Carmen Amado Mendes. , and the Negotiations, 1986-1999. Royal Asiatic Society Studies Series. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2013. 1 online resource. $35.00, cloth, ISBN 978-988-8139-00-2.

Reviewed by Zhidong Hao

Published on H-Diplo (January, 2014)

Commissioned by Seth Ofenbach (Bronx Community College, The City University of New York)

Almost ffteen years have passed since the re‐ would say, although hard power is always an im‐ turn of Macau to the People’s Republic of China portant factor in determining the outcome of a re‐ (PRC) and the establishment of the Macau Special lationship, social interaction can often change the Administrative Region (MSAR) in 1999. It is indeed dynamics of that relationship. The two sides ex‐ a good time to assess who won and who lost in the ploited each other’s weaknesses for their own Portugal-China negotiations on Macau, based on benefts, the author notes. Both sides wanted to what happened during the negotiations in 1986 save face: Portugal did not want to repeat the hu‐ and 1987, in the transition period between 1988 miliation it sufered in the process‐ and 1999, but especially in the ffteen years after es in Africa and , and China wanted 1999. Carmen Amado Mendes’s Portugal, China desperately to reunite with Hong Kong, Taiwan, and the Macau Negotiations provides an excellent and Macau so that it could show the world its re‐ starting point. In the book, Mendes presents the vival from 150 years of humiliation in the hands nuances of the “Macau question,” issues on the of Western powers. These former were negotiation table, the strategies of the Portuguese constant reminders of that humiliation. So they and the Chinese negotiators, and an evaluation of treated each other carefully and made necessary those strategies. Considering the scarcity of litera‐ compromises, resulting in what seemed to be a ture on the Sino-Portuguese negotiations, this largely harmonious negotiation process, Mendes book makes a valuable contribution to the feld. states. Mendes argues that Portuguese negotiators Indeed, both governments seemed to have won some important concessions from China, and saved face. They reached a compromise over the that a weaker power, in this case Portugal, can date of retrocession. It was going to be neither sometimes beat a stronger power, in this case Chi‐ what Portugal had wanted, 2007, the 450th an‐ na. This is indeed true. As sociological theories niversary of the Portuguese settlement in Macau, H-Net Reviews nor what China had wanted, 1997, the time Hong the Portuguese and the Chinese. Who wins and Kong was to be returned to China. They settled on who loses in the long run may be even more im‐ 1999. Portugal wanted dual nationality for the portant when assessing the success and failure of Chinese who held Portuguese passports (eighty the Sino-Portuguese negotiations. And it seems thousand altogether, according to Mendes [p. 50]), that both governments won by large margins but but China would not recognize dual nationality. the people in Macau lost to a greater degree. This They settled on China treating Portuguese pass‐ is what I will discuss as a complement to Mendes’s ports held by Chinese citizens as travel docu‐ analysis of both the negotiations on the Sino-Por‐ ments, virtually acknowledging dual nationality, tuguese Joint Declaration and the negotiations in although these Chinese citizens cannot seek con‐ the following twelve-year transition period. sulate protection in China. (Mendes notes that this First, the Joint Declaration said that civil ser‐ was a better deal than what the British got for the vice would be localized, but it did not say how. Chinese in Hong Kong who held British passports: This caused problems for the Joint Liaison Group they would not have the right of entry and abode (JLG), which was entrusted with the task of in the United Kingdom.) These are indeed good smoothing the transition from 1987 to 1999. The examples of successful negotiations. The building Chinese part of the JLG thought it meant that the of an international airport is also an example of “Chinese should occupy 97 percent of middle and success. China lost, however, on the issue of the high-ranking positions in the future administra‐ operation of the Orient Foundation: the MSAR tion,” refecting the composition of the popula‐ government still could not control what was sup‐ tion, while the Portuguese thought that “local staf posed to be public money. promotion should be based upon qualifcation” I am not going to focus on these issues in this (p. 76). To the dissatisfaction of the Chinese, the review. Rather, I am going to discuss the issues Portuguese dragged their feet, made few eforts to that appeared to have been successfully negotiat‐ localize the civil service personnel, and provided ed but turned out to be poorly implemented, both few openings to local Chinese or Macanese (the in the transition period and after 1999, leading to ofspring of Portuguese and Chinese/other Asian what we observe today as less than satisfactory mixed heritages). results. These issues are tied to the localization of As a result, by March 1999, out of 102 under‐ civil services in Macau, the use of the Chinese lan‐ secretary level ofcials, 65 percent had less than guage in government documents, and the localiza‐ two years of leadership experience because they tion of the Macau law. In addition, neither side were only recently promoted.[1] This was already was keen on democratization in Macau. Mendes close to the date of the handover, December 20, brings up these issues as they were discussed at 1999 (see also Mendes, p. 113). In the ffteen years the negotiation table, but her focus is on the tran‐ after the handover, the Macau Chinese and sition period, as the title of her book indicates, Macanese (mostly Chinese) government ofcials and not on the post-1999 era. stumbled in their governance of Macau and made Current problems related to these issues can one mistake after another. Even today, the citizens arguably be viewed as a result of the shortcom‐ in Macau are sufering from the inexperience of ings in the negotiations, which Mendes mentions the civil service personnel. Edmond Ho, the previ‐ but does not elaborate. Both the Portuguese and ous chief executive of Macau, once commented Chinese governments need to bear responsibili‐ that the Macau Chinese were just like children ties. An evaluation of these issues may balance learning to do what adults do.[2] It seems to still what seem to be successful negotiations between be the case today, ffteen years after the handover.

