DOCSLIB.ORG

Domain Auction and Priority Checking Analysis

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Domain Auction and Priority Checking Analysis ISSN: 2319-8753 International Journal of Innovative Research in Science, Engineering and Technology (An ISO 3297: 2007 Certified Organization) Vol. 3 , Issue 4 , April 2014 Domain Auction and Priority Checking Analysis Subhashini.V1, Babu.M2 1M.E (CSE), Department of CSE, G.K.M College of Engineering, Chennai, TamilNadu, India 2Ph.D Research Scholar, Department of CSE, G.K.M College of Engineering, Chennai, TamilNadu, India ABSTRACT: The domain name auction facilitates outbidthe next bidder; in fact, it can be shown that it is the buying and selling of currently registered optimal to bid one’s true valuation for the item. The domain names, enabling individuals to purchase a various auctions agree, in some sense, on the objective previously registered domain that suits their needs of efficient allocation, and the differences merely reflect from an owner wishing to sell. Domain auction sites other issues. There are other auctions that have a allow users to search multiple domain names that different objective, such as revenue-maximizing auctions, are listed for sale by owner, and to place bids on the which do not always allocate the item efficiently. As in names they want to purchase. As in any auction, the the single-item auction case, there are distinctions highest bidder wins. The more desirable a domain among combinatorial auctions in terms of the temporal name, the higher the winning bid, and auction sites aspects of the auction as well as the payments to be often provide links to escrow agents to facilitate the made by the bidders. safe transfer of funds and domain properties between the auctioning parties. A primary principle of market design is to promote an efficient outcome to the extent possible. For Key word: Async MQ, bid, Model the case addressed here with independent valuations for checker,Equilibrium approaches a single domain, this requires a design to enable the bidder who most values a domain to win it. I. INTRODUCTION The problem of valuation and information feedback has been addressed by proposing two new Auctions are used to determine how billions of combinatorial auction schemes,RevalSlotand dollars of goods and services will be allocated across the RevalBundle. These two schemes allow the bidders to globe. Each bidder privately sends a bid to the auction. participate in the auctionwithout imposing the A common objective among all of these auctions is to requirement that bidders have an accurate idea of their allocate the item to the bidder. Who values the item the valuations. RevalSlotuses the concept of varying slot most (that is, to allocate the item efficiently). The sizes to guide the bidders in their bidding. Equilibrium differences among them mostly reflect other issues. a bidding strategies in sealed-bid auctions for two payment bidder may not have to invest the effort necessary to rules, the first-price rule in which the winner pays her determine her exact valuation for the item. The winner bid, and the second-price rule in which the winner pays no longer has to think about how much longer she would the second-highest bid. We characterize equilibrium have stayed in the auction domain the winner no longer bidding strategies and predicted outcomes for both has to think about how much longer she would have asymmetric and symmetric distributions of the bidders’ stayed in the auction. valuations, assuming in each case that all bidders have In the first-price auction, bidders will try to only slightly the same interval of possible valuations over which the outbid their competitors, to pay as little as possible. If probability densities of their valuations is positive. The the bidder with the highest valuation for the item high participation and monitoring costs of bidders in underestimates the other bids, this can result in another online combinatorial auctions has been addressed by bidder winning the item, so that the allocation is proposing a distributed signal driven combinatorial inefficient. In the second-price sealed-bid auction, auction scheme. however, there is no reason to try to only slightly Copyright to IJIRSET www.ijirset.com 11779 ISSN: 2319-8753 International Journal of Innovative Research in Science, Engineering and Technology (An ISO 3297: 2007 Certified Organization) Vol. 3 , Issue 4 , April 2014 A. Domain Name Auction formulated in some precise mathematical language: To this end, it is formulated as a task in logic, namely to A number of factors have contributed to the rise check whether a given structure satisfies a given logical in popularity of the domain name auction. The formula. The concept is general and applies to all kinds personalization of the web resulted in domain names of logics and suitable structures. A simple model- being purchased by more private individuals and checking problem is verifying whether a given formula businesses than originally anticipated; and as a result in the propositional logic is satisfied by a given structure. there was also a rise in speculation and domain name Model checking is a method for formally verifying warehousing. Anticipating a growing need for a finite-state concurrent systems. Specifications about the targeted top-level domain name, domineers began to system are expressed as temporal logic formulas, and purchase names with an eye towards selling them at a efficient symbolic algorithms are used to traverse the later time. The advancing field of Search Engine model defined by the system and check if the Optimization (SEO) has also increased the desire to own specification holds or not. Extremely large state-spaces a domain name that accurately reflects the subject matter can often be traversed in minutes. of the web site. Property checking is used A domain auction website provides the for verification instead of equivalence checking when technology through which users can list or purchase two descriptions are not functionally equivalent. multiple domains easily and conveniently. Domain