MATERIALISM and EMPIRIO-CRITICISM S.Hrcm;Sqxj

V. I. LENIN MATERIALISM AND EMPIRIO-CRITICISM S.Hrcm;sqxJ

VORKERS OF ALL COUNTRIES, UNITE!

V. T. LENI

MATERIALISM AND EMPIRIO-CRITICISM

FOREIGN LANGUAGES PRESS PEKING 1,972 First Edition t9t2

PUBLISHER'S NOTE

The ptesent English edition of V. I. Lenin, Materialis'n and. Empirio-Criticism, is a reprint of the text given in the book under CONTENTS the same title published by the Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow. It contains "Ten Questions to a Lecturer," a given Collected Lenin, reprint from the text in Vorks ol V. I. TEN QUESTIONS TO A LECTURER English edition, Vol. 14. The notes at the end of the book are based on those given in the Chinese edition published by the MATERIALISM .A.ND EMPIIItrO-CRITICISM People's Publishing House, Peking, Aptil r97r. Critical Comments on a Reactionary Philosophy )

PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION t PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION In Lieu ol lntroducliott HO\fl CERTAIN "MARXISTS" IN 19OB AND CERTAIN IDEALiSTS IN 1710 REFUTED MATERIAI,ISM Chaptet One Ti]E THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE OF EX,{PIRIO-CRITICISM .A.ND OF DIALECTICAL MATERIALISA,{. I 3r r. Sensations and Complexes of Scnsations 1r z. "The Discovery of the r#orld-Elements" 41 l. The Principal Co-ordination and "Naive Realism" 65 4. Did Nature Exist Prior to Man? 7t 5. Does Man Think with the Help of the Brain? 9o 6. The Solipsism of Mach and Avenarius 99

Cbapter Tzoo THE THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE OF EMPIRIO.CRITICISM AND OF DIALECTICAL MITTERIALISM' II to4 Priued in tbe People's Republic ol Cbina 111 11 CONTENTS CONIENTS

r. The "Thing-in-Itself," or V. Chernov Refutes Frederick Cbapter Fiae Engels to4 THE RECENT REVOI,UT]ON IN NATURAL SCIENCE AND ry8 z. 1'Transcendence," or Bazarov "Revises" Engels I]' P}I[OSOPHICAI, IDEALISM Modern PhYsics ,oI 3, L. Feuerbach and J. Dietzgeo on the Thing-in-Itself 129 r. The Crisis in 4. Does Obfective Ttuth Exist? 13t 2. "Matter Has DisaPPeated" 308 5. Absolute and Relative Ttuth, or the Eclecticism of Engels 3. Is Motion W'ithout Matter Conceivablc? 1r8 as Discovered by A. Bogdanov r47 4. The Two Trcnds io Modern Physics, and English Spitit- 6. The Criterion of Practice in the Theory of Knorvledge rt, ualism 328 The Two Ttends in Modern Physics, and Getman Idealism 139 Cbapter Tlsree J. 6. The Two Trends in Modern Physics, and Frenctr Fideism 349 TIIE THEORY OF KNOTTLEDGE OF DIALECTICAL MATE- Russian "Idealist Physicist" 36o RIALISM AND OF EMPIRIO-CRITICISM. III $1 7. A The Essence and Siglificance o[ i'Physical" Idcalism ,64 r. What Is Matter? What Is Experience? fii 8. z. Plekhanov's Error Concerning the Concept "Experience" r72 Cb(llter Six 3. Causality and Necessity in Nature r7t EMPIRIO-CRITICISM AND HISTORICAL MATERIALISM 179 4. The "Principle of Economy of Thought" and the Problem r, The Excutsiotrs of the Getman Emp'irio-Criticists into the of the "Unity of the rJ/orld" t9, Field of the Social Sciences 380 5. Space and Time 202 z. How Bogdanov Corrects and "Develops" Marx t89 6. Freedom and Neccssity 2rS 3. Suvorov's "F-oundations of Social Philosophy" 400 Philosophy and Philosophical Blockheads 4c,6 Cbapter Four 4. Patties in Ernst Haeckel and Ernst &Iach 420 IFIE PHILOSOPHICAL IDEALISTS AS COMRADES-IN-ARMS ;. AND SUCCESSORS OF EMPIRIO-CR]TICISM CONCLUSION 413 r, The Criticism of Kantiar.rism from the LeIt and frorn the Cbaqtil Four, Section I Right Supplement to FROM WHAT ANGLE DID N. G. CHERNYSHEVSKY 2. How the "Ernpirio-Symbolist" Yushkevich ttre Ridiculed CR.ITICISE KANTIANISM? $6 "Empirio-Criticist" Chernov 24r ,. The Immanentists as Comradcs-in-Atms of Mach and NOTES 440 Avenarius 24t 4. Whithet Is Empirio-Criticism T'ending? 256 5. A. Bogdanov's "Empirio-Monism" 267 6. The "Thcory of Symbols" (ot Hieroglyphs) ancl tbe Criticism of Helmholtz 27t 7. Two Kinds of Criticism of Diihring 283 8. How Could J. Dietzgen Ilave For:nd Fevour with the Reactionary Philosophets ? 28g TEN QUESTIONS TO A LECTURER'I

I. Does the lecturer acknowledge that the philosophy of Marxism is dial.ectical ruaterialis m? If he does not, why has he ncver analysed Engels' countless statemeflts If he do Machists call their "revision" of dialectical e philosophy of Marxism"? z. Does cknowledge Engels' fundamcntal 2 TEN euESTroNs ro A LECTURER

6. Does the lecturer acknowledge as correct Engcls' assertion that "matter without motion is as inconceivable as motion without matter"? (Anti-Dtibring, 1886, zrrd ed, p. 45, ia part 6 on natural philosophy, cosmogony, physics and chemistry.)3 7. Does the lecturer acknowleclge that the ideas of causality, necessity,law, etc., ate a reflection in the human mind of MA.TERI,{LISM AND EIVffi'IRtrO-CR.ITICISM laws of flature, of the real world? Or was Engels wrong in saying so? (Anti-Dtibring, S. zo-zt, in part III on aprior- Critical Comments on a Reactionary ism, and S. to3-o4, in part XI on freedcim and necessity.)" Philosophyto 8. Does the lectr-lrer know that Mach expressed his agtee- ment with the head of the immanentist school, Schuppe, and evcn dedicated his last and chief philosophical work to him? How does the lecturer explain this adherence of Mach to the obviously idealist philosophy of Schuppe, a defender of clericalistn and in general a downright reactionary in philosophy? S. rMhy did the lecturer keep silent about "adventure" with his comrade of yesterday (according to the Studiess), the Menshevik Yushkevich, who has today cleclared Bog- danov6 (following in the wake of RakhmetovT) an ideatist? Is the lecturer aware that Petzoldt in his latest book has classed a number of Mach's disciples arnong the idealists? ro. Does the lecturer confirm the fact that Machism has nothirig in common with Bolshevism? And that Lenin has repeatedly protested against Machism?8 And that the Mensheviks Yushkevich and Valentinove are "pure" empirio- criticists ?

Written in May-June r9o8 Published according to the manuscflPt First published in r92\, in Lenin, Miscellany lll PREFACE TO TFIE FIR.ST'EDITION

A number of writers, would-be Marxists, have this year undertaken a veiltable campaign against the philosophy of Marxisrn. In the course of less than half a yer four books devoted mainly and almost exclusively to attacks on dialectical materialism have made their appearance. These include first and foremost Studies in l? - it would have been more proper to say "against"lLt ilre Philosopby ol A4arxisru (St. petersburg, r9o8), a symposium by Bazarov, Bogdanov, Lunacharsky, Rerman, Helfond, Yushkevich and Suvorov; yushkevich's Materialisru and Critical Realistn; Berman's Dialectics in tbe Ligbt ol the Modern Tbeory ol Knoza;tedge and Valentinov,s The Pbilosopbical Constructions ot' Marxism. All these people could not have been ignorant of the fact that Marx and Engels scores of times termed their philosophical views dialectical materialism. Yet all these people, who, despite the sharp divergence of their political views, are united in their hostility towards dialecticaT materialism, at the same time claim to be Marxists in philosophy! Engels' dialectics is "mysticism," says Berman. Engels' views havb become "antiquated," remarks Baz-arov casually, as though 6 PREFACI] TO TTIE FIRST EDIT]ON PREFACE To THE FIRsT EDITIoN 7 it n'ere a self-eviden t f act. Materialism thus appecrs to be and thoroughness that no one has ever found anything ambig- refuted by our bold warriors, who proudiy allude to the uous in such literary uttefances. "modern theory of knorvledge," "receflt philosophy'l ("r For the rest, there is in the Studies "in" tbe Pbilosopby ot' "recent positivism"), the "philosophy of modern natural Marxistn one phrase which resembles the truth. This is phrase: science," or even the "philosophy of natural science of the Lunacharsky's "Perhaps we li.e., all the collaborators of tire Stwdies evidently] have gone astray, but are seek- twentieth cefltury." Supported by all these supposedly reccnt we ing" (p. 16r). That the first half of this phrase contains an doctrines, our destroyers of dialectical matetialism proceed absolute and the second a relative truth, I shall endeavour fearlessly to downrigtrt fideism*12 (in the case of I-unachar- to denronstrate circumstantially in the present book. At the sky it is most evident, but by flo means in his casc alone!l3). moment I would only remark that if our philosophers had Yet when it comes to an explicit definition of their attitude spoken not in the name of Marxism but in the name o[ a and Engels, all their courage and all their towards Marx few "seeking" Marxists, they would have shown more respect once disappear. In respect for their own convictions at for themselves and for Marxisrn. dialectical materialism, deed a complete renunciation of As for myself, I too am a "seeker" in philosophy. Name- - attcmpts to i.. e., ot Marxism; in word - endless subterfuges, ly, the task I have set myself in these comments is to find to evade the essence of the qucstion, to cover their retreat, out what \tras the stumbling block to these people who under put some materialist or other in place of materialism in the guise of Marxism are offering something incredibly mud- general, and a determined refusal to make a ditect analysis dled, confused and reactioflary. materialist declarations of Marx and of the innumerable Tlte Autbor Engels. This is truly "mutiny on one's knees," as it was lustly characterised by one Marxist' This is typical philosoph- September r9o8 ical revisionism, fot it was only the revisionists who gained a sad notoriety for themselvcs by their departure from the fundamental views of Marxism and by their fear, or inability, to "settle accouflts" openly, explicitly, resolutely and cleady with the views they had abandoned. W'hen orthodox Marx- ists had occasion to pronounce against some antiquated views of Marx (for instance, Mehring when he opposed certain historical propositions), it was always done with such precision

* Fidcism is a doctrine which substitutes faith for krrowlcdge, or which generally attachcs significance to faith. IN LIEU OF IAITRODUCTION PREFACE TO TFIE SECOND E,DITIOi\T HOV/ CERTAIN "MARXISTS"IN 1908 AND CERTAIN IDEALISTS IN I71O REFUTED MATERIALISM With the exception of a few corrcciions in the text, the present edition does not difier from the previous one. I hope "Mach- that, irtespective of the dispute with the Russian Anyone in the least acquainted with philosophical litera- ians," it will prove useful as an aid to an acquaintance with ture must know that scarcely a single contemporary professor the plrilosophy of Marxism, dialectical matetialism, as well philosophy (or of theology) can be found who is not direct- as with the philosophical conclusions from the recent dis- of rnaterialism. They have coveties in natural science. As for A.A. Bogdanov's latest ly or indirectly engaged in refuting rvorks, which I have had no opportttnity to examine, the declared materialism refuted a thousand times, yet are con- appendecl article by Comrade V.I. Nevsky gives the necessary tinuing to refute it for the thousand and first time. All our information.l'n Cornrade V.I. Nevsky, not only in his revisionists are engaged in refuting materialism, pretending, rvork as a propagandist itt but also as an active horvever, that actually they are only refuting the materialist "general, worker in the Party school in particular, has had ample op- Plekhanov, and not the materialist Engels, nor the materialist the guise of "prole- portunity to convince himself that under Feuerbach, nor the rnaterialist views of J. Dietzgen and, culture" Bogdanov is imparting bourgeois and - tarian A.A. moreover, that they are refuting materialism from the stand- teactionary t,iels. point of "recent" and "modern" positivism, natural science, N. Lenin and so forth. Without citing quotations, which anyone desit- the books above September 2, r92o ing to do so could cull by the hundred from mentioned, I shall refer to those arguments by which materialism is being combated by Bazarov, Bogdanov, Yushkevich, IN LIEU OF INTRODUCTION ll 10 IN LrEU oF INTRoDUCTIoN religion ("holy mattcr," as Valentinov, Chernov* and other Machians. I shall use this of "metaphysics," a double o[ latter term throughout as a synonym for "empirio-criticist" Bazatov says). are the arguments levelled by the Machians against because it is shorter and simpler and has akeady acquired Such materialism, as repeated and retold in varying keys by the rights of citizenship in Russian literature. That Ernst Mach afore-mentioned writers. is the most popular representative of ernpirio-criticism today In order to test whether these arguments are new, and is universally acknowledged in philosophical litetature,** whether they are really directed against only one Russian while Bogdanov's and Yushkevich's departures frorn "pure" materialist who "lapsed into Kantianism," we shall give some Machism are of absolutely secondary importance, as will be detailed quotations from the v/orks of an old idealist, George shown later. Berkeley. This historical inquiry is all the more necessary The materialists, we are told, recognise something unin the introduction to our comments since we shall have thinkable and unknowable - "things-in-themselves" - mattet frequent occasion to refer to Berkeley and his trend in phi- They "outside of experience" and outside of our knowledge. losophy, for the Machians misrepresent both the relation of of lapse into genuine mysticism by adrnitting the existence Mach to Berkeley and the essence of Berkeley's philosophical bounds of something beyond, something transcending the line. "experience" and knowledge. !7hen they say that matter, The work of Bishop George Berkeley, published in rTro produces sensations, the by acting upon our seflse-organs, under the tide Treatise Concerning tbe Principles of Human materialists take as their basis the "unknown," nothingness; Knooledge* begins with the following argumeot: "It is sensations be the for do they not themselves declare our to evisense data variations. By touch I perceive hard and soft, heat and cold, "idol," an absolute, a source something else, some fetish, an motion and resistance. . . . Smelling furnishes me with odours; thepalate with tastes; and heating corveys sounds. . . . And * V. Chetnov, Pbilosopbieal and. Sociological Sndies, Moscow, r9o7. as several of these are observed to accompany each other, T'he author is as ardent an adherent o[ Avenarius and an enerny o[ dialectical materialism as Bazarov and Co. Concetning the Principles of Fluman +* See, for instance, Dr. Richard Hdnigswald, Ueber die Lebte Humes 't George Berkcley: "Treatise of 'Wo*s ol George Berkelelt, edited by A. Ftaser, oon der Realitiit der Aussend.inge [Hume's Doctrine of lbe Redlit! of tbe Knowledge", Vol. r There is a Russian translation- Extelnal \Vorldl, Betlin, r9o4, S. 26. Oxford, r87r, L2 IN LIEU oF INTRoDUCTIoN IN LIEU oF INTRoDUCTIoN 1;l they come to be marked by one name, and so to be reputed perceived by the understanding" ($ +). This opinion is a as one thing. Thus, for example, a ceftain colour, taste, smell, i'manifest contracliction," says Berkeley. "For, what arc tllc figure and consistence having been observed to go together, afote-mentionecl obiects but the things we perceive by sensc? are accounted one distinct thing, signified by the lname apple; and what do we perceive besides our own ideas or sensatious? other collections of ideas constitute a stone, a ttee, a book, and is it not plaintry repugnant that any one of these, or any and the like sensible things. . ." ($ ,. combination o1 th.m, should exist unperceived?" ($ +)' Such is the content of the first section of Berkeley's work. We ntust remember that Berkelcy takes as the basis of his philosophy "hard, soft, heat, cold, colours, tastes, odours," etc. For Berkeley, things are "collections of ideas," this expression designating the aforesaid, let us say, qualities or sensations, and not absttact thoughts. Berkeley goes on to say that besides these "ideas or ob- for to divorce the sensation from the obiect, according to iects of knowledge" there exists something that perceives Berkeley, is an ernpty abstraction. "In truth," he says at soul or rnyself" ($ z). It is self-evident, the second edition, "the obiect and them - "mind, spirit, the end of $ 5, omitted in the philosopher concludes, that "ideas" cannot exist outside the sensatio"n-are the same thing, and cannot therefore be ab- of the mind that perceives them. In order to convince our- stracted from each other." Berkeley Soes on: "But, say you, selves of this it is enough to consider the meaning of the though the ideas themselves do not exist without the mind, word "exist." "The table I write on I say exists, that is, I yet there may be things like them, whereof they are copies see and feel it; and if I were out of my study I should say tr resemblances; which things exist without the mind, in an it existed; meaning thereby that if I was in my study I might unthinking substance. I answer, an idea can be like nothing perceive it. ." That is what Berkeley says in $ 3 of his but an idea; a colour or figure can be like nothing but an- work and thereupon he begins a polemic against the people other colour or figure. . - . I ask whether those supposed orig- whom he calls materialists ($$ 18, 19, etc.). "For as to what is said of the absolute existence of unthinking things, without any relation to their being perceived," he says, "that is to me perfectly unintelligible." To exist means to be perceived percipi," dictum of Berkeley's fre- ("Their esse is $ A - , quently quoted in textbooks on the history of philosophy). "It hard or soft, like something which is intangible; and so of is indeed an opinion strangely ptevailing amongst men, that thc rest" ($ s). houses, mountains, rivers, and in a 'rvord all sensible obiects As the lead,er sees, Bazarov's "arguments" against Plek- have an existence, natttral or teal, distinct from tl-reir being hanov concerning the problem of whether things can'exist 14 IN LIEU oF INTRoDUcTIoN IN LIEU oF INTRoDUcTIoN 1!-r outside of us apart from their action on us do not difier in infection or distottion of materialism by Kantianisml Thc the least from Berkeley's arguments against the materialists "new" discoveries of the Machians are the product o[ an whom he does not mention by name. Berkeley considers the astounding ignorance of the history of the basic philosoph- notion of the existence of "matter or corporeal substance" ical trends. ($ 9) such a "corffadictiori," such an "absurdity" that it Their next "ncw" thought consists in this: that the con- is really not worth wasting time exposing it. He says: "But cepts "matter" of "substafice" are femnants of old uncriti- because the tenet of the existence of Matter seems to have cal views. Mach and Avenarius, you see, have advanced taken so deep a root in the minds of philosophers, and draws philosophical thought, deepened analysis and elirninated these af.ter it so many ill consequences, I choose rattrler to be thought "absolutes," "unchangeable entities," etc. If you wish to prolix and tedious than omit anything that might conduce check such assertions with the original sources, 8o to to the full discovery and extirpation of that prejudice" ($ S). Berkeley and you will see that they are pretentious fictions. We shall presently see to what ill consequences Berkeley Berkeley says quite definitely that matter is "nonentity" ($ 68), is referring. Let us first finish with his theoretical arguments that matter is notbing (S eo). "You may," thus Berkeley against the materialists. Denying the "absolute" existence ridiculcs the materialists, "if so it shatrl seem good, use the of objects, that is, the existence of things outside human word 'matter' in the same sense as other men use knowledge, Berkeley bluntly defines the viewpoint of his 'nothing'" (op. cit.; pp. ry6-gi. At the beginning, opponents as being that they recognise the "thing-in-itself." says Eerkeley, it was betrieved that colours, odours, etc., In $ z4 Bcrkeley writes in italics that the opinion wtrrich he "really exist," but subsequently such views were renounced, is rcfuting recogtrises "tltc absolute existerucc ol sercsible obiects and it was seen that they only exist in dependence on our in tbentseloes, or zoitbowt tbe znind," (op. ci.t., pp. 167-6a). The sensations. But this elirnination oI old errofleous concepts two fundamental lines of philosophical outlook are here was not completed; a remnaflt is the coacept "substaflce" depicted with the straightforr,vardness, clarity and precision ($ Zl), which is also a "preiudice" (p. rgi), and which was that distinguish the classical philosophers from the inventors finally exposed by Bishop Berkeley in rTro! In r9o8 there of "new" systems in our day. Materialism is the recognition are still wags who seriously believe Avenarius, Petzoldt, of "objects in themselves," or outside the mind; ideas and Mach and the rest, when they maintain that it is only "receit sensations are copies or images of those obiects. The opposite positivism" and "recent natural science" which have at last doctrine (idealisrn) claims that obiects do not exist "without succeeded in elirninating these "metephysical" conceptions. the mind"; objects are "combinations of sensations." These same wags (Bogdanov among them) assure their This was written in r7ro, fourteen years before the birth readers that it was the new philosophy that explained the of Immanuel Kant, yet our Machians, supposediy on the error o[ the "duplication of the world" in the doctrine of basis of "recent" philosophy, have made the discovery that the eternaily refuted materialists, who speak of some sort of the recognition o[ "things-in-themselves" is a result of the a "reflection" by the human consciousncss of things existing 16 rN LrEU oF rNTRoDUcrIoN IN LIEU oF INTRoDUCTIoN l7

outside the consciousness. A mass of sentimental verbiage dependence on it, that vzhen this cornerstone is once removcd, has been written by the above-named authors about this the whole fabric cannot choose but fall to the g(ound, iuso- "duplication." Owing to forgetfulness or ignorance, they much that it is no longer worth while to bestow a particular failed to add that these new discoveries had already been consideration on the absurdities of every rvretched sect of discovered in r7ro. Berkeley says: Atlreists" ($ gr, op. cit., pp. zo3'o4). "Our knowledge of these li.e., ideas or things] has been "Matter being once expelled out of nature drags with it very much obscured and confounded, and we have been led so many sceptical and impious notions, such an incredible into very dangerous errors by supposing a twofold existence number of disputes an'd pvzzlitg questions ["the principle of of the objects of scnse - the one intelligible or in the mind, economy of Mach in the 'seventies, the other real ar.d without the mind" (i.e., otttside conscious- "philosophy world according to the ness). And Berkeley ridicules this "absurd" notion, which principle of effo(t" - Avenarius in admits the possibility of thinking the unthinkable! The ,s7e !1 *hi.l-, sides of divines es well source of the "absutdity," of course, follows from our sup- as philosophers, and made so much fruitless work for man- posing a difierence between "things" and "ideas" ($ 87), kind, that if the arguments we have produced against it are "the supposition of external objects." This same source - as not found equal to demonstration (as to me they evidently discovered by Berkeley in rTro and rediscovered by Bogda- secnr), yet I am sure all friends to knowledge, peace, ar,d nov in r9o8 - engenders faith in fetishes and idols. "The religion have reason to wish they were" ($ S6). existence of. Mattet," says BerkeleY, "ot bodies unperceived, Frankly and bluntly did Bishop Berkeley argue! In out has not only been the main support of Atheists and Fatal- time these very same thoughts on the "econornical" elimina- ists, but on the same principle doth Idolatry likewise in all tion of "rnatter" from philosophy are enveloped in a much its various forrns depend" ($ S+). more attful form, and confused by the use of a "flew" ter- Here we arcive at those "i11 consequences" derived fronr minology, so that these thoughts may be taken by naive peo- the "absurd" doctrine of the existence of an external world ple for "recent" philosophy! which compelled Bishop Berkeley not only to refute this But Berkeley was not only candid as to the tendencies of doctrine theoretically, but passionately to persecute its his philosophy, he also endeavoured to cover its idealistic adherents as enemies. "For as we have shown the doctrine nakednesr, to represent it as being free from absurdities and of Matte( or corporeal Substance to have been the main pillar and support of Scepticism, so likewise upon the same foundation have been raised all the impious schemes of Atheism and Irreligion. How great a friend material substance has been to Atheists in all ages were needless to telate' All their monstrous systems have so visible atd necessary a cl.rimeras retnains, only "they both equaltry exist in the mind." 18 IN LIEU oF rNTRoDUcrtoN IN IIEU OF INTRODUCTION 10 "I do not argue against the existence of any one thing that as the foundation of all its reasoning the recognition o[ thc we can apprehend, either by sense or reflection. That the external world and the reflection thereof in the minds of mcn. things I see with my eyes and touch with my hands do eNist, Berkeley does not deny natural science, which has always really exist, I make not the least question. The only thing adhered (mostly unconsciously) to this, i.e., the materialist, \il/e whose existence r,ve deny is that which pbilosopl)ers [Berke- theory of knowledge. read in $ 59: "W'e rnay, frorn the ley's italics] call Matter or corporeal substance. And in doing cxperience [Berkcley - a philosophy of 'pure experience']+ this there is no damage done to the rest of mankind, who, we have had of the train and succession of ideas in our I dare say, will never miss it. . . . The Atheist indeed will minds. make. . well-grounded predictions concerning v/ant the colour of an empty flame to supporL his impiety. . . ." the ideas we shall be affected with pursuant to a gr.eat train of This thought is made still clearer in $ 32, where Berkeley actions, and be enabled to pass a ight judgment of what replies to the charge that his philosophy destroys corporeal would have appeared to us, in case we v/ere ptraced in circum- substance: ". . . if the word substance be taken in the vulgar stances very difierent from those we ate in at present. Herein serse, for a contbinatioa of sensibie qualities, such as exten- consists the knowledge of nature, which [listen to this !] may sion, solidity, weight, and the like - this we cannot be accused preserve its use and certainty -vety consistently with what of taking away; but if it be taken in a philosophic sense, for hath been said." the support of accidents or qualities without the mind - then Let us regard the external world, nature, as "a combina- indeed I aclcnowledge that we take it away, if one may be tion of sensations" cvoked in our mind by a deity. Acknowl- said to take away that which never had any existence, not edge this and give up searching for the "ground" of these even in the imagination." sensations outsicle the mind, outside man, and I will acknowl- Not without good cause did the English philosopher, Fraser, edge within the framework of my ideaiist theory of knowl- an idealist and adherent of Berkeleianism, who published edge all natural science and all the use and ceftalnty of its Berkeley's -,vorhs and supplied them with his own annotations, deductions. It is precisely this framework, ancl only this designate Berkeley's doctrine by the term "natural realism" franrework, that I need for rny deductions in favour of "peace (op. cit., p. x). This arnusing terminology must by ali rneans and religion." Such is Berkeley's fiain of thought. It coqrect: be noted, fot it in fact expresses Berkeley's intention to coun- ly expresses the pssqnce of idealist philogophy and its. social terfcit realism. fn our further exposition we shall frequently sisnificance. and we shall encounter it later when we come find "recent" "positivists" repeating the same stratagem or to speak of the relation of Machism to natural science. counterfeit in a difierent form and in a different verbal wrap- Let us now cousider another recent discovery that was ping. Berketrey does not deny the existence of real things! borrowed from tsishop Berkeley in the twentieth century by Berkeley does not go counter to the opinion of all humanity! - Berkeley denies "only" the teaching of the philosophers, zsi1., *In his pteface Fraser insists that both Betkeley and Locke l'appeal the theory of knowledge, which seriously and resolutely takes exclusively to experience" (p. ,rZ). 20 IN LIEU OF INTRODUCTION IN IIEU oF INTRoDUCTIoN 2l the recent positivist and critical realist, P. Yushkevich. This century garb rvhen we analyse the attitudes of Machism and discovery is "empirio-symbolisra." "Berkeley," says Fraser, dialectical materialism to this question. "thus reverts to his favourite theory of a Universal Natural Furtlrer, as regards the question of reality, it ought also Symbolism" (op. cit., p. r9o). Did these words not occur in to be remarked that Berkeley, refusing as he does to rec- an edition of r87r, one might have suspected the English ognise the existence of things outside the mind, tries to find fideist philosopher Fraser of plagiarising both the modern a criterion for distinguishing between the real and the ficti- mathematician and physicist Poincar6 and the Russian "Marx- tious. In $ 36 he says that those "ideas" which the minds of ist" Yushkevich! men evoke at pleasure "ate fairft, weak, and unsteady in respect others pelceive This theory of Berkeley's, which threw Frascr into raptures, to they by sense; which, being im- prcsscd upon is set forth by the Bishop as follows: them according to certain rules or laws of nature, speak themselves about the effects of a Mind more "The connexion of ideas [do not forget that for Bcrkeley powerful and wise than human spirits. These latter are said ideas and things are identical] does not imply the relation to have ffiore real;ty in them than the former; by which is of cause and eftect, but only of a mark or sign with the thing meant that they are more aflecting, orderly and distinct, and signified" ($ 6l). "Heflce, it is evident that those things, which that tlrey are not fictions of the rnind perceiving them. . . .'1 under the notion of a cause co-opcratiltg or concurring to the Elsewhere ($ s4) Berkeley tries to connect the notion of real- production of effects, are altogether inexplicable, and ruo us ity with the simultaneous perception of the same sensations into great absurdities, may be very naturaily explained. by many people. For instance, how shall we resolve the when they are considered only as marks or signs for our questiofl as to whether the transformation of water into wine, information" ($ course, in the opinion Berkeley 66). Of of of rvhich we arc being tolcl, is real? "If at table all who and Fraser, it is no other than the deity who informs us by 'were present should see, and smell, and taste, and drink means "empirio-symbols." o[ these The epistemological signif- wine, and find the eflects of it, v/ith me there could be no icance of symbolism in Berkeley's theory, hovzever, consists cloubt of its rcality." And Fraser explaits: "Simultaneous in this, that it is to replace "the doctrine" which "pretends perception of the 'saine'. . . sense-ideas, by difierent persons, to explain things by corporeal causes" (S 66). as distinguished from purely individual consciousness of ri7e have before us philosophical trends ques- tv/o in thc feelings and t'ancies, is here taken as a test of the . . . reality tion of causality. One "pretends to explain things by corpo- of the former." real causes." It is clear that it is connected with the "doc- From this it is evident that Berkeley's subjective ideal- trine of matter" refutecl as afl "absurdity" by Bishop Berke- ism is not to be interpreted as though it ignored the distinc- ley. The other reduces the "notion of cause" to thc notion of tion between individual and collective perception. On the a "matk ot sign" which scrvcs for "our information" (.rrp- contrary, he attempts on the basis of this distinction to con- plied by God). We shall meet thcse two trends in a twentieth- stfuct a criterion of reality. Deriving "ideas" from the a'ction 22 IN LIEU oF INTRoDUCTIoN IN LrEU oF INTRoDUCTToN 23 of a deity upon the human mind, Berkeley thus approaches pdmary and spirit secondary, for the idealists the revcrsc is obiective idealism: the world proves to be not my idea but the case. In between these two camps Engels places thc the product of a single supreme spiritual cause that creates adherents o[ Hume aod Kant, who deny the possibility of both the "laws of nature" and the laws distinguistrring "more knowing the world, or at least of knowing it fully, and calls real" ideas from less real, and so forth. them agnosticsLs, h his Ludroig Feuerbaci Engels applies In aoother work, Tbe Three Dialogues Betueen ITylas this term only to the adherents of Hume (those people whom anrl Fbilonous (t7ry), where he endeavours to present his Fraser calls, and who like to call themselves, "positivists"). views in an especially popular form, Berkeley sets forth the But in his article "On Historical Materialism," Engels explicit- opposition between his doctrine and the materialist doctrine ly speaks of the standpoint of "tbe Neo-Kantian agnostic,"Lo in the following way: regarding Neo-Kantianism as a variety of agnosticism.+ remarkably and "I assert as well os 1r6u [materialists] that, since v'e are !7e carnot dwell here on this cotrect affected frorn without, \Ye rnust allow Por.vers to be rvithout, profound judgnnent of Engels' (a judgmcnt which is shame- in a Being distinct frorn oursclves. . But then we difier as lessly ignored by the Machians). \vy'e shall discuss it in de- to tire kincl of this powerful being. I will have it to be Spirit, tall Later. on. For the present rve shall confine ourselves to you Matter, or tr know not rvhat (I may add too, you knorv pointing to this Marxist terminology and to this meeting of not wtriat) third nature. . ." (op. cit., p. fi). extremes: the views of a consistent materialist and of a con- This is the gist of the whole question; Fraset comments: sistent idealist on the fundamental philosophical trends. In according to the materialists, sensible phenomena are due to order to illustrate these trends (with which we shall constant- deal exposition) ntoteri.al substance, or to some unknown "third rrature" ; ly have to in our further let us briefly note philosophers accorclin.g to Berkeley, to F.ational !7i11; according to Hume the views of outstanding of the eighteenth and the Positivists, their origin is absolutely unknown, and century who pursued a difierent path from Berkeley. we cau only generalise them inductively, through custom, as Here are Hume's arguments. In his An Enquiry Concern- facts. ing Human Understanding, it the chapter (XIi) on sceptical Here the English Berkeleian, Fraser, approaches from his philosophy, he says: "It seems evident, that men are caried, consistent ictrealist staadpoint the same fundamental "lines': by a natwal instinct or prepossession, to repose faith in their in philosophy which were so clearly characteriscd by the seflses; and that, without any reasoning, at even almost materialist Engels. In his wotl< Ludzoig Feuerbaclr Engels before the use of reason, we always suppose an external divides philosophers into "trvo g(eat calnps" - materialists universe, which depends not on our perception, but would and idealists. Engels dealing with theories of the two - * Fr. Engels, "(Jeber historiscben Materialistnils," Nete 2cil,17 Y.I. trends much more cleveloped, varied and rich in content than Bd. I $sgz-y), Nr. r, S. 18. Translated from the English by Engels distinction between Jg,, Fraser clealt with - sees the fundamental himself, The Russian translation in Historical Mateialisrn (St, Petersburg, thcm in the fact that while for the materialists nature is I9o8, p. 167) is inaccurate. 24 IN LIEU OF INTRODUCTION IN LIEU oF INTRoDUcTIoN 25 exist though we and every scnsible creature were absent or wodd be once called in question, we shall be at a loss to 6ncl annihilated. Even thc animal creations are gove(ned by a arguments, by which we may prove the existence of that like opinion, and preservc this belief of external obiects, in Being, or any of his attributes."* all their thoughts, designs, and actiotls. . . . But this universal He says the same thing in his Treatise ol Huruan Nature and primary opinion of all men is soon destroyed by the (Part IV, Sec. II, "On Scepticism Towards Sensations"): slightest philosophy, which teaches us, that nothing can ever "Our perceptions are our only objects." (P. z8r of the French be present to the mind but ar image or perception, and that translation by Renouvier and Pillon, 1878.) By scepticism the senses are only the inlets, through v-hich these images are Hume means refusal to explain sensations as the effects of conveyed, without being able to produce any immediate in- objects, spirit, etc., refusal to reduce perceptions to the ex- tercourse between the mind and the oblect. The table, which ternal world, on the one hand, and to a deity or to an ufl- we see, seems to diminish, as we remove farther from it: known spirit, on the other. And the author of the introduc- But the real table, which exists independent of us, suffers no tion to the French translation of Hume, F. Pillon - a phi- alteration: It was, therefore, nothing but its image, wl-rich losopher of a trend akin to Mach (as we shall see below) - was pr^eseflt to the mind' These are the obvious dictatcs of iustly remarks that for Hume subiect and object are reduced reasoo; ancl no man, who reflects, ever doubted, that tl-re to "groups of various perceptions," to "elements of conscious- existences, which we consider, when we say, 'this house,' and ress, to impressions, ideas, etc."; that the only concern should 'that tree' are nothing but perceptions in the mind' ' ' ' By be with the "groupings and combinations of these elements."** what argument can it be proved, that the perceptions of the The English Humean, Huxley, who coined the apt and correct mind must be caused by external oblects, entirely difierent term "agnosticism," in his book on Hume also emphasises from them, though resembling them (if that be possible), and the fact that the latter, rcgarding "sensations" as the "primaty could not arise either from the energy of the mind itself, or and irreducible states of consciousness," is not entirely con- from the suggestion of some invisible and unknown spirit, sisteflt on the question how the origin of sensations is to be or from some other cause still more unknown to us? ' ' ' How explained, whether by the efrect ol objects on man or by the shall the question be determined? By experience surely; as creative power of the mind. "Realism and idealism are equally all other questions of a like rature. But here experience is, probable hypotheses" (i.e., for Hume).*x+ Hurne does not go and must be entirely silent. The mind has nevcr anything present to it but the perceptions, and cannot possibly reach * David Htme, An Enqtiry Concerning Hutnnn Und,erstanding, Essalts anrl Treatises, London, 1882, Vol. lI, pp, t4-26. any e*perience of their connection with obiccts' This suppo- ** Psycbologie de Hurne. Traiti de la natu.re bumaine, etu. Arad. par such a connection is, therefore, without any founda- sition of Ch. Renouvier et F. Pillon Psycbology. Treatite Hturzan the fHume's A ol tion in rcasoning. To have recourse to the veracity of Nature, translated by Ch. Renouvier and F. Pillon], Paris, 1878. Introduc- Supreme Bcing, in order to prove the veracity of our senses, tlon, p. x. is surely uraking a vcry unexpected circuic ' ' ' if the external 't'** Th. Huxley, Hume, London, 1879, p. 74, 27 26 IN LIEU OF INTRODUCTION IN LIEU oF INTRoDUCTIoN beyond sensations. "Ttrus the colours recl and blue, and the a piano to be endowed with the faculty of sensation and odour of a rose, are sirnple impressions. . . . A red rose gives memory, tell me, rvould it not of its orn'n accord repeat those you played are instruments us a c on into the simPle airs which have on its kelrs? I7e impre numerous others" endowed with sensation and memory. Our senses are so (oi. , "materialist Posi- many keys upon which surrounding nature strikes and tion" the "collection of which often strike upon themselves. And this is all, in my you perceptions" may be generated by the Fichtean "ego" or may opinion, that occurs it a piar,o organised like and me." te a "signification" and even a "symbol" of a "real some- D'Alembert retorts that such an instrurnent would have to thing." This is how Fluxley interprets Flume' possess the faculty of finding food for itself and of reproduc- contends But ta-ke A, lor the mzrterialists, here is an opinion of Berkeley ing little pianos. Undoubtedly, Diderot. - "This theology and given by Diderot, the leader of the Encyclopaedists: "Those an egg. is what refutes all the schools of are called id,ealists who, being conscious only all the temples on earttr. What is this egg? A mass that is [hil"roph"rt insensible the embryo introduced thither, and when of *n.ii existence ancl of the sensations which succeed each until is introduced, then? insensible other within themselves, do not admit anything else' An ex- this embryo is what is it An mass, for in its turn, tliis ernbryo is only an inert and crude liquid. How does this mass arc|ve at a different organisation, arrive at sensibility and life? By means of heat. And what produces heat? Motion. . . " The anirnal that is hatched from the egg is endowed with all your sensations; it performs all your actions. "\Would you maintain with Descartes that this is a simple imitating machine? Little children will laugh at you, and the philosophets will reply that if this be a machine then you too are a machine. If you admit that the difference between these animals and you is only one of organisation, you will prove your common sense and sagacity, you will be right. But from this will follow the conclusion that refutes you; namely, that from inert mati;er organised it a cettair. knowledge. our way, impregnated with another bit of inert fi),atter, by heat the "Conversation Betwcen d'Alembert and Diderot"' In and motion sensibility, life, memory, consciousness, emo- his philosophical position thus: " Suppose - Diderot states " ' tion, and thought are generated." One of the two, continues Diderot, either admit some "hidden element" in the egg, * (Euorcs conplites de Didcrot,6d. par J' Ass6zat [Diderot' Complete that pefietrates to in aD trnknown $/ay at a certain stage Wotks, edited by Ass6zatl, Patis, 1871, Vol' I, p' 3o4' it IN LIEU OF INTRODUCTION IN LIEU OF INTRODUCTION of clevelopment, an element about which it is unknown wheth- this cause?" Diderot: "There is only one substance in tlrc er it occupies space, whether it is material or wherher it is universe, in men and in animals. A hand-organ is of woocl, created for the purpose - which is contradictory to commoll man of flesh. A finch is of flesh, and a musician is of flesh, sense, and leads to inconsistencies and absurditics; or we but differently organised; but both are of the same origin, must make "a simple supposition which explains everything, of the same formation, have the same functions and the same na general ProPerty purpose." D'Alembert: "And what establishes the similarity of To d'Alcrnbcrt's of sounds between your two pianos?" Diderot: "... Thc ob qualitY rvhich in instrument endowed with the faculty of sensation, or the its iderot retorts: atimal, has learned by experience that after a certain sound cefiain consequences follow outside of it; that other sentient instruments, like itself, or similar animals, approach, recede, demand, offer, wound, caress; - ar,d all these consequences ate associated in its memory and in the memory of other animals with the formation of sounds. Mark, in intercourse betnzeen people there is nothing beside sounds and actions. sens And to appreciate all the pov/er of my system, mark again ofs that it is faced with that same insurmountable difiiculty com which Berkeley adduced against the existence of bodies. Did There was a momeflt of insanity when the sentient piano not see that all qualities of matter, that all its forms acces- imagined that it was the only piano in the world, and that sible to our senses arc in their essence indivisible? There the whole harmony of the universe resided within it."* This was viritten in ry69. And with this we shall conclude our brief historical enquiry. We shall have mote than one occasion to meet "the insane piano" and the harmony of the universe residing within man when we colne to analyse "recent positivism." For ttrre present we shall confine ourselves to one conclu- that exists and explains everything by somc other cause which sion: the "receit" Machians have not adduced a single argu- it is impossiblc io conceive, and thc conllcction of which ment against the materialists that had not been adduced by with the effect is cven morc difficult to conceivc, and which Bishop Berkeley. engenclers an infinitc number of clitlicultics without solving a ringle one of thcm." D'Alembert: "And what if I abandon * Ibid., Yol. II, pp. rr4-r8. 30 IN LIEU OF INTRODUCTION Let us mention as a curiosity that one of these Machians, Valentinov, vaguely sensing the falsity of his position, has tried to "cover up the traces" of his kinship with Berkeley and has done so in a rather amusing manner. On page r5o of lris book we read: " . . . \7hen those who, speaking of Mach, point to Berkeley, we ask, rvhich Berkeley do they mean? Do they mean the Berkeley who traditionally regards hirnself [Valentinov wishes to say who is regarded] as a solipsist; the Berkeley who defends the immediate presence CHAPTER ONE and providence of the cleity? Generally speaking [?], do THE TI{EORY OF KNOWLEDGE OF EMPIRIO. Berketrey, the philosophising bishop, the destroyer they mean CRITICISIVI AND OF DIALECTICAI. the thoughtful analyset? \With Berke- of atheism, or Berkeley, MATER.IALISM. I ley the solipsist and preacher of religious metaphysics Mach iodeed has nothing in common." Valentinov is muddled; he was unabie to make clear to himself why he was obliged 1.. SENSATiONS AND COMPLEXES OF SENSATIONS to defend Berkeley the "thoughtful analyset" a:nd idealist against the materialist Di.clerot. Diderot drew a clear dis- The fundamental premises of the theory of knowledge of tinction between the fundamental philosophical trends' Mach and Avenarius are frankly, simply and clearly ex- Valentinov confuses them, and wtriie doing so very amusingly pounded by them in their early philosophical works. To these tries to console us: "I[e would not consider the 'kinship' works we shall now turn, postponing for latet trcatment an of i\4ach to the ideatrist views of Berkeley a philosophical examination of the corrections and emenclations subsequently crime," he says, "eveu if this actually \ilere the case" (p' r49). made by these writers. To confound two irreconcilable fundamental trends in phi- "The task of science," Mach wrote it'r r87z, "can only be: losophy - rcally, what "crime" is that? But that is wl.rat thc r. To deterrnine the laws of conneclion of ideas (Psychology). whoie wisdom of Mach and Avenarius amouflts to. We shall z. To discover the laws of connection of sensations (Physics). now proceed to an examination of this wisdom. I. To explain the laws of connection between sensations and ideas (Psycho-physics)."'i This is quite clear.

* E. Mach, Die Gesclsichte und die \Wurzel des Satles oon der Erbal,- tung der Arbeit. Yortrag, gehalten in der k. Bdhm. Gesellschaft der lffissenschaften am r;. Nov. t87r lHistory and Roots ol tbe Principle of tbe Conseraation ol V/ork. A Lecture Delivered at the Bohemian Royal Scientific Society on November 15, r87r], Prag, l,812, S, lZ-18.

31 THEORY OF KNOIiTLEDGE I SENSA'IIONS AND COA{PLEXES OF SENSA'I'IONS

The subiect matter of physics is the connection between turn to the first section at Anti-Dtihring and read: ". . . things sensations and not between things or bodies, of which our and their mental images ;* or to the first section of sensations are the image. And in 1883, in his Mechanik, the philosophical part, which reads: "But whence does thought Mach repeats the same thought: "Sensations are not 'sym- obtain these principles li.e., the fundamental principles of all bols of things.' The 'thing' is rather a mental symbol for a knowledge] ? From itself ? No these forms can never complex of sensations of relative stability. Not the things be created and derived by thought out of itself, but only (bodies) but colours, sounds, pressures, spaces, times (what from the external world . . . the principles are not the starting we usually call sensations) are the real elernents of the point of the investigation [as Diihring who would be a ma- world."* terialist, but cannot consistently adhere to materialisrn, holds], About this word "elements," the fruit of twelve years of but its final result; they are not applied to natu(e and human "rcfl,ection," we shall speak later. At present let us note that history, but abstracted from thenr; it is not nature and the Mach explicitly states here that things or bodies are complexes realm of humanity rvhich conform to these principles, but of sensations, and that he quite cleady sets up his own philo- the principles are only valid in so far as they are in con- sophical point of view against the opposite theory which formity with nature and history. That is the only ma- holds that sensations are "symbols" of things (it would be terialistic conception of the matter, and Herr Diihring's con* more correct to say images or reflections of things). The trary conception is idealistic, makes things stand completely latter theory is pbilosopbical materialisnz. For instance, the on their heads, and fashions the real world out of ideas'l materialist Frederick Engels - the not unknown collaborator (ibid., p. zr).18 Engels, v/e repeat, applies this "only ma- of Marx and a foundet of Marxism - coastantly and without terialistic conception" everywhere and without exception, exception speaks in his works of things and their mental relentlessly attacking Diihring for the least deviation from pictures or images (Gedanken-Abbilder), and it is obvious materialism to idealism. Anybody who reads Anti-Dr.ibring that these mental images arise exclusively from sensations. and Ludutig Feuerbacb v'ith the slightest care will find scores It would seem that this fundamental standpoint of the "philos- of instances when Engels speaks of things and their reflections ophy of Marxism" ought to be known to everyone who in the human brain, in our consciousness, thought, etc. Engels speaks of it, and especially to anyone who comes our in print does not say that sensations or ideas are "symbols" of things, in tbe natne ol this philosophy. But becausc of the extraor- for consistent materialism must here use "image," picture, dinary confusion which our Machiar.rs have introduced, it or reflection instead of "syrnbol," as we shall show in detail becomes necessary to rcPcat what is gcncrally known. !(/e in the proper place. But the question here is not of this or

* * E. Mach, Dic Mecbanik in ibrcr Entoickl.ung bistoriscb-ktitiscb Fr. Engels, Henn Eugen Dilfuings UmoiilTung der V/issenscbat't dargestellt [Meclsanicr, a I]i.rtorical, arul Critical Accottnt ol Its Deoelop- [Herr Euget Diihring's Reoolution in Sciencel, y. Auflage, Stuttgart, r9o4, 6. ruentl, 1. Auflage, Lcipzi1; 1897, S. 473. s. SENSATIONS AND COMPLEXI,S OF SI]NSATIoNS ;II' 34 THEOI{Y OF KNOWL]:]DGI]. I proceed from permanent nuclei atd are conveycd to tlte sell thc opposition o[ that formulation of materialism, but of through the medium of the body; which effects we ca,ll scnsa- the difference betwcen the two materialism to idealism, of tions . . ." (p. z,o). to proceed from fundamental lines it philosophy. Are wc In other words, people "habituate" themselves to adopt Or are we to proceed from things to sensation and thought? thc standpoint of materialism, to regard sensations as thc things? The first line, i'e', the thotf,ht and sensation to result of the action of bodies, things, nature on our sense- Engels. The second Lne, i'e', ,rrrt"iiulitt line, is adopted by o(gans. This "habit," so noxious to the philosophical idealists Mach' No evasions, no the idealist line, is adopted by (a habit acquired by all mankind and all natural science!), we shall yet encounter) can sophisms (a multitude of which is not at all to the liking of Mach, and he proceeds to de- that Ernst Mach's ,.*orr. the cleat and indisputable fact stroy it: " . . . Thereby, however, these nuclei ate deptived of their entire sensible cofltent and are converted into naked abstractsymbols...." An old song, most worthy Professor! This is a literal repetition of Berkeley who said that matter is a naked abstract symbol. But it is Ernst Mach, ir fact, who goes naked, for if he does not admit that the "sensible content" is an objective reality, existing independently of us, there remains only a "naked abstract" I, at I infallibly written with a capital letter and italicised, equal to "the insane piano, which imagined that it was the sole existing thing in this world." If the "sensible content" of our sensations is not the external world then nothing exists save this naked I engaged in empty "philosophical" acrobatics. A stupid and fruitless occupation! r9o7): lished by Skirmutt, Moscow, " . . . It is then cor(ect that the world consists only o[ point If we touch S, that is, "t7e see a body with a S' our sensations. In which case we have knowledge only of our body, we rcceivc a prick' W'e bring it into contact r.vith sensations, and the assumption of those nuclei, and of their prick. But as soon as we can see S without fecling thc interaction, from which alone sensations proceed, turns out thc skin' Tlrus, thc visible point fccl thc prick wc fincl S on to be quite idle and superfluous. Such a view can only appeal rlg to circumstances' is a permancnt nuclcr'r to halt'-bearted realism or baff-bearted c:Jrticism." ctrbal' By frequent the irick is attachccl I7e have quoted the sixth paragraph of Mach's "anti- nal1y habituate our- ,.p"iition, of aualogo metaphysical observations" in full. It is a sheer plagiarism ,.irr", ,o rcgarcl alL s as 'effects' which r 36 THEORY oF KNo\(Llil)cil. SENSATIONS AND COMPLI]XES OF SIINIJA'I'IoNS 37

same "nuclei and their interaction" which our philosoplrt'r: declared to be idle and superfluous? \We are told that boclics are complexes of sensations; to go beyond that, Mach assLrrcs us, to regard sensations as a product of the action of bodics upon our sense-organs, rs metaphysics, an idle and supcr- fluous assumption, etc., ir la Berkeley. But the brain is a he accuses others. For if the "assumption" of the existence body. Consequently, the brain also is no more than a com- the of the external world is "id\'e," if the assumption that plex of sensations. It foliows, then, that with the help of that an interaction neeclle exists independently of me and a cornplex of sensations I (and / also am nothing but a com- point the needle is takes place between my body and the of piex of sensations) sense complexes of sensations. A delightful "assump- really "idle and superfluous," then prirnarily the philosophy! First sensations are declared to be "the real superfluous' tion" o[ the existence of other people is idle and elements of the world"; on this an "original" Berkeleianism as external Only 1 exist, and all other people, as well the is erected and then the very opposite view is smuggled Holding - *orid, conee under the category of idle "nuclei." in, rsi1., that sensatiofls are connected with definite processes this point ot in the organism. Ate not these "processes" connected with and when of an exchange of matter between the "organism" and the ex- of his own ed ternal world? Could this exchange of matter take place if philosophy le the sensations of the particular organism did not give it an their author himself does not believe. objectively correct idea of this external world? half- Here is a patictlady graphic exalnple of Mach's Mach does not ask himself such embarrassing questions the hearteclness and confusion. In $ 6 of Chapter XI of when he mechanically jumbtres fragments of Berkeleianisrn with the views of natural science, which instinctively adheres to the materiaiist theory of knowledge. fn the sarne par.agraph Mach writes: "It is sornetimes also asked whether (inorganic) '117atter.' experiences sensation. . . . " Does this mean that there is no doubt dtat organic natter experiences sensation? Does this mean that sensation is uot something primary but that it is one of the ptoperties of matter? Vlach Yes' organism in general, and in our skips over all the absurdities of Berkeleianism! "The d be MIch very .lcfinitely makcs this ' question," he avers, "is natural enough, if we proceed from turel quite a task not to makc it fron the currcnt widespread physical notions, according to which very science! But is not this tl'rc vcry matter is the irurnediate ar,d indisputably givet reality, out o[ SENSATIONS AND COMPLEXES OF' SI]NSAI']ONS JO THEORY OF KNO\(/LRDGI". I which everything, inorganic and organic, is constructed. . . ' " only surmise the existence of a faculty akin to scnsatiott. Let us bear in mind this truly valuable admission of Mach's Such, for example, is the supposition of the well-knowlr that the current widespread pbysical notions regard matter German scientist Ernst Haeckel, thc English biologist Lloycl as the immediate rcality, and that only one variety of this Morgan and others, not to speak of Diderot's coniecturc rcality (organic matter) possesses the well-defincd property mentioned above. Machism holds to the opposite, the idealist since, in of sensation. . . . Mach continues: "Thefl, indced, sensation point of view, and at once lands into an absurdity: primary, the must suddenly arise somewhere in this structure consisting the first place, sensation is taken as in spite of processes in matter of matter, or else have previously been present in the founda- f.act that it is associated only with delinite tion. Ftom our standpoint the question is a false one' For organised in a definite way; and since, in the second place, us matter is not rvhat is primarily given. Rather, what is the basic premise that bodies are complexes of sensations is primarily given are the eletnents (which in a certain familiar violated by the assumption of the existence of other living given relation are designated as sensations). . . ' " beings and, in general, of other "complexes" besides the 'What is primarily given, then, are sensations, although great I. they are "connected" only with definite processes in organic The rvord "clement," which maoy naive people (as we shall mattcr! And while uttering such absutdities Mach waflts to see) take to be some sort of a new discovery, in reality only rneaningless tenn which blarne materialism ("the current widespread physical notion") obscures the question, f.or it is a for leaving unanswered the question rvhence sensation creates the false impression that a solution of, a step forward "arises." This is a sample of the "refutntion" of materialism has been achieved. This impression is a false one, because by the fideists and their hangers-on. there still remains to be investigated and reinvestigated how to sophical standpoint "solve" a probl matter, apparently entirely devoid of sensation, is related (or for its solution has been collected? matter which, though composed of the salne atoms elec- faculty of sensa- say in the very same paragraph: "So long as this problem trons), is yet endowcd with a well"defined (how far sensation extends in the organic wodd) has not tion. Materialism clearly formulates the as yet unsolved to been solved even in a single special case, flo answer to the problem and thereby stimulatcs the atternpt to solve it, question is possible." undertake further experimental investigation. I\{achisrn, which the issue and Thc diflerence between materialism and "Machism" in this is a species of muCdled idealism, befogs side- particular question thus consists in the following. Material- tracks it by means of the futile verbal trick, "elernent." ism, in full agrecment vrith natural scicncc, takcs matter as Here is a passage from Mach's latest, comprehensive and primary and regards conscious conclusive philosophical work that cleady betrays the falsity and tead: secondary, bccausc in its wcll-dc of tlris idealist trick. In his Knouledge Error we (aut'7ltbauen) ciated only r,vith thc highcr form "While there is no difiiculty in constructing sensations, i.e., psychical while "in the foundation of thc sttLtcturc of matter" one can ersery pbysical expedence out of SENSATIONS AND COMPLEXIS OII SIiNgAl'IoNS 4l THEORY OF KNO'iTLEDGE. I from the movement of matter or in rcducing scnsatiott to elements, it is impossible to imagine (ist keine Moglicbkeit the movement of matter, but in recognising sensation as ottc abzuseben) how any psltcbical exp'erience can be composed of the properties of matter in motion. On this questiofl (darstelten) of the elements employed in modern physics, i'e', Engels shared the staodpoint of Diderot. Engels dissociatcd mass and motion (in their rigidity - Startheit - which is himself from the "vtrlgat" materialists, Vogt, Btichner and serviceable only for this special science)."* Moleschott, for the very reason, among othe(s, that they erred Of the rigidity of the conceptions of many modern scientists in believing that the brain secretes thought in. tbe same usay and of their metaphysical (in the Marxist sense of the term, as the liver secretes bile. But X{ach, who constantly sets up i.e., atti-dialectical) views, Engels speaks repeatedly and very his views in opposition to materialism, ignores, of course, precisely. We shal1 see later that it was iust on this point all the gteat materialists Diderot, Feuerbach, Marx and because did not understand or - that Mach went astray, he Engels - just as all other oflicial professors of official phi- did not know the retration between relativism and dialectics' losophy do. But this is not what concerns us here. It is important for In order to characterise Avenarius' earliesi and basic view, us here to note how glaringly Mach's idealisrn emerges, in let us takc his first independent philosophical wotk, Philos- spite of the confused - ostensibly new - terminology. There opby as a Conception ol tbe Wortd, According to the Prin' is no difiiculty, you see, in constructing any physical element ciple ol the Minimrmt. Expettdintre ol Effort. Prolegomena out of seflsations, i.e., psychical elenrents! Oh yes, such con- to a Critique ol Pure Experience, r.vhich appeared in 1876. they ate purely structions, of course, ate not difficult, for Bogdanov h hts Empirio-Monisnt (tsk. r, zrd ed., t9oj, p. 9, verbal constructions, shallorv scholasticism, serving as a loop- note) says that "in the development of A4ach's views, the hole for fideism. It is not surprising after this that Mach starting point was philosophical iclealisrn, while a realistic dedicates his works to the immanentists; it is not surprising tinge was characteristic of Avenatius from the very begin- that the immanentists, who profess the most reactionary kind ning." Bogdanov said so because he believed what Mach of philosophical idealism, welcome Mach with open arms. said (see Analysis ol Sensations, Russian translation, p. zBB). The "recent positivism" of Ernst Mach was only about two Bogdanov should not have believcd Mach, and his assertion hundred years too late. Berkeley had akeady sufiiciently is diametrically opposed to the truth. On the contrary, shown that "out of sensations , i.e., psychical elements," noth- Avenarius' idealism emerges so clearly in his work of t876 ing can be "built" except solipsisrn. As regards materialism, that Avenarius himself in r8gr was obliged to admit it. In against which Mach here, too, sets up his own views, rvithout the introduction to Tlte Fluruan Concept ol tbe World Avena- frankly and explicitly naming the "cncmy," we have aheady tius says: "He who has read my first systematic work, Pbi.los- seen in the case of Didcrot what thc rcal views of the ma- opbie, etc., will at once have prcsumed that I would have terialists are. These views do not cot-tsist in dcriving sensation attempted to tteat the ptoblems of a criticism of pure experience frorn the 'idealist' stanclpoint" (Der menscblicbe Welti * E. Mach, Erkenntnis und lrrtum, z. Auflagc, 19o6, S. rz, Anm. TI{EORY OF KNO\flI,IIDCE. I SENSATIONS AND COMPLEXES OF SENSA'I]ONS 4t

Sensation, then, exists without "substance," 1.e., tlrotrglrt exists without brain! Are there really philosophers capablc of defending this brainless philosophy? There are! Profcssor Richard Avenarius is one of them. And we must pausc for a while to consider this defence, difficult though it be for literature. Of the French writers I shall refer to Caurvelaert, a normal person to take it seriously. Here, in $$ 89 and 9o who says that Avenarius' philosophical standpoint in the Pro' of this same work, is Avenarius' argument: legomenale is "monistic idealism."* Of the Gcrman writers, ". The proposition that motion produces sensation is I shall name Rudolf Willy, Avenarius' disciple, who says that based on apparcat experience only. This experience, which "Avenarius in his youth - and particularly in his work o[ includes the act of perception, consists, presumably, in the (7anz o[ so- that sensation is generated in a certain kind of substance fi76 - was totally uncler the spell iru Banne) fact called epistemological idealism'"x* (brain) as a result of transmitted motion (excitation) and with And, indeed, it would be ridiculous to deny the idealism the help of other material conditions (e.g., blood). However - in Avenarius' Prolegornena, whete he explicitly states that apart froro the fact that such gencration has never itself (selbst) been observcd in order to construct the supposed "orzly sensatiorc can be tbougbt ol as tbe existing" (pp' to - experience, as an experience vhich is real in all its component arrd 65 of the second German edition; all italics in quotations parts, empirical proof, at least, is required to show that sen- are ours). This is how Avenarius himself presents the con- sation, which assumeclly is caused in a certain substance by tents of 116 of his work. I-trere is the paragraph in full: $ transmitted motion, did not aheady exist in that substance have recognised that the existing (das Seiende) is sub- ,"We in one way or another; so that the appearance o[ sensation stance enclowed with sensation; the substance falls away [it cannot be conceived of in any other way than as a creatiYe economical," don't you see, there is "a lesser expend- is "more act on the part of the transmitted motion. Thus only by prov- thinking that there is no "substance" and iture of effort" in ing that where a sensation now appears there vlas none !] sensation remains; we must that no external world exists , previously, not even a minimal one, would it be possible to as sensation, at the basis of which then regard the existing establish a fact which, denoting as it does some act of crea- (nicbts thete is nothirg r,vhich does not posscss sensation tion, contradicts all the rest of experience and rudically EruPfindttngsloses)." changes all the rest of our concepiion of nature (Naturan- scbauung). But such proof is not furnished by any experience, *F. Vao Caurvclacrt, "L'empirioctiticiune" ["Ilmpirio-Criticism"], and cannot be furnished by any experience; on the contraty, in Ret'ue nio-scolasliqtcj0 t9o7, Fcb', p. 5r- the notion of a state of a substance totally devoid of sensa- *+ Ruclolf ]i#tlly, Gt:gen dic ScLnkocislLeit. Einc Kritik der Pltiloso- begins to experience sensation is only pbie [Against StlLooI \iTistlottt. A Critirluc ot' PlLilosopl:1'], Miinchen, tion which subsequently r9o5, S. r7o. a hypothesis. But this hypothesis mcrely complicates and SENSATIONS AND COMPLEXES OF SENSA]'I()NS 4lt I 44 THEORY OF KNOISLEDGTJ. muddled Ostwald, he wrote: "From ancient times to thc insteacl of sirnplifying and clarify- obscures our understanding presert day, descriptive psychology has adhered to the classification of the facts of consciousness into three categories: the domain of sensations and ideas, the domain of emotions and the domain of impulses. . . . To the firsc category belong the iruages of phenomena of the outer or inner world, as taken by themselves in consciousness. . . Such an image is called a 'sensation' if it is directly produced through the sense-organs by its corresponding external phenomenon."* And a little father on he says: "sensation arises in consciousness as a result of a certain impulse from the external environment transmitted by the external sense-organs" (p. zzz). And further: "sensation is the foundation of mental life; it is its immediate connection with the external world" (p.r+o). "At each step in the process of sensation a transformation of the energy of external excitation into a state of consciousness takes ptrace" (p.rl). And even in r9oy, when with the gracious assistance of Ostwald and Mach Bogdanov had already abandoned the materialist stafldpoint in philosophy for the idealist standpoirt, he wrote (from forgetfulness!) in his Etnpirio-Monism: "As is knolvn, the energy of external excitation, transformed at the nerve-ends into a 'telegraphic' form of nerve current (still insufficiently investigatcd but devoid of all mysticism), first reaches the neurons that are located in the so-called 'lower' centres - ganglial, cerebro-spinal, subcortical, etc." (Bk. r, znd ed., t9o5, p. rr8.) For every scientist who has not been led astray by professorial philosophy, as well as for every materialist, sensa-

+A. Bogdanov, Tlse FunCamental Elements of tlte Historicut Outlook on Nalure, St. Petersburg, fi9g, p. z16, ..DlSCOVERY OF WORLD,}]LEMI]N1'S" THEORY OF KNO\(/LEDGE. I those analysed above. However, the desire to masqucrirtlc incleed direct coflnection betwccn consciousness tion is the as a materialist is so foreign to Pearson (that is a spccialty o[ the external world; it is tl-re transfotmation of the ene(gy and the Russian Machians), Pearson is so incautious, that hc excitation into a sta-te of consciousness' This - of external invents no "new" names for his philosophy and simply has been, ancl is, observed by each of us a transformation declares that his views and those of Mach are "idealist" (ibid., on every hand. The sophism of idealist philos- million times p. He traces his genealogy directly to Berkeley and the fact that it regards sensation as being 326)! ophy consists in Hume. The philosophy of Pearson, as we shall repeatedly between consciousness and tl-re exteroal not-th" connection find, is distinguished from that of Mach by its far greater a separating consciousness from the world, but a fence, well, integrity and consistency. not an image of the external phenomenon external wortrd - Mach explicitly declares his solidarity with the French physicists, Pierre Duhem and Henri Poincar6.* !7e shall have occasion to deal with the particularly confused and inconsistent philosophical views of these writers in the chapter on the new physics. Here we shall content outselves with noting that for Foincar6 things are "groups of sensations"** let us therefore acknorvl- matter organised in a def,nite way, and that a similar view is casually expressed by Duhem.*** alone that is what the edge the existence of sensatiou - We shall now proceed to examine how Mach and Ave- to. sophisrn of Avcnarius reduces itself narius, having admitted the idealist character of their origi- fundamental idealist To conclude our description of the nal viervs, corrected them in their subeequent works.