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But this kind of sufering could have been tioners of law have to resort to the original Por‐ shortened if the Portuguese government had tuguese documents to understand the law accu‐ started the localization of civil service earlier and rately. Neither the Portuguese Macau government with more serious eforts or if the Chinese govern‐ before the handover nor the Chinese Macau gov‐ ment had pushed harder. While the Portuguese ernment after the handover was serious enough and Chinese governments maintained a harmo‐ in localizing the . nious relationship and the negotiation was a win- The Portuguese and Chinese negotiators and win, in the end, the Macau citizens lost: they have the JLG could have done a better job in this re‐ lost many years of possibly good governance. This gard. But to maintain a harmonious relationship is, of course, not the only reason for poor gover‐ and to focus on what they believed to be more im‐ nance, as I show below. portant issues, like saving each other’s face, as Second, the Joint Declaration said that other Mendes illustrates, were probably their priorities than Chinese, Portuguese may also be used in the rather than such down-to-earth issues as the use MSAR, as Mendes notes. Although the wording is a of language and the training of civil servants. The bit vague, both languages are recognized as of‐ latter would afect only ordinary people’s lives, cial. Since all ofcial documents were in Por‐ not their lives. Although the Sino-Portuguese ne‐ tuguese, the transition period witnessed an oner‐ gotiations might be viewed as successful, local ous task of translating them into Chinese so that Chinese people did not win in the end. Chinese ofcials, most of who could not read, Third, the same problem emerged with local‐ write, or speak Portuguese, could take over gov‐ ization of the law, which is related to localization ernment afairs. But to translate all of them was a of the Chinese language. Neither the Portuguese mission impossible in the ten-year transition peri‐ nor the Chinese perceived any urgency in localiz‐ od. ing the law. As Mendes points out, the Joint Decla‐ And the Portuguese Macau government was ration stipulates that “the laws, decrees, adminis‐ not in a hurry to do it, either. As Almeida e Costa, trative regulations and other normative acts pre‐ the governor at the time, publicly declared, the viously in force in Macau shall be maintained government was not in a hurry to localize the Chi‐ save for whatever therein may contravene the Ba‐ nese language under emotional infuences.[3] sic Law or subject to any amendment” by the What happened later was that the Portuguese MSAR legislature (p. 81). The Portuguese per‐ Macau government was more keen on promoting ceived this as a reason not to localize the law, be‐ the than on the localization lieving that it would not need to be changed for of the Chinese language because they knew that ffty years after the handover, as mentioned by once the Chinese took over after 1999, even fewer Mendes. This thinking was inherited by the MSAR people would use Portuguese. To preserve Por‐ government, and the consequence is serious. tuguese culture, it was better that they spent more In fact, localization of the law involves not eforts on the latter than the former, although it only the translation of various legal codes, but still turned out to be a failed cause. also the use of the Chinese language and the Chi‐ At any rate, by 1999, many government docu‐ nese legal personnel to handle legal cases in Chi‐ ments were still in Portuguese. Even after the nese (the Portuguese and Macanese usually can‐ handover, many government documents are in not read Chinese). Since over 90 percent of the Chinese but with Portuguese linguistic character‐ population is Chinese, one could probably assume istics. In many cases, the Chinese in legal docu‐ that a similar number of cases would involve Chi‐ ments is beyond understanding, and the practi‐ nese-speaking people. The almost impossible task

