the mainland by Chiang Kai-shek becoming less and less unlikely, and the departure of

KMT followers from the territory who were quite substantial in the 1950s.84In general, these rightist papers aligned with the colonial regime.ss

The opposing force to the pro-Taiwan KMT was the pro-Beijing communists in the territory, with its main objective of conducting the united front task and propagating the communist ideology to the locals. As early as L945 after the World War II, the

CCP used Hong Kong as a base to support its activities in South China.86 After the founding of the PRC, the CCP had established political control in the territory mainly via economic means in the early 1950s.tt In 1957, andprobably in response to the

1956 riots and the belief that Hong Kong would be used as a base for KMT activities,ss the CCP started to centralise the party activities in the territory by establishing the New China News Agency (NCNA). NCNA functioned as the party news agency as well as the party operation centre in Hong Kong.se

Propaganda work was done through the leftist newspapers which were directly or indirectly owned by the party.eo Nevertheless, the pro-PRC papers did not adopt a high profile policy in promoting the party ideology so as to attract non-communist

83 ibid.,Ian Scott, Political change,p.77 84 ibid., Lee, Media structure and regime change, p.121 85 ibid., p.124 86 Burns P. John, "The Structure of Communist Party Control in Hong Kong", Asian Survey, (Vol. 30, No.8, Aug I99O)p.7a9 87 ibid. p.748 88 ibid., p.750, quoted from Carton Gary, "Hong Kong and Chinese Foreign policy, 1955-60", The China Quarterly 5 1 (July-September 197 2), pp. 4LL-I9 89 ibid., pp.750-51 90 ibid., pp.760-61

23 readers, as followed the order from Beijing." In 1967, in order to show support to the motherland during the Cultural Revolution, the leftist launched a series of destructive activities in the colony. From May up to December, there were widespread riots, strikes and bomb attacks in the terntory.e2 Leftist papers were employed as political propaganda tool. At the end of 1967 when the violence finally burned out, the

Cultural Revolution in the colony had left 51 dead and 800 injured.e3 The local communists found decreasing support from the public who were beginning to search for a local Hong Kong identity which was increasingly different from the mainland's.

As Nicholas Thomas put it, the riots did not bring Hong Kong closer to the motherland but instead deepen the dichotomy between Mainlander and Hong Kong people.ea Indeed, the disturbance helped boost public support of the colonial government as demonstrated by the readiness of the neighbourhood associations to co-operate with the police to restore social order. And the leftist papers became exceptionally unpopular as manifested by the decrease of its sales.es In fact, all other non-communist papers supported the British against Beijinge6 while the pro-PRC papers was suspended by the colonial government for a short period of time in the heat of the Cultural Revolution.eT

Otherwise, the government in general allowed the operation of newspapers in the territory without much interference. The local press industry was not subject to many

91 ibid., Lee, Media structure and regime change, p.117 ibid., quoted from Man, Cheuk-fei (1996), "How Did Xinhua Launch its Propaganda Work through the Leftist Newspapers (L949 - 1982)?" Hong Kong Economic Journal Monthly, no.226 (Jan.): 10-17 92 lbid., Ian Scott, Political change, pp.99- 104 93 ibid 94 Nicholas Thomas, (England : Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 1999) p. 8 3 - 8 3 95 Robert Cottrell, The End of Hone Kone - The Secret Diplomacy of Imperial Retreat (London: John Murray, 1993) p.30 96 ibid., quoted from Xu Jiatun (1994) Hong Kong Memoirs. Hong Kong: United daily News. 2 vols. 97 Elliot S.Parker, Hong Kong, World Press Encyclopedia (New York Facts on File, 1982) p.451

24 restrictions albeit by the existence of one of the most restrictive sets of press law. The law endorsed the former Hong Kong Governors with enormous power in controlling the print industry. For example, he could forbid any publication from entering into the territory. Nevertheless, this power was rarely employed. Amongst the press law were the three main regulations and ordinances governing the industry - Control of

Publications Consolidation Ordinance and the Newspapers Registration and

Distribution Regulationin 1979, and the Printed Documents (Control) Regulations in

lg64.es In fact, the general public was believed to be more influential regarding the operation logic of the highly commercial enterprise of the press industry in the

,99 colony.

Nonetheless, the leftist papers could generally survive in this competitive press market even with its suspected reliability and low number of readers. "Despite the low credibility and dismal circulation in Hong Kong, these mouthpieces [were] well- financed by advertising revenues from the PRC companies, thanks to the windows of opportunity opened up by China's economic change."l0O While the rightist papers were always pro-establishment and supportive of the colonial regime, the leftist papers supported their master on the mainland. This function was especially obvious in I982-L983 during the negotiation period between the British and Chinese government on the fate of Hong Kong before the conclusion of the Joint Sino-British

Declaration. Frequently, the nationalistic tactic was employed by the leftist press to push forward the "inarguable" re-unification of the territory with the motherland, as seen in a report of New Evening Post, a communist paper:

98 ibid., p.450 en Siu-kai Lau, Society and Politics in Hong Kong (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1982) footnote no.9 onp. 149 100 ibid., Lee, Media structure and regime change,p,I24

25 The atmosphere was fervent. Participants unanimously pledged full support for the Chinese government's policy statements on recovering sovereignty over Hong Kong. Now that the Chinese government has explicitly stated that recovery of sovereignty will not come later than 1 July 1997, this generation of workers feels very excited and inspired to be able to experience personally this uncommon change in Hong Kong and to see with its own eyes the imminent removal of a ceniury of naiional shu-".tot

In fact, the communist press began to receive unprecedented attention in the territory after the imminent fate of Hong Kong returning to China, which would be discussed in the later section of the transition period. Prior to that, the emergence of the popular centrist press and the social movement of the local populace, which were of paramount significance in the formation of the local Hong Kong identity, would be analysed.

TTM POPULAR CENTRIST PRESS

While the end of World War II saw a greatly tormented economy in the territory,l02 the end of Republican China saw the beginning of a prosperous economy with the huge influx of manpower and capital pouring into the colony. "The most dramatic consequence of this was the formation of a modern textile industry by the late 1940s and 1950s."103 The traditional trade from the entrepôt was then gradually replaced by the evolving manufacturing industry, and especially light industry.too The resulting rapid economic development served also as the nurturing base for the birth of a popular centrist press in the late 1960s and early 1970s.

101 ibid., Robert Cottrell, The end of Hong Kong, p.115 *1997 102 Johnson Graham 8., and After: Will Hong Kong Survive? A Personal View", Pacific Affairs (Summer 1986) p.238 103 ibid.,pp.240-41 IO4 tbid.,p.242

26 When the growing affluence of the Hong Kong population shifted their attention from the increasing irrelevant KMT and CCP confrontation to the more pertinent local issue, the party press began to go into decline in terms of its significance. The emergence of a group of popular-centrist newspapers further weakened the partisan press and the link of traditional press-party ties.rOs This group could be divided into two subgroups - one of intellectual taste culture such as Ming Pao and The Hong

Kong Economic Journal, and the other of mass taste culture such as The Oriental

Daily News and Tín Tin Daily News.It should be noted that the popular press has a two-thirds share in readership and advertising.106 While the majority of the locals read

Chinese newspapers, the expatriate and the Chinese elite read the English-language

South China Morning Posr (SCMP). With a circulation of 115,000, it shares only 47o of the readership b:ut 87Vo of the English-language press market. SCMP was indeed widely respected by journalists.l0T And it is always believed that the English-language could be able to enjoy a higher degree of press independence since most authoritarian govemments are more tolerant to English papers which have more sophisticated readers and are more influential on their external image'108

For the Chineselanguage newspapers of the mass press, the leaders were Oriental

Daity News and Sing Pao which "[pamper] the audience with vivid, vulgar and sensational accounts of crime stories, [mixing] with a large dosage of entertainment gossip, and daily titbits of soft pornographr.ttLoe The prominence of spot-news and

