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Home , Beyond Good and Evil, New Philosophers, Perspectivism, The Four Great Errors

THE PERSPECTIVE OF A NEW

A Thesis submitted to the faculty of San Francisco State University In partial fulfillment of A d s' the requirements for PHIL the Degree • UH-f Master of Arts

In

Philosophy

by

Mauricio Arturo Ulloa

San Francisco, California

August 2015 Copyright by Mauricio Arturo Ulloa 2015 CERTIFICATION OF APPROVAL

I certify that I have read THE PERSPECTIVE OF A NEW PHILOSOPHER by Mauricio

Arturo Ulloa, and that in my opinion this work meets the criteria for approving a thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirement for the degree Master of Arts in

Philosophy at San Francisco State University.

Professor of Philosophy

cXr^y'7'~ Sandra Luft, Ph.D. Professor of Humanities

Abrol Fairweather Ph.D. Adjunct Faculty of Philosophy Department THE PERSPECTIVE OF A NEW PHILOSOPHER

Mauricio Arturo Ulloa San Francisco, California 2015

In this paper, I will show why accounts that defend Nietzsche’s by reinterpreting him to be more in line with a traditional epistemic theory are mistaken. First, I will compare what Nietzsche calls the old philosopher (traditional as we know them) and what he calls the new philosopher. Then, I will examine the traditional account of perspectivism as the view that there is no such thing as one universal, claim but instead multiple perspectives and explain how it has been defended against its biggest criticism: the paradox of perspectivism. The paradox of perspectivism states that if perspectivism is to be taken seriously it undermines itself as it becomes just another mere perspective and if it is not taken seriously perspectivism is ultimately reduced to . I will look at how Brian Leiter, R. Lanier Anderson, Steven D. Hales, and Rex Welshon try to defend Nietzsche and I will argue that they fail to capture what Nietzsche is doing with his perspectivism. I argue Nietzsche’s perspectivism is not to be understood as an epistemic or metaphysical claim and, thus, the paradox of perspectivism is not an issue. Rather perspectivism should be understood as the only way we can live life-affirming lives in a nihilistic world within the confines of our human limitations. Under my interpretation, Nietzsche’s perspectivism is saved from being reduced to relativism because all that matters to Nietzsche is meaning. In words, some values are meaningful and life-affirming and others are nihilistic and life- denying. That is by rejecting the concept of truth, which is life-denying, Nietzsche is able to once again place meaning in the individual’s perspective and the creation of life- affirming values while avoiding relativism by placing more meaning on life-affirming values and rejecting life-denying or nihilistic values.

I certify that jt is a correct representation of the content of this thesis. ff//p As~ Chair, Thesis Committee Date TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction...... 1

Outline of Thesis...... 2

What are the Old Philosophers?...... 9

Mistake of the Antithetical...... 10

Mistake of Personal Prejudice...... 11

Mistake of Language...... 16

What are the New Philosophers?...... 19

The New Philosophers’ Creation of Values...... 20

Perspectivism as Traditionally Understood...... 22

The Paradox of Perspectivism...... 23

Two Major Ways of Defending Perspectivism...... 25

Hierarchy among Perspectives...... 29

Brian Leiter...... 29

R. Lanier Anderson...... 33

Steven D. Hales & Rex Welshon...... 37

My Interpretation of Perspectivism...... 42

Possible Contradiction?...... 52

Perspectivism as ...... 53

References...... 59

v 1

INTRODUCTION

"Supposing truth to be a woman—what then?" -

That philosophers are notoriously bad at wooing women, at least in Nietzsche's

time, inspired Nietzsche to liken the results of philosophers "pursuing" truth with the

results of their pursuit of women—both ending in catastrophic failures. Friedrich

Nietzsche criticized philosophers for their that there are absolute and for

their dedication to the pursuit of these so-called "truths". Truth as we know it and, more

importantly, the of truth is brought into question by Nietzsche. He asks why we

pursue truth at all and why do we perceive it as having high value in our lives; why not

pursue falsehoods instead: "What really is it in us that wants 'the truth'?... Granted we want truth: why not rather untruth? And ? Even ignorance?"1 Philosophers

simply take for granted that truth is and of high value, thus, worth pursuing. Such

is the case that many of them have actually dedicated their entire lives to the pursuit of

truth. Questioning the real value of truth, Nietzsche sets out to rectify what he considers to be previous philosophers' misconception of truth. He criticizes the metaphysical

of the ascetic ideal and Kantian as being "errors, nothing but

errors!"2 In doing so, he creates a distinction and maps out transitional steps between

1 Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and , trans. RJ. Hollingdale (England: Penguin Books, 2003), §1. 2 Friedrich Nietzsche, On the of Morals, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: The Modern Library, 1992), §12. 2

old philosophers (i.e., Kant, Descartes, ) who deeply believe in the pursuit of truth

on the one hand and what he calls "the new philosopher". The latter, according to

Nietzsche, being a thinker that will think of truth in a different light—"For that we have

to await the arrival of a new species of philosopher, one which possesses tastes and

inclinations opposite to and different from those of its predecessors..."3

OUTLINE OF THE THESIS

In this paper I will be taking a closer look at Nietzsche's perspectivism and his

own account of truth, what he means by truth versus what is traditionally meant by truth, and why he rejects the concept of truth. My goal is to show why other accounts that try to defend Nietzsche's perspectivism or reinterpret him to be more in line with a traditional epistemic theory are mistaken. I will argue that, while Nietzsche rejects

epistemic claims in his own theory called "perspectivism", what he means by

perspectivism should not be understood as it is traditionally understood by philosophy.

Perspectivism is traditionally understood as an epistemic theory that states all

perspectives are subjective and thus equally true. As a matter of fact, perspectivism

shouldn't be mistaken for any kind of epistemic or metaphysical theory at all but,

instead, perspectivism should be understood as a way of living life-affirming lives in a

3 Nietzsche, Beyond , §2. 3

nihilistic world within the confines of our human limitations. I will show that Nietzsche's perspectivism is meant to help us realize our inability to attain what traditional philosophers call "truth". By bringing "truth", its existence, and its attainability into question it places less importance and less value on the concept of "truth". Ultimately,

"truth" being less important allows us to redirect our attention towards the importance of living. In other words, my interpretation of Nietzsche's perspectivism claims that

Nietzsche is not interested in establishing an epistemic or metaphysical theory; rather, what Nietzsche is interested in doing is rejecting the dichotomy of the real versus the apparent. In rejecting this dichotomy Nietzsche provides us with a way of living that is much more embracing of our human abilities and understanding. This allows us to better exercise our will to power by being life affirming and embracing our human rather than denying it. That is, by realizing the flaw in believing we can know an objective world we are then able to reject the existence of an objective world and our efforts in attaining knowledge of it, and thus focus on the creation of new values that help us transcend a world that is void of meaning and morals.

In order to do this, Nietzsche gives us his perspectivism. I will first examine the ways in which an old philosopher differs from that of a new philosopher according to

Nietzsche. It will help to understand the three fundamental mistakes Nietzsche the old philosopher makes in his or her thinking. The first mistake the old philosopher makes is in assuming antithetical values exist as opposites from one another; for 4

example, good versus evil, right versus wrong, true versus false. These antithetical values bleed into our other thoughts and create a dualism that later reinforces the dichotomy of the real versus the apparent in our reasoning. The second mistake the old philosopher makes is in thinking he or she is discovering some truth or knowledge about how the world works when in fact the "discovery" is just a confirmation bias based on his or her personal and psychology. What old philosophers fail to realize is they are actually expressing their will to truth as their will to power—Nietzsche's key concept that all living creatures' ultimate desire is to express and exert their life force and power. Possessing knowledge is one of the ways to express this life force, though it is still a mistake according to Nietzsche. Lastly, old philosophers mistake the built in assumptions in our Indo-Germanic language as truths as well, such as postulating subject versus object, the self, actions as caused by a doer, etc. Understanding these mistakes will help us better comprehend what Nietzsche means when he refers to truth in respect to an old philosopher versus what he means when he refers to truth in respect to a new philosopher and himself. This will allow us to then turn our attention to what is traditionally considered Nietzsche's epistemic theory, perspectivism.