Particularly, during refinement, the specification is parking, once the most efficient method for advertising a complemented with the details that are unnecessary in domain for sale, allowed a domain owner to post the the higher level specification. Yet, there is no need to availability of the domain on a page, hoping someone verify the newly introduced properties against the who was interested in that name would surf through and original specification. It is not even possible. Therefore, see it listed for sale. With the development of the domain the strict bi-directional equivalence check is relaxed to auction, multiple users can list multiple domains all in one-way property checking. The implementation or the same place, thereby exposing them to a greater design is regarded a model of the circuit whereas the number of potential buyers. Sites such as eBay have specifications are properties that the model must satisfy. made using auctions very commonplace, and domain An important class of model checking methods have auction sites also require little to no technical knowledge been developed for checking models to use. of hardware and software designs where the specification is given by a temporal logic formula. In the past, if a domain name was already Model checking is most often applied to hardware registered by another party, it was generally advisable to designs. For software, because of undecidability the choose a different name. Whether current owners list approach cannot be fully algorithmic; typically it may domains for auction for a specified period of time or fail to prove or disprove a given property. provide an instant purchase option, the domain auction has become an important tool in uniting buyers and The structure is usually given as a source code sellers in the quest for the most beneficial domain name. description in an industrial hardware description language or a special-purpose language. Such a program II. MODEL CHECKER corresponds to a finite state machine (FSM), i.e., a directed graph consisting of nodes (or vertices) Model of a system, exhaustively and and edges. A set of atomic propositions is associated automatically check whether this model meets a given with each node, typically stating which memory specification. Typically, one has hardware or software elements are one. The nodes represent states of a system, systems in mind, similar critical states that can cause the the edges represent possible transitions which may alter system to crash. Model checking is a technique for the state, while the atomic propositions represent the automatically verifying correctness properties of finite- basic properties that hold at a point of execution. state systems. Formally, the problem can be stated as follows: given a desired property, expressed as a temporal logic In order to solve such a problem algorithmically, formula p, and a structure M with initial states, decide If both the model of the system and the specification are Copyright to IJIRSET www.ijirset.com 11780 ISSN: 2319-8753 International Journal of Innovative Research in Science, Engineering and Technology (An ISO 3297: 2007 Certified Organization) Vol. 3 , Issue 4 , April 2014 M is finite, as it is in hardware, model checking reduces IV. INDEPENDENT PRIVATE VALUE to a graph search. Bidder has a privately known valuation that is III. EQUILIBRIUM BIDDING independently distributed according to the probability Equilibrium bidding strategies in sealed-bid distribution with cumulative and positive density on an auctions for two payment rules, the first-price rule in interval that is the same for all bidders. In a monotone which the winner pays her bid, and the second-price rule pure-strategy equilibrium, bidder bids if her value is . in which the winner pays the second-highest bid. We Assume throughout that the bidding strategy is an characterize equilibrium bidding strategies and predicted increasing and differentiable function, and thus has an outcomes for both asymmetric and symmetric increasing and differentiable inverse function .
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Internet Service Provider Liability: Imposing a Higher Duty of Care
    WENDY LARSON, ISP LIABILITY: IMPOSING A HIGHER DUTY OF CARE, 37 COLUM. J. L. & ARTS 573 (2014) Internet Service Provider Liability: Imposing a Higher Duty of Care Wendy C. Larson* INTRODUCTION Today’s Internet is exploding with creativity and innovation, and it has spurred new markets and industries in an unprecedented period of time.1 Such progress is inevitably accompanied by intellectual property rights violations, particularly as the law struggles to keep pace with the exponential growth in technology. Moreover, online actors are becoming increasingly skilled at hiding their identities to evade responsibility. The service providers that these actors employ to host their Web sites, auction their domain names, provide their advertising content, process their payments, promote their businesses—and even hide their identities—have limited exposure to liability for their customers’ actions. As a consequence, service providers have little incentive to cooperate with brand owners or to voluntarily identify trademark violations. In fact, such cooperation or voluntary participation may place service providers at a competitive disadvantage. Law and practice should be revised to create incentives for service providers to work with brand owners to effect the primary purpose of trademark law: preventing consumer confusion. This Article identifies the types of online services most often involved in trademark violations. It provides a brief review of the current statutory framework and the evolution of the common law concerning liability of online service providers. Borrowing from the Digital Millennium Copyright Act and traditional tort concepts, this Article explores avenues for legislative change and the best practices to address the issues.2 Requiring a higher duty of care from online service providers will help minimize consumer confusion, protect brand owners and provide a more authentic online consumer experience.