3 H-Net Reviews of translating government documents includes le‐ the legal feld. This can partly be seen in Mendes’s gal documents. The Portuguese Macau govern‐ book. As on the two previous issues, it seems that ment did some work in translation, but it was far both governments win by large margins, while from enough. people often lose big. This is apparently deter‐ The new MSAR government did not do any mined by the political structure that the Por‐ better in this regard. Neither did they do much to tuguese and Chinese put in place before the han‐ localize the legal personnel. According to one ac‐ dover, our fnal topic of analysis. count, by 1999, out of 43 judges in Macau, only 22 Fourth, neither the Joint Declaration nor the were local.[4] By 2013, out of 46 judges, 24 percent JLG worked on further democratization of the po‐ or 11 of them were Portuguese or Macanese, indi‐ litical system, as seen in Mendes’s book. In fact, cating some improvement. But the percentage of they were resistant to any further progress on the Portuguese and Macanese lawyers was still very issue. This exacerbates the problems discussed high: out of 272 registered lawyers in Macau, 76.4 above about the governing ability of the MSAR percent were Portuguese/Macanese.[5] Apparent‐ and the deplorable language and judicial prob‐ ly the Portuguese/Macanese continue to dominate lems. the legal feld ffteen years after the handover. It The Portuguese thought that they had a much would be very difcult for anyone whose frst lan‐ more progressive Joint Declaration than what guage is not Portuguese to join the profession Hong Kong obtained since the political system had since all legal documents are written in Por‐ been maintained, a system that included partial tuguese. Even if there are translations, they are elections of the legislature, which Hong Kong did not reliable, as I mention above. not have, as Mendes shows. But the fact is that As a result, the judicial process has been Hong Kongers were able to make sure that uni‐ painfully slow. As Ho Chio Meng, the prosecutor versal sufrage was written in the Hong Kong Ba‐ general, has pointed out, legislative delays, such sic Law. The same was not true in Macau! Both as the amendments of the penal code, are already declarations use the same language about the fu‐ hurting Macau’s economic and social develop‐ ture of the chief executive and the legislature, i.e., ment.[6] Chan Chak Mo, a legislator, also noted elections, although they do not say what kind elec‐ that since most people involved in lawsuits are tions, direct by the populace or indirect by a Chinese, there is no reason why judges have to be group of people. But Hong Kongers were able to fuent in both Chinese and Portuguese. It is espe‐ make it written in the Basic Law that universal cially unnecessary for lawyer candidates to write sufrage would be realized in 2017 and onward. their exam papers in Chinese and then have This is not the case in the Macau Basic Law. somebody translate them into Portuguese so that This is consistent with the Portuguese and Portuguese lawyers can read them.[7] Apparently Chinese governments’ historical resistance to de‐ only Portuguese lawyers have the right to read mocratization in Macau. Back in 1980, some these papers. This is de facto monolingualism Macanese legislators made an efort to amend the rather than bilingualism as stipulated by both the Macau Organic Law to allow direct elections of Joint Declaration and the Macau Basic Law. legislators. But any change was resisted by both Apparently neither the Portuguese govern‐ the Portuguese and Chinese governments, repre‐ ment nor the Chinese and Chinese Macau govern‐ sented by Melo Egidio, the Macau governor at the ment was conscientious about the interests of lo‐ time, and Portuguese President Ramalo Eanes on cal people, especially the local Chinese people the Portuguese part, and Guangdong Governor Xi when they worked on the so-called localization of Zhongxun and the Deng Xiaop‐

4 H-Net Reviews ing on the Chinese part.[8] The same collaboration soon. That is, I believe, a result of the shortcom‐ continued in the 1990s as Mendes points out. ings of the Sino-Portuguese negotiations in spite When the Macau Basic Law was drafted, liberals of the few successes I mention above. like Ng Kuok Cheong and Au Kam Sun were ex‐ Notes cluded from the drafting committee. In compari‐ [1]. Jixiu Guo, Dangdai Aomen Toushi (A son, the Hong Kong Basic Law drafting committee study of contemporary Macau) (Macau: Jiuding was much more representative of the spectrum of Journal Press, 2009), 135. the political opinions of Hong Kongers, who were, in general, much more active in striving for de‐ [2]. Zhidong Hao, Liang’an Sidi Zhengzhi yu mocratization with the support of the leaving Shehui Fenxi (An analysis of politics and society in government. , Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan) (Macau: , forthcoming 2014). All in all, rather than arguing that the Por‐ tuguese government could get more benefts out [3]. Guo, Dangdai Aomen Toushi, 146-147. of the negotiations if they were more united and [4]. Ibid., 144. experienced, as Mendes does, I would say that [5]. Zhidong Hao, “Social Stratifcation and they largely got what they wanted. She thinks that Ethnic and Class Politics in Macau before and af‐ the internal politics between the president and ter the Handover in 1999,” China: An Internation‐ the premier and the lack of experienced diplo‐ al Journal (forthcoming 2014). mats on Macau afairs hindered them from ob‐ [6]. Ibid. taining better results. But she is not clear as to what more they could have gotten. In fact, as a [7]. Ibid. colonial power that declined a long time ago and [8]. Shiu Hing Lo, Political Development in decades after worldwide decolonization move‐ Macau (Hong Kong: The Chinese University of ments, there were not many bargaining chips on Hong Kong Press, 1995), 32-33. the Portuguese part, morally or realistically. What they got was already laudable. The Chinese gov‐ ernment got what they wanted, too. It was the lo‐ cal people who lost big, as I analyze above, judg‐ ing from the consequences we have seen in the past ffteen years. The cover picture of the book shows a scene of the Joint Declaration signing ceremony. The then Premier Zhao Ziyang, who was put into house arrest because of his resistance to crack down on the student democracy movement in 1989, was the signer of the declaration on the Chi‐ nese part. But he is not in the picture. This is sym‐ bolic of who won and who lost in the Portugal- China negotiations. Without political reform, it is hard to imagine that the government could im‐ prove its efciency while practicing fairness, and that the localization of the Chinese language and legal personnel can be truly realized any time

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Citation: Zhidong Hao. Review of Mendes, Carmen Amado. Portugal, China and the Macau Negotiations, 1986-1999. H-Diplo, H-Net Reviews. January, 2014.

URL: https://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=40280

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