I will examine the traditional account of Nietzsche's perspectivism, which runs into a problem known as the paradox of perspectivism. Traditionally, perspectivism is the view that there is no such thing as one, universal, truth claim about the world, but instead there are just multiple perspectives that are all subjective with no single 5

perspective being better than another. The paradox of perspectivism is twofold: if perspectivism is to be seen as a universal "fact" about the world, perspectivism then contradicts and undermines itself as perspectivism too must be just another subjective perspective and thus not a "fact" about the world. However, if Nietzsche admits that perspectivism is simply just another perspective in order to avoid the contradiction, then perspectivism is reduced to relativism and leaves us wondering why it should be taken as a serious statement at all if it is no better than any other theory. I will examine three major ways in which Nietzsche's perspectivism has been defended from the paradox of perspectivism with special focus on two of those ways presented in the works of Brian Leiter, R. Lanier Anderson, Steven D. Hales, and Rex Welshon. I will show how they effectively defend perspectivism from the paradox, in particular the arguments defending it from being reduced to relativism, yet ultimately I will argue that they do not adequately capture the implications Nietzsche's perspectivism has on

"truth". Briefly, Leiter takes Nietzsche's perspectivism to mean that all knowledge is perspectival. As such, all perspectives are affected by an infinite combination of interests and needs. Some of those combinations distort our perspectives for the worse; however, we can identify at least some of the times our perspectives are being distorted. This cleverly introduces a hierarchy among perspectives—that is, less distorted perspectives are better than more distorted perspectives. This interpretation rejects the dichotomy that there exists a "real" world that is inaccessible to us in any 6

way other than it "appears" and it saves perspectivism from the paradox of perspectivism because it introduces a means to rank perspectives—so not all perspectives are equal. Anderson also introduces a hierarchy among perspectives but the qualifier is based on the coherence with broader claims of perspectives. In other words, the more coherent a perspective is the better. Again, with a hierarchy among perspectives perspectivism is saved from relativism and from the paradox of perspectivism as a whole. Furthermore, Anderson makes an additional move that not only rejects the dichotomy but makes its rejection absolutely necessary: Anderson states that because all our knowledge is perspectival and, thus, a subjective experience, that when we experience , causality must also be a subjective experience. A real, objective world—if it exists—would exist outside of subjective experience. It follows from this that if there were an objective world existing outside of subjective experience the objective world could not be the cause of knowledge because it exists outside of experience. Therefore, it would be incoherent to claim the "real" world and

"things in themselves" as causes of knowledge. Thus, we must reject the dichotomy that

Nietzsche wants to reject as well. Hales and Welshon on the other hand take a very different approach from Leiter and Anderson. They interpret Nietzsche as saying that the objective world could very well exist, but it is a world completely unknowable to us.

Perspectivism is the connecting method across the way we live in that we adopt facts or truths that hold some truth status within the structure of perspectives. Our perspectives 7

organize the world in a way that best suits us and our conceptual reality. Thus, there are truth values among different perspectives so long as they are only claimed as true within the conceptual reality from which these perspectives are manifested. As long as truth values are in place, this interpretation also avoids the paradox of perspectivism, while remaining agnostic about the dichotomy as it does not matter to our day to day living and conceptual reality.

Lastly, my interpretation of Nietzsche is like Hales and Welshon in that I also take

Nietzsche's perspectivism as a way of living but I do not cash it out on any similar terms.

Instead, I argue that perspectivism is the only way we can live in this kind of world while still fulfilling our will to power. Traditionally, the pursuit of truth is of the upmost importance for philosophers. Nietzsche thinks that pursuit is futile and wants philosophers instead to place more importance on life and creating life-affirming values; perspectivism allows this by eliminating "truth" altogether. Perspectivism, then, becomes the only life-affirming view on our subjective experience because it is the only view that places value on our subjective experience instead of placing value on "truth" about an "objective world" that we have no access to as human beings. Because

Nietzsche values life above all else, perspectivism allows "truth" to take a less important role than living and exerting our life force—otherwise known to Nietzsche as our will to power. This interpretation is more in the spirit of Nietzsche's philosophy as it places the individual experience first again and adds value to our perspective, unlike the old 8

philosopher who constantly places and truth above life and our human perspective. The values that the old philosopher proclaims are in fact life-denying values as they are like ascetic ideals, denying the body of its senses, pleasures, instincts, etc., by valuing reason, truth, and discipline above all. Now, with "truth" exposed as a fiction, we can continue to contemplate things, but this time we can also trust our senses, our instincts, and our animalistic characteristics in hopes of creating life-affirming values to which we can use to give meaning to our lives. I argue that with my interpretation of perspectivism Nietzsche is able to avoid relativism because my interpretation does not mean any perspective goes, but rather it creates a distinction between life-affirming perspectives and life denying perspectives. The life-affirming perspectives allow us to exert our will to power the most and thus life-affirming perspectives are the ones that matter. In other words, the more life-affirming the perspective, the "better" it is.

However, my interpretation does not restrict perspectivism to because the highest expression of will to power is the creation of values and this forces us to constantly create new values in order to exert our highest life force—the will to power—and continue to add meaning into our lives. 9

WHAT ARE OLD PHILOSOPHERS?

Old philosophers—or most philosophers as we've known them—are essentially dogmatists who value truth above all else in Nietzsche's estimation. Nietzsche calls these old philosophers dogmatists because of their deep commitment to the attainability of absolute truth. They are committed to truth as being of the highest value to mankind and they believe that, ultimately, they have or could attain concrete, universal truth, at least partially so (e.g., Plato, Descartes, Kant, etc). Nietzsche considers this eagerness for truth a problem for philosophy because it leads old philosophers to the delusional belief that they have gotten a hold of truth in a way that they proclaim is objective. "They [old philosophers] pose as having discovered and attained their real opinions through the self-evolution of a cold, pure, divinely unperturbed ..."4

Furthermore, they become firmly entrenched in their beliefs and stop questioning once they attain this truth. According to Nietzsche, this is dogma and couldn't be any further away from their goal of acquiring this so called "truth". However, why does Nietzsche claim that old philosophers become so dogmatic and erroneous when they believe in the attainability of absolute truth?

4 Nietzsche, , §5. 10

THE MISTAKE OF ANTITHETICAL VALUES:

Nietzsche believes the old philosopher has made three fundamental mistakes which leads the old philosopher into the erroneous belief in the concept of truth. First,

Nietzsche claims that the old philosophers, for as much as they doubt, have never taken the time to doubt the distinction between truth and falsity—what he refers to as an antithetical value. Antithetical values—like truth and falsity, good and evil, right and wrong, the real and the apparent—are not as absolute as these dogmatic philosophers assume them to be and should be brought into doubt:

For it may be doubted, firstly whether there exist any antithesis at all,

and secondly whether these popular evaluations and value-antithesis, on

which the metaphysicians have set their seal, are not perhaps merely

foreground valuations, merely provisional perspectives...5

Nietzsche critiques old philosophers for not doubting the assumed distinction between antithetical values—in particular, truth and falsity. Their belief in the distinction between antithetical values underlies and shapes their interpretation of the world by creating dichotomies: values of truth and false, right and wrong, good and evil, real and apparent. Nietzsche doubts that these distinctions exist at all and critiques the old philosophers heavily for posing as men of truth, who cast doubt on all their beliefs, yet

5 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, §2. 11

forget to critically doubt these distinctions. Moreover, if these distinctions do exist he asks what makes them more than just the way things appear, i.e., as shallow, foreground valuations of the way things are? What reason is there to believe they are absolutely true? These old philosophers spend their entire lives thinking in this light and never feel the need to cast any doubt on it because it has been the way they judge the world since the beginning. This leads us to the second key point of the critique of the old philosopher.

THE MISTAKE OF PERSONAL PREJUDICE/BIAS:

In fact, Nietzsche claims that there is a reason why these philosophers are not able to bring the value of truth and its distinction with falsity into doubt. It is due to their personal prejudices and psychology that guides their pursuit of truth and underlies these said truths:

...what happens at bottom is that a prejudice, a notion, an 'inspiration',

generally a desire of the heart sifted and made abstract, is defended by

them with sought after the event—they are one and all

advocates who do not want to be regarded as such, and for the most part 12

no better than cunning pleaders for their prejudices, which they baptize

'truths'...6

Truth being of highest value and the exact opposite of false is one of those prejudices and assumptions. Essentially, the old philosopher unknowingly has these prejudices that he deems as truth. He does so maybe because he was raised that way or he had an experience that moved him strongly; whatever the reason may be, prejudices are made in each person throughout his or her life. He or she then builds a whole system of philosophy in which these personal prejudices lie at the foundation of his philosophy.

One of those prejudices is that truth is of the highest value for humanity. Truth is then seen of the highest importance in our lives and leads us to believe there is such a thing as truth and to pursue it feverishly. In other words, the old philosopher is justifying his interpretation of the world based on his own personal and moral prejudices. By building a system of thought that works, if one believes the assumptions that lie at its root, the whole system reinforces itself and makes seeing through its underlying assumptions difficult. For example, in reading Plato, the Form of the Good is the anchor for his system. Believing in the Form of the Good as an absolute truth leads one to make sense of the rest of Plato's ideas. Many of Plato's conclusions concerning humanity and , as well as his metaphysics, all follow from believing in his core idea of the Form

6 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, §5. 13

of the Good. Nietzsche wants to question the reasons we have for believing in the Form of the Good. This is the kind of dogma that old philosophers hold onto without knowing.

Then they try to convince others to interpret the world similarly instead of more honestly reflecting about the intentions in their truth. Incidentally, because their presumed truths stand true within their philosophy and reinforces their psychology it all makes sense to them and they become deluded into thinking they have discovered an absolute truth very few people can discover. This is precisely the misconception and prejudice of old philosophers—that there are undeniable, universal truths and falsehoods, rights and wrongs about the world that they have somehow discovered in an objective manner within the very limited confines of their human and thinking.