    [Show full text]
  • The E-Brand, I-Brand and Generic Domain Names Ascending to Power?" American University Law Review 50, No.4 (2001): 937-978
    American University Law Review Volume 50 | Issue 4 Article 2 2001 Shifting the Paradigm in E-Commerce: Move Over Inherently Distinctive Trademarks - The E-Brand, I- Brand and Generic Domain Names Ascending to Power? Xuan-Thao N. Nguyen Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/aulr Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Nguyen, Xuan-Thao N. "Shifting the Paradigm in E-Commerce: Move Over Inherently Distinctive Trademarks - The E-Brand, I-Brand and Generic Domain Names Ascending to Power?" American University Law Review 50, no.4 (2001): 937-978. This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington College of Law Journals & Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in American University Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Shifting the Paradigm in E-Commerce: Move Over Inherently Distinctive Trademarks - The E-Brand, I-Brand and Generic Domain Names Ascending to Power? This article is available in American University Law Review: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/aulr/vol50/iss4/2 NGUYENPP 10/18/01 4:48 PM SHIFTING THE PARADIGM IN E-COMMERCE: MOVE OVER INHERENTLY DISTINCTIVE TRADEMARKS—THE E-BRAND, I-BRAND AND GENERIC DOMAIN ∗ NAMES ASCENDING TO POWER? ∗∗ XUAN-THAO N. NGUYEN TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction ........................................................................................938 I. The Trademark Paradigm Before E-Commerce .....................940 II. The E-I-G Movement in E-Commerce .....................................948 A. Brief Overview of E-Commerce.........................................948 B.
    [Show full text]
  • Trademark Threats on Instagram, Twitter, Facebook, and Other Social Media Policing and Protecting Against Infringement and Counterfeiting by Website Users
    Presenting a live 90-minute webinar with interactive Q&A Trademark Threats on Instagram, Twitter, Facebook, and Other Social Media Policing and Protecting Against Infringement and Counterfeiting by Website Users TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 19, 2017 1pm Eastern | 12pm Central | 11am Mountain | 10am Pacific Today’s faculty features: Britt L. Anderson, Partner, K&L Gates, Palo Alto, Calif. Ian C. Ballon, Shareholder, Greenberg Traurig, Los Angeles and Palo Alto, Calif. Brian D. Wassom, Partner, Warner Norcross & Judd, Southfield, Mich. The audio portion of the conference may be accessed via the telephone or by using your computer's speakers. Please refer to the instructions emailed to registrants for additional information. If you have any questions, please contact Customer Service at 1-800-926-7926 ext. 10. FAIR USE AND NON-TRADEMARK USE OF MARKS UNDER THE LANHAM ACT Excerpted from Chapter 6 (Trademark, Service Mark, Trade Name and Trade Dress Protection in Cyberspace) of E-Commerce and Internet Law: A Legal Treatise With Forms, Second Edition, a 5-volume legal treatise by Ian C. Ballon (Thomson/West Publishing 2017) STRAFFORD PUBLICATIONS PRESENTS “TRADEMARK THREATS ON SOCIAL MEDIA” WEBINAR SEPTEMBER 19, 2017 Ian C. Ballon Greenberg Traurig, LLP Silicon Valley: Los Angeles: 1900 University Avenue, 5th Fl. 1840 Century Park East, Ste. 1900 East Palo Alto, CA 914303 Los Angeles, CA 90067 Direct Dial: (650) 289-7881 Direct Dial: (310) 586-6575 Direct Fax: (650) 462-7881 Direct Fax: (310) 586-0575 [email protected] <www.ianballon.net> LinkedIn, Twitter, Facebook, Google+: IanBallon This paper has been excerpted from E-Commerce and Internet Law: Treatise with Forms 2d Edition (Thomson West 2017 Annual Update), a 5-volume legal treatise by Ian C.