2. "TIIE DISCOVE,RY OF THE \X/ORLD-ELF,MENTS"

Such is the title under which Friedrich Adler, lecturer at the University of Ziich, probably the only German author also anxious to supplement Mam with Machism, writes of s of sense- materialism * Analysis ol Sensations, p. 4. Cl. Preface to Erkeruilnis and lrtum, now Feuer- znd ed. difier from +* Henti Poincard, La oaleur de la science [Tl:e Value ol Science], Patis, rgoy (There is a Russian uanslati,on), passim. *'r'* P. Duhem, La thdorie pbysique, son objet et sa structure London' I9oo, [The * Karl Perrson, Tlte Gtantntr ol Scietce, znd ecl', Physical Tbeory, lts Object and Strnctwel, Paris, 19o6. Ct'. pp. 6 and to, p. 326- 48 THEORY OF KNOWLI]DGI]. I .,DISCOVERY OF \(/ORLD ELI]AIDNI'S'' 4t

Mach.* And this naive university lecturer must be given his that it is only in this connection [namely, in the conncctiorr of A, B, C with K, L, M, that is, in the connection of "complexes which we ordinarily call bodies" with "the comirlcx which we call our body"] and relation, only in this functional dependence that the elements are sensations. fn another functional dependence they are at the same time physical of Mach to the old philosophical errors? objects" (Russian translation, pp. z1 ar.d r7). "A colour is a 'We saw that Mach ir, ,e7, and Avenarius in 1876 het\d physical object when we consider its dependence, fot instance, a purely idealist view; for them the world is our sensation' upon the source of illumination (other colours, temperatures, In r8B1 Mach's Mechanik appear'ed, and in the preface to spaces and so forth). Xfhen we, howcver, consider its Ptolegoruena, and the first edition Mach refers to Avenarius' dependence upon the retina (the elements K, L, M), it is a psycbological object, a sensation" (ibid., p. z$. Thus the discovery of the world-elements amounts to this: r) all that exists is declared to be sensation, z) sensations are called elements, 1) elements are divided into the physical and tlie psy- connec- matter of the connection of these elements. . . . The chical; the latter is that which depends on the human nerves problem physics, tion of A (hea| with B (flame) is a of and the human organism genetally; the former does not that of A and N (nerves) a problem of physiology' Neither depend on them; Only temporar- exists sel)aratety; both exist in coniunclion. the connection of physical elements and the connec- ent- 4) tion of psychical elements, it is declared, do not exist sep- cit., sol arutely from each other; they exist only in conjunction; it is possible only temporarily leave one xo[ 5) to or the othcr connection out of account; place of the terms sensations,' are used alongside o[ or in 6) the "new" theory is declared to be frce from "o[e- borne rnind 'element,' 'complex of elements,' it must bc in sidedness."* Indeed, it is not one-sidedness we have here, but an in- * Fricdr coherent fumble of antithetical philosophical points of view. Machs 7o. ()ccasion (Fcbruar). x Mach says it the Analltsis ol Sensatiozs: "These elements ate ro (April). usually called sensations, But as that tetm already implies a one-sidcd the symposium Historical Llaterialisttt, thcory, we ptcfer to spcak simply of elcmcnts" (pp. z;-zs). ,.DISCOVEITY OF'WORLD-ELEMENTS'' l-r I 50 THEORY OF KNO!(LEDGE. I procluccs Since you base yourself. only on sensations you do not cor- materialism: rnatter acting upon our seflse-organs rect the "one-sidedness" of your idealism by the term "ele- sensation, Sensation depends on the brain, nervcs, rctirra, a definite way. The existcllcc mellt," but only confuse the issue and cravenly hide from etc., i.e., on matter organised in Matter is primary. your own theory. In a rrord, you eliminate the antithesis of matter does not depend ofl sensatiofl. Sensation, thought, consciousness are the supreme product between the physical and psychical,* betrveen materialism organised in a particular way. Such ate the views (which regards nature, r,;,atter, as primary) and idealism of matter of materialism in general, and of Marx and Engels it partic- (rvhich rcgards spirit, mind, sensation as primary); indeedy ular. Mach and Avenarius seuetly smuggle in materialism you promptly restore this antithesis; you restore it surrep- by means of the rvord "element," which supposedly frces titiously, reffeaLtittg from your own fundamental premise! their theory of thc "one-sidedness" of subiective idealism, For, if elements are sensations, you have no right even for sttpposedly permits the assumption that the rnental is depend- a momcnt to acccpt the existence of "elements" independent on the retina, nerves and so forth, and the assumption ently of my nerves and my mind. But if you do admit that the physical is independent of the human organism' physical objects that are independent of my nerves and my In fact, of course, the trick with the word "element" is a sensations and that cause seflsation only by acting upon my wrctched sophistty, for a materialist who teads Mach and you are disgracefully abandoning your "one-sided" retina - Avenarius will immediately ask: what are the "elements"? icJealism and adopting the standpoint of "one-sided" mate- It would, indeed, be childish to think that one can dispose of colour a sensation only depending upon the rialism! If is the fundamental philosophical trends by inventing a new compels you to admit), then light retina (as natural science word. Either the "element" is a sensatiott' as all empirio- produce sensation of col- rays, falling upon the retina, the criticists, Mach, Avenarius, Petzoldt,* etc., maintain in us and - our. This means that outside us, independently of which case your philosophy, gentlemen, is idealisru vainly say cf our minds, there exists a movement of matter, let us seeking to hide the nakedness of its solipsism under the cloak of ether waves of a definite length and of a definite velocity, of a more "objective" terminology; or the "element" is not produce in man the sensation which, acting upofl the retina, a sensation - in which case absolutely no tbought u;hateoer of a particular colour. This is precisely how natural science is attached to the "new" term; it is merely an empty bauble. regards it. It explains the sensations of various colours by Take PetzoTdt, for instance, the last word in empirio-criti- the various lengths of light-waves existing outside the hu- cism, as V. Lessevich, the first and most outstanding Russian man retina, outside man and independently of him. This is * Joseph Petzoldt, Eint'iihrung in die Pbilosopbie det teinen Etfab' + "The antithcsis bctrvccn thc self and the wotld, scnsation or ap' rung pntroduction ,o tbe Pbilosopby ol Pure Experiencel, Bd. I' Leipziy,, pearance ancl the thing, thcn vanishcs, and it all rcduces itsclf to a r9oo, S. rr3: "Elements are seosations in the ordinary sense of simple, (Vabrnehmungen)." complex of clements" (ibicl., p. zr). irreducible petceptions !,DISCOVERY OF \VORLD-ELEMENTS'I 53 52 THEORY OF KNO\TLEDGE. I as saying that sensation is a result of the action of mattcr on empirio-criticist describes him.* Having defined elernents our sense-o(gans. says in the second volume of the work men- as sensations, he Let us take Avenarius. The most valuable material on the statement that 'sensations are the elements tioned: "In the question of the "elements" is to be found in his last work of the wodd' one must guard against taking the term 'sensa- (and, it might be said, the most important for the comprehen- as denoting something only subjective and therefore tion' sion his philosophy), Notes on tbe Concept of the Subiect picture the world into of ethercal, transforming the ordinary of gives a very *tr of Psycbology.* The authot, by the way, here an illusion (V er ht i ge nde s)." fltic "graphic" table (Vol. XVI[, P. 4ro), the main part of which One speaks of what hurts one most! Petzoldt feels that we reproduce here: the u'orld "evaporates" (oerfh.icbtigt sicb), or becomes trans- complexes of elements: formed into an illusion, when sensations are regarded as Elements, I. Things, or the substantial Corpoteal things world-elements. And the good Petzoldt imagines that he II. Thoughts, or the mental Incorpoteal things, tecollections helps matters by the reservation that sensation must not be (Gedankenbaftes) and fantasies Is this not a ridiculous taken as something only subiective! Compare this with what Mach says after all his elucida- whether we "take" sophistry? Does it make any difierence tion of tlre "elernents" (Analysis of Sensations, p.fi): "It is or whether we try to stretch the mean- sensation as sensation not boCies that produce sensations, but complexes o[ elements away with the fact that sensa- ing of the term? Does this do (complexes of sensations) that make up bodies." Here you functioning ne(ves, tions in man are connected with normally have the "discovery of the world-elements" that overcomes independently retina, brain, etc., that the external world exists the one-sidedness of idealism and materialism! At first we of our sensations? If you are r'ot trying to evade the issue are assured that the "elements" are something new, both by a subterfuge, if you are rcally in earnest in wanting to physical and psychical at the same time; then a little correc- "gtard" against subiectivism and solipsism, you must above tion is surreptitiously inserted: instead of the crude, material- all guard against the fundamental idealist premises of your ist differentiation of natter (bodies, things) and the psychical philosophy; you must rcplace the idealist line of your phi- (sensations, recollections, fantasies) we are presented with losophy (from sensations to the external world) by the mate- the doctrine of "recent positivism" regarding elements sub- rialist line (from the external world to sensations); you must stantial and elements mental. Adler (Fritz) did not gain abandon that empty and muddled verbal embellishment, very much frorn "the discovery of the wodd-elements" ! ,"element," and simply say that colour is the result of the Bogdanov, arguing against Plekhanov it 19o6, wrote: action of a physical object on the retina, which is the same ". . . I cannot own myself a Machian in philosophy' In the

+ R. Avenarius, l'Bemerkungeg zn?i? Begriff des Gegenstandes det * Lesscvich, Vbat Is Scientific [read: fashiorable, ptofessorial, V. Psychologie," Vierteljahrsscbrilt uissenscbaftlicbe Philosophie,23 Bd. eclectic] Pbilosopby?, St' Pctctsburg, r89I, pp. 229, 247' liir XVIII Gaq+) und Bd. XIX Gsqt). ** Petzoldt, Bd. II, Leipzig, r9o4, S. 729. 54 THEORY OF KNOITLEDGE. I !.DISCOVERY OF IiTORLD-ELEMBNTS'I 65 general philosophical conception there is only one thing I blindly believed Mach and began to rcpeat after hin'r that the neutral in relation to the borrowed from Mach - the idea of the neutrality of the "elements" of experience are elements of experience in relation to the 'physical' and physical and psychical. "As has been established by recent 'psychical,' and the dependence of these characteristics solely positivist philosophy," wrote Bogdanov in Book I of Empi- on the connection of experience." (Empirio-Monistn, Bk. III, rio-Monisru (znd ed., p. 9o), "the elements of psychical the elements of expetience in St. Petersburg, 19o6, p. xli.) This is as though a religious t experience are identical with elements of physical man were to say - I cannot own myself a believer in religion, g"n.ral, as they are identical with the for there is "only one thing" I have borrowed from the be- experience." Or in 19o6 (Bk. III, p' xx): "as to 'idealism,' can grounds that the elements lievers - the belief in God. This "only one thing" which it be called idealism merely on the Bogdanov borrowed from Mach is th,e basic eruor of Machism, of 'physical experience' are regarded as identical with the the basic falsity of its entire philosophy. Those deviations elements of 'psychical experience,' or with elementary sensa- of Bogdanov's from empirio-criticism to which he himself tions - when this is simply an indubitable fact?" attaches great signifi.cance are in fact of entirely secondary Here we l.rave the true source of all Bogdanov's philosoph- rest importaflce and amount to nothing more than inconsiderable ical misadventures, a source which he shares with the private and individual diflerences between the various of the Machians. !7e can and must call it idealism when "the Lmpirio-criticists who are apProved by Mach and who ap- elements of physical experience" (i.e., the physical, the ex- as identical with sensations, prove Mach (we shall speak of this in Sreater detail later)' ternal world, matter) are rcgarded is flot a trace here of H.n.. when BogdafloY was annoyed at being confused with for this is sheer Berkeleianism. There philosophy, or of indubitable the Machians he only revealed his failure to understand what recent philosophy, or positivist idealist sophism. ,tnd were one rad.icalty distinguishcs materialism from what is comtnon to fact. It is merely an old, old prove the "indubitable fact" Bogdanov and to all other Machians. Horv Bogdanov de- to ask Bogdanov hor.v he would sensatioos, ofle would get veloped, improved or worsened Machism is not important' that the physical is identical with save the eternal refrain of the idealists: What is important is that he has abandoned the materialist no other argument only of my sensations; the "testimony of self- stanclpoint and has thereby inevitably couclemned himself to f am aware consciousnes s" (die Aussage des Selbstbeortsstseins) of Avena- con{usion and idealist aberrations. rius in his Prolegontena (znd German ed., $ 91, P.:6); or: "in In 1899, as v/e saw, Bogdanov had the correct standpoint our expericnce testifies that "we are sentient sllb- when he wrote: "The image of the man before me, directly [which stance"] sensation is given us vrith more certainty than is given to rne by vision, is a sensation."* Bogdanov did not substantiality" (ibid., gr, p. y5), and so on and so fotth. trouble to give a cr:iticism of this earlier position of his' He $ Bogdanov (trusting Mach) accepted a reactionatv philosophical trick as an "indubitable fact." For, indeed' not a * Tbe Frmrlamcttldl Elemc,Tls, ctc., P. u6; cl' the quotations cited refute the above. single fact was or could be cited which would 56 THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE. I !.DISCOVERY OF !(ORLD.ELEMENTS', 57 a view that sensation is an image of the external world - s€osations," the elements discovered by recent positivism, ancl is view which vzas shared by tsogdanov in 1899 and which similar floflsense. shared by natural science to this day. In his philosophical That is just the whole trouble. Bogdanov (like the rest of from wanderings the physicist Mach has completely strayed the Russian Machians) has never looked into the idealist the path of "modern science." Regarding this irnportant views originally held by Mach and Avenarius, has never circurnstance, which Bogdanov ovedooked, we shall have understood their fundamental idealist premises, and has there- much to say later. fore failed to discover the illegitimacy and eclecticism of their One of the circurnstances which helped Bogdanov to iump subsequent attempts to smuggle in materialism surreptitious- of the naaual scientists to so quickly from the materialism ly. Yet, iust as the initial idealism of Mach and Avenarius is the muddled idealism of Mach was (apart from the influence generally acknowledged in philosophical literature, so is it of Ostwald) Avenarius' doctrine of the dependent and inde- generally acknowledged that subsequently empirio-criticism the pendent series of experience. Bogclanov himself expounds endeavoured to swiag towards materialism. Cauwelaert, the so far as matter in Book I of his Ernpirio-Monisnt' thts: "In French writer quoted above, asserts that Avenarhts' Ptolego- state ot' the data of experience appear in clependence upon tbe mena is "monistic idealism," the Critique ot' Pure Expelience tbe particular neroous s:istem, they fotm the psycbical zoorld (r88S-9o) is "absolute realism," while Tbe Human Concept of the particular person; in so far as the data of experience of the World (r89r) is an attempt "to explain" the change. are taken outsicle ot' such a dependence, we have before us Let us note that the term realism is here employed as the these the pbysical zttorlcl. Avenarius therefore characterises antithesis of idealism. Following Engels, I use only the tcrm two realrns of experience respectively as the dependent series materialism in this sense, and consider it the sole correct and the inclepend,ent series of. experience" (p' rB). terminology, especially since the term "realism" has been the inde- That is iust the whole trouble, the doctrine of bedraggled by the positivists and the other muddlehcads who is pend.ent (i.e., itdependent of human sensation) "series" oscillate between materialism and idealism. For the present a surreptitious importation of materialism, which, from the it will suffice to note that Cauwelaert had the indisputable are standpoint of a philosophy that maintains that bodies factin mind that in the Prolegonxena (1876) sensation, accord- .o*pi."", of sensations, that seosations are "identical" with ing to Avenarius, is the only entity, while "substance" eclectic' - plrysical "elements," is illegitimate, arbittary, and in accordance with the principle of "the economy of thought"! you recognised that the source of light and ho. un." have - is eliminated, and that in the Critique of Ptre Experience light-waves exists independently of man and the human con- the physical is taken as the independent series, while the ..1ouun"rr, that colour is clepcndcnt on the action of these psychical and, consequently, sensations, are taken as the the rnaterial- \yaves upoll thc rctina, you have in fact adopted dependent series. "indubi- ist standpoint ancl havc compl,etely clcsttoyed all the Avenarius' disciple Rudolf \X/iily likewise admits thac "the con-rplexes of table facts" of ideatrisrn, togcthcr rvith all Avenarius was a "complete" idealist it fi76, but subsequently .,DISCOVERY OF \iYORLD-ELEMENTS" 5O 58 THEORY OF KNOVLEDGE. I fines as standing midway between Spinozism and absolutc "reconcilecl" (Ausgleicb) "naive realism" (i'e', the instinctive' materialism).* unconscious materialist standpoint adopted by humanity' True, this opinion of Wundt's is extremely interesting. which regards the external world as existing independently But what is even more "interesting" is Mr. Yushkevich's with this teaching (loc' cit')' of our minds) attitude towards the books and articles on philosophy of the author of the boak Aoenarius as tlte Oskar Ewald, which he treats. This is a typical example of the attitude of ou( Machiaas to such matters. Gogol's Petrushka2s used to read and find it interesting that letters always combined to make words. Mr. Yushkevich read I7undt and found it "interesting" that Wundt accused Avenarius of materialism. If Wundt is wrong, why not refute him? If he is right, why not explain the antithesis between materialism and empirio- criticism? Mr. Yushkevich finds what the idealist 'Wundt says "interesting," but this Machian regards it as a \vaste of efiort to endeavour to go to the root of the matter (probably on the principle of "the economy of thought"). . . . But of pa(ticular interest to us in this respect is the opin- The point is that by informing the reader that Iflundt above- ion of \7undt, who himself, like the maiority of the accuses Avenarius of materialism, and by not informing him stand- mentioned writers, adheres to the confused idealist that Wundt regards some aspects of empirio-criticism as materialism and others as idealism and holds that the connection bet,veen the two is artificial, Yushkevich entirely distorted tbe matter. Either this gentleman absolutely does not understand what he reads, or he was prompted by a desire to indulge in false self-praise with the help of !7undt, as if to say: you see, the ofiicial professors regard us, too, as materialists, and not as muddleheads. The above-mentioned article by I7undt constitutes a large book (more than 3oo pages), devoted to a detailed analysis * Oskat E:wild, Ricbord Aocnarirrs al's Begriitttler d'es Empiriokriti- Betlitt' first of the immanentist school, and then of the empirio- z;r*^ inirnotd Aaenaritts as the t'orttt'cLct ol Empirio-Ctiticisml' r9o5, S. 66. *I7. I7undt, "Ucber naioen utd ktitiscben Realismus" Naioe ** p. yushkevicl.:, Matcrial.ism antl criticot Realisnt, St. Pctetsburg, [On and Critical Retlisnl, in Pbitosophiscbe Studien,24 Bd. XIII, t897, S. 314. r9o8, P. t5. OF KNO\VLEDGE. I 60 THEORY !,DIscoVERY oF WoRLD-ELEMENTS'' O1 criticists. Why did Wundt connect these two schools? Because "metaphysical substance" says I7undt (ibid., p. 64), and is - he consiclers thern closely akin; and this opinion, which your doctrine is materialism. It should be said that many idealists and all agnostics (Kantians and Humeans included) call the materialists metaphysicians, because it seems to them that to recognise the existence of an external world independent of the human mind is to transcend the bounds of experience. Of this terminology and its utter incorrectness from the point of view of Marxism, we shall speak in its proper place. Here it is important to note that the recognition of the "independent" series by Avenarius (and also by Mach, who expfesses the same idea in diffetent words) is, according to the general opinion of philosophers of variors parties, i.e., principles by incorrect methods' they arrive at these great of various trends in philosophy, at appropriation froru ma- article arc Fuither, the second and third parts of Wundt's terialism. If you assume that everything that exists is sensation, or that bodies are complexes of sensations, you cannot, without violating all your fundamental premises, all "your" philosophy, artive at the conclusion that the pbysical exists independently of. ov minds, aod that sensatiori is a lunction of matter organised in a definite way. Mach and Avenarius, kritiscbe in (Jebereinstinxmulxg ruit det irnmancnten Pbiloso- in their philosophy, combine fundamental idealist premises prop- pbie annimmt,26 5.382). Other of Avenarius' theoretical with individual materialist deductions for the very reason general ositions ate borrowed from materialism, and in that their theory is an example of that "pauper's broth of eclecticism"zT of which Engels speaks with just contempt.* * The foreword to Ladzaig Feuetbacb, dated February 1888. These words of Er.rgels' refet to German professorial philosophy in general. The Machians who would like to be Marxists, being unable to grasp the significance and meaning of this thought of Engels', sometimes take tefuge in a wretched evasion: "Engels did not yet know Mach" (Fritz Adlet in Hist. Mat., p. On what is this opinion based? On the very fond of 3jo). "system C" (that is how Avcnarius - wl'ro '"vas fact that Engels does not cite Mach and Avenarius? There ate no othe( *nking eruclitc play of ncw tcrms - dcsignates the human grounds, and these grounds are wotthless, for Engels does not mention the ncrvous systcrl in gcncral), and if the mental any of the eclectics by name, and it is hardly likely that Engels did not brain or knorv Avenatius, who had been editing a quarterly of then this "system C" is a "scientific" is for you a functiotl of the btain, philosophy ever since 1876. ,.DiSCOVERY OF IiTORLD-ELEMENTS" 03 62 THEORY OF KNO\(LEDGB. I vanish. The physicists' theory proves to This eclecticism is partioulady marked in Mach's latest Berkeleian wisdom bodies, gases us philosophical work, I{iozotedge and' Etot, znd edition' 19o6' be a reflection of liquids, existing outside We hrve aheady seen that Mach there declared that "there and independently of us, a reflection which is, of course, is no difficulty in constructing every physical element out of approximate; but to call this approximation or simplification "arbitrary" by sensation, i.e., ottt of psychical elements," and in the same is wrong. ln fact, sensation is here regarded book we read: "Defendencies outside the boundary U' Mach just as it is regarded by all science which has not been lJtl*rrroruttg, i.e., "ihe spatial boundary of our body"' S' 8] "pvifred" by the disciples of Berkeley and Hume, oix., as an u." pf,iri., i,, th" broadest sense" (S' lzl, S+)' "To obtain itnage ol the external zooild. Mach's own theory is subjective those iependencies in a pure state (rein erbalten) it is neces- idealism; but when the factor of obfectivity is required, Mach sary as mrr.h a, possible to eliminate the influence of the unceremoniously insefts into his arguments the premises of (loc' obr"rrr"., that is, of thor. elements that lie within U" the contrary, i.e., the materialist, theory of knowlcdge. Eduard cit.). $lell,well, the titmouse first promised to set the sea on von Hartmann, a consistent idealist and consistent reactionary psychical fire]8 . . i.e., to construct physical el.ements from in philosoplry, zobo sympathises zoitb tbe Macbians' figbt lie elements, and then it trrrns out that physical elements against materialistn, comes very close to the truth when he beyond the boundary of psychical elemeots, "which lie within says that Mach's philosophical position is a "mixture (Nicbt- ori body"! A rematkable PhilosoPhY! unterscbeidung) ol naive realism and absolute illusionism."* pe? Anoth., example: "A perfect (oollkotztnenes) gas' a That is true. The doctrine that bodies are complexes of a perfect body, does not exist; the physi sensations, etc., is absolute illusionism, 1.e., solipsism; for from f".itiq,rid, "lasiic cist knows that his fictions only approximate to the facts this standpoint the world is nothing but my illusion. On and arbitrarily simplify them; he is aware of the divergence' the other hand, Mach's afore-mentioned argument, as well which-Y[r; cannot be eliminated" (S. 4r8, $ 3o)' as many other of his fragmentary arg:umerrts, is what is known Jir"rg.n." (Aboeichung) is meant here? The di- as "naive realism," i.e., the materialist theory of knowledge ,r".g"n." of *irt from what? Of tho"ght (physical theory) unconsciously and instinctively taken over from the scientists. froir the facts. And what are thoughts, ideas? Ideas are the Avenarius and the professors who follow in his footsteps "tracks of sensations" (S. g). And what are facts? Facts are attempt to disguise this mixture by the theory of the "principal the "complcxes of sensations.i' And so, the divergence of co-ordination." We shall proceed to examine this theory tra.ks of sensations from complexes of sensations cannot be presently, but let us first finish with the charge that Avenarius eliminated. is a materialist. Mr. Yushkevich, to whom !7undt's opinion 'l7hatdoesthismcan?ItmcansthatMachforgetshis which he failed to understand seemed so interesting, was o-n th.o.y and, when treating of various problems of physics' ,p"rt, plrinty, without idealist twists, i'e'' matetialistically' *Eduard von Hartmann, Die rYeltanscltauung der modernen Pblsik al ,n""'complexes of sensations" and the entire stock of [Tbe Vorld Outlook ol Modern Pbysics], Leipzig, r9oz, S. zr9. ..NAivE PRINCIPAL co-oRDINATIoN AND REALISM,, OI-I 64 TI]EORY OF KNOITLEDGE. I "truth . . . does not lie in the 'golden mean' betwecfl thc either himself not enough interestcd to lcarn, or else did not conflicting trends [materialism and spiritualism], but lies out- condescend to inform the reader, how Avenarius' nearest side of both."* What appeared to Bogdanov to be truth is, as a matter of. f.act, confusion, a wavering between materialism and idealisrn. Carstanjen, rebutting Wundt, said that he absolutely repudiated this "importation (Unterscbiebung) of a materialist element" which is utterly foreign to the critique of pure ex- know whither this curreot turned - if we may so express it perience."x* "Empirio-criticisrn is scepticism yocr'tloyilv to disown it because of - after the ofiicial idealists began (pre-eminently) in relation to the content of the concepts." its concessions to materialism. There is a grain of truth in this insistent emphasis on the Wundt was aflswered, among others, by two of Avenarius' neutrality o[ Machism; the amendment made by Mach and Avenarius to their original idealism amounts to partial concessions to materialism. Instead of the consistent standpoint of Bcrkeley - the external wodd is my sensation - lve sometimes get the Humean standpoillt - I exclude the question whether or not there is anything beyond my sensations. And this agnostic standpoint inevitably condernns one to vacillate that can be made to embrace both purely idealist works and between materialism and idealism- arbitrarrl alist pre tique ol Pure course, this teaching, , writes does 3. TI-{E PRINCIPAL CO-ORDINATION it contra opposite An AND :'NAiVE REALISM'I excellent defence! This is exactly what Engels called "a refuses to pauper's broth of eclecticism." Bogdanov, who Avenarir-rs' doctrine of the principal co-ordination is ex- a twn hims"tf a Machian and who warts to be considered pounded h The Hi.truan Concept of tbe World and in the Marxist (in pbilosoply), follows Petzoldt' He asserts that concerned with materialism, or * "empirio-criticism is nol . Ibid., p. 91. gcneral,"x* that with spiritualism, or with metaphysics in *tFr. Carstanj en, "Der EmpiioleritiTisntus, Tugleicb eine Erze:iderung aul V/. Vundts AufsritTe" fEmpirio-Criticism, oitb a Reply to V. Wundt's *;. Petzoldt, Eiultiltrung in clie l'Lilosopbic tler rcinen Etlabtung, Articlesl, Vierteljabrsscbtift fir u;issenscbat'tlicbe Pbilosopbie, Jahrg. zz (1898), S, und 24. Bd. I, S. 3ir, 152. 73 ** Empirio-Monism, Bk. I, znd ccl', p. zr. KNo!(/LEDGE. I ,.NAIVE 66 THEoRY oF PRINCIPAL Co oRDINATIoN AND RIALISM,, B7

Notes. The second was written later, and in it Avenarius In orcler to decide who actually possesses the greatest degrcc emphasises that he is expounding, it is truc in a somewhat of naioetd, let us proceed from a somewhat remote starting altered form, something that is not different from the CritiErc point. Here is a popular dialogue bet,*,een a certain philosopher and his reader: "Reader: The existence of a system of things [according to otdinary philosophy] is required and from them only is consciousness to be dcrived. "Autbor: Now you are speaking in the spirit of a pro- pres Avenarius says here, one can say fessional philosopher . . . and not according to human common the We "alaaYs find togethet" (intmer sense and actual consciousness. other, the self ein enes) the one and the "Tell me, and reflect well before you answer: Does a find and No full description of what we thing appear in you and becorne present in you and for you otherwise than simultaneously with and through your consciousness of the thing? . . . "Reader: Upon su.{icient rellection, I must grant you this. "Autbor: Now you are speaking frona yourself, from your heart. Take carc, therefore, not to jump out of yourself glied.). (Ct'. Der menscblicbe V/eltbegrifl, z' Atflage' t9o5' and to apprehend anyrhing otherwise than you are able to S. 83-84, $ ra8 f{.) apprelrend it, as consciousness and [the italics are the philos- Avenari,rs claims that by this doctrine he rccognises the opher's] the thing, the thing and consciousness; or, rnore full value of what is known as naitse realisru, that is' the precisely, neither the one nor the other, but tirat which hical, naive view which is entertained only subsequently becomes resolved into the two, that not trouble thcmsclvcs as to whethcr r.vhich is the absolute subjective-objective and objective- and whether the cnvironment, the ex- subjective." xpressing his soliclarity with Avenarius, Here you have the vrhole essence of the empirio-critical .,naive Machalsottiestoreprescnthimsclfasadefenderof..naive principal co-ordination, the latest defence of realism,, by the latest positivism! The idea of "indissoluble,' co- ordination is here statecl very cleady and as though it were a genuine defence of the point of view of the common man, uncorrupted by the subtleties of "the professional philosophers." rvhat more do You '"vant? But, as a rnatter of fact, this dialogue is taken from PRINCIPAL CO-ORDINATION AND "},IAIVE REALISNI" 69 68 THEoRY oF KNo\(/LEDGU I any healthy person who has not been an inmatc the work of a classical representative of subjectice idealisru, realisrn" of of a lunatic asylum or a pupil of the idealist philosophcrs Johann Gottlieb Ficbte, published in r8or.* consists in the view that things, the environment, the world, There is nothing b:ut a paraphrase of subjective idealism exist independently our sensation, of our consciouslless, in the teachings of Mach and Avenarius we are examining. of general. same experieftce (not The claim that they have risen above matcrialism and ideal- of our self and of man in Th.e sense, but the hurnan sense of the term) ism, that they have eliminated the opposition between the in the Machian in that has ptoduced in us the firrn conviction that independently point of view that proceeds from the thing to consciousness peoplc, and mere compiexes of and the conttary point of view is but the empty claim of of us there exist other not - rny sensations high, short, yellow, hard, etc. this same a renovated Fichteanism. Fichte too imagined that he had of - produces the conviction that things, the world, "indissolubly" connected the "self" and the "environment," experience in us environment exist independently of Our sensation, the consciousness and the thing; that he had "solved" the the us. our consciousness is only an itnage of the external world, and problem by the assertion that a rnan cannot jump out crf cannot exist r,vithout the thing himself. In other words, the Berkeleian argument is repeated: it is obvious that an irnage imaged, and that the latter exists independeritly of that which I perceive only my sensations, I have no right to assume the "naive" beiief "obiects in themselves" outside of my sensation. The dif- images it. Materialism deliberately makes ferent methods of expression used by Berkeley ir't t7rc, by of mankind the founclat-ion of its theory of kno'wledge. "principal co-orciina- Fichte in r8or, and by Avenarius it t9gt-94 do not in the Is not the foregoing evaluation of the preiuctrice against Machism? least change the essence of the matter, r:i7.., the fundamental tion" a product of the matcrialist philosophical line of subjective idealism. The world is rny Not at all. Speciatrists in philosophy who canflot be accused sensation; the non-self is "postulated" (is created, produced) of partiality towards materialism, who even detest it and by the sefi; the thing is indissolubly connected with the con- who accept one or other of the ictrealist systems, that Co. ^gteesubiective sciousness; the indissoluble co-ordination of the self and the d the principal co-ordination of Avenarius and is environment is the empirio-critical principal co-ordination; i idealism. Wundt, fot instance, rvhose intcresting opinion - ll this is all one and the salne proposition, the same old trash was rot understood by Mr. Yushkevich, cxplicitly states that with a slightly refurbished, or repainted, signboard. Avenarius' theory, accotding to which a full description of The referencc to "naive realism," supposedly dcfended by the given or the found is impossible without sone self, an this philosophy, is sophistry of the chcapcst kind. The "naive observer or describer, is "a false confusion of the content of real experience with reflections about it." Natural scieflce, says completely abstracts from every ,observer. "Such * Johann Gottlicb Fichtc, Snnnenklnrcr Bcricbt an das grdssere Pabli- Wundt, kum iiber das eigentlicba Wr:sen der ncilcsten Pbilosophie. Ein Versucb, abstraction is possible only because the attributiot (Hinyu- die Leser zutn Verslehen 4u xtoingen [A Clear Account to tbe Broad denken) of an experiencing individual to every content of Public ol the True Natu/e ol Reccnt Pltilosopby. An Atlempt to Get experience, which thc empirio-critical philosophy, in agree- the Reader to Understandl, Bcrlin, r8or, S. I78-8o. 70 THEoRy oF KNolo/rEDGE. r pRINcIpAL co-oRDINATToN AND "NAIvLi RIIALISM'! 71 ment with the immanentist philosophy, assumes, is in general tion by directing his rnain attack against the very weakrcss an empirically unfounded assumption arising from a false fi.e., of. the idealist position] which is fatal to his own confusion of the content of real experience with reflections tireory."* "Throughout the wtrrole

entirely or the self ; and Petzolclt wishes to make a correc- actually wants and hcw vre can "mentally project" the specta- tion.) "A\.enarius said on one occasion," Petzoldt continues, tor, objects: "that we can think of a 'rcgion' whcrc no human foot has "No, we wish to know whether I have the right to think yet trodden, but to be able to think (itc,licised by Avenarius) that the earth at that temote epoch existed in the same lray of such an environment there is requircd wha"t we designate as I think of it as having existed yesterday or a minute ago. by the term self (Ich-Bezeicbnetes), zotlto.ce (italicised by Ave- Or must the existence of the earth be realtry made conditional, narius) thought the thinlility of reconciling it with icant worm - as primitive fellow-men (l,4itmenscben) if. wc the demands o[ natural sciencc, which declares the earth regard anirnal life in connection with gcneral experience" (obiect) to have existed long bcforc thc appearance of living bp. ll-lD. Thus, prior to man the earth v/as the "experi- beings (subject), compelled Pctz.olclt to rcsort to causality ence" of a \r/orm, which discharged the functions of the (unique determination). The carth cxistcd, for its existence "central term" in order to save Avenarius' "co-ordination" prior to man is causally conncctecl 'nvith thc prcsent cxistence and Avenarius' philosophy! No wonder Petzoldt trie to of the earth. First11,, where docs causality come from? dissociate himself from an argument vzhich is oot only the A priori,3" says Petzoldt. Secondly, arc not the ideas of hell, height of absurdity (ideas of the eartli corresponding to the devils, and Ltrnacharsky's "mcntal proicctions" also con- theories of the geologists attributed to a rvorm), but which nccted by causality? Thirclly, the thcory of the "coneplexes does not in any way help our philosophcr, for the earth of sensations" in any case turns out to bc dcstroyecl by existed not only before man but before any iiving being Fetzoldt. Fetzoldt failecl to resolvc thc contradiction he ob- generally. served in Avenarius, and only entanglcd himsclf still more, Ifilly returned to the questicn in r9oJ. The worm was for only one solution is possible, z;iZ., thc rccognition that now removed.* But Petzoldt's "larv of unique detcrmina- the externatr 'lvorlcl rcflected by our nlitltl cxists independ- tion" could not, of course, satisfy I7illy, rvho regarded it ently of our mind. This materialist solution alonc is really rnerely as "logical formalisrn." The author says - will not compatible r.vith natural science, and it alouc climinatcs the question of the world prior to man, as Petzoldt puts it, both Petzolclt's ancl Mach's idealist solution o[ thc qucstion lead us "back agair to the things-in-themselves of common of causality, r.vhich we shall speak of scparatcly. sense"? (i.e., to materialism! How terrible indeed!). What The third empirio-criticist, R. \X/i1ly, fir:st raised the does millions of years vrithout life mean? "Is time perhaps questiofl of this difficulty in Avenarius' plrilosoplty in 1896, a thing-in-itself ? Of course not!** And that means that things in an article entitled "Der Empiriokritizi.snurs als einTig zttis- outside mefl are only impressions, bits ort fantasy fabricated senschat'tlicber Standpunkt" ("Empirio-Criticism as the Only by men with the help of a few tragments \,ve find about us. Scientific Standpoint"). What about tl.rc rvor:ltl pl'ior to rnan? And why not? Need the philosopher feat tl.re stream of life? - Willy asks here,* and at first answcrs according to Ave- . . . And so I sayto rnyself : abandoo all this love of systems narius: "vze proiect ourselves trentally into the past." But and grasp the momcnt (ergreife den Atgenblick), the rno- then he goes on to say that we arc not ncccssaritry obliged *R. ITilly, Gegcn die Scbulacisbeit [Against School Wisdoru], ,9ot, *Viefieljabrsscl:rit't ftir uissenscbaf tliclte PlLilcsoplic, Band XX, 1896, S. 173-78. s. jz. ** Ife shall discuss tl.ris point with the Machians latet. 84 THEoRY oF KNowr-llDcu I DID T.trATURE EXIST PRIOR TO MAN? 85 ment you are living in, the nonlcnt wirich alone brings hap- its laws to nature? The intelligence of the archaeopteryx? To piness" (pp.tll-18). these queries the Kantian philosophy can give no answer. Well, well! Either materialism or solipsism - this, in And it must be rejected as absolutely incompatible with spite of his vociferous phrases, is whrt Wi1ly arrives at when modern science' (L. Feuerbacb, p. :.r7)." he analyses the question of the cxistcncc of nature before man. Herc Bazarov breaks the quotation from Plekhanov just To surnmarise. Three augurs of cmpirio-criticism have before a very important passage - as we shall soon see - appeared before us and have labour:cc[ in the sweat of their namely: "Idealism says that without subject there is no ob- brow to reconcile their philosophy wiLh natural science, to iect. The history of the earth shows that ttrre obiect existed patch up the holes of solipsism. Avcnarius rcpeated Fichte's long before the subject appear.ed, i.e., lor.g before the appear- argument and substituted an imaginary world for the real ance of organisms possessing a perceptible degree of con- wor1d. Petzoldt withdre',v from llichtcan idealism and sciousness. . . . The history of development reveals the truth moved towards I(antian idealism. Willy, having suf{ered a of materialism." fiasco with the "worm," threw up thc spongc and inadvert- We continue the quotation from Bazarov z ently blurted out the truth: eithcr matcriirlism or solipsism, ". . . But does Flekhanov's thing-in-itself provide the de- or even the recognition of nothing but thc prcscnt moment. sired solution? Let us remember that even according to It only rernains for us to sho'rv thc rcirdcr l.toto this prob- Plekhanov we can have no idea of things as they are in Iem was understood and treated by our olvu naLive Mach- themselves; we know only their manifestations, only the ians. Here is Bazar.ov in the Studies "iti' tlLe Pbilosopby results of their action on our sense-organs. 'Apart from this of Marxistn (p. rr): action they possess no aspect' (L. Feuerbacb, p. :-rz). \fi/hat "It rema-ins for us now, under the guiclilncc of our faith- sense-organs existed in the period o[ the ichthyosauruses? fu.l caderuecumss li.e., Plekhanov], to clcsccnd into the last Evidently, only the sense-organs of the ichthyosauruses and and most horrible circle o[ the solipsist infcruo, into that their like. Only the ideas of the ichthyosauruses were then circle where, as Plekhanov assurcs uS, cvcry subjective the actual, the real manifestations of things-in-themselves. idealisrn is menaced with the necessity of conceiving the Hence, according to Flekhanov also, if the paleontologist world as it was cGntemplated by the ichthyosauruses and desires to remain on 'real' ground he must write the story of archaeopteryxes. 'Let us mentally transport ourselves,' the Mesozoic period in the light of the conternplations of the writes Plekhanov, 'to that epoch when only vcry remote an- ichthyosaurus. And, consequently, fiot a single step forward cestors of man existcd on the earth, for instence, to the is made in comparison with solipsism." Mesozoic period. The question ariscs, what was the status Such is the complete argument (the reader must pardon of space, time and causality theil? \7hosc subjective forms the lengthy quotation - rve could not avoid it) of a Machian, were they ther? \lere they the subjcctivc forms of the ich- an argumeflt w'orthy of perpetuation as a first-class example thyosauruses? And rvhose intelligence at titat time dictated of muddleheadedness. EXIST PRIOR TO MAN? 87 86 THEORY OIT KNO}/LI]DGE. I DID NATURE Bazarov imagines that Plekhanov gave himself away. If ITas Piclihanov right rvhen tre said that for idealisrn rnaterialisnr things-in-themselves, apart frorn thcir action on our seose- there is no obiect witirout a sublect, while for reflected organs, have no aspect of their own, then in the Mesozoic thc object exists independently of the subject and is this is period they did not exist except as the "aspect" of the sense- more or less adequately in the subiect's mincl? If fespect for organs of the ichthyosaurus. And this is the argument of a zoloftg, then any man who ha s the slightest materialist! If an "aspect" is the result of the action of Marxism should have pointed out tbis error of Plekhanov's, someone else, "things-in-themselves" on sense-organs does it follow that and should have dealt not with him, but with - question of mate- things do not exi.st independentll of sense-organs of one kind with Marx, Engetrs, ot Feuerbach, on the But this of anothef?? rialism and the existence of nature prior to man. if error here, I-et us assume for a moment that Bazarov indeed "mis- is right, or, at least, if you are unable to flnd an the understood" Plekhanov's words (improbable as such an then your attempt to shufile the cards and to confuse in material' asslrllrption may seem), that they did appcar obscure to him. reader's mind the most elernentary conception of literary indecency. Be it so. W'e ask: isBazarov engaged in a fencing bout with ism, as distinguished from idealism, is a question Plelchanov (whom the Machians exalt to the position of the As for the Marxists who are interested in the we shall ontry representative of materialism!), or is he endeavouring apart frorn every little word uttered by Plekhanov, as is known (perhaps to clear up the problem ol znaterialisrn? Il Plekhanov seerned quote the opinion of L. Feuerbach, who, through whom Marx obscure to you, or contradictoly, and so forth, why did you not to Bazaror,?), was a materialist, and of not turn to other materialists? Is it because you do not and Engels, as is well knorvn, carne from the idealism to know them? But ignorance is no argument. Hegel to their materialist philosophy. In his reioinder It Bazarov indeed does not know that the fundamental R. Haym, F'euerbach v/rote: mind, for premise of materialism is the recognition of the external "Nature, which is not atl obiect of man ot is Kantian world, of the existence of tbings outside and independent speculative philosophy, or at least for idealism, a the fact that of our mind, this is truiy a striking case of crass ignorance. thing-in-itself [we shall speak later in detail of the rWe woLllC remind the reader of Berlieley, who in rTro re- our Machians confuse the Kantian thing-in-itself with reality, but buked the materialists for tlieir recognition of "objects in materialist thing-in-itself], an abstraction without themselves" existing independenttry of our mind and re- it is nature that causes the clownfall of idealism. Natural leads us back flected by out mind. Of course, everybody is free to side science, at least in its present state, necessarily existence were still rvith Berkeley or an)rone else againsl the materialists; that to a point when the conditions for human yet an of is unquestionablc. But it is equally unqucstionable that to absent, when nature, i.e., the eatth, was not obiect nature was an speak of the rnaterialists and distort or ignore the fuoda- the human eye and mind, when, consequentiy, mental premise af all matcl;ialism is to import preposterous absolutely non-human elltity (db s olttt unmens cblic be s W e s en). also something thought oI confusion into the problem. Idealism may retort: but flature is 68 THEoRy oF KNov(/LEDGll. I DID NATURE ExIsT PRioR To MAN? 89

by you (oon dir gedacbte). Ccrtainly, but from this it does on the sense-organs! Truly, either Feuerbach did not know not follow that this oature did rot at onc time actually exist, the elementary difierence between materialism and idealism, iust as from the fact that Socratcs and Plato do not exist for or else Bazarov and Co. have completely altered the elemen- me if I do not think of them, it cloes nor follow that Socrates tary truths of philosophy. and Plato did not actually at one timc cxisr without me."* Or let us take Valentinov, a philosopher who, naturally, This is hovz Feuerbach regardcd marcrialism and idealism is delighted with Bazarov: r) "Bcrkeley is the founder of the from the standpoint of the existencc of nature prior to the correlativist theory of the relativity of sublect and object" appearance of man. Avenarius' sophistry (the "mental pro- (p. rls). This is not tserkeleian idealism, oh, no! This is a jection of the observer") was refutcd by licuerbach, who did "profound analysis." z) "It the most realistic aspect, ir(e- not know the "recent positivism" but who thoroughly knew spective of the forms [!] of their usual idealist intelpretation the old idealist sophistries. And Bazaruw offcrs us absolutely [only interpretation!], the fundamental premises of the theory nothing new, but merely repeats this sophistry of the idealists: are formulated by Avenarius" (p. r48). Infants, as we see, "Had I been there [on earth, prior to man], I would have seen are taken in by the mystification! 3) "Avenarius' conception the world so-and-so" (Studies "in" tlLc Pl.tilo.ropby ot' Marx- of the starting point of knowledge is that each individual finds isna, p. z9). In other v/ords: if I malf thc fact that the unceremoniously expose the unconnected fragments of mate- visual image of a tree is a function of thc rctina, the nerves rialism and idealism that are contained in all the "recelt" and the brain, was required by Avenarius in order to bolster and "original" systems. And if a fera, young intellectuals up his theory of the "indissolublc" conncction of the "com- swallor,ved Avenarius' bait, tli:rt oltl bircl S/trnclt was not to plete" experience, which incluclcs nclt only thc self but also the be enticccl so easiiy. 'Ihe ic'lcelist ]')7r-rndt tole the mask from tree, i.e., the environrnent. the poseut Avcnarius very Lrncereflroniously ushen be praised DoES r{AN THINK lrlTr-r HELp S7 96 TFIDORY oF KNOVLLDGE. I oF BRArN? "In his frequently quoted statement," bitn f'or tbe anti-materialist tendency ot' tbe tbeory ot' introjec- [Avenarius'] Nor- trcn. man Smith says, "that the brain is not the seat, organ or "If empirio-criticism," Iil/undt wrote, "reproaches vulgar supporter of thought, he refects the only terms rvhich we pos- rnaterialism because by such exprcssions as the brain 'has' sess for defining their connection" (op. cit., p. 3o). thought, or the brain 'produces' thought, it expresses a rela- Nor is it surprising that the theory of introiection approved tion which generally cannot be cstablished by factual obser- by !/undt excrtes the sympathy of the outspoken spiritualist, rX/ard,x vation and description [evidently, for !7undt it is a "fact" James r.vho wages systematicwar on "naturalism and that a person thinks without the hclp of a brain!] . this agnosticisrn, and especially on Thoma.s Huxley (not because reproach, of course, is well founded" (oD. cit., pp. 47-48). he was an insufiiciently outspoken and determined rnaterialist, Well, of course! The idealists will always join the half- for which Engels reproached him, but) because his agnosti- hearted Avenarius and Mach in attacking materialism! It is cism served in fact to conceal materialism. lWundt only a pity, goes on to say, that this theory of in- Let us note that Karl Pearson, the English Machian, who troiection "does not stand in any relation to the doctrine of avoid all philosophical artifices, and who recognises neither appcarances, only the independent vital series, and was, to all introjection, nor co-ordination, nor yet "the discovery of the as afterthought in a rathcr artiflcial tacked on to it an atd world-elements," arrives at the inevitable outcome of A{achisrn fasl'rion" (p. l6t). when it is stripped of strch "disguises," namely, pure subjective Introjection, says O. Evald, "is to bc rcgarclcrl as noth- idealism. Pearson knows no "elements"; "sense impressions" ing but a fiction of empirio-criticism, which thc latter re- are his alpha and omega. He never doubts that man thinks qnites in order to shield its own fallacics" (oP.cit., p.44). with the help of the brain. And the contradiction between "'W'e observe a strange contradiction: on thc onc hand, the this thesis (which alone conforms elimination of introiection and the restoration of the natural with science) and the basis of philosophy world conception is intended to restore to thc world the his remains naked and obvious. Pearson spares no effort in combating the concept that matter chat;acter of living rca7ity; on the othcr hancl, in thc prin- exists independ- cipal co-ordinatlon empirio-criticism is lcilcling to a purely eflt1y of our sense-impressicns (T be Gratnmar ol Science, idealist theory of an absolute correlation of tl.rc counter-term Chap \rII). Repeating all Berkeley's argurnents, Pearson and the central tetm. Avenarius is thus tloving in a circle. declare that me.tter is a nonentity. But when he comes to He set out to do battle against idealism bLrt laid down his speak of the relation of the brain to thought, Pearson emphat- arms before it came to afl open skirmish. He wanted to lib- ica.lly declares: "From will and consciousne ss associated with erate the workl of obiects from the yoke of the subiect, but material machinery we cafi infer nothing whatever as to will again bouncl that world to the subiect. What he has actually *James destroyed by his criticism is a caricaturc of idealism rather tVar<1, Natwalism and Agnosticism, 3rd cd., London, 19o6, than its genuine epistemological expression" (ibid., pp. 6+-6). Vol. II, pp. r7r-j2. sol,rpsrsM oF MACH AND AvENAruus 09 98 TI]EOI(Y L]IT (NOV/LEDC]J. I section "Scholastic and consciousness v/ithout that machinery."* He even Wundt in the entitled Chatacter of thc Ernpirio-Critical Systcm." And, indeed, the purest aod advances the following thcsis as a sulnmary of his investiga- it is tions in ttris fielcl: "Conscioust.tcss has no meaning beyond most dreary scholasticism. One of Avenarius' most faithful disciples, nefvorls systems akin to our own; it is illogical to assert that R. Willy, had the courage to admit it frankly. "Avenarius dreamed all matter is conscious [but it is logical to assert that all tnatter of a bio-mechanics," says he, "but an understanding possesses a properLy u'hich is esscntially alcin to sensation' the of the life of the brain can be arrived at only p.op..ry of'reflecticn], still more that coflsciousness or will by actual discoveries, and not by the way in which Avenarius carr exist outside maltcr" (ibid., p. 75, znd thesis)' Fearson's attempted to arrive at it. Avenarins' bio-mechanics is not grounded on any new observations whatever; its characteristic feature is purely schematic constructions of concepts, and, indeed, constructions that do not even bear the nature of hypotheses that open up new vistas, but rather of stereotyped speculations (blosse Spekulierscbablonen), which, like a wall, conceal ouf view."* The Russian Machians will soon be like fashion-lovers who are moved to ecstasy oyet a hat which has already been dis- carded by the bourgeois philosophers of Europe.