What actually happens is that these dogmatic philosophers are simply expressing their will to power: a central theme in Nietzsche's thought suggesting that "a living thing desires above all to vent its strength—life as such will to power..."7 Nietzsche claims that in every animal's psychological constitution is the instinct to strive for and create certain conditions that are favorable to its form of life. This instinctual drive is what creates conflict among different types of life as each desires different conditions which most favorably help it overcome. This drive is not exclusive to the level of the individual but

7 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, §13. 14

also applies to groups, societies, clans, like-minded people, etc. What this means is each

human being desires to create conditions favorable to its form of life, ideas, and

prejudices that have all been formed through experience.8 A useful way of thinking

about this is the way lobbyists work in politics. Each institution has lobbyists that lobby

to politicians and the voters in order to pass laws and regulations that aid their goals,

while they try their best to convince politicians and voters to vote against laws and

regulations that hurt their goals. This applies from the individual level (i.e., an old

philosopher trying to convince people he is right) to groups (i.e., feminists and their fight

for gender equality) to corporations (i.e., lobbyists in Washington, DC). While the

lobbyist example may make us seem selfish or immoral because of the negative

connotations lobbying and corporate greed have, Nietzsche suggests such things are

simply a function of being alive and wanting to feel alive throughout multiple parts of

his books and writings:9

8 While there is more to be said about the concept of Nietzsche's will to power this is briefly what it boils down to: There are various interpretations of his will to power: a metaphysical one, an organic one, and a psychological one. When referring to the "will to life" I will be referring to the psychological interpretation because it applies the will to life to all living creatures with a will. This is more easily understood because it is easy to understand human beings as willing creatures, and thus having a will to power. This is not to say I do not believe the organic or metaphysical interpretations are wrong; however, the metaphysical interpretation is the most controversial and the organic and psychological interpretations have more support and are more easily identified in Nietzsche's writing. The between the three interpretations are just in their degree of application. That is to say, the metaphysical interpretation applies will to power to everything that exists, the organic interpretation applies the will to power exclusively to all life, while the psychological one applies the will to power to all willing creatures. However, explaining this with more depth is outside the scope of this paper and has enough substance to merit its own paper. 9 Nietzsche, Antichrist, §6. Human All Too Human, II; §5. Genealogy of Morals, III; §7. Some examples to support my statement. 15

...life itself is essentially appropriation, injury, overpowering of

what is alien and weaker... it will strive to grow, spread, seize,

become predominant—not from any morality or immorality but

because it is living and because life simply is will to power.10

However, if the lobbyist example is troubling one can apply the same analogy to the agenda of human rights activists. The desire to exert power above all is a part of everyone's psychology and the old philosophers do not understand that. Each philosopher holds onto ideals that are expressions of his or her psychology: "Insofar as the individual wants to preserve himself against other individuals, in a natural state of affairs he employs the intellect mostly for simulation alone".11 Nietzsche understands psychology as the development of one's will to power.12 So what occurs is these old philosophers are just trying to create conditions favorable to their maximum exercising of power: "In every philosophy there is a point at which the philosopher's 'conviction' appears on the scene..."13 And, in order to exercise power on their part, they proclaim their philosophy as the ultimate truth. In convincing others to believe their respective philosophy, old philosophers get the feeling of maximizing their power, and thus feels as if they are fulfilling their will to power. Every philosophy is ultimately a confession, "an

10 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, §259, 11 Nietzsche, On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense, 44. 12 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, §23. 13 Ibid., §8. 16

involuntary and unconscious memoir" of the respective philosopher, from which one can derive insight of the philosopher's persona and life more so than one can derive any actual truth from it.14 How we understand the world depends on our perspective, which is shaped by our values, and these values originate in our instincts. This is why old philosophers are so certain and firmly entrenched in what they believe—because their philosophies are an expression and reinforcement of their own psychology.15

THE MISTAKE OF LANGUAGE

Lastly, Nietzsche claims that many of the personal prejudices these old philosophers project into their philosophies—like the distinction between antithetical values—are derived from language. Nietzsche asks, "Is language the adequate expression of all realities?"16 What he means to point out is that our Indo-Germanic language makes distinctions between subjects and objects inherently and it postulates entities that engage in activity. This is part of the grammatical structure of our language.

For example, "I think" postulates an "I" substance as an entity that not only engages in the action of thought but is also the cause of it. Already there are at least a few assumptions embedded in this that may be impossible to prove. Namely, "that it is I

14 Ibid., §6. 15 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, §23. 16 Nietzsche, On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense, 45. 17

who think... that thinking is an activity and operation on the part of an entity thought of as a cause, that an T exists..."17 In other words, there are series of assumptions in the

sentence "I think." Firstly, that / exists as an entity. Secondly, that I am the one who engages in thought. Thirdly, that / am an entity that causes thought and chooses what to think. Nietzsche further drives his point by asking whether it is not strange to say "I think" when thoughts come to our heads at random—when it chooses to, rather than when I choose? To believe that this "it" is no other than "/" is nothing but an assumption that our language reinforces and shapes. Christoph Cox, a Nietzschean scholar, refers to this as "a grammatical habit"18:

A quantum of force is equivalent to a quantum of drive, will,

effect—more, it is nothing other than precisely this very driving,

willing, effecting, and only owing to the seduction of language

(and of the fundamental errors of reason that are petrified in it)

which conceives and misconceives all effects as conditioned by

something that causes effects, by a 'subject/ can it appear

otherwise...there is no such substratum; there is no 'being' behind

17 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, §16. 18 Christoph Cox, Nietzsche: Naturalism and Interpretation, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999) p. 124 18

doing, effecting, becoming; 'the doer' is merely a fiction added to

the deed—the deed is everything."19

Nietzsche goes on to provide an example of how the "popular mind" sees lightning and separates the lightning from the flash as two separate things, the latter being an action while the former being the cause of that action: "it posits the same event first as cause and then a second time as effect".20 Those are a few of the many assumptions that are a consequence of the structure of our language and grammar along with the creation of antithetical values. The reason why these old philosophers construct similar metaphysical pictures of the world is due to the fact that they all use the same language: a language which presumes a distinction between things and entities and one between actions and agents as causally related.21 In our language we are forced into the distinction of antithetical values as they are embedded in the way we speak (e.g.,

"good" versus "not good"). This leads to many assumptions and prejudices that go undoubted by these dogmatists who fail to see this in their pursuit for truth. However, these assumptions and prejudices are mistakes that do not go unnoticed by Nietzsche's new philosopher.

19 Nietzsche, Genealogy of Morals, I; §13. 20 Tbid., I; §13 21 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, §17. 19

WHAT ARE NEW PHILOSOPHERS?

Nietzsche's new philosopher is in direct contrast with the old philosopher and what Nietzsche takes the world needs more of. The new philosopher is a thinker that does not allow himself to be tied down to a single dogma or perspective; rather, he is a creator of values. He does not just experiment with different ideas and values as he pleases without care; the new philosopher creates new values to live by. Understanding that there are multiple perspectives and ideas to explore, the new philosopher seeks to create his own values that transcend the given ways of thinking in order to uncover and understand not just more holistically, but in a more life-affirming way.22 Like the old philosopher, the new philosopher puts forward theories, although the new philosopher does not hold on to them dogmatically. However, he does not merely just discard various theories after playing with them. Rather than talk about "truth" objectively, the new philosopher remains flexible and looks at matters from as many different

perspectives as possible. This "philosophy of the future", as Nietzsche puts it, is open to overturning truths and dogmas as it shifts from perspective to perspective for the sake of understanding and creates values in order to exert one's will to power. Such a philosophy overcomes the rigid distinctions language imposes on our thought through will to power, rendering moral concepts like good versus evil as meaningless. In this

22 The new philosopher's creation of values being more life-affirming is explained in more depth later where I provide my interpretation of Nietzsche's perspectivism. However, generally most scholars, like Leiter, would leave it at just "more holistically". 20

sense, such a philosophy transcends "beyond good and evil", hence the chosen title of one of Nietzsche's books. The new philosopher knows what constitutes the real value of

"truth" and "good", which allows him to believe in a higher value—the value of life above all.23 This is because the new philosopher is able to realize that as human beings we are limited in our experience of the world. Our minds are wired in a way that is very specific to human beings and this specific wiring of our minds is traditionally considered to distort whatever information we believe we can discover and claim as knowledge or truth. The new philosopher rejects the external world, and thus the notion that information is being distorted or skewed is also rejected, while still acknowledging that we cannot gather information objectively. This allows new philosophers to see past what old philosophers see and be able to understand life as more of a cluster of man- interpreted "truths" and values trying to win out over one another.

THE NEW PHILOSOPHERS' CREATION OF VALUES

With this in mind, the new philosopher is then able to exercise his will to power and focus on the creation of life-affirming values rather than hopelessly seeking truths and knowledge that are impossible to be had. However, this is not easy for the new philosopher as the new philosopher is constantly fighting against his own prejudices and

23 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, §2. 21

assumptions with his will to power. This is because those prejudices and assumptions have become part of his will to power. Furthermore, to go beyond good and evil is to understand that there is no such thing as truth in the classical, old philosopher sense of the word. All we have are our perspectives and this can leave us feeling a sense of emptiness about ourselves as we do not have access to any meaningful values or truth.