"societal news" could be revealed by the number of staff employed by the Oriental

105 ibid., Lee, Media structure and regime change, p'126 106 ibid.,p.I27 107 ibid 108 ibid 109 ibid.,p.130

27 Daily News, which was 110 staff, in comparison to 30 staff the paper employed for political and economic news.llo

In fact, the importance in preserving the culture of life of the general public projected by the press was always emphasized by the Chinese officials, who repeatedly mentioned the way of life such as horseracing, pornography and other capitalistic values would not be changed after 1997.r11

In a highly competitive market-driven industry, the press put their priority on issues of local interest and which were at the same time removed from the PRC-Taiwan irvalry.tL2 As a beneficiary of the current system, the papers in general supported the status quo and operated under the logic of market economy, middle-class liberalism and the centrally legitimated institutions.tt' The colonial regime remained in a dominant position during this period, without coming out with any strong criticism of the media. In fact, the media - except the pro-communist part - supported the British administration on the question of Hong Kong's sovereignty after 1997 .rla

FORMATION OF A MORE LOCALISED HONG KONG IDENTITY

\ü/hile the press industry saw the emergence of the popular-centrist press as a manifestation of a more localised press culture in the territory, the society as a whole of course had undergone a similar process of change in the meantime. As in the local press industry, mainland politics declined its significance in the territory when a ne\ry

110 ibid., p.130 111 ibid ll2lbid',p.lI7 II3lbid.,p.I27 Il4 ibid., p.Ll7

28 generation grew up locally who were no longer that much bound by the ideological rivalry between the nationalists and communists. Instead, more localised issues began to assume prominence on the agenda of the social movement of the new generation, as reviewed by the series of demonstrations and riots following the hunger strike against the Star Ferry fare increase in 1966. No signs of central organisation or control were found amongst the protesters. "The disturbances represent[ed] the first major, spontaneous attempt by the post-war baby boomers to express their discontent openly."115 A new era of political climate began with demands which were more spontaneous and issue-driven.l16 This represented a quest for a local Hong Kong identity and the attention and redressing of grass roots' grievance by the young generation.llT

While the colonial government was busy with looking for ways of dealing with the disturbances in the 1966 and 1967, measures which in fact resulted in tighter colonial laws on assembly, freedom of speech and demonstration,lls, the young generation began to pay more attention to the social issues such as the poor living and working conditions brought forth through the colony's growing prosperity. Student activism reached its height in the issue of Diaoyutai Islands, which provided huge Chinese nationalistic appeal.lle Again, Chinese nationalism served as a source of identity- construction when the colonial regime failed to provide a framework for the new generation's quest of identity. It also served as the backing principle for the critique of colonialism and capitalism. But the zeal tampered somewhat, firstly by the apathetic

115 ibid., Lui and Chiu, Social movements, p.104 116 ibid.,p.105 117 ibid.,p.106 1 1 8 Patrikeeff Felix, "The People's Republic of China and Hong Kong: A Crisis of Human Rights or The Emergence of 'Democratisation with Chinese Characteristics'?", Crisis and Conflict in Asia (New York Nova Science Publishers, 2002) p.188 119 ibid.,Lui and Chiu, Social movements, p.106

29 attitude of the PRC government on local issue and, secondly, by the change of party line, with the emergence of Deng Xiaoping's new reform policy after Mao's death.l20

Hence, ideological struggle was gradually replaced by a more locally oriented agenda of social movements.l2l In general, these social movements were manifested themselves in the form of collective actions via protestsl22 such as the series of protests against the government's resettlement policy in relation to the "Yaumati Boat

People Action".123 The erstwhile nationalistic appeal was no longer the principal drive behind the social actions in this new generation. "Implicit in most of the students' organized actions, ranging from social actions to protest govemment policy to cultural critique of everyday life, there was an underlying agenda of criticizing the colonial government and the capitalist economy."l24

These social actions could be treated as a product of the restricted administration of the colonial bureaucracy within the 'consultative democracy'. Before the establishment of the District Board and the related election in the early 1980s, official channel for expressing public discontent were limited and confined to the Urban

Council. To address the many social issues, a number of protest and pressure groups were formed to help mobilise the general public:

The rise of pressure group politics in the late 1970s and early 1980s can be understood in terms of the institutional configuration of social protest. The closed political system created a coÍrmon understanding among the activists

120 ibid., Lui and Chiu, Social movements, p.107 121ibid L22 ibid., p.108, quoted from Lui Tailok and Kung James K.S, Chengsi zongheng (City Unlimited: Community Movement and Urban politics in Hong Kong), Hong Kong, Wide Angle Publications, 1985 123 ibid., p.107 124 ibid.,p.108

30 because they shared the experience of being rejected and sometimes repressed by the colonial state.125

Ironically, these opposition forces poised against the British regime helped strengthen the colonial legitimacy.t'u To accommodate the growing demands for political reforms and to address the social problems, the colonial government absorbed the young elites to replace the old ones in decision-making processes and government bodies,127 implementing a series of projects such as the public housing scheme, and the further development of education and health services. The establishment of the

Independent Commission Against Comrption (ICAC) had especially promoted the status of the colonial regime.

The colonial state was subsequently perceived as an efficient administration which could meet the needs of the population and provide them with an institutional framework enabling the Hong Kong Chinese to improve their livelihood through entrepreneurship/or credentialism. 128

With the improvement of working and living conditions in a much more prosperous economy, all those government policies helped created a sense of local governance and in turn foster the formation of the Hong Kong identiry.l2e Nevertheless, "[t]he colonial nature of the administrative state was left unscathed."l30

In the latter half of this consolidating period, a much more localised Hong Kong identity evolved when the Hong Kong politics replaced the prominent position of the

China politics. The Hong Kong way of life became increasingly distinctive from the mainland's. The normative orientations, life style and mental outlook of the Hong

125 ibid., pp.108-9 126 ibid.,p.I09 127 ibid.,p.IlO, quoted from Tang Stephen, 'The power structure in a colonial society: a sociological study of the Legislative Council in Hong Kong', unpublished senior BSoc.Sci. thesis, Sociology Department, Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, L973 128 ibid.,p.111 I29 ibid., Nicholas, Democracy denied, pp.l27-17O 130 ibid., Lui and Chiu, Social movements, p. 1 1 1

3T Kong Chinese were wildly apart from those of their counterparts on the mainland, especially so in the late 1970s.131 Under the affluent economic development and the

"benign" colonial governance, the Hong Kong press culture consolidated itself with the popular centrist press. "Free" as it appeared to be. The communist press coexisted with the KMT and later the popular centrist press without much government intervention. Nevertheless, the local press, as it was before, did not function as an independent press of the Liberlarian model. The society, as a whole, was rather pro- establishment. Except the few English papers, the Chinese papers which were read by the majority of Hong Kong people did not pay much emphasis on editorials and the editorial sections.l32 Indeed, the press was not of great direct influence on broad government policy.l33 All papers, excluding the pro-PRC ones, were hardly ever overtly critical of the British government. The status quo or the colonial regime was generally supported by the press and the society.

THE TRANSTTTON PERTOD (1984 - 1997)

However, with the conclusion of the Joint Sino-British Declaration in 1984, and with it the sealing of Hong Kong's fate post-1997 ,the press as well as the rather well formed localised Hong Kong identity entered into a new era. The colonial government in Hong Kong was no longer the single dominant power when the Chinese regime shifted from a subservient role to a more prominent role from a political point of view. A "dual power structure" evolved.13

13libid., Siu-kai Lau and Hsin-chi Kuan, The Ethos of The Hong Kong Chinese p.2 1'2 ibid., Elliot, Hong Kong, p.451 133 ibid 134ibid., Lee, Media structure and regime change, p.118

32 Both the colonial and Chinese governments sought to the press to promote their public image and legitimacy in the eyes of the Hong Kong people. While the British wanted to maintain the image of a good governance, the Chinese wanted to smooth the process of resumption of its sovereignty over Hong Kong by giving promising future to the local populace, who were virtually forced to accept the decided fate of returning to China without their prior consentl3s. "situated at the centre of a struggle that was full of twists and turns, the media had a confusing and often contradictory role to pluy."t'u On the other hand, the media enjoyed favourable treatment from both regimes with tangible rewards such as advertising and news or intangible rewards such as status, attention and access.t" Chinu politics regained its importance amongst the general public after the conclusion of the Joint Sino-British Declaration. At the same time, the pro-PRC papers saw unprecedented significance in the territory.