6. THE SOLIPSISM OF MACH Ah]D AVENA.R.IUS '!(e have seen that the sta(ting point and the fundamental premise of the philosophy of empirio-criticisrn is subjective idealism. The r.vorld is our sensation - this is the fundamental premise, rvhich is obscured but in nowise altercd by the word "element" and by the theories of the "independent series," "co-ordination," arr,d "introjection." The absurdity

*R. Willy, Gegen die Scbukoeisbeit, p. :169. Of corrse, the pedant Petzoldt will not make any such admissions. With the smug satisfaction of the philistine he chews the cud of Avenatius' "biological" scholasticism (Vol. I, Chap. II). *'I'he Grutnnttar ttJ Science, znd ccl , Loiltlon, rgoo' p' 53' 1OO THEORY OF KNOVLEDGE. I SOLIPSISIVI OF MACH AND AVENARIUS 1OI from solipsism without stopping there" (Arcbio ltir systematiscbe Pbilosopbie,/'L Bd. VI, r9oo, S. 87). E. Lucka, atralysing Mach's Anabtsis ol Sensatiow, says: "Apart from this . . . misunclerstanding;s (h4isx-tersttindnisse) Macl-r adopts the ground of pure idealism. . . . It is incom- prehensible that }4ach denies that he is a Berkeleian" (Kant- a great (p. *i), and the whole Machian troop repeat it in studien,"z Bd. VIII, r9o3, S. 4t6-ry). W. Jerusalem, a most reaciionary Kantian with whorn Mach in the above-mentioned preface expresses his solidarity ("a closer kinship" of thought than lllach had previously suspected -Vorcoort zu"Erkenntnis und lrrtutn," S. x, r9o5), says: "Consistent plienomenalism leads to solipsism." And therefore one must borro'"y a little from I(ant! (See Der kritiscbe ldealistnus und die reine Logik lCritical trdealisru arud Pure Logicf , r9oy, S. 26.) R. Hcinigswald says: ". the immanentists and the empirio-criticists face the alternative of solipsism or metaphysics in the spirit of Fichte, Schelling, or Flcgel" (Lleber die Lehre Hume's oon der Rcalitiit der Aussendinge fHutne's Doctrine ol tbe Reality of the External Workl], r9o4, S. 68). The English physicist Oliver Lodge, in his book denounc- but to them morc consistent. ing the materialist FIaecketr, speaks in passing, as though of Avena- O. Ewald, in the book devoted to an analysis of something generally known, of "solipsists such as Mach and rius' teachings, writes: "The creator of eurpirio-criticism Karl Pearson" (Sir Oliver Lodgc, La cie et la ruatiire (loc' cit'' lLife commits himself oolens nolens3e to solipsism" and Matterl, Paris, r9o7, p. ry). Nature,"3 the organ of the English scientists, through the mouth of the geometrician E. T. Dixon, pronounced a vety definite opinion of the Machian Peerson, one v/orth quoting, not because it is new, but because the Russian Machians have naiveiy accepted Mach's philosophical muddle as the "philosophy of natural science" (A. Bogdanov, introdr:ction to Analy- sis ol Sensations, p. x1i, et seq.). LO2 THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE. I SOI-IPSISI{ OF }IACII AND AYL^IAIIILIS I0;i "The foundation of tlte wholc book," Dixon wrote, "is the And here, finally, is the opinicn of a German physicist, proposition that since wc cannot dircctly apprehend aoything I-. Boltzmann. The Machians will perhaps say, as Friedrich tut scnse-impressions, therefor:e the things we commonly Adler said, that he is a physicist of the old school. But we speak of as oblective, or external to ourselves, and their are concerned nozo not with theories of physics but with a variations, are nothing but groups of sense-impressions and fundamental philosophical problem. Writing against people sequences of such groups. But Professor Fearson admits the r,vho "have been carried away by the new epistemological existence of othcr consciousness than his own, not only by dogmas," Boltzrnann says: "Mistrust of conceptions which implication in adclressing his book to them, but explicitly in we can derive oniy from immediate sense-impressions has led many passages." Pearson infers the existence o[ the conscious- to an extreme which is the direct opposite of former naive .r"rr-of others by analogy, by observing the bodily motions of belief. Only sense-impressions are given us, aild, therefore, other people; t'rut since the consciousness of others is real, the it is said, we have no right to go a step beyond. But to existence of people outside m)'self must be granted! "Of be consistent, one must futther ask: are onr sense-iurpres- sions ycsterday also given? immediately given coufse it would be impossible thus to refute a consistent ideal- of What is is only the one sensc-impressiou, or only the one thought, ist, who maintainecl that not only external things but all namely, the one \r/e are thinking at the present mofleflt. other consciousness were unteal and existed only in his imagi- Hcnce, to be consistent, ofle woulcl have to deny not only the nation; but to recognise the reality o[ other consciousness is existence of other people outsidc one's seu, but also all con- tecognise the reality o[ the means by vrhich we become to ceptions cver had in the past."* is the external aspect of tnen's we ,*ur" of thern, which This physicist rightly ridicules the sLpposedly "new" way out of the clifiiculty is to recognise the bodies." The "phenomenalist" view of Mach and Co. as the old absurdity to our sense-impressions there corresponds "hypoihcsis" that of philosophical subjectivc iclealism. of us. This hypothesis satisfactorily an'obl"ctiv" reality outsicle No, it is those who "failed to note" that solipsism is "I cannot seriously doubt that .*plrin, our sense-impressions. Mach's fundamental error who are stricken with "sub.iective" them as much as any- I'rofessor Pearson himself believes in blindness. one else. Only, if he were to acknowledge it explicitly' he woulcl have to rewrite almost every page of The Grantmar ol Science."* Ridicule_thatisthercsponseofthethinkingscientists to the idealist philosophy ovcr which l'factr v/axes so eflthu- siastic. * Luclwig Boltzmann, Popultire Schrilten Essays], Leipzig, * lPopulff Nattte, JrJy zt, t392, P. t69. r9oy, S. r3z. Cl. S. t68, t1,J, r87, etc. !'THING-IN-rrSELF'r 105

accusation we shall deal with norv.) The l\fachian Mr. Victor Chernov, a Naroclnik and a sworn enemy of Marxisrn, opens a direct campaign against Engels because of the "thing-in- itself." One is ashamed to confess it, but it would be a sin to conceal the fact that on this occasion open enmity towards Marxism has made Mr. Victor Chernov a li?ole principled triterary antagonist than our comracles in party and opponents in philosophy.'-5 For only a guilty cottscience (and in ad- CI]AP'l'ER T\Y/O dition, perhaps, ignorance of materialisrn?) could have been THE THEOII.Y OF KNOWLEDGE OI] E,MPtrRIO. responsible for the fact that the Machian would-be h{arxists CR.ITICISM AND OF DIAI,ECTICAL have diplomatically set Engels aside, have completely ignored MATEITIALISM. II Feuerbach and are chclirg exclusively around Plekhanov. It is indeed circling around one spot, tediots and petty pecking and cavilling at a disciple of Engels, while a frank examina- 1,. THIi "I'I]ING-IN-ITSELF," OR V. CHERNOV tion of the views of the teacher himself is craventry avoided. RIlI]UTIiS ITtrlEDERICK ENGELS And since the purpose of these cursory comments is to disclose the reactionary character of Machism and the correctfless of the "thing-in- Our Machiirlrs hrrvc writLen so much about the materialism of Marx ancl Engels, we shall leave aside the collected they would itsclf" that rvcrc irll thcir writings to be fussing of the Machian rlrould-be Marxists with Flekhanov printed Tire "thing-in-itself'l rcsult in ntottlrLrtirts o[ matter. and turn directly to Engels, whom the empirio-criticist Mr. V. Bogdanov and Valentinov, is a vcritablc ltttc noirc"" with Chernov refuted. Tnhis Philosoltbical and Sociological Stwdies Yushkevich. There is Baz.arov antl Clrcrnov, Berman and (Moscow, tgol a collection of articles w(itten, with few lravc not hurled at it, therc is no riclicule they - no abusc thcy exceptions, before rgoo) the article "ndarxism and Transcen- showct'ccl <.,n it. Atd against rvhcm are they break- have not dental Philosophy" bluntly begins with an attempt to set up thlr; lLrcklcss "th a Marx against Engels and accuses the latter of "naive dogmatic phcrr; of Russiatt to rnaterialism," of "the crr-rrlest materialist dogmatism'l (pp. All the would- he z9 and Mr. V. Chernov states that a "sufficient" exam- l'lakltanor:'.r eY 7z). 'ng, ple of this is Engels' argument agaitst the Kantian thing-in- Plckhanov of lravirrg bccomc cntanglccl and straying accuse itself and I{ume's philosophical line. Ve shall bcgin with into Kantianism, ancl of having forsakcn El.rgcls' (Wc shall this argument, discuss the f,rst accusation in thc fourth chaptcr; the second 106 TIIEORY OF KNOWLEDGE II ,.THING-IN.ITSELF" IO7 In lris Luc),'oig Feuerbacb, Engels declares that thc fun- mundane "absolute idca," rvhile the human spirit, corrcctly damental philosophical trends arc matetialism and idealisin. apprehending the real world, aprprehends in it and through Materialism regards nalure as primary and spirit as sccond- it the "absolute idea." ary;it places being first and thought second. Idealism holds "In addition li.e., to the rnaterialists and the consistent the "two the contrary view. This root distinction between ideaiists] there is yet a set of difierent philosophers - those great camps" into which the philosophers of the "various who question the possibility of any cognitioi, or least of ^t schools" of idealism and materialism are divided Engels takes an exhaustive cognition, of the world. To them, arnong the as thc cornerstone, and he directly chatges with "confusion" more rnodern ones, belong }{ume and Kant, and they have those rvho use the terms idealism aud materialism in any played a very important role in philosophical develop- other way. ment. . , ."46 "The great basic question of all philosophy," Engels says, Mr. V. Chernov, quoting these words of Engels', Iaunches the rela- "especially of modern philosophy, is that concerning irto the fray. To the word "Kant" he makes the following tion of tl-rir-rking and being," of "spirit and nature'" I{aving annotation: great camps" on this basic divided thc philoscphers into "t:wo "In r88B it was rather strange to term such philosophers another side" to question, Engels sho"vs that there is "yet as Kant and especially Hume as 'modern.' At that time it question, oi7., "in what relation do our this basic philosophical was more naturatr to hear mefltioned such names as Cohen, us stand to this world thoughts about the vrorlcl surrounding Lange, Riehl, Laas, Liebrnann, Gciring, etc. But Engels, evi- the cognition of the real itsclf? Is our thinkir-rg capable of dently, was not rvell versed in 'modern' philosophy" (op. cit.; worlcl? Arc we able in our ideas and notions of the real p. 13, note 2). procluce a correct reflection of reality?* world to Mr. V. Chernov is true to himself. Equally in economic maiority of philosophers give an afrit- "Thc ovcrwhclming and philosophical questions he reminds one of Turgenev's to this question," says Engels, including under mativc answcr Voroshilov,"7 annihilating now the ignorant Kautsky,* now this hcad not only all materjalists but also the most consistent the ignorant Engels by merely referring to "scholarly" names ! as, for cxample, the absolute idealist F{egel, who iclcalists, The only trouble is that all the authorities mentioned by considered tlrc rcal rvorld to be ttre realisation of some pre- Mr. Chernov are the very Neo-Kantians whom Engels refers to on tbis oer)) sante page ofhis Ludu:ig Feuerbacb as theoret- + Fr. Engcls, l,rulu:i1; Iicrrc;bnclt, etc,, 4th Ger:rn. ccl', p' l5' Russian translation, b.n"t,. ccl., t9o;, pP. rz-rJ. Mr. V. Chcrnov trallslates the ical reactionaries, who were endeavouring to resurrect the (a accusing Plckhanov of vord Spiegetbild,"tlrc litcrttlly tLrirrcir teflection), corpse of the long since refuted doctrines of Kant and Hume. "in oery oeakened by speakilg prerenting th"rry of lr,rrgcls a frtrtn" The good Chernov did not unrlerstand just "tc[lr:cLi.tl" instcad of a "mirror rtrflcction'" This that it is these in Rrrsir,. sin:ply of ^ is mete cavillirryi. Spiegclbiii in Gcrman is also nsccl simply in the sensc * oI Abbild [reOcction, imrgc]. V. Ilyin, The Agrarian Question, Part I, St. Petersburg, r9o8, p. r9i, "THING-rN-TTSELF,! 108 THEoRY oF KNoV/LEDGE. Ir 100 "Engels, apparently, having learned that authoritative (for Machism) and muddled professors whom according to I(ant the 'thing-in-itself is unknowable, turned this theorem into Engels is rcfr-rtiug in his argument! its converse and concluded that everything pointed out that F{egel had already presented the unknown is a Having thing-in-itself" "decisive" arguments against Hume and l(ant, and that the b. l). Listen, Mr. Machian: lie, but don't overdo it! Why, be- additions rnade by Feuerbach are more ingenious than pro- fore the very eyes of the public you are misrcpresenting the founcl, E,ngels continues: very quotation from Engels you have set out to "tear to "The most telling rcfutation of this as of all other philo- pieces," without even having grasped the point under clis- (Scbi'wllen.) is ptactice, namely, experimeot sophical crotchets cussion ! prove the correctness of our ancl industry. If we are able to In the first place, it is not true that Engels "is producing process by making it ourselves, bring- conccptioa of a natural a refutation of the thing-in-itse1f." Engels said explicitly and clearly that he was refuting the Karutian ungraspable (or unknor,vable) thing-in-itse1f. Mr. Chernov confuses Engels' materialist conception of the existence of things independently of our consciousness. In the second place, if Kant's theorem reads that the thing-in-itself is unknowable, the of plants and The chcmical substaflces produced in the bodies "conoerse" theorcm would be: the wnkrzo-roable is the thing- until organic auimals tcnrained just such 'things-in-themselves' in-itself. Mr. Chernov replaces the unknowable by the un- another, where- chemistry bcgan to produce them one after knozon, without realising that by such a substitution he has in- upon thc 'thing-in- us,' as, for again confused and distorted the materialist view of Engels! .frn.", alizaril, th madder, which Mr. V. Chernov is so bewildered by the reactionaries of wc no longct troub ots in the field, ofiicial philosophy whom he has taken as his mentors that he but prrrhistory of science learnccl that it does. The question is, did coal tat contain and technology but in the everyday life of each and every ,.things-in- alizarin yesterdaY? one of us that illustrate the transformation of ,,phenom- Of co,rrre it aia. To doubt it would be to make a mockery themselves" into "things-for-us," the appearunce of of modern science. ena" when our sense-organs experience an impact from ex- And if that is so, thtee important epistemological conclu- ternal objects, the disappearance of "phenomena,, when some -sions follow: obstacle prevents the action upon our sense-organs of an obiect r) Things exist independently of our consciousness' inde- which we know to exist. The sole and unavoidable deduc- pendcntly of orrr perceptions, outside of us, for it is beyond tion to be made from this - a deduction which all of us make iorbt tliot ali:zari. existed in coal tar yesterday and it is in everyday practice and which materialism deliberately ptraces beyond doubt that yesterday we knew nothing of the at the founclation of its epistemology - is that outside us, and "q"rffy.*irr.rl.. of tl-ti, alizatin and received no sensations from it' independently of us, there exist objects, things, bodies and z) Thcrc is definitely no difference in principle between that our perceptions are images of the external world. Mach,s the phenomcnon and the thing-in-itse1f, and there can be converse theory (that boclies are complexes of sensations) is no ,u.h clifference' The only difference is becvzeen rvhat is nothing but pitiful idealist nonsense. And Mr. Chernov, in in- "analysis" known and what is not yet known' And philosophical his of Engels, once more revealed his Voroshilov ,.rrtion, of spccific boundaries between thc onc and the other' qualities; Engels' simple example seemed to him ',strange and i,*.niion. to the cffcct that the thing-in-itself is "beyond" naive"! He regards only gelebrte fiction as genuine philosophy ft"no-"n, (Kant), or that we can and must fence ourselves and is unable to distinguish professorial eclecticism from the in Uy somc philosophical partition from the problem of a consistent materialist theory of knowledge. rvorli which in one part or another is still unknown but which It is both impossible and unnecessary to analyse Mr. Cher- nov's exists outsicle us (Hume) - all this is thc sheerest flonsense' other arguments; they all amount to the same pretentious rigmarole (like thc assertion that the S c brulle,"9 crotchet, invcntion' for materialists the !.THING-IN-ITSELF,! 113 I72 THEORY OF KNOWLI]DGE II of thought. Because only the Flumeans ancl the Kantians con- We shall note only the argument atom is the thiog-in-itself !)' fine thought to "ttris side of phenomena." Br-rt for all matc- relevant to our discr-rssion (an atgument which ltas which is rialists, including those of the seventeenth century whom led cettain people astray), ztiz', that Marx sup- apparently Bishop Berkeley demolished (see Introduction), "phenomena" ptsedly differed frorn Engels. The qucstion at issue is Marx's are "things-for-us" or copies of the "objects in themselves." iecond, Thcsis on Feuerbach and Plekhanov's translation of Of course, Plekhanov's fuee panphrase is not obligatory upon the word Diesseitigkeit.so those who desire to know Marx hirnself, but it is obligatory to Here is the second Thesis: try to understand what Marx meant and not to prance about like a Voroshilov. It is interesting to note that while among people who call themselves socialists we encorinter an unwillingness or inability to grasp the meaning of Marx's "Theses," bourgeois writers, specialists in philosophy, sometimes manifest greatel scrupulousness. I knor,'r of one such writer who studied the philosophy of Feuerbach and in conncction with it Marx's "Theses." That writer is Albert L6vy, who devoted the third chapter of the second par.t ol his book on Feuer- inated very simply. It appears as thollgh Marx, like bach to an examination of the influence of Feuerbach on Engcls, urr".t.d th" knowability of things-in-thernselves and Marx.* Without going into the question whether L6vy al- thJ'otlier-sidedness' of thinking" (toc' cit' p' 34, note)' ways interprets Feuerbach correctly, or hor.v he criticises whose every phrase 'What can be done with a Voroshilov Marx from the ordinary bcurgeois standpoint, we shall only makes confusion worse confounded! It is sheer ignorance' quote his opinicn of the philosophical content of Marx's Mr. victor chernov, not to know that all materialists assert famous "Theses.'l R-egarding the first Thesis, L6vy says: thc knowability of things-in-themselves' It is ignoraoce' "Marx, on the one hand, together with all earlier materiaT- zsery Mr. Victor Chernov, or infinite slovenliness, to skip the ism and with Feucrbach, recognises that therc are real ancl distinct objects outsirle us corresponding to our ideas of things. ."

* Albert Ltvy, Ln plLilosopLie tle Feuefiacb et son inlhrcnce sur lo. litttrature ullcnande lFeuerbaclt's Pl:ilosopby and His Inlluence on Germnn Litcrature), Prris, r9o4, pp. 24g-f8, on the influence o[ Feucrbach on Marx, and pp. z9o-98, an examination of the l'Theses." .,TR.dNSCENDENCE," OR tsAZAROV "II.EVISI]S'' IJNC,-IJJ-S II5 LL4 TFIEORY OF KNOWLEDGE. II and Kantian sense As the reader sees, it was immediately cleat to Albert of the term), but an objectively rcal L6vy that the basic position not only of Marxist material- signi-frcance. The criterion of practice - as '"ve shall show in detail in its proper place ($6) has entirely mean- isrr but of. ez;ery rnaterialism, of "all eatlief' materialisrn, - different is the recognition of real obiects outsidc us, to which obiects ings for Mach and Marx. "Flumanity partakes of thc ;corrurpond." our icleas Tliis elementary truth, which holds absolute" means that human knowledge reflects absolute gooc'l for all mateialism in general, is unknown only to the truth (see below, $ 1); the practlce of humanity, by verifying Russian Machians. L6vy continues: our ideas, corroborates what in those ideas corresponds to ". .On the other hand, Marx expresses regret that mate- absolute truth. A. Li'vy cont;nues: rialism had left it to idealisrn to appreciate the importance ". I-Iaving reachecl this point, Marx naturally encoun- of thc acfive forces fi.e., ltlrli,an practicc] , which, according ters thc objcctions of the critics. I-Ie has admitted the exist- to Mittx, must be wrested from idealism in order to inte- cnce of things-in-themscives, of whicir our theory is the gratc thcm into the ffIaterialist system. But it will of course human translation. He cannot evade the tisual objection: L" .,...rrr.y to gi'e these active forces the real and sensible what assurance have you of the accuracy of the ttanslation? idea' charactct which-idealism cannot grant them' l'{arx's !7hat prcof have you that the human rnind gives you an correspond then, is the follor.ving: iust as to our ideas there objective truth? To this objection lfarx rcplics in his second rcal obiccts outside Lrs, so to our phenomenal activity therc Thesis" (p. ,Sr). activity of things' corrcsponcls a real activity outside us, an The reeder sees that L6vy does not for a moment doubt partakes the absolute, not ontry In thi,; scnsc humanity of that Marx rccognised the existence of ttrings-in-themselves! tlrrouglr thcotetical knowledge but also through ptactical activiiy; thus all human activity acquires a dignity, a nobil- theory' ity, that pcrmits it to advance hand in hand with "TRANSCE,NDENCE," metaphysical 2. CR BAZAROV RevolutionaLy activity henceforth acquires a 1'REVISES" ENGELS significancc. ." profcssor. And a proper professor must Albcrt L6vy is a But whilc the Rtrssiar.r Machian would-bc &{arxists diplo- llaterialists as being metaphysicians' F-or thc abusc thc matically er,,acled one of thc nost emphatic and explicic profcssorial iclcalists, I{umeans and Kantiarrs evcry kifld statements of Engcls, they "revised" anotber statement oI matcrialism is "mctaphysics," bccause bcyond the phe- tf his in quite ti're Chernov manner. Flowever tedious and labo- nomenon (rppcaratrcc, the thing-Ior-us) it disccrns a rcality rious the task of correcting distortions and perversions of outside us. A. L6vy is thcrefore esser.rtially right when he the meaning of quotations rnay be, he who wishes to speak says that in Matxls opinion there corresponds to man's of the Russian Machians canrot avoid it. "phenornenal activity" "en activity of things," that is to say, Here is Ba.zarov's revision of Engels. hrman practice has r-rot only a phcnon-rcnal (in the Humeau 116 THECRY OF I(NOWLENGE. II ..TRAI{SCELJDENCE,'' OR BAZAROV "REVISES'' ENGIII,S II7 In the article "On HistoricalMatedalism,"* Engels speaks boundary of sensations. About these tbings tbemseloes (i.e., of the E,nglish agnostics (philosophers of Hume's trend of about the tliings in-themselvcs, the "objects in themselves," thought) as follows: as the materialists whora Berkeley opposed called thcm), ". .Our agnostic admits that all our knowledge is based we can know nothing certain - so the agnostic categorically upon the inforrnation (htritteilwngen) iotparted to us by our insists. I{ence, in the controversy of which Engels speaks senscs. ." the materialist affirms the existence and knowability of Let us note for the benefit of our Machians that the things-in-themselves. The agnostic does Ttot eoen ad,nzit tbe agnostic (I-Iumean) also starts f.ram sensations and recognises tbougbt of things-in-themselves and insists that we can knovr no otlrcr source of knowledge. The agnostic is a p:ute "posi- nothing cettail about them. tioist," be it said for the benefit of the adherents of the "lat- It may be asl

Plekhanov] can be found only beyond the boundaries of or, to be more precise, sensations, as only subiective (whiclr eaerytbing tbat is irnntediately gioen" is sheer nonsense and the agnostic does not do!), while we and Avenarius havc inevitably follows from your Machian position. But while "co-ordina.ted" the object into an indissoluble connection you have a perfect right to adopt any position you choose, with the subject. Not bad, Comrade Bazarcv! including a Machian onc, you have no right to falsify Engels ". .But what do you term 'cortect'? - Engels rejoins. - once you havc unclcrtaken to speak of him. And from Engels' That is cor(ect which is confirmed by our practice; ar\d words it is perfcctly clear that for the materialist real being consequently, since our sense-perceptions are confirmed by lies bcyontl the "scnse-pcrceptions," impressions and ideas of experience, they are not 'subiective,' that is, they are not man, wlrilc for tl.rc agnostic it is impossible to go beyond these arbi.trary, or illusory, but correct and real as such, ." perceptions. Baz.arov believed Mach, Avenatius, and Schuppe You are muddling things, Comrade Bazarov! You have when thcy said that the "immediately" (or factually) given substituted for the question of the existence of things out- connects the pcrcciving sc$ with the perceived environment side our sensations, perceptions, ideas, the question of the in the famous "indissoluble" co-ordination, and endeavouts, criterion of the correctness of our ideas of "these things unobservecl by the readci:, to impute this nonsense to the themselves," or, more precisely, you are bedging the former matcrialist fingcls ! question with the help of the latter. But Engels says explicit- ". .It is as though the foregoing passage from Engels ly and clearly that what distinguishes him from the agnostic was clclilrcratcly vrritten by him in a vety popular and is r.rot only the agnostic's doubt as to whether our ima.ges are acccssiblc fottn in order to dissipate this idealist misunder- "cortect," but also the agnostic's cloubt as to w-hether we standing. ." may speak of the tbings tberuseloes, as to whether we may Not for nor.rglrt was Bazarov a pupil of Avenarius! He have "certain" knowledge of their existence. Why did Baza- continucs his nrystiEcation: uoder the pretence of combating rov resort to this juggling? In orcler to obscure and con- iclcalism (o[ r,vhich Engels is not speaking here), he smuggles found what is the basic question fcr materialism (and for kr thc itlcali.r, "co-ordination." Not bad, Comrade Bazarcv! Engels, as a materialist), oi7.., the question of the exislence of ". .lfhc agnostic asks, hov,, do we know that our subiec- things outside our mind, rvhich, by acting on our seose-organs tivc scnscs givc us a correct presentatiofl of objects?. ." evoke sensations. It is impossible to be a materialist rvithout You arc mudclling things, Comrade Bazarovl Engels answering this question in the affirmative; but one can be himsclf clocs not speak of, and does not even ascribe to his a matcrialist ancl still difier on what constitutes the criterion foe thc agnostic, such uonscnse as "subiectlzre" senses' There of thc corrcctness of the images presented by our senses. are no other scltscs cxccpt hutnan, i.c., "stbicctive" senses, Ancl Dazarov muddles matters still more when he attrib- for we are spcaking from thc stanclpoint of man and not utcs to Engels, in the dispute with the agnostic, the absurd of a hobgoblin. Yon arc again trying to impute Machism and ignorant expression that our sensc-perceptions are con- to Engels, to in-rply thirt hc says: thc agnostic rcgards senses, firmed by "escperience." Engels did not use and could not ..TRANSCENDENCE," 124 TTIEOI(Y OF KNOVI,EDGE II OR BAZAROV "RTVISES'' IINC;I'I,S 125 have used this worcl bere, for Engels u,as zotell aaate that i Ia l\{ach on a pe(version of the meaning of a quotation, the idcalist Bcrkclcy, thc agnostic Hume and the materialist and nothing more. Didcrot at[ hed rccoursc ro cxpcrience. Take the German original and you wilt find there thc ". .Insidc thc limits within which rve have to do with worcls stimmen lftit, which means to correspond with, "to objccts in practicc, puceptions of tbe object and ot' its prop- voice with" - the latter translation is literal, for Stimme ertics coittcirlc z,ttitb tbc reality existing outside us.'To means voice. The wofds "stitfimen ?nit" cafifiot mean "to coinciclc' is sonrcwhat different from being a 'hieroglyphic.' coinciclc" in the sense of "to be identical." Ancl even for tirc 'Thcy coirrcirlc' mcans that, within the given limits, the sense- reader who does not k11ow German but who reads Engels pcrccpti{)n is fl3azar;ov's itaiics] the reality existing outside witlr the least bit of attention, it is perfectly clear, it cannot us. . ." be otherwise than c7ear, that E,ngels throughout his whole Thc crrcl crowns the r.vork! Engels has been tteated h" la argument treats the expression "sense-pcrccplio11" as the Macl-r, friccl ancl sctvccl with a Machian sauce. But talr^e cate image (Abbild) of the rcality existing outsicle us, and thar you clo not chokc, v/orihy cooks! therefore the word "coincide" can be used in Russian exclu- "Sclic-l.rcrccption is the rcality existing outside us"! ! This sively in the sense of "correspondence," "concurrence," etc. zs just thc [rrnclunental absurdity, the fundamental muddle To attribute to Engetrs thc thought that "seose-perception is and lrrlsity of Mirchism, from which flows all the rest of the the reality cxisting outside us" is such a pearl of A4achian balclcrclrrslr of this philosoptiy and for which Mach and distortion, such a flagratt attempt to palm off agnosticism Avctraritrs lrrrvc l.,ccn cmbraced by those affart reactionaries and idealism as materialism, that oflc fl]ust admit that Eaza- ancl prcrL,,:lrcr s of pricstlore, the immanentists. However rov has broken all records! rnuch V. lJlzrrlov w.igglecl, howevet cunning and diplomatic One asks, how can sane people in sound mind and iudg- hc was in cvrrcling ticklish points, in the end he gave him- ment assert that "sense-perceptioll [within vhat lirnits is not scif away arrcl bctrai,s6l his true Machian character! To say important] is the reality existing outsicie us"? T'he earth is tlrat "scnsc-pcrcci.rtion is the reality existing outside us" is to a reality existing outside us. It cannot "coincide" (in the rcttt,'tt to Ilrrnti.tnr, or eoen Berkeleianisnz, concealitrg itself sense of being identical) with our sense-perception, o( be in thr: fog of "co ordination." This is either an ideatrist lie in indissoluble co-ordination with it, or be a "complex of elements" in another connection identical with sensation; for sensc-f(il'ccl)tioir ir ilol tltc rcality existing outside us, it is the earth existed at a time when there w€re no men, no only tlrc itttulit: of tlrnt r:cality. Arc you trying to rnake capi- sense-ofgans, no matter organised in that superior form in tal of tlrc rrnrbi;;uous ltrrssian word soopatlat? Are you which its propefty of sensation is in any way clearly percep- trying to Icacl thc rrnsophisticatcd rcaclcr to believe that tible. soopctd(tt hcrc mczrns "co bc iclcntical," ancl not "to corre- That is iust the point, that the tortuous theories of "co- spond"? That mcans basing onc's falsifrcation of Engels ordination," "introiection," ar,d the newly-discovered world- L26 Trllr,oi(y orr KNow'.t.EDCll. II 127 elemeflts which we analysed in Chapter I scrve to cover up the external world lies "beyond the boundaries" of nrcn's this idealist absurdity. Bazarov's fonnulation, so inaclvert- sensations, perceptions and ideas. But the word "transcend- ently and incautiously thrown off by him, is excellent in ence" once more betr.ays Bazarov. It is a specifically l(ant- (eveals that it patently that crying absurdity, which other- ian and Humean "fancy" to e(ect in principle a boundary piles wise it would have been neccssary to excavate from the between the appearunce and tlte tbing-in-itseff. To pass pseudoscientific, professorial of erudite, rigmarole. from the appearalce, or, if you will, from our sensation, praise you, a All to Cornracle Razaroy! We shall erect perception, etc., to the thing existing outside of perception monument to you in your lifetime. On one side rve shall is a transcend.ence, Kant says; afid transcefidence is permis- engraye your dictum, and on the "To the Russian other: sible not to knowledge but to faith. Transcendence is not Machian who dug the grave of Machisrn among the R.ussian permissible at all, Hume objects. And the Kantians, like the Marxists !" Humeans, call the materialists fianscendental realists, "ttteta- physicians," rvho eflect an illegitimate passdge (in Latin, transcensus) from one region to another, fundamentally difierent, region. In the works of the contemporary profes- \X/e shall speak separately of the tr.vo points touched on sors of philosophy who follow the reactionary by Bazar.ov in the abovc-mentioned quotation, oiZ., the line of Kant and Hume, you may encounter (take citeria of practice o[ the agnostics (I\4achians included) and only the names enu- of merated by Voroshilov-Chernov) endless repetitions made the materialists, and the difference betrveen the theory ..meta- reflection (". images) and the tireory of symbols (o. in a thousand keys of the charge that materialism is physical" hieroglyphs). For the present we shall cortinue to quote a and "transcendent." Bazarov borrowed from the little more frcm Bazarov: reactionary professors both the word and the line of thought, ". .But what is bcyond these boundaries? Of this Engels and flourishes them in the name of "recent positivism,,! cloes not say a word. He nowhere manifests a desire to As a matter of lact the very idea of the "transcendence,,, perform that 'transcenCence,' that stepping beyond the i.e., of a boundary in principle beiween the appearance and boundaries of tl.ic perceptually-given world, which lies at the the thing-in-itse1f, is a nonsensical idea of the agnostics founclation of Plckhanov's 'theory of knowledge'. . . ." (Humeans and Kantians included) and ttre idealists. We Bcyond what "bour-rdarics"? Does he mean the bound- have aheady explained this in connection rniith Engels, aries of thc "co-ordination" of Mach and Avcnarius, which example of alizarirr, and '"ve shall explain it again in the supposedly indissolubly merf]cs thc selt' with the environ- words of Feuerbach and Joseph Dietzgen. But let us first ment, the subicct with thc objcct? Thc vcry question p'rt by finish with Bazarov's "revision" of Engetrs: Bazarov is devoid of mcar.ring. But if he had put the ques- ". In one place in his Anti-Dtibring, Engcls says that tion in an intelligible wey, l'rc would have clearly seen that 'being' outside of the reaLa of perception is at ot'lcne Frage, 728 T}ITCIIY OF KNO\(LLjD(;i, II \ID DIE:IZGT-jN ON lllINC IN-I-fStrT.U 12f) i.e., a question, for the ans\Mcr to which, ot cvcn for the asking promise," saying: it is an open question. Had Engels cvcr of r,vhich wc have no data." said anythrng like this, it woutrd be a shame and d-isgracc Baza,rov rcpeats this argunrct.tt aftcr thc German Machian, to call oncsclf a Marr.ist. Friedrich Acltcr. This lrst cx:rtuplc is pcrhaps even worse But enough! i-{atrf a page of quotation trarrBazarov pre- "scusc-pcrcclltiotr" "is existing than tlic which the reality sents such a con-rplete tangle that we are obltged to content (;th Germ. ed.), outsiclc us." In his Attti-Diibring, P. JI ourselves with v-hat has aiready been said end not to con- Enlgcls s:rys: tini-ic following all the waverings of Machian thought. "Thc unity of t.Irc rvor:ld clocs not consist in its bcing, althor-rgh itr; bcinil is rr prc conclition of its uaity, as it musi certainly lirst be, bcforc ii c;rn be one. Being, indeed, is -tr. 3. L. FEUERBACI.I AND DIETZGE,hI (,,1)crI clucstiou (oflene Frage) beyond the point ;rlways an ON TFTE T}-IING-IN ITSELF whcrc rrLrr splrcrc oI obscrvaLiorr (Gesiclttskreis) eods. The rcal urrity o[ tlrc u,orld consists in its tnaterialit;', and this To show how absurd are the asscrtions of our X{achians is provcc.l trol. lry e fclv phrases, but by a long and iuggling that the materialists Marx and Engels denied the existence wr:arisorr.rc rlcvclopncnt of philosophy and natural science."50 of things-in-themselves (i.e., things outside our sensations, Bcholtl (lrc ttcrv hash our cook has prepared. Engels is perceptions, and so forth) and the pcssibility of their cogni- spcaliirril of bcin,g beyoncl the point where out sphere of tion, and that they admitted the existencc an absolute obsclvrLl iorr t'rr

This scems cleat enough. Thc world in itself is a world man himself is only a fragment of the nature reflected in his that exists z.e:ithout us. This matcrialism of Feuerbach's, idcas. like the matcrialism of thc scvcntccnth century contested by ". . .The taste-nerve is just as much a product of naturc Bishop Bcrkclcy, consistctl irr thc recognition that "objects as salt is, but it does not follow from this that the taste of in thcmsclves" cxist oLrtsirlc our mind. The an sich (of itself, salt is directly as such an objective property of salt, that whar or "in itsclf") of lrcucrbach is the direct opposite of the salt is merely as an object of sensation it also is in itself an sicb of l(ant. J.,ct us rccall the excerpt from Feuerbach (an und liir sic,b), hence that the sensation of salt on the al.tcacly (lr.rotccl, whclc lrc lcl;uhcs Kant because for the latter tongue is a property of salt thought of rvithout sensation the "thing-in-itsclf" is itn "rrbstraction without reality." For (des obne Erupfinciung gedacbten Salxes). . .,, And several Irctrcrbaclr tlrc "tlrirll-in-itr;clf" is an "abstraction usith real- pages earlier: "saltiness, as a taste, is the subjective exptes- ity," that is, a rvorlcl cxisring outside us, completely know- sion of an objective property of salt" (ibici., p. yfi. ablc ancl fLrtrrlirnrcntrrlll, not difierent from "appearatce." Sensation is the result of thc action of a thing-in-itseif, F-cucrblch vcly in;lcniously and clearly explains how existing objectiveiy outside us, upol1 our sense-o(ge.ns such Feuerbach's - ridiculous it is to postrrlatc a "transcendence" from the '"vodd is tireory. Sensation is e subjective image of the of phcnontctrl to llrc world in itself, a sort of impassable objective world, of the wotld aiz und f tir sicb. gulf crcatccl hy tlrc pricsLs and taken over from tirem by the ". .So is rnan also a being af. r,a.tute (Natwruesen), iike profcssors of philosol.hy. IIere is one of his explanations: slln, star, plant, animal, and stone, rieverLhclcss, he is distinct "Of corrrsr', llr(: I)ro(lLlcts of fantasy are also ptoducts of from nature, and, conscquently, nature in the head anrl heart luaturc, for tlrc l'orcc of fantasy, like all other human forces, of man is distinct frcrn nature outside the human head and is in thc l:rst lrr,rlyr;is (ryilet7t) both in its basis and in its trcaft." origiu a forcc oF r]rltrrrc; nevcrthetress, a human being is a ". .However, this object, oi7., mant, is the only ob,icct bcing clistirrgrrislrccl from the sun, moofl and stars, from in which, according to the statemeat of the iclealists thein- storlcs, anitn;rls nntl plents, in a word, from those beings selves, the requirement of the 'identity of object and subject' (Wc.rcn) which hc rlcsigtrates by the general name, 'nature'; is realised; for man is an object whose equality and unity and corrscqrrcrrtly, lnan's presentations (Bikler) of the sun, with my being are beyond ali possible doubt. . . . And is not moon ancl stars rn(l thc other beings of nature (Iiaturaesen), one man for another, even the most intimate, an object of although tlrcsc prcscnt2ltions are products of nature, are yet fantasy, of the imagination? Does not cach man comprehend pr:oducts rlistittct flonr their obfects in nature" (Werke, Band another in his own way, alter his own mind (in und nach VII, Stuttgatt, r9oi, S. 116). seinem Sinne)? . . . And if even betrveen man and man, I'he objccts o[ orrr ic]cas are distinct from our ideas, the between mind and mind, there is a vcry considerable ciiffer- thing-in-itsclf is c]isrirrct from ttrrc tiring-for-us, for the latter ence which it is impossible to ignore, trrow much greatet must is only a patt, or only ouc aspect, of the former, just as be the difierence betv'een an unthinking, non-human, 1-I]I]I.]RI]ACH AND DIF)TZCEN ON ']'IIIN(| 1'I :iI I II 1:J:I 132 THEoRY olr I(NovLll)cr. II ]N bounrls sense-perceptions dissimilar (to us) being in ttscll (Wcsctt an sicb) ancl the same of to the exi.rtencc of things orrtsiclc being as we thir.rl< of it, pcrcci,,,c it and appreliend it?" (ibid., LlS. "We learn by experience (oir erfaltren)," says Dictzgcn p. ,rB). All thc mystcl:ious, sn13c ancl subtle ciistinctions ilctween inhis Excursions of a Sacialist into tlte Doruain of tbe Tbeory the phenorncnon anc[ tlrc tlring-in-itsel-[ are sheer philosoph- ot' Ktzo',r;ledge , "that each experience is only a paft of that ,ical balclcrclarih. lrr pr':rt.ticc clch orrc of us has obscrved times rx,hich, in the words oE Kant, passes beyond the bor-rnds of rvithout numbcr tlrc sirrrplc nnd palpable transfolmation of all experience. . . . Fot a consciousness that has become con- 'the "thing-ir.r-itsr:ll'" irrto p!rcrromenon, into the "thing-for- scious of its own nature, each particle, be it of dust, ot of us." ft is prccist'ly tiris tmrrr;formation that is cognition. The stone, or of vrood, is sometl.ring tutknousable iiz its full ex,te?it "doctrinc" of Mrrtlrisrrr tlrrrt since we know only sensations, (Uxauskenntlicbes), i.e., each particle is inexhaustible mate- we cannot krrorv ol tltc cxistcrtce of anything beyond the rial far the human faculty of cognition and, consequefltly, bounds o[ scnsrrtiorr, irr;rrr olcl sophisiry of idealist audl agnostic something which passes bcyond experience" (lileinere philo- philosophy scrvcobjectivity of any truth and his Russiln followcr, Betrtov"57 (Enzpirio-Monistn, Bk. whatsoever, the denial of all eternal truths" (Enrpirio-Mon- II, znd ccl., r1o7, 1r1,. 4o-4r). isnt, Bk. III, pp. iv-v). \flhat is meant by "unconditional This is o corrplctc muddle. r) The materialists of the obiectivity"? "'Iruth for all eternity" is "an objective truth seaetilecnllt ct')ttttt.\J, ar;ainst whom Berkeley argues, hold that in thc absolute meaning of the word," says Bogdanov in the "objccts irr thcrrrsclvcs" are absolutely knowable, for our sa[le passage, and agrees to recognise "objective truth only prcscntrrtions, irlcirs, rrrc only copies or reflections of thosc within the limits of a given epoch." obfccts, whiclr cxist "outside the mind" (see Introduction). Two questions are obviously confused here: l) Is there Feuerbatl.t, z) rrrtl .f . l);ctzgen after him, vigorously dispute such a thing as obiective truth, that is, can human ideas any "funclnnrcnt:rl" cli{lcrcnce between the thing-in-itself and have a content that does not depend on a subiect, that does thc phcnon'rcrrorr, :rrrcl lingcls disposcs of this view by his not depead either on a human being, or on humanity? z) lI brief cxanrplc ol' thc triursformation of the "thing-in-itself" so, can human ideas, which give expression to oblective truth, into thc "thini;-for-rrs." 3) Ilinally, to ma;ntaill that the ma- express it all at one time, as a whole, uncoflditionally, abso- terialists rcgarcl things-in-thcrnsclvcs as "always only dimly lutely, or only approximately, relatively? This second ques- discerniblc in tlrc plrcnorncurin" is shccr nor]scu.sc, as we have tion is a question of the relation of absolute trurth to relative seen from Engcls' rcflrtntion of tl.rc :rgn<-rstic. The reason for truth. Bogdanov's distortion oI trratcrialisrn lics in his failure to Bogdanov replies to the second question cleady, explic- understand the rclation of rbsohrtc truth to rclative truth itly and de6nitely by rejecting e'r'en the slightest admission 136 THiioRY oF KNowLTiDCE II of absolute truth and by accusing Engels ecLecticisru compatible *,,n ;;"' u,"-,..r.' :;1" of for ;jffi,^ii],.,' "u making such an admission. Of this discovery of eclecticism existence of the thing reflected independent of the reflector in Engels by A. Bogdaflov we shall speak separately later (the independence of the external world from the mind) is on. For the present we shall confinc ourselves to the first a fundamental tenet of materialism. The asserlion made by question, which Bogdanov, without saying so explicitly, like- science that the earth existed prior to man is an obiective wise answers in the negativc - for: although it is possible to truth. This proposition of natural science is incompatible deny the element of relativity in one or another human idea with the philosophy of the Machians and with their doctrine without d.enying the existcncc of obiective truth, it is impos- of truth: if truth is an organising form of human experience, sible to deny absolutc truttr rvithout denying the existence then the assertion that the earlh exists otttside human expe- of objective truth. rience cannot be true. ". . . The critction of objcctive truth," writes Bogdanov But that is not all. If trr-rth is only an organising form of a little further on (p. ix), "in Beltov's sense, does not exist; human experience, then the teachings, say, of Catholicism truth is an ideological form, an organising form of human are also true. For there is not the slightest doubt that Cathoi- experience. ." icism is an "organising form of human experience." Bogda- Neither "Beltov's scnse" - for it is a question of one of nov himself senses the crying falsity of his theory and it is the fundamcntal philosophical probiems and not of Beltov - extremely interesting to watch how he attempts to extricatc nor the cilteriott o[ truth - rvhich rnust be treated separate- himself from the swamp into \phich he has fallen. ly, rvithout confounding it with the question of whether "The basis of oblectivitl," we read in Book I of Erzpirio- objective trutl't cxi.sts - has anything to do with the case here. Monism, "must lie in the sphere of collective experience. !7e Bogdanov's ncgativc answer to the latter question is clear: term those data of experience objective which have the same if truth is ottly an ideological forrn, then there can be no vital meaning for us and for other people, those data upon truth indepcnclcnt of the subiect, of humanity, for neither which not only we constrlrct our activities without contraclic- Eogdanov nor wc know any other ideology but human ideol- tion, but upon which, we are convinced, otlier people must ogy. And llogdanov's negative answer eme(ges still more also base themselves in order to avoid contradiction. The clearly from thc sccond half of his statement: if truth is a obiective chatacter of the physical world consists in thc fact form of human cxperience, then there can be no truth indc- that it exists not for me personally, but for evcrybody [that pendent of humanity; thcrc can be no obfective truth. is not true! It exists indepenclently of "everybody"!], and has Bogdanov's dcnial of objective truth is agnosticism and a definite meaning for everybody, the same, I am convinced, subiectivism. The absurdity of this dcnial is cvidcnt even as for mc. The objectivity of the physical series is its uniz-;ersal from the single exarnplc of a scicntific truth cltroted above. significance" (p. 25, Bogdanov's italics). "The objectivity of Natural science lcaves no room for doubt that its assertion the physical bodics we encounter in our cxperience is in thc that the earth existed prior to rlan is a trr-rth. This is entirely last analysis established by the mutual verification and co- i3B THEoRY oF KNo!/LEDGri, rr DOES OtsJIlC',UVE TRU'III Il\ls'l-? I ill) ordination of the utterances of various pcoplc. In general, doctrine has "universal significance" to a gteatcr clcgrec tharr the physical world is socially-co-otdinated, socially-harmo- the scientific doctrine; the greater part of mankind cling to nised, in a u/ord, socially-organisctl cxltcricttcc" (p. 36, Bog- the former doctrine to this day. Catholicism has been "so- danov's italics). cially organised, harmonised and co-ordinated" by centuries We shall not rcpeat that this is a furrclanrentally untrue, of development; it "fits in" with the "chain of causality" in idealist ctrcfinition, that thc 1'rhyr;icrl worlci cxists independ- the most indisputable manaer; for religions did not otiginatc ently of humanity lrrd o[ hunurr.r cxpcricncc, that the phys- without cause, it is not by accident that they retain their ical world cxistcd nt a tirnc whcLr no "sociality" and no holcl over the masses under modern conditions, and it is "organisatiot-t" of humiur ('hPct'icoce was possible, and so quite "in the order of things" that professors of philosophy forth. rMc shall norv stol) Lo cxpose the Machian philosophy should adapt then-rselves to them. If this undoubtedly uni- from auothcr aspcct, nlmcly, that objectivity is so defined versally significant and undoubtedly highly-organised religious that rcligious doctri ncs, r.vhich undoubtedly possess a social experience does "not hattnonise" with the "experience" "universal significirncc," and so forth, come under the of science, it is because there is a radical and fundamental definition. llut listcn to Bogdanov again: "W.e remind difierence between the two, which Bogdanov obliterated the reaclcr oucc luofc that 'obiective' experience is by no when he reiected obiective truth. And however much means thc sanrc as 'social' experiencc. . Social experience Bogclanov tries to "corc.ect" himself by saying that fideism, is far frorn bcing altogethcr socially organised and always or clericalism, does not harmonise with science, the undeni- contains variorrs contrarlictions, so that certain of its parts able fact temains that tsogdanov's denial of obiective truth do not agrcc with othcrs. Sprites and hobgoblins may exist cornpletely "harmonises" with fideism. Contemporary fideism in thc sphcrc of social cxperience of a given people or of a does not at all reject science; all it tejects is the "exaggeratcd givcu group of pcoplc - for example, the peasantry; but they claims" of science, to lvit, its claim to obiective truth. If need not thcrcforc be included under socially-organised or objective truth exists (as the materialists think), if natural obiectivc cxpcricncc, for they clo not harmonise with thc science, reflecting the outer world in human "experience," is rest oI collcctivc cxpcriencc and do flot fit in with its organis- alone capable of giving us objective truth, then all fideism is ing f<-ums, for cxarnple, with the chain of causality" (p. +l). absolutely refuted. But if there is no objective truth, if truth Of coursc it is very $atifying that Bogdanov himself (inclucling scientific truth) is only an organising form of human "does not includc" thc social experience in respect to spritcs experience, then this in itself is an admission of the funda- and hobgoblins uncler objective experience. Buc this well- mental prernise of clericalism, the door is thrown open for it, meant amcndrncnt in the spirit of anti-fideism by no 1i1cans and a place is cleared for the "organising forms" of religious correcis tl-rc fundamental error of Bogdanov's whole posi- expetience. tion. Bogdanov's definition of objectivity and of the phys- The question arises, does this denial of obiective truth ical world cornplelely falis to the ground, since the religious belong personally to Bogdanov, who refuses to ov/n himsell 140 THEORY OF KNOWI,IIDG]I II OBJECTIVE TRUTI-I EXIST? I41 a Machian, or does it follow from the fundamental teachings tive idealism, there ca-n be no objective truth. For the scconcl of Mach and Avenarius? The later is the only possible an- point of view, i.e., materialism, the recognition of obicctivc swef to the question. If only sensation exists in the world truth is essential. This old philosophical question of the two (Avenarius in fi76), if bodies are complexcs of sensations trends, ot rathet, of the two possible deductions frorn the (Mach, in the Analysis ot' Sensation.r), then we are obviously premises of empiricism and sensationalism, is not solved by confronted with a philosophical subjcctivism which inevitably Mach, it is not eliminated or overcorne by him, but is leads to the denial of objective trLrth. And if sensations are tnudclled, by verbal trickery rvith the word "elemenr," ancl called "elements" which in one connection give rise to the the like. Bogdanov's denial of objective rruth is an inevitablc physical and in another to the psychical, this, as we have consequence of Machism as a whole, and not a deviation seen, only confuses but does not reject the fundamental point from it. of departure of empirio-criticism. Avenarius and Mach Engcls in his Ludoig Feuerbacb calls Hurue and tr(ant recognise sensations as the sou(ce of our knowledge. Conse- philosophers "who question the possibility of any cognition, quently, they adopt the standpoint of cmpiricism (a11 or at least of an exhaustive cognition, of the w.orld." Engels, knowledge derives from experience) or sensationalism (all therefore, lays stress on what is common both to Hume and knowledge derives from sensations). But this standpoint gives Kant, and not on what divides them. E,ngels states further rise philosophical to the difierence between the fundamental that "what is decisive in the refutation of this [Humean and trends, idealism and materialisrn and does not eliminate that Kantian] view has already been said by Hegel" (4th Germ. dif{erence, no matter in what "new" verbal garb ("elements") ed., pp. 15-16).58 In this connection it seems to me not unin- you clothe it. Both the solipsist, that is, the subjective teresting to note that Hegel, declaring materialism to be "a idealist, and the materialist may regard sensations as the consistent system of empiricism," vzrote: "For empiricism source of our knov,tredge. Both Berkeley and Diderot started the external (das Atrsserlicbe) in general is the truth, and from Locke. The first premise of the theory of knowledge if then a supcrsensible too be admitted, neverrheless knowl- undoubtedly is that the sole sou-rice of our knowledge is sensa- edge of it cannot occur (soll docb eine Erkenntnis desselben tion. Having recognised the first premise, Mach confuses the ld. b. des Uebersinnlichen] nicbt stattfinden kr;nnen) and one second important premise, i.e., regarding the objective reality must keep exclusively to v'llat belongs to perception (das clcr that is given to man in his sensations, or that forms the source Waltrneltmung Angehdrige). Howcver, this principle in its of man's sensations. Starting from sensations, one may follow realisation (Durcbftibrwng) prodtced what was subsequently ("bodies the line of subiectivism, which leads to solipsism are termed ruaterialism. This materialism regards matter, as complexes or combinations of sensations"), or the line of such, as the truly objective (das u;abrhalt Objektiae)."* objectivism, which lcads to matcrialism (scnsations are * images of obiccts, of the cxtcrnal world). For the first point Hegel, "Etzcyklopriclie clet pltilosophiscben Vissenscbalten int Grudtl- ris:e" [Enclclopaedia ot' tbe Pbilosopbical Sciences in Outtiruef, of view, i.e., agnosticism, or, pushed a little further, subfec- Verke, VI. Bancl (rs43), S. g. Ct'. S. rzz. I42 TIIEC OBJECTIVE TRUTH EXIST? 143

A1l knowledge comes from experience, from sensatiofl, point of view, repcat, in fact, although in a confusecl ancl from perception. That is true. But thc question arises, does muddled rvay, thc reply of the agnostic: on the one hand, objectioe reality "belong to perceptioni' i.e., is it the source bodies are complexes of sensations (pure subjectivism, pure o[ perception? trf you answer ycs, you ate a materialist. Berkeleianism); on the other hand, if we rechristen our If you answer flo, you are inconsistcnt and will inevitably sensations "elements," we may think of them as existing aruive at subjectivism, or agnosticism, irrespective of whether independently of our sense-organs! you deny the knowability of thc thing-in-itself, or the The Machians love to declaim that they ate philosophers objectivity of time, spacc ancl causality (with Kant), or who completely trust the evidence of our sense-organs, who whether you do not cven pcrmit thc thought of a thing- rcgard the world as act:ually being what it seems to us to be, in-itself (with Flumc). Thc inconsistcllcy of your empiricism, full of sounds, colours, etc., whereas to the materialists, they of your philosophy of cxpcricncc, will in that case lie in the say, the world is dead, devoid of sound and colour, and in fact that you deny thc obicctivc colrtcnt of cxperience, the its reality dillerent from what it seems to be, and so forth. objective truth of expcrimcnt!11 knowlcdgc. Such declamations, for example, are inclulged in by J. Petzoldt, Those who hold to thc linc of I(ant or Humc (Mach and both in his Introcluction to tbe Pbilosopby of Pure Experience Avenarius are among thc lattcr, itr so far as they are not pure and in his World Probleru from tbe Positioist Standpoint Berkeleians) call us, tltc matcrillists, "mctaphysicians" because (19o6). Petzoldt is parroted by Mr. Victor Chernov, who we recognisc obicctivc rcality which is given us in experience, waxes enthusiastic over the "new" idea. But, in fact, the because wc rccogrtisc all <-rbicctive source of our sensatious Machians are subjectivists and agnostics, for they do not independcr.rt of matr. W'c materialists follow Engetrs in sufficiently trust the evidence of our sense-organs and are calling tlrc Kantians aLrd Flumears agttostics, because they inconsistent in their sensationalism. They do not recognise deny objcctivc rcality as thc source of our sensations' objective reality, independent of man, as the source of our Agnostic is z't Grcck wotd: a in Greek mcafls "no," gnosis sensations. Ttrey do not regard sensations as a true copy "knowlcdgc." Thc agnostic says: 1 do not knoro lf there is of this objective reaTity, thereby dkectly conflicting with objectivc rcality which is reflected, imaged by our sensa- natural science and throwing the door open an for fideism. On I tions; I cleclarc therc is no way of knowing this (see the the contrary, for the materialist the world is richer, livelier,l words of Engels above quoted setting forth the position of more varied than it actually seems, for with each step in thel the agnostic). Hence the denial of obiective truth by the development of science new aspects are discovered. For theI agnostic, and the tolerance - the philistinc, cowardly materialist, sensations are images of the sole and ultimate tolerancc - o[ the dogmas regarding sprites, hobgoblins, objcctive reality, ultimate not in the sense that it has already Catholic saints, and the like' Mach and Avcnarius, Pretclr- been explored to the encl, but in the sense that there is not tiously rcso(tiag to a "new" tetminology, a supposcdly "ncw" and cannot be any other. T'his view irrevocably closes the 744 THEoRY oF KNoWLEDGE. Ir DoEs oBJEcrrvE TRUTH Exrsr? 145 door not only to every species of fideism, but also to that category denoting the objective reality which is given to mrrn professorial scholasticism which, while not recognising an by his sensations, and which is copied, photographed ar.rcl obfective reality as the sou(ce of our selrsations, "deduces" reflected by our sensations, while existing independently of the concept of the obiective by means of such ariificial verbal them. Therefore, to say that such a concept can become "antiquated" constructions as universal significancc, socially-organised, and is childish talk, a senseless repetition of the so on and so forth, and which is unable, and frequantly arguments of fashionable reactionary philosophy. Could the struggle between materialism and idealism, struggle be- unwilling, to separate objective truth from bclief in sprites the tween the tendcncies and hobgotrlins. or lines of Plato and Democritus in philosophy, the struggle between religion and science, the The Machians cofltemptuously shrug their shoulders at the denial of objective truth and irs assertion, the struggle be- "antiquated" views of the "clogmatists," the materialists, tween the adherents of supersensible knowleclge and its who still cling to the concept matter, which supposedly has adversaries have become antiquated duting the two thousand been "rccent positivism." refuted by "recent scicnce" and years of the development of philosophy? \X/e shall speak separately of new theories physics on the of Acceptance ot rejection of the concept matter is a ques- the structure of matter. is absolutely unpardonable to But it tion of the confidence man places in the evidence of his confound, as the Machians do, any particular theory of thc sense-ofgens, a question of the source of our knowiedge, a structure of matter with the epistemological category, to question w-hich has been asked and debated from the very confound the problem of the new properties of ncw aspects inception of philosophy, which may be disguised in a thou- of rnatter (electrons, for examplc) u,ith the o1d problern of sand diflerent garbs by professorial clowns, but which can the theoty of knowledge, with the problem of the sources of no more become antiquated than the question whether the our knowledge, the existence of obiective truth, etc. V(i'e source of human knowledge is sight and touch, hearing and arc told that Mach "discovered the wotld-elements": red, smell. To rcgard our sensations as imagcs of the external green, hard, soft, loud, long, etc. \Y/e ask, is a man given world, to recognise objective truth, to hold the materialist objective rcality when he sees something red or feels some- tireory of knowledge - these arc all one and the same thing. thing hard, etc., or not? This hoary philosophical query is To illustrate this, I shall only quote from Feuerbach and confused by Mach. If you hold that it is not given, you, from two textbooks of philosophy, in order that the reader together with Mach, inevitably sink to subjectivism and may iudge how elementary this question is. agnosticism and descrvedly fall into the embrace of the irn- "How banal," wrote Iieuerbach, "to deny that sensation manentists, i.e., thc philosophical Menshikovs. If you holcl is the evangel, the gospel (Verkilndung) of an objective that it is giver.r, a philosophical conccpt is needcd for this saviour."* A strange, a preposterous tenninology, as you see, obiective rcality, and this conccpt has bcen worked out long, long ago. This concept is ntatter. Matter is a philosophical t Feuerbach, Sdrntlicbe Werke, X. Band, 1866, S. rq+-ql. 746 Tr{EORY OF KNOWLEDCI]. rr ABSo-LUTE AND REI,ATIVE TRUTLI I47 but a perfcctly clear philosophicrl linc: scnsaLion revcals 5. ABSOLUTE AND RELATIVE TRUTH, OR. TI-Itr, obfective truth to man. "My scnsation is subicctivc, but its ECLECTICISM OF ENGELS AS DISCOVERED foundation [or ground - Grtnilf is objcctivc" (S. r9t). BY A. BOGDANOV Compare tiiis with thc quotation givcu above rvhere Feuer- Bogdanov made his discovery preface bach says that matcrialistn starts frorn tirc perceptuai world in ryo6, in the to Book III of his Entpirio-Monisru. "Engels in Anti-Diibring," as an ultin.rarc (atrsg,erttacl.ttc) objcctivc tnlth. writes Bogdanov, "expresses himself alruost in the same sense Sensationalisllr, wc rcad in Franck's dictionaty of plii- in which I have iust described the relativity of truth" (p. v) losophy,* is a cloctrirrc which dcduces all our ideas "from --that is, in the sense of denying all eternal truth, "denying the cxpcricncc of scnsc-organs, reducing all knowledge to the unconditional obiectivity of all truth v/hatsoever.'1 subjcctivc sensationalism (scepticism sensations." Tlrcrc is "Engels is wrong in his indecision, in the fact that in spite t.noral sensationalism (Epicureanism), and Berkclciarrism), of his irony he recognises certain 'eternal truths,' wretched "Obiective sensationalism is and objcctivc sctrsationalisrn. though they may be. . ." (p. viii). "Only inconsistency can nothing but ntatcrialism, for matter or bodies are, in the here permit such eclectic reservations as those of Engels. . .'l opinion of thc matcrialists, the only obiects tl-rat catl affect (p. i"). Let us cite one instance of tsogdanov's refutation our scnscs Qrltt'inirc nos sens)." of Engels' eclecticism. "Napoleon died on May 5, t8zr,'l "If scnsationalisn.r," says Schwegler io his history of phi- says Engels in Anti-Dtibring, in the chapter "Eternal losophy,'k* "nsscrtcd that tnrth or being can be apprehended Truths," where he reminds Drihring of the "platitudes" exclusivcly by rtrcans of the senses, one had oaly [Schwegler (Plattbeiten) to which he who clairns to cliscover eternal is spcakirrg of philosopl'ry at the end of the eighteenth century truths in the historical sciences has to confire himself. Bog- in Franccl to formulatc this proposition oblectively and one danov thus answers Engels: "What sort of 'truth' is that? had thc thcsis of materialism: only the perceptual exists; And what is there 'eternal' about it? The recording of a therc is r)o othcr being save material being." single correlation, which perhaps even has no longer any Thcsc clcrncntary truths, which have managed to find real significance for our generation, cannot serve as a basis (p. their rvay cvcn into the textbooks, have been forgotten by for any activity, and leads nowhere" i"). And on page "Can Plattheiten called 'Wabrbeiten? 'plati- our Mach;ens. viii: be Are tudes' truths? Truth is a vital organising form of experience; it leads us somewhere in our activity and provides a point * Dictionnairc der sdentes pLilosopltiques [Dictionory ol tlte P,tLilo- of support in the struggle of life.': sophical Sciencesl, Patis, r875. It is quite clear from these two quotations that Bogdanov, *x Dr. Alhcrt Schwegl.cr, Gescbichte d.er Pl:ilosopL,ie in Unu'iss [Art- instead of refuting Engels, makes a mere declamation. II line Historj, ol Pbilosopbyl, r5-te Aufl., S. I94. yolr cannot asscrt that the proposition "Napoleon died on 148 TI-IEoRY orr KNo\r(/LEDGE, II ABSOLUTE AND RELATIVE TRUTI{ 149

M^y j, r8zr," is false or inexact, you acknowledge that it is lectical materialist Engels. On the most complex questions trLle. If you do not assert that it may be refuted in the fu- of science in general, and of historical science in particular, ture, you acknowledge this truth to be eternal. But to call Diihring scattered words right and left: ultimate, final and plrtases such as truth is a "vital organising form of expe- eternal truth. E,ngels jeered at him. Of course there are rience" an ans\,ver, is to palrn ofi a n-lere jumble ol zoords eternal truths, Engels said, but it is unwise to use high- as philosophy. Did the earth have thc history which is ex- souncling words (geoaltige Worte) in connection with simple pounded in geology, or was the earth created in seven days? things. If we want to advance materialism, we tlust drop Is one to be allowed to dodge this question by talking abouc tl.ris trite play with the words "eternal truth"; we must learn "vital" (what does that mean?) truth which "leads" sorne- to put, and answer, the question of the relation between where, and the like? Can it be that knowledge of the history absolute and relative truth dialectically. It was on this is- "has no real of the earth and of the history of humanity sue that the fight between Diihring and Engels was waged usccl Bog- significar.rce"? This is fust turgid nonsense, by thirl-y years ago. And Bogdanov, who rnanaged "not to no- cover his Fot is a reffeat, lvhen, having danov to retreat. it tice" Engels' explanation of the problem of absolute and rel- taken it upon himself to prove that the admission of eter- ative truth given in this zsery same cbapter, and who managed nal truths by Engels is eclecticism, he dodges the issue by to accuse Engels of "eclecticism" for his admissiot of a a noisc and clash of words and leaves unrefuted the fact proposition which is a truism for all forms of materialism, that Napoleon did die on lr{ay y, rlx, and that to rcgard only once agaii beffays his utter ignorance of both material- this trrrtlt as refutable in the future is absurd. ism and dialcctics. Thc cxzrmpie given by Engels is elementary, and an-y- "Now come the question," Engels wtites in Anti- body r.vithout the slightest difficulty cari think of scores of we to similar truths that are ete:rtal and absolute and that only Dtihring, in thc beginning of the chapter rnentioned (Part products insanc pcoplc can doubt (as Engels says, citing another exam- I, Chap. IX), "whether any, and if so which, of p1e: "Paris is in France"). Why does Engels speak here of human knowledge ever can have sovereign validity and at.t "platituclcs"? Bccause he refutes and ridicules the dogmatic, ur.rconditional claim (Anspruch) to trLrth" (5th German ed., metaphysical materialist Diihring, who was incapable of ap- p.7il. And Engels answers the question thus: plying dialcctics to thc rclation between absolute and relative "The sovereignty of thought is realised in a number of extremely unsovereignly-thinking human beings; the knowledge which has an unconditional claim to truth is realised in a number of relative errors; neither the one nor the other li.e., neither absolutely true knowledge, nor soveteign thought] can be fully realised except through an endless guishes thc metaphysical rratcrialist Diihring from the dia- etcrrriry of hurnan cxistcnce. 150 TLr[.oR]. oF KNor(rLDGr] rI ABSOLTITE AND RELATIVE TRLTTII