How can one overcome this as one ventures into the unknown void of meaning and truth which causes confusion and hopelessness? To remedy this, new philosophers must create new values with the purpose of creating new perspectives and interpretations that do not give in to common ways of thinking (i.e., there exists an external world and how it "actually is" will never be known to us through our human perspective, rendering our subjective experiences as ultimately worthless). New philosophers have the strength to be leaders and masters of the world that create new values that others can willingly take on. In order to do this, new philosophers must fight many temptations in order to become truly independent so they can create these new values. They must detach themselves from others, even if that means detaching from their greatest love. They must detach themselves from their homeland, pity, science, etc. Even their own and the detachment from all these things itself must not become an attachment for in one way or another those too can prevent the new philosopher from truly creating new values.24 Only by having this level of detachment

24 lbid.,§41. 22

can the new philosopher experiment in ways that rise above customary thoughts and morality. And though he may appear cold or harsh in his investigation of things this is how new values shall be created and go beyond good and evil. The way to do this is by understanding and adopting perspectivism.

PERSPECTIVISM AS TRADITIONALLY UNDERSTOOD

Traditionally, Nietzschean scholarship has interpreted perspectivism as an epistemic theory, though there is little consensus among scholars as to what Nietzsche's perspectivism entails. Roughly, as I stated earlier, perspectivism is the belief that there is no single, universal truth about the world but instead there are just multiple perspectives which we can be used to understand reality. While there are many different interpretations on perspectivism that change how it is to be defined and understood, for the sake of this paper, I will be focusing on the most prominent interpretation of perspectivism, the central problem with this interpretation—that it essentially reduces perspectivism into some kind of relativism—and explain some of the most compelling ways scholars have gotten around the problem. By giving charitable accounts of what I take to be the most compelling ways to defend perspectivism from slipping into relativism and then providing my own interpretation of Nietzsche's perspectivism, I hope to show why the previous interpretations missed the mark. I claim 23

that my interpretation establishes a more novel way of interpreting Nietzsche that is more consistent with what Nietzsche's overall philosophy is trying to get at.

THE PARADOX OF PERSPECTIVISM

Among Nietzschean scholarship, the most orthodox interpretation of Nietzsche's perspectivism is one that takes his perspectivism to be an epistemic theory. Scholars such as Brian Leiter, R. Lanier Anderson, Steven D. Wales, Rex Welshon, and Alexander

Nehamas all, roughly, take the traditional interpretation of Nietzsche's perspectivism to be saying that there is no one particular "truth" or interpretation of reality that is privileged over another.25 Instead of there being universal or absolute truths there are just multiple perspectives that are pre-conditioned by each individual's interpretive interests which distorts the "perspective" from saying anything objectively meaningful about the world, reality, etc. Alexander Nehamas attributes four claims to Nietzsche's perspectivism:

1. The world has no determinate nature of character 2. Our concepts and theories do not "describe" or "correspond" to this world because it has no determinate character

25 R. Lanier Anderson, Truth and in Perspectivism, in Synthese vol. 115 (1998) p. 1-32; Maudemarie Clark, Nietzsche on Truth and Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990) Ch. 5; Brian Leiter, Perspectivism in Nietzsche's Genealogy of Morals, In Nietzsche, Genealogy, Morality, ed. R. Schacht (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1994) p. 334-357; Alexander Nehamas, Nietzsche: Life as Literature, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985); Steven D. Hales, Recent Work on Nietzsche, in American philosophical Quarterly Vol. 37 (Illinois: University of Illinois Press) p. 313-333. 24

3. Our concepts and theories are "mere" interpretations or "mere" perspectives (reflecting our pragmatic needs, at least on some accounts) 4. No perspective can enjoy an over any other, because there is no epistemically privileged mode of access to this characterless world.26

What ultimately reduces perspectivism to relativism is what Leiter takes to be Nehamas' fourth claim. By and large, this has been the traditional philosophical consensus on

Nietzsche's perspectivism. The problem with the fourth claim is that Nietzsche's perspectivism runs into what is known as the paradox of perspectivism. That is, if there are no claims about reality that are objectively true without a perspective how can

Nietzsche make sense of his own claim of perspectivism? In other words, does Nietzsche consider his perspectivism to be just another unprivileged perspective conditioned by a particular interpretive interest—namely, his? If so, then his view is reduced to relativism and we are left wondering why we should take him seriously. If Nietzsche's perspectivism is no different or no better than any other epistemic or metaphysical theory, why should we care about it? If Nietzsche claims perspectivism is not simply a perspective conditioned by a particular interpretive interest and, in fact, is "the case" or is a "true" descriptive statement about the world then it seems he is undermining his own perspectivism which claims there is no such thing as an absolute interpretation of reality (or "truth"). Either Nietzsche's perspectivism is just another unprivileged

26 Leiter, Perspectivism in Nietzsche's Genealogy of Morals, p. 334 25

interpretation of the world and is reduced into relativism or it is a privileged interpretation over all other interpretations and it inconsistently contradicts itself by undermining its own point—this is the paradox of perspectivism. Though this problem is identified by Nietzsche, it is not clearly tackled or given an explicit solution: "Supposing that this also is only interpretation—and you will be eager enough to make this objection—well, so much the better."27

TWO MAJOR WAYS OF DEFENDING PERSPECTIVISM

Since the paradox of perspectivism is not explicitly addressed and defended by

Nietzsche himself, there have been an onslaught of thinkers that have tried to defend perspectivism. While it is clear to most thinkers that Nietzsche wants to reject the dichotomy of the "real" and the "apparent", it is unclear how to reconcile the rejection of the dichotomy while grounding Nietzsche's theory in some kind of "truth" as this has traditionally been the goal of philosophy. How do we maintain that Nietzsche is saying something meaningful and "true" about the world, in order to avoid relativism, while also rejecting the dichotomy of a world as it appears to humans versus how it actually is outside of human perspectivism? If we can successfully answer this as philosophers we are then able to embrace Nietzsche in the philosophical canon and save him from the

27 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, §22. 26

hostile criticism he has faced historically. There are two major ways Nietzschean scholars have dealt with the paradox of perspectivism. The first way takes insight from some of Nietzsche's passages, such as:

But they [new philosophers] will certainly not be dogmatists. It

must offend their pride, also their taste, if their truth is supposed

to be a truth for everyman—which has so far been the secret wish

and hidden meaning of all dogmatic aspirations. 'My judgement is

my judgment': no one else is easily entitled to it—that is what

such a philosopher of the future may perhaps say of himself.28

This method belongs, particularly, to the deconstructionists, though many Nietzschean scholars seem to think Nietzsche is giving in to the paradox of perspectivism by claiming that he is just offering a personal interpretation when discussing his perspectivism. In other words, Nietzsche himself believes that his perspectivism is his perspective and should not be taken any more seriously than any other epistemic or metaphysical theory. In fact, listening to him and taking his beliefs or perspective as true is exactly what an old philosopher would want and not what a new philosopher (and Nietzsche) would want or do. Instead, one should go out and create his or her own interpretation

28 Tbid., §43. 27

and values because that is what a new philosopher would do.29 In one sense, this response to the paradox of perspectivism embraces the problem in a way. This take does not necessarily equate perspectivism with relativism, though it leaves it open to taking on the form of relativism and has no qualms about it, i.e., interpreting Nietzsche as being comfortable with this paradox whether it is relativism or not. In other words, this interpretation does not recognize the paradox of perspectivism as a problem, but instead it takes the paradox of perspectivism to be pointing out something about the nature of metaphysics, our understanding of metaphysics, and truth. It also serves as a commentary on our language; namely, that even though we talk about truth, we are unable to attain it and our language is inept at describing reality in a meaningful way.

Though this interpretation can be seen as a solution to the paradox of perspectivism, it nonetheless reduces perspectivism to relativism by making it no better than any other epistemic or metaphysical theory. From Nietzsche's writing, however, it does not seem that he is willing to accept the view that all perspectives are equal.

Following the previous passage, Nietzsche brings to light that he does not simply think all perspectives are equal:

29 Ken Gemes, Nietzsche's Critique o/Truth, in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research vol. 52 (1992) p 47 - 65; Lawrence Hinman, Nietzsche, Metaphor, and Truth, in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research vol. 43, (1982) p. 179-199; George Stack, Nietzsche and Perspectival Interpretation, in Philosophy Today vol. 25 (1981) p. 221-241; all were charitable if not on board with this idea. 28

One must shed the bad taste of wanting to agree with many.

"Good" is no longer good when one's neighbor mouths it. And

how should there be a "common good"! The term contradicts

itself: whatever can be common always has little value. In the end

it must be as it is and always has been: great things remain for the

great, abysses for the profound, nuances and shudders for the

refined, and, in brief, all that is rare for the rare.30

The above passage seems to imply just the opposite of the first solution to the paradox of perspectivism. This is not the only passage either where Nietzsche seems to suggest there is a hierarchy among differing perspectives or "judgments". From this passage, it is suggested that though truth is perspectival and everyone has his or her own perspective, Nietzsche seems to believe some perspectives are "greater" than other perspectives. How can we make sense of some perspectives being better than others?