However, they were also in a rather embarrassing position in reporting the events of the democratic movement on the mainland which led to the tragedy on June 41989.

The tragic events in China and the decolonisation process promoted a general atmosphere of heightened political interest in the territory. The proliferation of pressure groups since the mid-1980s brought forth a new role for the press, which had to inform the public about the groups' activities and served as a platform between these rival groups of people in debate and the exchange of differing views, each seeking popular support.l3s With the approaching of the departure of the colonial government and the coming near of resumption of Hong Kong sovereignty by the

Chinese government, an analysis of press reporting during the last Legislative election showed subtle adjustments, and in some other cases explicit adjustments, being made

135 ibid., p.118, quoted from Chin-chuan Lee and Joseph Man Chan (1990), "Government Management of Press in Hong Kong." Gazette,46:. 125-139 136 ibid.,p.118 137 ibid 138 ibid.,pp.118-9

JJ-õ by the Hong Kong press. The mainland press system would be discussed and the clash of the difference between the Hong Kong press and the mainland press systems was believed to be the principal reason behind the problems of press freedom.

V/ith the conclusion of the Joint Sino-British Declaration, the voice of Taiwan in the press industry became increasingly irrelevant in the territory, when Hong Kong would be soon under PRC. Regardless of Deng Xiao-ping demonstration of a friendly gesture to this ideological incompatible press under the assurance of autonomy for the

Hong Kong people, a number of pro-Taiwan newspapers left the local press arena.

Kung Sheung Yat Pao closed in 1984 when other pro-Taiwan newspapers were still struggling in the extremely competitive press industry in the colony.l3e Without financial support from Taiwan, Hong Kong Times, the KMT mouthpiece, closed in

February 1993 when it was unable to survive on its own with its inadequate readership.too Woh Kiu Yat Pao, after being purchased by a succession of owners, still could not escape the fate, and closed in January lgg5.r41 United Daity N¿ws and

China Times Weekly, the Hong Kong edition of two biggest Taiwanese newspaper chains established in the colony in 1992, had to retreat because of a chronically small readership, and beyond that a price war at end of l995.1a2 "Media voices representing

Taiwan [had] been virtually extricated, thus substantially narrow Hong Kong's pluralistic ideological field."1a3

The price war initiated by the "cash-rich" Oriental Daily News was also partly responsible for the closure of Eastern Express, SingTao Evening News and Qingxiu

139 ibid., pp.l2I-2 l4O lbid.,p.l22 L4l ibid.,p.l25 I42 ibid., p.I22-3 143 ibid

34 Magazine. The lowering of HK$5 to HK$2 a copy of the daily newspaper intensified the already tough market, which was becoming increasingly difficult due to decreasing advertising revenues and increasing newsprint price.l4 While the commercial logic drove the unfit out of the highly competitive market, the diversity of views and opinions was at stake with fewer papers remaining in the industry.

TFIE LOCAL COMMUNIST PRESS

The influence and significance of communist press, on the other hand, became increasingly explicit in the running up to the handover.las As mentioned in previous section, the left-wing papers served as valuable adjunct to the Chinese diplomatic effort early during the negotiation process in1982-83 between the British and the

Chinese government.la6'While promoting the closely nationalistic tie between Hong

Kong and the mainland, the pro-PRC press also helped buttress the official stance of anti-British colonialism and the gangren zhigang (Hong Kong people ruling Hong

Kong) spirit.laT However this pro-communist position was vigorously challenged during the period of the democratic movement before the June 4 tragedy.In addition to the primary goal of propagating the communist ideology and conducting united front work, the communist press was nonetheless not exempt from the reality of competing readership for survival. Serving both the central Chinese authorities and the general public, editors of the communist press had a difficult job in reporting the

r441bid 145 Chan Ming K. and Lau Tuen-yu, "Dilemma of the comrnunist Press in a pluralistic society - Hong Kong in the Transition to Chinese Sovereignty, 1988-1989", Asian Survev (Vol. 30, No. 8, Aug, 1990) p.731 146 ibid., Ian Scott, political change in HK, p.199 147 ibid.,p.202

35 events in Beijing in such a way as to satisfy both sides.lo8 The way that the editors of

Ta Kung Pao (TI(P) and, WenWei Po (WWP) in reporting the June 4 movement revealed the conflicting nature of the job-at-hand. Indeed, the resplse of the pro-

PRC newspapers in the territory during the period of the student movements provided unique perspectives in examining the development of the Hong Kong-Beijing press linkage.lae

Although the student movement was originally a domestic event on the mainland, the general public as well as the journalists of the territory identified themselves with the students' cause. They believed the democracy the students fought for was directly related to their future. Wen Wei Po adopted a sympathetic approach in reporting the students' movement from the very beginning in late April 1989. The paper was even against the PRC regime when the Beijing authorities, using The People's Daily, condemned the students' movement as a "dísturbance". After the imposition of martial law on 2l May, editorial columns of WWP printed nothing but four big words, tongxin jishou, which means 'painful heart and aching mind'.150 And the paper printed a public statement by its 124 staff-members, which read:

1. We firmly support the Chinese students' patriotic democratic movement. 2.We consider the May 19th statement by Li Peng as distorting true facts, going against historical trends and the wishes of the Chinese people, and can only worsen the situation. 3. We do feel that China ought to urgently eliminate the various factors that lead to the emergence of autocratic dictatorship in order to establish a sound lsl democratic system.

While this was an unprecedented open challenge to the central regime, the dramatic gesture was in line with both the paper's own liberalizing tendency and the universal

148 ibid.,Chan & Lau, Dilemma of the communist press, p.73I-2 149 ibid., p.738 150 ibid., p.738 151 ibid., pp.738-9

36 condemnation of the Beijing authorities. WWP journalists devoted themselves wholly in informing the Hong Kong public by providing detailed and vivid reports and pictures of violent reaction of the Chinese authorities to the students' protest, along with extensive coverage of the international criticism on the event: "Special feature stories by WWP's own reporters in Beijing added much to the sense of crisis and national tragedy."l52 Factual Record of the Beiiing Blood Bath, a publication produced by WWP, sold exceptionally well: "In making such an irrevocable break with Beijing, WWP established itself as a respected newspaper of the Hong Kong community fully prepared to present the facts in China as its reporters and editors saw them."153

In contrast to the popularity gained in the territory, WWP was subjected to fierce criticism from the central authorities, and, from early June 1989, it was even banned from entry into the mainland. TKP, being much more conscious about its link with

Beijing, adopted a rather more moderate, ambivalent tone in reporting the events in

Beijing. Instead of condemning the Beijing authorities as most newspapers did, TKP urged the students and the leadership to settle the issue by communicating via dialogues. Not until the massacre on June 4 did TKP shift from its earlier slightly critical attitude to a more rebellious gesture by providing extensive coverage of the events for a couple of days. Nevertheless, the paper remained cautious, seemingly aware of its connection with the Beijing authorities, by not mentioning the names of top leaders in reporting the massacre. In fact, TKP adjusted its attitude soon and

1s4 reassumed its pro-PRC tone.