"Ilet:e once again we find thc same contradiction as wc frotn relativc truths. l}ogdauov is a relativist; Engels is a found above, between the charactcr of human thought, ncc- dialectician. I{ere is another, no less irnportant, argulllcllt essarily conceivcd as absolutc, and its reality in individual of Engels from the chapter ol Anti-Diihrii;g ahearly quoted: human beings wirh their extrenrcly limited thought. This is "Truth and error, like all thought-concepts which move a contradiction which can only be solved in the infinite in polar opposiLes, have absolute validity only in afl extrelne- progression, or what is for us, at lcast from a practical stand- ly limited 6eld, as we have ,ust seen, atld as even Herr point, the endless succession, of gcnerations of mankind. In Diihring would lealise if Lre had ary acquaintance with the this sense human thought is just as rnuch sovereign as flot first elements of dialectics, which dcal ptecisely with the sovereign, and its capacity for knowlcdge just as much un- inadequacy of all polar opposites. As soon as we apply the limited as limited. It is sovereign and unlimired in its dis- afltithesis between truth and error outside of that narrow position (Anlage), its vocarion, irs possibilities and its field which has been referred to above it becomes relativc historical ultimatc goal; it is not sovereign and it is limited and therefore unserviceable for exact scientific modes of in its individual cxpression and in its realisation at cach par- expression; and if we attempt to apply it as absolutely valid ticular moment" (p. 8r).o outside that field \tre really find ourselvcs altogether beaten: becorne transformecl their "It is just the sanre," Engels colrtiflucs, "w-ith e ternal both poles of the antithesis into truths."5e opposites, truth becomes etror and error truth" (p.86).0{) This argument is extremely import^nt for the question Here follows the examlrle of Boyle's law (the volume of a "grain of relatioistw, i.e., the principle of the relativity of our knowl- gas is inversely proportional to its pressure). The of absolute within edge, which is stressed by all Machians. The Machiais one truth" corrtained in this law is only truth "only approxi- and all insist that they are relativists, but the Russian certain limits. The law, it appears, is a truth Machians, while repeating the words of the Germans, are matetry." giving, afraid, or unable to propour.rd the question of the relation of Human thought then by its naturc is capable of compounded a relativism to dialectics clcarly and straightforwardly. For and does give, absolute truth, which is of step in the development Bogda-nov (as for ail the Machians) recognition of the rela- sum-total of relative truths. Each grains sum absolute truth, but tivity of our knowledge excludes even the least admission o[ science adds new to the of scientific proposition are tela- of absolute truth. For Engels absolute truth is compounded the limits of the truth of each tive, now expanding, now shrinking rvith the growth of says Dietzgen in his Excur- * Cl. Y. Chernov, loc. cit., p. 64, et .req. Chctnov, thc Machian, fully knowledge. "Absolute truth," J. thc position of Ilogclanov docs not sions,(ir "can bc seen, heard, smelt, touched atrd, o[ course, "^harcs who wish to ou,n himself a X'Iachian. 'Ihc dillcr:cncc is thrrt Bogcllnov trics to coDcr rzp his disagree- also be knoz,tn; but it is not entirely absorbcd (gebt nicbt mcnt rvith Ilnilcls, to pl cscut it as l casual luil cr, ctc., whilc Chcrnov ailD into knowledgc" (p. ,sl). "It goes without saying fcels that it is rr rlucstion oI I strugglc against both matcrialism ancl clialcctics. that a picture does not exhaust its obiect and the artist ts2 THEORY OF KNOWLEDCE, II ABSOLUTE AND RELATIVE TRUTII lsr

remains behind his model. . . . Horv can a picture .coir.rcide, that we are approaching nearer tc it is also unconditional. with its model? Approxirnatcly it can,, (p. ,gi. .,Ftrence, The contours of the picture are historicatrly conditiolal, but \lze can know nature and her parts only relatir.ely; since the fact that this picture depicts an obiectively existing rWhcn even a part, though only a rclation of nature, possesses model is unconditional. and under what circumstances nevertheless the nature of thc absolutc, the nature of nature we reached, in our knowledge of the essential nature of a.s a whole (des Naturgdltzen an sicl:) which cannot be ex- things, the discovery of alizarin in coal tar or the discovery hausted by knowledge. Flor,v, thcn, do we know that of electrons in the atom is historically conditional; but that behind thc phenomena of naturc, bchind the rclative truihs, every such discovery is an advance of "absolutely oblective there is a universal, unlimited, absolutc nature rrhich does knowledge" is unconditional. In a word, every ideology is tuot reveal itself to man compl*cly? . VThence this knowl- historically conditionatr, but it is unconditionally true that to every scientific ideology (as distinct, for instance, from religious ideology), there corresponds an oblective truth, absolute nature. You will say that this distinction between relative and absolute truth is indefinite. And I shall rcply: 1,es, it is sufliciently "indefinite" to prevent science from becorning a dogma in the bad sense of the tertn, from becom- But Dietzgen corrects himself on the sdme pd.gei .,Wherl ing something dead, ftozen, ossified; but it is at the same I say that the consciousness of eternal, absolute truth is time sufficiently "de6nite" to enable us to dissociate our- innate in us, that it is the one and only a pricri knowledge, selves in the most ernphatic and irrevocable manner from experience also confirms this innate consciousness,, (p. r9g). fidcism and agnosticism, from philosophical idealism and

se statem s the sophistry of the followers of Hume and Kant. Here is a r dialecti boundar:y which you have not noticeC, and not having no- between ticed it, you have falien into the swamp of reactionary phi- failed to I losophy. It is the boundary between dialectical materialism [the lvorid outlook of the old materialism] sets itself up as and relativism. tlre absolute objectioe knou;ledge of tbe esseftce of things We are relativists, proclaim Mach, Avenarius, Petzoldt. 'We [Bogdanov's italics] and is incompatible with the histot- are relaiivisis, echo Mr. Chernov and certain Russian ically conditional nature of all ideologics" (Empirio-Monisru, Machians, would-be Marxists. Yes, Mi. Chernov and Bk. III, p. iv). From tl-rc standpoillr of mocJcrn materialism, Comrades Machians - and therein lies your error. For to i.e., Marxism, the liruits of approximation of our knowledge make relativism the basis of the theory of knowledge is in- to objective, absolutc truth arc historicaUy conditional, but evitably to condemn ooeself either to absolute scepticism, the existence of such truth is unconrJitional, and the fact agnosticism and sophistty, ot to subjectivism. R.elativism as t51 T}JI]ORY OF KNO\VLI]DCII. II CRITERION oF- PRACTICE IN THEoRY oF KNoWL],DCII 1I-I5 a basis of t1.re theory of knowleclgc is not only the rccogni- as rve have akeady seen in the case of the fairly "old" ma- tion of the relativity of our knoivlcclgc, but also a denial o[ terialist, Feuerbach. The obiections brought against mate- any objcctivc measure or moclcl cxisting inclepcndently of rialism from the standpoint of the celebrated "recent posi- humanity to which our rclativc knowledge approximates. tivism" are just ancient trash. From the standpoint of nakcd rclativism one can justify any sopl.ristry; onc may tcgarcl ir as "conditional" whether Napoleon clicd on May ,, t12r, or not; one may declare the 6, TFIE CRITtrRION OF PRACTICE, IN TT{E admission, alonp;siclc of scicntific ideology ("convenient" in THEOI{Y OF KNOWLE,DGE, one respcct), of rcligious iclcology (very "convenient" in another rcsrpcct) a llcrc "convenience" for man or humanity, Iff/e have seen that Marx in 1845 and Engels in rB88 and and so frlrth. r8gz placed the criterion of practicc at the basis of the ma- Dialectics - as Ilcgcl in his time explained - contaifts the terialist theory cf knowledge.63 "The dispute over the reality clement of rclativism, of r.regation, of scepticisrn, b:ut is not or non-reality of tirinking which is isolated from practice is t'educiblc to rclativism. The rnaterialist dialectics of Maru a purely scholastic question," says Marx in his seconcl Thesis and Engcls ccrtainly cloes contain relativism, but is not re- on Feuerbach. Thc best refutation of l(antian and Humean duciblc to rclativism, that is, it recognises the relativity of agnosticism as well as of other philosophical crotchets all our kr.rorvlctlgc, not in the sense of denying objective truth, (Schrullen) is practice, repeats Engels. "The result of our but in thc scnse that the limits of approximation of our action proves the conformity (Uebet'einstirtruirng) of otrr knowlcclgc to this truth are historically conditional. pcrceptions with the objective nature of the ttrings per- Bogdanov writcs in italics: "Consistent Marxism does not ceived," he says in reply to the agnostics.0a arlmit s;rcb tlogruatistn and such static concepl.r" as eternal Cornpare this vzith Mach's argumeflt about the critcrion truths. (Entpirio-Monisnt, Bk. III, p. ix.) This is a muddle. of practice: "trn the common way of thinking and spcaking II thc world is eternally moving and developing rnatter (as dpl)ettronce, illusion, is usually contrastcd tvith renlity. A pen- the Marxists think), rell,ected by the developing human con- cil hcld in front of r.rs in the air is seen as straight; when we sciousncss, what is thete "static" here? The point at issue dip it slantwise into water we see it as crooked. In thc lattcr is not thc immutable essence of things, or an immutable case we say that the pencil appeals crooked bwt in reality consciousocss, but the correspondence between the conscious- it is straight. But what entitles us to declare one fact to be ness rvhich reflects oatlrre ancl the nature rvhich is reflected the reality, and to degrade the otber to an appearance?. by consciousness. In connection with this question, and this Our expectation is deceived when we fall into the natural question alone, the term "dogrnatism" has a specific, charac- crror of expecting what we are accustomcd to although the teristic philosophical flavour: it is a favourite rvord used case is unusual. T'he facts are not to blarnc for that. In by the idcalists and the agnost'ics against the materialists, thcse cases, to speak of appcarance may have a practical 156 lI.IEORY OIr l(NOWJ.t:il)(;ri rr CRITDRION OF PNACTICE IN THEORY OF KNO$(L]IDGE I57 significancc, but not a scientific signiEcancc. Similarly, the And a twisted professor:al idealism it is, indeed, when thc question which is often askccl, whcihcr thc tvorld is rcal or criterion of practice, which for every ofle of ris distinguishes whether we merely drcam it, is clcvoicl of all scicntific sig- illusion from reality, is removed by Mach from the realm nificancc. Evcn thc wilclcst clrcirm is a fact as much as any of science, from tile realm of the theory of knowledge. othcr" (tlnallt.ris of Scnratiottr, pp. rB-r9). Hunran practice proves the correctness of the materialist ft is tr:r-rc tltat rrot only is thc wildest dream a fact, but theory of knov,-ledgc, said Marx and Engels, w-ho dubbed also the wjlclcst philosophy. No doubt of this is possible all attempts to solve the fundamental question of episternology the practice "scholastic" and "philo- after an acquilintlltcc with the philosophy of Ernst lMach. without aid of sophical crotchets." practice is one thing and Egrcgious sophi:;t that hc is, he confounds the scientific- But for Mach the theory of knowledge another. They can be placed side historical ancl psychological investigation of human errors, by side without making the latter conditional on the former. of evcry "wil,-l clrcam" of humanity, such as belief in sprites, In his last work, I{nozoledge and Error, Mach says: "Kt.rowl- hobgoblins, :rrcl so forth, vrith the epistcmological distinc- edgc is a biologically useful (f6rderncles) meotal experience" tion bctwccn truth and "wildness." It is as if an econorrist (znd Germ. ed., p. rr5). "Oniy success can separate knowl- werc to say that both Senior's tireory65 that thc whole profit cdge from error" (p. u6). "The concept is a physical work- of thc capitalist is obtained the "last the from hour" of ing hypothesis" (p. r43). In their astonishing naivet6 our wo(kcr's lirboLrr and theory Marx's are both facts, and that llussian Machian rvould-be Marxists rcgard such phrases fi:om standpoint thc of science there is no point in asking of Mach's as proof that he cotnes close to lVlarxism. But which thcury cxpresscs objective truth and which the prej- - lr{ach here comes iust as close to l\{arxism as Bisrnarck to uclicc bourgcoisie professors. of tlic and tne r.cnality of its the labour [lovement, or Bishop Eulogius to democracy. joscph Tlrc tanncr Dietzgen regarded the scicnti{ic, i.e., thc With Mach such propositions siand sicle by side with his matcrialist, thcory of knowledge as a "universal weapolt iclealist theory of knowledge and do not determine the choice agair-rst rcligious belief" (Kleinere pbilasophiscbe Scbrit'ten of one or aoother definite line of epistemology. I(nowledge lSrua!ler PlLiLosopbical Essaysl, S. 55), but for the professor- can be useful biologically, useful in human practice, uscful in-orclinary Ernst Mactrr the distinction between the mate- for the preservation of 1ife, for the preservation of the rialist ar.rd ttre subjective-idealist theories of knowlcdgc "is species, only when it reflects objective truth, truth which clevoid of a1l scientific significance"! That science is ron- is independent of man. For the materialist the "success" partisan in the struggtre of materialism against idealism and of human practice proves the correspondence between our religion is a favourite idea not only of Mach but of all ideas and the oblective nature of the things we perceive. modern bourgeois professors, who are, as Dietzgen justly For the solipsist "success" is everything needed by tne in expresses it, "gradrated flunkeys wlio stupefy the people practice, which can be regarded separately from the theory by their twistcd idealism" (op. cit., p. 5). of knorvledge. If lve include the criterion of practice in the 158 T]II]oRY OF I(NO\Y/]NDCIi TI i,dClICE IN 'IHEORY OII KNOVLIJI)(JI' I5U

foundation of thc theory o[ knorvlcclgc ,uvc incvitably arrive beyond "experiencc," beyond sensations, in which conncc- at materiirlisln, says thc Marxist. [,ct placticc bc rratcrialist, tion he atticipates the followitg objection from the othcr says Mach, but theory is arrothcr ll:tttcr. camp: "Since the sceptic when he takes part in the aft-airs "In practice," Mach writcs in the Analysis of Sensation.r, of life assumes as indubitable the reality of objcctive things, "we can as littlc do witlrour thc idea of the self when we behaves accordingly, and thus admits a criterion of truth, perform any act, :1s wc crtn clo without the idea of a body his own behaviour is the best and ciearest refutation of his when r,vc gr:asl) at a thirrg. Physiologically we renrain egoists scepticism."* "Such proofs," Schulze indignantly retorts, and nlatcrialists witlr tlrc sarne constancy as we forever see "are only valid for the mob (Pdbel)." For "my scepticism the sr-rn rising a13:rirr. IJut thcoretically this view callnot be does not concern tl're requirements of practical life, but re- acllrercd to" (pp. 284-8). rnains within the bounds of philosophy" (pp. 2j4, 2tt). Egoism is bcsiclc thc point here, for egoism is not an In similar manner, the subjective idealist Fichte also hopes cpistcmological catcgory. I'he question of the apparent move- to find room within the bounds of idealistic philosophy for mert of tlrc surr around tl.re earth is also beside the point, that "realism which is inevitable (sicb aufdringt) for all of practicc, for ir.r which sefves us as a criterion in the theory us, and even for the most determined idealist, when it comes of knowlcclgc, wc ,nlrst include also the practice of astronom- to action, i.e., the assumption that objects exist quite inde- ical obscrvations, cliscoveries, etc. There remains only Mach's pcrrdently of us and outsitie :us" (Werke, I, q;). valuablc admission that in their practical life men are entire- Mach's reccnt positivism has not travelicd far from ly ancl cxclLrsivcly guided by the materialist theory of knowl- Schulzc and Fichte! Let us note as a curiosity that on this edgc; tlrc attempt to obviate it "theoretically" is character- question too for Bazarov thcre is no o11e but Plekhanov istic of Mrrch's gelebrte scholastic arrd tvzisted idealistic - therc is no beast stronger tl-ran the cat. Bazarov ridicules cndcavclu rs. thc "salto oitalc phrlosophy of Plekhanov" (Studies,t;6 etc., To u,Lr.t cxtent these efforts to eliminate practice as - p. 6il, who indeed made thc absurd remark that "belief" something Lrnsusceptible to epistemological treatmenr in - io the existence of the outer world "is an inevitablc salto ordcr to make room for agnosticism and idealism are not 'L);t(tle" (vital leap) oI philosophy (Ncties on Ludaig Feuer- ncw is shown by the following example from the history of bacb, p. ur). The word "belief" (taken from Hume), although Ge rman classical philosophy. Between Kant and Fichte put in quotation marks, discloses a confusion of terms on stands G. E. Schulze (known in the history of philosophy as Plekhanov's part. T'here can be no question about Schulze-Acnesidemus). He openly advocates the sceptical that. But trend in pliilosophy and calls himself a follower of Hume * G. E. Schulzc, Aetrcsidemus odcr ilbu die F'tndatnenle der zson (and of thc ancients Pyrrho and Sextus). He emphatically lcin IIetrn Prolessor Iieinhold in lena gcliefenen ElerncntarpbilosoplLie reiects every thing-in-itself and the possibility of obiective IAcnesidentus, or tl:e Itutdamentals ot' the Elementory Pbilosoplt1, P;s- knowledge, and emphatically insists that we should lrot go pou;ttl,ed by Prclessor Reinbolcl in Jenal, qgz, S. 253. 160 ?HEORY OF KNOWLEDGE. II cRtrrRIoN oF PRACTICE rN TIlEoRy oF KNo!(/LEDCE 161 what has Plekhanov got to do with it? Why did flotBazarov "Does this mean that we must deal with questions of food take some other materialist, Feucrbach, for instance? Is it and drink when examining the problem of the ideality or only because he does not know him? But ignorance is no rcality of the world? exclaims the indignant idealist. How \What - argument. Feuerbach also, like Marx and Engels, makes vile! an offence against good manners soundly to an impermissible from the point of view of Schulze, Fichte berate materialism in the scientific sense from the chair of - philosophy pulpit and Mach - "leap" to practice in the fundamental problems and the of theology, only to practise mate- of epistemology. Criticising iclcalism, Feuerbach explains its rialism with all one's heart and soul in the crudest form at essential nature by the follorving striking quotation from the table d'h6te" (p. ,Sl). And Feuerbach exclaims that to Fichte, which superbly dernolishes Machism: "'You assume,' identify subjective sensation with the objective world "is identify pollution writes Fichte, 'that things arc rcal, that they exist outside to with procreation" (p. r98). A comment not the politest of you, only because you see thctn, hcar them and touch of order, but it hits the vital spot those philosophers thern, But vision, touch and hcaring are only sensations. of who teach that sense-pc(ception is the reality existing outside us. You perceive, not thc objccts, bLrt only your sensations"' Thc standpoint life, practice, (Feuerbach, \Ylerke, X. Band, S. rB5). To which Feuerbach of of shouiJ bc first and fr-rndamental in thc theory of replies that a human bcing is not an abstract ego, but either knowledge. And it inevitably leads to materialism, brushing aside the endless fabrications a t\a17 or womafl, ancl tlrc rprcstion whether the world is of professorial scholasticism. Of course, v/e must not forget sensation can be coniparcd to thc questior: is the man or that the criterion of practice can ne\/er, in the nature of u/oman my sensation, or clo our relations in practical life things, either confirm or refute any human idea cotnpletely. prove the contrary? "T'his is the fundarnental defect of This criterion also is sufiiciently "indc6nite" not to allor.v idealism: it asks and ansr.vers the question of objectivity and human knowledge to become "abso1ute," but at the same subiectivity, of thc rcality or Llnreality of the world, only time it is sufficiently definite ro v/age a rurhless fight on all from thc standpoir-rt of theory" (ibid., p. fifi. Feuerbach varieties of idealism and agnosticism. If what our practice sum-total human practice the basis the makes thc of of confirms is the sole, ultimate and objective truth, then from F{e says that idealists course also theory of knowlcdge. of this must follow thc recognition that the only path to this recognise thc reality of thc 1 and the Thou in practical life. truth is the path oI science, which holds the materialist point For thc idealists "this point of view is valid only for prac- of view. For instance, Bogdanov is pi:epared to recognise tical life arrd not for speculation. BuL a speculation which Marx's theory of the circulation of money as an obfective contradicis life, which makes the standpoilt of death, of truth only for "our time," and calls it "dogmatism" to at- a soul separ;rted from the body, the standpoinl of truth, is tribute to this theory a "snper-historically objectivc" truth a dead and false spcculation" (p. ,Sr). Beforc wc pcrceitte, (Empirio-Monism, Bk. III, p. vii). This is again a muddle. ve breathe; wc canooL exist v'ithout air:, food and clrinli. The correspondence of this theory to practice cannot be L62 TI-IEORY OF KNO!rI-EDGE, I1 altered by any future circumstances, for the same simple reason that makes it ar: etetilal truth that Napolcon died on May 1, t8zr. But inasmuch as thc critcrion of practice, i.e., the course of developmcttt of atL capitalist countrics in the last fe'rv dccadcs, Provcs only thc obiective truth of Marx's zp:hole social ancl cconomic thcory in general, and not merely of onc or othcr o[ its pirrts, formulations , etc., it is clear that to talk of thc "clogrratism" of the Marxists is to make an unpardonablc coticcssior to bourgeois economics' The sole cot.rclusion ttl bc clrar'vn from the opinion of the Marxists that Marx's tl.rcory is an obiective truth is that by following rr{E rx{E"*" r*'#,X;1;;ffi:T oF Dn.{r,EcrrcAr. the 'pat/.t o[ Marxist theory we shall draw closer and closer MATERIAI.ISM AND OF EMPiI{IO-CRI'{ICX5M. IItr to objcctivc trLrth (without ever exhausting it) ; but by following any otl)er patb we shall arrive at nothing but confusion anci lics. 1,. $rHAT IS MATTER? WHAT IS EXPE,RIENCE?

The first of these questions is constantly being hurled by the idealists and agnostics, including the Machians, at the materialists; the second questioil by the materialists at the Machians. Let us try to make the point at issue clear. Avenarius says on the subject of matter: "\ffithin the purified, 'complete experience' there is nothing 'physical'- 'matter' in the metaphysical absolute conccption - fot 'matter' according to this conception is only an abstraction; it would be the total of the counter-terms abstracted from every central term. Just as in the principal co-ordination, that is, 'complete experience,' a counte(-term is inconceivable (undenkbar) without a central term, so 'matter' in the metaphysical absolute conception is a complete chimera (Undi.ng)'t (Beruerku.ngen lNotesl, S. z, in the journal cited, $ rr9).

163 164 TTIEORY OF KNO\{/I,EDC]]. ]1I WHAT IS MATTER? \X/IIAT IS EXPERIDNCI? I (iI-r

In all this gibberish one thing is evident, namely, tllat cntirely away from mattar as the thing which moves" (T be Avenarius designates the physical or matter by tl-re terms Gramnzar ot' Science, znd ed., rgoo, p. 249). Ilere there is not absolute ar.rd metaphysics, for, according to his theory of even the fig-leat of the "elements," and the iclealist openly the principal co-ordination (or, in the nc\M way, "corrplete stretches out a hand to the agnostic. expericnce"), the counter-terfiI is inscparablc frorn the cen- As the readu sees, all these arguments of the founders tral term, tlre environment lrom the seff; the non-self is in' of empirio-criticism entirely and exclusively revolve around separabie from the selt' @s J. G. Fichte said). That this the old epistemological question of the relation of thinking theory is disguised subjcctive idealism we have aheady to being, of sensation to the physical. It reqLrired the ex- shown, ancl the nature of Avenarius' attacks on "matter" is treme naivete of the Russian Machians to discern anything quitc obvious: the idealist denies physical being that is in- here that is even remotely related to "recent science," or depcndent of the mind and therefore re;ects the cotlcept "ieccnt positivism." All the philosophers mentioned by us, elaboratcd by philosophy for such being. That matter is some frankly, others guardedly, replace the fundamental "plrysical" (i.e., that which is most familiar and imme- ptrrilosophical line of materia-lism (from being to tl-rinking, diately given to man, and tire existence of which no o1le save from matter to sensation) by the reverse line of idealism. an inmatc of a luna-tic asylum can doubt) is not denicd by T'heir denial of matter is the old ansrver to epistemological Avcnarius; he only insists on the acceptance af "bis" theory problems, which consists in deny-ing the existence of an ex- of thc indissoluble conncction betrvcen the cuvironment and ternal, objective source of our sensations, of an obiective the sclf. rcality corresponding to our sensations. Cn the other hand, Mach cxpresscs the sarne thotlSht more simpl5', v'ithout the recognition of the philosophical line denied by the ideal- philosophical flourishcs: "!flhat we call matter is a certain ists and agnostics is expressed in the definitions: matter is systcmatic combination of ttne eleruezls (sensations)" (Analy- that which, actiog upo11 our sense-organs, produces sensa- sis ol Settsatir.nt-r, p. 265). Mach thinks that by this assertion; rnatter is the objective reality given to us in sensation, tion lrc is ct{ccting a "radical charrge" in the usual world and so forth. outlook. L.r rcality this is the old, old subiective idealism, Bogdanov, pretending to argue only against Beltov and thc nal

compared with experietce" (Erkennlnis unrl brtult, S. zoo). investigation."* It follows that according to Plekhanov any Mach's special "philosophy" is hcrc thrown ovcrboard, and distinction between the views of Fr. Carstanjen and matc- the author instinctively accepts thc customafy standpoint of rialism is meaningless! tlre scientists, who regard expcricncc mirtcrialistically. Fr. Carstanjen is almost lttelo'lly quoting Avenarius, who To summarise: the word "cxpcricncc," on which the in his NoresTo emphatically contrasts his conception of ex- Machians build their systcms, has long bccn serving as a perience as that which is givcn us, that which we frnd (das shield for ideatrist systcms, arrcl is now serving Avenarius Vorgef undene), with the conception of cxperience as a and Co. in eclectically passing to and fro between the ideal- "means of knowledge" in "the sense of the prevailing theo- ist position and the matcri;rlist position. The various "def- ries of knowledge, which essentially are futrly meraphysical" initions" of this concept arc only cxprcssions of those two (op. cit., p. 4ot). Petzoldt, following Avenarius, says the fundamental lines in philosophy rvhich were so strikingly samc thing in his Introduction to tbe Pltilosophy ot' Ptn e rcvealed by E,ngels. Experience (Bd. I, S. r7o). Thus, according to Plekhanov, the distinction between the views of Carstanjen, Avenarius, Petzoldt and materialism is meaniflgless! Either Plekhanov 2. PLEKFIANOV'S TIIROR CONCERNING TFIE has not read Carstanjen and Co. as thoroughly as he should, CON (]I]P:f :'E.)GE,RIENCE'' or he has taken his refcrence to "a Germalt writer" at fifth hand. On pagcs x-xi of his itrtrocluction to L. Feuerlsacb (t9o5 What then docs this statement, uttered by somc orc the ed.) Pickhanov s:r)s: most prominent empirio-criticists and not understood by "Onc Gcrn'ran rvriici has remarked that for ernpirio-critic- Plekhanov, mean? Carstanjen wishcs to say that Avenariris ism expcricizcr: is orr11, arr obiect of investigation, and not h hts The Critique ot' Pure Experience takes experience, i.e., a lneans of krrowlcclgc. If that is so, then the distinction all "human predications," as thc object of investigation. Ave- betwccn cmpirio criticism and materialism loses all mean- rrrrrius does not invcstigate here, says Carstanjeo (op. cit., ing, ancl cliscussiorr of the qllestion whether or no[ empirio- p. to), whcthcr thcsc predications are real, or whethcr thcy criticism is clcstincd to rcplace matcrialism is absolutely relate, for example, to g/tosts; he merely arrangcs, systema- shallow and icllc.'r tises, formally classifies all possible human predications, botb This is onc cornplctc n-ruddlc. ideal,ist and materialist (p. 53), without going into the es- Fr. Carstanjcn, onc of the most "orthodox" followers of sence of the question. Carstanien is absolutcly right when hc characterises tl:is point "scepticism Avenarius, says ir.r his article on cmpirio-criticism (a rcply of vicw as par excel- to N7undt), tl.rat "for The Critique ot' Pure Experience expe- Y Vier!eljalLrssclti/t rience t'ilr aisscntcbnftlicbc Pl:ilosophie, Jrhrg. zz, r898, is not a means of kno'uvledge but only an obiect of S. +;. I74 THEORY OF KNOVIEDGE. III Y AND NECESSI Y IN NATURE L75 lence" (p. ,r). In this article, by tl're way, Carstanien de- As a curiosity let us note that on this point Bogdanov fends his beloved master from the ignominious (for a Ger- and Valentinov, in their reply to Plekhanov, revealed no man professor) charge of rnatcrialism levelled against him greater knowledge of the subject. Bogdanov declared: "It by 'il(/undt. Why are v/e matcrialists, pray? - such is the is not quite clear" (Bk. III, p. xi).- "It is the task of burden of Carstanien's objcctions - wheu we speak of "ex- empirio-criticists to examine this formulation and to accept pericncc" wc do not fficafl it in the ordinary cutrent sense, or rciect the condition." A very convenient position: I, for- which leads or might lcad to materialism, but in the sense sooth, am not a Machian and am not therefore obliged to that wc invcstigatc cvcrything that men "predicate" as ex- find out in what sense a certain .,{,venarius or Carstanfen perience. Carstanlcrr and Avenarius regard the view that speaks of experience ! Bogdanov wants to make use of (that, expericncc is a rncans of knowledge as materialistic Machism (and of the Machian confusion regarding "expe- opinion, but nevertheless, un- perhaps, is thc most common rience"), but he does not want to be held responsible for it. as wc havc sccn in the case of Fichte). Avenarius true, The "pure" empirio-criticist Valentinov transcribed Plek- entrenchcs hinrsclf against the "prevailing" "metaphysics" hanov's remark and publicly danced the cancan; he sneered which pcrsists in rcgarding the brain as the organ of thought at Plekhanov for not naming the author and for not explaifl- and which igtrorcs the theories of introiection and co-ordina- ing what the matte,: was all abot (op. cit., pp. ro8-o9). By tlrc givcn or the found (das Vorgefundene), Ave- But tion. at the same time this empirio-critical philosopher narius rrcans thc indissoluble connection betweett the selt' in his answ-er said not a single oord on the substance of and thc cnvironment, which leads to a confused idealist the matter, although acknowledging he interprctation of "experience.'l that had read Plekhanov's re- nrark "three times or more" (and Hencc, both tire materialist and the idealist, as well as the had apparently not uncler- Humcan arrd the Kantian lines in philosophy may unques- stood it). Oh, those Machians! tionably bc concealed beneath thc word "experience"; but ncither thc deEnition of experience as an obiect of investigation,* nor its definition as a means of knowledge is decisive 3, CAUSALITY AND NECE,SSITY IN NATURE in this rcspect. Carstanien's remarks against S(undt especial- The questioo ly have no relation whatever to the question of the distinc- of causality is particularly important in philosophical tion between empirio-criticism and materialism. determining the line ol any new j'ism," and we must therefore dwell on it in some detail. * Plekhanov pethaps thought that Carstanjen had said, "an obicct oI Let us begin with an exposition of the materialist theory knowledgc indepcndent of knowledge," aud not an "obiect o[ invcstiga- of knowledge on this point. L. Feuerbacl.r's views are ex- materialism. But neithcr Carstanieu, nor tion"? This rvould indcccl be pounded with particular clarity in his reply to R. Hayrn anybody elsc acquaintecl with empirio-criticisrn, said or coulcl havc said, any such thing. already referred to. 176 THEORY OF KNOU/LEDCE, III CAUSALITY AND NECESSITY IN NAT.UR]] 177 "'Natute and human reasoo,' says Haym, 'are for him tent (nicht sinn-, d. b. gegefista.ndslose Worte); neverthclcss, (Feuerbach) completely divorced, and between them a gulf a distinction must be made betr,veen the original and thc is formed which cannot be spanned from one side or the translation. Order, purpose, law in the human sense exp(ess other.' Haym grounds this reproach on $ 48 ol my Essence something arbitrary. ol Religion where it is said that 'uature may be conceived "From the contingency of order, purpose and law in only through nature itsclf, that its necessity is neither human natlrre, theism expressly infers their arbitrary origin; it in- nor logical, neithcr metaphysical nor mathematical, that lers the existence of a being distinct from nature vrhich nature alone is the being to which it is impossible to apply brings order, purpose, law into a [ature that is in itselt (an any human measure, althouglt we compare and give names sicb) chaotic (dissolr.rte) and indifferent to all determination. to its phenomena, in order to make them comprehensible to The reason of the theists. is reason contradictory to na- us, and in general apply human expressions and concep- ture, reason absolutely devoid of understanding of the es- tions to thetn, as for cxamptre: order, purpose, law; and are sence of natu(e. The reason of the theists splits nature into obliged to do so because of the character of our langtage.' two beings - one matetial, and the other formal or spir- (Werke, Iil/hat does this mcan? Does it mean that there is no order itlial" YII. Band, r9o3, S. ;r8-zo). in nature, so that, for cxample, autumn may be succeeded Thus Feuerbach recognises objective law in nature and by sumrner, spting by winicr, winter by autumn? That there obiective causality, which are reflected only with approxi- is no putpose, so that, for example, there is no co-ordination mate fidelity by human icleas of order, Iaw and so forth. betv-een the lungs arrcl the air, between light and the eye, With Feuerbach the recognition of objective law in flature inseparably connected between sound anc{ thc ear? That there is no law, so that, is with the recognition of the objec- for example, thc carth may move now in an ellipse, now in tive reality of the external world, of obiects, bodies, things, a citcle, that it may rcvolve around the sun now in a year, reflected by our mind. Feuerbach's views are consistently rnaterialistic. philosoph- now in a quartcr of an hour? \fr/hat nonsense! !(hat then Ail other views, or rather, any other ical line on the question causality, objec- is meant by this passagc? Nothing more than to distinguish of the denial of tive 1aw, causality and necessity nature, are justly rcgard- between that which belongs to natllre and that which be- in ed by Feuerbach as belonging to the fideist trend. For is, longs to man; it docs not asserl that there is act:ually nothing it indeed, clear that the subjectivist the question in nature corresponding to the words or ideas of order, pur- line on of causality, the deduction of the order and necessity of nature pose, law. All that it does is to deny the identity between not from the external objective conscious- lhought and being; it dcnies that they exist in nature exactly world, but from ness, reason, logic, and so forth, not only cuts human rea- as they do in the head or mind of man. Order, purpose, son ofi from nature, not only opposes the former the lat- lasv are words used by man to translate the acts of nature to ter, but makes nature a part of reason, instead of regarding into his outn latgtage in order that he may undelstand them' reasofl as a part of nature. The subiectivist line on the ques- These words are not devoid of meaning or of obiective con- 178 T]'IEORY OF KNO\fLEDGE. III CAUSALITY AND NECESSITY IN NATURI] L7!) tion of causality is philosophical iclealism (varicties of which and then, and oice oersa" (p.8). Hence, the human conccp- are tlre theories of causality o[ I-Iurnc and I(ant), i.e., frde- tion of cause and efiect always somewhat simplifles thc ism, more or less weakened and diluted. The recognition of objective connection of the phenomena of nature, reflecting objective law in nature and tl.rc rccogr.rition that this law is it only approximately, a:r,ificially isolating one or another as- reflected with approximatc ficlclity in the mirld of man is pect of a single world process. If we find that the laws of materialism. thought correspond with the laws of nature, says Engels, As regards Engels, hc l.rad, if I am not mistaken, no oc- this becomes quite conceivable when we take into account casion to contrast his matcrialist view with other trends rin that reason and consciousfless are "products of the human the particular qucstion o[ causality. He had no need to brain and that man himself is a product of nature." Of do so, sincc hc had dclinitcly dissociated himself from all course, "the products of the human brain, being in the last the agnostics on thc nrore fundamental question of the obiec- analysis also products of nature, do not contradict the rest tive reality of the cxtcrnal world in general. But to anyone of nature's interconnectiots (NaturTusammenltang) but are who has read his philosophical works at all attentively it in correspondence with them (p. zz)-72 There is no doubt must be clcar that Ilngels does not admit even the shadow that there exists a natural, objective interconnection betr,veen of a doubt as to the existence of obiective law, causality the phenomena of the world. Engels constantly speaks of and necessity in nature. !fl'e shall confine ourselves to a few the "laws of nattte," of the "necessities of nature" (Natur- examples. In the .6rst section of Anti-Dtihring1l Engels says: tzotrarcndigkeiten), without considering it necessary to explain "In order to undcrstand these details [of the general picture the generally known propositions of materialism. of the world phenomena], we must detach them from their Tn Ludroig Feuerbacb also we read that "the general natural (natiirliclt) or historical connection and examine laws of motion - both of the external world and of human each one separately, its nature, special causes, effects, etc." thought - [are] tuTo sets of laws which are identical in sub- (pp. l-6). That this natural connection, the connection be- stance but difier in their expression in so far as the human tweefl natural phenomena, exists obiectively, is obvious. mind can apply them consciously, while in nature and also Engels partioulatly emphasises the dialectical view of cause up to now for the most part in human history, these lar,vs and effect: "And we find, in like manner, that cause and assert themselves unconsciously in the form of external efiect are conceptions which only hold good in their applica' necessity in the midst of an endless series of seeming acci- tion to individual cases; but as soon as we consider the indi- dents" (p. ls). And Engels reproaches the old natural philos- vidual cases in their general connection with the universe ophy for having replaced "the real but as yet unknown as a whole, they run into each other, and they become con- interconnections" (of the phenomena of nature) by "ideal founded when rve contempiate that universal action and and imaginary ones" (p. +r).'3 Engels' recognition of obiec- reaction in which causes and effects are eternally changing tive law, causality and necessity in nature is absolutely places, so that what is effect here and now will be cause there clear, as is his emphasis on the relative character of our, 1B() THEORY OF KNO!(LEDGE. III CAUsALITY AND NECESSITY IN NATURE lBI i.e., ntafl's approximate reflections of this law in various It is clear from this that Mr. Helfond has made a statc- coflcepts. ment which is directly contrdry to fact. The world outlook Passing to Joseph Dietzgery we must first note one of of mateialism expounded by J. Dietzgen recognises that the innumerable distortions committed by our Machians. One "the causal dependence" is contained "in the things them- of the authors of thc Studies "iri' the Pbilosopby ot' Marxism, seh.es." It was necessary for the Machian hash that Mr. Mr. Helfond, tclls us: "Thc basic points of Dietzgen's world Helfond should confuse the materialist line with the ideal- outlook may be summarised in the following propositions: ist line on the question of causality. . . . (C) The causal dcpcndcnce which we ascribe to things is Let us now proceed to the latter line. in reality not contait.tcd in the things themselves" (p. ,q8). A clear statement of the starting point of Avenarius' This is sheer nonsattsc. Mr. Ifelfond, rvhose own vier'vs rep- philosophy on this question is to be founcl in his first work, reseflt a veritablc hash of materialism and agnosticism, has Philosopbie als Denken der Welt gemiiss dem PrinTip des can finci owtrageously fal.rifietl J. Dictzgen. Of course, we kleinsten Kraf tmasses. In $ 8r we read: "Just as we do not plenty of confusion, incxactncsses ancl errors in Dietzgen, experience (erfahren) force as causing motion, so we do not such as gladclcn thc hcarts of thc Machians ancl oblige materi- experience the necessity tor aty motioo. . . . All we expe- philosopl-rer is not entirely atrists to regard Dictzgcrt as a who ience (et'fabren) is that the one follows the other." This is Dtetzgen consistent. Br-rt to attribute to the materialist J. the Humean standpoint in its purest form: sensation, expe- view of causality only a a direct dcnial of the materialist - rience tell us nothing of ar:ry neccssity. A philosopher who only Russian Machians arc capable of that. Flelfond, thc asserts (on the principle of "the economy of thought") that "Objcctivc scicntific knowledge," says Dietzgen in his only sensation exists could not havc come to any othcr The ol tbe'Workings ol the lltttnan Mind (Germatr Naturc conclusion. "Since the idea at causality," we read further, cd. r9o1), "sccks for causes fiot by faith or speculation, but "dcmands force ar,d necessity or constraint as integral by expcricnce aL.rd induction, not a ptiori, b:ut a posteriori' parts of the effcct, so it falls together with the latter" ($ sr). Natural scicuce looks for causes not outside or back of "Necessity therefore expresses a paftia)lat degrec of probabil- phenomcna, but within or by means of them" (pp. gq-S)- which the effcct is, or may bc, expected" ($ Bl, "Causes arc the products of the faculty of thought' They are, ity with however, uol its pure products, but are produced by it in thesis). This is outspoken subjectivism on the question of causality. coniunction with sense material. This sense material gives one is at all consistent one cannot cofire to any other the causes thus detived their objective existence. Just as we And if objective reabty as the source clernand that a truth should be the truth of an obiective conclusion unless one recognises phenornenon, so we demand that a cause should be rcal, that of our sensations. us turn Mach. In a special chapter, "Causatrity and it should bc the cause of some oblective efiect" (pp. Ss-Sg). Let to "The canse of the thing is its connection" (p. Ioo). Explanation" (Wiirruelebre,T'" z. Auflagc, r9oo, S. 412-9), we 182 THI]ORY OF KNOWLEDGE. III CAUSALI.III AND NI]CESSITY IN NATURE 183

read: "'Ihe Humean ctiticism (of the conccption of causality) thc results of investigation in measurable quantitics, v/hich nevertheless retains its validity." Kant and Hume (Mach even in sciences like chemistry has only partly been achieved. does not trouble to deal with r-rthcr pl'rilosophcrs) solve the Apparently, in the opinion of our Machians, who are so problem of causality diffcr:cntly. "Wc prefer" Hume's credulous as to professorial discoveries, Feuerbach (not to solution. "Apat fuon logical ncccssity [Mach's italicsl no mention Engels) did not know that the concepts order, law, other neccssity, for instaucc physical necessity, exists." This and so forth, can under certain conditions be expressed as is exactly tl.re vicw which was so vigorously combated by a mathematically defined functional relation! Feucrbach. It ncvcr cvcn occurs to Mach to deny his kinship The really important epistemological question that divides with Humc. Only thc ltussian Machians could go so far as the philosophical trends is not the degree of precision attained to assert thnt I-Iurnc's :rgnosticism cotrld bc "cornbined" with by our descriptions of causal connections, or whether these Marx's ancl E,ngcls' nrrtcr:ialism. In Mach's Mecbanik, we descriptions can be expressed in exact mathematical formulas, read: "In naturc thcrc is ncither cause nor effect" (5. +lq, f but whether the source of our knowledge of these connec- Auflagc, rtl97). "[ havc rcpeatedly dernonstrated that all tions is objective natural law or properties of our mind, its forms of ttrc law o[ causalitl. spring from subjective nrotives innate faculty of apprehending certain a prioti truths, and (Triebcn) ancl thtrt tl.rcrc is no necessity for nature to corre- so forth. This is what so irrevocably divides the materialists spond with thcnr" (p. 495). Feuerbach, Marx and Engels from the agnostics (Humeans) 'W'c must hcrc notc that o,.rr Russian Machians with Avenarius and Mach. amazing naivctt rcplace the question of the matcrialist or In certain parts of his works, &Iach, whom it would be idealist trcncl of irll arguments on the law of causality by a sin to accuse of consistency, frequently "forgets" his the qucstiou of onc or another formulation of this law. They agreement with Hume and his own subiectivist theory of believed thc (icrman cmpirio-critical professors that merely causality and argues "simply" as a natural scientist, 1.e., to say "futrctional correlation" was to make a discovery in from the institctive materialist standpoint. For instance, in "rccct'rt positivisLl" and to release one from the "fetishisrn" his Mechatzik, we reacl of "the uniformity which nature teaches of exprcssions likc "necessity," "law," and so forth. This of us to find in its phenomena" (French ed., p. I8z). But if \ffundt course is uttcrly absurd, and was fully iustified in we do find uniforrnity in the phenomena of nature, does this ridiculing such a change ol oords (in the afiicle, quoted mean that uniformity exists obiectively outside our mind? above, in PltiLosopbische Studien, S. 383, 388), r,vhich in fact No. On the question of the uniformity of nature Mach also changes nothing. Mach himself speaks of "all forms" of the delivers hirnself thus: "The power that prompts us to com- law of causality and in his Kno'oledge and Error (2. Auflage, plete in thought facts only partially observed is the power S. z7B) makcs thc self-evident reservation tl-rat the concept of association. It is greatly strengthened by repetition. It fu-nction can cxpre ss the "dependence of clements" morc then appears to us to be a power which is independent of precisely only whcn thc possibility is achievcd of exprcssing our r.vill and of individual facts, a powe( which directs LB4 TI]]]ORY OF KNOWLIIDGI]. III CAUSALITY AND NECESSITY IN NATURE 185 thouglrts and fMaclis italics] facts, which kecps both in tion of causality, Pearson formulates the following thesis mutual correspondence as a lazet governing both. That we ($ t): "Tbe necessity lies in tbe zoorld ot' conceptions and not consider ourselves capable of making predictions with the in tbe utorltl ot' perceptions." It should be noted that for help of such a law only [!] proves that therc is suflicient Pearson perceptions or sense-impressions are the rcality uniformity in our environment, but it does not prove the existing outside us. "In the uniformity with whictrr sequeflces necessity of the success of our predictions" (WrirmeLebre, S. of perception ate repeated (the routine of perceptions) there t8). is also no inherent necessity, but it is a flecessary condition It follows that we may and ought to look necessity for a for the existence of thinking beings that there should be a apart the uniformity of our eovironment, froru i.e., of nature! routine in the perceptions. The necessity thus lies in the Where to look for it is the secret of philosophy idealist which nature of the thinking being and not in the perceptions is afraid to recognise rnan's perceptive faculty as a simple themselves; thus it is conceivabl)' a product of the perceptive reflection of nature. In his last work, Knoz,tslerlge ancl Error, facrlty" (p.rly). Mach even defines a law of flature as a "limitation of ex- Our Machian, with whom Mach himself frequently ex- pcctation" (2. Atfl,age, S. 4yo fi.) ! Solipsism clairns its owrr. presses complete solidarity, thus arrives safely and soundly Let us examine the position of other writcrs of the same pure is man rvho dictates laws to philosophical trend. The Errglishmarr, Karl Pearson, expresses at Kantian idealism: it man ! The himself with characteristic precision (Tbe Graznmar ot' nature and not natlrre that dictates laws to doctrine of Science, znd ed.): "The lar.ys of science are products of thc important thing is not the repetition of Kant's human mind rather than factors of the external v-orld" apriorism which docs not define the idealist line in - of b.$)."Those, whether poets or materialists, who do hom- philosoptry as such, but only a pafticrlJat formulation age to nature, as the sovereign of man, too often forget that this line - but the fact that reasofl, mind, consciousness are the order and complexity they admire are at least as much a here primary, and nature seconCary' It is not reason that is product of man's perceptive and reasoning faculties as are a paft of nature, one of its highest products, the reflection their own memories and thoughts" (p. r8y). "The compre- of its processes, but nature that is a part of reason, which hensive character of fiatoral law is due to the ingenuity of thereby is stretched from the ordinary, simple human reason the humarr mind" (ibid.). "Man is tbe maker ol natural laro," known to us all to a "stupendous," as Dietzgen puts it, it is stated in Chapter III, $ 4. "There is more meaning in mysterious, divine reason. The Kantian-Machian formula, the statement that man gr'ves laws to nature than in its that "man gives laws to l1ature," is a fideist formula. If our converse that nature gives laws to man," although, the Machians stare wide-eyed on rcading Engels' statement that worthy professor is regretfully obliged to admir, the iatter the fundamental characteristic of materialism is the accept- (materialist) view is "unfortunately far too common today,' ance of nature and not spirit as primary, it ontry shows (p. AZ). In the fourth chapter, which is devoted ro the ques- how incapable they are of distinguishing the really impor- 186 THEoRy oF KNo!(/LF,DGE rrr CAUSALITY AND NECESSITY IN NATURts 187

tant philosophical trends from thc rnock crudition and sage received an impulse in tl're direction of the iine AB, does jargon of the professors. a body move towa(ds C and not towatds D or F, etc.? J. Petzoldr, who in his two-volurne work analysed and developcd Avcnarius, may scrvc as an excellent example of reactionary Machian scholasticism. "Even to this day,,, says he, "one hundred aod fifty years after Hume, substantiality and causality paralysc the daring of the thinker" (lntroduc- tion to tbc Pl.tilo.ropltlt o1 1t,rrt Experience, Bd. I, S. 3r). It goes withotrt sayiug that those who are most "daring" are other the solipsists rvho discovered sensation vzithout organic "\ff/hy does raturc not choose any of the countless mattcr, thought without brain, nature without obfective law! directions?" G. l). Because that would be "rnultiple de- "And thc last folnulation of causality, u,hich we have not termination," and the great empirio-critical discovery of yet mcrrtionccl, nccessity, or necessity in nature, corrtains loscph Petzoldt demands unique detetrttination. "empirio-criticists" fill scores of pages with sr-rch sornething v:rguc and mystical" - (the idea of "fetishism," The "anthropomor6rhisrn," etc.) (pp. 32, 1,D. Oh, the poor mys- unutterable trash! tics, Fcucrbach, Nfarx and Engels! They have been talking ". V/e have remarked more than once that our thesis all thc tirnc of necessity in nature, and have even been call- does not derive its force fron a sum of separate experiences, ing tl.rosc who hold the Humean position theoretical reac- but that, on the contrary, we demand that nature should tionaries! Petzoldt rises above all "anthropomorphism." He recognise its validity (seine Gelttlng). Itdeed, even before it has discovcred the great "laza; ol unique determination," becomes a law it has already become for us a principle with which eliminates er/ery obscurity, every trace of "fetishism," wlrich we approach rcality, a postulate. It is valid, so to etc., etc., etc, For example,.the parallelogram of forces (p. speak, a priori, independently of all separate expericnces. It ll). This cannot be "proven"; it must be accepted as a "tact r,vould, indeed, be unbefitting for a philosophy of pure expe- of expericnce." It cannot be conceded that a body under rience to preach a priori truths and thus relapse into the likc impulses u,ill move in different ways. "We cannot most sterile metaphysics. Its apriorism can only be a logical concedc nature such indefiniteness and arbitrariness; we one, flever a psychological, or metaphysical one" (p. +o). must clemand from it definiteness and law" (p. 3r). Well, Of course, if we call apriorism logical, then the reactionary well! \ii/e demand of nature obedience to law. The bour- nature of the idea disappears and it becomes elevated to the geoisie demands reaction of its professors. "Our thought level of "recent positivism" ! demands definiteness ftom nature, and nature always con- There can be no unique determination of psychical phe- forms to this demand; we shall even see that in a certain oolnena, Petzoldt further teaches us; thc role of imagination, sense it is compelled to conform to it" (p. 36). !7hy, having the significance of great inventions, ctc., hcre create excep- TIIEORY OF KNOWLEDGE. III tions, while thc lalv of naturc, or the law of spirit, tolerates is onry , ,".",,1'i'i,';'J;::':;;J"" H.., ,r"",:,:: "no excepLiolts" (p. 6t). Iif. have before us a pure metaphysi- who are basically at one, oiz., in their denial of obiective cian, who has not the slightest inkling of thc relativity of law in nature, and who thus inevitably condemn themselves the diflercncc between the contingent and the nccessary. to idealist conclusions of one kind or another. A rather more I may, perhaps, be reminded - continues Petzoldt - of "scrupulous" empirio-criticist than J. Petzoldt, Rudolf Willy, the motivation of historical events or of the development who is ashamed of his kinship with thc immanentists, rejects, of character in poetry. "If we eramine the matter carefully for example, Petzoldt's whole theory of "unique determina- we shall find that there is no such unique determination. tion" as leading to nothiog but "logical forrnalism." But does Th.erc is not a single historical evert or a single drama in Willy improve his position by disavowing Petzotrdt? Not in which we could not imagine the participants acting differ- the least, for he disavows Kantian agnosticism solely for the ently under similar psl,chical conditions. ." (p. Zl). "Unique sake of l{umean agflosticism. "We have known from tire determination is not only absent in the realm of the psychical, time of Hume," he rvrites, "that 'necessity' is a pur:ely logical but we are also entitled to demand its absence frcm teality (not a 'transcendenta!') chancteristic (Alerkmal), or, as I [Petzoldt's italics] . Our doctrine is thus elevated to the would rather say and have a\teady said, a purely verbal rank of a posttildte, i.. e., to the rank of a fact, which we (.rpracblicb) characteristic" (R. \Milly, Gcgen die Schtl.zoei- regard as a. necessary condition of a much earlicr experience, sbeit, Minchen, r9or, S. 9r; ct'. S. r73, r75). as its l.ogical a priori" (Petzoldt's italics, p. 76). The agnostic calls our ma1-erialist vie"v of necessity And Petzoldt continues to operate with this "logical a "transcendental," for from the standpoint of Kantian and priori" in both volumes of his Introduction, and in the Humean "school wisdom," which 1Milly does not reject but booklct issued in 19o6, Tlse World Problem t'roru tbe Po.ri- only furbishes Lrp, aflJr recognition of objcctive reality givcn tiaist Standpoirzt.+ Here is a second instance of a noted us in experience is an illicit "ransccndence." empirio-criticist who has irnpetceptibly stripped into Kant- Among the Frenctr u,riters of the philosophical trend we ianism and who serves up thc most reactionary doctrines are analysing, we find Henri Poincar6 constantly straying with a somewhat difierent saucc. And this is not fortuitous, into this same path of agnosticism. Henri Poincar6 is an for at thc very foundations of Mach's and Avcnarius' teach- eminent physicist but a poor philosopher, whose errors ings on causality there lies an idealist falsehood, which no Yushkevich, of course, declared to be the last word of recent highflown talk of "positivism" can cover up. The distinction positivism, so "recent," indeer-I, that it even required a new betwcco the Hurnean and the Kantian theories of causality "ism," oi1., empirio-symbotrism. For Poincar6 (with whose views as a whole we shall dcal in the chapter on the ne'nv + Peti:olclt, Das Wel.tprobletn ron positioistiscben Standptnktc aus, J. physics), Lcipzig, 19o6, S. r1o: "Also from the empir:ical stanclpoint there can be the laws of nature ale symbols, conventions, u,hich e Jirgicnl a priori; causality is thc logical a priori of thc cxpcricnccd man creates for the sake of "conztenience." "The only true (erf ahnrt gsmiisslge) pcrmancnce of onr env.ironment." obiectir.e reality is the internal harmony oI the world." By CAUSALITY 190 TTIF.oRY orr KNoVLEDCE. IrI AND NECESSITY IN NATURE 191

"objective," Poincare means that which is generally regarded We quote this example in order to give the reader a clear as valid, that which is accepted by the majority of men, or idea of the degree of naivet6 of our Yushkeviches, who take by all;* that is to say, in a purely sublectivist manner he a "theory of symbolism" for something genuinely neza), destroys obiective truth, as do all the Machians. And as whereas philosophers in the least versed in their subfect say regards "harmony," he categorically declares in answer to plainly and explicitly: he has become converred to the the question whether it exists outside ol us - "undoubtedly, standpoint of critical idealisrn! For the esseflce of this point no." It is perfectly obvious that the new terms do not in of view does not necessarily lie in the repetition of I(ant's the least change the ancient philosophical position of agnosti- formulations, but in the recognition of the fundameotal idea cism, for the essence of Poincare's "original" theory amounts coTnrfton to both Hume and Kant, oi1., the denial of objectivc to a denial (although he is far from consistent) of objective law in nature and the deduction of particular "conditions reality and of obfective law in flature. It is, therefote, pet of experience," particular principles, postulates and proposi- fectly natural that in contradistinction to the Russian tions frorn tbe subject, from human consciousness, and not Machians, who accept new formulations of old errors as the from nature. Engels was right when he said that it is not latest discoveries, the German Kantians greeted such views important to which of the numerous schools of materialism as a convefsion to their own views, 1.e., to agaosticism, on or idealism a particular philosopher belongs, but rather wheth- a fundamental question of philosophy. "'Ihe French mathe- cr he takes nature, the external world, matter in motion, matician llenri Poincar€," we read in the work of the or spirit, reason, consciousness, etc., as primary. Kantian, Philipp Frank, "holds the point of view that many Another characterisation of Machism on this question, in of the most general laws of theoretical natural science (e. 6., contrast to the other philosophical lines, is given by the the law of inertia, the law of the conservation of energy, etc.), expert Kantian, E. Lucka. On the question of causality of which it is so often difficult to say whether they are of "Mach entirely agrees with Hume."* "P. Volkmann derives empirical or of a priori origin, are, in fact, neither one nor thc necessity of thought from the necessity of the processes the other, but are purely conventional propositions depending of nature - a standpoint that, in contradistinction to Mach upon human discretion. . . ." "Thus [exults the Kantian] and in agreement with Kant, recognises the fact of necessity; the latest Naturpbilosopbie utexpectedly renews the funda- but contrary to Kant, it seeks the source of necessity not in mental idea of critical idealisrrr, namely, that experience thought, but in the processes of nature" (p. +r+). merely fills in a framework which man brings with him from Volkmann is a physicist who writes fairly extensivcly on natufe. . . .")k* epistemological questions, and w-ho tends, as do the vast

* * Henri Poincat[, La oaleut de la science [The Vcitte ol Science], E. Lucka, Das Erkerzntnisproblem ukl Macbs "Analltse dcr Emp- Paris, r9o1, pp. 7, 9. There is a Russian ttanslation. findungen" fI'be Problem ot' l{noulctlge and. Illach's "Analysis ol Sen- sations"l in Kantstuclien, VIII. Bd., S. ** Annalen der Naturphilosopbie,Ts VI. 8., r9o7, S. 4$, ++,-. +oq. 192 THIaOii.Y OF KNO\ULEDCE. IIl CAUSALI'IY AND NECESSITY IN NATURE 193 maiority of scientists, to materialism, aLbeit an inconsistent, illogical" (pp. ,87, ry4). Energy "is just as little a thing, a timid, and incoherent rnaterialism. The rccognition of neces- substance, as time, space, mass and the other fundamental sity in nature and the derivation from it of necessity in concepts of science: energy is a constancy, an empirio-symbol, thought is rnaterialism. The derivation of necessity, causal- like other empirio-symbols that for a time satisfy the funda- ity, law, etc., from thought is idealism. T'he only inaccuracy mental human need of introducing reason, Logos, into the in the passage quoted is that a total clelial of all necessity is hrational stream of experience" (p. zo9). attributed to Mach. We have aheady seen that this is not Clad like a harlequin in a garish motley of shreds of the true either of Mach or of the empirio-critical trend generally, "latest" terminology, there stands before us a subiective which, having definitely departed from matcrialism, is inevita- idealist, for whom the external world, flature and its laws bly sliding into idealism. are all symbols of our knowledge. The stream of experience the Russian It remains for us to say a few words about is devoid of reason, ordet and law: our knowledge brings like to be Marxists; they Machians in particular. They would reasco into it. The celestial bodies are symbols of human decisive demarcation of materialism have all "rcad" Engels' knowledge, and so is the earth. If science teaches us that trend; they could not have failed to learn from the If umean the earth existed long before it r,vas possible for man and Mach himself and from cvcrybody in the least both from organic matter to have appeated, v/e, you see, have changed a.cquainted with his philosophy that Mach and Avenarius all that! The order of the motion of the planets is brought follow the line of Hume. Yet they are all careful not to say abott by us, it is a product of our knowledge. And sensing a single uorcl abott Humism and materialism on the question that human reason is being inflated by such a philosophy of causality! Their confusion is uttcr. Let us give a few into the author and founder af na,trre, Mr. Yushkevich puts examples. IvIr. F. Yushkevich preaches the "new" empirio- alongside of reason the Logos, that is, reason in the ons of bluc, hard, etc. - these suP- 'nvord cnce" and "the crealions supposedly abstract, not reason, but Reason, not a function of the human solxething existing ptior to any brain, sotnething a clrimcra or a chess game" - all brain, but ls" (Studies,Ttj etc., p. r7il. "I(nowl- divine. The last word of "tecefit positivism" is that olcl cdge is empirio-r;ymbolic, and as it develops leads to {ornrnla of fideism which h-euerbach had aheady exposed. 1899, he a empirio-symbols of a greater degrec of symbolisation. Let us take A. Bogdanov. In when was still begun go astray under The so-callcd laws of nature. . . are these empirio-symbols' . '" semi-materialist and had only iust to (ibid.). "T'he so-called true teality, being in itself, is that the influence of a very great chemist and very muddled infinitc [a terribly learned feilow, this Mr. Yushkevich!]7i philosopher, W.ilhelrn Ostwald, he wrote: "The general ultimatc systcm of symbols to which all our knowledge is causal connection of phenomeua is the last and best child striving" (p. r8B). "Tlie strcam o[ experience . . . which lies of human knowledge; it is the universal law, the highest of at the foundation of our knowledge is . . . irrational . ' . those laws which, to express it in the vrords of a philosopher, .,PRINCIPLE 194 THEo OF ]ICONOMY OF THOUGIIT", "UNI:IY OF WORI-D" 195 human reason dictates to nature" (Fundattental Eleruents, thought as a means of organising, harmor.rising, co-ordinat- etc., p. ing. . . what with what, Comrade Bogdanov? 4r). "Empirio-monism Allah alone knows from what source Bogdanov took this is possible only because knowledge reference. But the fact is that "thc urords of a philosopher" actively harmonises experience, eliminating its infinite contradictions, creating trustingly repeated by thc "Marxist" are the words of Kant. for it universal organising forms, - replacing the primeval chaotic world of elements by a An unpleasant cventt And all the mote unpleasant in that deriva- tive, ordered world of relations" (p" That is not true. it cannot cvcn be cxplained by the "firere" influence of lZ). flre idea that knowledge can "create" universal forms, Ostwald. teplace the primeval chaos by order, etc., is the idea of It t9o4, having ahcady managed to discard both natural- idealist philosophy. The world is matter moving in conform- rnatcrialism and Ostwald, Bogdanov wrote: historical ity to law, and our knowledge, being the highest product of . positivism regards the lav' of causality only as ". Modcrn flature, is in a position only to reflect this conformity to law. phenomena into a con- a means r,rf cognitively connecting In brief, our Machians, blindly believing the "recent" only as a form of co-ordinating experience" tinuous scries, reactionary professors, repeat the mistakes of Kantian and p- 2o7).Bogdanov either (Frottz the Psycbology of Society, Humean agnosticism on the question of causality and fail that this modern positiv- did not know, or would not admit, to notice either that these doctrines are in absolute contradic- obiective necessity ism is agnosticism and that it denies the tion to Marxism, i. e., materialism, or that they themselves "knowl- of natute, which existed prior to, and outside of, are rolling down an inclined plane towards idealism. edge" and man. He accepted on faith what the German professors called "rnodern positivism." Finally, in r9o5, having passed through all the previous stages and the stage 4. THE "PRINCIPLE OF ECONOMY OF' of empirio-criticism, and being already in the stage of "em- TFIOUGHT" AND TI]E PROBLEM OF THE .,UNITY pirio-monism," Bogdanov wrote: "Laws do not belong to the OF THE !TORLD'1 sphere of experience they arc not given in it, but arc creatcd by thought as a means of organising experience, of "The principle of 'the least expenditure of energy,' which harmoniously co-ordinating it into a symmetrical whole" Nlach, Avenarius and many others made the basis of the (Empirio-Monism, I, p. 4o). "Laws are abstractions of theory of knowledge, is unquestionably a 'Marxist' knowledge; and physical laws possess physical ploperties iust tendency in epistemology." as little as psychological laws possess psychical properties" So Bazarov asserts h the Studies, etc., page 69. (ibid.). There is "economy" in Marx; there is "economy" in Mach. And so, the law that winter succeeds autumn and the But is it indeed "unquestionable" that there is evelr a shador.y spring winter is not given us in expetience but is created by of resernblance between the two? 196 THEoRY oF IiNov/LrD(;11. III Avenarius' vtork, Philosopbie als Denken det Welt gerutiss #,H::,"'::;: ffi#,. JJ#:? ;,* dem PrinTip des kleinsten Ktafunasses (t876), as rve have ing tlre category of "the economy of thotght" bete' I-Iuman seen, applies this "principle" in such a w^y that in the narne tlrought is "economical" only when it colrectly reflects ob- of "economy of thought" sensation alone is declared to exist' iective truth, and the criterion of this correctfless is practice, Both causality ancl "substance" (a word wl'rich the professorial cxperiment and industry. Only by denying obiective reality, gentlemen, "for the sake of importancc," prefer to the tlrat is, by denying the t'aundations of Marxism, can ofle .l.ot.t and more exact word: matter) arc declared "elim- scriously speak of economy of thought in the theoty ol inated" on the same plea of economy' Thus u'c get sensation knou.ledge. without matter and thought without brain. T'his utter non- If we tutn to Mach's later works, we shall find in them sense is an attempt to smuggle in' subiectii;c itlealisttt' under a an interpretation of the celebrated principle which frequently new guise. Tttat sucb precisely is the charactet of this basic amounts to its complete denial. For instance, in the 'viorlron the celebrated "economy of thought" is, as we have WihrnelelLre Mach returns to his favourite id-ea of "the seen, generally acknozoledged in philosophical literature' That economical nature" of science (znd German ed-, p. 356)- our Machians did not flotice the sublectivc iclealism under But there he adds that we engage in an activity not for the the' a fact belonging to the rcalm of curiosities' sake of the activity (p.$6; repeated on p. 39r): "the purpose In ol Serusatiortr (Russ' trans', p' 49), Mach of scientific activity is to present the fullest most refer to his work of fi72 on this question' And tranquil . picture possible of the world" (p. $6). If this this have seen, propouncls thc standpoint of is the case, the "principle of economy" is banished not only pure stbjectivism and reduces the worlcl to scnsations' Thus, from the basis of epistemology, but virtttally from episte- toth the fundamental works which introcltrce tl-ris famous mology generally. 'W'hen one says that the purpose of science "principle" into philosophy expound idcalisrn! \)fhat is the is to present a true picture of the world (tranquillity is entirely ,.^ron fot this? The teason is that if thc ptinciple of econ- beside the point hcre), one is repeating the materialist poiflt omy of thought is really made "tbe basi'r ot' the theory of of view. When one says this, one is admitting the objective knowleclge," lt .un lead to notbing but subicctivc idealism' reality of the world in relatior, to our knowledge, of the That it is more "econotlical" to "think" that only I and my model in relation to the picture. To talk of economy of. sensations exist is unquestionable, providccl wc $/ant to intro- thought in sucb a connection is merely to use a clumsy and duce such an absurd conception i:nto epistcruology' ridiculously pretefltious utorrl in. place of the word "cor- Is it "more economical" to "think" of thc atom as indi- rectoess." Mach is muddled here, as usual, and the Machians visible, or as composed of positive and ncgativc clectrons? behotrd the muddle and worship it! Is it "more economical" to thiok of thc RLrssian bourgeois In Knoz,ztledge and Et ror, in the chapter entitled revolution as being conducted by the libcrals or as being "Illustrations of Methods o[ Investigation," we read the conductecl against the liberals? One has only to put the ques- following: .,I'RINCIPI,I| 198 THEORY OF KNoWLIjDGE. III OI. LCONOA{Y OF THOUG]I'I''" "UNIT'Y OF WORI,D" 199