By what standard do we measure the level of greatness among various perspectives? On pragmatic terms? Coherent terms? This leads me to the second solution typically offered to the paradox in Nietzsche's perspectivism.

30 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, §43. 29

HIERARCHY AMONG PERSPECTIVES - LEITER

The other angle traditionally taken by philosophers attempting to defend

Nietzsche from the paradox of perspectivism, and most relevant to this paper, is to suggest that Nietzsche is offering at least some kind of hierarchy among perspectives.

Thus, not every claim made is merely a perspective and self-defeating but, instead, some perspectives are, in some sense, "truer" than others and, as a result, better than others. Brian Leiter, for example, interprets perspectivism as a claim that all knowledge is perspectival. By perspectival he means anything we come to know is always known from a particular view point that is preconditioned due to particular interests and needs.

Because of this, the more perspectives we have on any given piece of knowledge the more we come to understand that piece of knowledge, i.e., the more of the picture is revealed. However, the number of perspectives is inexhaustible. There are infinite combinations of particular interests and needs to take into account. With so many combinations of interests and needs, factors arise in which our particular interests and needs can actually distort our knowledge for the worse.31 To understand this account, imagine the visual example of looking at a picture. Let's imagine five people looking at a painting for thirty seconds. At the end of the thirty seconds they are told to recreate the painting. Each person has different tastes, interests, and perspectives and, thus,

31 Leiter, Perspectivism in Nietzsche's Genealogy of Morals, p. 345,346 30

different aspects of the painting may stand out to each of the five individuals. No one will argue that having five perspectives instead of one will most likely reproduce a more accurate picture. However, one of the participants is in need of eyeglasses and is standing a bit too far away. Thus, by participating in the reproduction of the painting his perspective can do more to distort than complete the knowledge of the painting. Leiter goes to point out other ways Nietzsche implicitly suggests not all perspectives are merely the same. For example, Nietzsche's criticism and rejection of the dichotomy presented with Kant's concept of the "thing-in-itself suggests Nietzsche favors the

"apparent" over the "real". Nietzsche's attack on and the values represented in Christianity imply that he favors values that maximize an individual's will to power instead of repress it. According to Leiter, what Nietzsche is really saying is that access to knowledge is not impossible; but rather unfiltered, unmediated access to knowledge is impossible.32 This is what Nietzsche finds dishonest about "old philosophers": their belief that unfiltered, unmediated access to knowledge is possible.

Leiter furthers his points by examining Nietzsche's famous visual example in section 12 in the third essay in Genealogy of Morals. Leiter points to Nietzsche's claim that we are, at least at times, self-aware of some of the distortions in our perspectives. To continue the visual analogy of the painting from earlier, the individual with the poor eyesight who was standing farthest away is able to realize his poor eyesight and need for eyeglasses.

32 Tbid., p. 340-342 31

Perhaps the participant realizes he forgot his eyeglasses and knows his vision is blurry, and thus he knows his perspective is going to distort the reproduction of the painting:

...to want to see differently, is no small discipline and preparation

of the intellect for its future "objectivity"—the latter understood

not as "contemplation without interest" (which is nonsensical

absurdity), but as the ability to control one's Pro and Con and to

dispose of them, so that one knows how to employ a variety of

perspectives and affective interpretations in the service of

knowledge.33

Under Letter's interpretation, Nietzsche is attacking the idea that "objective truth"— that is, unfiltered knowledge of reality—is knowable; however, not all interpretations must be distorted. Furthermore, we have at least some degree of awareness when our perspective is distorted as we are able to "control one's Pro and Con and to dispose of them". According to Leiter, this suggests Nietzsche believes there are some perspectives that are more subject to distortion than others. The perspectives subject to distortion are hierarchically inferior to those without distortion.34 However, it is important to distinguish the difference between an undistorted perspective and an objective perspective. They are absolutely not the same. To Nietzsche, all perspectives are filtered

33 Nietzsche, Geneaology of Morals, III; §12. 34 Leiter, Perspectivism in Nietzsche's Genealogy of Morals, p. 345 32

and interpreted, making an objective perspective impossible. However, not all perspectives are distorted just because they are filtered or interpreted. Again, to continue the visual analogy of the painting from earlier, the perspective of the person who was farthest away from the painting is inferior to the other perspectives, even though that person's perspective may still be able to contribute to the overall reproduction of the painting. A question that arises is how do we know if the hierarchy of perspectives is ranked correctly? What does that make of Leiter's interpretation? If the hierarchy of perspectives happens to be ranked incorrectly, it holds nothing against

Leiter's overall interpretation as other perspectives (less distorted ones perhaps) can come in and suggest better methods of ranking.35 In other words, someone cannot argue that if the perspectives are ranked inaccurately then there really is no hierarchy, and thus Leiter is wrong. Rather, Leiter is saying that if the hierarchy is wrong it does not weaken his argument because how the hierarchy is ranked is not the key point in his interpretation. Leiter's key point is that a hierarchy among the plurality of perspectives exists in the first place. Just because we may rank them incorrectly at one point in time, it just means our perspectivism on ranking perspectives itself was distorted and there can always be some less distorted way of ranking the perspectives. Though Leiter interprets Nietzsche's perspectivism as containing a plurality in that there are multiple perspectives which equally enlighten a piece of knowledge, it is not relativism because

35 Leiter, Perspectivism in Nietzsche's Genealogy of Morals, p. 346,347 33

all perspectives are subject to distortions caused by the limitations of our senses or knowledge-acquiring tools (i.e., reason, logic, senses). Because of these distortions, perspectives fall in a hierarchy where some perspectives are better than others by being less distorted. Leiter claims that the plurality of perspectives makes our understanding of the world better even if the understanding can never be objectively complete.36

Therefore, in the sense that our understanding of the world is better through multiple perspectives, it still gives us a standard by which to measure perspectives in a way that a relativistic interpretation of perspectivism does not. This allows Letter's Nietzsche to maintain his perspectivism and all its plurality while avoiding the paradox of perspectivism—and in particular the reduction to relativism.

HIERARCHY AMONG PERSPECTIVES - ANDERSON

Like Leiter, Anderson also interprets perspectivism as a rejection of metaphysical realism, i.e., the view that there exists an objective reality completely independent of our and conceptual schemes. Anderson's interpretation of Nietzsche's perspectivism also embraces pluralism but avoids reducing it to relativism by providing a hierarchy among the perspectives like Leiter. Anderson sees Nietzsche as pointing out the limitations of our human perspectives when it comes to acquiring knowledge. Like

36 Tbid., p. 345 34

Leiter, Anderson claims the world, as it appears to each individual, is affected by the visual perspectives we each have. However, Anderson goes a step further and claims that, similarly, each piece of knowledge we acquire about the world is affected by the cognitive perspective we each have.37 These cognitive perspectives are more than the knowledge-acquiring tools Leiter ascribes to knowledge (senses, reason, logic). To

Anderson, our perceptions can be distorted by sensory limitations as well as by cognitive limitations because we do not have a "background of nonperspectival knowledge".38 While Anderson does not provide much in the way of what can judge or qualify these cognitive perspectives as being more or less true from one another in the way that visual perspectives can be judged as Leiter does with non-distorted views versus distorted views, Anderson does argue that Nietzsche would claim these cognitive perspectives do not justify the existence of "things-in-themselves". In other words, our perspective of a reality does not entail that reality exists in the way we perceive it or at all. Thus, our cognitive perspectives are simply evidence for our beliefs and not evidence for objective "knowledge". Furthermore, Anderson claims that Nietzsche denies our ability to understand a way to rank perspectives for such an ability would require

"knowledge unlimited by perspective".39 Therefore, for Anderson, the only guide we have to rank perspectives is to measure them relative to one another by means of

37 Anderson, Truth and Objectivity in Perspectivism, p. 2 ^Tbid., p. 6 39 Anderson, Truth and Objectivity in Perspectivism, p. 5 35

coherence.40 Without the ability to check our perspectives against some objective

reality, or "background of nonperspectival knowledge" as Anderson calls it, we may be

wrong about the totality of our beliefs. Because we are unable to measure the validity

of perspectives and thus are unable to measure the validity of perspectivism as a claim

corresponding to the actual state of the world, perspectivism is internally unstable.41

However, Anderson claims Nietzsche's perspectivism can be saved from being

considered internally unstable with a coherence theory of truth. Anderson ascribes a

coherence theory that a perspective moves up on the hierarchy of perspectives based

on the amount of coherence a perspective has among a broader class of perspectives.42

This approach allows Anderson to both defend Nietzsche by providing a hierarchy to the

plurality of perspectives and also deny the belief in the "thing-in-itself" as a coherent

perspective because it is incompatible with the view that our cognitive perspectives,

due to their limitations, are simply evidence for our beliefs but not evidence for

knowledge 43 Furthermore, Anderson refers to Nietzsche's '" in

Twilight of the Idols to argue that because causality is unknowable to us outside of our

subjective experience (i.e., we only have evidence that things appear to be caused, not