152 ibid 153 ibid 154 ibid., p.740-l

31 It was not long before WWP could feel the pressure from the north. Director LeeTze

Chung insisted on his "nationalistic but independent" stance of W-WP, in spite of the threat of losing the paper's financial support. Lee was asked to stop his anti-Beijing stance or WWP would lose HK $11 million subsidy and advertisements from pro-

PRC local enterprises. After repeatedly failing to follow the orders from the central authorities, Lee was dismissed. Chen Bojian, who replaced Lee, oversaw a paper in which editorial content shifted from the original firm stance against the central authorities, to one that adopted a pro-PRC attitude over the June 4 issue. Enraged by the editorial change, nearly 50 staff resigned in July-August 1989. In this case, the

Chinese regime showed explicitly the determination to regain full control over its propaganda organs in Hong Kong.ls5 "However, this high handed, official PRC intervention in WWP's management and the paper's editorial turnabout might prove counterproductive in the long run, as it could only further undermine the Hong Kong people's already shaken confidence in the PRC's 'one country, two systems' formula that supposedly would leave Hong Kong to manage its own affairs."ls6 After the tragic events in China, the usually apathetic general public seemed to be more anxious to push the democratisation process in the territory which saw a new phenomenon to be discussed in the forthcoming section.

PROLIFERATION OF PRESSURE AND POLITICAL GROUP

The proliferation of political groups was a new trend in the latter half of the 1980s in

Hong Kong. The agreement between the British and the Chinese governments, and later the June 4 events, brought into existence a completely different political arena in

155 tbid.,pp.742-3 t56 tbid., p.744

38 the territory. As concluded by Suzanne Pepper, the two events had led to Hong

Kong's political awakening.t5t Before that, Hong Kong people had got a general political apathetic attitude. Either they got a sense of 'political impotence' due to the

'refugee mentality'. Or, they supported the status quo because they had benefited from the establishment.r5s The apathetic political culture could also be explained by the generally confined government structure which allowed limited public participation. Before 1984, it was always a closed colonial administration system.

Other than the minority elite, public political participation was not possible.

After 1984, however, there was a growing concern on political issues in the territory which was believed to be "a result of the rise of political opportunities brought about by decolonisation, and of the increased attention for political participation in formal institutional politics on the part of pressure groups, social movement organisations and grass roots protest groups."lse The single most important task on the activists' agenda in the 1980s and 1990s was the struggle for democracy in the political structure for the future SAR government.l6O

The establishment of representative government in 1985 and 1988 further politicised the pressure groups and social movements. More political groups were formed to consolidate the existing networks of political groups. Nevertheless, consensus was not as solid as that formed between participants of the social movements in the earlier period before 1984. Opinions were often divided on whether to adopt a pragmatic

157 Pepper Suzanne, "Hong Kong, 1997, East vs Vy'est and the Struggle for Democratic Reform within the Chinese State", Asian Surve]¡ (Vol. 37, No. 8, August1997) p.687 158 Cheng Joseph Y.S., "Elections and Political Parties in Hong Kong's Political Development", Journal of Contemporary Asia. (Vol. 31, No.3, April,2OO2),p.346 159 ibid., Lui and Chiu, Social movements, p.I12 160 ibid

39 approach with accommodating gestures being shown towards the Chinese regime, or an idealistic approach of fighting for democracy as the definite goal, and thereby taking a confrontational stance towards the Chinese regime.16l

Social groups were also torn between the objectives of mobilisation and community action, and party politics participations.t6'Though democrats' leaders usually assumed principal role in oppositional position in the elected bodies as they did in protest actions in the past, their expertise in protest actions was not really applicable in electoral politics. Some pressure groups and grass roots groups later decided to retreat from the main stage of political arena and assumed a low profile role in the (

1991 and 1995 elections. The initial zeal in political participation did not actually last long in the territory. In fact, "[t]he rapid development and the increased concern for parliamentary struggle had led to a 'hollowing out' of political organisation at the grass roots level."163

Although the June 4 events aroused tremendous empathy and mass action from the general public in the colony, the enthusiasm in pushing democratic reformation did not sustain. "Nor did the controversies over the political reform programme put forward by the governor, Chris Patten, trigger another round of pro-democracy popular mobilisation."t64 The proliferation of pressure groups and its participation in electoral politics did not really succeed in bringing social movements into institutional politics.165 On the contrary, it was becoming increasingly difficult to generate a

161ibid.,pp.112-3 162 ibid., p.113, quoted from Lui Tai-lok, 'Fanpu guizhen', in Hong Kong Council of Social Service. Community Development Resource Book 1989 ¡3¿ 199Q, pp.I2-14 163 ibid., p.113 164 ibid 165 ibid

40 critical attitude towards the Chinese authorities from the pragmatic public, and

especially so as 1997 was fast approaching. This accommodating gesture could also

be found in the media, as shown in the way newspapers covered the last Legco

elections in 1994-95.

PRESS REPORTS OF TIIE LAST LEGCO ELECTIONS

In analysing news coverage by Ming Pao and the South China Morning Post (SCMP),

which on the whole target the Hong Kong elite,166 Anthony Fung demonstrated how

the press promoted the image of the pro-China camp and played down that of the pro-

democracy camp in the last Legco elections. Although the Chinese authorities argued

that the elections were not in line with the spirit of the Joint Sino-Declaration,

candidates from the pro-China camp did participate actively in the elections via the

Democratic Alliance for Betterment of Hong Kong (DABHK). DABHK's main rival

was the pro-democracy party, the Democratic Party (DP). "The [press] played

significant role in legitimising the image of these parties by mobilising and raising the

awareness of the voting public."167 While the journalists were aware of the

importance in presenting a balanced and fair report and the impact of media coverage,

they were perhaps less conscious of the effect of how they treated the issues which

could have projected another, and misguided, message, and done so in a subtle

way.tus In a number of ways, Ming Pao and SCMP presented DABHK in a positive manner and DP in a negative one.

166 Anthony Fung, "The Dynamics of Public Opinion, Political Parties, And media in transitional Hong Kong", Asian Survey (Vol. 38, No. 5, May 1998) p.486 167 ibid., p.474, quoted from Louis Kin-shuen, '?olitical Parties", in The Other Hone Kong Report 1991 , ed., Y, Sung and M. Lee (Hong Kong :Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1991) 168 ibid., p.486

4L Firstly, the papers highlighted China's support of DABHK and China's critical stance on the DP. Despite of the fact that DP was widely supported by the general public in the territory, it was nonetheless represented as a 'loser' in Ming Pao, with reference to

DP's poor and confrontational relationship with China. On the other hand, DABHK was presented as the "largest pro-Beijing party" and its chairman, Tsang Yuk-shing the legitimated representative of Hong Kong, acting as a bridge between the Hong

Kong people and the Chinese authorities. Furthermore, these newspapers tended to be critical of the internal rifts within DP but sympathetic with regard to problems of the

DABHK. While the papers highlighted the lack of unity of the DP by reporting the resignation of a leading DP member and the rows between other members of the party, a forgiving approach was adopted by the papers in reporting the application of a foreign passport by Tsang Yuk-shing, which might otherwise have signified a lack of confidence in the future of a China-governed Hong Kong. The issue, however, was not presented in a negative light. Extensive reports in explaining the situation and

Tsang's withdrawal of his application were to be found in both papers instead. Also, these newspapers emphasized DP's inconsistencies in its policy by quoting the

"double standards" employed by the party. While one DP member received no punishment in resigning, and in doing so even disclosing the party's strategies, another member received chastising treatment from the party regarding his resignation. Meanwhile, the newspapers played down DABHK's inconsistencies.

Also, the papers tended to present the internal conflicts in DP negatively.

Disagreement within DP was presented as sign of disintegration, on one hand, while

DABHK's fighting between its members was presented in a positive light (as making the election more "challenging"), on the other.16e

169 ibid., pp.486-9

42 "Interpreting the election results and media behaviour using a structuralist frame analyses, it can be argued that the framing in the media's reporting served to legitimise those parties seen as representing the interests of Hong Kong's soon- to-be sovereigns from China; conversely the framing also marginalised and ._^ delegitimized the pro-democracy forces opposed to imminent Chinese ruIe.""'

