Carmen Amado Mendes. Portugal, China and the Macau Negotiations, 1986-1999. Royal Asiatic Society Hong Kong Studies Series. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2013. 1 online resource. $35.00, cloth, ISBN 978-988-8139-00-2. Reviewed by Zhidong Hao Published on H-Diplo (January, 2014) Commissioned by Seth Offenbach (Bronx Community College, The City University of New York) Almost ffteen years have passed since the re‐ would say, although hard power is always an im‐ turn of Macau to the People’s Republic of China portant factor in determining the outcome of a re‐ (PRC) and the establishment of the Macau Special lationship, social interaction can often change the Administrative Region (MSAR) in 1999. It is indeed dynamics of that relationship. The two sides ex‐ a good time to assess who won and who lost in the ploited each other’s weaknesses for their own Portugal-China negotiations on Macau, based on benefits, the author notes. Both sides wanted to what happened during the negotiations in 1986 save face: Portugal did not want to repeat the hu‐ and 1987, in the transition period between 1988 miliation it suffered in the decolonization process‐ and 1999, but especially in the ffteen years after es in Africa and East Timor, and China wanted 1999. Carmen Amado Mendes’s Portugal, China desperately to reunite with Hong Kong, Taiwan, and the Macau Negotiations provides an excellent and Macau so that it could show the world its re‐ starting point. In the book, Mendes presents the vival from 150 years of humiliation in the hands nuances of the “Macau question,” issues on the of Western powers. These former colonies were negotiation table, the strategies of the Portuguese constant reminders of that humiliation. So they and the Chinese negotiators, and an evaluation of treated each other carefully and made necessary those strategies. Considering the scarcity of litera‐ compromises, resulting in what seemed to be a ture on the Sino-Portuguese negotiations, this largely harmonious negotiation process, Mendes book makes a valuable contribution to the field. states. Mendes argues that Portuguese negotiators Indeed, both governments seemed to have won some important concessions from China, and saved face. They reached a compromise over the that a weaker power, in this case Portugal, can date of retrocession. It was going to be neither sometimes beat a stronger power, in this case Chi‐ what Portugal had wanted, 2007, the 450th an‐ na. This is indeed true. As sociological theories niversary of the Portuguese settlement in Macau, H-Net Reviews nor what China had wanted, 1997, the time Hong the Portuguese and the Chinese. Who wins and Kong was to be returned to China. They settled on who loses in the long run may be even more im‐ 1999. Portugal wanted dual nationality for the portant when assessing the success and failure of Chinese who held Portuguese passports (eighty the Sino-Portuguese negotiations. And it seems thousand altogether, according to Mendes [p. 50]), that both governments won by large margins but but China would not recognize dual nationality. the people in Macau lost to a greater degree. This They settled on China treating Portuguese pass‐ is what I will discuss as a complement to Mendes’s ports held by Chinese citizens as travel docu‐ analysis of both the negotiations on the Sino-Por‐ ments, virtually acknowledging dual nationality, tuguese Joint Declaration and the negotiations in although these Chinese citizens cannot seek con‐ the following twelve-year transition period. sulate protection in China. (Mendes notes that this First, the Joint Declaration said that civil ser‐ was a better deal than what the British got for the vice would be localized, but it did not say how. Chinese in Hong Kong who held British passports: This caused problems for the Joint Liaison Group they would not have the right of entry and abode (JLG), which was entrusted with the task of in the United Kingdom.) These are indeed good smoothing the transition from 1987 to 1999. The examples of successful negotiations. The building Chinese part of the JLG thought it meant that the of an international airport is also an example of “Chinese should occupy 97 percent of middle and success. China lost, however, on the issue of the high-ranking positions in the future administra‐ operation of the Orient Foundation: the MSAR tion,” reflecting the composition of the popula‐ government still could not control what was sup‐ tion, while the Portuguese thought that “local staff posed to be public money. promotion should be based upon qualification” I am not going to focus on these issues in this (p. 76). To the dissatisfaction of the Chinese, the review. Rather, I am going to discuss the issues Portuguese dragged their feet, made few efforts to that appeared to have been successfully negotiat‐ localize the civil service personnel, and provided ed but turned out to be poorly implemented, both few openings to local Chinese or Macanese (the in the transition period and after 1999, leading to offspring of Portuguese and Chinese/other Asian what we observe today as less than satisfactory mixed heritages). results. These issues are tied to the localization of As a result, by March 1999, out of 102 under‐ civil services in Macau, the use of the Chinese lan‐ secretary level officials, 65 percent had less than guage in government documents, and the localiza‐ two years of leadership experience because they tion of the Macau law. In addition, neither side were only recently promoted.