40 Tbid., p. 6 41 Tbid., p. 7-8 42 Tbid., p. 21 43 Tbid., p. 11 36

that they are) and we cannot experience "things-in-themselves", it is incoherent to claim things-in-themselves as causes for our knowledge:

Perspectivism offers such a reason [why perspectivism is a better

interpretation of our cognitive practices than realism or Kantian

transcendental idealism] by arguing that a concept crucial to both

alternative views, the concept of a thing in itself, is incoherent.44

Anderson's Nietzsche provides an effective argument against realists, like Kant, who see internal coherence as a requirement for any good epistemic theory. Anderson does so all the while maintaining Nietzsche's rejection of the dichotomy between "the real" and

"the apparent" and preventing his perspectivism from being reduced to relativism by providing a hierarchy among perspectives based on one's internal coherence with other perspectives. This coherence serves as a criterion that justifies perspectivism over other epistemic theories as well because it goes to show that perspectivism is the most internally coherent epistemic theory. Thus, it makes perspectivism the best and highest ranked theory. Again, according to Anderson's account, Nietzsche's perspectivism is the best theory not because it is the most "true" as it corresponds to the "actual" state of the world, but because it is the most internally coherent theory by allowing beliefs

44 Anderson, Truth and Objectivity in Perspectivism, p. 10 37

about things to be considered true without requiring unperceivable and impossible knowledge of these things to justify them as true.

HIERARCHY AMONG PERSPECTIVES - HALES & WELSHON

Hales and Welshon have a radically different approach to defending perspectivism from being reduced to relativism. According to Hales and Welshon, they see Nietzsche's perspectivism as more than just an epistemic theory but as a consistent theme throughout Nietzsche's thoughts on truth, metaphysics, , , and pretty much all major philosophical subcategories. What Hales and Welshon mean by this is that Nietzsche's perspectivism permeates throughout his whole philosophy as a connecting theme. That is, Nietzsche's perspectivism is at the foundation of all his philosophical thought. They take Nietzsche's perspectivism as a rejection of "absolute truths" and the "real" while embracing ontological anti-realism and further claim that these both go hand in hand. Truth, as considered by what Nietzsche would call old philosophers, is something that Hales and Welshon call "extra-perspectival". That is, imagine a perspective outside of the limitations of perspective. Such a perspective does not exist; thus, such extra-perspectival truths either do not exist or are impossible to know. 38

WP 481, for example, declares that "facts is precisely what there

is not, only interpretations. We cannot establish any fact "in

itself:" perhaps it is folly to want to do such a thing." Passages

such as this one are best understood not as denying that there are

absolute truths, statements that denizens of any human

perspective must accept in order to live, but as denying that there

are facts or truths outside the structure of perspectives.45

However, this does not make our perspectival "knowledge" completely trivial. We are able to use some of the information we acquire from our perspectives in a meaningful way as they have a truth status within the structure of perspectives, according to Hales and Welshon. Hales and Welshon argue that Nietzsche promotes a view of the world as always changing, unknowable, and unstable—a Heraclitean view. Our perspectives, then, conceptually organize this Heraclitean chaos into a rational order that we can better understand in order to suit our purposes.46 For Hales and Welshon, this conceptual organization is the "distortion" our human perspective creates. Insofar that this "distortion", or it might be better called "organization", allows us to experience and understand the world then our perspectives can maintain a "truth" status though not in

45 Steven D. Hales., Rex Welshon, Nietzsche's Perspectivism, (Urbana: University of Illinois Press) p. 115 46 Hales, Recent Work on Nietzsche, p. 320 39

a classical, extra-perspectival sense but within the confines of our conceptual reality only. Nietzsche states:

To the Realist.—... you call yourselves realists and hint that the

world really is the way it appears to you. As if reality stood

unveiled before you only, and you yourselves were perhaps the

best part of it... But in your unveiled state are not even you still

very passionate and dark creatures compared to fish, and still far

too similar to an artist in love?... Your love of "reality"... Every

feeling and sensation contains a piece of this old love; and some

fantasy, some prejudice, some unreason, some ignorance, some

fear, and ever so much else has contributed to it and worked on

it... What is "real" in that? Subtract the phantasm and every

human contribution from it, my sober friends! If you con! If you

can forget your descent, your past, your training—all of your

humanity and animality. There is no "reality" for us—not for you

either, my sober friends... perhaps our good will to transcend

intoxication is as respectable as your faith that you are altogether

incapable of intoxication.47

47 Friedrich Nietzsche, , trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage Age Books, 1974) §58. 40

Because we are humans our perspective interprets things in a way that suits our needs.

Other species may render such things as completely different to better fit their conception of reality and needs. For example, take my dog. She knows absolutely nothing about the laptop I am holding in my hands. For most humans they can recognize a laptop from a good distance away and immediately have a conception of the laptop's purposes and how it fits a human's needs. If you're in Starbucks and you see a young man or woman come in, take a seat and start typing away on a laptop you may presume they're a student or young employee getting work done, typing papers, letters, emails, etc. Because the conceptual reality of my dog does not extend that far, when she's at

Starbucks next to me and sees someone sit down with a laptop she does not understand anything we can presume about that person. A laptop is no different than a book or a tablet or a piece of wood on my lap that is impeding my hand from landing on my dog's back and rubbing her. That is, Hales and Welshon's Nietzsche does not claim that there is no "thing in itself', but rather that it is absolutely unknowable to us, e.g., the "thing in itself' is to us what the "laptop" is to my dog:

For example, it [their interpretation of Nietzsche] leads to a

perspectival assessment of causation. This causal perspectivism

underwrites the rejection of claims made by scientists and certain

metaphysicians that they have discovered the laws of the

universe that are universally binding, and it replaces such claims 41

with the claim that causality is a kind of interpretation or

perspective taken by one sector of the world on another.48

In other words, Hales and Welshon save Nietzsche's perspectivism from relativism by regarding perspectivism as a theory of knowledge in which there is an objective reality; however, any information of it is impaired by our perspectival limitations and thus only the object's suited conceptual purpose for our species is what we can come to experience and "know". This creates a sort of bundle theory of objects for Nietzsche, in which there are no knowable absolute facts but their "truth" value is a function of the perspective taken on these things' bundles of properties49 (i.e., a laptop takes on different properties for human beings than it does for a dog). This allows Nietzsche's perspectivism to be grounded in some kind of criteria by which to measure

"perspectives" against one another without it falling into a realist account of the external world and "things in themselves". Hales and Welshon's interpretation avoids relativism by providing grounds for various perspectives to be measured while maintaining the rejection of absolute truth and the Heraclitean world view—at least as a knowable requirement to speak about things as true or not.

48 Hales., Welshon, Nietzsche's Perspectivism, p. 319 49 Hales, Recent Work on Nietzsche, p. 320 42

MY INTERPRETATION OF PERSPECTIVISM:

Like Hales and Welshon, I also see Nietzsche's perspectivism to be a foundational idea and theme in his philosophy across the board. However, I go a step further. Unlike

Hales and Welshon, I do not try to cash out Nietzsche's perspectivism as saying that we interpret things based on what is most suitable for our needs and that insofar as these perspectives are suitable they hold some kind of "truth" status even if the perspectives are not objectively or classically "true" (in the old philosopher sense of the word). While there are things interpreted in order to facilitate and aid our needs as human beings, this mustn't always be the case. In any event, how could we know what is suitable and in what sense? Nietzsche's Heraclitean view of the world is one in which the world is always in a state of "becoming"—to borrow from Plato. This means that the world is always in process, unstable, changing, and there is no criteria with which to measure the

"truth value" of perspectives against one another because there are no unchanging objects of knowledge.50 Even within our own perspectives, which according to Hales and

Welshon present the world as unchanging, orderly, and stable, there are constant changes: something we consider life-saving one day may be life-threatening the next.

While Nietzsche explicitly states the new philosopher is able to go from perspective to perspective experimenting with whatever he or she pleases, this is not in the same

50 Nietzsche, in fact, does provide a criterion for measuring perspectives against one another and that is a commitment to life and life-affirming values. I explain this in much more detail alter on as it is a crucial point of Nietzsche’s philosophy and my argument. 43

sense that Hales and Welshon are arguing. Hales and Welshon are limiting the experimenting to what is needed or most suitable for our conceptual reality. Hales and

Welshon also maintain the possibility that Nietzsche believes there is some kind of reality outside of the human perspective except that such a reality remains unknowable.

Though I agree that it is unclear in Nietzsche's writing whether he believes that there is an unknowable objective reality to us or that there is no objective reality whatsoever, I believe Nietzsche means to go further than simply stating such a reality is unknowable. I claim that Nietzsche means believing in an objective reality, whether it actually exists or not, is harmful to the human species because it is out of our reach.