    [Show full text]
  • Middle East and Adjoining Countries DNS Study
    Middle East and Adjoining Countries DNS Study Document Reference ICANN/ME-DNS/003 Protective Marking COMMERCIAL - IN CONFIDENCE Document Owner EURid Status FINAL Publication Date 25 Jan 2016 Latest review date 22 Feb 2016 Contents Acknowledgements ................................................................................................................... 7 Executive Summary ...................................................................................................................... 7 Understanding the region’s Internet environment ..................................................................... 7 The region’s domain name industry: registries, registrars and registrants ................................ 8 Domains in the region – facts and figures ................................................................................. 9 Analysis of the market potential for domains in the region ...................................................... 10 Recommendations .................................................................................................................. 10 I. Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 12 Research methodology ........................................................................................................... 13 User survey ............................................................................................................................. 13 Observations on methodology and potential
    [Show full text]
  • Legal Considerations: Domain Name Auction Using the Twitter Platform
    LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS: DOMAIN NAME AUCTION USING THE TWITTER PLATFORM MRS. EDITH UDEAGU. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, NIRA. OUTLINE • Introduction • NiRA SLDs • Domain Name Registration • NiRA Strategic Direction • Premium Domain Name • Guidelines on Premium Domain Names Auction • Bidding Process • Twitter Legal Considerations/Perspective • NiRA Legal Considerations/Perspective • Next Steps INTRODUCTION • The Nigeria internet Registration Association (NiRA) is a Not-for-Profit, Non-Governmental Self- Regulating body that manages the .ng national resource, the country code Top Level Domain(ccTLD), name space in the public interest of Nigeria and global internet communities. • The management of the .ng ccTLD is a delegation responsibility from the National Information Technology Development Agency (NITDA), an organ of the Federal Government of Nigeria. • NiRA was established on March 28, 2006 when stakeholders adopted its constitution. • Affairs of NiRA are conducted by the Executive Board of Directors in accordance with NiRA constitution and resolutions of members. • NiRA Secretariat handles day to day operations of NiRA • NiRA operates the 3R model (Registry, Registrar ,Registrant): The Registry - NiRA. The Registrar – NiRA Accredited Registrars (both local and foreign). The Registrants – The end users (both local and foreign). • There are about 139,200 active .ng domain names as at May, 2019. NiRA SLDs NiRA SLDs THE SLDs: .com.ng • Commercial entities and purposes (Open) .edu.ng • Universities and Higher Education and research institutions (Closed) .i.ng • General purposes (Open) .name.ng • Personal names (Open) .net.ng • Internet Service /Telecoms Providers' infrastructure (Closed) .org.ng • Not-for-profit entities (Open) .sch.ng • Other Academic institutions (Closed and at regional level) .gov.ng • National, regional, and local government bodies and agencies (Closed) .mil.ng • Military and related purposes (Closed) .mobi.ng • For mobile devices.
    [Show full text]
  • An Economic Analysis of Domain Name Policy Karl M
    Hastings Communications and Entertainment Law Journal Volume 25 | Number 3 Article 1 1-1-2003 An Economic Analysis of Domain Name Policy Karl M. Manheim Lawrence B. Solum Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/ hastings_comm_ent_law_journal Part of the Communications Law Commons, Entertainment, Arts, and Sports Law Commons, and the Intellectual Property Law Commons Recommended Citation Karl M. Manheim and Lawrence B. Solum, An Economic Analysis of Domain Name Policy, 25 Hastings Comm. & Ent. L.J. 359 (2003). Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_comm_ent_law_journal/vol25/iss3/1 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Hastings Communications and Entertainment Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. An Economic Analysis of Domain Name Policy* by KARL M. MANHEIM** & LAWRENCE B. SOLUM**" I. Introduction: Domain Name Policy ................................................. 361 A . The D om ain Name System ....................................................... 364 1. W hat are D omain Names? ................................................... 364 2. Why are Domain Names Important? ................................. 366 3. How Are Domain Names Created? .................... ............... 368 4. How Does the Domain Name System Work? ................... 369 B. Management of the Domain
    [Show full text]
  • Continuous Double Auction Mechanism and Bidding Strategies in Cloud Computing Markets
    IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON JOURNAL NAME, MANUSCRIPT ID 1 Continuous Double Auction Mechanism and Bidding Strategies in Cloud Computing Markets Xuelin Shi, Ke Xu, Senior Member, IEEE, JiangChuan Liu, Senior Member, IEEE, Yong Wang Abstract—Cloud computing has been an emerging model which aims at allowing customers to utilize computing resources hosted by Cloud Service Providers (CSPs). More and more consumers rely on CSPs to supply computing and storage service on the one hand, and CSPs try to attract consumers on favorable terms on the other. In such competitive cloud computing markets, pricing policies are critical to market efficiency. While CSPs often publish their prices and charge users according to the amount of resources they consume, auction mechanism is rarely applied. In fact a feasible auction mechanism is the most effective method for allocation of resources, especially double auction is more efficient and flexible for it enables buyers and sellers to enter bids and offers simultaneously. In this paper we bring up an electronic auction platform for cloud, and a cloud Continuous Double Auction (CDA) mechanism is formulated to match orders and facilitate trading based on the platform. Some evaluating criteria are defined to analyze the efficiency of markets and strategies. Furthermore, the selection of bidding strategies for the auction plays a very important role for each player to maximize its own profit, so we developed a novel bidding strategy for cloud CDA, BH-strategy, which is a two-stage game bidding strategy. At last we designed three simulation scenarios to compare the performance of our strategy with other dominating bidding strategies and proved that BH-strategy has better performance on surpluses, successful transactions and market efficiency.