As a matter of fact, the reform package pushed by the last Governor, Christ Patten was not always presented positively as a leap forward of democratisation in the territory. Not a few journalists emphasized the confrontation with Beijing the elections brought forward and instead highlighted the significance of a smooth transition and the importance of co-operation with Beijing. More often than before, the general public were reminded of the close economic tie between Hong Kong and

China, and hence the mutual relationship. "There is no reason to doubt the Chinese commitment to keeping Hongkong stable and prosperous. Its importance to the continued success of China's economic reforms - and thus the nation's future - cannot be overrated."171 While this accommodating gesture served to allay public apprehension of the Chinese govefnment and smooth the hand-over pfocess positively, a number of incidents had aroused the fear of the public in the regard of press freedom in the post-1997 Hong Kong.

NEGATIVE INCIDENTS ON PRESS FREEDOM IN TIIE TERRITORY

TFIB XI YANG CASE

Severe concern was shown by the public and the press industry in 1993, when Xi

Yang, a reporter of Ming Pao, was arrested in China on the suspicion of "spying and

170 ibid., p.490 lTl "One Country, Two Kitchens", ASIAWEEK, April 7,1993,p.23

43 stealing state secrets", which appeared to be connected with a report of 28 July 1993 about the decision of the Chinese People's Bank to sell its gold reserve in order to build up its foreign exchange holdings, and speculation of the unlikely introduction of a third increase in interest rates that year.t72 Xi Yang was sentenced to twelve-year imprisonment in March 1994, after already being kept in jail for eight months. More troubling still was the soft posture adopted by Yu Pun Hoi, Chairman of the Ming Pao group at that time. He openly admitted his member of staff "was guilty as charged", without so much as consulting Xi Yang. In addition, Yu apologised to the Chinese authorities.lt3 Xi's arrest and trial had raised profound concern from his colleagues at

Ming Pao, the Hong Kong Journalists Association (HKJA) and other socio-political groups as well. They staged a series of protests to plead for his release.lTa In fact, Xi

Yang's case had caused wide spread apprehension of journalists and the public regarding the return of Hong Kong's sovereignty to China.

Most worrying in Xi Yang's case was the apparent lack of justice in China's legal system. The accusation of Xi Yang's "spying and stealing state secrets" was so controversial, especially with the problematic definition of state secrets. Without an explicit and clear definition of the term, the authorities could always exploit the ambiguous and encompassing nature of the term to suit their political needs.l7s As remarked by SCMP's editorial, without "[making] clear what is or is not out of bounds", China rendered the legal mark "invisible and movable".1t6 Xi Ya.rg's case

172 Jonathan Dimbleby, The Last Governor - Chris Patten & the handover of Hong Kong (London: Little, Brown and Company,1997) p.215 173 ibid.,p.2I6 174 Joseph Chan and Yiu Ming To, "Reunification and press freedom in Hong Kong: The Xi Yang Case", sovereigntv (England: Ashgate, 2OOO) p.221 175 ibid 176'Blow to Confidence", South China Morning Post, Editorial, op-ed page, 16 April 1994 as quoted by Chan and To, Reunification and press freedom, p.228

44 also exposed the arbitrariness of the judiciary system on the mainland. While six other major papers including Tai Kung Pao, Wen Wei Pao, Hong Kong Economic Journal,

Hong Kong Financial Times, Hong Kong United Daily, and Sing Tao Yat Paohad reported the same ne\rys, only Ming Pao's Xi Yang (who was neither the first to report the news nor the one who gave most detailed account of the news) was singled out and arrested by the Chinese authorities.lTT Lastly, Xi Yang's case demonstrated the lack of transparency of mainland's judiciary system. Xi Yang was denied any visit during detention, not only after repeated requests he was allowed a visit from his father. And no judgement was announced in public. China would have kept quiet about the case if there were no strong pressure from Hong Kong and the international community. "Even Xu Simin, the publisher of a local pro-Beijing magazine who served on China's Political Consultative Conference (CPCC), openly admitted that the Xi Yang case attested to the 'backwardness' of the Chinese legal system that had failed to comply with the basic principle of a fair trial."178

Xi Yang's case exposed not only the problems of mainland's legal system, but also the widely differed conceptions of journalism between the territory and the mainland.

While Hong Kong journalists treated themselves as independent workers and worked in a private market-driven media,l7e their counterparts on the mainland were treated as mouthpiece of the CCP which has monopolised control of all news media.l80 "As can be expected, conflicts abound when these incompatible systems meet with each

I77 ibid., Chan and To, Reunification and press freedom,p.228 I78ibid.,p.229 179 ibid., Lee, Media structure and regime change in Hong Kong 180 Leonard Chu, "Continuity and Discontinuity of Press Development in China", Journal of Communication (vol. 44, no.3, 1994) pp.4-21, quoted by Chan and To, Reunification and press freedom inHK,p.229

45 other."lsl The contrasting different treatment Xi Yang received in the territory and the mainland demonstrated this point vividly. V/hile Xi Yang was awarded the first prize for his report by the Hong Kong Society of Newspapers, he was sentenced to twelve- year imprisonment by the Chinese authorities because of the same piece of report.ls2

It was because of the different value of news scoop in the two places. In Hong Kong, an exclusive story about the government is highly valued by journalists and the public.

However, the same thing is not any merit in the eyes of the Chinese authorities who command publication of a piece of information according to party needs.l83 Exposing unauthorised government information which might be against party's benefit is therefore treated as a criminal offence on the mainland. To many journalists in Hong

Kong, Xi Yang was punished by the Chinese authorities for performing his duties to the best of his ability. Nevertheless, the Chinese authorities insisted that the case was not a question of independent reporting which they said was a pretext for committing cnme. 184

China's persistent stance on Xi Yang's case and its unbending belief in its conceptions of law and journalism not only led to the imprisonment of the pnze- winning reporter, it served to impose on Hong Kong its own value of journalism and the way of handling conflicts.lss

The surprise at hearing the heavy sentence received by Xi Yang could be demonstrated by SCMP's headline news which said, "Official confirmation that

China has jailed a Hong Kong reporter for twelve years has sent shock \¡/aves among journalists and political groups, who denounce the verdict as unacceptable,

181 ibid., Chan and To, Reunification and press freedom inIIK,p.229 182 ibid 183 ibid 184 ibid., pp.229-3o 185 ibid

46 t86 unjustifiable and a threat to press freedom." All the major ne\¡/spapers showed a critical attitude of China's judiciary and a worry of future press freedom.l87 The protests were not limited in the press industry. The Legislative Councillor debated and passed the motion to urge the Chinese government respect press freedom of Hong

Kong and to release Xi Yang.l88 Even the Liberal Party, a pro-PRC party which always emphasized the importance of harmonious relations with China, joined to press China to release more information on Xi Yang's casetse under the general atmosphere of increasingly democratic political culture in the territory. Over 120

ee411 social and political groups were involved in the campaign to release Xi Yang.leo these developments underlield] the close connection between democracy and press freedom."191

Xi was finally released on parole in 1997 , after spent three years in jail, but "there is nothing to be grateful [for] to China" as remarked by Mak Yin-ting, the chairperson of the Hong Kong Journalists Association. "The release of Xi Yang was the result of various forces, including the tensions between democratisation and reunification, and between 'one country' and 'two systems'."192 Nevertheless, Xi Yang's release did not end the pressure faced by Hong Kong journalists as demonstrated by other worrying incidents.