"The 'complcte and simplest description' (Kirchhoff, 1874), following passage from the Analysis of Sensationr: "'We can the 'economical presentation of the factuat' (Mach, r87z), the from our bodily and spiritual stability infer the stability, the 'concordance of thinking and being and the mutual concordance uniqueness of determination and the uniformity of the proof the processes of thought' (Grassmann, fi+q) - all these, cesses of nature" (Russ. trans., p. z8r). And, indeed, the with slight variations, express one and the same thought." subjective-idealist character of such propositions and the Is this not a model of confusion? "Economy of thought," kinship of Mach to Petzoldt, who has gone to the length of from wlrich Mach in fi72 inferted that scnsarions alone exist apriorism, are beyond all shadow of doubt. (a point of view which he himself subscqtrently was obliged In connection with "the principle of the economy of to acknowledge an idealist one), is declarcd to bc equioalent thought," the idealist \Tunclt very aptly characterised Mach to the purely materialist dictum of thc mathematician as "Kant turnecl inside out" (Sys'tertatisclte PbilosoTthie, Gtassmann regarding the necessity of co-ordinating thinking Leipzig, r9o7, S. rz8). Kant has a priori and experiencc, Mach and being, cquivalent to the simplest description (of ar objec- lras experience and a priori, for Mach's principle of the econ- tioe reality, the existence of which it ncvcr occurred to omy of thought is essentially apriorism (p. ,lo). The con- Kirchhoff to doubt!). nection (Verknr,ipt'ung) is either in things, as an "oblective Sucb at application of the principle of "economy of law o[ flature [and this Mach emphatically rejects], or else thought" is but an example of Mach's curious philosophical it is a subjective principle of description" (p. lio). The waverings. And if such curiosities and lapses are eliminated, principle of economy with Mach is subiective and korumt the idealist character of "the principle of thc economy of zoie aus der Pistole gescbossen - appears nobody knows thought" becomes unqurestionable. For exarnple, the Kant- whence - as a teleological principle which may have a diver- ian Honigswald, controverting the philosophy of Mach, sity of meanings (p. ,lr). As you see, experts io philosoph- greets his "principle of economy" as afl apprcacb to the ical terminology ate not as naive as our Machians, who are "Kantian circle of ideas" (Dr. Richard HOnigswald, Zur blinclly prepared to believe that a "flew" term can eliminate I{ritik der Macbscben Pbilosophie lA Critiquc ot' Mach'.r the contrast between subiectivism and objectivism, between Philosopbyl, Berlin, r9o7, S. z7). And, in trnth, if we do not idealism and materialism. recognise the objective reality given us in our sensations, Finally, let us tu(n to the English philosopher James whence are u/e to derive the "principle of cconomy" if not Ward, who without circumlocution calls himself a spiritual- frctn tbe subject? Sensations, of course, do oot contain any ist monist. He does not controvert Mach, but, as we shall see "economy." I-Ience, thought gives us something which is not later, utilises the entire Machian trend in physics in his fight containecl in sensations! Hence, the "principle of economy" against rnaterialism. And he definitely declares that with is not taken from experience (i,e., sensations), but precedes Mach "the criterion of simplicity. is in the n-rain subjec- al1 experience and, tike a Kantian category, consritutcs a tive, not objective" (Nttturalisrt and Agu.osticism, YoI. I, logical condition of experience. Honigswald quotes the 3rd ed., p. 8z). 2OO TFIEORY OF KNO!/LrjDGE. III ..PIIINCIPLE OF IJCONONIY OF THOUG}]T", "UNITY OF \VORI,D" 201

That the principle of the economy of thought as the basis clear" in orcler fraudulently to evade giving a genuine answer of episcemology pleased the German Kantians and English to Engels' clear materialist proposition. And, doing so, he spiritualists will not seem strange after all that has been talks pure Diihringian floflsense about "the cardital postulate said above. That people who are dcsirous of being Marxists of the fundamental hornogeneity and connection o[ being" should link the poiitical economy of thc materialist Marx (Yushkevich, op. cit., p. 5I), about postulates being "proposi- with the epistemological economy of Mach is simply ludicrous. tions" of which "it rvould not be exact to say that they have It would be appropriate here to say a Icw words about been dedtrced from experience, since scientific experience is "the unity of the world." On this qr-restion NIr. P. Yushke- possible only because they are made the basis of investigation'l vich sttikingly exemplifies - for the thousanclth tirne per- (ibid.). f'his is nothing but twaddle, for if this individual haps - the abystlal confusion create(l by our Machizrns. had the slightest respect for the printed word he would detect Engels, in hts Anti-Dr.iltring, replies to DLihriog, who had the idealist character in general, and the Kanti.an character deduced the unity of the world from thc rrnity of thought, in patticular of the idea that there can be postulates which as follows: "The real unity of the world cousis[s in its mate- are not taken from experience and without which experience riality, and this is proved not by a few iuggling phrases, but is impossible. A jumble of u,ords culled from diverse books by a long and protracted development o[ philosophy and and coupled with the obvious ertors of the materialist natur.al science" (p. :r).'* lVIr. Yushkevich citcs this passage Dietzgen - such is the "philosophy" of N{t. Yushkevich and and retorts: "First of all it is not clear what is meant here his 1ike. by the assertion that'the unity of the worlcl coirsists in its Let us rather examine the argument for the unity of the natetiaTity'" (op. cit., p. ,2). world expour.rded by a serious empirio-criticist, Joseph Charming, is it not? This individual uuclcrtzrkes publicly Petzoldt. Section 29, Yol. II, of his Introduction is termed: to prate about the philosophy of Marxisnr, ancl then declares "The Tendency to a Uniform (einheitlich) Conception of the that the most elementary propositions oI nraterialism are Realm oI Knowledge; the Fostulate of the Unique Determi- "not clear" to him! Engels showed, using l)iihring as an nation of All That Happens." And here are a few samples example, that any philosophy that clairns to bc consistcnt of his line of reasoning: ". . . Only in unity can one find can deduce the unity of the world either f rorn thought - in that natural end beyond rvhich no thought can go and in which case it is helpless against spiritualisrn zind fideism which, consequently, thought, if it ta.kes into consideration (Anti-Dtihring, p. p), and its argunents incvitably become all the facts of the given sphere, can reach quiescence" mere phrase-juggling - or from the objectivc reality which @.-1il.". It is beyond doubt that nature does not always exists outside us, which in the theory of knor,vledge has long respond to the demand for unity, but it is equally beyond gonc under thc name of matier, ancl whicl'r is studiecl by doubt that in many cases it aheady satisfies the demand natural sciercc. It is useless to spcak serior-rsly to an indiviriual lor quiescence and it must be held, in accordance r,vith all to whom such a thing is "not clear," for hc says it is "not our prcvious investigations, that nature in all probability 202 IHEoRY orr KNo!(/LL,rDGtr. rrl sPAcE AND T1ME 203

will satisfy this demand in the future in all cases. F{ence, quest;on sidcs with idealisrn and regards time aud space it would be more correct to clcscribe the actual soul behav- not as obiective realities but as forms of human understand- iour as a striving for states rif stability rather than as a ing. The basic difierence between the two fundamental phi- striving for unity. . Thc principle of the states of sta- losophical lines on this question is also quite clearly recog- bility goes farther and dccper. . . . Haecliel's proposal to put nised by writers of the most diverse trends who are in any the kingdom of the protista alongside the plant and animal way consistent thinkers. Let us begin with the materialists. kingdom is an untenable solution fot it creates two new "Space and time," says Feuerbach, "ate lrot mere forlns dif{iculties in place of the formet one dif}iculty: while for- of phenomena lrut esscnti:ll conditions (We-eensbedingun- medy the bounclary between the plants and animals was gcn). . . of being" (Werk,e, II, S. yz). Regarding the sen- doubtful, now it becomes impossible to demarcate the pro- sible world we know through sensations as objective rcality, tista from both plants and aniorals. . . . Cbviously, sucir a Ileuerbach naturally also rejects the phenornenalist (a,s Mach state is not final (endgiiltig). Such antbiguill of concepts u,ould call his owlr conception) or the agnostic (as Engels must in one way or another be eliminated, if on1y, should calis it) conception of space and time. Just as things or there be no other means, by an agreement between the bodies are not mere phenomena, not complexes of sensations, specialists, orby a majority vote" (pp. 8o-8r). but objective realities acting o1r our senses, so space and Enough, I think? It is evident that the empirio-criticist time ate flot mere forms of phenomella, but obiectively real Petzoldt is not one u,hit better than Diihring. But we must fonns of being. There is nothing in thc rvorld but matter be fair even to an adversary; Petzoldt at least has sufiicient in motion, and mattet in motion cannot move otheru/ise scientific integrity to reject materialism as a philosophical than in space and time. Human conceptions of space and trerd unflinchingly and decisicely in all his works. At least, time are relative, but these relative coaceptions go to com- he does not humiliate hirnself to ttre extent of posing as pound absolute tru';h. These relative conceptions, in their a materialist and cleclaring that the rnost elementary distinc- development, move towards absolute truth and approach tion between the fundamental philosoplilcal trcnds is "not nearer and nearer to it. The mtrtability of human conceptions cleat." of space and time no more refutes the objective reality of space and time ttran the mutability of scientific knowledge of the structure and forms of uratter in motion refutes the 5. SI'ACE, AND TIME objcctive reality of the external world. Engels, exposing the inconsistent ancl muddled material- Recognising the existence of objective rcality, i.e., matter ist Dtihring, catches him on ttre very point where he speaks in motion, independently of our minrJ, materialism must of the change in the idea of tirne (a question beyond contro- also inevitably recognise the obiective reality of tirne and versy for contemporary philosophers of any importance even space, in contrast above all to Kantianism, ..vhich in this of the most d.irterse philosophical trends) ltut eoades a direct sP.AcE 1,ND Trr,{E 20!j 204 Tr-rEoRY oF KNoVLIDGE rrr allswer to the questioti: are space and time rcat or iclc:tl, so forth. lt is impossi'nle to holcl consistently to a standpoint and are our reiative conceptions of space and time approxi- in philosoptry which is initrical to all forms of ficleism ancl rnations to obiectively real forms of being; or are they only idealism if we clo not deEnitely and resolutely recognisc products of the developing, organising, harmonising, etc., that our cleveloping notions of time and space reflect at human rnind? This and this alone is the basic epistemolo- objectively real time atd space; that hcre, too, as in general, gical problem on which the truly fundamental philosophical they ate approaching objective truth. trends are dividccl. Engels, h Aitti-Dtihring, says: "We are "The basic forms of all being," Engeis admonishes hete not in the least concerned with what ideas change in Drihring, "are space and time, and existence out of time is Herr Diihring's head. The subiect at issue is not the idea just as gross an absurdity as existence out of space" (op. cit.). of time, but real time, which Hert Diihring cannot rid him- I(hy was it necessary for Engeis, in the hrst half of the self of so cheaply li.e., by the use of such phrases as the quotation, to repeat Feuerbach almost literaltry and, in the rnutability of our conceptions]" (Anti-Diibring, 5th Gerrn. second, to recall the struggle which Feuerbach fought so successfully against gross absurdities Becausc ed., S. 4r).7e thc of theism? Tlris would seem so clear that even the Yushkeviches Diihring, as one sees from tiris same chapter of E,ngels', could should be able to grasp the essence of the matter! Engels not g€t the ends of his philosophy to meet without resotting sets up against Diihring the ptoposition of tlrc reality, i.e., rrow to the "final cause" of the world, now to the "initial objective reality, of time which is generally accepted by atd impulse" (which is another expression for the concept "God," obvious to every materialist, and says that one cannot escape Engels says). Drihring no doubt wanted to be a materialist a duect affirmation or denial of this proposition merely by and atheist no less sincerely than our Machians want to be talking of the change in the ideas of time and space. The Marxists, but he u;as unable consistently to develop the point is l1ot that Engels denies the necessity and scientific philosophical point of view that would really cut the ground value of investigations into the change and development from under the idealist and theist absurdity. Since he did of our ideas of time and space, but that we should give a not recognise, ar, ai least, did not recognise clearly and consistent ans\per to the episternological question, z;i7., tbe distinctly (for he wavered and was muddled on this qucs- question of the source and significance of human knowledge tion), the objective reality of time and space, it was not in general. Any moderately intelligent philosophical idealist accidental but inevitable that Diihring should slide down an Engels when he speaks of idealists has in mind the inclined ptrane to "Iinal ciluses" ancl "initiai impulses"; for -and he had deprived himself of the objective criterion which great consistent idealists of classical philosophy - will readi- ly admit the development of our ideas of time and space; prevents one going beyond the bounds of tirne and space. he would not cease to be an idealist for thinking, for exarn- If tinre and space are otxly concepts, man, urho created them, ple, that our developing ideas of time and space ate ap' is jnstified in going beyoncl their bounds, and bourgeois pro- proaching towards the absolute idea of time and space, and fessors are justifiecl in receiving salarics from reactionary 206 TrltioRy orr l(Not(/r,.EDGE. Itr SPACE AND TI]VIE 207 governments for defelding thc right to go bcyond thcse and Error, znd Genn. ed., pp. 3jo, jlt). tsut if objective bounds, f or directly or indircctly dcf cncli ng rucdicval reality is not given us in expericnce (as Mach teaches), such "absurclity." an objection to l(ant does not in the least clestroy the generaL Engels pointed out to Diilrring ttrtat denial of the obiec- position of agnosticism in the ca.se eitber of Kant or of. Mach. tive reality of time and space is theorcLically philosophical If our notion of space is taken from experience u;itbout being practically confusion, while it is capitulation to, or impotence a reflectiol of objective reality outsicle us, Mach's theory face of, fideism. in rcmains iclealistic. The existence of nature in tirue, measured Behold now the "teachings" "recent positivism" on of in millions of years, prior to the appearance of man and this subject. W'e read in Mach: "Space and time are weil- human experience, shows l-low absurd this idealist theory is. ordered (zoohlgeordnete) systems of series of sensations" "In the physiological respect," writes Mach, "time and (Mecbanik,3. Auflage, S.+SB). This is palpable idealist non- space are systems of sensations of otientation which together sense, such as inevitably follows frorn the doctrine that bodies with sense-perceptions determine the discharge (Austoswng) are complexes of sensations. According to Mach, it is not of biologically purposive reactions adaptation. man .ivith his sensations that exists in space anci time, but of trn the physical respect, time space space and time that exist in man, that depend upon mao and are interdependerrcics of physical elements" (ibid., p. ql+). and arc generated by man. He feels that he is falling into idealism, and "resists" by making a host of reservations and, The relativist Mach confines hirnself to an examination of like Diihring, burying the questiarn under lcngthy clisquisi the concept of tirne iu its various aspects! And like Diihring tions (see especially Knozoledge and Etror) on the muta- he gets nowhere. If "elements" are sensations, then the bility of our conceptions of space and time, their telativity, dependence of physical etcments upon each other cannot exist and so forth. But this does not save him, and cannot save outside of man, and could not have existed prior to man and him, for one can really overcome the idealist position on prior to organic matter. If the sensations of time and space this question only by recognising the objective reality ol can give man a biologically purposive orientation, this can space and time. And this Mach rvill not do at any price. only be so on the condition that these sensations reflect an He constructs his epistemological theory of tirne and spacc objectice reality outside fi1afl: mafl could rever have adapted on the principle of relativism, and that is all. In the very himself biologically to the environment if his seusations had nature of things such a construction car lead to nothing but r.rot given him an ctbjectit;ely colrect presentation of that subiective idealism, as v/e have aheady rnade clear when cnvironment. The theory of space ancl time is inseparably speaking of absolute and relative truth. coonected r,vith the aaswer to thc fundamental question of Resisting the idealist conclusions which inevitably follow epistemology: are our sensations images of boclies aocl things, from his premises, Mach argues against I(ant and insists that or ate boclies complexes of our sensations? Mach merely our notion of space is derived from experience (Knoroledge blunders abor.rt betrveen the two answers. 2()B TFIEORY OF KNOWLEDGE. III spACE AND TIME 209

In modern physics, he says, Newton's idca of absolute is no nrore necessity to think of rvhat is merc thaught (das time and space prevails (pp. 442-44), of time and space as bloss Gedachte) spatially, that is to say, in relation to the such. This idea seems "to us" scnseless, Mach continues - visible and tangible, than there is to think of it in a definite apparcntiy not suspecting the €xistence of rnaterialists and pitch" (p. z7). "The reason why a satisfactory theory of of a nrateriaiist theory of knowledge. Bt in practice, he clectricity has not yet been established is pcrhaps because claims, this view was barmless (unscbiidliclt, p. 442) and we have insisted on explaining electrical phenomena in therefore for a long time escapeC criticisnr. terms of molecular processes in a three-dimensional spacc" This naive remark rcgarding the hartr-rlcssness of the (p. lo). materialist view betrays Mach completely. Iiirstly, it is not From the standpoint of the straightforwar:d and unmuddled true that for a "long time" the idealists dicl not criticise this Maclrism which Mach openl,v advocated in 1872, it is indisput- view. h4ach simply ignores the struggle bctwccn the idea-list able that if molecules, atoms, in a word, chemical elements, ard materialist theorics of knowledge on this questioo; he cannot be pcrceived, they are "inere thought" (das bloss evades giving a plah and direct statemcnt of these two Gedacbte). If so, and if space and time have no obiectivc views. Secondly, by rccognising "the harmlcssuess" of the reality, it is ribvious that it l's not essential to think of atoms matetialist views he contests, Mach thereby irr fact admits spatialtyl Let physics and chemistry "restrict themselvcs" to a their correctness. For if they were incorrcct, how could the1, three-dimeosional space in which matter moves; for thc cx- have remaiued harmless throughout the coursc of ceniurics? planetion of electricity, hov,rever, we rnay seek its elemctrts iu rMhat has bccome of the criterion of practicc rvith which a space which is not three-dimensional! Mach attempted to flirt? The materialist vicr,v of the obiec- That our Machians should circumspectty avoid all reference tive reality of time and space can be "harmlcss" only be- to this absurdity of Mach's, although he repeats it in 19o6 cause natural science doe.r i-,ot trarzscend thc bounds of time (Knoaledge attd Et'ror, z. Aaflage, S. 4rB), is understandable, and space, the bounds of the rnaterial world, leaving this for otherwise they would have to raise the question of the occupation to the professors of reactionary philosophy. Such idealist and materiaUst views of space point-blank, without "harmlessness" is equivalent to correctaess. cvasions and without attempting to "reconcile" these an- It is Mach's idealist vierv of space and timc that is "harm- tagonistic positions. It is likeu,ise understandable that in ful," for, in the first place, it opens the door wide for fide- the 'seventies, when Mach rvas still entirely unknown and ism ancl, in the secoud place, seduces Maclt himsclf into when "orthodox physicists" even refused to publish his drawirrg rcactionary conclusions. For instancc, in t87z- Mach articles, one of the chiefs of the immanentist school, Anton u,rote that "one does trot have to conceive of the chcrnical von Leclair, should eagerly have seized upon precisely tbi.s clements in a space of three dimensions" (IirLtaltung der argument of Mach's as a noteworthy renunciation of material- Arbeit, S. 29, rcpeated on S. li). To do so would be "to ism and recognition of idealism! For at that time Leclair impose an unnecessary restriction upon ourselves. There had not )ret invented, or hacl 11ot )ret borrowed from Schuppe .I,IME 210 TIrEoRy orr KNorflLEDGl]. rrl SPACE AND 2II and Schubert-Soldern, or J. Rehmke, the "rew" sobriquet, cent mathematics, Mach says, has raised the very important "immanentist school," but plainly called himself a critical and useful questiou of a space of z dimensions as a conceiv- idealist.* This unequivocal advocate of fideisrn, who openly able space; nevertheless, three-dimensional soace remains preached it in his philosophical .rvorks, immediately proclaimed the only "teal case" (ein oirHiclter Fall'1 (1rd German ed., Mach a great philosopher because of these statements, a pp. 483-85). In vain, thereforc, "have many theologians, who "revolutionary in the best sense of the word" (p. zsz); and experience difiiculty in deciding where to place hell," as well he was absolutely right. Nlach's argument anounts to desert- as the spiritualists, sought to derive advantage from thc ing science for fideisrn. Science was seeking, both in fi12 fourth dimercion (ibid.). Very good! Mach refuses to join colnpany with the theo- and in 19o6, is tow seeking, and is discovcring - at least it is groping its aay tooards the atom of electricity, the logians and the spiritualists. But how does he dissociate - himsclf them electron, in three-dimensional space. Science does not doubt from in his tbeory ol kno'oledge? By stating that thrce-dimensional space alone is reall But what sort of that the substance it is investigating exists in three-dimen- clcfence is it against the theologians and their like when you sional space and, hence, that the particles of that substattce, deny obicctivc reality to space and tirne? Why, it colnes to although they be so srnall that we cannot sce them, must this, that when you have to dissociate yourself frorn the also "neccssarily" exist in tl-ris tliree-dimetsional space. Since spiritualists you rcsort to tacit borrowings from the rnaLc- 1872, durir:rg the course of three decades of stupendous ancl rialists. For the materialists, by recognising the real wodd, dazzliog scientific successes in the problem o[ the structure of thc matter we perceive, as an objectioe reality, havc the right materialist space and timc has remained matter, the view of to conclude therefrom that no human coricept, rvhatever its "hatnrless," compatible, as with science, while i.e., heretoforc, purpose, is valid if it goes beyond the bounds of time and "l.rarmful" the contrary view of Mach and Co. rvas a capit- space. But you Machian gentlemen deny the objective valid- ulation to the position of fideism. ity of "rcality" when you combat materialism, yet secretly In his Mecbanik, Mach defends the mathematicians who introduce it again when you havc to combat an irJealism are investigatiog the problem of conceivable spaces witb it that is consistent, fearless and fuank throughout! If in the dimensions; he defends them against the charge clf drawiug telatioe conception of tirne and space there is nothing but "preposterous" conclusions from their investigatiolls. The relativity, if there is no objective reality (i.e., rcality inde- defence is absolutely and undoubtedly just, but see the pendent of man and mankind) reflected by these relativc episteruological position Mach takes up in this defence. Re- collcepts, why should mankind, why should thc maiority of rnankind, not be entitled to conceive of beings outside time * Anton von Leclair, Dcr Realisttttts der modernen Nalurtttissenrcbtlt and space? If Mach is entitled to seek atoms of electricity, l{ant attgebabnttt Erk.cnntnisk,ritik im Licltte der aon Berkeley unrl lTl:e or atoms in general, owtside three-dimensional space, why Realism of Mod.ern Science in the Ligbt ot' Berkeley's and Kanls Critique ol Knoalerlgef, Prag, fi19. should the maiority of rnankind not be entitled to seek the 212 IHEoRY or KNox'LllDCr]l IIl SPACI AND TI\18 27i atoms, L)r Llre [oundatiphenomenalism" (i.e., agnosticism).*** ril7. rJTundt also points thi5 sur.**** That I4ach is a phcnomenalist who is "not averse to voluntaristic

* Aitl:io liir q)ilciltdtischc Philosopltie, r898, II, Bd, IV, S. 6;, trrricle on Mach's philosophical vicrvs. + *Erich I3echer, "Thc Philosophical Vicrvs of Ernst Nlach," 7',6c Pbilosopl:ical Reoica, \/o1. XIV, j, t9ot, pp. y6, t46, t41, 148. **'r'E. Lucka, "Das Erkenntitisprobleru und A,Iaclts 'Anelysc der Em,- pfinrlutgen"' l7'he Problenr of Knoaledge ancl l,laclt's "Anttly-sis of Sensa- *Mach in the Mccbenilz says: "Religious opinions atc pccplc's slrictly othcrs and do not tions"l, in Kantstuiie n, Bcl. VIII, r9o3, S. 4oo. pr;rot" ,,:.11ni, as long as thcy .lu nlL obttude-thcrn on (Frclch trens *+*'N Systenutiscbe Pbilosop,bie Phih-tsoplt;'], oppfv tl"- to thin!s virich bclor,g to anothcr sphcre" ' ISlsternatic Leipzig, tt1o7, S. r;r. p. .+1D. 226 THEORY OII KNO!(LEDGE. III idealism" is attested also in Ueberweg-Heinze's tcxtbook on the history of modern philosophy.x In shoit, Mach's eclecticism ancl his tcndcncy to idealism are clear. to everyonc exccPt pcrhaps t1.rc Russian Machians'

CTTAPTER ,II[E T;OUR PHILOSOPHICAL IDEALtrSTS AS COMRA.DES-IN-AR.MS AND SUCCESSORS OF EMPIRIO.CRITICISM

rius to Kant.

1. THE CRITICISM OF KANTIANISM FR.OM THE LEFT AND FROM TIJE RIGTIT

says Mach, "was, as I acknorvledge with the deepest grati_ + ltr Cescltich!:e ,Lcr PbiLosopbie lautlir;c oj tbe Ilistort, GrtuuJri:,' tude, the starting point ol Plilosop/tyl, lld. I\r, 9. Aufl, Bcrlil, r9ci, S' ulo' of all my critical thought. But I found 228 PLIIr-osoPlIIC,^L TDllALIsrs CIIITIC]SM OF KANT]ANIST'I FF.OM LEFT AND RICI]T it impossiblc to remain faitlifut to it. Vcty sootr I bcgan to It'ring only iu pompousness of formulatiotl. But rvc tnust return to the vier,vs of Berkclcy. . . fancl thcn] al:rivcd at vicws lirs;t notc that Avenarius is telling a l)lain tmtrutb when he akin to those of Hume. And evcn today I cannot help irsscrts that it was he who in fi16 lor tbe first titne ruised regarding Berkeley and Humc as far more consistcnt thinkers tlrc cluestion of "purifying experience," i.e., of. purifying the than I(ant" (Analysis ol Sensatiotts, p. z9z). l(:rntian doctrine of aprioristn and the assumption of the Thus Mach quite clcfinitcly admits that having begun r'vit.h tlrirrg-in-itself. As a matter of fact, the development of Ger- I(ant he soon followcd thc line of Berkeley al'rd Humc. I-et rnan classical philosophy immcdiately after tr(ant gave rise us turfl to Arrcnarius. tr r a criticism of I(antianistn exactly along the oery lirte In his Prolegoznena to a "Crititlue of Pute Experiettce" lollowed by Avenarius. This line is represented in German (rs76), Avcnarius alteady in the foreword states that thc rvorcls tlassical philosophy by Schulze-Aenesiclemus, an adherent of Rritik tler reinen Erfabrung (Critique of Pure Expericncc) are llrlmean agnosticism, and by J. G. Fichte, an adherent of indicative of his attitude towards Kant's "Critique of Pure llcrkeleianisrn, i.e., of sublective idealism. lt t79z Schulze- Reason," and "of course, of an antagonistic attitude" towards Aenesidernus criticised Kant for tbis ',sery recognition of Kant (1876 cd., p. iv). In what does Avenarius' antagonism npriorisnn (op. cit., pp. t6, r4r, etc.) and of the thing-in-itself- to Kant consist? In the fact that I{ant, in Avenarius' opinion, We sceptics, or followers of Hume, says Schulze, relect the had not sufiiciently "purified experience.'l It is with this thing-in-itself as being "beyond the bounds of all experience" "purification of expericnce" that Avenatitls dcals in his Pro- (p. lz). We reject objectioe knouledge (p. ,:); we deny that (p. the legotttena ($$ 16, 72 and many othcr places)- Of rvhat does space and time really exist outside us loo); we reiect Avenarius "prrlfy" the Kantian doctrine of expeticnce? In presence in our experience of necessity (p. Irz), causality, the first place, of aPriorism. In $ 56 hc says: "The question force, etc. (p. ,rl). One cannot attribute to them any "rcality as to whether the supctfluous '4 prioti conceptions of teason' outside ou( conceptions'? (p. rr4). Kant proves apriority should and could be eliminated frorn the content of cxpcr:icnce "dogmatically," saying that sincc we cannot thintrr otherwise atd thereby pure experience Par excellence established is, as there is therefore an a priori law of thought. "This argument,'l far as I know, raised here, as such, for the {irst time." \X/e Schulze replies to Kant, "has long been utilised in philosophy have already seen that Avenarius in this way "purified" Kant- to prove the objective flature of wha"t lies outside our ideas'? ianism of the recognition of necessity and causaiity. (p. ,+r). Arguing thus, we may attribute causality to things- SeconrJly, he putifies Kantianism of the assumption of sub- in-tlremselves (p. r4z). "Experience never tells w (roir etfalt' stance ($ 9t), i.e., the thing-in-itself, which, in Avenarius' ren nieruals) that the action on us of obiective things produces opinion "is not given in the stuff of actual expetience but is ideas," and Kant by no means proved that "this something imported into it by thought." (which lies outside our reason) must be regarded as a thing- We shall presently see that Avenarius' definition of his in-itself, distinct from our sensation (Geruiit). But sensation philosophical line entireiy coincides with that of Mach, dif- also rnay be thought of as the solebasis of all our kno',vledge"

I 230 C,I(I'IICISM OF KANTIANIS]VI I]ROM LE,F'T AND RIG}IT 231

(p.16). The Kantian critiquc of pure reason "bases its argu- :rnd Berkeley, Schulze-Aenesidemus and J. G. Fichte. Avena- ment on the proposition that cvery act of cognition bcgins with rius imagined that he was "purifying experience" in general. the action of objective things on our organs of scnsation (Ge- In reality he was oriy purifying agnosticism ot' Kantianisru. ruiit), but it then disputes thc truth and reality of this prop- lIc fought not against the agnosticism of l(ant (agnosticism osition" (p. 266). Kant in no way rcfuted thc idealist is a denial of objective rcality given in sensation), b:ut for a Berkeley (pp. 268-12). ptffel agfiosticisnt, f.or the elimination of Kant's assumption, It is evident from this that the Humean Schulze rejects which is contradictory to agnosticism, that there is a thing-in- Kant's doctrine of the thing-in-itself as an inconsistent con- itsclf, albeit unknowable, noumenal and other-sided, that cession to materialisfli, i.e., to the "dogmatic" assertion that there is necessity and causality, albett a priori, given in our in our sensations we are given objective reality, or, in other tunderstanding, and not in obiective reality. FIe fought Kant words, that our ideas are caused by the action of objective not from tine Left, as the materialists fought Kant, btrt from things (independent of our mind) on our sense-organs. The the Rigbt, as the sceptics and idealists fought Kant. He agnostic Schulze reprcaches the agnostic Kant on the grounds imagined that he was advancing, when in rcality he was re- that the latter's assumption of the thing-in-itself contradicts treating to the programme of criticising Kant which Kuno agnosticism and leads to materialism. In the same way, but Fischer, speaking of Schulze-Aenesidemus, aptly charucterised evcn more vigorously, I(ant is ctiticised by the subjective in the following words: "The critique of pure reason with idealist Fichte, who maintains that tr(ant's assumption of the pure reason li.e., aprioism] left out is scepticism. The critique thing-in-itsctrf independent of the self is "realism" (Werke, of pure reason with the thing-in-itself left out is Berkeleian I, S. 4.83), and that Kant makes "no clear" distinction between idealism" (History ot' Modern Philosophy, German ed., 1869, "realism" and "idealism." Fichte secs a crying inconsistency Vol. V, p. rrr). in the assumption of tr(ant and the I(antians that the thing- This brings us to one of the most curious episodes in our in-itself is the "basis of obiective reality" (p. +8o), for this whole "Machiad," in the whole campaign of the Russian is in contradiction to critical idealism. "'W'ith you," exclaims Machians against Engels and Marx. The latest discovery by Fichte, adelressirrg the realist expositors of Kant, "the earth Bogdanov and Bazarov, Yushkevich and Valentinov, trum- rests on the great elephant, and the grcat elephant rcsts ofl peted by thern in a thousancl different keys, is that Plekhanov the earth. Your thiog-in-itself, rvhich is only thought, acts is rnaking a "luckless attcmpt to reconcile Engels with Kant on the selfl" (p. a$). by the aid of a cornpromise - a thing-io-itself which is lust Thus Avcnarius was profoundly mistaken in imagining that a lyee bit knowable" (Studies,ss etc., p.61 and many other he "for the first time" undertook a "purification of the ex- places). This discovery of our Machi.ans discLoses a veritable perience" of Kant from apriorism and frorn the thing-in-itself bottomless pit of utter confusion and monstrous misunder- and that he r.vas thereby giving rise to a "new" trend in phi- standing both of Kant and of the whole course of develop- losophy. trn reality he rvas continuing the old line of Hume ment of German classical philosophv. PHILoSoIJHICAL IDEALISTS 232 CTTITICISA,I OF KANTIANISM ITRO},I LEFT AND RIGTIT 233

The principal feature of Kant's philosophy is the teconcil- lrcads with ashes at the sight of monstrous people who criti- iation of rnaterialism with idcalism, a colrpromise between cised I(ant from a diaruetrically opposite point ol oieu;, who the two, the combination within onc system of heterogerieous rciected the slightest element of agnosticism (scepticism) and \When and cofltrary philosophical trcnds. Kant assumes that iclcalism in his system, who argued that the thing-in-itself is something outside us, a thing-in-itself, corresponds to our obicctively r.eal, fiflly knowable and this-sided, that it does ideas, he is a materialist. VThen he declares this thing-in-itself rrot differ fundamentally ftom appearafice, that it becomes to be unknowable, transcendental, other-sided, he is an ideal- transformed irto appearunce at every step in the development ist. Recognising experience, sensations, as the only source of of the individual consciousness of man and the collective con- our knowledge, Kant is directing his philosophy towards sen- sciousness of mankind. Help, they cried, this is an illegitirnate sationalism, and oia sensationalism, under certain conditioos, mixture of materialism and Kantianism! towards materialism. Recognising the apriority of space, time, !(hen I read the assurances of our Machians that they causality, etc., Kant is directing his philosophy towards ideal- criticise Kant far more consistently and thoroughly than any ism. Both consistent materialists and consistent idealists (as of the antiquated mateialists, it always seems to me as though as the "pure" agnostics, the Humeans) have mercilessly well Purishkevich8o had ioined our company and was shouting: I criticised Kant for this inconsistency. The materialists blamed criticised the Constitutional-Democr.ats far more consistentJy Kant for his ideaiism, rcjected the idealist features of his and thoroughly than you Marxist gentlemen! There is no system, dernonstrated the knowability, the this-sidedness of cluestion about it, Mr. Purishkevich, politically consisteut the thing-in-itself, the absence cf a fundamental difierence people can and always will criticise the Constitutional-Demo- between the thing-in-itself and the phenornenon, the need of crats from diametrically opposite points of vierv, but after all deducing causality, eic., not from a priori laws of thought, it must not be forgotter that you criticised the Constittrtional- but from obiective reality. The agnostics and idealists blamed Democrats for being excessioely dernocrabic, while we Kant for his assurnption of the thing-in-itself as a concession ctiticised them for beitg insufficiertly democratic! Tlie l\{ach- to materialisnr, "realism'? or. "naive realism." The agnostics, ians criticise Kant for being too much of a materialist, while moreover, rejected not only the thing-in-itself, but apriorism we criticise him for not being enough of a materialist. The as well;',vhile the idealists demanded the consistent deduction Machians criticise Kant from the Right, u,e from the Left. frorn pure thought not only of. the a priori forms of the under- The Humean Schulze and the subiective idealist Fichte may standing, but of the world as a whole (by magnifying human bc taken as examples of the former category of critics in the thought to an abstract Seff, or to an "Absolute Idea," or to a history of classical German philosophy. As we have already "Universal \Yill," etc., etc.). And here our Machians, seen, they try to obliterate the "realistic" elements of Kan- they had taken as their teachers meu "without roticing" that tianism. Just as Schulze and Fichte cri.ticised Kant himself, who had criticised Kant from the standpoint of scepticism so the Flumean empirio-criticists and the subjective idealist- and idealism, began to rend their clothes and to cover their imrnanentists criticised the German Neo-Kantians of the Pl IILOSOPI lICAL lDllAl,IS'l's seconcl half of the nineteenth century. Thc linc of Flume c,,,c,,;H :; ;" #:.,;:#, ilffi,,. .::: and Berkeley reappeared in a slightly rcnovatcd verbal garb. tt'rnplction against English empiricisrn" (p. ,;). "I would Mach and Avenarius rcproachcd Kant not bccause his treat- (orrpare the Kantian thing-in-itself with a rnovable lid ptraced ment of the thing-in-itsclf was rrot sullicicntly rcalistic, not ovcr a pit: the thing looks so innocent and safe; one steps on sufiiciently materialistic, but bccausc he assurued iis existence; it arrcl suddenly falls into . th.e'zotorl.d-in-itseff"' (p. ,i. not becausc hc rcfusccl to dcduce causality and necessity in 'l'hat is r.vhy Kantis not likcd by the associates of Mach and nature frorn objectivc reality, but because he assumed causality Avcnarius, the imrnanentists; they do not like him because and ncccssity at all (cxccpt perhaps purely "logical" necessity). in sorne respects he approaches the "pit'? of materialism! The irnrnancntists wcrc at one with the empirio-criticists, also And hcre are some examples of the criticism of Kant from criticising l(ant from thc Humean and Berkeleian standpoint. tlrc Lcft. Feuerbach reproaches Kant not for his "rea\ism,". I"'or instance,Leclait it'r 1879, in the work in which he praised lrLrt for his idealisrn, and describes his system as "idealism N4ach as a rernarkable philosopher, reproachcd Kant for his lrased on empiricism" (Werke, II, 296). "inconsistency and connivatce at realism" as cxpressed in the Ilere is a particltlarly important remark on Kant by Feuer- concept of the '"tbitzg-in-itself" - that "nominal residuum of hacl.r. "Kant says: If rve regard - as we should - the ob- vulgar realism" (Der Realisruus Cer rnodernen Natmzoissen- ]ccts o[ our perceptions as mcre appearances, r.ve thereby scbaft, uszts., S. g). Lcclair calls materialism "vulgar realism" rclmit that at the bottom of appearances is a thing-in-itsclf, - in order "to make it stronger." "In out opinion," writes altl-rough we do not know how it is actually constructed, but Leclak, "all those parts of the Kantian theory which grav- crrrly knolv its appearance, i.e,, the rnanner in rvhich ou,: senses itate towards realismws oulgaris should be vanquished and lrre aftected (alliziert) by this unknown something. Hence, eliminated as being inconsistencies and bastard (ztoitteiltaft) outr (eason, by the very fact that it accepts appearances, also products from the idealist point of view" (p. 4r). "The in- ldmits the existence of things-in-themselvcs; and to that ex- consistencies and contradictions in the Kantian theory o[ tcnt we can say that to entertain an idea of such cntities rvhich knowledge [arise from] the amalgamatior (Verquickung) of lic at the bottom of appearances, afld cooseq'rrently are but idealist criticism with still unvanquished remnants of realistic tiiougirt cntitics, is not oniy permissible, but unavoidabtre. . . .'l dogmatism" (p. ,Zo). By realistic dogmatism Leclair means l{aving setrccted a passage from I(ant where the thing-io-itself materialism. is regarded mei:ely as a mental thing, a thought entity, and not Another immanentist, Johannes Rehnrke, reproached Kant a r:eal thing, Feuerbach directs his whole criticism against it. because he realistically u;alled biruself off from Berkeley with ". . . Therefore," he says, "the objects of the scnses [the objects the thing-in-itself (Johannes Rehrnke, Die Welt als lVabrneb- of cllperience] are for the mind only appcarances, and flot nu.rng und Begriff, Berlin, r88o, S. 9). "The philosophical trr-rth. . . . Yet the thought entities ar:e not actual objects for activity of l(ant bore an esselltially polemical character: with the mind! The Kantia"n philosophy is a contradiction between the thing-in-itself he turned against German ntionalism li.e., subject and obicct, betwcen efltitJr end existcncc, thinking and 236 PHlLOSOPHICAL ]D]]ALISTS (;lilll(.lsIl (-)L liANll.\h!ISI1 FI{OII Ll-ltrf AND IttCIff treing. Entity is lcft to thc n'rincl, cxistcnce to tl.rc sclrscs. prcrjLrdicc that the sonl is an elrtity totally difierent from sen- Exis[cncc without eittty li.c., Ilrc existcJrcc of appearanr:cs siblc things. Hence there are real things and a human mind without oblective reality] is mcrc appcaralrce the sensibie - rvhich apprehends those things. But how can the mind ap- things while entity without cxistcncc is mere thought the - - Jrrorrch things totally difiercnt ftom itself ? The way out adopt- tlrought entities, thc noutttcntt; thcy arc thought of, but they c'rl by I(ant is as follows: the mind possesses certain a priori lack existencc at lcast for us and obiectivity; they are - - l

Kantianisrn v'hich distinguish it from Flumism, but for those 2. FIOUT TFIE "EMPIRIO-SYMBOI-IST" YUSHKEViCFI which ate common to both Kant and Humc; not for his ITIDICULED THE "EMPIRIO-CRITICIST" CHERNOV assumption of the thing-in-itself, but for his inadequately materialist vicrv of it. "It is, of course, amusing," writes Mr. P. Yushkevich, "to And iastly, I{arl Kautsky in his Etbics also criticises Kant scc how &Ir. Chernov tries to make the agnostic positivist- from a standpoint dianetrically opposed to that of Ifume and Corntean and Spencerian, Mikhailovsky, a forerunner of Mach Berkeley. "That I see green, red and whitc," hc writes, argu- nrrd Avcnarius" (op. cit., p.71). ing against Kant's epistemology, "is groundccl in my faculty First of all, what is amusing here is Mr. Yushkcvich's of sight. But that grecn is something diffcrcnt from red astonishing ignorance. Like ali Voroshilovs, he concea.ls this testifies to something that Ues outside of me, to rcal differences ignorance under a display of eruclite words and names. The between the things. . . . The relations and difiercnccs between passage quoted is from a paragraph devoted to the relation the things themselves revealed to me by the individual space between Machisrn and Marxisrn. And although he ul.rcler- and time concepts. . . are real relations and diffctcnces of the takes to treat of this subject, NIr. Yushkevich does not know cxternal rvorld, aot conditioned by the oature of my perceptive that for Engels (as for evcry materialist) the adherents of facult1 . . . . If this were really so fif Kant's doctrine of the the Hrrmean line and the adherents of the Kantian line are ideality of time and space v/ere true] , we could know nothing eclually agnostics. Therefore, to contrast agnosticism gener- about (Russ. thc world outside us, not even that it exists." ally with Llachisrn, when even Mach hirnseil confesses to trans., pp. 33-14.) being a follorver of Hume, is simply to prove oneself an Feuerbach, Thus the cntire school of Matx and Engels ignotamus in philosophy. The phrase "agnostic positivism'l turned from Kant to the Left, to a completc rcjection of all is also absurd, for thc adtrrerents of Hume in fact call them- idealism and of all agnosticism. But our Machians followed selves positivists. Mr. Yushkevich, who has taken Petzoldt the reactiondry trend in philosophy, Mach and Avenarius, as his teacher, shotild have knolvn that Petzoldt definitely who criticised Kant from the standpoint of Flume and Berke- regards empirio-criticisrn as positivism. And l"y. Of course, it is the sacrcd right of cvcry citizen, and finally, to drag in the names of Auguste and particularly of every inteiiectual, to folIow any ideological Cornte Herbert Spencer is again reactionary he likes. But when pe'ople who have radically absurd, for Marxism rejects not what distinguishes one positivist from alother, butwhat is common to both and severed relations rvith the very foundations ol Marxism in what makes a philosopher positivist philosophy begin to dodge, confusc matters, hcdgc and assure a instead of a materialist. us that they "too" are Marxists in philosophy, that they are Our Voroshilov needed this display of worcls so as to "almost" in agreement with Marx, and have only slightly "mesmerise" his reader, to stun him with a cacophony of words, to "supplemented" him - the spectacle is a far from pleasant distract his attention away froru the essence ol tbe o1te, ?lt(ltter to empty trifles. And the essence of the matter is the 242 PFIILOSOPHICAL IDEALISTS "jilvll'>lRlo-SYlvlBOl,IST'' RIDICULED "EMPIRIO-CRITICIS'I'r 24:l ndical dif{erence between materialism and the broad curreut A. Riebt, V/itdetband and A. Lange (pp. 7, r9-r9, r27, etc., of positivism, which inclucles Auguste Comte, I{erbert Spen- irr Starcke). cer, Mikhailovsky, a nurnbcr of Neo-I(antians, and Mach and W'e open Avenarius' T'he Flwruan Concept ol tbe Wotld, ,{,venarius. The esscncc of thc matter has been very accu- u,hich appeared in r89r, and on page no of the first German rately expresscd by Engcls in his Ludu:ig Feuerbacb, where cclition we read: "The final result of our analysis concurs - he places atL the Kantians and Flumeans of that pertod {i.e., although not absolutely (durcbgebend) in the measure of the the 'eightics of thc last century) in the camp ol wretched various points of view - with that reached by other investi- eclectics, pettifoggcrs (Flobkruacker: literally, flea-crackers), gators, for exa.mple, E. Laas, E. Mach, A. Riebl, W. Wundt. and so on.s9 To whonr this charactetisation can and must See also Scbopenhauer." apply is a question on which our Voroshitrovs did not wish !/hom \vas our Voroshilov-Yushkevich ieering at? to reflect. And since they are incapable of reflecting, we shall Avenarius has not the slightest doubt as to his kinship in cite one illuminating comparison. E;rgels, speaking bc,th in prir-rciple -- not regarding any partic,tlar qr'.es1-ion, but regard- empirio-criticism to the Kantians 1888 and fi92 ol the l(antians and Humeans in general, men- ing the "final result" of - I-Ie mentions tions no names.e0 The only reference Engels makes to a book Riehl and Laas and to the idealist $7undt. indeed, are they not is his reference to the work of Starcke on Feuerbach, which lztrach between the two l(antians. And, since and Laas purified Kant i la Engetrs analysed. "Starcke," says Engels, "takes great pains all one compafly, Riehl and Avenarius purified Hume i la Berkeley? to defend Feuerbach against the attacks and doctrines of the Hume, ancl Mach surprising that Engcls wished to "spare" the Ger- vociferous lecturers who today go by the name of philosophers Is it man rrrorkcrs, to save them from a close acquaintance with in Germany. For people vzho are interested in this afterbirth this lvhole compaoy of "flea-cracking" university lecturers? of German classical philosophy this is a matter of impottance; Engels could spare the Gerrnan workers, but the Voroshi- for Starcke himself it may have appeared necessary. !(e, lovs do not spare the Russian reader. however, will spare the readcr this" (Lttdoig Feuerbach, S. It should be noted thar afl essentially eclectic cornbination z)).^-\ 9l of tr(ant and Hume, or Hume and Berkelel', is possible, so to Engels rvanted to "spare the reader," that is, to save the spealt, in vat;ying proportions, by laying principal stress now pleasant acquaintance with the \il/e Social-Democrats from a on one, now o11 another element of the mixture. saw philosophers. degenerate chatterboxe s who call themselves above, for instance, that only one Machian, H' Kleinpeter, "afterbirth"? And who are implied by this openly admits that hc and Mach are solipsists (1.e., cousistent rff/e open Starcke's book (C. N. Starcke, Ludzoig Feuer' Berketreians). On the other hand, the Humean trend in the bach, Sttrttgart, r88y), and find constant rcferences to the views of N4ach and Avcnarius is emphasised i:y many of theit adherents of lTume arzd. Rant. Starcke dissociates Feuerbach disciples and followers: Petzolclt, \7i11y, Pearson, the Rtts- from these two trends. Starcke quotes in this connectioll sian empirio-criticist Lcssevich, the Frenchman Flenri Dela- 244 l,Hlr,osoPIrICi\L IDI:IALISTS TT1E I]VII\IANENT]STS 245 croix* and others. We shall cite ollc cxamplc - an cspecially ilatter - eacl.r slatement has a certain relative truth ["rela- cminelrt scicntist wl-ro in philosophy also cornbincd Humc tivcly stable complexes of elements," according to Mach]. with Berkeley, but who emphasiscd the materialist elemcnts But with a view to the progress of science, the materialistic of this mixture. He is Thomas Huxley, the famous trnglish terminology is in every way to be preferred. For it conflects scientist, who gave curreucy to thc tcrm "agnostic" and whom thought with the other phenomena of the universe. . . whereas Engels undoubtedly had chiefly and primarily in rnind when thc alternative, or sp,'ritualistic, terminology is utterly barren, he spoke of English agr.rosticisrn. Engeis in r89z caltred this and leads to nothing but obscurity and confusion of ideas. . . . type of agnostics "shamefaced materialists."02 James Ward, Thus there can be little doubt, that the further science ad- tlre English spiritualist, in his book Naturalisru and Agnostic- vances, the more extensively and consistcntly will all the phe- ism, wherein he chiefly attacks the "scientific champion of nomena of Naiure be represented by materialistic formulac agnosticism," Huxley (Vol. II, p. 229), bears out Engels' and symbois'" (Vol. l, p. r7-tg). opinion when he says: "In I{uxley's case indced the leaning So argued the "shamefaced matctialist" I-Iuxley, r.vho re- towards the primacy of the physical side fl"series o[ elements" fused to accept materialism, regarding iL as "metaphysics" Mach calls it] is often so pronounced that it can hardly be that illegitirnately goes be,r,ond "groups of scnsations." And called parallelism at all. In spite of his vchement repudiation this same Fluxley wrote: "'If I were obliged to choose be- of thc titlc of matcrialist as ail afrrant to his uotarnished ag- twecn absolute materialism and absolute ide:rlism I should nosticisrn, I knory of fcw recent writers rvho on occasion feel compelled to accept the lattct alternative. . . Our one better descrve the title" (Vol. II, pp.3o1r). And Jatres Iflard ceftainty is the existence o[ thc rnental world'r: (J. Ward, quotcs the following statements by Huxlcy in confirrnation of Vol. II, p. zfi). his opinion: "'Anyoue who is acquainted with the history Huxley's philosophy is as much a mixture of Hurne and of science rvill admit, that its progress has, in all ages, meant, Berkeiey as is Mach's philosophy. But in I{uxley's case the and now mofe thafl c\rcr rneans, the extension of the province Berkeleian streaks are incidental, and agnosticism serves as of what we call mattef and causation, and the concomitant a fig-Leaf. for materialism. rMith Mach the "colouring" of 'W'ard, gradual banishment from all regions of human thought of the mixture is a different one, ancl the spirituatrist, rvhat rve call spirit and spontanetty."' Or: " 'lt is in itsclf vzhile bitterly combating Fluxiey, pats Avenarius and Mach of little moment rvhether u/e exprcss the phenomena of rnat- al{ectionately ofl thc back. ter in tenns of spirit, 01 the phenomena of spirit in terrns of

* 3, TI-IE IMMANENTISTS AS COMRADES-IN-ARMS Bibliotbique tlu congrAs international de pbilosopbie, Vol. IV, Helti OF MACH AND AVENARIUS Delacroix, Da-oir) Ilume et la philosophie critique lDatid Hutne and Critical Pbilosopblf. Among thc followcrs of Flrmc thc author inclucles Avcnarius and thc immanentists in Germany, Ch. Renouvier and his In speaking of empirio-criticism we could not avoicl re- school (the nco-criticists) in France. peatedly mertioning the philosophcrs of the so-called im- 246 PIJILOSOPHICAL IDEALISTS THE IMMANENTISTS manentist school, the principal representatives of which are Schuppe's sympathy for empirio-criticism, and that the "dif- Schuppe, Leclair, Rehmkc, and Schubcrt-Solderr-r. It is now fetences" between him and Schuppe "exist, perhaps, only necessary to examinc thc rclation o[ cmpirio-criticism to the temporarily'l (oielleicbt nur einstzoeilen nocb bestebend).* immaneutists and the naturc of thc philosophy preached by And, finally, J. Petzoldt, whose teachilgs Lessevich regards the latter. as the last word in ernpirio-criticism, operuly acclainzs the -Lt't rgoz Mach rvrotci ". . - Today I sce tirat a host o[ irio - Schuppe, Mach and Avenariurs - ds tbe leaders of philosophcrs positivists, empirio-criticists, adherents of thc the "nezo" trend. (Einltihrung in die PlLilosopbie der t'einen - Erfahruitg, Bd. II, r9o4, S. 295; Das \,Yeltproblem, r7c,6, immanentist philosophy - as well as a very few scientists, havc all, without knowing anything of each other, entered S. v. und 146). On this point Petzoldt is definitely opposed \X/illy oo fle\r/ paths r,vhich, in spite of their individual dificrences, to (Einf., TI, 3zt), probably the only outstancling converge almost tor,yards one point" (Analysis of Sensations, Machian who felt ashamed of such a kinship as Schuppe's p. 9). Here w.e mLlst first note Mach's unusually frank admis- and who tried to dissociate himself from him fundamentally, sion tlrat oery t'ezo scientists are followets of the supposedly for which this disciple was reprimanded by his beloved "ne\,y," but in truth very old, Humean-Berkeleian philos- teacher Avenarius. Avenarius w(ote the words about ophy. Secondly, extremely important is Mach's opinion that Schuppe above quoted in a commeflt on \ff/iily's article this "ner,v" philosophy is a broad utruent in v,rhich the im- against Schuppe, adding that Willy's criticism perhaps "was manentists are on the same footing as the empirio-criticists put more strongly than was really necessary'1 (Viertel- and the positivists. "Thus" - repeats Mach in the introduc- jabrsscbrit't fr.ir oissenscbaltliche Pbilosopbie, fi. Jahrg., t894, tion to thc Russian translation of the Analysis ot' Sensations S. z9; which also contains Willy's afticle against Schuppe). (19o6) - "therc is a common movement. . "" (p. a). "My Having acquainted ourselves with the empirio-criticists' position [Macir says in another placc], moreover, borders opinion of the immanentists, let us examine the immanent- ctroscly on that of the representativcs of the immanentist ists' opinion of the empirio-criticists. rWe have already men- philoscphy. . . . I found hardly anythiog in this book fi.e., tioned the opinion uttered by Leclair in 1879. Schubert-Sol- \v,/. Schurppe, Ouiline ot' t/':e Tbeory of Knooledge and Logic) dern in r88z explicitly expressed his "agreement" "ifl part vrith rvhich, with perhaps a very slight change, I rvould with the elder Fichte" (i.e., the distinguished representative not gladly agree" (p. q5). Mach considers that Schubert- of subjective idealism, Johann Gottlieb Fichte, rvhose son Solrlern is also "following close paths" (ir. D, and as to was as inept in philosophy as was the son of Joseph Dietz- \Y,/ilhelm Schuppe, Mach even dedicates to hirr his laeest gen), and "with Schuppe, Leclair, Aoenaritts and partly with work, the summary so to speak of his philosophical labours, Relrmke," while Macb (Die Gescbicbte und die Wurzel d.es Idnoioled gc attd Error. * Avenatius, the other founder of empirio-criticism, wrote Vierteljabrsschilt ftb zoissenscbnftl.iche Philosopbie, fi94, r8. Jahrg., in 1894 that he r.vas "gladdenecl" and "e ncouraged" by IJeft I, S. 29. 248 PIIILOSOP}IICAL ID]]AL]STS TIIE IMIviANENTISTS 249