    [Show full text]
  • Federal Communications Commission Record 9 FCC Red No
    FCC 94-61 Federal Communications Commission Record 9 FCC Red No. 11 C. Alternative Competitive Bidding Designs 79 Before the 1. Multiple v. Single Round Bidding 80 Federal Communications Commission Washington, D.C. 20554 2. Sequential v. Simultaneous Bidding 86 3. Combinatorial Bidding 98 D. Preferred Competitive Bidding Designs 106 PP Docket No. 93-253 1. Primary Method: Simultaneous Multiple Round Bidding 106 In the Matter of 2. Alternative Methods 112 Implementation of Section 309(j) E. Bidding Procedures 116 of the Communications Act - 1. Sequencing 117 Competitive Bidding 2. Duration of Bidding Rounds 121 3. Bid Increments 124 SECOND REPORT AND ORDER 4. Stopping Rules for Multiple Round Auctions 127 Adopted: March 8, 1994; Released: April 20, 1994 5. Activity Rules 133 By the Commission: 6. Bid Withdrawal and Default 146 7. Releasing Bid Information 158 TABLE OF CONTENTS 8. Delay, Suspension or Cancellation of Auction 159 IV. PROCEDURAL, PAYMENT AND PENALTY Paragraph ISSUES 160 A. Pre-Auction Procedures and Bidder and Licensee I. INTRODUCTION 1 Qualifications 161 A. Policy Objectives 3 B. Upfront Payment 169 B. Summary 8 II. PRINCIPLES FOR DETERMINING WHETHER C. Payment for Licenses Awarded by Competitive LICENSES MAY BE AUCTIONED 11 Bidding 189 A. General Requirement for Mutual Exclusivity D. Default and Disqualification 195 Among Applications for Initial Licenses or E. Minimum Bids and Reservation Prices 206 Construction Permits Accepted for Filing 12 F. Procedures in Other Auction Designs 208 1. Shared Spectrum 13 V. REGULATORY SAFEGUARDS 210 2. Licenses Awarded on a "First-Come. A. Unjust Enrichment and Transfer Disclosure First-Served" Basis 15 Requirements 211 3.
    [Show full text]
  • An Economic Analysis of Domain Name Policy Karl M
    University of San Diego Digital USD University of San Diego Law and Economics Law Faculty Scholarship Research Paper Series March 2004 An Economic Analysis of Domain Name Policy Karl M. Manheim Loyola Law School, [email protected] Lawrence B. Solum University of San Diego, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: http://digital.sandiego.edu/lwps_econ Part of the Law and Economics Commons Digital USD Citation Manheim, Karl M. and Solum, Lawrence B., "An Economic Analysis of Domain Name Policy" (2004). University of San Diego Law and Economics Research Paper Series. 1. http://digital.sandiego.edu/lwps_econ/art1 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Faculty Scholarship at Digital USD. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of San Diego Law and Economics Research Paper Series by an authorized administrator of Digital USD. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Manheim and Solum: Law and Economics Research Paper Series Spring 2004 An Economic Analysis of Domain Name Policy Lawrence B. Solum and Karl M. Manheim Published by Digital USD, 2004 1 University of San Diego Law and Economics Research Paper Series, Art. 1 [2004] SOLUM2V8-FINAL.DOC 2/9/04 10:06 AM An Economic Analysis of Domain Name Policy* by ** *** KARL M. MANHEIM & LAWRENCE B. SOLUM I. Introduction: Domain Name Policy .................................................319 A. The Domain Name System .......................................................322 1. What are Domain Names?...................................................322 2. Why are Domain Names Important? .................................324 3. How Are Domain Names Created? ...................................326 4. How Does the Domain Name System Work?...................327 B.