186 "Shock at Xi's I}-year Term", South China Morning Post, 5 April 1994, pp,1,3, quoted by Chan and To, Reunification and press freedom in HK, p.231 187 See editorials inHong Kong Economic Journal,5 April 1994, Hong Kong Financial Daily, 16 April 1994, Sing Pao, 1 1 April 1994, Hong Kong News Daily, 5 April 1994, Sing Tao,7 April 1994, Oriental Daily, 16 Aprll L994, quoted in Chan and Lee, Reunification and press freedom in HK, p.231 188 ibid., Chan and To, Reunification and press freedom,p.232 189 Lai-fun So and Wai-fong Chan, "China Deaf to Appeal for Details of Xi's Case", SCMP, 8 April 1994, quoted by Chan and To, Reunification and press freedom inHK,p.232 190 ibid., Chan and To, Reunification and press freedom,p.233 191ibid 792 lbid., Chan and To, Reunihgation and press freedom,p.Z3í

47 THE JIMMY LAI CASE

With the entry of the weekly magazine Next and later the daily newspaper Apple

Daily into the market in 1990 and 1995 respectively, the competitiveness in local press industry was further intensified. Their owner, Jimmy Lai, enhanced the readership successfully, by explicit sex topics and scandals involving celebrities from 'Within the entertainment business. a short period of time, Lai's press business has taken a large share of the market by indulging the more craven readers' curiosity. The paper was/is especially proud of the exclusive pictures or stories produced by the entertainment-page reporters, who follow/ed the target actor or actress virtually at a

24-hour basis. The Hong Kong Performers Association was so infuriated by the annoying 'spy' from the reporters of the paper that it protested against media interviews in a72-hour boycott. Nonetheless, Lai's publications maintain/ed their leading position in the local press industry with the sellable 'low culture'. "Though highly controversial and often ethically dubious, Apple Daily has compelled its rivals to rethink their own practices and to compete innovatively for the lowest cultural denominator."l93

Not only were its "investigative" reports on actors and actresses controversial, but so too were its critical viewpoints on Mainland China. Li Peng, Chinese Prime Minister

(who was believed to be behind the June 4 massacre), was referred to as " a turtle oEE" , which is a Chinese insult regarding one's parentage, in a Next editorial. The remark brought Lai both an increased readership and trouble as well. His profitable garment industry on the mainland soon experienced financial and regulatory problems.

193 ibid., p.131

48 Many observers believed the problems originated from Beijing, and stemmed directly from the publication of the offensive article. While some believed the trouble was from Li Ka-shing, one of the most powerful capitalists in Hong Kong, who was upset by Lai's publishing of his personal life and his business dealing in China. Indeed, as noted by Next publisher, Yeung Wai-hong, Lai's publications received no advertising order from the many companies of Lee Ka-shing.lea On top of this, China's indirect influence could not be ruled out.

Lai met another setback in February 1996, when he experienced difficulties in raising capital for his company's further growth, despite its great promise, backed by a surging popularity of his magazine.Instead of a smooth Initial Public Offering, Lai found no underwriter at all for his flotation, when Sun Hung Kai International, a leading investment agency in the territory, withdrew on the eve of the listing without providing any explanation for doing so. No banker was willing to give any comment on this sensitive issue with 1997 andthe handover of Hong Kong fast approaching.le5

SING TAO GROUP

While Lai's paper showed no fear of the central power in exposing China's sensitive issues, other papers demonstrated the opposite. In July 1993, N¿xt disclosed a disturbing case of self-censorship involving the Sing Tao Group. Sally Aw, owner of the group, instructed her editors to be "fair, neutral and objective", however, without indicating how these standards were to be measured. She berated her editorial team regarding the unhappiness expressed by the Chinese authorities on the Sing Tao

194 ibid., Neumann A. Lin, Press freedom under the dragon 195 ibid

49 editorial which discussed human rights issues in China. Apparently, her order was duly observed later. No mention of a students' protest on a Beijing university campus was found in any paper of the Sing Tao Group, even though the events were widely covered by other newspapers. Despite the undertones of patriotism and political submissiveness were suggested as the reasons, commercial interests were believed to be another important cause. The Sing Tao Group had joined two Chinese media to produce magazines, with one in Beijing and another in Guangzhou.le6

SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (SCMP)

One of the most worrying chapters in the unfolding story of the problems of censorship in Hong Kong's press came when its most respectable paper, the South

China Morning Post, became involved in a wave of self-censorship. Larry Feign, who had been producing a highly successful, and popular, daily cartoon series 'The World of Lily Wong' for eight years in SCMP, was sacked abruptly in 1995. While the management said that it was an economic decision, the killing of a popular section by one of the most profitable paper in the world was hardly convincing.leT Although some observers believed that commercial interest was simply the rationale for an otherwise political act (the o\üner of SCMP, Robert Kuok, has some business investment in China), the incident seemed more likely to be a practice of self- censorship. As the sudden dismissal of Larry Feign followed closely the publication of his sarcastic cartoon which joked about the use of cartoonists' organ to fill up the

196 ibid., Dimbleby, The last Governor, p.220 197 "Iluman Right in Hong Kong", Newsletter Oct 1996, Hong Kong Human Rights Monitor, ,http ://ww w.hkhrm.org. hk/english,/reports/enw/enw 1 096a. htm>

50 possible inadequate supply in a soon-to-be communist-controlled Hong Kong proposed a Chinese official in the cartoonre8 (see appendix). l by ¡

While self-censorship and commercial considerations explain some of the above events, the author believes the major cause of problems concerning press freedom originates from the radical extreme of the press systems practised in the territory and on the mainland.

TTIE CHINESE PRESS AFTER 1949

After the establishment of the PRC in 1949 , the rather independent Republican press was replaced by the restrictive Soviet Communist press system on the mainland. Mao

Tse-tung followed closely the press model of Marxist-Leninist doctrine and stressed the functions of the press "to publicize the Party decisions, to educate the masses and to form link between the Party and the masses."lee As put by the People's Daity in

1960,'the press must become the Parly's "loyal eyes, ears and tongue", and "an important bridge for daily contact between the Party and innumerable people and a powerful tool for the Party to guide revolutionary struggle and construction".'200 All papers are owned by the Chinese authority, either the national one or the local one.2Ot

Foreign ownership is not permitted. Only a few foreign publications are allowed in the country.2o2 Despite of the non-existence of a set of press law, censorship is practised at a number of levels. The press is monitored by the Party committee of the

198 "China - Hong Kong newspaper fires cartoonist over his strip's 'deadly' implication (1995)", Witty World's Research on Censorship: China, tee Min Chen and James Chu, '?eople's Republic of China", World Press Encyclopedia (New York: Facts On Flle,1982) p.2I9 2m ibid 2" ibid.,p.2z3 'o'ibid.,p.zz9

51 city where the paper operates and by the committee that owns the judicial power over the place where the paper is located.2o3 Self-imposed censorship is practised by recruiting only journalists who are "loyal" to the P*ty.'oo And prior approval from

Party authorities is needed for important editorials and news stories.20s Press freedom is something unfamiliar, if not alien, to the Chinese journalists. While the press in the territory serves the public who, in a sense, "lead" the market-driven press industry, the press on the mainland serves the Party with the guided public. It is not surprising at all to observe clash or conflict when the restricted press system in China meets the rather

"liberated" one in Hong Kong as demonstrated vividly by the Xi Yang case. However, it should be again noted that the "free" press in the territory does not function as the independent press proposed by the Libertarian press model. From a pro-British stand, most of the papers in the territory shift to a pro-Chinese stand, which reveals the general pragmatic attitude of the public. They believe that confrontational gesture with the Chinese authority would jeopardize both economical and political stability of the territory.

Hong Kong experienced considerable socio-political change during the transition period. China politics again became increasingly dominant amongst the local public.