Satzes oon der Erbaltung der Arbeit) is cited with particular o[ their colleagues, against the unphilosophical spirit wirich gusto in opposition to "natural-historical metaphysics"x - the lras taken possession of the tatwtal scicnces. T'hus the term given to natural-historical materialism by all the reac- physicist Mach. On all hands fresh forces are stirring tionary univcrsity lecture(s and professors in Germany. In and arc working to destroy the blind faith in the infallibilitv t8%, attcr the appcarance of Avenarius'Tbe Httntan of the natural sciences, and once again peoplc are beginning Concept ot' tl:e World, I7. Schuppe hailed this work in Azz to seek for other paths into the profundities o[ the mysterious, Open Letter to Prof. Aaenarius as a "confirmation of thc a bctter entraflce to the house of truth."* naive realism" which he (Schuppe) himsclf advocated. "My A rvord or t\r/o about Ch. Renouvier. He is the head of collccption of thought,'l Schuppe wrotc, "excellently harmo- the influential and widespread school in France known as nises with your [Avenarius'] pure experiencs."*x Thcn, in the neo-criticists. His theoretical philosophy is a combination fi96, Schubert-Soldern, summarising the "methodological of the phenomenalism of Hume and the apriorism of Kant. trend in philosophy" on which he "bases himself," traces his -tr'he thing-in-itself is absolutely reiectecl. T'he connection of genealogy from Berkeley cnd Hume down through F. A. plrenomena, order aod law is declarecl to be a prioti; law Lange ("the real beginning of our movement in Germany is written with a capital letter and is convertcd into the dates from Lange"), and then through l-aas, Schuppc and basis of religion. The Catholic priests 80 into raptures over Co., Aoenarius and Macb, Riebl (among the Neo-I(antians), this philosophy. The Machian Willy scornfully refets to Ch. Renouvier (among the Frenchmen), etc.*** Finally, in P.enouvicr as a "second apostle Paul," as "an obscurantist their programmatic "Introduction" printecl in the first issue o[ the first water" and as a "casuistic preacher of free will'l of the philosophical organ of the immanentists, alongsidc a (Geg,en rlie Scbu.kt;eisbeit, S. Iz9). And it is such co-thinkers declaration of war on materialism and an expression of of the immanentists who 'oarntly Sreet M^ch's philosophy. 'When thc sympathy with Charles Renouvier, we read: "Even in the his Mecbanics appeared in a Frcnch translationia neo-criticists L'Annie camp of the scientists themselves voices of inclividual thinkers orgafl of the - ltbilosophiquees - are being raised sermonising against the growing arrogance cdited b-v Pillon, a collaborator and disciple of Renouvier, wrote: "It is unnecessary to speak of the extent to which, * Dr. Richalcl von Schubert-Soldern, Ueber Trunscenden4 dcs Ob- in this criticism of substance, the thing, the thing-in-itse1f, jekts und Subjekts lOn tbe Transcendence of tbe Object and Subiett), Mach's positive science agrees with neo-critical idealism" 1882, Cl. einer Erkenntnixbcorie S. 37 and 5. also his Grundlagcn lPtin' (Vol, XV, ryo4, p. q9). ciples ol a Tbeorlt of Knoutlecl.gef, 1884, S. 3. As for 'che llussian Machians, they are all ashamed of **Vierteljabrsscht,ift Pbilosopltic, 17. t893, lur usissenscltaltlicbe Jahrg., one course cotrld S' their kinship with the immanentists, and of :8+. people deliberately *+* Dr. R'chard von Schubert Soldern, Das ncnscblicl:e Gliiclz und not expect anything else of who did not clie soziale Frage lLhman Happitess alLl tbe Social Questioz], 1896, S. + Zeitscbrilt liir itntnanente Pbilosopltie,gs Bd. I, Berlin, fi96, S. 6, 9' 250 pHrLosopLIIC/\L IDI.ALISTS THIl IXII,,IANENTISTS 251 adopt the path of Struve, Mcnshil.:ov, ancl the likc. Bazr^"rov presnmably, that Bazarcv ranked "cettain" immanentists alone refcrs to "certrrin rcprcsent;rtivcs of thc imrnalcntist- among the "realists"?), and mofeovef the "objectivisation school" as "realists."* Bogclanov bricfly (and in fact t'al.sely) of this real coflcept is relegated to practical life," while declares that "the imtnancntist school is only an interme- Biederrnann's "Christian dogmatism" is declared to be a diate form between Kantianism altd empirio-criticism" mociel of "scientific theology" (J. Rehrnke, Die Welt als (Etnltitio-Monism, Bk. III, p. xxii). V. Chernov writes: \f,/abrnebruung und Begriff, Bedin, r8Bo, S. 3rz). Schuppe "Generally spcaking, the immanertists approach positivism in the Zeitschrit't fiir intntancnte Philosopbze assures us that in only one aspcct of tlieir theory, in other aspects they go though the immanentists deny the transcendental, God and far beyond it" (Pl:ilosopbical and Sociological Stwclies, p. 1). the future life do not come under this concept (Zeitscbrit't Valentinov says that "the immanentist school clothed these ftir imruanente Philosopbi.e, II.Band, S.5z). In his Etbikhe [Machian] ideas in an unsuitable form and found thernselves insists or-r the "connection of the moral law with the in the blind alley of solipsism'r (op. cit., p" qil. As you see, metaphysical world conception" and condemns the sepata- you pay your money and take your choice: constitution afld tion of the church from the state as a "senseless phrase" (Dr. salmon mayonnaise, realism and solipsism. Our tr{achians \X/ilhelm Schuppe, GrundTr.ige der Etbik und Recbtspbilo- are afnid to tell the plain and clear truth about the im- sopltie fPrinciples of EtlLics and tbe Philosophy ol Laal, manentists. Breslau, r88r, S. fir,325). Schubert-Soldern io his Grundlage The fact is that the immanentists are rank reactionaries, ein.er Erkenntnistbeorie decluces both the pre-existcnce of the open advocates of fideism, unadulterated in their obscurant- selt' before the body and the afier-existence of the self after ism. There is not ofte of them who has not frankly made the body, i.e., the irnmortality of the soul (op. cit., p. Bz), etc. his more theoretical works on epistemology a defence of In The Social Question,e$ atgring against Bebel, he defends, religion and a justification of medievalism of one kind or together with "social reforms," suffrage based on class distinc- anotllcr. Leclafu, in 1879, advocated his philosophy as one tion, ancl says that the "Social-Democrats ignore the fact that satisfies "all the needs of a religiously inclited mind,: that without the divine gift of unl.rappiness there could be no (Der Realismlts, etc., S. Zl). J. Rehmke, in r88o, dedicated happiness" (p. fo), and ti.rereupon laments the fact that his "theory of knowledge" to the Protestant pastor Bie- nraterialism "prevails" (p. ,+r): "he who in our time bclieves dermann and closed his book by preaching not a supersen- in a life beyond, o( evcfl in its possibility, is considered a sible God, but God as a"real concept" (it was for this reason tool" (ibid.). And German Nlenshikovs like these, no lcss obscurantists x 1'Realists in modern philosophy certain representatives of the im- of the first w-ater than Renouviet, live in lasting concubinage manentist school - who have emerged from Kantianism, the school of with the cmpirio-criticists. Their theoretical kinship is ir-r- Mach-Avenarius, and many other kindred movements find - that thete are immanent- absolutely no gtounds for rejecting (Stutlies, contestable. There is no more Kantianism in the the basis of naive realism'r IWe etc., p. z6). ists than in Pctzoldt or Pearson. saw above that they 2s2 PIITI,OSOPHICAL IDDALISTS THE IMMANEN,.IISTS 253 themselves rcgard themselves as disciplcs of Hume ar.rd of "complexes ot' sen:ations" (p. 18), rvhile ceftain classes of Berkeley, an opinion of the immanentists that is gctlerally properties (Eigenscltat'tex), which act upon our sense-olgans, recognised in philosophical literature. In order to show he designates, for example, by the letter M, and other classes, clearly what epistemological premises thcse conrradcs-in-arms which act upon other oblects of flature, by the letter N (p. of Mach aod Avenarius proceed from, r.ve shall quote some r5o, etc.). Moreover, Lectrair speaks of nature as the "phenom- fundamental theoretical propositions from the works of im- ena o[. the consciousness" (Berosusstseinsphrinonten) not of manentists. a single persorl, but of "mankind" (pp. 55-56). If we remember Leclair in 1879 had not yct inl,ented the term "immanent," that Leclair published his book in Prague, where Mach was "given which really signifies "experiential," in experience," professor of physics, and that Leclair cites with rapture only and just as spurious a label for concealing corruption which is Mach's Erbaltung cler Arbeit,DT which appeared in 1872, the as bourgeois parties. In his first the labels of the European question involuntarily arises: ought we not to regard tite Leclair frankly and explicitly calls himself a "critical work, advocate of fideism and frank idealist Leclair as the true idealist" (Der Realisntils, etc., S. rr,2r, zo6, etc.). In this ';zork progenitor of the "original" philosophy of Mach? he criticises Kant, as we have aheady seen, for his concessions As for Schuppe, who, according to Leclak,* arcived at to rraterialism, and clearly indicates his ott,n path aaay froru the "same results," he, as we have seen, really claims to Kant to Fichte and Berkeley. Leclair fights materialism in defend "naive realism," general and tlLe tendency toaards ruatet'ialism displayed by and in lis Open Letter to Prot'. Azsenarius complains "established perversion tbe majority ol scientists in particular as mercilessly as bitterly of the Schuppe, Schubert-Soldern and Rehmke. of my [Schuppe's] theory of knowledge to subiective ideal- "If we tet:urr-," Leclait says, "to the standpoint of critical ism." The true nature of the crude forgery which the im- idealism, if we do not attribute a transcendental existence manentist Schuppe calls a defence of realism is quite clear 'Wundt, fi.e., art existence outside of human consciousness] to nature from his reloinder to who did not hesitate to class or tlre processes of nature, then for the subiect the aggregate the immanentists with the Fichteans, the subiective idealists of bodies and his own body, in so far as he can see and feel (Pbilosopbiscbe Studien, loc. cit., S. 386, 797, 4o7). it, togethcr rvith all its changes, will be a dircctly givcn "In my case," Schuppe retorts to V/undt, "the proposition phenomenon of spatially connected co-cxistences ancl succes- 'being is consciousness' means that consciousness without the sions in time, and the whole explanation of nature will re- cxternal world is inconceivable, that the latter belongs to duce itself to stating the lar,vs of these co-existences and the fornrer, i.e., the absolute connection (Zusantrnengebdrig- successions" (p. z'r). keit) of the onc with the other, which I have so often asserted Back to Kantl - said the rcactior ry Neo-Kantians. Back to Fichte and Berkeley! is essentially what the reactionary * - Beitriige 7u. einer monistircben Erkennlni.rtlteorie lEssq,s in a Monistic immanentists are saying. For Leclafu, all that exists consists Theory of Knoaledgel, Breslau, 1882, S. ro. 254 PFrILosoPHrcAL IDEALISTS THE IMMANENTISTS 255 and explained and in which the two constitute the primary tlris philosopher (Grundlagen einer Erkenntnistbeorie, 1884, whole of being."* p. y and the whole of Chapter II: "The Metaphysics of One must be extremely naive not to discern unadulterated Natural Science"). "Natural science abstracts from all rela- subiective idealism in such "realism"! Just think: the exter- tions of consciousness': (p. ,z) - that is the chief evil (and nal world "belongs to consciousness" and is in absolute con- that is just what constitutes materialism!). F'or the individual nection with it! The poor professor was indeed slanderecl by cannot escape from "sensations and, hence, from a state of the "established" practice of ranking him with the subjectivc consciousness" (pp. 33-JD. Of course, Sctrubert-Soldern idealists ! Such a philosophy cornpletely coincides with admitted in fi96, my standpoittt is epistentological solipsism Avenarius"'principal co-ordination"; no reservations and (Die soxiale Frage, S. x), but not "metaphysical," fiot "prac- protests on the part of Chernov and Valentinov can sunder tical" solipsism. "'What is given us immediately is sensations, them; both philosophies will be consigned togethe( to the complexes of constantly changing sensations" (LIeber 'l'rans- museum of reactionary fabrications of German professordom. cendenT des Objekts und Subjekts, S. Zl). As a curiosity once more testifying to Valentinov's lack of "Marx took the rnatedal process of ptoduction," says "as iudgment, lct us note that he calls Schuppe a solipsist (it Schubert-Soldern, the cause of inner processes and mo- (and just goes without saying that Schuppe vowed and sr.vore that he tives, in the same way as falsely) as natural science v/as not a solipsist and wfote special articles to this effect regards the common [to humanity] external world as the - cause of the individual inner worlds" (Die soziale Frage, - jusl as vehemently as did Mach, Petzoldt, and Co.), yet is highly delighted with Bazarov's article in the Studiesl I S. xviii). That Marx's historical materiatrism is connected should like to translate into German Bazaroy's dictum that with natural-historical materialism and philosophical mate- general, "sense-perception is the reality existing outside us" and for- rialism in it does not even occur to this comrade- in-arms of Mach to doubt. ward it to soflre more or less intelligent immanentist. He "Many, perhaps the mafority, will be of the opinion that would embrace and kiss Bazarov as heartily as the Schuppes, from the standpoint of epistemological solipsism no mera- Leclairs and Schubert-Solderns embraced ]\4ach and Avena- physics is possible, i.e., that metaphysics is always t(ans- rius. For Bazarov's dicturn is the alpba and ontega of the cendental. Upon more mature reflection I cannot concur doctrines of the irnmanentist school. with this opinion. Here are my reasons. . . . The immediate And here, lastly, is Schubert-Soldern. "'Ihe materialism foundation of all that is given is the spiritual (solipsist) con- of natural science," the "metaphysics" of recognising the nection, the central point of which is the individual self oblective rcality of the external world, is the chief enemy of (the individual rcalm of thought) with its body. The rest of the world is inconceivable without this seff, just as this self * )7ilhelm Schuppe, "Die immanente Pbilosopbie und iVilbelm V/undt' is inconceivable without the rest of the thc l"The Immanent Pl:ilosopblt and \ff/ilbelm W'undt"l, Zeitscbilt lrtr im- world. With fitdnente Philosopbie, Iland II, S. r9y destruction of the individual sefi the world is also anni- 256 PHILOSOPHICAI- IDEAI,ISTS WHITT]ER IS EI{PIRIO-CRITICISM TENDING? 257 hilated, which appears impossible - and with the destruction developing, for this will heip us to settle certain "disputable" of the rest of the world, nothing retnains for my individual questions by refercing to indisputable historical facts. And selt', for the latter can be separated from the world only indeed, in view of the eclecticisrn and incoherence of the logically, but not in time and space. Therefore my individual initial philosophical prernises of the trend we are examin- self must continue to exist after my death aiso, if the entire ing, varying interpretations of it and sterile disputes over world is not to be annihilated with it. . ." (ibid., p. xxlii). particulars and trifles are absolutely inevitable. But empirio- The "principal co-ordination," "complexes of sensations" criticism, like every ideological curreflt, is a living thing, and the rest of the Machian banalities render faithful service which grows and develops, and the f.act that it is growing in to the ptoper people! one direction or another will help us more than long argu- ". . \What is the hereaf ter (das Jenseits) from the solipsist ments to settle the basic qtestion as to what the real essence point of view? It is only a possible future experience for of this philosophy is. \We judge a person not by what he me. . ." (ibid.). "spiritualism . would be obliged to prove says or thinks of himself but by his actions. And we must the existence of the Jeruseils. But at atry tate the materialisrl ludge philosophers not by the labels they give themselves of natural science cannot be brought into the field against ("positivism," the philosophy of "pure experience," "mon- spiritualism, for this materialism, as we have seen, is only ism" or "empirio-monism," the "philosophy of natural one aspect of the wodd process within the all-embracing spir- science," etc.) but by the manoer in which they actually settle itual connection" (- the "principal co-ordination") (p. xxiv). fundarnental theoretical questions, by their associates, by what All this is said in that philosophical introduction to Die they are teaching and by what they have taught their disciples soziale Frage (t896) rvhetein Schubert-Soldern all tlse time and followers. appears arm in arm with Mach and Aveoarius. Only for It is this last question which interests us now. Everything the handful of Russian Machians does Machism serve exclu- essential was said by Mach and Avenarius more than twenty sively for purposes of inteltrectual prattle. In its native country years ago. It was bound to become clear in the intewal boro its role as a flunkey to fideism is openly proclaimed ! these "leaders" were understood by those who wanted to uqderstaod them, and whom they themselves (at least Mach, wlro has outlived his colleague) regard as their successors. 4. WIIITHER IS EMPIRIO-CRITICISM TENDING? To be specific, let us take those who themselves claim to be disciples of Mach and Avenarius (or their adherents) and Let us now cast a glance at the development of lMachism whom Mach himself ranks as such. !7e shall thus obtain a after Mach and Avenarius. We have seen that their philos- picture of empirio-criticism as a philosophical current, and ophy is a hash, a pot-pourri of contradictory and discon- not as a collection of literury oddities. 'We nected epistemological propositions. must now examite In l{ach's Introduction to the Russl'an translation of the how and whither, i.e., in rvhat direction, tl-ris philosophy is Analysis ot' Sensations, Hans Cornelius is recommended as 258 PF1ILOSOPHICAL IDEALISTS s Er{PrRro-cRITrcrsM TENDING? 2ig a "youlg investigator" who is following "if not quite the Ilducation (of the youth stultified by this man of science, same, at least very close paths" (p.+). In the text of the prcsumably) is necessary not only for action but "above Analysis of Sensations Mach once again "mentions with all . . to inculcate veneration (Ebrfurcbt) not for the pleasure the works" of Cornelius and others, "who have dis- transitory values of a fortuitous tradition, but for the im- closed the kernel of Avenarius' ideas and have developed pcrishable values of duty and beauty, for the divine (dent tlrem further" (p. +8).Let us take Cornelius' Einleitung irt Gi)ttlicben) within us and without" (p. y:,). clie Pbilosopbie fln*oduction to Pbilosopby) (Germ. ed., Compare this with Bogdanov's assertion that "there is ryo;) and wc find that its author also speaks of his endeavour absolutely no roona" (Bogdanov's italics) and "there cannot to follow in the footsteps of Mach and Avenarius (pp. viii, be any room" for the idea of God, freedom of the will and immortality the soul philosophy 3z). We have before rts then a disciple acknooledged by the of in Mach's in view of his teacber. This disciple also begins with sensations-elements denial of every "thing-in-itself" (p. xii). \7hile Mach in this (pp. ,1, z4), categorically declares that he confines himself to same book (p. ,S) declares that "there is no Machian philos- expeilence (p. vi), cails his views "consistent or epistemolog- ophy," and recommends not only the immanentists, but also ical empiricism" (p. 33;), emphatically condemns the "one- Cornelius who had disclosed the kernel of Avenarius' ideas ! sidedness" of idealism and the "dogmatism" of both the Thus, in the -first place, Bogdanov absolutely does not knozo idealists and the materialists (p. ,rg), vehemently denies the tlre "Machian philosophy" as a current which not only nes- possible "misconception" (p. nr) that his philosophy irnplies tlcs under the wing of fideism, but which itself goes to the the recognition of the world as existing in the mind of mat, lcrrgth of fideism. In the second place, Bogdanov absolutely flirts with naive realisrn no less skilfully than Avenarius, rl.oes not knozo the histcry of philosophy; for to associate Schuppe or Bazarov ("a visual, as well as every other sense- rr denial of the ideas mentioned above with a denial of the perception, is located where we find it, and only where we thing-in-itself is to insult the history of philosophy. Will find it, that is to say, where the naive mind, untouched by Ilogdanov take it into his head to deny that all consistent a false philosophy, localises it" - p.e;) - and this disciple, Iollowers of Hume, by reiecting every kind of thing-in-itse1f, acknowledged as such by his teachet, arrives at i?7lruortality rlo lea'oe rooru lor these ideas? Has Bogdanov never heard o[ subiective idealists, and God. Materialism - thunders this police sergeant in a thc who reject every kind of thing- professorial chair, I beg your pardon, this disciple of the in-itself and thereby make room for these ideas? "There "recent positivists" - converts man into an automaton. "It t;rrr be flo room" for these id,eas solely in a philosophy that need hardly be said that together with the belief in the lcaches that nothing exists but perceptual being, that the freedom of our decisions it destroys all considerations of the rvor:ld is matter in motion, that the external world, the physi- moral value of our actinns and our responsibility for them. cal rvorld famlhar to all, is the sole objective reality - i.e., il rhc philosophy materialism. precisely Just as little room is left for the idea of the continuation of of And it is for this, our life after death" (p. u6). The final note of the book is: lor this, ttrat materialism is combated by the immanentists VHTTHER rs EMprRro-cRrTrcrsM 260 PH]LOSOP}IICAL IDEALISTS TENDING? 26L perverted recommerdcd by Niach, by Mach's disciple Cornclius, ancl thought is idealism. To say that the world depends by modern professorial philosophy in general. upon thought in general is recent positivism, cl,itical realism in word, thoroughgoing Our Machians began to repudiate Cornelius only after this - a bourgeois charlatanism! If indecency had been pointed out to them. Such repudiations Cornelius is an agnostic semi-solipsist, Petzoldt is a solipsist scmi-agnostic. are flot worth much. Friedrich Adler evidently has not been You are cracking a flea, gentlemen! "warned," and therefore recommends this Cornelius in a Let us proceed. In the second edition of his Erkenntnis tr.nd Mach "A systematic socialist journal (Der Karupf, r9o8, t, S. 4j: "a \r/ork that lttum, says: exposition [of Mach's views], one to which in a1l essentials can subscribe, is 'is easy to r.ead and highly to be commended"). Through the its I given medium of Machism, downright philosophical reactionaries by Professor Dr. Hans Kleinpeter" (Die Erkeruntnis- t ls e o r i e der N at ur or s c bun g der G e genzo ar Leipzig, t9o :. T b e and preachers of fideism are palmed ofi on the workers as t' t, 5 'I'heory l{nooledge us teachers ! of ol Modern Natural Science). Let 'Petzoldt, without having been warned, detected the falsity take Hans Number Two. This professor is an accredited in Cornelius: but his method of combating this falsity is clisseminator of Machism: a pile of articles on Mach's views philosophical journals, a gem. Listen to this: "To assert that the world is idea in both in Getman and in English, translations of works recommended by Mach introduc- [as is asserted by the idealists whom we are combating, with - tions by Mach in a the right hand of "teacher." no joke!] has sense only when it implies that it is the idea - word, the of the predicator, or, if you like, of all predicatots, i.e., that Here are his views: ". A11 my (outer and inner) experience, its existence depends exclusively upon the thought of that all my thoughts and aspiratiolls are given me as individual or of those individuals; it exists only inasmuch a psychical process, as a. part of my consciousness" (op. cit., p. r8). "That physical as he thinks about it, and what he does not think of does which we call is a construction of 'Sf'e, psychical "Subjectioe not exist. on the contrary, make the wodd dependent elements" (p. Ui. conoiction, not not upon the thought of an individual or individuals, or, to objectioe certainty (Gezoissbeit) is tbe only attainable goal (p. put it better ar,d clearer, not upon the act of thinking, or ot' any science" q). (The italics are Kleinpeter's, who adds "Something upon any actual thought, but and exclusively in the logical the following remark: similar was already said - by Kant the assump- sense upon thought in general. The idealist confuses one in Critique ot' Practical Reason.") "The - tion that there are other rninds one with the other, and the result is agnostic semi-solipsism, as is which can never be we observe it in Corneliw" (Einfilhrung, II, y7). confirmed by experience" (p. 42). "I do not know. Stolypin denied the existence of the cabinets noirsles Pet- whether, in general, there exist other seloes outside of myself" zoldt annihilates the idealists! It is truly astonishing how b. q).In S r, entitled "Activity (Spontaneity) in Conscious- much this annihilation of idealism resembles a recolnmen- ness," we rcad that in the case of the animal-automaton the dation to the idealists to exercise more skill in concealing succession of ideas is purely mechanical. The same is true their idealism. To say that the world depends upon man's t-,[ us when we dream. "The quality of our consciousness 262 PHILOSOPHICAL IDEALISTS vrIrrHER IS EI{PIRIo-CRITICISM TENDING? 2$3 in its normal state essentially difiers from this. ft possesscs rli98-99 Kleinpeter wrote: "Hertz proclaims the same sub- a property which these [the automata] entirely lack, and icr:tivist view li.e., as Mach] of the nature of or'rr concePts..-. which it would be very difiicult, to say the least, to explain lf Mach andHertz [with what iustice Kleinpeter here impli- mechanically or automatically: the so-called self-activity of cates the famous physicist we shall soon seel deserve credit the self. Every person can disscver himself from his states from the standpoint of idealisrll for having emphasised the of consciousness, he can manipulate them, can make them sublective origin of all ov coocepts and of the connections stand out more clearly or force them into the background, bctween them - and not only of certain individual ones - can analyse them, compare various parts, etc. A11 this is a from the standpoint of empiricisrn they deserve no less credit fact of (imrnediate) experience. Our selt' is therefore for having acknowledged that experience alone, as a coutt essentially dil{erent from the sum-total of the states of con- cntirely independent of thought, can solve the question of sciousness and cannot be put as an equivalent of it. Sugar thcir correctness" (Arcbio filr systematiscbe Pbilosophie, consists of carbon, hydrogen and oxygen; were v/e to Bd. V, r89B-99, S. 169-7o). In rgoo he rrrote that in spite attribute a soul to it, then by analogy it would have to of all the points on which Nfach differs from Kant and possess the faculty of directing the movement of the hydro- Berkeley, "they at any ratc are lnore akin to him than the gen, oxygen and carbon at will" (pp. ,s-lo).$ 4 of the follow- nretaphysical empiricism prevailing in natural science fi.e., ing chapter is headed: "The Act of Cognition - an Act of materiaiism! The professor does not like to call the devil WILL (V/illenshandlung)." "It must be regarded as definitely by name] which is indeed the main target of Mach's attacks" established that all my psychical experiences are divisible (op. cit., Bd. VI, S.87). In I9o1 he v/rote: "The starting point into two large main groups: compulsory acts and deliberate of Berkeley and Mach is irrefutable. . Mach completed acts. To the former belong a1l impressions of the external what Kant begart" (I{.antstudien' Bd. VI[, r9o3, S. y4, world" (p. +). "That it is possible to advance several 270. theories regarding one and the same realm of facts. . is as In the preface to the Russian edition of the Arcalysis ol well known to physicists as it is incompatible with the prem- Sensations Mach also mentions T. Ziehe\ "who is following, ises of an absoiute theory of knowledge. And this fact is if nct the same, at least vcry close paths." We take also linked with the volitional character of our thought; it Frofessor Theodor Ziehen's book Tbe Psycbopbysiol.ogical also implies that our volition is rot bound by external Theory ol Knoroledge (Psycbophysiologische Erk-enntnis' circumstances" (p. ro). tbeorie, Jena, rB98) and find tliat the author refers to Mach, Now iudge how bold Bogdanov was in asserting that in Avenarius, Schuppe, and so forth in the very introduction. Mach's philosophy "there is absolutely no room for free Here therefore we aSain have a case of a disciple acknowl- will," when Mach himself recommends such a specimen as teacher. Ziehen's "recent" theory is that only 'We c,lged by the I(leinpeter! have ah.eady seen that the latter does not tlre "nrob" is capable of believing that "rcal obiects evoke attempt to conceal either his own idealism or Mach's. In our sensations" (p. l), ard that "over the portals of the theory 264 PHrrosoPHrcAL rDEALrsrs WIIIT,HLR IS EMPIRIo-CRITICISM TENDING? 265 of knowledge there can be no other inscription than the I [ad Pctzolclt been acquainted rvith Mach's English acl- words of Berkeley: 'The exterr.ral objects subsist not by lrcrcnts he would have had very considerably to extend the themselves, but exist in our mindst"' fu. l). "!flhat is given list of Machians who had lapsed (because of a "misconcep- us is sensations and ideas. Both are embraced by the r,vord tior-r") into idealism. We have already refcrred to Karl Fear- psychical. Non-psychical is a word devoid of meaning" son, whom Mach praised, as an unadulterated idealist. Here (p. roo). The laws of naturc are relations not of material ilrc the opinions of two other "slanderers" who say the same bodies but of "reduced sensations" (p. ,o+. This "new" thing of Pearson: "Professor Pearson is merely echoing a concept - "reduced sensations" - contaifis everything that cloctrine first given clear utterance by the tr.uly great Berke- is original in Ziehen's Berkeleianism!). lcy" (Howard V. Knox, Mind.,Yol.YI, fi97, p. 2ot). "There Petzoldt repudiated Ziehen as an idealist as far back as can be no doubt that Mr. Pearson is an idealist in the strictest ryo4 in the second volume of his Introduction (5. z981ot). scnse of the word" (Georges Rodier, Reoue pbilosopbique, By 19o6 he had akeady included Cornelius, Kleinpeter, rBB8, II, Yol. 26, p. zoo). The English idealist, William Ziehen and Verworn (Das Weltproblem, etc., S. r37 Fussnote) Clifiord, rrhom Mach regards as "coming very close" to his in the list of idealists or psycbontonists. In the case of all qrhilosophy (Analysis of Sensationr, p. 8), must be considered these worthy professors, you see, there is a "miscoflception" r tcachcr ,:ather than a disciple of Mach, for Clifford's in their interpretations "of the views of Mach and Avenarius" philosophical works appearcd in the 'seventics. Here thc (ibid.). "rnisconception" is due to Mach hirnself, who in rgoI "failed Poor Mach and Avenarius! Not only u/ere they slandeted to notice" the idealism in Clifiord's doctrine that the world by their enemies for idealism and "even" (as Bogdanov is "mind-stufr," a "social obiect," a "highly organised ex- expresses it) solipsism, but their very friends, disciples and pcrience," and so forth.* For a characterisation of the followers, expert professors, also undersiood their teachers charlatanism of the German Machians, it is sufficieflt to note pervettedly, in an idealist sense. If empirio-criticism is de- that Kleinpeter in rgoy elevated this idealist to the rank of veloping into idealism, that by no rreans demonstrates the founder of the "epistemology of modern science" ! rudical falsity of its muddled Berkeleian basic premises. God On page 284 of the Analysis ol Sensations, Mach men- forbid! It is only a slight "misconception," in the Nozdriev- tions the "kindred" (to Buddhism and Machism) Arneri- Petzoldtee sense of the term. can philosopher, Paul Carus. Carus, who calls himself an The funniest thing of all perhaps is that Petzoldt himscif, "admirer and personal friend" of Mach, edits in Chicago the guardian of purity and innocence, firstly, "supplementeci" Mach and Avenarius with his "lagical a priori" ancl, * William Kingdon Clifiord, Lectures and Essa1,s, 3rd ed., London, "On point agrec with Berkeley secondly, coupled them with Wilhelm Schuppe, the vehicle r9or, Vol. II, pp. ll, 65,69: this I entirely rrrcl not with Mr. Spencer" (p. "The object, then, is a set of changes of fideism. l8); ia my colsciousness, and not anything out of it" (p. tz)' 266 PrIl BocDANov's "EMPIRIo-MoNISM" 267 Tbe Monist, a iournal devotecl to philosophy, atrd Tbe Open the immanentists (pp. r;r-52). I7hen Haeckel issued his theses Court, a journal devotcd to the propagatioll of religion. l'or a Monistic Alliance, Carus vigorously opposed him on the "science is divine revelation," say thc editors of this popular ground that, first, Haeckel vainly attempts to refute aptiot- little journal, and they cxpress thc opinion that science can ism, which is "quite in keeping with scientific philosophy"; bring about a refonn of thc church that will rctain "all that sccond, that Haeckel's doctrine of determinism "excludes is true and good in religion." Mach is a regulat contributor thc possibility of free will"; third, that Haeckel is mistaken to Tlte Moni.st and publishes in it individual chapters from "in emphasising the one-sided view of the naturalist against his latest works. Carus corrects Mach "ever so little" i la the traditional conservatism of the churches. Thus he appears Kant, and dcclares that Mach "is an idealist or, as we woulcl irs an enemy to the existing churches instead of reioicing at say, a subjectivist." "There are, no doubt, difietences be- their higher development into a new and truer interptetation tween Mach's views and mine," although "I at once recognised

Only when we throw out the first two rungs, and only r icnccs and in the course of furtber deoelopment becomes a then, can we obtain a picture of the wodd that truly corre- t,lr.ysical body! That means that there are "imrnediate ex- sponds to science and materialism. T'o wir: r) the physical lrcr:icnces" usitltou.t a physical body, prior ro a physical body! world exists independently ol the mind of man and existed Whct a pity that this raagnif,cent philosophy has not yet found long prior to man, pliol to any "human experience"; z) the ilcceptance in our theological seminaries! There its merits psychical, the mind, ctc., is the highest product of matter woLrld have been fully appreciated. (i.e., the physical), it is a function of thar parricularly complex ". I7e have admitted that physical nature itself is a fragment of matter called the human brain. product [Bogdanov's italics] of complexes of an immediate "The realm of substitution," writes Bogdanov, "coincides t:haracter (to which psychical co-ordinations also belong), with the realm of physical phenomena; for the psychical phe- thflt it is the reflection of such complexes in others, analo- nomena we need substitute nothing, because they are imme- gous to them, but of the most complex type (in the socially- diate complexes" (p. xxxix). rrr:ganised experience of living beings)" (p. ,16). And this precisely is idealism; for the psychical, i.e., cor-r- A philosophy which teaches that pl'rysical nature itself is sciousness, idea, sensation, etc., is taken as the inzruediate and ;r product, is a philosophy of the priests pure and simple. the physical is deduced from it, substituted for it. The world And its character is in no wise altered by the fact that per- is the non-ego created by the ego, said Fichte. The wodd is sonally Bogdanov emphatically repudiates all religion. Diih- absolute idea, said Hegel. The wodd is will, said Schopen- ling was also an atheist; he even proposed to prohibit religion hauer. The world is conception and idea, says the immanent- in his "socialitarian" order. Nevertheless, Engels was ist Rehmke. Being is consciousness, says the immanentist :rbsolutely right in pointing out that Diihring's "system" could Schuppe. The physical is a substitution for the psychical, not rnake ends meet without religion. The same is true of says Bogdanov. One must be blind not to perceive the llogcianov, with the essential difierence that the quoted pas- identical idealist essence under these various verbal cloaks. srgc is not a chance inconsistency but the very essencc of his "Let us ask ourselves the following question," writes Bog- "crnpirio-monism" and of all his "substitution." If nature is danov in Book I of Empirio-Monism (pp. tz8-z): "W'har rr product, it is obvious that it can be a product only of some- is a 'living being,' for instance, 'man'?'l And he ans\rers: thing that is greatcr, richer, broader, mightier than nature, "'Mat' is primarily a definite complex of immediate expe-

"psychical," as an "immediate complex," as the immediately Rut why speak of the Jesuits! W'e find Bogdanov's "cogni- given which requires no proof. Absolute Idea, Universal tivc socialism" in its entirety among the immanefltists, so Spirit, ril/orld Will, "geteeral substitution" of the psychical for lreloved of Mach. Leclair regards nature as the consciousness the physical, are differcnt formulations of one and the same

difiicult to find the anstver to this question. Marx frequently I )rrtrgc are rendering him left-handed service by their inven- callcd his world outlook dialcctical matcrialism, and Engels' tiou of "Naturmonisrnus," "Dietzgenism," etc. "Dietzgen- Anti-Dtibring, the zt:bole of ohicb Marx read tbrougb i.n isrn" as distinct from dialectical materialism is confusion, a manuscript, expounds preciscly this world outlook. Hence, \t(p towards reactionary philosophy, an attempt to c(eate a it should have been clear even to the Valentinovs that Dietz- tr.cnd not from what is great in Joseph Dietzgen (and in that gen's cont'usion corld lic only h lsis deoiation from a consist- worker-philosopher, who discovered dialectical matetialism ent applicatron of dialectics, from consistent ruatefiali;ru, ifl irr his own way, there is much that is $eat!) bt front bis iocak points. Does now dawn upon Mr. and brethren it Valentinov his I shall confine myself to two examples in order to illus- that what Marx could call Dietzgen's confusion is only zobat trate how Comrade P. Dauge and Eugene Dietzgen are brings Diet4gen close to Macb, who went from Kant not sliding into reactionary philosophy. towards materialism, but towards Berkeley and Hume? Or In the second edition of the Akquisitr06 (p. ,l), Dauge was it that the materialist Marx called Dietzgen's materialist writes: "Even bourgeois criticism points out the connection theory of knowledge confused, yet approved his deviations bctween Dietzgen's philosophy and empirio-criticism and also from materialism, that is, approved rvhat difiers from Anti- thc imrnanentist school," and, "especially Dilbring, rvhich was written with his (Marx's) participation? further on, Leclair" (a quotation "bourgeois !7hom are they trying to fool, our Machians, who desire from a criticism"). to be regarded as Marxists and at the same time inform the That P. Dauge values and esteen:rs J. Dietzgen cannot be world that "tbeir" Mach approved of Dietzgen? Have our rloubted. But it also cannot be doubted that he is defatn- heroes failed to guess that Mach could approve in Dietzgen ing hin by citing zoitbout protest the opinion of a bourgeois only that which Marx called confusion? sctibbler who classes the sworn enemy of fideism and of the But taken as a whole, J. Dietzgen does not deserve so professors - the "graduated flunkeys" of the boungeoisie - severe a censure. He is nine-tenths a materialist and never with the outspoken preacher of fideism and avowed reaction- made any claims either to originality or to possessing a xy, Leclair. It is possible that Dauge repeated another's spccial philosophy distinct from materialism. He spoke of opinion of the immanentists and of Leclair without himself Marx frequently, and invariably as the bead ol the trend bcing familiar with the writings of these reactionaries. But (Kleinere pltilosopbische Schriften, S. + - an opinion uttered lct this setve him as a warning: the road aroay lrom Marx in 1877; oD page 95 - 1876 - he emphasises that Marx and to the peculiarities of Dietzgen - to Mach - to the imma- Engels "possessed the necessary philosophical trairing"; on ncntists - is a road leading into a morass. To class him not page r8r - 1886 - he speaks of Marx and Engels as the only with Leclair but even with Mach is to lay stress on "acknowledged founders" of the trend). Dietzgen was a l)ietzgen the mucldlehead as distinct from Dietzgen the ma- Marxist, and Eugene Dietzgen,l01 and - alas ! - Comrade P. tclialist. 296 PrrrlosoPHrcAr. rDEALrsTs I)lr,|'Z(;LN ITOLIND REACTIONARY PIIILOSOPI:IERS' FAVOUR 297 I shall dcfcnd Dietzgcn against Daugc. I assert thar lfietz- l\4chring in a long, sniveliing note, in which he went so far gen did not descrve the shamc

298 300 RECENT REVOLUTION IN NATURAL SCIENCE CRISIS IN MoDERN PHYSICS 301 connection between the new physics, or rather a definite school thc physicists, and definite schools are beginning to be formed of the new physics, and Machism and other varieties of r.rr.r this basis. Our object, therefore, will be confined to ex- modern idealist philosophy is beyond doubt. To analyse plaining cleatTy the essence of the difference between these Machism and at the same time to ignore this connection - various trends and the relation in which they stand to the as Plekhanov does - is to scoff at the spirit of dialectical [undamental lines of philosophy. materialism, i.e., to sacrifice the method o[ Engels to the letter of Engels. Engels says explicitly that "with each epoch- making discovery even in the sphere of natural science ["not 1. THE CRISIS IN MODERN PHYSICS to speak of the history of mankind"), matedalism has to change its form" (Ludzrtig Feuerbach, Germ. ed., p. 19).107 In his book Valeur de la science lValue ot' Science], the Hence, a revision of the "totrfi" of Engels' materialism, a famous French physicist Henri Poincar6 says that there are revision of his natural-philosophical propositions is not only "symptoms of a serious crisis" in physics, and he devotes a not "revisionism," in the accepted meaning of the term, buf, special chapter to this crisis (Chap. YIII, cf. p.ryr). The crisis on the contrary, is demanded by Marxism. We criticise the is not confined to the fact that "radium, the great revolu- Machians flot for making such a revision, but for their purely tiotary," is undermining the principle of the conservation of rez;isiotzist trick of beffayirrg the essence of materialism under cnergy. "All the other principles are equally endangered" the guise of criticising its fornz and of adopting the funda- (p. r8o). For instance, Lavoisier's principle, or the principle mental precepts of reactionary bourgeois philosophy without of the conservation of mass, has been undermined by the elec- making the slightest attempt to deal directly, frankly and tron theory of matter. According to this theory atoms afe definitely with assertions of Engels' which are unquestionably composed of. very minute particles called electrons, which are extremely important to the given question, as, for example, charged with positive or negative electricity and "are im- his assertion that ". . . motion without matter is unthinkable'1 mersed in a medium which we call the ether." The experi (Anti-Dtibring, p. to).ro9 ments of physicists provide data for calculating the velocity It goes without saying that in examining the connection of the electrons and their mass (or the relation of their mass between one of the schools of modern physicists and the re- to their electtical charge). The velocity proves to be compar- birth of philosophical idealism, it is far from being our inten- able with the velocity of light (1oo,ooo kilometres per sec- '!7hat tion to deal with specific physical theories. interests ond), attaining, for instance, one-third of the latter. Under us exclusively is the epistemological conclusions that follow such circumstances the twofold mass of the electron has to from certain definite propositions and generally known dis- be taken into account, corresponding to the necessity of over- coveries. These epistemological conclusions are of themselves coming the inertia, firstly, of the electron itself and, secondly, so insistent that many physicists are akeady reaching for of the ether. The former mass will be the real or mechanical them. What is more, there are aheady various trends among mass of the electron, the latter the "electrodynamic mass which 302 RECENT REVOLUTION IN NATURAL SCIENCE :SIs IN MoDERN PHYSICS 303 represents the inertia of the ether." And it turns out that not be suspected of a desire to "slander" our Machians' idol. the former mass is eqtal to zeto. The entire mass of the llcy cannot be trusted when it comes to giving an exact phil- electrons, or, at least, of the negative electrons, proves to be osophical definition of concepts and of materialism in partic- totally and exclusively electrodynamic in its origin. Mass rular, for R.ey too is a professor, and as such is imbued with disappears. The foundations of mechanics are undermiued. rn utter contempt for the rnaterialists (and distinguishes him- Newton's principlc, the equality of action and reaction, is r;clf by utter ignorance of the epistemology of materialism). undermined, and so on. It goes without saying that a Marx or an Engels is absolutely 'W'e are faccd, says Poincare, with the "ruilrs" of the old r)on-existcnt for such "men of science." But Rey summarises principles of physics, "a genetal debacle of ptinciples." It is carefully and in general conscientiously the extremely abun- true, he remarks, that all the mentioned departures from prin- dant literature on the subject, not only French, but English ciples refer to infinitesimal magnitudes; it is possible that we and German as well (Ostwald and Mach in particular), so are still ignorant of other infinitesimals counteracting the that we shall have frequent recourse to his work. undermining of the old principles. Moreover, radium is very The attention of philosophers in general, says the author, rare. Brt at afly rate we have teached a "pefiod ol doubt." and also of those who, for one reason or another, wish to We have aheady seen what epistemological deductions the criticise science generally, has now been particulady attracted author draws from tl-ris "period of doubt": "it is not flature towards physics. "In discussing the limits and value of physical knowledge, which imposes on [or dictates to] us the concepts of space it is in effect the legitimacy of positive and time, but we who impose them on nature"; "whatever science, the possibility of knowing the object, that is criticised" is not thought, is pure nothing." These deductions are ideal- (pp. i-ii). From the "crisis in modern physics" people hasten ist deductions. The breakdown of the most fundamental to draw sceptical conclusions (p. r+). Now, what is this crisis? principles shows (such is Poincar6's trend of thought) that During the fitst two-thirds of the nineteellth century the phys- these principles are not copies, photographs of nature, not icists agreed among themselves on everything essential. They images of sornething external in telation to man's conscious- believed in a purely mechanical explanation of nature: they ness, but products of his consciousness. Poincar6 does not assumed that physics is nothing but a more complicated me- develop these deductions consistently, nor is he essentially chanics, namely, a molecular mechanics. They diflered only interested in the philosophical aspect of the question. It is as to the methods used in reducing physics to mechanics and dealt with in detail by the French rvriter on philosophical as to the details of the mechanism. . . . At present the spec- presented problems, Abel R.ey, in his book Tbe Pb),sical Theory ol tbe tacle by the physico-chemical sciences seems com- Modern Pbysicists (La Tbdorie pbysique cbez les pbysiciens pletely changed. Extreme disagreement has replaced general contetnporains,Faris, F. Alcan, r9o7). True, the author him- unanimity, and no longer does it concern details, but lead- self is a positivist, i.e., a mrddlehead and a semi-Machian, ing and fundamental ideas. While it would be an exaggera- but in this case this is even a certait advantage, for he can- tion to say that each scientist has his own peculiar tendencies, 304 RECENT REVOLUTION IN NATURAL SCII at the ."n,.,,r. ,.t"::: it must nevertheless be noted that science, and especially l,trirosophy .i'J;. ffi.:,'i \vfls nothing but a symbolic formula, a method of notation physics, has, like art, its numerous schools, the conclusions of (replrage, creation signs, marks, symbols), and since which often difier from, and somelimes are directly opposed the of tlrc methods of notation varied according to the schools, the and hostile to each other. . . conclusion was soon reached that only that was denoted "From this one may iudge the significance aud scope of (fagonni) for what has been called the crisis in modern physics. wlrich had been previously designed by rnan "Down to the middle of the nineteenth century, tradi- notatioo (or symbolisation). Science became a work of art tional physics had assumed that it was sufiicient merely to for dilettantes, a work of aft for utilitatians: views which extend physics in order to arrive at a metaphysics of r\^tter. could with legitimacy be generally interpreted as the nega- This physics ascribed to its theories an ontological value. And tion of the possibility of science. A science which is a pure its theories were all mechanistic. The traditional mechanism artifice for acting upon nature, a rrlere utilitarian technique, [Rey employs this word in the specific sense of a system of has no right to call itself science, without perverting the mean- ideas which reduces physics to mechanics] thus claimed, over ing of words. To say that science can be nothing but such and above the results of experience, a renl knowledge of the nn artificial means of action is to disavow science in the proper mateial universe. This was not a hypothetical account of rneaning oI the term. experience; it was a dogma. . ." (p. 16). "The collapse of traditional mechanism, or, more precisely, W'e must here interrupt the worthy "positivist.'1 It is clear the criticisrn to which it was subjected, led to the proposition that he is describing the materialist philosophy of ttaditional that science itself had also collapsed. Frotr the impossibility physics but does not want to call the devil (materialism) by of adhering purely and simply to traclitional mechanism it name. Materialism to a Humean must appeff to be meta- r,vas inferred that science was irnpossible" (pp. 16-17). physics, dogma, a transgression of the bounds of experience, And the ar-rthor asks: "Is the present crisis in physics a and so forth. Knowing nothing of materialism, the Humean temporary aud external incident in the evolution of science, Rey has no conception whatever of dialectics, of the difference or is science itself making an abrupt right-about-face and between dialectical materialism and metaphysical materialism, clefinitely abandoning the path it has hitherto pursued?. . ." in Engels' meaning of the term. Hence, the relation between "If the [physical and chemical] sciences, which in history for example, is absolutely unclear absolute and relative truth, hrave been essentially emancipators, collapse in this crisis, to Rey. which reduces them to the status of mere, technically useful ". . The criticism of traditional mechanism made during . recipes but depritres them of all significance from the stand- of the second half of the nineteenth century weak- the whole point of knowledge of nature, the result must needs be a ened the premise of the ontological reality of mechanism. complete revolution both in the art of logic and the history On the basis of these criticisms a philosophical conception of ideas. Physics then loses all educational value; the spirit of physics was founded which became almost traditional in 306 RECENT REVOI-UTfON IN NATURAI, SCIENCE CRISIS IN MoDERN PHYSICS 3L]7 of positive science it represents becomes false and dangerous." o[ the idealists and agnostics, has been taken advantage ot Science can offer only practical recipes but no real knowledge' by fideism. "Knowledge of the real must be sought and given by other I3ut Rey does not present this replacement, which consti- means. . . . One must take another road, one must return to tutes the crisis, as though all the modern physicists stand subiective intuition, to a mystical sense of reality, in a word, opposed to all the old physicists. No. He shows that in their physicists to the mysterious, all that of which one thought it had been cpistemological trends the modern are divided into deprived" (p. ,s). tl-rree schools: the energeticist or conceptualist school; the mechanistic or neo-mechanistic school, to which the vast ma- As a positivist, tl.re author considers such a view wrong j<.rrity of physicists still adhere; and in between the two, the and the crisis in physics only temPorary. We shall presently critical school. To the first belong Mach and Duhem; to the see how Rey purifies Mach, Poincar1 ar,d Co. of these con- third, Henri Poincare; to the second, Kirchhoff, Helmholtz, clusions. At present we shall confine ourselves to noting Thomson (Lord Kelvin), Maxwell among the older phys- the fact of the "crisis" and its significance. From the last - icists and Larmor and Lorerrtz among the modern phys- words of Rey quoted by us it is quite clear what reactionary - icists. What the essence of the tu;o basic trerds is (for the elements have taken advantage of and aggravated this crisis' third is not independent, but intermediate) tt ny be iudged states the preface to his work that "the Rey explicitly in lrom the following words of Rey's: movement of the last years of fialist and anti-intellectualist "Traditional mechanism constructed a system of the ma- seeking "to base itself on the the nineteenth century" is tcrial world." Its doctrine oI the structure of matter was based on "elements qualitatively homogenous and identical"; and elements were to be regarded as "immutable, im- lrenetrable," etc. Physics "constructed a real edifrce out of real materials and real cemert. The physicist possessed ma- icrial elements, tbe cluses and rnodes of their action, and thc physics regatded its theories as "real knowledge of the mate- rcal la:ws of their action" (pp. ll-$). "The change in this i'ial world," i.e., a reflection of obfective teality. The ne'ur r,iew consists in the rejection of the ontological significance trend in physics regatds theories only as symbols, signs, and of the theories and in an exaggerated emphasis on the phe- marks fot practice, i.e., it denies the existence of an obiective nomenological significance of physics.'? The conceptualist rcality indepenclent of our mind and reflected by it. If Rey view operates with "pure abstractions. . . and seeks a purely hacl used correct philosophical terminology, he would have abstract theory which will as far as possible eliminate the said: the materialist theory of knowledge, instinctively ac- hypothesis of matter. . . . The notion of energy thus becomes cepted by the earlier physics, has been teplaced by an idealist the substructure of the new physics. This is why concep- and agnostic theory of knowledge, which, against the wishes tualist physics may most often be called energeticist physics,'l 3OB RIjC]]NT R}]VOLUTION ]N NATURAL SCJ r-rER r{AS DISAPPEARED,' 309 although this designation docs not fit, for example, such a tlcmaterialises, matter disappears."* To see how easily fun- rcpresentativc of conceptualist physics as Mach (p. $). tlerrnental philosophical conclusions are drawn from this by Rey's identification of energctics with Machism is not thc Machians, let us take Valentinov. He writes: "The state- altogether coffect, of coursc; nor is his assuraltce that the rucnt that the scientific explanation of the wodd can find a neo-mechanistic school as wcll is approaching a phenomenal- lir:nr foundatiot only in materialism is nothing but a fiction, ist view of physics (p. +g), despite the profundity of its dis- rrnd what is more, an absurd fiction" (p.6). He quotes as a agreement with the conceptualists. Rey's "new" terminology clcstroyer of this absurd flction Augusto Righi, the well-koown does not clarify, but rather obscures matters; but we couid ltalian physicist, who says that the electron theory "is not so not avoid it if rve were to give the reader an idea of how much a theory of electricity as of matter; the neliz system a "positivist" rcgards the crisis in physics. Essentially, the sinrply puts electricity in the place of mattet." (Augusto opposition of the "new" school to the old views fully coin- l\ighi, Die tnoderne Theorie der pbysikaliscben Erscbeinungen cides, as the reader may have convinced himself, with Klein- lTbe Moclern Theory ot' Physical Phenomenaf, Leipzig, r9o1, peter's criticism of Helmholtz quoted above. In his presenta- S. r3r. There is a Russian translation.) Having quoted these tion of the views of the various physicists Rey reflects the words (p. 64), Mr. Valentinov exclaims: philosophical indefiniteness and vacillation of their views. "Why does Righi permit himself to commit this offence physics consists the The essence of the crisis in modern in against sacred matter? Is it perhaps because he is a solipsist, old and basic principles, in the re- breakdown of the laws an idealist, a bourgeois criticist, an empirio-monist, or even jection existing outside the mind, that of an objective reahty someone worse?" is, in the replacement of materialism by idealism and agnos- This remark, which seems to Mr. Valentinov to annihilate ticism. "Matter has disappear.ed" one may thus express - the materialists by its sarcasm, only discloses his virgin in- the fundamental and characteristic difficulty in telation to nocence on the sublect of philosophical materialism. Mr. Va- rnany of the particular questions, which has created this crisis. lcntinov has no suspicion of the real connection between Let us pause to discuss this difficulty. philosophical idealism and the "disappearance of matter." 'Ihe "disappeatatTce of matter" ot' ethicb be speaks, in imita- tion of the modern physicists, has no relation 2. "MATTER HAS DISAPI'EARED" to the epistemological distinction between materialism and idealism. To nrake clear, us take one and Such, literally, is the expression that may be encountered tlris let of the most consistent in the descriptions given by modern physicists of recent dis- * L. Houllevigte, L'doolution des sciences Eoolution of tbe coveries. For instance, L. Houllevigue, in his book The Eoo- lTl:e Sciencef, Paris (A. Collin), r9o8, pp. q, 81,, 88; cf. his article: "I-es lation ot' tbe Sciences, entitles his chapter on the new theo- ilies des pbysiciens sur la matiire" lThe Pbysicists' Ideas ol Matterf, it ries of matter: "Does Matter Exist?" He says: "The atom l-' annie prycbologique,los r9o8. ..MA'TTER 310 RECENT REvoLUTIoN IN NATURAL SCIENCE HAS DISAPPEARED'' 311 clearest of the Machians, Karl Pearson. For him the physical tcr, clectricity and ether; whereas now only the two latter univetse consists of groups of sense-impressions. He illus- rcmain. For it has become possible to reduce matter to trates "our conceptual model of the physical universe" by clcctricity; the atorn can be explained as resembling at ir,- the following diagtam, explaining, however, that it takes no Iinitely small solar system, within which negative electrons account of relative sizes (The Gramntar ol Science, p. z8z): - rrrovc around a positive electron with a deflnite (and, as we have seen, enormously large) velocity. It is consequently possible to reduce the physical wodd from scores of elements 10 t\Mo or three elements (inasmuch as positive and negative #*4n .IV9. ds* kinds of rrlatter," %.xi* '/:i+ clectrons constitute "two essentially distinct ;rs the physicist Pellat says - Rey, op. cit., pp. 294-9). Hence, (=v) rratural science leads to the "unity of mattet" (iO;a.)* - such Ether- Prime- Chemical- Particls Body is the real meaning of the statement rcgatdirt'g the disap- units atom atom (-v) pcarance of matter, its replacement by electricity, etc., which In order to simplify his diagram, Karl Pearson entirely is leading so many people astray. "Matter is disappearing" omits the question of the relation between ether and electric- lneans that the limit within which we have hitherto known ity, or positive electrons and negative electrons. But that rnatter is vanishing and that our knowledge is penetrating is not important. Vflhat is important is that ftom Pearson's rlceper; propertics of matter are likewise disappearing which idealist standpoint "bodies" are F,rst regarded as sense-im- formerly seemed absolute, immtrtable, and primary (impene- pressions, and then the constitution of these bodies out of trability, inertia, mass, etc.) and which are now revealed to particles, particles out of molecules and so forth afiects the be relative and chatacteristic only of certain states of matter' changes in the model of the physical world, but in no v/ay For the sole "property" of matter with whose recognition affects the question of whether bodies are symbols of per- philosophical materialism is bound up is the property of being ceptions, or perceptions images of bodies. Materialism and an objectizte reality, of existing outside our mind. idealisrn differ in their respective answers to the questiou of the source of out knowtredge and of the relation of knowl- + Cl. Olivet Lodge, Sn les ilecttons, Paris, 19o6, p. r59. "The electrical eclge (and of the "mental" general) to the pbisical in woid; thcory of mrtter," the recognition of clectricity as the "fundamental while the question of the structure of matter, of atoms and substance," is "an approximate accomplishment of that to what the electrons, is a question that concerns only this "physical philosophers strove always f mattet"; cf. also Augusto tbe Stracture ol Matterf, world." VThen the physicists say that "matter is disappear- Righi,'ueber d,ie Struktu Leipzig, r9o8; J. J. Thoms Tbeoty of Matter, Lor.don, ing," they mean that hitherto science reduced its investiga- tgo); P. Latgevin, "La ons" [Tbe Physics ol tbe tions of the physical world to three ultimate concepts: mat- Electronsl, Reoue gindrale d,cs sciences,r\o t9o5, pp. 257-76- 312 RECENT REvoilJrfoN rN NATURAL scrENcE !'MAITER HAs DISAPPEARED" 313 The error of Machism in general, as of the Machian ne'"v appcar, however "strange" may seem the absence of any physics, is that it ignores this basis of philosophical material- othcr kind of mass in the electron save electromagnetic mass, ism and the distinction between metaphysical materialism and hrrwevcr extraordinary may be the f.act tbat the mechanical dialectical materialism. The rccognition of immutable ele- lrrws of motion are confined only to a single sphere of natural ments, "of the immutablc substance of things," and so forth, lrhcnomena ar,d are subordinated to the more profound laws is not materialism, bt tuetapltysical, i.e., anti-dialectical, ma.- of electromagnetic phenomena, and so forth - all this is but terialism. That is why J. Dietzgen emphasised that the another corroboration of dialectical materialism. It is mainly "subject-rnatter of scieuce is endless," that not only the in- bccause the physicists did not know dialectics that the new finite, but the "smallest atom" is immeasurable, unknowable physics strayed into idealism' They combated metaphysical to the end, inexbaustible, "for nature in all her parts has no (in Engels', and not the positivist, i.e., Humean, sense of the beginning and no etd" (Kleinere pbilosopbiscbe Scbrit'ten, word) materialism and its one-sided "mechanism," and in so S. zz91o). That is why Engels gave the example of the dis- doing threw the baby out with the bath-water. Denying the covery of alizarin in coal tar ar,d criticised ruecbanical mate- immutability of the elements and the ptoperties of matter rialisrn. In order to present the question in the only correct known hitherto, they ended in denying matter, i-e-, the obiec- way, dTat is, from the dialectical materialist srandpoint, \ve tive reality of the physical wodd. Denying the absolute nrust ask: Do electrons, ether and so on exist as objective character of some of the most important and basic laws, they realities outside the human mind or not? The scientists will cnded in denying all obiective law in flature and in declaring also have to ars\Mer this question unhesitatingly; and they that a law of nature is a mere convention, "a limitation of do invariably answer it in the affirmatioe, iust as they unhes- cxpectation," "alogical necessity," and so forth. Insisting on itatingly recognise that nature existed prior to man and prior the approximate and relative character of our knowledge, to organic matter. Thus, the question is decided in favour of they ended in denying the obiect independent of the mind materialism, for the concept matter, as we alfeady stated, and reflected approximately-correctly and reXatively-truthfuliy epistemologically implies notbing but objective reality existing by the mind. And so on, and so forth, without end. independently of the human mind and reflected by it. The opinions expressed by Bogdanov in rB99 tegatding But dialectical materialism insists on the approximate, rel- "the immutable essence of things," the opinions of Valentinov ative character of. evety scientific theory of the structure o[ and Yushkevich regarding "substance," and so forth - are matter and its properties; it insists on the absence of absolute similar fruits of ignorance of dialectics. From Engels' point boundaries in nature, on the transformation of moving matter of view, the only immutability is the reflection by the human from one state into another, which is to us apparently ir- mind (when there is a human mind) of an external world reconcilable with it, and so forth. Howeyet bizarre from the existing and developing independently of the mind. No other standpoint of "common sense" the transformation of impon- "immutability," no other "essence," flo other "absolute sub- derable ether into ponderable matter a\d oice z,ersa ff.ay stance," in the sense in which these concepts were depicted 3L4 RECENT REVoI,UTIoN IN NATURAL scIENcE .'MATTER HAS DISAPPEARED'! 315 professorial philosophy, by the empty exist for Marx and ordering and summarising facts and as a guide in the search Engels. The "essence" of things, or "substance," is also rel- for further phenomena. But while in former times perhaps ative; it expresses only the deg,ree of profundity of man's too much confidence was placed in the faculties of the human knowledge yesterday profundity of obiccts; and while the mind, and it was considered too easy to Srasp the ultimate knowledge of this did not go beyond the atom, alnd today causes of all things, there is nouradays a tendency to fall into does not go beyond the clcctron and ether, dialcctical mate- the opposite eror" (oP. cit., P. 3). rialism insists on the temporary, rclative, approximate chartc- Why does Righi dissociate himself here from the positivist ter of all these milestones it the knowledge of nature gained and utilitarian tendencies? Because, while apparently he has by the progressing science of man. The electron is as inex- no definite philosophical standpoint, he instinctiveiy clings hawstible as the atom, nature is infinite, but it infinitely exists. to the rcality of the external world and to the recognition And it is this sole categorical, this sole unconditional recogni- that the new theory is not only a "convenience" (Poincare), nature's tion of existence outside the mind and perception of not only an "empirio-symbo1" (Yushkevich), not only a "har' man that distinguishes dialectical materialism from relativist monising of experience" (Bogdanov), or whatever else they agnosticism and idealism. cail such subjectivist fancies, but a further step in the cogni- Let us cite two examples of the way in which the new tion of objective rcality. Had this physicist been acquainted physics wavers unconsciously and instinctively between dia- with d.ialectical materialism, his opinion of the error which lectical materialism, which remains unklown to the bour- is the opposite of the old metaphysical materialism might gcois "phenomenalism," scientists, and with its inevitable perhaps have become the starting point of a coffect philoso- subjectivist (and, subsequently, directly fideist) deductions. phy. But these people's rvhole environment estranges them This same Augusto Righi, from whom Mr. Valentinov was from Marx and Engels and throws them into the embrace get unable to a reply on the question which interested him of vulgar ofiicial philosoPhY. about materialism, writes in the introduction to his book: Rey too is entirely unfamiliar with dialectics. But he too "\What the electrons, or electrical atoms, really are remains is compelled to state that among the modern physicists there even now a mystery; but in spite of this, the new theory is are those who continue the traditions of "mechanism" (i."., perhaps destined in time to achieve no small philosophical materialism). The path of "mechanism," says he, is putsued significance, since it is arriving at entirely new hypotheses not only by Kirchhoff,Hertz, Boltzmann, Maxwell, Helmholtz regarding the structure of ponderable matter and is striving and Lord Kelvin. "Pure mechanists, and in some respects to reduce phenomena all of the external wodd to one common nrore mechanist than anybody else, and representing the cul- origin. mination (l'aboutissant) of rnechanism, are those who follow "For the positivist and utilitarian tendencies of our time Lorentz and Larmot in formulating an electrical theory of such an advantage may be of small consequence, and a theory matter and who arcive at a denial of the constancy of mass, perhaps is regarded primarily as a means of conveniently declaring it to be a function of motion. Tbey are all mecban- 316 R.ECENT REvoLUTToN rN NATURAL scrENCE !,MATTER r{AS DTSAppEARED', 317 ists becatrse they take real motion as tlteir starting point" rcmain concepts of the same order as physico-chemical con- (Rey's italics, pp. z9o-9r). ccpts. In traditional mechanism it was motions copied ". . . If, for example, thc rccent hypotheses of Lorentz, (calquds) frorn relatioely slout motions, which, since they alone Larmot and Langevin were, thanks to certain experimental were known and most directly observable, were taken. . confirmation, to obtain a sufficiently stable basis for the sys- as a type of all possible motions. Recent experiments, orr tematisation of physics, it would be certain that the larvs of the contrary, show that it is necessary to extend our concep- present-day mechanics are nothing but a corollary of the laws tion of possible motions. Ttaditional mechanics remains of electromagnetism: they would constitute a special case of cntirely intact, but it now applies only to relatively slow the latter r,vithin well-defined limits. Constancy of mass and motions. . . . In relation to large velocities, the laws of motion our principle of inertia would be valid only for mcderate are difierent. Matter appears to be reduced to electrical velocities of bodies, the term 'moderate' being taken in rela- particles, the ultimate elements of the atom. (1) Motion, tion to our senses and to the phenomena which constitute our displacement in space, remains the only figuative (fiCuri) general experience. A general recasting of mechanics would element of physical theory. (4) Finally, what from the stand- result, and hence also, a gened recasting of the systemati- point of the general spirit of physics comes before every sation of physics." other consideration is the fact that the conception of physics, "!7ould this imply the abandonment of mechanism? By its methods, its theories, and their relation to experience no means. The purely mechanist tradition would still be remains absolwtely identical with the conception of mechanism, followed, and mechanism would follow its normal course of with the conception of physics held since the Renaissance" development" (p. ,s)" (pp.+6-+). "Electronic physics, which should be ranked among the I have given this long quotation from Rey in full because theories of a generally mechanist spirit, tends at present to owing to his perpetual anxiety to avoid "materialist meta- impose its systematisation on physics. Although the funda- physics," it would have been impossible to expound his state- mental principles of this electtonic physics are not furnished ments in any other way. But however much both Rey and by mechanics but by the experimental data of the theory the physicists of whom he speaks abiure materialism, it is of electricity, its splirit is mechanistic, bccause : (r) It uses nevertheless beyond question that mechanics was a copy of liguratioe (figuris), material elements to fepresent physical real motions of moderate velocity, while the new physics is properties and their laws; it expresses itself in terms of per- a copy of real motions of enormous velocity. The recognition ception. (z) I(zhile it no longer regards physical phenomena of theory as a copy, as an approximate copy of objective as particular cases of mechanical phenomena, it regards me- reality, is materialism. When Rey says that among modern chanical phenomena as particular cases of physical phe- physicists there "is a reaction against the conceptualist nomefla. The laws of mechanics thus retain their direct con- [Machian] and energeticist school," and when he ranks the tinuity with the laws of physics; and the concepts of mechanics physicists of the electron theory among the representatives of 318 RECENT REVOLUTION IN NATURAL SCI ]S A,{O'IION \TITHOUT IIATTER CONCEIVABLEI 3I9 this reaction (p. +6), we could desire tto better corroboration tion fron:r lnatter, force from substance, Dietzgen associatcs of. the fact that the struggle is essentially between the mate- with idealism, compares with the endeavour to divorce rialist and the idealist tendencies. But we must not forget rhought frorn the brain. "Liebig," Dietzgen continues, "lvho that, apatt from the general prcjudiccs against materialism is especially fond of straying from his inductive science into common to all educated philistines, the most outstanding thc field of speculation, says in the spirit of idealism: 'force theoreticians are handicapped by a complete ignorance of cannot bc seeo"' (p. to9). "The spiritualist or the idealist dialectics. belieoes in the spiritual, i.e., ghostlike and inexplicable, nature of force" (p. rro). "The antithesis between force and matter is as old as the antithesis betrveen idealism and materialism" 3. IS MOTION ITITHOIJT MATTER CONCEIVABLtr? (p. ,ril. "Of course, there is no force without matter, no matter without force; forceless matter and matterless force ate The fact that philosophical iclealism is attempting to make absurclities. If there are idealist natural scientists who believe use of the new physics, or that idealist conclusions are being in the immaterial existence of forces, on this point they are drawn from the latter, is due not to the discovery o[ new not natural scientists. . . but seers of ghosts" (p. ,r+)' kinds of substance and force, of matter and motion, but to 'Ufe thus see that scientists who were preparcd to 4raflt that the fact that an attempt is being made to conceive motion motion is conceivable without matter were to be encountered without matter. And it is the essence of this attempt which forty years ago too, and that "on this point" Dietzgen declared 'What, our Machians fail to examine. They were unwilling to take them to be seers of ghosts. then, is the connection accouflt of Engels' siatement that "motion without matter is between philosophical idealism and the divorce of matter frorn untbinkable." J. Dietzgen in 1869, i-lr,his Tbe Natwre of tbe motion, the separation of substance ftom force? Is it not Workings ot' tbe Human Mi.nd, expr.essed the same idea as "more economical," indeed, to conceive motion without Engels, although, it is true, not vzithout his usual muddled matter? attempts to "reconcile" materialism and idealism. Let us Let us imagine a consistent idealist who holds that the leave aside these attempts, which are to a large extent to cntire wodd is his sensation, his idea, etc. (if we take "no- be explained by the fact that Dietzgen is arguing agaimt body's" sensation or idea, this changes only the variety of Biichner's non-dialectical materialism, and let us examine philosophical idealism but not its essence). The idealist would Dietzgen's own statements on the question under considera- not even think of denying that the world is motion, i.e., the tion. He says: "They [the idealists] want to have the general motion of his thoughts, ideas, sensations. The question as without the particular, mind without matter, force without to zt;bat moves, the idealist will reiect and regard as absurd: substaflce, science without experience or material, the abso- what is taking place is a change of his sensations, his ideas lute without the r:elative" (Das Wesen der ruenscblichen come and go, and nothing more. Outside him there is nothing. endeavour to divorce mo- Kopfarbeit, I9o3, S. ro8). Thus the "It moves" - and that is all. It is impossible to conceive Ii9I'1'HOU1 320 RI'CEN'I REVOLUTION IN NATURAL SCIENCE IS MO]ION MATTER CONCI.]IVABLE? 321 a lnore "economical" way of thinking. And no proofs, syllo- tiousiy gonc over to the standpoint of philosophical iclcalism. gisms, or definitions are capable of refuting thc solipsist if And this alwa,ys happcns with peoplc who wish, for "econo- he consistently adheres to his view. rrry's sake," to conceive of motion without matter, for tacitly-, The fundamental distinction between thc materialist and lry the very fact that they continue to argue, they are acknowl- the adherent of idealist philosophy consists in the fact that cclging the existence of thought after the disappearance of the materialist regards sensation, perception, idea, and the rnattcr. This means that a very simple, ot a very complex mind of man generally, as an image of objective reality. The philosophical idealism is taken as a basis; a yery simple one, world is the movement of this objective reality reflected by our if it is a case of frank solipsism (1 exist, and the world is only consciousness. To the movement of ideas, perceptions, etc., nty sensatian); a very complex one, if instead of the thought, there corresponds the movement of matter outside me. The icicas and sensations of a living person, a dead abstraction is concept matter expresses nothing more than the obiective 1rosited, that is, nobody's thought, nobody's idea, nobody's reality which is given us in sensation. Therefore, to divorce scnsation, but thought in general (the Absolute Idea, the motion from matter is equivalent to divorcing thought from [Jniversal Will, etc.), sensation as at.r incleterrninate "element," obiective rcality, or to divorcing my sensations from the ex- thc "psychical," which is substituted for the wholc oI physical ternal world - ir a word, it is to go over to idealism. Thc nature, etc., etc. Thousands of shades of varieties of philo- trick which is usually performed in denying matter, and in sophical idealism are possible and it is always possible to assuming motion without matter, consists in ignoring the rela- create a thousand and first shade; and to thc author of this to thought. question is presented as though tion of matter The thousand and first little system (empirio-monism, for example) this relation did not exist, but in reality it is introduced sur- what distinguishes it frorn the rest may to be mo- reptitiously; at the beginning of the argument it remains un- ^ppeff mentous. From the standpoint of materialism, however, the expressed, but subsequeltly crops up more or less impercep- distinction is absolutely unessential. What is essential is the tibly. 'What point of departure. is essential is that the attempt to Matter. has disappeared, they tell us, wishing from this to tbink of motion without rnatter smuggles it tbou.gbt divorced draw epistemological conclusions. But has thought remained? from matter and that is philosophical idealism. we ask. If not, if with the disappearance of ffattet thought - - Thcrefore, for example, the English Machian Karl Pear- has also disappeared, if with the disappearance of the brain son, clearest and most consistent the Machians, and nervous system ideas and sensations, too, have disap- the of who averse to trickery, directly the seventh chapter peared then it follows that everything has disappeared. is verbal begins - "matter," And your argument has disappeared as a sample of "thought" of his book, devoted to with the characteristic hcad- ing "A11 things move but only in conception." "It is there- (or lack of thought) ! But if it has remained - if it is as- - sumed that with the disappearance of matter, thought (idea, fore, for the sphere of perception, icile to ask what moves sensation, etc.) does not disappear, then you have surrepti- and rvl-ry it moves" (Tlte Gramntar ot' Science, p. 241,). 322 RI]C]]NI REVOIUfiON IN NATURAL SCII]NC}iJ Is Mol,IoN SfITHoUT MATTER CONCI]IVABLE? 323