    [Show full text]
  • Exploring Domain Auction and Priority Checking Analysis
    Middle-East Journal of Scientific Research 20 (12): 2549-2553, 2014 ISSN 1990-9233 © IDOSI Publications, 2014 DOI: 10.5829/idosi.mejsr.2014.20.12.621 Exploring Domain Auction and Priority Checking Analysis 1R. Udayakumar, 2 V. Khanaa and 3T. Saravanan 1School of Computing Sciences, Bharath University, India 2Information Technology, Bharath University, Chennai-600073 India 3Department of ETC, Bharath University,Chennai-47, India Abstract: The domain name auction facilitates the buying and selling of currently registered domain names, enabling individuals to purchase a previously registered domain that suits their needs from an owner wishing to sell.Domain auction sites allow users to search multiple domain names that are listed for sale by owner and to place bids on the names they want to purchase. As in any auction, the highest bidder wins. The more desirable a domain name, the higher the winning bid and auction sites often provide links to escrow agents to facilitate the safe transfer of funds and domain properties between the auctioning parties. Key words: Model checker Equilibrium approaches Bid INTRODUCTION objective, such as revenue-maximizing auctions, which do not always allocate the item efficiently. As in the Auctions are used to determine how billions of single-item auction case, there are distinctions among dollars of goods and services will be allocated across the combinatorial auctions in terms of the temporal aspects of globe. Each bidder privately sends a bid to the auction. the auction as well as the payments to be made by the A common objective among all of these auctions is to bidders [3, 4].
    [Show full text]
  • Online Auctions As Tools for Asset Management S E R I E S
    NOVEMBER 2004 Government Garage Sales: Online Auctions as Tools for Asset Management S e r i e s David C. Wyld Mayfield Professor of Management and Director of the Strategic e-Government Initiative Southeastern Louisiana University E-Government E-GOVERNMENT SERIES Government Garage Sales: Online Auctions as Tools for Asset Management David C. Wyld Mayfield Professor of Management and Director of the Strategic e-Government Initiative Southeastern Louisiana University November 2004 TABLE OF CONTENTS Foreword ..............................................................................................4 Executive Summary ..............................................................................5 Introduction .........................................................................................8 The “Usual Suspects” .......................................................................8 “I Love Entrepreneurialism!” ............................................................9 Reverse Logistics and Public Sector Asset Management .................12 Auction Theory & Practice 101 ..........................................................15 Introduction ................................................................................... 15 The History of Dynamic Pricing ..................................................... 15 The Characteristics of Auctions ...................................................... 15 Information Asymmetry and Optimism .......................................... 17 Winners and Losers .......................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Heritage Auctions
    Heritage Auctions For Trusts and Estates Advisors Journal SECOND ISSUE // 2015 LIKE-KIND EXCHANGES FOR IN THIS ART & COLLECTIBLES ISSUE: BY CHAD SCHLEICHER, BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT MANAGER, ACCRUIT LLC ONCE AGAIN IT IS THAT DREADED TIME FOR MOST—TAX TIME. WE START 1 COMPILING OUR RECEIPTS, ORGANIZING OUR ASSETS, AND TRYING TO Like-Kind Exchanges for REMEMBER WHAT WE DID OVER THE PAST YEAR. WE ARE FORCED TO Art & Collectibles REALIZE THAT THERE AREN'T A LOT OF OPTIONS WHEN IT COMES TO 3 DEFERRING OR ELIMINATING TAXES. Rarity, Desirability and Authenticity 4 For collectors, one powerful option to Simply put, an LKE allows a taxpayer Dealing with an Estate consider involves Like-Kind Exchanges the ability to maximize cash flow by Coin Collection (LKEs), also known as 1031 Exchanges. deferring capital gains tax on the sale of 5 Which are commonly known through an asset that produced a taxable gain. Valuations in the Vault their use in Real Estate transactions. LKEs can be used across a wide For example, a person buys a Norman 6 variety of transactions, including those Rockwell drawing for $100,000 with the Luxury Real Estate involving tangible, depreciable personal intention to hold it as an investment. 7 property such as, trucks, tractors, office Three years later a buyer is willing to Domain Names equipment, restaurant equipment, etc. pay $250,000 for that same piece. LKEs can also work with collectibles, The person sells the art and makes 10 a $150,000 gain on the original All About Appraisals such as art, antiques, metals, gems, coins, stamps and fine wine.
    [Show full text]