The localised Hong Kong culture born out of a capitalist economy underwent a big challenge with the imposing contrasting one from the communist China. The wide spread support of Hong Kong people and even the communist press, Wen Wei Po on the mainland democratic students' movement in 1989 reflected the general democratic aspiration of the locals. Together with the series of electoral reforms introduced by the colonial government, the territory saw a proliferation of the pressure and political

203 rbid., p.224 'on ibid zos ibid.,p.zzs

52 groups. The zeal of political participation, nevertheless, did not end up with a genuine democratic government, but more a divided political attitude with the Chinese regime

- an accommodating one or a confrontational one. With the closely economic connection between Hong Kong and China, the pragmatic Hong Kong people, especially the businessmen, seemed to favour more the accommodating posture and perceived the confrontational posture only detrimental to the local economy. In fact, a number of newspapers seemed to adopt a similar gesture as revealed by the prevalent practice of self-censorship, which, though, may not be a pure political consideration.

However, the public would also be defiant as demonstrated by the Xi Yang's case when the imposition of China's pressure on local press independency was so intense and direct.

AFTER THE HANDOVER

This section commences after 1997. As the mini-constitution governing the territory for fifty years after the handover, the Basic law, in pafticular the part which grants the local populace the freedom of expression, would be discussed. Other relating laws concerning freedom of expression would be discussed as well. These include Article

23 of the Basic Law, the internal security law in China, the Official Secrets Ordinance and the Public Order Ordinance left by the British colonial regime. Despite of the fact that press independence in the SAR has not, so far, underwent overt intervention, several incidents have caused general public anxiety regarding the autonomy of the territory including the remarks by Tung Chee-hwa, the SAR Chief Executive, the departure of Anson Chan, the Chief of Civil Servise and the remarks by some senior

53 mainland officials concerning the boundary of subjects to be discussed and reported by the local journalists.

TI{E PROMISE OF PRESS FREEDOM BY TITE BASIC LAW

After the handover ceremony, Hong Kong is to be governed by the Basic Law for fifty years. Article 2l of the mini-constitution explicitly guarantees freedom of press in post-1997 Hong Kong. "Hong Kong residents shall have freedom of speech, of the press and of publication; freedom of association, of assembly, of procession and of demonstration; and the right and freedom to form and join trade unions, and to strike."2o6

However, the laws do not provide genuine protection. As in China, people cannot really practise freedom of speech as enshrined in article 35 of Chapter 2 of the

Constitution: "Citizens of the People's Republic of China enjoy freedom of speech, of the press, of assembl), of association, of procession, and of demonstration."2oT For instance, Chen Lanto had to serve a l6-year sentence because she criticised the government on the June 4 events in a public speech.2o8 And the media is treated as propaganda tools by the PRC government to served the party political needs as mentioned earlier. Instead of providing justice, law is always an inherently political process as concluded by David Kairys; even the guarantee of freedom written in the

First Amendment of the American Constitution does not always actualise in the real

206 Frances H. Foster, "The Illusory Promise: Freedom of the press in Hong Kong, China", 207 China-Constitution, 208 "Imprisoning those who speak out, No one is safe in China (U.K.: Amnesty International Publications, L996) pp.3L-43

54 world when its interpretation and enforcement are subject to constant influence in different political environment.2oe

The Basic Law is neither a clearly defined set of laws which is subject to interpretations.2lo And the PRC has the final say in its interpretation. In fact, press freedom cannot be plainly guaranteed by law. Rather,

[s]truggle to protect press freedom is a struggle between the state and the civil society, and a struggle between political and the economical; in Hong Kong it will depend substantially on the integrity of the 'free market' system, social pluralism, citizen vigilance and public demands."'

ARTICLE 23 OF TI{E BASIC LAW

In addition to the ineffective protection of press freedom, the Basic Law includes a rather negative law conceming freedom of speech as stipulated in Article 23:

[T]he Hong Kong Special Administrative Region should enact laws on its own to prohibit any act of treason, secession, sedition, subversion against the Central People's Government, or theft of state secrets, to prohibit foreign political organisations or bodies of the Region from establishing ties with foreign political organisations and bodies.

If any criticism of the Central government is considered an "act of treason, secession, sedition, subversion against the Central People's Government", then freedom of speech is effectively curtailed."2 Atthe moment when the SAR government is trying to formally implement Article 23,the law is being vigorously debated amongst the public, in particular the legal professions.

2OgDavid Kairys, "Freedom of Speech", Politics of Law: A Progressive View (New York: Pantheon, 1982), quoted by Lee, Media Structure and regime change in HK, p.136 210 ibid., A. Lin Neumann, press freedom under the dragon 211 ibid., Lee, Media structure and regime change in HK, p.136 2I2"The Chief Executive vs Press Freedom", Hong Kong Voice of Democracy, March L3,1998,

55 TI{E LAV/ OF INTERNAL SECURITY AFTER THE LEGAL REFORM IN

CHINA

More disturbing was the legal reform in China concerning the law of internal security in March 1997 which was regrettably a backward move on the road of democratisation. The China's National People's Congress decided to replace the criminal code of "countelrevolution" with "endangering state security", a term with much broader of "coverage" to suppress dissent. National security has always been a

"convenient" pretext employed by authoritarian government worldwide to kill freedom of expression and freedom of association. That the process of absolute power by the executive power in China on the interpretation of "national security" is a definite concern for defenders of freedom in the territory'2l3

A number of disturbing aspects are noted in the revised criminal code. Firstly, any

"offence" involving a connection overseas carries heavier penalty, in comparison to one that is purely local. "Colluding with institutions, organisations, or individual outside China to harm state security" is treated the same as obtaining or providing state secrets for an enemy. "Offenders" with a foreign connection would face more severe penalty than those with only domestic encounter. Secondly, crimes of separatism receive more attention and constitute one whole separate article, highlighting the authority's determination in combating forces of independence in places like Tibet, Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia, in addition to the always-sensitive issue of Taiwan. Lastly, the wider scope of subversive, seditious or secessionist crime in the newly reformed law virtually enables the authority higher suppressive power

213 "Chinese Legal "Reforms" Have Serious Implications for Hong Kong", 2OApril 1997, Human China Press Release,

56 than that was available in the 1979 cnminal code.2ra As demonstrated by the Xi

Yang's case, the all-encompassing nature of this law posed enorTnous threat to journalists, in particular for those who work on the mainland.

DRACONIAN LAW LEFT BY THE BRITISH

The British regime also left behind a number of repressive laws, such as the Official

Secrets Ordinance. "...[a] law incorporat[ing] Britain's 7911,1920,1939 and 1989 official secret laws, which together cover espionage and the disclosure of official information."275 The Chinese regime has no problem in retaining this all- encompassing legislature, which enables the authority to prosecute individuals who has disclosed unlawfully official information in six broad areas: "security and intelligence, defence, international relations, information obtained in confidence from other states or international organisations, crime and special investigations carried out under statutory warrants".2l6

And the Public Order Ordinance is another repressive law left behind by the British colonial regime. The ordinance requires that an application be made for a permit at least seven days before a scheduled demonstration of more than 30 people. This was relaxed in 1996, when the British government moved to introduce more democratic rights into the territory. With the newly relaxed law, only prior notification was required. However, the old rule was reinstated by the Beijing Preparatory Committee in early 1997 arrd is enacted after the handover. The law was not seriously enforced so

2r4 ibid 215 '?ress Freedom in Jeopardy", China Rights Forum, Fall 1997, 2L6 tbid

57 far or the participants of the few hundreds of gatherings organised afterwards would have been prosecuted. Nevertheless, the existence of such a draconian law is disturbing with respect to the issue of freedom of speech.2lT

REMARKS FROM TFIE CHIEF EXECUTIVE

Then came the disturbing remarks by Tung Chee-hwa, the Chief Executive of the

SAR. After Simon Xu accused of the Radio Television Hong Kong (RTHK) as being

"a remnant of British colonialism" and urged the station to promote rather than to criticise government policy in March lgg8,2r8 Tung replied: "While freedom of expression is important, it is important for government policy to be presented in a positive manner. I shall see to that later."2le lnstead of allaying the public anxiety over the suppression of freedom of speech, the Chief Executive seemed to be more anxious to "educate" the radio station to assume the role of mouth- piece of the govemment as its counterpart on the mainland.