[1] This was already was keen on democratization in Macau. Mendes close to the date of the handover, December 20, brings up these issues as they were discussed at 1999 (see also Mendes, p. 113). In the ffteen years the negotiation table, but her focus is on the tran‐ after the handover, the Macau Chinese and sition period, as the title of her book indicates, Macanese (mostly Chinese) government officials and not on the post-1999 era. stumbled in their governance of Macau and made Current problems related to these issues can one mistake after another. Even today, the citizens arguably be viewed as a result of the shortcom‐ in Macau are suffering from the inexperience of ings in the negotiations, which Mendes mentions the civil service personnel. Edmond Ho, the previ‐ but does not elaborate. Both the Portuguese and ous chief executive of Macau, once commented Chinese governments need to bear responsibili‐ that the Macau Chinese were just like children ties. An evaluation of these issues may balance learning to do what adults do.[2] It seems to still what seem to be successful negotiations between be the case today, ffteen years after the handover. 2 H-Net Reviews But this kind of suffering could have been tioners of law have to resort to the original Por‐ shortened if the Portuguese government had tuguese documents to understand the law accu‐ started the localization of civil service earlier and rately. Neither the Portuguese Macau government with more serious eforts or if the Chinese govern‐ before the handover nor the Chinese Macau gov‐ ment had pushed harder. While the Portuguese ernment after the handover was serious enough and Chinese governments maintained a harmo‐ in localizing the Chinese language. nious relationship and the negotiation was a win- The Portuguese and Chinese negotiators and win, in the end, the Macau citizens lost: they have the JLG could have done a better job in this re‐ lost many years of possibly good governance. This gard. But to maintain a harmonious relationship is, of course, not the only reason for poor gover‐ and to focus on what they believed to be more im‐ nance, as I show below. portant issues, like saving each other’s face, as Second, the Joint Declaration said that other Mendes illustrates, were probably their priorities than Chinese, Portuguese may also be used in the rather than such down-to-earth issues as the use MSAR, as Mendes notes. Although the wording is a of language and the training of civil servants. The bit vague, both languages are recognized as offi‐ latter would affect only ordinary people’s lives, cial. Since all official documents were in Por‐ not their lives. Although the Sino-Portuguese ne‐ tuguese, the transition period witnessed an oner‐ gotiations might be viewed as successful, local ous task of translating them into Chinese so that Chinese people did not win in the end. Chinese officials, most of who could not read, Third, the same problem emerged with local‐ write, or speak Portuguese, could take over gov‐ ization of the law, which is related to localization ernment affairs. But to translate all of them was a of the Chinese language. Neither the Portuguese mission impossible in the ten-year transition peri‐ nor the Chinese perceived any urgency in localiz‐ od. ing the law. As Mendes points out, the Joint Decla‐ And the Portuguese Macau government was ration stipulates that “the laws, decrees, adminis‐ not in a hurry to do it, either. As Almeida e Costa, trative regulations and other normative acts pre‐ the governor at the time, publicly declared, the viously in force in Macau shall be maintained government was not in a hurry to localize the Chi‐ save for whatever therein may contravene the Ba‐ nese language under emotional influences.[3] sic Law or subject to any amendment” by the What happened later was that the Portuguese MSAR legislature (p. 81). The Portuguese per‐ Macau government was more keen on promoting ceived this as a reason not to localize the law, be‐ the Portuguese language than on the localization lieving that it would not need to be changed for of the Chinese language because they knew that fifty years after the handover, as mentioned by once the Chinese took over after 1999, even fewer Mendes.