What I mean is that by believing in the dichotomy that the world "appears" to us completely different from what the "true" state of the world actually is we are saying that the only meaningful experience is one that experiences the world as it "really is", i.e., outside of human perception and interpretation. Because we can never experience the world outside of human perception, then we can never experience the world in a meaningful way. This means we can never come to have "truth", which is of the highest value for the old philosopher, and it effectively renders our subjective experiences as worthless. In other words, if experiencing the "thing in itself', as Kant would put it, is of the highest value and we can never come to experience the "thing in itself' do to our human nature but we can only experience the disguise in which the "thing in itself' appears to us as, then what does that say about the value of our experience—and, 44

ultimately, what does it say about ourselves? This view of the world as a stable, unchanging thing that we must come to know and figure out only by denying ourselves of our natural instincts, senses, and perceptions as if we are constantly deceiving ourselves is life-denying to Nietzsche. Thinking in this way is denying our own humanity and nature and this is a great harm.

Leiter and Anderson both attribute a kind of hierarchy to Nietzsche's perspectivism in order to make sense of it as an epistemic theory that does not reduce to relativism. Leiter establishes a hierarchy among perspectives by appealing to a visual knowledge analogy. He claims we can rank some perspectives higher than others on the basis that we have the ability to recognize when our interpretation of perceptions are distorted. Distorted perceptions are less valuable than undistorted perceptions, no matter the filtration and interpretive forces of the mind. Anderson establishes a hierarchy among perspectives by introducing a kind of coherence theory to each perspective. The more coherent a perspective is with other broader perspectives and interpretations, the higher it should be ranked among the hierarchy and the better the perspective is. Both keep the plurality of perspectives Nietzsche seems to want while preventing this plurality to be reduced to relativism by means of rank. While this is certainly compelling and I agree that Nietzsche also believes some perspectives are better than others, the qualifications to rank a perspective higher than others do not rely on how distorted or coherent the various perspectives are. Such a move 45

desperately tries to label Nietzsche's perspectivism as a kind of epistemic theory which then allows it to be placed in the philosophical canon among the likes of Kant,

Descartes, Hume, Plato, etc. In Nietzsche's words, this would make him an old philosopher. I claim that Nietzsche considers himself, in the very least, a free spirit if not a new philosopher.51 With that being said, I do not believe Nietzsche would appreciate being put in the philosophical canon among the likes of philosophers he very explicitly considers "old philosophers" and when he states that what the world needs are "new philosophers".

I argue the purpose of Nietzsche's perspectivism is as important as his notion of will to power. It is the basis from which new philosophers can come forth and help bring meaning into the human life. Nietzsche's intended purpose and use of perspectivism is different from the traditional interpretation that it is an epistemic theory or ontology.

Nietzsche's perspectivism is not trying to explain how we know things or what we can know or what is real or not. Instead, I take Nietzsche's perspectivism to be a model for the way we can live as life-affirming creatures in what he considers a world void of

51 Nietzsche's free spirit is a transitional figure between the old philosopher and a new philosopher: a stage in which one is able to recognize that there are prejudices that shape our thoughts prevalent not only in old philosophers but in everyone alike. This recognition is absent in the old philosophers and is what makes them dogmatic. Free spirits are individuals who understand that notions of absolute truth are misconceptions derived from one’s prejudices and their will to power. Because of this understanding, the free spirit refuses to commit to any notion of truth. Instead, they are experimenters with ideas; individuals who see the so called "absolute truths" of old philosophers simply as different perspectives or theories which they can momentarily adopt to see the world and play with. The free spirit is a perspectivist. See Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, Part Two: The Free Spirit § 24-44 46

meaning—in the abyss. It is not a metaphysical claim, epistemic claim, or ontological claim, and it is not based on ethics. Nietzsche does not try to establish an epistemic or metaphysical theory with his perspectivism. On the contrary, Nietzsche is trying to break down and rid our thoughts of previous epistemic and metaphysical theories through his perspectivism. What I mean by this is that Nietzsche's perspectivism denies the dichotomy between "the real" and "the apparent". Nietzsche denies that there are two realms, one that exists independent of the senses and the one that exists as it appears to human beings. The dichotomy between the "real" and "apparent" further states, as

Kant claimed, that there is a distinction between how things appear to us and how things actually are. According to Kant, this realm of how things actually are is unknowable to us but this is the realm where things in themselves belong. Both of these are metaphysical claims about what is real and epistemic claims about what we know and how we know. Nietzsche's perspectivism is an attempt to point out a flaw in this kind of thinking. That is, if we cannot know anything about the "thing in itself' why do we assume it must exist? Furthermore, why does it exist as a realm that contains knowledge more valuable than the "knowledge" from the realm we can perceive?

Nietzsche thinks this line of thinking is a huge error. Positing the existence of a realm where there exists pure knowledge that goes through no interpretive forces is impossible to understand and thus completely fictional: 47

Henceforth, my dear philosophers, let us be on guard against the

dangerous old conceptual fiction that posited a "pure, will-less,

painless, timeless knowing subject"; let us be on guard against the

snares of such contradictory concepts as 'pure reason/ 'absolute

spirituality,' 'knowledge in itself: these always demand that we

should think of an eye that is completely unthinkable, an eye

turned in no particular direction, in which the active and

interpreting forces, through which alone seeing becomes seeing

something, are supposed to be lacking; these always demand of

the eye an absurdity and a nonsense.52

Philosophers, such as Kant, who claim to understand such things are just lying as they would need to have "an eye turned in no particular direction". That is, for "knowledge in itself" to be attainable philosophers would need a perspective that has no interest, bias, or interpretive force. Furthermore, in of being a human being, such an ability or posture would be impossible and self-deceiving. Most importantly to Nietzsche's ultimate point, the conceivability of "knowledge" or "truth", in the classical sense, does nothing but "eliminate the will altogether, to suspend each and every affect, supposing we were capable of this—what would that mean but to castrate the intellect?"53 The

52 Nietzsche, Geneaology of Morals, III; §12. 53 Tbid., Ill; §12. 48

idea here is that if real "knowledge" is knowledge of "things in themselves" and it is impossible for us, as human beings, to have any knowledge of "things in themselves", then we are eliminating the possibility of having knowledge about anything in any meaningful way for human beings. This renders the knowledge we can have (knowledge of the "apparent", i.e., the way things appear to us) as useless and fictional in comparison to knowledge of the "real" (i.e., "things in themselves"), and thus, meaningless.

This is a huge problem for Nietzsche as we want to preserve knowledge for humanity because attaining knowledge has become a part of our will to power— however, this is not knowledge in the classical sense but rather more like judgments or values before being mistakenly seen as "knowledge" or "truth". Textual evidence for this view is indicated in a passage I consider very important on multiple levels:

Origin of knowledge.— Over immense periods of time the

intellect produced nothing but errors. A few of these proved to be

useful and helped to preserve the species: those who hit upon or

inherited these had better luck in their struggle for themselves

and their progeny... until they [the errors] became almost part of

the basic endowment of the species, including the following: that

there are enduring things; that there are equal things; that there 49

are things, substances, bodies; that a thing is what it appears to

be; that our will is free; that what is good for me is also good in

itself... Gradually, the human brain became full of such judgments

and convictions, and a ferment, struggle, and lust for power

developed in this tangle... eventually knowledge and the striving

for the truth found their place as a need among other needs...

Thus knowledge became a piece of life itself, and hence a

conditionally growing power... A thinker is now that being in

whom the impulse for truth and those life-preserving errors clash

for their first fight, after the impulse for truth has proved to be

also a life-preserving power.54

From this passage alone we can see the story unfold of how judgments became something important to us, even if it leads us to errors such as believing there are such things as stable, permanent facts or knowledge. There are two key points to gather from this story. First, and most importantly, is the idea that Nietzsche not only is aware of our instinctual desire to seek understanding and "knowledge" of our surroundings but also accepts it as a part of our will to power. Seeking "knowledge" is another way for us to exert our life force.55 Nietzsche is clear that the new philosopher, however, has no need

54 Nietzsche, The Gay Science, III; §110. 55 See Nietzsche, The Gay Science, I; §13, §14: "The things people call love—...Our love of our neighbor—is it not lust for new possessions? And likewise our love of knowledge, of truth, and altogether any lust for 50

for the illusion of "knowledge"—knowledge here being used as a stable, unchanging claim about the world. By claiming we have "truth" we fulfill our desire for power in that we now have a possession of something we have conquered or figured out. This fulfills our will to power in that it is a creation of power and thus provides meaning to our actions. The dichotomy of the real and the apparent is what turns the creation of new values and our expressions of power into a powerless act because it renders the individual's perspective useless by positing a fixed, external world that is only accessible to us by denying everything that makes us human and strong—our ability to create values, our will to power. Perspective is rendered useless for acquiring "knowledge" because the "knowledge" acquired through perspective is always filtered and interpreted (i.e., we do not have direct access to the actual "thing in itself') and deemed as less valuable under the dichotomy. Simply put, if one believes in the dichotomy one must also believe that "knowledge", in the old philosopher sense of the word, is impossible to have and this belief turns the individual's perspective into a meaningless fiction—i.e., everything perceived is interpreted and thus, skewed. Therefore, we must reject the dichotomy and metaphysical realism because we need to preserve our perspective as valuable.

what is new?" In Section 123 of Book III in The Gay Science he refers to knowledge as a new passion. In other parts he also refers to us as being meaning seeking creatures. 51

The second point to gather from the passage above is the misinterpretation that

Nietzsche's perspectivism could be regarded as relativism. As I just stated, if one believes in the dichotomy of the real and the apparent one must also believe that knowledge is impossible to acquire, rendering the individual's perspective into a meaningless fiction. It is precisely the belief in this dichotomy that turns perspectivism into relativism. In other words, trying to understand Nietzsche's perspectivism as an epistemic theory that is trying to establish "truth" and "knowledge", like all epistemic theories in the philosophical canon, is what causes perspectivism to be misinterpreted as relativism. A relativist interpretation of Nietzsche's perspectivism claims that

Nietzsche is simply saying that because there is no truth, all perspectives are equally valuable. Or it claims that Nietzsche is saying that there is truth but we simply cannot attain it, so instead we can only have perspectives. This is precisely what Nietzsche does not want to do. He does not want to render all perspectives as equal because it undermines the will to power, the life force and drive in every individual trying to exert his or her power and fulfill him or herself. A relativist interpretation of Nietzsche denies the individual the opportunity of exerting his or her power through the creation of values because all human values are rendered worthless in comparison to the "truth".