Therefore, too, in the case of Bogdanov, his philosophical It is evident that tsogdanov is arguing incorrectly. Not misadventures in fact began before his acquaintance with orrly does he confuse the rnaterialist recognition of an objec- Mach. They began from the moment he put his trust in the tive source of sensations (unclearly formulated in the words assertion of the eminent cl-rcmist, but poor philosopher, Ost- "cause of sensations") with Mill's agnostic de6nition of mat- wald, that motion can be thought of without matter. It is all tcr as the permanent possibility of sensation, but the chief the more fitting to pause on this long-past episode in Bogda- crror here is that the author, having boldly approached the nov's philosophical dcvelopment since it is impossible when t;uestion of the existence or non-existence of an objective speaking of the connection between philosophical idealism solrrce of sensations, abandons this question half-way and and certain trends in the new physics to ignore Ostwald's iumps to anothe( question, the question of the existence or ''energetics." rron-existence of matter without motion. The idealist may "We have aheady said," wrote Bogdanov in t899, "that rcgard the world as the ruooement of our sensations (even the nineteenth century did oot succeed in ultimately ridding tlrough "socially organised" and "hatmonised" to the high- itself of the problem of 'the immutable essence of things.' cst degree); the rnaterialist regards the world as the move- This essence, under the name of 'matter,' even holds an im- nrcnt of an obiective source, of an objective model of our portant place in the world outlook of the foremost thinkers sensations. The metaphysical, i.e., anti-dialectic al, material' of the century" (Fundamental Elerr'tents ol tbe Historical ist may accept the existence of matter without motion (even The Outtook on Nature, p. 38). though temporarily, before "the first impulse," etc.). We said that this is a sheer muddle. The recognition of clialectical matetialist not only regards motion as an insep- the objective reality of the outer world, the recognition of rrable property of matter, but reiects the simplified view of the existence outside our mind of eternally moving and eter- nrotion and so forth. nally changing matter, is here confused with the recogni- ". . . The most exact definition would, perhaps, be the tion of the immutable essence of things. It is hardly possi- following:'matter is what moves'; but this is as devoid of ble that Bogdanov in 1899 did not rank Marx and Engels content as though one were to say that matter is the subiect among the "foremost thinkers." But he obviously did not of a sentence, the predicate of which is 'moves.' The fact, understand dialectical materialism. rnost likely, is that in the epoch of statics men were wont ". . . Ifl the processes of nature two aspects are usually to see something necessarily solid in the role of the subject, still distinguished: matter and its motion. It cannot be said an 'obiect,' and such an inconvenient thiog for statical that the concept matter is distinguished by great clarity. trt thought as 'motion' they were prepated to tolerate only as 'matter.'" is not easy to give a satisfactory answer to the question - a predicate, as one of the attributes of what is matter? It is defined as the 'cause of sensations' or This is something like the charge Akimov brought against as the 'permanent possibility of sensation'; but it is evident the Iskra-ists, namely, that their programme did not contain that matter is here confused with motion. . . .'l tlre word proletariat in the nominative case! Whether we IS MOTION ITITHOUT MATTER CONCEIVABLE? 325 324 RECENT Rr.voLUTroN rN NATURAL scIENcE he that he regards "as a great gain the say the world is moving matter, or that the world is material I'Lilosophy* declares way motion, makes no difference whatevcr. simple and natural removal of the old difliculties in the of uniting the concepts mattr.r and spirit by subordinating " . . . But energy must have a vehicle say those who - both to the concept energy." This is not a gain, but a loss, believe in matter. Why? asks Ostwald, ar-rd with reason. - bccause the question whether epistemological investigation Must nature necessarily consist of subject and predicate?" (Ostwald does not cleatly realise that he is raising an b.:,q-) cpistemological and not a chemical issue!) is to be conducted Ostwald's ansv/er, which so pleased Bogdanov in 1899, is along materialist or idealist lines is not being solved but is plain sophistry. Must our judgments necessarily consist of bcing confused by an arbitrary use of the term "energy." Of electrons and ether? one might retort to a - Ostwald. As course, if we "subotditate" both matter and mind to this matter of fact, the mental elimination from "nature" al concept, the zserbal annihilation of the antithesis is beyond matter as the "subject" only implies the tacit admission into question, but the absurdity of the belief in sprites and hob- pbilosopby of tbougbt as the "subiect" (i.e., as the primary, goblins, for instance, is not removed by calling it "energet- the starting point, independent of matter). Not the subject, ics." On page of Ostwald's Lectures we read: "That but the objective 394 source of sensation is eliminated , and setz- all external events may be presented as an interaction of sationbecomes the "subject," philosophy i.e., becomes Berke- cnergies caa be most simply explained if our mental processes leian, no matter in what trappings the word "sensation" are themselves energetic and impose (aufpriigen) this prop- is afterwards decked. Ostwald endeavoured to avoid this crty of theirs on all external phenomena." This is pure inevitable philosophical alternative (materialism or idealism) idealism: it is not our thought that reflects the transforma- by an indefinite use of the word "energy," but this very tion of energy in the external world, but the external world endeavour only once again goes to prove the futility of such that reflects a ceftain "property" of our mind! The American artifices" If energy is motion, you have only shifted the philosopher Hibben, pointing to this and similar passages in difiiculty from the subject to the prcdicate, you have only Ostwald's Lectures, aptly says that Ostwald "appears in a changed the question, does matter move? into the question, I(antian disguise": the explicability of the phenomena of the is energy material? Does the transformation of energy take external world is deduced from the properties of our mind ! place outside my mind, independently of man and mankind, "It is obvious therefore," says Hibben, "that if the primary ot are these only ideas, symbols, conventional signs, and so concept of energy is so defined as to embrace psychical forth? And question proved this fatal to the "energeticist', phenomena, 'we have no longer the simple concept of energy philosophy, that attempt to disguise old epistemological errors as understood and recognised in scientific circles or even by a "new" terminology. Here are examples of how the energeticist Ostwald got * Wilhelm Ostwald, Vorlesungen iiber Naturpbilosopbie, z Aufl., Leipzig,, r9oz, S. viii. into a muddle. In the preface to his Lectares o?? Natural 326 RECENT REVoLUTToN IN NATURAL scIENcE Is MoTIoN'JfITIJOUT MATTER CONCEIVABLE? 327

among the Energetiker themselves. . . ."* The tfansfofma- tween a man v,rho believes in a yellow devil and a man tion of energy is regarded by science as an objective process wtro believes in a green devil. For the important thing is independent of the minds of men and of the experience of not the difierences between Bogdanov and the other Ma- mankind, that is to say, it is rcgarded materialistically. And clrians, but what they have in comrnon, to wit: the idealist by energy, Ostwald himself in many instances, probably in interpretation of "experience" and "energy," the denial of the vast majoity of instances, neans material motio11. objective rcality, adaptatiot to which consiitutes human And this accounts for the remarkable phenornenon that cxperience and the copying of which constitutes the only Bogdanov, a disciple of Ostwald, having become a disciple scientific "methodology" and scientific "energetics." of Mach, began to reproach Ostwald not because he does "It [Ostwald's energetics] is indifierent to the material not adhere consistently to a materi^listic view of energy, but of the world, it is fully compatible with both the old mate- because he admits the materialistic view of energy (and at rialism and pan-psychism" (i.e., philosophical idealism?) times even takes it as his basis). The materialists criticise (p. xvii). And Bogdanov depated frorn muddled energetics Ostwald because he lapses into idealisrn, because he attempts not by the materialist road but by tbe idealist rcad. - to reconcile materialism and idealism. Bogclanov criticises "!7hen energy is represented as substance it is nothing but Ostwald from the idealist standpoint. In 19o6 he wrote: the old materialism minus the absolute atoms - materialism Ostwald's energetics, hostile to atomism but for the with a correction in the sense of the continuity of the exist- rest closely akin to the old materialism, enlisted my heartiest ing" (ibi{t.). Yes, Bogdanov left the "old" materialism, i.e., sympathy. I soon noticed, howevef, an important contradic- the metaphysical materialism of the scientists, not for dialec' tion in his Naturpbilosopbie: although he frequently em- tical materialism, which he understood as little in 19o6 as no educated phasises the purely metbodologi.cal significarrce of the con- he did in 1899, but for idealism and fideism; for "neo- cept'energy,'in a gr.eat number of instances he himself fails representative of modern fideism, no immanentist, no to adhere to it. He every now and again converts 'energy' criticist," and so forth, will object to the "methodological" from a pure symbol of cotrelations between the facts of conception of. etetgy, to its interpretation as a "pure symbol experience into the substance of experience, into the 'wodd of correlation of the facts of experience." Take Paul Carus, stufi' " (Empirio-Monism, Bk. III, pp. xvi-xvii). with whose mental make-up we have aheady become Energy is a pure symbol! After this Bogdanov may dispute sufficiently acquainted, aod you will find that this Machian as much as he pleases with the "empirio-symbolist" Yush- criticises Ostwald in the oery satlte roay as Bogdanooz are exactly the same kevich, with the "pure Machians," the empirio-criticists, etc. Materialism and energetics in (The Monist, r9o7, No. p- from the standpoint of the materialist it is a dispute be- predicament" Vol. XV[, 4, ,$). - "We are very little helped by materialism when we are told rfiatter, and that * J. G. Hibben, "The Theory of Energetics and Its Philosophical that everything is matter, that bodies are Bearings," Tbe Monist, Vol. XIII, No. 3, April ryq, pp. 1,zg-3o, thoughts are merely a function of matter, and Frofessor Ost- 328 REcEN'f REVoLUTIoN rN NATURAL scIENcE TrJ(o TRENDs, AND ENGLISH sPIRITUALISM 32f) wald's energetics is not a whit better when it tells us that of physical theory and especially the doubts that have arisen matter is energy, and that the soul too is only a f.actor of. as to the existence of atoms, and of the ether. The speaker energy" b. sll). rcferred to the physicists Foincar6 and Poynting (an English- Ostwald's energetics is a good example of how quickly a man who shares the views of the symbolists, or Machians), "new" terminology becomes fashionable, and how quickly it who raised this problem, to the philosopher r{'/ard, and to turns out that a somewhat altered mode of expression can E. Haeckel's famous book and attempted to presert his own in no way eliminate fundamental philosophical questions and views.* fundamental philosophical trends. Both materialism and "The question at issue," said Riicker, "is whether the idealism can be expressed in terms of "energetics" (more or hypotheses which are at the base of the scientific theories Iess consistently, of course) iust as they can be expressed in nov/ most generally accepted, are to be regarded as accurate terms of "experience," and the like. Energeticist physics is a dcscriptions of the coristitution of the universe around us, source of new idealist attempts to conceive motiofl without or merely as convenient fictions." (In the terms used in our matter because of the disintegration particles - of of matter cofltroversy with Bogdanov, Yushkevich and Co.: are they which hitherto had been accounted non-disintegrable and a copy of objective rcality, of moving matter, or are they because of the discovery of heretofore unknown forms of only a "methodology," a "pue symbol," mere "forms of material motion. organisation of experience"?) Riicker agrees that in practice there may prove to be no difierence belween the two theo- ties; the direction of a river can be determined as well by 4. THE TWO TRENDS IN MODERN PHYSICS, one who examines only the blue streak on a map or. diagram AND ENGLISH SPIRITUALISM as by one who koows that this streak represents a real rivet. Theory, from the standpoint of a convenient fiction, will In order to illustrate concretely the philosophical battle be an "aid to memory," a means of "producing order" in raging in present-day literature over the various conclusions our observations in accotdance with some artificial system, drawn from the new physics, we shall let certain of the direct ol "arcangirtg our knowledge," reducing it to equations, etc. participants in the "fr.ay" speak for themselves, and we shall 'We confine ourselves to declaring heat to begin with the English. The physicist Arthur !7. Riicker can, for instance, motion or energy, thus exchanging "a vivid defends one trend from the standpoint of the natural be a form o[ - conception of moving atoms for a colourless statement of scientist; the philosopher James Ward another trend from - not attempt to the standpoint of epistemology. heat energy, the real nature of which we do At the meeting of the British Association held in Glasgow * The Btitish Association at Glasgow, r9or. Presidential Address by in r9or, A. IJf. Riicker, the president of the physics section, Professor Atthur 17. Riicker, in Tbe Scientific Ameilcan. Supplement, chose as the subject of his address the question of the value r9or, Nos. ry4y and t146. 330 RECENT REVoI,UTIoN IN NATURAL SCIENCE Two TRENDS, AND ENGLISH SPIRITUALISM 331 define." While fully recognising the possibility of achieving no ground for denying a priori the evicleoce of experiment's great scientific successes by this method, Riicker "ventures slrowing that "quasi-material substances" exist r*-hich differ to assert that the exposition of such a systcm of tactics can- (r:om orclinary mattff (atoms and ettrer). Farticular errors not be regarded as the last word of science in the struggle are here inevitable, but the aggregate of scientific data leaves for the truth." The questions still force themselves upon us: no room for doubting the existence of atorns and molecules. "Can we argue back from the phenomenon displayed by ltiicker then refers to the new data on the structure of matter to the constitution of. matter. itself ; r.vhether we have atoms, which consist of corpuscles (electrons) charged with any reason to believe that the sketch which science has al- tregative electricity, and notes the similarities in the resuits ready drawn is to some exteltt a copy, and not a mere dia- o[ various experiments and caiculations on the size of mole- gram of the truth?" cules: the "first approximation" gives a diameter of about Analysing the problern of the structure of matter, Riicker roo millimicrons (millionttrs of a rnrlllimetre). Otritting takes air as an exalnple, saying that it consists of gases and Riicker's particular remarks and his criticism of neo-vitalism, that science resolves "an elementaty gas into a mixture of we quote his conclusions: atoms and ether. . . . There are those who cry 'Halt'; mole- "T'hose who belittle the ideas v,rhich have of late governed cules and atoms cannot be direcdy perceived; they are mere the advance of scientific theory, too often assume that there conceptions, which have their uses, but cannot be regarded is no alternative between the opposing assertions that atoms as realities." Rricker meets this objection by referring to one and the ether are mere figments of the scientific imagination, of numberless instances in the development of science: the anci that, on the other hand, a mechanical theory of the atoms rings of Saturn appeat to be a continuous mass when ob- and the ether, which is now confessedly imaertect, would, served thtough a tetrescope. T'he mathematicians proved by if it coulcl be perfected, give us a full and adequate repre- calculation that this is impossible and spect(al analysis cor- scntation of the underlying realities. For my part I believe roborated the conclusion reached on the basis of the calcula- that there is a oia media." A man in a dark room may dis- tions. Another obiection: properties are attributed to atoms cer:n obiects dimly, but if he does not stumble over the furni- and ether such as ou( seflses do not disclose in ordinary ture ancl does not walk into a looking-glass instead of through matter. Riicker answers this also, rcferiltg to such examples a door, it means that he sees some things correctly. There as the diffusion of gases and liquids, etc. A number of facts, is no need, therefore, either to renounce the claim to pene- observations and experiments prove that matter consists of trate betrow the surface of nature, or to claim that 'we have discrete particles or grains. Whether these particles, atoms, already fully unveiled the mystery of the world around us. are distinct from the surrounding "original medium" or "basic "It may be granted that uze have not yet framed a consistent medium" (ether), or whether they are parts of this medium image either of the nature of the atofils or of the ether in in a particular state, is still an open question, and hcs no which they exist, but I have tried to show that in spite of bearing on the theoty of the existence of atoms. There is the tentative nature of some of our theories, in spite of many IN NATURAL SCIE1 332 RECENT REVOLUTION Tlro TRENDS, AND ENGLTSH sprRrruAlrsM 333 lrany outstanding difiiculties, the atomic theory unifies so tions which science unconsciously fnakes."* True! The have facts, simplifies so much that is complicated, that we natural sciences unconsciously assume that their teachings a right to insist at all events until an equally intelligible rcflect objective rcality, and only such a philosophy is recon- - structure of rival hypothesis is produced that the main cilable with the natural sciences !" Not so with Natural- - ptzzled our theory is true; that atoms are not merely aids to ism, which is as innocent of any theory of knowledge as mathematicians, but physical realities." science itself. In fact Naturalism, like Materialism, is only That is how Riicker ended his address. The reader will physics treated as metaphysics. Naturalism is less dog- see that the speaker did not deal with epistemology, but as matic than Materialism, no doubt, owing to its agnostic a matter of. f.act, doubtless in the name of a host of scientists, reservation as to the nature of ultimate rcality; but it insists he was essentially expounding an instinctive materialist emphatically on the priority of the material aspect of its standpoint. The gist of his position is this: The theory of Unknowable." physics is a copy (becoming ever more exact) of obiective The materialist treats physics as metaphysics ! A familiar reality. The wodd is mattet in motion, our knowledge of argument. By metaphysics is meant the recognition of an which grows ever more profound. The inaccuracies of objective reality outside man. The spiritualists agree with Rticker's philosophy are due to an unnecessary defence of the Kantians and Humeans in such reproaches against ma- the "mechanical" (why not electromagnetic?) theory of ether terialism. This is understandable; for without doing away motions and to a tailtrc to understand the relation between with the objectioe reality of things, bodies and oblects known relative and absolute truth. This physicist lacks only a knowl- to everyone, it is impossible to clear the road for "real con- (if count, of edge of dialectical materialism we do not ceptions" in Rehmke's sense ! . course, those very important social considerations which in- "!7hen the essentially philosophical question, how best to duce English professors to call themselves "agnostics"). systematise experience as a whole [a plagiarism from Bog- Let us now see how the spiritualist James Ward criticised danov, Mr. \Ward!], arises, the naturalist . contends that this philosophy: "Naturalism is not science, and the mechan- we must begin from the physical side. Then only are the ical theory of Nature, the theory which serves as its founda- facts precise, determinate, and rigorously concatenated: every tion, is no science either. . . . Nevertheless, though Naturalism thought that ever stirred the human heart . . . cai, it holds, and the natural sciences, the Mechanical Theory of the Uni- be traced to a perfectly definite redistribution of matter and yet verse and mechanics as a science are logically distinct, motion. . . . That propositions of such philosophic generality historically arc the two are at first sight very similar and and scope are legitimate deductions from physical science, sciences and very closely connected. Between the natural Iew, lf. any, of our modern physicists are bold enough directly (or type there is philosophies of the idealist spiritualist) to maintain. But many of them consider that their science indeed no danger of confusion, for all such philosophies epistemological assump- necessarily involve criticism of the *James Ward, Naturalism and Agnosticism, 19o6, Vol. I, p. 1o3. 334 RECENT REvoLUTIoN IN NATURAL SCIENCB T!(o TRENDS, AND ENGr.rsH sprRITUALrsM 335 itself is attacked by those who seck to lay bate the latent ir.nmcflse, end in this rcspect the question which is right metaphysics, the physical realism, on which the Mechanical Irccomcs important." Theory of the Universe rests. The criticism of this T'he question is put by this frank and consistent spriritualist theory in the preceding lectures has been so regarded [by r.vith rcmarkable truth and clarity. Indeed, the difference Riicker]. . . . In point of fact my criticism [of this "rnetaphys- l)cLween the two schoois in modern physics is only philo- ics," so detested by all the Machians too] rests throughout sophical, only epistemological. trndeed, the basic distinction on the expositions of a school of physicists - if one might is only that onc recognises the "ultimate" (he shoulcl have call them so - steadily increasing in number and influence, snid ob)ective) re.'rlity reflected by our theory, while the who reject entirely the almost medieval realism. This other denies it, regarding theory as only a systematisation realisrn has remained so long unquestioned, that to chalienge of experience, a sJrstem o[ empirio-symbols, and so on and it now secms to many to spell scientiGc anarchy. And yet so forth. 'Ihe nery physics, having found new aspects of it surely verges on extravagance to suppose that men like mattet and ncr.v forms of its rnotion, raised the old philo- I(irchhoff or Poincar6 - to mention only two out of many sophical questions because of the collapse of the old physical distinguished names - who do challenge it, are seeking 'to concepts. And if the pecple belonging to "intermediate" invalidate the methods of science.' . . . To distinguish them philosophical trends ("positivists," Humeafls, Machians) are from the old school, whorn we may faidy terrn physical unable to put the question at issue distinctly, it rernained realists, we might call the new school physical symbolists. for the outspoken idealist !flard to tear off all r.eils. The term is flot very h^ppy, but it may at least se(ve to em- " . . . Sir A. W. R.iicker . . . devoted his Inaugural Address phasise the one difference between the two which now spe- to a defence of physical realism against the symbolic inter- cially concerfls us. The question at issue is very sirnple. pretatiolls recently advocated by Professors Poincar6 and Both schools statt, of course, frc,m the same perceptual ex- Poynting and by myself" (pp. 3o5-o6; and in other parts of periences; both employ an abstract conceptual system, difrer l'ris book lVard adds to this list the names of Duhem, trrearson ing in detail but essentially the same; both resort to the same aud Mach; see Vol. II, pp. t6r,63,57,75,83, etc.). methods of verification. But the one believes that it is get- He [Rticker] is constantly talking of 'mental pic- ting nearer to the ultimate rcality and leaving mere appea(- tures,' while constantly protesting that atoms and ether must ances behind it; the other believes that it is only substituting bc more than these. Such procedure practically amounts to a generalised descriptive scheme that is intellectually manage- saying: In this case I can form no other picture, and there- able, for the complexity of concrete facts. In either fore the reality must be like it. . . . He [R.ricker] is fair view the rralue of physics as systematic knotr,tredge about cnough to allow the abstract possibility of a different rnental [rff/ard's itatrics] things is unaffected; its possibilities of future picture. Nay, he aLlows 'the tentative nature of some extension anctr of pffictical application are in either case of our theories'; he admits 'many outstancling difiiculties.' the sarne. But the speculative difierence between the two is Aftcr all, then, hc is only clefending a working hypothesis, 336 RECENT REVOLUTION IN NATURAL SCIENCE T\0o TRENDS, AND ENGLTSH SPIRITUALISM 337 and one, moreover, that has lost greatly in prestige in the Among the other points on which Ward connects his epis- last half century. But if the atornic and other theories of tcmology with the "new" physics must be counted his deter- the constitution of matter are but working hypotheses, and mined attack on ruatter. W'hat is matter and what is energy? \Ward, hypotheses strictly confined to physical phenomena, there is - asks rnocking at the plethora of hypotheses and their no iustification for a theory which maintains that mechanism contradictoriness. Is it ether or ethers? - or, perhaps, some is fundamental everywhere and reduces the facts of life and new "petfect fluid," arbitrarily endowed with new and improbable qualities? " we mind to epiphenomena - makes them, that is to say, a degree And Ward's conclusion is: . , more phenomenal, a degree less real than matter and motion. find nothing definite except movement left. Heat is a mode Such is the mechanical theory of the univetse. Save as he of motion, elasticity is a mode of motion, light and magnetism seems unwittingly to countenance that, we have then no are modes of motion. Nay, mass itself is, in the end, sup- quarrel with Sir Arthur Riicker" (pp. lr+rl). posed to be but a mode of motion of a something that is It is, of course, utterly absurd to say that materialism ever neither solid, nor liquid nor gas, that is neither itself a body maintained that consciousness is "less" real, or necessarily nor afl aggtegate of bodies, that is not phenomenal and professed a "mechanical," and not an electromagnetic, ot must not be noumenal, a veritable apeiron [a term used by some other, immeasurably more complcx, pictute of the world the Greek philosophers signifying: infinite, boundless] on of mooing nxatter. But in a truly adroit manncr, much more which we can impose our own terms" (Vol. I, p.l'4o). skilfully than our Machians (i.e., m,tddled idealists), the The spiritualist is true to himself when he divorces motion outspoken and straightforwatd idealist Ward seizes upon the from matter. The movement of bodies is transformed in na- weak points in "instinctive" natural-historical materialism, ture into a movement of something that is not a body with a as, for instance, its inability to explain the relation of relative constant mass, into a movement of an unknown charge of and absolute truth. W'ard turns somersaults and declares an unknown electricity in an unknown ether - this dialectics that sioce truth is relative, approximate, only "tentative," of material transformation, performed in the laboratory and it cannot reflect reality! But, on the other hand, the question in the factory, serves in the eyes of the idealist (as in the eyes of atoms, etc,, as "a working hypothesis" is very correctly of the public at large, and of the Machians) not as a cofl- put by the spiritualist. Modern, cultured fideism (which firmation of materialist dialectics, but as evidence against \ffard directly deduces from his spiritualism) does not tbink materialism: " ... The mechanical theory, as a professed of dentanding anything more than the declaration that the explanation of the world, receives its death-blow from the concepts of natural science are "working hypotheses." !7e progress of mechanical physics itself" (p. r43). The world is will, sirs, surtender science to you scientists provided you matter in motion, we reply, and the laws of its motion are surrender epistemology, philosophy to us - such is the con- reflected by mechanics in the case of moderate velocities and dition for the cohabitation of the theologians and professors by the electromagnetic theory in the case of great velocities. in the "advanced" capitalist countries. "Extended, solid, indestructible atoms have always been the 338 RECENT REVOLUTION IN NATURAL SCIENCE T\VO'IRENDS, AND GERMAN IDEALISM 339 stronghold of materialistic views of ttre universe. But, un- symbols of the sum of existence. \We can never get to happily for such views, the hard, extended atom v/as not God through a mere mechanism" (p. r8o). equal to the demands which increasing knowledge made upon $i/ell, well, this is exactly in the spirit of the Studies "in" it" (p. Uq). The destructibility of the atom, its inexhaustibil- tlLe Pbilosopby ol Marxism! Mr. rWard, you ought to address ity, the mutability of all forms of matter and of its motion, yourself to Lunacharsky, Yushkevich, Bazarov and Bogdanov. 'I'hey have always been the stronghold of dialectical materialism. are a little more "shamefaced" than you are, but they All boundaries in nature are conditional, relative, movable, preach the same doctrine. and express the gradual approximatlion of our mind torvards the knowledge of natter. But this does not in any way prove that nature, matter itself, is a symbol, a conventional 5. THE TWO TRENDS IN MODERN PHYSICS, sign, i.e., the product of our mind. The electron is to the AND GERA4AN IDEALISM atom as a full stop in this book is to the size of a building zoo feet long, roo feet broad, and yo feet high (Lodge); it In fi96, the well-known Kantian idealist Hermann Cohen, with unusually triumphant exultation, moves with a velocity as high as 27o,ooo kilometres per wrote an introduction to the fifth edition of the Gescbicbte des Materialistnus, the second; its rnass is a function of its velocity; it makes;oo falsified history of materialism written by F. Albert Lange. trillion revolutions in a second all this is much more com- - "Theoretical idealism," exclaims Cohen (p. xxvi), "has al- plicated than the old mechanics; but it is, ne.vertheless, rnove- ready begun to shake the materialism of the natural scien- ment of matter in space and time. Human reason has dis- tists, and perhaps in only a little while will defeat it com- covered many amazing things in nature and will discover pletely." Idealism is permeating (Durcboirkung) the rrew still more, and thereby increase its power over nature. will physics. "Atomism must give place to dynanrism. . " "It creation our But this does not mean that nature is the of is a remarkable turn of afiairs that tesearch into the chemical nrind or of abstract mind, i.e., of l7ard's God, Eogdanov's problem of substarce should have led to a fundamental etc. ."substitution," triumph over the materialist view of fiiatter. Just as Thales "Rigorously caried out as a theory of the teal world, that performed the first abstraction of the idea of. substance, and ideal li..e., the ideal of "mechanism"] lands us in nihilism: linked it with speculations on the electron, so the theory all changes a(e motions, for motions are the only changes of electricity was des[ined to cause the greatest revolution \rze can understand, aod so what moves, to be understood, in the conception of fiatter and, through the transformation must itself be motion" (p. fi6). "As I have tried to show, of matter into force, bring about the victory of idealism" and as I believe, the very advance of physics is proving the (p. xxix). most efiectual cure for this ignotant Iaith in matter and Flermann Cohen is as clear and definite as James Ward motion as the inmost substance rather than the most abstract in pointing out the fundamental philosophical trends, and 340 RECENT REVOLUTION IN NATURAL SCIENCE Two rRENDs, AND GERMAN TDEALTSM 341 does not lose himself (as our Machians do) in petty distinc- This strange dispute as to robere Hertz belongs is a good tions between this and that energeticist, symbolist, empirio- cxample of how the idealist phiiosophers seize on the minutest criticist, empirio-monist idealism, and so forth. Cohen takes error, the slightest vagueness of expressioo on the part of the lundamerutal philosophical trend of the school of physics renowned scientists in order to justify their refurbished de- that is now associated with the names of Mach, Poincare and fence of fideism. As a matter of fact, Hertz's philosophical others and correctly describes this trend as idealist. "The preface to his Mecbanik* displays the usual standpoint transformation of matter into force" is here for Cohen the of the scientist who has been intimidated by the professorial most important triumph of idealism, lust as it was for the hue and cry against the "metaphysics" of materialism, but "ghost-seeing" scientists - whom J. Dietzgen exposed in who nevertheless cannot overcome his instinctive conviction fi69. Electricity is proclaimed a collaborator of idealism, of the reality of the external world. This has been acknowl- because it has destroyed the old theory of the structure of edged by Kleinpeter himself, who on the one hand casts to matter, shattered the atom and discovered new forms of the mass of readers thoroughly false popularly-written material motion, so unlike the old, so totally uninvestigated pamphlets on the theory of knorvledge of natural science, in and unstudied, so unusual and "miraculous," that it permits which Mach figures side by side with Hertz, while on the nature to be presented as non-mateilal (spiritual, mental, other, in specifically philosophical articles, he admits that psychical) motion. Yesterday's limit to our knowledge of the "IJ.ertz, as opposed to Mach and Pearson, still clings to the infinitesimal particles of matter has disappeared, hence preiudice that all physics can be explained in a mechanistic - way,"x{' that he retains the concept of the thing-in-itself concludes the idealist philosopher - matter has disappeared (but thought remains). Every physicist and every engineer and "the usual standpoint of the physicists," and that Hertz knows that electricity is (material) motion, but nobody knows still adheres to "a picture of the universe in itself," and so clearly u:hat is moving, hence concludes the idealist philos- 6n.*** - It is interesting to note Hertz's view of energetics. He opher - we can dupe the philosophically uneducated with the seductively "economical" proposition: let ts conceioe writes: "If we inquire into the real reason why physics at prefers motion roithout ftzatter. . . the present time to express itself in terms of encr- Hermann Cohen tries to enlist the famous physicist Hein- getics, we rnay answer that it is because in this way it best rich Hertz as his ally. Hettz is ours he is a Kantian, we avoids talking about things of which it knows very litt1e. . . . - ponderable sometimes find him admitting the a priori, he says. Hettz Of course, we are now convinced that matter is ours, he is a Machian contends the Machian Kleinpeter - * Fleinriclr Hcttz, Gesamfltelte tMerke, Bd. III, Lcipzig, 1894, esp. glimpses of "the same subiectivist - for in Hertz we have S. t, z, q9. case Mach."* view of the nature of our conccpts as in the of ** Kantsludien, VIII, Band, r9o3, S. 3o9. *+*Tbe Monist, Yol. XVI, 19o6, No. z, p. fi4; an article on Mach's * Arcbio lrit systematiscbe Pbilosopbie, Bd. V, r898-99, S. r69-7o. "Monism." 342 RECENT REvoLUTIoN IN NATURAL SCIENCE Tlro TRENDS, AND GERMAN TDEALISM 343

consists of atoms; and in certain cases we have fairly definite tcrested in the specific arguments of tire author in favour of ideas of the magnitude of these atoms and of their motions. lris own variety of ideaiism. For us it is important only to But the form of the atoms, their connection, their motions point out that this idealist notes the same phenomena as in most cases, all these are entirely hidden from us. . So Rey, Ward and Cohen. "Modern physics had grown up on that our conception of atoms is therefore in itself an im- a realist basis," says Hartmann, "and it rvas only the Neo- portant and interesting object for further investigations, but I(antian and agnostic movement of our own time that led is not particularly adapted to serve as a known afld secure it to re-interpret its data io an idealist spirit" (p. zr8). foundation for mathematical theories" (op. cit., Yol. III, p. According to Hartmann, three epistemological systems con- 2t). Hertz expected that further study of the ether would stitute the basis of modern physics - hylo-kinetics (from the provide an explanation of the "nature of traditional matter Greek hyle - fiiatter, and kinesis - motion - i,e., the rec- ... its inertia and gtavitational force" (Vol. I, p. 1.r). ognition of physical phenomena as matter in motion), ener- It is evident from this that the possibility of a non-mate- getics, and dynamism (i.e., the recognition of force without rialist view of energy did not even occur to Hettz. Energetics substance). Of course, the idealist Hartrnann favours "dyna- served the philosophers as an excuse to desert materialisrn tlism," frorn which he draws the conclusion that the laws for idealism. The scientist regards energetics as a convenient o[ nature are world-thought, in a wo(d, he "substitutes'n the method of expressing the larvs of material motion at a pedod psychical for physical nature. But he is forced to admit that when, if we may so express it, physicists had left the atom hylo-kinetics has the majority of physicists on its side, that but had not yet arrived at the electron. This period is to a it is the system that "is most frequently employed" (p. ,9o), large extent not yet at an end; one hypothesis yields place that its scric'us defect is "materialism and atheism, which to another; nothing whatever is known of the positive elec- threaten frorn purc hyloJcinctics" (p. r8S). This author quite tron; only three months ago (June zz, rgo}), Jean Becquerel iustly regards energetics as an intermediary system and calls reported to the French Academy of Science that he had suc- it agnosticism (p. 136). Of course, it is an "aily of purc ceeded in discovering this "new cornponent part of matter" dynarnism, for it dethrones substance" (pp. vi, t9z), b:ut (Comptes rendus des siances d.e l'Acaditnie cles Sciences, p. Hartmann dislikes its agnosticism as a form of ".Anglomania," r3rr). How could idealist philosophy rcfrain from taking ad- which is incompatible with the genuine idealism of a true- vantage of such an opportunity, when "natter" was still being German reactionary. "sought" by the human mind and was therefore no more It is highly instructive to see how this irreconcilable partisan than a "syrnbol," etc, idealist (non-partisans in philosophy are iust as hopelessly Another Getman idealist, one far more reactionary than thick-headecl as they are in politics) explains to the physicists Cohen, Eduard von tr-Iartmann, devoted a whole book to the rvhat it rneans to follow one epistemological trend or aflother. world outlook of modern physics (Die Weltaitscbauung der "Only a very few of the physicists who follow this fashion," 'W'e modernen Pbysik, Leipzig, tgoz). are, of course, not in- vrrites Flartmann in reference to the idealist interpretation scl 344 RECENT REvoLUTIoN IN NATURAI- Two rRENDs, AND GERMAN IDEALISM 345 of the latest results in physics, "realise the full scope and Among the German physicists, Ludwig Boltzmann, who have failed implications of such an interpretation. They died in 19o6, systematically combated the Machian tendency' to observe that physics with its spccific laws has retained Wc have aheady pointed out that as against those who were ad- significance only in so fat as, despite its idealism, it has "carried away by the new epistemological dogmas" he simply hered to rea!,istic basic propositions, z;iZ., the existence of and clearly reduced Machism to solipsism (see abovc, Chap' things-in-themselves, real mutability in time, real cau- a their I, S 6). Boltzmann, of course, was afraid to call himself sality. Only by granting these realistic premises (the materialist and even explicitly stated that he did not deny transcendental validity of causality, time and three-dimen- the existence of God.* But his theory of knowledge is essen- sional space) , i..e., only on the condition that nature, of whose tially materialistic, and expresses - as is admitted by S. laws physics speaks, coincides with a . . . realm of things-in- Giinther,** the historian of natural science in the nineteenth themselves, can one speak of natural laws as distinct ftom century - the views of the maiority of scientists. "We psychological laws. Only if natural la',vs operate in a realm know," says Boltzmann, "of the existence of all things solely independent of our mind can they serve as an explanation from the impressions they make on ou( senses" (op. cit., p' 2il' of the fact that the logically necessary effects of our images Theory is an "image" (or copy) of fiatlure, of the external are always images of the natural-historically necessary efiects world (p. 77). To those who say that matter is only a com- of the unknown which they reflect or symbolise in our con- plex of sense-perceptions, Boltzmann points out that in that sciousness" (pp. zr8-r9). case other people are only the sensations of the speaker (p. Hartmann rightly feels that the idealism of the new physics r6s). These "ideologues," as Boltzmann sometimes calls the "subiective picture is nothing but a fasbion, artd not a serious philosophical philosophical idealists, present us with a turfl away from natural-historical materialism; and he, thereof the world" (p. ,76), whereas the author prefers a "simpler [ore, correctly explaios to the physicists that in otder to obiective picture of the world." "The idealist compares the with transform the "fashion" into consistent, integral philosophical assertion that matter exists as weil as our sensations experiences idealism it is necessary radically to modify the doctrine of the child's opinion that a stone which is beaten that one cannot the objective reality of time, space, causality and natural pain. The realist compares the assertion can be formed from the material, larv. We cannot regard only atoms, electrons and ether as ionceive how the mental play atoms, with the opinion of an mere symbols, as a mere "working hypothesis": time, space, or even from the of person who asserts that the distance between the the laws of nature and the whole external world must also uneducated cannot be twenty million miles, fot he be proclaimed a "working hypothesis." Eithcr materialism, sun and the earth or the universal substitution of the psychical for the whole * Ludwig Boltzmann, Populdre Schriften, Leipzig, r9o5, S' r87' of physical nature; those anxious to confound the two are ** Siegmund Giinther, Gescbichte der anorganischen Nature'issen- legion, but we and Bogdanov are not of their number. scltaflen im t9. labrl:rudert lHistory of tbe Inorganic Sciences in tbe Nineteen.tb Centurl'f , Betlin, r9or, S. 942 uncl 94r' 346 RECENT REVor-urIoN IN NATURAL sclENcE T'i(o TRENDS, AND GERMAN IDEALISM 347 cannot conceive it" (p. 186). Boltzmann does not deny that entertain illusions as to the significance of a difierential the ideal of science is to present mind and volition as "com- cquation . . we cannot doubt that this picture of the world plex actions of particles of matter" (p. gg6). (expressed in differential equations) must again by its nature L. Bokzmann frequently poiemicised against Ostwald's be an atomic one, i.e., an instruction that the changes in energetics from the standpoint of a physicist, and argued that time of a vast quantity of things arc.anged in three-dimen- Ostwald could neither disprove nor eliminate the formula sional space must be thought of in accordance with definite of kinetic energy (half the mass multiplied by the square rules. The things can, of course, be similar or dissimilar, of velocity) and that he was revolving in a vicious circle by unchangeable or changeable," etc. (p. ,t6). "If we ar.e per- first deducing energy from mass (by accepting the formula fectly clear," said Boltzmann in an address delivered to the of kinetic energy) and then deEning mass as energy (pp. Congress of Scientists held in Munich in 1899, "that the lz, ry9). T'his reminds me of Bogdanov's paraphrase of Mach phenomenalists cloaked in dificrential equations likewise base in the third book of his Entpirio-Monisrn. "In science," writes themselves on atom-like discrete urits (EinTelaesen) which Bogdanov in reference to Mach's Mecbanik,lrt "the concept they have to picture as possessing now ceftair, p(operties matter is reduced to the coefficient of mass as it appears now others for each group of phenomena, the need for a in the equations of mechanics; upon accurate analysis, how- simplified, uniform atomism will soon again be telt" (p. z4). ever, the coeflicient of mass proves to be the reciprocal of The electron theoty "is developing into an atomic theory of the acceleration when two physical body-complexes interact" etrectricity as a whole" (p. liZ). The unity of nature is re- (p. ry6). It is evident that if a certain body is taken as a vealed in the "astonishing analogy" between the differential unit, the motion (mechanical) of all other bodies can be equations of the various realms of phenomena. "The same expresscd as a mere relation of acceleration. But this does equations can be rcgarded as solving the problems of hydro- not at all mean that "bodies" (i.e., matter) disappear or cease dynamics and of the theory of potentials. The theory of to exist independently of our mind. VThen the wirole world vortices in fluids and the theory of friction in gases (Gasrei- is reduced to the movement o[ elecrrons, it will be possible bung) reveal a most astonishing analogy to the theory of elec- to eliminate the electron from all equations, because it will tromagnetism, etc." (p.7). Those who accept "the theory of 'Who be everywhere assumed, and the correlation between groups universal substitution" cannot escape the question: was or aggregates of electrons wiltr reduce itself to their mutual it that thought of "substituting" physical nature so uniformly? acceleration, if the forms of rnotion prove to be as simple As if in answer to those who brush aside "the physicist as those of mechanics. of the old school," Boltzmann relates in detail how certain Combating the "phenornenalist" physics of Mach and Ca., specialists in "physical chemistry" are adopting an episte- Boltzmann maintained that "those who believe atomism to mological position contrary to that of Machism. Vaubel, the have been eliminated by differential equations, cannot see author of "ooe of the best" comprehensive works of r9o3 the wood for the trees" (p. r44). "If we do not wish to (according to Boltzrnann), "takes up a definitely hostile atti- 348 RECENT REVOLUTION IN NATURAL SCI lNDs, AND FRENCH FrDErsM 341) tude towards the so-called phenomenalism so often recom- 6. THE TWO TRENDS IN MODERN PHYSICS, mended today" (p. lSr). "He tries rather to obtain as con- AND FRENCH FIDEISM crete and clear an idea as possible of the nature of atoms and molecules and of the forces and agencies acting berween In France, idealist philosophy has seized upon the vacilla- them, and this idea he attempts to bring into conformity with tions of Machian physics with no less determination. We have the most receflt experiments in this field [ions, electrons, akeady seen how the neo-criticists greeted Mach's Mecbanik radium, Zeeman effect, etc.] . . . . The author strictly adheres and how they immediately discerned the idealist character to the dualism of matter and energy,* which have this in of the principles of Mach's philosophy. The French Machian, common that each has a special law of conservation. In Flenri Poincar€, was even more successful in this respect. rcgard to matter, the author also holds fast to the dualism The most reactionary idealist philosophy, the implications between ponderable matter. and ether, yet regards the latter of which were definitely fideistic, immediately seized upon as material in the strictest sense" (p. aSr). In the second his theory. An adherent of this philosophy, Le Roy, argued volume of his work (theory of electricity) the author "from thus: the truths of science are convefltional signs, symbols; the very outset takes the view that the phenomena of elec- you have abandoned the absurd, "metaphysical" claims to tricity are determined by the interaction and movement of knowledge of objective reality - well then, be logical and atom-like entities, the electrons" (p. l8l). agree with us that science has practical significance only Hence, we find that what the spiritualist James Ward for one sphere of human activity and that religion has a no admitted to be true of England applies also to Germany, less real significance for another sphere of activity; "sym- namely, that the physicists of the realistic school systematise bolic," Machian science has no right to deny theology. H. the facts and discoveries of recent years no less successfully Poincar6 was abashed by these conclusions and in his book than the physicists of the symbolist school and that the essen- La oaleur de la sci.ence made a special attack on them. But tial difierence between them consists "only" in their episte- just see usbat epistemological position he was obliged to adopt mological points of view.** in order to rid himself of allies of the type of Le Roy. He

* Boltzmann wishes to say that the authot does not attempt to con- materialism, the author devotes his work to a defence and interpretation ceive motion without matter, To spcak of dualism here is ridiculous, of the fundamental premises of physics and chemistry. This defence Philosophical monism and dualism consist respectively in a consistcnt ot naturally becomes converted into a fight against the fashionable but inconsistent adherence to materialism or idealism. incteasingly-resisted Machian trend in physics (cl. p. 9r, etc.). E. Becher ** The work of Erich Bechet Pbilosopbical Premises ol the Exact correctly characterises this tendency zs "subjectizse positizsism" (p. iii) and Sciences (Pbilosopbisehe VoruussetT,ungen der exakten Natunoissenscbat'ten, reduces the central point of his objection to it to a proof of the "hypo- Leipzig, r9o7), with which I became acquainted only after my book had thesis" of the external world (Chapters II-V[), to a proof of its "existence been completed, confirms what has been said in this paragraph. Holding independently of human petceptions" (aom Vahgenommenoerden unab- closest of all to the epistemological point of view of Helmholtz and hdngige Exiaenx). The denial of this "hypothesis" by the Machians .rr1"* Boltzmann, that is, to a "shamefaced" and incompletely thought-out frequently leads the latter to solipsism (pp. Z8-Sz, etc.). l'M".lr'r 350 RE]CENT REVOLUTION IN NATURAL SCIENCE 1'!(IO TRENDS, AND FRENCH FIDEISM 3s1 writes: "N4. I-e li-oy regarcls the intellect as incurably irn- iprouoer) appear to be united by some sort of indestructible potent only in order to give greater place to other sources of cement and not by an ephemeral accidetrt" (pp. 269-7o). knowledge, for instance, the heart, scntl'ment, instinct and The author of such a remark may well be a great pbysi- faith" (pp. zt4t5). "I do not go to the lirnil," he says. cist, but it is absolutely indisputable that only the Voroshi- Scientific larvs are conventions, symbols, but "if scientific lov-Yushkeviches can take him seriously as a philosopher. 'recipes' have a value as rules of action, it is because we Materialism is declared to have been destroyed by a "theory" know that, in general at least, they are successful. But to wtrich at the first onslaught of fideism takes refwge under know this is alreacly to know something; and if so, how tbe rtoing of materialism! For it is the purest materialism to can you say that we cafl know nothing?" (p. zt9). say that sensations are evoked in us by real objects and that H. Foincare resorts to the criterion of practice. But he "belief" in the objectivity of science is the same as "belief" only shifts the question without settling it; for this crite- in the objective existence of external objects. rion may be interpreted in a subiective as well as in an ob- ". It can be said, for instance, that ether has no less jective way. Le R.oy also admits this criterion for science reality than any external body" (p. z7o). rWhat and industry; all he denies is that this criterion proves ob- an outcry our Machians would have raised had a jectizte truth, for such a denial suffices him fot admitting the materialist sar'.d that! How many feeble witticisms would subjective truth of reiigion along with the subjective truth have been uttered at the expense of "ethereal materialism," of science (i.e.,as not existing apartfrom mankind). Poincar6 and so forth. But five pages later the founder of recent em- realises that one cannot limit oneself to a reference to prac- pirio-symbolism declares: "Everything that is not thought is tice in arguing against Le Roy, and he passes to the question pure nothing, since we can think nothing but thought" of the obiectivity of science. "'What is the criterion of its (p. z16). You are mistaken, M. Poincar6; your r,vorks prove obiectivity? \)(e11, it is exactly the same as the criterion of that there are people who can only think u,hat is entirely our belief in external objects. These obiects are real inas- devoid of thought. To this class of people belongs the notor- much as the sensatiofls they evoke in w (qu'ils nous lont ious muddler, Georges Sorel, who maintains that the "first that sensations and complcxes of sensations, and not the external world" lepistemologies. We must now and refined, leads us to necessity and to truth" (p. 398). see how the positivist Rey solves a problem which is diamet- There is no doubt that all Machism, in the broad sense of opposed that broached by the spiritualist rically to James the term, is nothing but a distortion, by means of impercep- 'Ward and the idealists Cohen and Hartmann, the problem, tible nuances, of the real meaning of the word "experience" ! upon philosophical mistakes the namely, not of seizing the of But how does Rey, who accuses only thc fideists of distor- new physics, its leanings towards idealism, but o[ rectifying tion, but not Mach himself, correct this distortion? Listen. these mistakes and of proving the illegitimacy of the idealist "Experience is by definition a knowledge of the object. In (and fideist) couclusions drawn from the new physics. physical science this definition is more in place than any- A thread that runs through the whole of Rey's work is where else. Experience is that over which our mind has the recognition of the fact that the new physical theory of no command, that which our desires, our volition, caflnot the "conceptualists" (Machians) has been seized upon by control, that which is given and which is not of our ov/n fideism (pp. ,r, tj, 2zo, 162, etc.) and "pbilosopbical ideal- making. Experience is the obiect that faces (en lace du) the istn" (p. zoo), scepticism as to the rights of the intellect and subfect" (p. y+). the rights of science (pp. zto, zzo), subiectivism (p. 1u), and Flere you have an example of how Rey defends Mach- so forth. Therefore, Rey quitc rightly makes the analysis ism! lfhat peoetrating genius Engels revealed when he 354 RECENT REvoLUTIoN IN NATURAL SCIENCE .ENDS, AND FRENCH FIDEISM 355 dubbed the latest type of adherents of philosophical agnosti- tivity of science, from the recognition of objective reality cism and phenomenalism "shamefaced materialists." The rc{lected by science, whereas idealism needs "detours" in positivist and ardent phenomenalist, Rey, is a superb speci- order, in one way or another, to "deduce" objectivity frorn men of this type. If experience is "knowledge of the obiect," mind, consciousness, the "psychic." "The neo-rnechanist li.e., if "experience is the obfect that faces the subject," if experi- tlrc prevailing] sclaool in physics," says Rey, "belieoes in ence means that "something external (qwelque cbose da de- tl.te reality of the physical theory iust as humanity belieoes hors) exists and neccssarily exists" (se pose et en se posdnt in tbe realitl of the external wodd" (p. 214, $ zz: Thesis). Iior this school "theory airns at being a copy (le ddcatque) s'itnpose - p. j2D, this obviously amounts to materialism! Rey's phenomenalism, his ardent and emphatic assertion of the object" (p. ,l). that nothing exists save sensations, that the obiective is that True. And this fundarnental trart of the "neo-mechanist" sctrool is nothing but the basis of materialist epistemology. which is genenlly vaiid, etc., etc. - ail this is only a frg-leaf, an empty verbal covering for mateilalism, since we are told: No attempts of Rey to dissociate hirnself from the materialists "The obiective is that which is given from without, that or to assure us that the neo-mechanists are also in essence phenornenalists, which is imposed (inaposd) by experience; it is that which is etc., can mitigate this basic fact. The es- not of out making, but which is made independently of us scoce of the difference between the neo-mechanists (ma- and which to a certain extent makes us" (p. 3zo). Rey de- tcrialists who are mo(e or tress shamefaced) and the Machians fends "conceptualism" by destroying conceptualisrn! The is that the latter depart from this theory of knowledge, and refutation of the idealist implications of Machism is achieved clcparting from it inevitably fall into fideism. only by interpreting Machism after the manner of shame- Tai