DEPARTURE OF ANSON CHAN

Well-known to be "the conscience of the people", the respected Chief of Civil Service,

Anson Chan suddenly resigned from her post in January 200I.220 Her departure was perceived by the public as a setback to the territory already shattered autonomy as she

217 ChungYalunda, "This is an Evil Law", ASIAWEEK, October 13, 2000. p'30 218 "Freedom in the World 1998-9:Hong Kong", 219 "Human Rights Groupb Call on the European Union Not to Sacrifice Human Rights and Press Freedom on Altar of Economics", an Reports San Frontieres, Article 19, and Human Rights in China Joint Statement, Human Rights in China Press Release, 2 April i998, 22}Bruce Herschensohn, "Hong Kong: Five years after the handover", The World & I Online Magazine,

58 was believed to be "a brake on Chief Executive Tung Chee-hwa's eagerness to accommodate Beijing's wishes'.22r Earlier, Anson Chan has emphasised in a number of occasions the importance of an independent press in keeping an accountable government and has urged the press not to practise self-censorship.222 Her resignation, therefore, implies one less vocal support guarding Hong Kong's freedom.223

CHINESE OFFICIAL REMARKS

Vice-Premier Qian Qichen stated that Hong Kong should not promote 'two-state theory' because of the 'one-country principal' after Cheng An-kuo being attacked by the pro-Beijing press and politicians for his support of 'two-state theory' concerning the Taiwan issue in a RTHK program in August I999.By crj^ticizing Cheng's opinion, the central authorities, once again, pose threat to the freedom of expression

'promised' in the Basic Law.224

In general, Hong Kong has not seen severe erosion of press freedom after the handover. However, this does not mean that press independence in the territory is well protected by the Basic Law. In fact, the promise stated in the Basic Law is not a solid well-defined guarantee, which would undergo interpretation by the courts and the final decision is at the hand of the PRC. Freedom of expression is particular at stake when the draconian laws left by the British, and the reformed state law in China are taken into consideration. And the remarks by the Chief Executive of Hong Kong SAR

221"Hong Kong Blow", ASIATWEEK, January 26,2000,p.I9 222 AnsonChan Interview: Conversations with History; Institute of International Studies, UC Berkeley, 223 ibid., Hong Kong Blow 224"Stop interfering with freedom of expression", Press Release, 21 August 1999, Hong Kong Human Rights Monitor,

59 and the Chinese official is obvious intrusion of press independency. Together with the departure of Anson Chan, the society feels rather anxious whether the climate of freedom in the territory could be sustained. Nevertheless, the prospect of press independence in Hong Kong is not entirely pessimistic. Several factors work in the opposite direction to help keep press freedom in the territory. Firstly, diversity of viewpoints and opinions would unlikely be suppressed in such a pluralistic Hong

Kong society. Secondly, the economic and political reforms in China would gradually open up the restricted society on the mainland. Little by little, media control would hopefully be relaxed. Finally, the Taiwan issue serves positively the territory's autonomy in deterring the Chinese regime from the damaging 'one country, two systems' formula. On the other hand, the local journalists should also do their best to upgrade the press standard which is experiencing a downturn at the moment with all the over-mounting sensationalism, and insufficient investigative and critical report especially on the government policy.

CONCLUSION

After examining the press industry and the general social movement in the territory under the interaction of the Hong Kong politics and the China politics, it is found that the more localized Hong Kong identity started to form since the end of the 1960s when the socio-political landscape of the external Mainland politics between the

KMT and CCP was replaced by the local social issue in an increasingly affluent economic environment. Though there were quite a lot of draconian rules during the

British colonial rule, Hong Kong enjoyed a de facto high degree of freedom. The journalists in the territory experienced the level of press freedom only second to their

60 Japanese counterparts in Asia, albeit by the fact that the press is not genuinely independent according to the Libertarian press model. And Hong Kong is also the

Asian base of a number of international publications. They enjoy not only the advanced infrastructure and the ease of accessibility, but also most importantly the high degree ofpress freedom available in the territory. Press as a significant and influential component of a society, the intemationally recognized freedom of press in the territory clearly constituted the pronounced local Hong Kong identity.

However, the well-formed localized Hong Kong identity experienced a tremendous blow in the early 1980s when they realized the definite fate of Hong Kong returning to China. In spite of the strong nationalistic sentiment rooted in the society, the perceived incompatibility of the way of life under capitalism versus that under communism had caused enoÍnous tension. The tension was then translated into enthusiastic public participation in the election process after the colonial regime introduced political reforms in the government structure. In 1989 during the process of the student democratic movement in Tinanmen Square, the general public in the territory deeply identified themselves with the students on the Mainland and staged massive protest against the Chinese regime. Even Wen Wei Po, one of the two principal pro-PRC daily newspapers, demonstrated confrontational gesture towards the CCP in an overall anti-PRC atmosphere locally as well as internationally. The press exemplified clearly the conflicting roles of communist press in serving its two masters- the central CCP and the local readers, with basically opposite ideologies. At the end, the CCP displayed the robust belief of press as propagandist tool by imposing strong control onto Wen Wei Po.

6L Meanwhile, the interference on press freedom was exemplified in the popular mass press as well, which demonstrated obvious caution in reporting the Chinese news. In addition to the direct intervention from the central, other indirect factors were also influencing the local press industry. The increasing involvement of press owners in

China business permits decreasing level of critical reporting on China by their editors in fear of unsetting their business on the mainland. $econdly, advertisers are especially influential due to the heavy reliance on advertising revenue in the local fierce competitive press industry. Tremendous pressure may be exerted on joumalists in order not to displease the source of income. With less surviving press in the market after the price war and the departure of Taiwan voice in the mid 1990s before the handover, diversity of opinions was further imperiled. Albeit by the repeated promise from the Chinese regime, all these posed a negative impact on the press freedom, which was believed to be an inalienable part of the local Hong Kong identity. The ultimate root of press problem lies in the radical diverse press systems in the territory and on the mainland, with one practicing a rather liberated press model along the spectrum of a Libertarian press and an Authoritarian press, and the Soviet Communist press respectively.

Nevertheless, the press had performed its function in helping integrate the "one country, two systems". Frequently, the press help legitimize the forthcoming master by highlighting the cultural and economic link between the territory and the mother land which had a significant stabilizing effect in the heart of anxious locals. On the other hand, the colonial regime in particular Christ Patten, the last Governor, was always downplayed by the press during the last Legco election in the last minute democratic reform in 1994-95 before the handover. In the meantime, the reporting of

62 the democratic party and pro-PRC party by the South China Morning Post and Ming

Pao was particularly demonstrative of the legitimizing effect of pro-PRC party by the press. Rather than practicing self-censorship, the press industry is essentially re- adjusting its role in the new power structure.

In fact, the territory has long used to survive in the middle of the struggle of the two apparently conflicting basic orientation of endemic fear of communism and the close economic tie with the communist China. As proposed by Suzanne Pepper, "Hong

Kong's post-'World War II success derived from the pragmatic balance between those two opposites."225 Economic integration not only advanced significantly before 1997 but also was always projected as a major cause of the territory's continuing prosperity.226 Reciprocally, Hong Kong is significant to China both in economic sense and political sense. Hong Kong is one of the major trading partners of China.

Politically, Hong Kong serves as an example to Taiwan for China's realization of the re-unification aspiration. Hence, the Chinese regime would unlikely interfere the local press independence to such a degree that would endanger these strategic values of the territory. Besides, the ongoing economic and political reforms on the mainland assure the potential emergence of a more open press.

END

225 ibid., Suzanne Pepper, Hong Kong 1997,p.701 226ibid.,p.699

63 APPENDIX

WHAf ÍAPPENô AFÍnt THOSE TIIET 1,{¡J OOT? \

)

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