Furthermore, a relativist interpretation is still interpreting perspectivism as a theory that is interested in saying something objective, universally true about the state of the world. 52

Perspectivism is not interested in saying anything objective or establishing any "truth", instead, it is interested in encouraging and cultivating our will to power.

POSSIBLE CONTRADICTION?

On the surface my interpretation can sound like Nietzsche is contradicting himself. One could say under this kind of interpretation Nietzsche is saying knowledge is a good thing, even after going through great lengths to slander old philosophers like

Kant for desperately trying to acquire knowledge. It very clearly seems like Nietzsche is hostile towards the concepts of knowledge and truth, calling them erroneous byproducts of our language and personal psychology that skews what we call truth.

Moreover, Nietzsche goes to great lengths to disprove our ability of attaining knowledge: all things are perspective and they are filtered through interpretive forces and personal biases. In other words, if this interpretation is correct, why can't we say

Kant and any of the old philosophers are simply trying to exert their will to power, their life force in seeking knowledge (like it seems humans instinctually now do) and express their theories? Nietzsche should be for the fulfillment of the will to power so why does

Nietzsche slander them and says their desire for truth is wrong if they are indeed fulfilling their will to power? In other words, why can't we then accept the traditional metaphysical and epistemic theories as an expression of the life force (i.e., will to 53

power) of whichever old philosopher? To understand this potential pitfall I need to say a little bit more about the will to power and the new philosopher.

PERSPECTIVISM AS WILL TO POWER

Nietzsche's new philosopher is a perspectivist who recognizes we cannot attain absolute truth because it is a fictional concept created by our language and its inherent dualism. The new philosopher understands there is nothing more than perspectives.

While this may sound like perspectivism is an epistemic theory, it goes much deeper than that. In virtue of being a living creature, we have a will and the highest drive in all living creatures is the will to power: "a living thing desires above all to vent its strength—life as such will to power.."56 What I mean by this is the will to power is the highest desire for every creature, the exertion of its power and life force over its surroundings: "Every animal... instinctively strives for an optimum of favorable conditions under which it can expend all its strength and achieve its maximal feeling of power."57 The will to power encompasses our basic drives and instinct, and its essence is to assert itself and show that it has power. Why power? Because only by being powerful can one go about the world and act instead of react. That is, the will to power

56 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, §13 57 Nietzsche, Genealogy of Morals, III, §7 54

is always some form of self-overcoming and the assertion of life for its own sake, unaffected by others. However, it is important to understand that by power Nietzsche does not mean something like political power or the power of a boss to fire an employee. The will to power does not strive to exert itself over others in a way that causes others pain or makes them feel inferior, though it may result in others feeling pain or inferior at times. The will to power could be any successful overcoming of an obstacle or hurdle towards achieving—in particular, something creative within oneself.

Nietzsche finds oppressive power, force, and hurting others as not only a sign of weakness and a lack of power but as complete impotence: "Certainly the state in which we hurt others is rarely as agreeable, in an unadulterated way, as that in which we benefit others; it is a sign that we are still lacking power, or it shows a sense of frustration in the face of this poverty."58 In other words, if one exerts one's will to power, one feels powerful and will be strong. The strong never have to assert themselves against others because they are not bothered by others. The strong are able to walk away from what cannot be changed or overcome without feeling any less or bothered. To Nietzsche, the highest expression of will to power is through creation—art, ideas, and, most importantly, new values. This is a key component in understanding

Nietzsche's will to power: values that hurt, oppress, or deny people the possibility of

58 Nietzsche, The Gay Science, §13 55

creating for themselves are weak expressions of will to power and show insecurity.

Thus, perspectives that express the values to hurt, oppress, and deny people the possibility of creating are life-denying expressions of the will to power. This is precisely how Nietzsche is able to slander other perspectives, in particular perspectives held by old philosophers such as the dichotomy of the "apparent" versus the "real", Christian values, etc. "Knowledge" is really just creation and insofar that it is creation it is an act of power. Why then does Nietzsche slander other epistemic theories if their creation is an act of power? Old philosophers mistakenly label their acts of powers as "knowledge" and by doing so they posit their creations as universal truths that they can rely on and feel reassurance with. As soon as their creation is seen as some stable, external discovery or "fact" about the world, they are denying themselves of their authorship and giving it away to some fictional stable world because it makes them feel better.

They are lying to themselves because they are unable to embrace the life of the abyss— an unstable, always changing world of "becoming". Positing these values they have created as universal "truths" is not only a mark of weakness as it shows their inability to live without the reassurance of stable, universal "truths", but it also denies the human perspective from being considered valuable, and thus is life-denying instead of life- affirming. I believe the crux in the will to power is that it is our life force, and thus it is life-affirming. By fulfilling our will to power we are embracing life, embracing our instincts, senses, powers of creation, which is ultimately all we have, and most 56

importantly, encourages being alive, feeling alive unlike the ascetic who starves himself, beats himself, constantly denying his own flesh under the mistaken notion that his body and material existence is preventing him from greater things. Metaphysical and epistemic theories such as Kant's that posit a real world that is more valuable than the world we do understand and experience are then life-denying, not life-affirming. Though it is a perspective and insofar that it is a perspective it aids us to hear it and experiment with it, such perspectives are inferior to life-affirming perspectives that do not deny our experiences and perspectives because they fulfill our will to power.

My interpretation saves Nietzsche from relativism on two accounts. First, it shows that his perspectivism can only be mistaken as relativism when you try to make sense of it as an epistemic theory in the traditional sense—that is, to interpret it as such that he is claiming we do not have access to a "real" world and all we have are perspectives which we can rank no matter the fashion of ranking. Second, it shows that perspectivism cannot be reduced to relativism because the qualification for some perspectives being better than others is based on the degree of how life-affirming a perspective is. Does it oppress? Does it deny? Does it force itself on others and seek followers? In other words, what life-affirming values does it promote? Furthermore, perspectivism as a life theory is the only way to understand and cultivate our will to power because perspectivism allows us to create our own values by which to live life and provide meaning into our lives. And this is what I argue is Nietzsche's main concern. 57

He cares about living a life full of meaning or perhaps we can call it a life worth living.

And only through perspectivism can we care more about living than we do about truth.

Only by caring more about living, or holding living as the highest value (as opposed to truth), can we be life-affirming creatures. Embracing perspectivism is the way to do this.

In summary, perspectivism is the only way to fulfill our life force, not as knowledge seekers but as powerful creators of values making sense of the abyss and injecting meaning into our lives. Perspectivism feeds that will to power, whereas a single theory of absolute truth would "...eliminate the will altogether, to suspend each and every affect, supposing we are capable of this—what would that mean but to castrate the intellect?"59 All along Nietzsche has claimed that reason, our societal structure, and life as it is, represses our will to power, turns it inward by denying itself from expressing itself and denying it of its own value. I take this to be the crux of his perspectivism—not that it is the way to "truth", or "real knowledge", or even any kind of understanding; but rather, perspectivism entices our will to power to fulfill itself by creating and experimenting with different values and, thus, perspectivism is life-affirming. It allows us to create and give meaning to our lives without an old philosopher fooling himself into thinking and saying, "No, x is the truth, not y." It allows us to understand that

59 Nietzsche, Genealogy of Morals, III; §12. 58

"truth" is a product of our language and seeking it is a mark of not being able to handle the meaningless, completely unknowable nature of the world. Nietzsche also wants us all to transcend our humanity and be creators of new values. The only way to do this is to be perspectivists because only by being perspectivists can we let people create their own values in accord with their own will to power without us telling them they're wrong. If we go about telling people they are wrong about their created values we are first, forcing or oppressing our values against theirs, which Nietzsche is strongly opposed to. Second, we are going against the will to power and since the will to power is every thing's life force to go against the will to power is to be anti-life and Nietzsche believes in being life-affirming. 59

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