* The "conciliator," A, Rey, not only cast a veil over the formulation l)cnetrate into the knowledge of natural phenomena, the more does the of the question at issue as made by philosophical materialism but also bold Cartesian conception of the mechanism of the univetse unfold and ignored the most clearly expresscd matetialistic dechtations of the French tlcfine itself, namely, that in the physical world there is nothing save physicists. FIc did not mention, for example, Alfred Cotnu, who died rnatter and motion. The problem of the unity of physical forces . has in r9oz. That physicist met the Ostrvaldian "destruction [or conquesl, rgain come to the fore after the great discoveries vzhich matked the end Ueberu;indtng] of scientific matetialism" with a contemptuous temark o[ this century. Also the constant concern of our moder:n leadets, Faraday, rcgarding pretcntious jounralistic treatment of the qucstiot (see Reou.e A,[axrvell, IJertz (to mention only the illustrious deacl), was to define gdndrale des sciences, r89i, pp. ro3o-3r). At the international congtess of rrature more accurately and to unravel the properties ctf tlsir elusiae physicists held in Paris in r9oo, Cotnu said: !' . . . The deeper we natter (matiirc subtile), the receptrcle of u'orld energy. .fhe rcvcr- 360 RECENT REVoLUTToN rN NATURAL scrENcE A RUSSIAN "IDEALIST PHYSICIST'I 361

we acted on the object. Hence, this expectation or antici- issuc of Problents ot' Pbilosopby arzd, Psycbology,tls r9o7, and pation contains elements controlled by the obiect and by the is entitled "An trdealist Physicist." A "true-Russian" philo- action it undergoes. In these diverse theories thele is sophical idealist, Mr. Lopatin bears the same relation to thus a part of obiectivity" (p. l6e). This is a thoroughly the contemporary European idealists as, for example, the materialist, and only materialist, theory of knowledge, for "Union of the Russian People" does to the reactionaty par.- other points of view, and Machisrn in particular, deny that ties of the Iflest. All the more instructive is it, therefore, to the criterion of practice has objective signi.6cance, i.e., signifi.- see how similar philosophical trends manifest themselves cance that docs not depend upon man and mankind. in totally difierent cultural and social sufroufldings. Mr. To sum up, Rey approached the question frorn an angle Lopatin's article is, as the French say, an dloge - a eulogy - entirely different from that of Ward, Cohen, and Co., but of tl-re Russian physicist, the late N. I. Shishkin (died 19o6). he arrived at the same result, namely, the recognition that Mr. Lopatin was fascinated by the fact that this cultured the materialist and idealist trends form the basis of the divi- man, who was much interested ir Hertz and the new phys- sion between the two principal schools in modern physics. ics generally, was not only a Right-Wing Constitutional- Democrat (p. nil but a deeply religious mafl, a devotee of the philosophy of Vladimir Solovyov, and so on and so 7. A RUSSIAN "IDEALIST PHYSICIST" forth. However, in spite of the fact that his main line of "endeavour" lies in the bordedand between philosophy and the Owing to certain unfortunate conditions under which I police department, Mr. Lopatin has also furnished certair, am obliged to work, I have been almost entirely unable to material for a characterisation of the epistenzological views acquaint myself with the Russian literature of the subject of this idealist physicist. Mr. Lopatin writes: "He was a under discussion. I shall confine myself to an exposition genuine positivist in his tireless endeavour to give the broad- of an article that has an important bearing on my theme est possible criticism of the methods of investigation, sup- written by our notorious arch-reactionary philosopher, Mr. positions and facts of science from the standpoint of their Lopatin. The article appear.ed in the September-October suitability as means and matedal for the construction of an integral and perfected wortrd outlook. In this respect N. I. sion to Cartesian ideas is obvious. ." (Rapports prdsentis congris au Shishkin was the very antipode of many of his contempo- internntional de pblsique lReports Made at tbe International Pbltsics Congressf , Paris, r9oo, t. 4-me, p. 7.) Lucien Poincar6, in his book Modern raries. In previous articles of mine in this periodical, I have PLtlsics, iustly remarks thar this Cattesian idea was taken up and devel- frequently endeavoured to explain the heterogeneous and oped by the Encyclopaedists of the eighteenth cenary (La pbysique often shaky materials from which the so-called scientific ntod,erne, Paris, 19o6, p. r4). But neither this physicist nor A. Cornu They include established facts, knew that the dialectical materialists Marx and Engels had freed this world outlook is made up. fundamental premise of rnaterialism from the one-sidedness of necbanistic rnore or less bold generalisations, hypotheses that are cofl- materialism. venient at the given moment for ofle or another field of 362 RECENT REVOLUTION IN N,\TURAL SCIENCE A RUssrAN "IDEALrsr pHyslcIsr" 363

science, and everi auxiliary scientific fictions. And all this of scicnce. For him, therefore, the mechanical conception of is elevated to the dignity of incontrovertible obiective tturhs, rrature and the materialist view of nature by no means from the standpoint of which all other ideas and all other t:oincide." Exactly as in the case of the authors of the beliefs of a philosophical and religious nature must be Surdies "in" the Philosopby of Marxisml "Quite the con- iudged, and everything in them that is not indicated in these t:r:ary, it seerned to him that in questions of a higher order, truths must be rejected. Our highly talented natural scien- thc mechanical theory ought to take a very critical, even tist and thinker, Professor V. I. Vernadsky, has shown with a conciliatory attitude." exemplary clailty how shallow and unfounded are these In the larguage of the Machians this is called "overcom- claims to convert the scientific views of a given historical ing the obsolete, flarro\r and one-sided" opposition between period into an immobile, dogmatic system obligatory fot rnaterialism and idealism. "Questions of the first beginning all. And it is not only the broad reading public that is guilty and ultimate end of things, of the inner nature of out mind, of making such a conversion llootnote by Mr. Lopatinz of freedom of the will, the immortality of the soul and "For the broad public a number of popular books have been so forth, cannot in their full breadth of meaning come within written, the purpose of which is to foster the conviction that its scope - since as a methocl of investigation it is confined there exists such a scientific catechism providing an answer within the natural limits of its applicability solely to the to all questions. Typical works of this kind are Biichner's facts of physical experience" (p- l+r). The last two lines Force and Matter and Haeckel's The Riddle of tbe uni- are afl undoubted plagiarism from A. Bogdanov's Empirio- oerse"l and not only individual scientists in pafticular ruoni.rru. branches of science; what is even more strange is that this "Light can be regarded" - wrote Shishkin in his article sin is frequently committed by the ofiicial philosophers, all "Psycho-Physical Phenomena from the Standpoint of the of whose efiorts are at times directed only to proving that Mechanical Theory" (Problems ot' Pbilosopby and Psycbol- they are saying nothing but what has been said before them ogy, Bk. y p. :.z7) - "as substance, as motion, as electricity, by representatives of the several sciences, and that they are as sensation." only saying it in their own language. There is no doubt that Mr. Lopatin is absolutely right "N. I. Shishkin had no trace of prejudiced dogmatism. in ranking Shishkin among the positivists and that this He was a convinced champion of the mechanical explana- physicist belongeC body and soul to the Machian school of tion of the phenomena of natlue, but for him it u/as only the new physics. In his statemeflt or light, Shishkin means a method of investigation ." b. l+r). So, so . . a famil- to say that the various methods ol rcgarding light arc var iar refrain! "He was far from believing that the mechanical ious methods of "organising experience" (in A. Bogdanov's theory reveals the true flatu(e of the phenomena investigat- terminology), all equally legitimate from different points of ed; he regarded it only as the most convenient and fertile view, or that they are vatious "connections of elements" (in method of unifying and explaining them for the purposes Mach's terminology), and that, in any case, the physicists' 364 RECENT REVoLUTToN rN NATLIRAL scrENcE ESSINCE AND SIGNIFICANCE oF ,.PHYSICAL', IDEALISM 365 theory of light is not a copy of objective reality. Br-rt Shish- points of view in English, German and French literature. kin argues very badly. "Light can be rcgarded as substance, fhere can be no doubt that we have before us a certain as motion. ." he says. But in nature there is neither sub- international ideological current, which is not dependent stance without motion nor motion without substance. upon any one philosophical system, but which is the result Shishkin's first "apposition" is meaningless. "As elec- of certain general causes lying outside the sphere of philos- tricity. . ." Electricity is a movement of substance, hence ophy. The foregoing review of the facts undoubtedly shows Shishkin is wrong here too. The electromagretic theory of that Machism is "connected" with the new physics, but at light has shown that light and electricity are forms of motion the same time reveals that the version of this connection of one and the same substance (ether). "As sensation. ." spread by our Machiaos is fwndamentally incorrect. As in Sensation is an image of matter in motion. Save through philosophy, so in physics, our Machians slavishly follow the sensations, we can know nothing either of the forms of fashion, ar,d arc unable frorn their own, Marxist, stand- substance or of the forrns of motion; sensations are evoked point to give a general survey of pafiicular. currents and to by the action of fiatter in motion upon our sense-organs, judge the place they occupy. That is how science views it. The sensation of red reflects A double falsity pervades all the talk about Mach's philos- ether vibrations of a frequency of approximately 45o tril- ophy being "the philosophy of twentieth-century natural lions per second. The sensation of blue reflects ether vibra- scieoce," "the recent philosophy of the sciences," "recent tions of a frequency of approximately 6zo trillions per sec- natural-scientific positivism" and so forth. (Bogdanov in ond. The vibrations of the ether exist independently of our the introduction to Analysis ot' Sensations, pp. iv, xii; cf. sensations of light. Our sensations of light depend on the also Yushkevich, Valentinov and Co.) Firstly, Machism is action of the vibrations of the ether on the human organ of ideologically connected with only one school it one branch vision. Our sensations reflect objective reality, i.e., some- of modern science. Secondly, and this is the main point, thing that exists independently of humanity and of human what in Machism is connected with this school ls not obat sensations. That is how science views it. Shishkin's argu- distinguisbes it fuotn all other trends and, systetns ol idealist ment against raaterialism is the cheapest kind of sophistry. philosopby, but obat it bas iru comTnon u;itb pbilosopbical idealism in general. It sufiices to cast a glatce at the ideological current in question as a obole in order to leave no 8. TFIE E,SSENCE AND SIGNIFICANCE shadow of doubt as to the ttuth of this statement. Take the OF "PHYSICAL" IDEALISM physicists of this school: the German Mach, the Frenchman Itrenri Poincat6., the Belgian P. Duhem, the Englishman We have seen that the question of the epistemological Karl Pearson. They have much in commofl: they have the deductions that can be drawn from the new physics has same basis and are following the same direction, as each been raised and is being discussed from the most vafied of them rightly acknowledges. But what they have in com- 366 RECENT REvoLUTIoN IN NATURAL SCIENCE ESSDNCE AND SIGNIFICANCE oF ',pFIysICAL', IDEALTSM 367 mon includes neither the doctrine of empirio-criticism in ist consistc{i in the fact that when investigating the signifi- general, nor Mach's doctrine, say, of the "world-elements" t:rrnce of the mechanism of our sense-orgafls in telation tr: in particular. The three latter physicists even know nothing scnsations, showing, for instancg that the sensation of light of either of these doctrines. They have "only" one thing in is produced as the result of the action of various stimuli on common - philosophical iclealism, towards which they atrl, thc eye, he was inclinecl to arrive from this at a denial that without exception, tend more or less consciously, morc or rrrrr sensations are images of obiective rcality. This tendency less decisively. Take the philosophers who base themseivcs of one school of scientists towards "physiological idealism," ot tbis school of the new physics, who try to groufld it episte- i c., towards an idealist interpretation of cerrain data of. mologically and to develop it, and you will again find the pli1,si61n8r, was very accurately discerned by L. Feuerbach. German immanentists, the disciples of Mach, the French '['lic "connection" between physiology and philosophical neo-criticists and idealists, the English spirittralists, the irlcalism, chiefly of the Kantian kind, was for a long tirne Russian Lopatin and, in addition, the one and only empirio- rfter that exploited by reactionary philosophy. F. A. Lange monist, A. Bogdanov. Ttrrey all have only one thing in com- made great play of physiology in support of I{antian ideal- mon, namely, that they ail - trore or less consciously, more ism and in refutation o[ materialism; while among the im- or less decisivetry, either with an abtrpt and precipitate rnanentists (whom Bogdanov so incortectly places midway slant towards -yith personal (as fideism, or a aversion to it between Mach and I(ant), J. Rehmke in rSBz specially cam- in Bogdanov's case) - are vehicles of philosophical idealism. paigned against the allegatiori that Kantianism v/as con- The fundamental idea of the school of the new physics firmed by physiology.* That a nurnber of eminent physiol- under discussion is the denial of the obiective reality given ogists at that time graoitated towards idealism and us in our sensation and reflected in our theories, of the doubt I(antianism is as indisputable as that taday a number o[ as to the existence of such a rcality. Here this school departs cminent physicists graoitdte towards philosophical ideatrisrn. (inaccurately ftom rnaterialistn called realism, neo-mecha- "Physical" idealism, i.e., the idealism of a certain school of nism, hylo-kinetism, and any appreciable not in degree con- physicists at the end of the nineteenth century and the be- sciously developed physicists), general by the which by ginning of the twentieth century, flo more "refutes" mate- acknoroledgttent prevaTls among the physicists and - departs rialism, no more establishes the connection between idealism from it as a school of "physical" idealism. (or empirio-criticism) and natural science, than did the To explain this last term, which sounds very strange, it similar efforts of F. A. Lange and the "physiological" ideal- is necessary to recall an episode in the history of modern ists. The de'r-iation towards reactionary philosophy mani- philosophy and modern science. In 1866 L. Feuerbach at- fcsted in both cases by one school of scientists iri one branch tacked Johanncs Miller, the famous founder of modern physiology, and ranked him with the "physiological ideal- * Johannes Rehmke, Philosophie uzd Kantianisnzus and (Werke, idealism this physiolog- lPbilosopby ists" Vol. X, p.ry). The of l{.antianisml, Eisenach, tBBz, S. ry, et seq. 368 RECENT REVOLUTION IN NATURAL SCIENCE NSSENCE AND SiGNIFICANCE OF "PHYSICAL" IDEALISM 369

of science is a temporary deflection, a transitory period of t)rograss without it?) will not perceptibly atrter the scientific sickness in the history of science, an ailnrent of growth, sgririt" (op. cit., pp. 170-72). mainly brought on by the abrwpt breakdoon of old establish- Rey the conciliator tries to unite all schools of modern ed concepts. ph1,5isr against fideism! This is a falsity, well meant, but a The connection between modern "physical" idealism and l.llsity nevertheless; for the trend of the school of Mach- the crisis of rnodern physics is, as we have already pointed l'oincar6-Pearsoa towards idealism (i.e., tefined fideism) is out, generally acknowledged. "The arguments of sceptical bcyond dispute. And the obiectivity of physics that is asso- criticism levelled against modern physics" - writes A. R.y, ciated with the basis of the "scientific spirit,'u as distinct who is ref.ercirrg not so much to the sceptics as to the out- from the fideist spirit, and that Rey defends so ardently, is "shamefaced" formulation of materialism. spoken adherents of fideism, like Brunetidre - "essentially nothing but a amount to the proverbial argument of all sceptics: a diver- ifhe basic materialist spirit of physics, as of all modern sity of opinions" (among the physicists). But this diversity science, will overcome all crises, but only by thc iodispen- "proves nothing against the objectivity of physics." "In the sable replacement of metaphysical materialism b)' dialectical history of physics, as in history generally, one can distinguish materialism. great periods which difier by the form ar,d general aspect Rey the conciliator very often tries to gloss over the fact of theories. But as soon as a discovery is made that that the crisis in modern physics consists in the latter's affects all fields of physics because it establishes some car- deviation from a direct, resolute and irrevocable recognition dinal fact hitherto badly or very paftially perceived, the of the obiective value of its theories. But facts are stronger entire aspect of physics is modified; a new period sets than all attempts at reconciliation. The mathernaticians, in. This is what occurred after Newton's discoveries, and writes Rey, "in dealing with a scieflce, the subiect matter after the discoveries of Joule-Mayer and Carnot-Clausius. of which, apparently at least, is cl:eated by the mind of the The same thirg, appateatly, is taking place since the dis- scientist, and in which, at arly rate, concrete phenomena are covery of radioactivtty. . . . The historian who later sees not involved in the investigation, have formed too abstract things from the necessary distance has no trouble in discern- a conception of the science of physics. Atternpts have been ing a steady evolution where contemporaries saw conflicts, made to bring it ever closer to mathematics, and the general contradictions, and divisions into various schools. Apparent- conception of mathematics has been transferred to the con- ly, the crisis which physics has undergone in recent years ception of physics. This is an invasion of the mathe- (despite the conclusions drawn from it by philosophical matical spirit into the methods of ludging and understanding criticism) is no different. It even excellently illustrates the physics that is denounced by all the experimenters' And is typical crisis of growth (crise de croissance) occasioned by it not to this influence, none the less powerful because at the great modern discoveries. The undeniable transformation times concealed, that are often due the uncertailty, the of physics which will result (could there be evolution or r.vavering of mind regarding the obiectivity of physics, and 370 REcENT RE\/or-urIoN IN NATURAL scIENcE l,sSLtNCL AND SIGNIFICANCII OF "PHYSICAL" IDEALISM 37L the detours made or the obstacles surmouflted in order to yrhysics has become mathematical physics. Then therc demonstrate it? . . ." (p. zz). bcgan the formal period, that is to say, the period of mattre- This is excellently said. "rWavcring of mincl" as to the ruatical physics, purely mathematical; mathematical physics objectivity of physics - this is the very essellce of fashion- lot as a branch of physics so to speak, but as a branch of able "physical" idealism. mathematics cultivated by the mathematicians. Along this ". . The abstract fictions of mathematics seem to have ncw line the mathematician, accustomed to conceptual interposed a screen between physical rcality and the man- (purely logical) elements, which furoish the sole subject ner in which the mathematicians understand the science of rnatter of his work, and feeling himself cramped by crude, pliable, this reality. They vagucly feel the obiectivity of physics. . . . material elernents, which he found insufiiciently Although thcy desire above all to be oblective when they nccessarily always tended to reduce them to abstractions as engage in physics; although they seek to find and retain a far as possible, to present them in an entirely non-material foothold in reality, they are still haunted by oid habits. So irnd conceptual manner, or even to ignore them altogether. that even in the concepts of energetics, which had to be built 'fhe elements, as real, otriective data, as pbysical elernents, more solidly and with fewer hypotheses than the old mech- so to speak, completely disappeared. 'Ihere remained only anism - which sought to copy (ddcalquer) the sensible formal relations represented by the difierential equations. . . . universe and not to reconstruct it - we are still dealing If the rnathematiciafl is not the dupe of his constructive work, with the theories of the mathematiciafls. . . They [the when he analyses theoretical physics he can recover its mathematiciansl have done everything to save oblectivity, for ties with experience and its objective value, but at a lirst they are aw^re that without objectivity there can be no glance, and to the uninitiated person, we seem faced with physics. But the complexity or deviousness of their an arbiffary development. The concept, the notion, theories nevertheless leaves an uneasy feeling. It is too has everywhere replaced the real element. Thus, his- artificiaT, too far-fctched, too stilted (Adifii); the experi- torically, by virtue of the mathematical form assumed by menter here does not feel the spontaneous confidence which theoretical physics, is explained the ailment (tc tna- constant contact with physical rcality gives him. This laise), the crisis of physics, and its apparent withdrawal ftom in effect is what is said by all physicists who are primarily objective facts" (pp. zz8'12). physicists or who are exclusively physicists - and their name Such is the first cause of "physical" idealism. The reac- is legion; this is what is said by the entire neo-rnechanist tionary attempts are engefldered by the very progress of school. . . The crisis in physics lies in the conquest of the science. The gteat successes achieved by natural science, realm of physics by the mathematical spirit. The progress the approach to elements of matter so homogeneous and sim- of physics on the one hand, and the progress of rnathematics ple that their laws of rnotion can be treated mathematically, on the other, led in the nineteenth century to a close amal- cncouraged the mathematicians to overlook matter. "Matter gamation betwcen these two sciences. Theoretical disappears," only equations remain. In the new stage of 372 RECENT REVOLUTIoN IN NATURAL SCIENCE IiSSENCE A^\D SIGNIFICANCE OF "PIIYSICAL" IDEALISM 373 development and appar.ently in a ncw manner, we get the hctween moderate and immoderate relativism. Of course, old Kantian idea: reason prescribes laws to nature. Hermann "immoderate relativism logically, if not in practice, bor- Cohen, who, as we have seen, tejoices over the idealist spirit clcrs on actual scepticism" (p. zr5), b:ut there is no "immod- of the new physics, goes so far as to advocate the introduc- cratc" relativism, you see, ilr Poincar6. Just fancy, one tion of higher mathematics in the schools - in order to im- can, like an apothecary, weigh out a little rnore or a little bue high-school students with the spirit of idealism, which lcss relativism and thus save Machism! is being extinguished in our materialistic age (F. A. Lange, As a matter of fact, the only theoretically correct formu- Geschicbte des A4aterialisrnus, y. Auflage, 1896, Bd. II, lation of the question of relativism is given in the dialectical S. xlix). This, of course, is the ridiculous dream of a reac- materialism of Marx and Engels, and ignorance of it is tionary and, in fact, there is and can be nothing here but a bound. to lead from relativism to philosophical idealism. temporary infatuation with idealism on the pafi oI a small Incidentally, the failure to understand this fact is enough to number of specialists. But what is highly characteristic is rcnder Mr. Berman's absurd book, Dialectics i.n tbe I'igbt of the way the drowning man clutches at a straw, the subtle tbe Moclern Tbeory ol Knooledge, ltterly valueless. Mr. means wheteby representatives of the educated bourgeoisie Berman repeats the old, old nonsense about dialectics, which artificially attempt to preserve, or to find a pTace for, the lre has entirely failed to understand. We have already seen fideism r,vhich is engendered among the masses of the people that in the theory of knowledge all the Machians, at eoery by their ignorance and their downtrodden condition, and step, rc-veal a similar lack of understanding. by the wild absurdities of capitalist contradictions. A11 the old truths of physics, including those which were Another cause which bred "physical" idealism is the regarded as firmly established and incontestable, have p(oven principle of relatioism, the relativity of our knowledge, a to be relative truths - bence, there can be no obiective principle which, in a period of breakdown of the old theories, truth independent of rnankind. Such is the argument not is taking a firm hold upon the physicists, and which, il tbe only of all the Machians, but of the "physical" idealists in latter are ignorart of dialectics, is bound to lead to idealism. general. That absolute truth results from the sum-total of The question of the relation betwcen relativism ar.d dia- relative truths in the course of thcir development; that lectics plays perhaps the most important part in explaining rclative truths represent relatively faithful reflections of the theoretical misadventures of Machism. Take Rey, for an obiect existing independently of man; that these reflec- instance, who like all European positivists has no conceptions become more afld more faithful; that every scientific tion whatever of tr4arxist dialectics. He employs the word truth, notlvithstanding its relative nature, contains an element dialectics exclusively in the sense of idealist philosophical of absolute truth - all these propositions, which are obvious speculation. As a result, although he feels that the new phys- to anyone who has thought over Engels' Anti-Dr.ibring, arc ics has gone astray on the question of relativism, he never- for the "modern" theory of knowledge a book rvith seven theless flounders helplessly and attempts to differentiate seals. 3'.14 RECENT REVOLUTION IN NATURAL SCIENCE I]SSIJNCE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF "PHYSICAL" IDT]A]-IST4

Such works as Duhem's Theory ol Physics,* or Stallo's,** lrcats them as varieties of obiective realrty" (p. ,io). This which Mach particularly recommends, show very cleaily is quite ttue, if you do not deny objective reality and com- that these "physical" idealists attach the most significance l)i)t metaphysics for being anti-dialectical. Stallo does not to the proof of the relativity of our knowledge, and that rcalise this clearly. He has not understood rnaterialist dia- tlrey are in reality vacllTating between idealism and dialecti- lcctics and therefore frequently slips, by way of relativism, cal materialism. Both authors, who belong to difierent pe- into subjectivism and idealism. riods, and who approach the question from different angles The same is true of Duhem. N7ith an enormous expendi- (Duhem's speciality is physics, in which field he has worked tut:c of labour, and with the help of a number of interesting for twenty ycars; Stallo u/as an erstwhile orthodox Hegelian rnd valuable examples from the history of physics, such as who grcw ashamed of his own book on natural philosophy, rine frequently encounters in Mach, he shows that "every written in 1848 in the old }legelian spirit), energetically law of physics is provisional ancl relative, because it is combat the atomistic-mechanical conception of nature. They epproximate" (p. z8o). The man is hammering at an open point to the narrowness of this conception, to the impossi- cloor! - will be the thought of tl-re Marxist wheo he reads bility of ac,cepting it as the limit of our knorvledge, to the the lengthy disquisitions ofl this subject. But that is iust petrification of many of the ideas of writers who hold this the trouble with Duhem, Stallo, Mach and Poili'car.t, that conception. And it is indeed undeniable that the old ma- they do not perceive the door opened by dialectical material- terialism did suIler from such a defect; Engels reproached ism. Being unable tc give a correct formulatioo of relativ- the earlier materialists for their failure to appreciate the ism, they slide from the latter into idealism. "A law of relativity of all scientific theories, for their ignorance of physics, properly speakiog, is neither true nor false, but ap- dialectics and for their exaggerution of the mechanical point proximate" - writes Duhem (p. ,lD. And this "but" con- of view. But Engels (unlike Stallo) was able to discard tains the beginning of the falsity, the beginning of the Hegelian ideaiism and to grasp the great and true kernel of obliteration of the boundary between a scientific theory that Hegelian dialectics. Engels rejected the old metaphysical approximately reflects tbe object, i.e., approaches objective materialism fot dialectical matedalism, and Dot fff relativ- truth, and an arbitraty, fantastTc, or purely conventional ism that sinks into subiectivism. "The mechanical theory," theory, such as, for example, a religious theory or th.e theorl, game says Stallo, for instance, "in common with all rnetaphysical of the of chess. point theories, hypostases partial, ideal, and, it may be, purely Duhem carries this falsity to the of declaring that question "material per- conventional groups of attributes, or single attributes, and the whether reality" corresponds to ceptual phenomena is metapbysics (p. ro). Away with the hypotheses * P. Dnhem, I-a tbiotie pbyique, son objet et sd sttucture, Patis, 19o6. guestion of reality! Our concepts and are mere (p. "arbitrary" (p. 27) constructions, ** J. B. Stall,o, Tbe Concepts antl Theories ol Modern Physics, Lurdon, signs z6), and so forth. 1882. There are French arrd German translations. There is only one step from this to idealism, to the "physics 376 RECENT REVOLUTION IN NATURAI- SCIF,NCE I,SSIINCE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF "PHYSICAI-'' ID]]ALISM 377

of the beiiever.," which M. Pierre Duhem preaches in the soonef or later oppose a rude refutation in the form of a Kantian spirit (Rey, p. fiz; cl., p. fio). But the good Adler l:act; but, indefatigable, physics will improve, modify, and (Fritz) - also a Machian would-bc Marxist! - could find complicate the refuted law" (p. :9o). This would be a quite nothing cleverer to do than to "corcect" Duhem as follows: correct exposition of dialectical materialism if the author Duhem, he claims, eliminates the "realities concealed behind firmly held to the existence cf this objective rcality inde- phenomena only as objccts of theory, but not as objects of lrcndent of humanity. ". . . The theory of physics is not a reality."* This is the familiar criticism of l(antianism from lrurely artificial system r;r,hich is convenlent today and un- the standpoint of Hume and Berkeley. suitable tomorrow it is a classification, which becomes But, of course, there can be no question of any conscious more a.nd more natural, a rctl,ection, which grows clearer Kantianism on the part of. Duhem. He is merely oacillating, and clearer, of the realities that the experimental method as is Mach, not l

Thc Russian Machians, as we have already seen, are (William Ramsay, Essays, Biograpbical and Cbetnical, London, r9o8, p. divided into tr.vo camps. Mr. V. Chernov and the collabora- ru6). Having spoken about the transformation of radium into helium, tors of the Rwsskoye BogatstooLt4 are downright and cor- Ramsay rematks: "At least one so-called element can no longer be philos- regardccl as ultimate matter, but is itself undergoing chaoge into a simplcr sistent opponents of dialectical materialism, both in f orm of matter" (p. 16o). "Now it is almost certain that negative ophy aad history. The other company of Machians, in whom particular clectricity is a form of matter; and positive electricity is matte( interested here, are would-be Matxists and try cleprived of ncgative electricity that is, minus this electtic rnatter" (p. v/e are more - com- rj6). "Now what is electricity? trt used to be believed, formerly, that in every way to assure their readers that Machisrn is there v,ere two kinds of electricity, one called positive and the othet patible with the his';orical materialism of Marx and Engels' negativc. At that time it would not have been possible to answer the are far the most part nothing but question. But recent researches make it ptobable that what used to be True, these assurances called nega-tive electricity is really a substance. Indeed, the relativc assuraflces; not a single Machian would-be Marxist has ever weight of its particles has been measured; each is about ofle seven- made the slightest attempt to present in any systematic way hundredth of the mass of an atom of hydrogen. . Atoms of electricity empirio-criticism in the are named 'electrons"' (p, ,g6). If out Machians who ryrite books arld the real trends of the founders of articles on philosophical subiccts were capable of thinking, they would field of the social sciences. \(e shall dwell briefly on this understand that the exptession "matter disappears," "matter is teduced question, turning first to the statements to be foufld in writ- to electricity," etc., is only an epistemologically helpless expression of and then to those of the truth that science is able to discover new forms of matter, nerv forms ings of the German empirio-ffiticists of material motion, to reduce the old forms to the new forms, and so on. their Russian disciPles.

379 3BO EMPIRIO-CRITICISMANDHISToRICALMATERIALISM EXCURSIONS OF GERMAN EMPIRIO-CRI'TICIS'|S 7. THE EXCURSIONS OF THE, GERMAN forsooth, dealing with'sober' (nlicbterne),'practical' antl E,MPIRIO-CRITICiSTS INTO THE FIELD OF THE, 'tangible' (sinnt'ciilige) economic phenomena. And all SOCIAL SCIE,NCE,S have that family resemblance to many trends in physiology which only the sarne parents - ztiz., metaphysics and specu- In r89;, when R. Avenarius was still alive, there appeared lation - can transmit to their children, in out case to the in the philosophical journal edited by him an article by physiologists and economists. One school of economists his disciple, F. Blei, entitled "Metaphysics in Political Econ- analyses the 'phenomena' of 'economy' [Avenarius and his omy."* All the teachers of empirio-criticisrn wage war school put ordinary words in quotatioo marks in order to ou the "metaphysics" not only of explicit and conscious show that they, the true philosophers, discern the essentially philosophical materialism, but also of natural science, which "metaphysical character" of a use of words which is so vul- instinctively adopts the standpoint of the materialist theory gar and so unrefined by "epistemological analysis"l without of knowledge. The disciple takes up arrns against metaphys- placing what they find (das Gefundene) in this way into ics in political economy. The fight is directed aga.inst the relation with the behaviour of individuals; the physiologists most varied schools of political economy, but we are in- exclude the behaviour of the individual from their investiga- terested only in the character of the empirio-critical argument tions as being'actions of the soul' (Wirkwngen der Seele), against the school of Marx and Errgels. while the economists of this trend declare the behaviour of "The purpose of the present investigation," writes Franz individuals to be negligible in relation to the 'immanent Blei, "is to show that all political economy until now, in laws of economy' (pp. y8-lg). rW'ith Marx, theory estab- its endeavour to interpret the phenomena of economic life, lished 'economic laws' from construed processes, and these opefates with metaphysical premises; that it . 'derives' 'laws' figured in the initial section (lnitialabscl:nitt) of the the 'laws' governing atr economy from the 'nature' of the dependent vital series, while the economic processes figured latter, and rnan is only an incidental f.actor it relation to in the final section (Finalabscbnitt). . . . 'Econorny' was these 'iaws.' In all its theories political economy has transformed by the economists into a transcendental cate- hitherto rested on metaphysical grounds; all its theories gory, in which they discovered such 'laws' as they wished to are trnbiological, and therefore unscientific and worthless discover: the 'laws' of. 'capital' and 'labour,' 'rer^t,' 'wages' for knowleclge. The theoreticians do not know what arrd'profit.' The economists transformed man into a Platonic they are building their theories on, what the soil is of which idea - 'capitalist,' 'worker,' etc. Socialism ascribed to the these theories are the fruit. They regard themselves as real- 'capitalist' the character of being 'greedy for profit,' liberal- ists operating without any premises whatever, for they are, ism ascribed to the worker the character of being 'exacting' - and characters were moteover explained by the 'opera- *Vierteljc/:rsscbrit't both ftir zoissenscbet'tlicbe Pbilosopltie, r895, Bd. XIX, tion of the laws of capital"' (pp. F. Blei, "Die Metapbl;sik in der llationaldkonotnie," S. y8-9o. 38r-82). EMPIRIO-CRITICISM AND HISTORICAI IUATERIALISM EXCURSIoNS oF GERMAN EMPIRIo-CRITICISTS 383

"Marx came to the study of French socialism and polit- three stages, three sections, initial, middle and final: Initial- ical economy with a socialist world outlook, and his aim abscbnitt, Medialabscbnitt, Firualabscbnittl . . i.e., the as regarcls knowiedge was to provide a 'theoretical founda- 'cognition' of that 'economic fact.' Or, in other words, the tion' for his world outlook in order to 'safeguard' his initial task now is to 'find again' the initial value, his 'world out- value. I{e found the law of value in Ricardo . . but the look,' in the 'economic facts' in order to 'safeguard' the conclusion which the French Socialists had drawn from initial value. This definite variation of the dependent series Ricardo could not satisfy Marx in his endeavour to 'safe- aheady contains the Marxist metaphysics, regardless of how guard' his E-vahretl5 brought into a vital-difference, i.e., his the 'cognised' appears in the final section (Finalabscbnitt). 'world outlook,' for these conclusions lnad ab.eady entered 'The socialist world outlook,' as an independent E-value, as a component part into the content of his initial value in 'absolute truth,' is 'given a basis' 'tetrospectively' by means the form of indignation at the robbery of the workers,' and of a 'special' theory of knowledge, namely, the economic 'being so forth. The conclusions were reiected as forroally system of Marx and the materialist theory of history. untrue 'simply economically' for they are an application of By means of the coflcept of surplus value the 'subiective' morality to politicai 'But may be economy.' what formally 'truth,' in the Marxist wodd outlook finds its 'obiective economically incorrect, may all the same be correct from truth,' in the theory of knowledge of the 'economic cate- the point of view of world history. If the moral conscious- gories' the safeguarditg of the initial value is completed ness of the mass declares an ecoflomic fact to be unjust, - and metaphysics has retrospectively received its critique of that is a proof that the fact itself has been outlir,,ed, that knowtredge" (pp. other economic facts have made their appearance, owing 38a-s6). reader is probably fuming at us for quoting at such to vzhich the former one has become unbearable and un- The this incredibly trivial rigmarole, this quasi-scientific tenable. Therefore, a .very true economic content may be length concealed behind the formal economic incorrectness.'" (From tomfoolery decked out in the terminology of Avenarius. But Engels' preface to Karl Marx's Tbe Pooerty of Philosopby.) u:er den Feind toill oersteben, naass itn Feindes Lande enezny go into the enezfiy's Having quoted the above passage from Engels, Blei con- geben -who would know the flust tinues: "In the above quotation the middle section (Medial- territory.llo And R. Avenarius' philosophical iournal is in- abscbnitt) of the dependent series which interests us here deed enemy territory for Marxists. And we ifivite the reader to restrain for a minrite his legitimate aversion for the is d,etached labgeboben -a technical term of Avenarius' implying: reached the consciousness, separated ofi]. After bufioons of bourgeois science and to analyse the argument the 'cognition' that an 'economic fact' must be concealed of Avenarius' disciple and collaborator. behind the 'moral consciousness of iniustice,' comes the final Argument flumber one: Marx is a "metaphysician" who section lFinalabscbnitt: the theory of Marx is a statement, did not grasp the epistemological "critique of concepts," i.e., an E-value, i.e., a vital-difierence whicl.r passes through who did not work out a geoeral theory of knowledge and 384 EMPIRIO-CRITICISMANDFIISTORICALMATERIALISI4 ExcURSIoNS oF GERI'IAN EMPIRIo-CRI1'ICISTS 385 who simply insert6d materialism into his "special theory o[ Argument number four: Marx's theory is "unbiological," knowledge." it is entirely innocent of "vital-differences" and of similar This argument contains nothing original to Blei personally. spurious biological terms which constitute the "science" of We have akeady seen scores and hundreds of times that the reactionary professor, Avenarius. Blei's argument is all the founders of empirio-criticism and all the Russian correct from the standpoint of Machism, for the gulf between Machians accuse materialism of "metaphysics," or, more Marx's theory and Avenarius' "biological" spillikins is in- accuately, they repeat the hackneyed arguments of the deed obvious at once. We shall presently see how the Kantians, Humeans and idealists against materialist "met- llussian l4achian would-be Marxists in effect followed in aphysics." Blei's footsteps. partiality Argument number two: Marxism is as "metaphysical" Argument nurnber five: the partisanship, the preconceived solution. The ernpirio- as natural science (physiology). And here again it is not Blei of Marx's theory and his criticists as a obole, and not Blei alone, claim to be non- who is "responsible" for this argument, but Mach and partisan both philosophy and in social science. They are Avenarius; for it was they who declared war on "nattr.al- in neither for socialism nor for liberalism. They rnake no historical metaphysics," applying that name to the instinc- difierentiation between the fundamental and irreconcilable tively materialist theory of knowledge to which (on their own trends of materialism and idealism in philosophy, but admission and according to the of all who are in 'We iudgment cndeavour to rise abooe them. have traced this tendency any way versed in the subject) the vast majoity of scientists of Machism through a long series of problems of epistemol- adhere. ogy, and we ought not to be surprised rvhen rve encounter Argument number three: Marxism declares that "per- it in sociology. sonality" is a qttantitd nigligeable, a cypher, that man is an "Argument" nunrber six: ridiculing "obiective" truth. "incidental factor," subiect to certain "immanent laws of Blci at once sensed, and rightly sensed, that historical mate- economics," that an analysis des Get'undefien, i.e., of what rialism and Marx's entire economic doctrine are permeated is found, of what is given, etc., is lacking. This argument through and through by a recognition of obiective truth. is a cornplete repetition of the stock of ideas of the empirio- And Blei accurately expressed the tendency of Mach's and cdtical "pincipal co-ordinationi' i.e., of ttre idealist crotchet Avenarius' doctrines, when, precisely because of the idea in Avenarius' theory. Blei is absolutely right when he says of objective truth, he, "from the very threshold," so to that it is impossible to find the slightest hint of such idealist speak, rejected Marxism by at or,ce declaring that there was nonsense in Marx and Engels, and that from the standpoint absolutely nothing behind the Marxist teaching save the of this nonsense Marxism must be reiected cotnpletell, from "subjective" views of Marx. tlre very beginning, from its fundamental philosophical And i[ our Machians (enounce Blei (as they surely will), pfemises. we shall tell them: You must not blame the mirror fot I.'XCI]RSIONS EMPIRIO.CRITICISM AND HISTORICAL MATERIALISM OIT GERMAN EMPIRIO-CRI?ICISTS JOt showing a crooked face. Blei is a mirror which accurately reflects the tendencies of empirio-criticism, ao.d a renounce- ment by our Machians would only bear witness to their good intentions - and to their absurd eclectical endeavours to combine Mar:x and Avenarius. Let us pass from Blei to Petzoldt. If the former is a mete disciple, the latter is declared by outstanding empirio- criticists, such as Lessevich, to be a master. While Blei brings up the question of Marxism explicitly, Petzoldt - who would not demean himself by dealing with a rnere Marx or a trrere Engels sets forth in positive form the views of empirio- - is criticism on sociology, which enables us to compare them not always the desire for a spacious view or ioy in the physical with Marxism. exercise of climbing in fresh ak and wide nature The second volume of Petzoldt's Einliihrwng in die Pbilos- that urges them towards the peaks, but also the instinct which opbie der reinen Ert'abrung is entitled "Awf dern Wege xuru is deeply ingrained in every organic being to pursue Dauernden" ("Towards Stability"). The authot makes the an adopted path of activify until a natural aim has been tendency tov/ards stability the basis of his investigation. "The main features of the ultimate (endgtiltige) state of stability of humanity can be inferred in its fornlal aspect. We thus aruive at the foundations of ethics, aesthetics and the formal theory of knowledge" (p. iii). "Human development bears its goal witlrin itself, it also tends towards a perlect (aoll- koznmene) state of stability" (p. 6o). The signs of this are The philosophically untutored can have no conception of abundant and vatied. For instance, arc there many violent the breadth of the principles of stability and of economy of radicals r,vho do not in their old age become "rnore ser- thought. Petzoldt develops his "theory,, in detail for the profane. sible," more restrained? True, this "premature stability" "Sympathy is an expression of the immediate need (p. 6r) is characteristic of the philistine. But do not philis- for a state of stability," runs $28. "S),mpathy is not a repeti- tines constitute the "compact majoity"? (p. 62.) tion, a duplication of the observed suffering, but suffering Our philosopher's conclusion, which he gives in italics, on account of this suffering. . . . The greatest emphasis musi be placed is this: "The quintessential feature of all the aims of our on the immediacy, of sympathy. If wo admit this rve thereby reasoning and creative activity is stability" The admit that the welfare of others can concern a b. lz). man explanation is: "Many cannot bear to see a key lying ob- lust as immediately and fundamentally as his own wel_ IIIATERIALiSM I]O!/ BOGDANOV CORRECTS AND "DEVELOPS" MARX 389 JOO EI\,IPIRIO-CRITICISM AND HISTORICAL doubt; look at the university settlements in England, at the Salvation Army (p. 4o), at the German "ethical societies-" In the name of "aesthetic stability" (Chapter II, Section z) "romanticism" is reiected. But romanticism embraces all forms of inordinate extension of the ego, idealism, metaphysics, occultism, solipsism, egoism, the "forcible coercion of the minority by the maiority" and the "social-democratic ideal of the organisation of all labour by the state" (pp. z4o-4r).* The sociological excursions of Blei, Petzoldt and Mach are but an expression of the in-6nite stupidity of the philistine, smugly retailing the most hackneyed rubbish under cover of a new "empirio-critical" systematisation and terminology. A pretentious cloak of verbal artifr.ces, clumsy devices in syllogistic, subtle scholasticism, in a word, as in epistemology, so in sociology - the same reactionary content under the same flamboyant signboard. Let us flow turn to the Russian Machians.

2. HO\T BOGDANOV CORRECTS AND ..DEVELOPS" MARX

In his article "The Development of Life in Nature and Society" (From tbe Psycbology of Society,7go2, p. f, et seq.), Bogdanov quotes the well-known passage from the preface

* It is in the same spirit that Mach expresses hinself in favour of the bureaucratic socialism of Popper and Menger, which guarantees the "freedom of the individual," whereas, he opines, the doctrine of the Social-Democrats, which "compares unfavourably" with this socialism, threatens a "slavery eveo more univetsal and more oppressive than that of a monarchical or oligarchical state." See Erkenntnis und ltrtatz, 2' Auflage, 19o6, S. 8o-8r. 390 EMPIRIo-CRITICISMANDHISToRICALMATERIALISM Ho!/ BoGDANoV CoRRECTS AND ..DEVELOPS,' MARX 301 to the Zur Kritik,trT where the "great sociologist," i.e., l,Larx, "social being" and "social consciousness" are not identical, expounds the principles of historical materialism. Having iust as being in general and consciousness in general arc quoted Marx's ivords, Bogdanov declares that the "old not identical. From the fact that in their intercourse men fotmulation of historical rnonism, without ceasing to be basi- :1ct as conscious beings, it does not follozo that social con- cally true, no longer fully satisfies us" (p. 37). The author sciousness is identical with sociai being. In all social forma- wishes, therefore, to correct the theory, or to develop it, tions of any complexity - and in the capitalist social forma- starting from tbe princiltles ol tbe theory itseff. 'lhe author's tion in particular - people in their intercourse are not con- chief conclusion is as follows: .scictus of what kind of social relations are being formed, in "'V7e have shown that social forms belong to the compre- accordance with what laws they develop, etc. Fot instance, hensive gentts - biological adaptations. But we have not a peasant when he se1ls his grain enters into "intercourse" thereby de6ned the province of social forms; for a definition, rvith the worlcl producers of grain it the wotld market, not only the genus, but also the species must be establish- but he is not conscious of it; nor is he conscious of the kind ed. . . . In their struggle for existence mefl can unite only of social relations that are fotrned on the basis of exchange. with the help of consciousness: without consciousness there Social consciousness reflects social being - that is Marx's can be no intercourse. I{ence, social lile iru all its mani.t'esta- teaching. A reflection may be an approximately true copy tions is a consciously psychical life. . .. Society is inseparable of the r.efTected, but to speak of identity is absurd. Con- from consciousness. Social being and social consciousruess sciousness in general reflects being - that is a general prin- are, in the exact naeaning ol these terrus, identical" (pp. 5o, ciple of all matedalism. It is impossible not to see its direct ;r, Bogdanov's italics). and inseparable contection with the principle of historical That this conclusion is absolutely alien to Marxism has materialism: social consciousfless reflects social being. been pointed out by Orthodox (Pbilosophical Essays, St. Bogdanov's attempt imperceptibly to correct and develop Petetsburg, ryo6, p. r83, ff.). But Bogdanov responded simply Marx in the "spirit of his principles" is an obvious distor- by abuse, picking upon an error it quotation: instead of "in tion of these materialist pdnciples in the spirit of idealism. the exact meaning of these terms," Orthodox had quotecl "in It would be ludicrous to deny it. Let us recall Bazar.ov's the full meaning of these terms." This error was indeed cxposition of empirio-criticism (not empirio-monism, oh no! committed, and the author had every right to cortect it; - there is such a wide, wide difference befween these "sys- but to raise a cty of "muti1ation," "substitutiofl," and so tems" !) : "sense-perception is the reality existing outside forth (Empirio-Monism, Bk. III, p. xliv), is simply to obscure us." This is plain idealism, a plain theory of the identity the essence of the point at issue by wretched words. \f'hat- of consciousness and being. R.ecall, further, the formulation ever "exact" meaoing Bogdanov may have invented for the of !7. Schuppe, the immanentist (who swore and vowed as terms "social being" and "social consciousness," there can fervently as Bazarov and Co. that lie v/as not an idealist, be no doubt that the statement we have quoted is not correct. and who with no less vigour than tsogdanov insisted on the 392 EMPrRIo-CRITTCTSMANDHTSToRICALMATERTALTSM rrow BocDANov CoRRECTS AND "DEVELops" MARX 393 vety "exact" meaning of his terms): "being is consciousness." social being and social consciousness is sbeer nonsense and Now compare this with the refutation of Marx's historical xr absolutel.y reactionLxr) theory. If certain people reconcile materialism by the immanentist Schubert-Soldern: "Every it with Marxism, with Marxist behaviour, we must admit material process o[ production is always an act of conscious- tlrat these people are better. than their theory, but we cannot ness on the part of its observer. . . . In its epistemological jr.rstify outrageous theoretical distortions of Marxism. aspect, it is not the external process of production that is Bogdanov reconciles his theory with Marx's conclusions, the primary (prius), but the subject or subjects; in other ar.rd sacrifices elementary consistency for the sake of these words, even the purely material process of production does conclusions. Every individual producer in the world eco- not lead us out of the general connection of consciousness nomic system realises that he is introducing a certain change (Beoul3tseinsxusammenhang)." (See Das menschlicbe Gh,ick into the technique of production; every ov/ner realises that und die soz-iale Frage, S. ,93, 2gt-96.) he exchanges certain products for others; but these producers Bogdanov may curse the materialists as much as he pleases and these owners do not realise that in doing so they are for "mutilating his thoughts," but no curses will alter the thereby changing social being. The sum-total of these changes simple and plain fact. The correction of Marx's theory and in all their ramifications in the capitalist world economy the development of Marx supposedly in the spirit of Marx could not be grasped even by seventy Marxes. The para- by the "empirio-monist" Bogdanov in no essential respect mount thing is that the laos of. these changes have been difier from the rvay the idealist and epistemological solipsist discovered, that the objectioe logic of these changes and Schubert-Soldern endeavours to refute Marx. Bogdanov their historical development have at bottom and in the main assures us that he is not an idealist. Schubert-Soldern as- been disclosed - objective, not in the sense that a society sures us that he is a realist (Bazarcv even believed him). of conscious beings, men, could exist and develop inde- In our time a philosopher has to declare himself a "realist" pendently of the existence of conscious beings (and it is and an "enemy of idealism." It is about time you under- only such trifles that Bogdanov stresses by his "theory"), stood this, Messrs. Machians ! but in the sense that social being is inclependent of tbe social The immanentists, the empitio-criticists and the empirio- consciousness of men. The fact that you live and conduct monists all argue over particulars, over details, over the your business, beget children, produce products and exchange formulation of idealisnt, whereas we frorn tbe z.tery outset them, gives rise to an obiectively necessary chain of events, reiect all the principles of their philosophy common to this a chain of development, which is independent of yo:ur social trinity. Let Bogdanov, accepting in the best sense and with consciousness, and is never grasped by the latter completely. the best of intentions all the conclusions of Marx, preach the The highest task of humanity is to comprehend this obiective "identity" of social being and social consciousness; we shall logic of economic evolution (the evolution of social life) in say: Bogdanov nilnus "empirio-monism" (or rather, minus its general and fundamental features, so that it may be pos- Machism) is a Marxist. For this theorl. of the identity of sible to adapt to i.t one's social consciousltess and the con- 394 EMPIR]o-CRITICISMANDHISToRICALMATERIAIISM rrovT BocDANov coRREcrs AND "DEVELoPS" MARX 395 sciousness of the advanced classes of all capitalist countries llerc are further examples of how the dead philosophy in as definite, clear and critical a fashion as possible. r,[ idealisrn lays hold of the living A4arxist Bogdanov. Bogdanov admits all this. And what does this mean? T.t 'Ihe article "What Is Idealism?" ryot (ibid., p. t et seq.): flreans iru effect that his theory of the "identity of social "Wc arrive at the following conclusion: both w-here people being and social consciousfless" is thrown overboard, that it rrgrce in their judgrnents of progress and v'here they dis- becomes an empty scl-rolastic appendage, as empty, dead and :rgrce, the basic meaning of the idea of progress is the same, useless as the "theory of general substiturtion" or the doctrine rrnrnetry, increa.ring corupleteness and harmony of conscious of "elernents," "introjection" and the rest of the Machian life. \'Itis is thc obiective content of the concept progress. . . . rigmarole. But thc "dead lay hold of the living"; the dead I t we now compare the psychological formulation o[ the idea schoiastic appendage, against the rp;ill of and independ,eittly o[ progress thus arrived at with the previously explained ol tbe consciousness of Bogdanolz, converts his philosophy lriological forrnulation ["biological progress is at increase into a seroiceable tool of. the Schubert-Solderns and other in the sutn-total al lit'e," p.:4f, we shall easily convince reactionaries, who in a thousand different keys, from a tlurselves that the forneer fultry coincic{es with tl're latter and l-rundred professorial chairs, disseminate this dead thing as can be deduced from it. . . . And since sociai life amounts a living thing, direct it against thc living thing, for the pr:r- to the psychical iife of metnbcrs of society, here too the t-he same increase in the posc of stifling it. Bogdanov persoreaLly is a sworo enemy of content of the idea of progress is - rcaction ia geaeral and of bourgeois rcaction in partrctiat. completeness and harmony of life; only we must add: the the idea of social progress Bogdanov's "substitution" ancl theory of the "identity of v,tcial life of men. ,{.nd, of course, rrcver and cannot have any other content" (p. 16). social being and social consciousness" serce this reaction. had that idealism expresses the victory It is sad, but true. "IWe have found . in the human soul of moods more social over moods less Materialism in general recognises obiectively real being social, ttrrat a progressive ideal is a reflection of the socially (rnatter) as inclependent of consciousness, sensatiofl, experi- lrrogressive tendency in the idealist psychology" (p. lz). cnce, etc., of hurnanity. Historical materialism recognises It need hardly be said that all this play with biology and social being as independent of the social consciousness of sociology contains not a graift oI Marxism. Both in Spencer hurnanity. In both cases consciousness only the reflection is and Mikhaitro-rsky one may find afly number of deFlnitions of beiag, at best an approximately (adequate, perfectly true not a whit worse than this, defining nothing but the "good exact) reflection of it. From this Marxist philosophy, rvirich intentions" of the author and betra.yilg a coTlrplete lack piecc is cast from a single of steetr, you caflnot elirninate one of und.erstanding, af "what is idcalism" and what ma- basic premise, one essential part, without departing from tcrialism. objective truth, without falling a prcy to a bourgeois-reac- Tlre author begios Book trII of Etnpirio-Monistn, the article tionary falsehood. "Social Sclection (Founda.tions o[ Ndethod)," 19o6, by tefut- 396 EMprRro-cRTTIcIsMANDHISToRTcALMATERTALIsM IIow BoGDANoV CoIIRECTS AND ..DEvE]-ot'S', MARX 397

ing the "eclectic socio-biological attempts of Lange, Ferri, lrcirrg added and without the nature of crises being elucidatcd. IW'oltmann and many others" (p. r), and on page ry we find Alt this is done with the very best intentions, for the author the following conclusion of the "enquiry": "We car. for- u,ishcs to cotroborate and give greater depth to Marx's con- mulate the fundamental connection between energetics and t:lrrsions; but in point of fact he otiy dilutes then with an social selection as follows: irrtolerably dreary and lifeless scholasticism. The only "Ersery act ot' social selection represents an inct.ease or "Marxism" here is a repetition of an aheady known con- decrease of tbe energ! ol tbe social complex concerned. In clrrsion, ard all tire "new" proof of it, all this "social ener- tbe fortner case @)e baae 'positioe selection,' in tbe latter 1lrtics" (p. lD and "social selection" is but a mere collection ' negatiL)e selection."' (Author's italics.) of z,oorrls and a sheer mockery of Marxism. And such unutterable trash is served out as Marxism! llogdanov is not engaged in a Marxist enquiry at all; Can one imagine anything rnore sterile, lifeless and scholastic :rll he is doing is to reclothe results aheady obtained by the than this string of biological and energeticist terms that con- Marxist enquiry in a biological and energeticist terminology. tribute nothing, and can contribute nothing, in the sphere 'fhc whole atteffrpt is worthless from beginning to end, for of the social sciences? There is not a shadow of concrete the concepts "selection," "assimilation and dissimilation" of economic enquiry here, not a hint of the Marxist zn.ethod, cnergy, the energetic balance, and so fotth, are, when ap- the method of dialectics and the world outlook of material- lrlied to the sphere of the social sciences, but empty pbrases. ism, only a mere inoention of definitions and attempts to Irr fact, at enquiry into social phenomena afid an elucidation fit them into the ready-made conclusions of Marxism. "The rrf the rnetbod, of the social sciences cannot be undertaken rapid growth of the productive forces of capitalist society with the aid of these concepts. Nothing is easier than to is undoubtedly an increase in the eaergy of the social trck the labels of "energetics" or "biologico-sociology" on whole. . . . " The second half of the phrase is undoubtedly to such phenomena as crises, revolutions, the class struggle a simple repetition of the first half expressed in meaningless :rnd so forth; but neither is there aflything more sierile, terms rvhich seem to lend "profundity" to the question, but tnore scholastic and lifeless than such an occupation. The which in reality in no zoay differ from the eclectic biologico- inrportant thing is not that Bogdanov tries to frt all his results sociological attempts of Lange and Co. ! - "but the dishar- :rrrd conclusions into the Marxist theory -or "neaily" all monious character. of this process leads to its culmination (we have seen the "correction" he made on the sublect of in a crisis, in a vast viaste of productive forces, in a sharp thc relation of social being to social consciousness) but decrease of energy: positive - selection is replaced by negative tl.rat the rnetbods of fitting - this "social energetics" - are selection" (p.rs). thoroughly false and in no way difier from the methods of In what way does this difler from Lange? A biologico- l-ange. energeticist label is tacked on to ready-made conclusions on "Herr Lange (On the Labour Question, etc., znd ed.)," the subiect of crises, without any concrete material whatever Marx wrote to Kugelmann on Jlur,e 27, r87o, "sings my 398 EMPIRIO-CRITICISMANDHISTORICALMATERIALISM Ilo,i( BocDANov coRnEcrs AND !,DEvELops,' MARX 399 praises loudly, but with the oblect of making himself im- A historical peculiarity of modern Russian Machism (or pottart. Flerr Lange, you see, has made a Steat discovery. r:rLher of the Machian epidernic arnong a section of the The wliole oI history can bc brought under a single great Social-Democrats) is the following. Feuerbach uras a "ma- natural law. This natural law is the phrase (in this applica- tcrialist below and an idealist above"; this to a certarn extent tion Darwin's expression bccomes nothing but a phrase) :rpplies also to Biichner, Vogt, Moleschott and Diihring, with 'struggle for life,' and the content of this phrase is the Mal- thc essential diflerence that all these philoscphers were pyg- thusian law of population ot, ral-.her, over-population. So, rnics and wretched bunglers comparecl with Feuerbach. instead of analysing the 'struggle fot life' as represented Marx and Engels, as they g(ew out of Feuerbach and historically in various definite forms of society, all that has matured in the fight agaiflst the bunglers, naturally paid to be done is to translate every concrete struggle into thc nrost attention to c(owning the structure of philosophical phrase 'struggle lor life,' and this phrase itself into the rnaterialisrn, that is, not to the materialist episternology but Malthusian 'population fantasy.' One must admit that this to the materialist conception of history. 'Ihat is why Marx is a very irnpressive method - for svraggering, shanr-scientific, nnd Engels laid the emphasis in their works rather on dia- bombastic ignorance and intcllectual laziness."ltS lactica{. materialism than on dialectical materialism, why they The basis of Marx's criticisrn of I-ange is not that l"ange insisted rather on bistorical materialism than on historical foists Malthusianism in particular upon sociology, but that ltaterialisrn. Our would-be Marxist Machians approached tire transfet of biological concepts itt. general to the sphete Marxism in an entircly difietent historical period, at a time o[ the social sciettces is pbrasetnongeting. Whether ttrlc trans- lviren bourgeois philosophers were particularly specialising fer is undettaken with "good" intentions, or with the purpose in epistemology, ancl, having assimilated in a one-sided and of bolstering up false sociological conclusions, the phrase- mutilated forrn certain of the cornponent parts of dialectics mon.geting none the less remains phrasemongering. And (rctrativism, for instance). directed their attention chiefly to Bogclanov's "social energetics," his coupling of the cloctrinc a defence or restorati,on of idealism below and not of ideatrism of social selection with Marxism, is just such phrasemon- rbove. . At any rate, positivism in general, and Machism 8er1ng. iLr particular, have been much more concerned with subtly Just as in epistemology Mach and Avenarius did not l'alsifying epistemology, assurning the guise of materialism develop idealisrn, but only overlaid the olcl idealist err:ors and concealing their iclealism under a pseudo-materialist ter- with a bombastic terminological rigmarole ("elements," rninology, and have paid comparatively little attention to the "p/lncipal co-ordination," "'inffoiection," etc.), so in sociotrogy, philosophy of history. Our A4achians did nor understand er"n -lren there is sincere sympathy for Matxist conctrusions, Marxisrn because they happened to approach it from tbe empirio-criticism results in a distortion of historical material- otlter side, so to speak, and they have assimilated and at and biolog- - ism by means of empty and bombastic energeticist times not so much assimilated as learnt by rote - Marx's ical verbiage, cconomic and historical theory, rvithout clearly apprehending suvoRov's oF socIAL pHllosopHy" 401 4OO EI"IPIRIO-CRITICISM AND HISTORICAL MATI "FouNDAl'IoNs its fowdation, oix., philosophical materialism. And the thc clialectics of Marx and Engels to be mysticism, of Luna- result is that Bogdanov and Co. deservc to be called Russian charsky, who goes to the length of religion, of Yushkevich, Biichners and Diihrings turncd inside out. They want to who introduces "the Logos into the irrational stream of ex- be materialists above, but are unable to rid themselves of pcrience," of Bogdanov, who calls idealisrn the philosophy rauddled idealism below! In the case of Bogdanov, "above" o[ Marxism, of Helfond, who putges J. Dietzgen of material- "Foundations there is historical materialism, vulgarised, it is true, and much ism, and lastly, of S. Suvorov with his atticle corrupted by idealism, "below" there is idealisn-r, disguised of Social Philosophy" - you at once get the "aroma" of in Marxist tetminology and decked out in Marxist viords. the new alignment. Quantity has passed into quality. The "seekers," "Socially organised experiencc," "collective labour process," who had heretofore been seeking separately in ancl so forth are Marxist v'ords, but they are only *^otd.r, individual articles and books, have come out rr,'ith a veritable concealing an idealist philosophy that cleclares things to be pronunciamento. Individual disagreements among thern are obliterated appearance complexes of "clements," of sensatiotts, the external worlcl by the very fact of their collective ogainst (and "in") philosophy to be "exp erience," or an "empirio-symbol" of mankind, not the of Marxism, and the physical flature to be a "procluct" of the "psychical," and reactionary features of Machism as a curreflt becorne mani- so on and so forth. fest. An ever subtlcr falsification of Marxistn, an ever subtler Under these circumstances, Suvorov's article is all the presentation of anti-rnaterialist doctrines under the guise of more interesting for the fact that the author is neither an cmpirio-monist nor an ernpir.io-criticist, "realist." tr4arxism this is the characteristic feature of modern revi- but simply a - relates therefore, rest company is sionism in political economy, in questions of tactics and in \flhat him, to the of the not Bogdanov philosophy gcnerally, both in epistcmoiogy ancl in sociology. what distinguishes Eazarov, Yushkevich and as philosophers, but what they all have in common against dialectical materialism. A comparison of the sociological :xguments of this "realist" with the argurnents of the empirio- 3. SLTVO]1OV'S "FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY" nronist will help us to dcpict their comruon tendency. Suvorov v/rites: "In the gradation of the laws that regu- The Studies "in" the Pbilosophy of Marxism, the con- late the world process, the particular and complex become cluding aticle in r.vhich is the one by Comrade S. Suvorov reduced to the general and simple, and all of them are mentioned above, by very reason of the collective nature of subordinate to the universal law of development - tbe lau: the book constitutes an unusually potent bouquet. \When ol tbe econoruy ol t'orces. T'he essence of this law is that you have at one time and side by side the utterances oI eoery systenx ot' t'orces is tbe ntore capable of conserzsation Bazatov, who says that accorcling to Engels "sense-perception and dettelopntent tbe less its expenditure, tbe greater its is the reality existing outside us," of Berman, who declares acuunulation ancl tbe more eflectioely e:cpeftdittn'e serzses ..FoUI.JDATIoNS 4A2 EN{PI1IIo.CRITICISMANDI-IISIoRICALMATERIALISM SUVonoV,S oF SoCIAL PIIILoSoPHY'' 403 dccuffiillatioru. The forms of mobile equilibrium, which long l'rrrnration of energy into the law of the "econotny ol force.r"? ago evoked the idea of objectivc expediency (the solar system, 'l'hcre are no such facts or discoveries; Suvorov does not the cycle of terrestrial phenomena, the process of life), arise cvcn hint at thern. He simply - to make it look impressive, and develop by virtlle of the conservation and accumutration rrs Turgenev's Bazarovrtg used to say - flourished his pen of the energy inhercnt in thcm - by virtue of their intrinsic ;rnd forth calne a new "universal law" of "real-monistic ecolomy. The law of cconomy of forces is the unifying plrilosophy" (p. ,Sr)- That's the stuff v/e are made of ! How and tegulating principle of all developmeut - inorganic, tre wc worse than Diihring? biological and social" (p. ,gl, author's italics). Take the second field of development - the biological. In Y/ith '"vhat remarkable ease do our "positivists" and this field, where the development of organisms takes place "realists" turo out "universal laws"! What a pity these laws by the struggle for existence and selection, is it the law of are flo whit better than those turned out as easily and sv-iftly tlre economy of forces or the "l.aw" of the wastage of forces by Eugen Diihring. Suvoror,'s "universal law" is just as that is universal? But never mind! "Real-monistic philos- empty and bornbastic a phrase as Diihring's universal laws. ophy" can interpret the "meaning" of a universal law in Try to apply this law to the first of the thrce fields mentionecl one fie1d in one way and in another fietrd in another way, by the author - inorganic development. You will see that for instance, as the development of bigber organisms from no "economy of forces" apart from the law of the conser- lorver. lVhat does it mattcr if the universal law is thus trans- vation and transformation of energy can be applied hcre, formed into an empty phrase - the principle of "monism" let alone applied "universally." And the author had aheady is preserved. And in the third field (the social), the "uni- disposed of the law of the "coinservation of energy," had vcrsal law" can bc interprcted in a third sense - as the already nrentioned it (p. z9z) as a seperate law.* What clcveloprncnt of productive forces. That is why it is a "uni- then remained in the field of inorganic development aparc versal law" - so that it can be made to cover anything yoLr from this law? Wherc arc the aclditions or complications, please. or ne\',/ discovcries, or ne\r facts n.hich entitled thc author "Although social science is still young? it aheady possesses to modify ("pertcct") the law of the conscrvation and trans- both a solid foundation and definite generalisations; in the

* It is charactcristic that Suvorov cal1s the discovery of thc law of is iust the ttoublc: "realists" like this succumb to fashion, while Engels, the conservation and transfotmation of energy "the establishment of the for instance, assimilated the, to him, fiezo terfti, energy, and began to basic principles ol energeticl'(p. z9z). Has our would-be Marxist cmploy it in 1885 (Preface to the znd ed. of Anti-Dtibing) and in 1888 "rcalist" ever hcard of thc fact that the vulgar materialists, Biichner and (Luduig Feuerbacb), but to employ it equally vith the concepts l'force" Co., and tbe dialectical materialist, Engels, regarded this 1aw as the end "motion" and along with them. Engcls was able to enrich his cstablishment of the basic principles oI materialism? IIas our "realist" niaterialisnz by adopting a new terminology. The "realists" and other ever reflectcd on the meaning oI this difference? IIe has not: he hrts muddleheads seized upon the nerv tetm without noticing the difierence merely follorved the fashion, repcatcd Ostwalcl, and that is all. That betrveen materialism and energetics! 404 Er,rprRro-cRrTrcrslrANDrrrsroRrcAlI{ATERIALISM STI\/O]TOV'S "FOT]NDATIONS OF SOCIAL PLIII,OSOPHY" 405 nineteenth century it reached a theoretical level - and this prccise and definite facts it embraces; - and this cannot bc constitutcs Marx's chief merit. He elevated social science cxplained, because it is a muddle. Listen to this: to the level of a social theory [Engels said that Marx trans- " . . . This law of social economy is not only the principle formed socialisrn from a utopia into a science, but this is of the internal unity of social science [can you make any- flot enough for Suvorov. It \r,ill sound more impressive if Lhing of this, reader?], but also the connecting link betuieen we distinguish tbeont from sci.eztce (rvas there a social science social theory and the general theory of being" (p. ,Sq). before Marx?) - and no harm is done if the distinction is \X/e11, well, here we have "the general theory of being" absurd !1. once more discovered by S. Suvorov, after it has aheady " . . . by establishing the fundamental law of social been discovered, many timcs and in the most varied forms dynamics according to which the evolution of productive by nurnerous representatives of scholastic philosophy. We forces is the determining principle of all economic and social con.gratulate the Russian Machians on this new "general development. But the development of productive forces theory of being"! Let us hope that their next collective corresponds to the growth of the productivity of labour, to work will be entirely devoted to the demonstration and the relative reduction in expenditur.e arrd the increase in the development of this great discovery! accumulation of energy [see how fertile the "real-monistic The way our representative of realistic, or real-monistic, philosophy" is: a new, energeticist, foundation for Marxism philosophy expounds Marx's theory will be seen from the has been created!] . . . this is the economic principle. Thus, following example: "In general, the productive fotces of men Marx made the principle of the economy of forces the form a genetic gradation [ugh!] and consist of their labour foundation of thc social theory. . . . " cnergy, harnessed elemental forces, culturally modified nature This "thus" is truly superb ! Because Marx has a political and the instruments of labour which make up the technique economy, let us tberelore chew the oord "economy," and of production. . In relation to the process cf labour these call the cud "real-monistic philosophy"! forces perform a putcly economic function; they economise No, Marx did not make any principle of the economy of labour energy and increase the productivity of its expendi- forces the basis of his theory. Thcse are absurdities invented ture" (p. z9B). Productive forces perform an economic func- by people who covet the laurels of Eugen Diihring. Marx tion in relation to the process of labour! This is iust as gave an absolutely precise definition of the concept growth though one v/ere to say that vital forces perform a vital of productive forces, and he studied the concrete process of function in relation to the process of life. This is not ex- this growth. But Suvorov invented a new term to designate pounding Marx; this is clogging up Marxism with an in- the concept analysed by Marx; and his invention was a very credible clutter of words. unhappy one and only confused matters. For Suvorov did It is impossible to enumerate all the clutter contained in not explain what is meant by the "economy of forces," how Suvorov's article. "The socialisation of a class is expressed it can be measured, how this concept can be applied, what in the growth of its coilective power over both people and 406 EMPIRIO-CRITICISM AND I{ISTORICAL AIATERIALISM PAR.I]ES IN PIJIT,oSoPHY AND PHII,oSoPHICAL BLoCKHEADS 407 their property" (p. yl). The class struggle aims at plrysics, we traced the struggle between ntaterialism arrd estabtrishing forms of equilibrium between social forces" itlealisru. Behind the mass of new terminological devices, b. l.r). Social dissension, enmity and struggle are essentially bchind the litter of erudite scholasticism, we invariabtry dis- negative, anti-social phenomcna. "Social progress, in its ccrned tu;o pdncipal alignrnents, two fundamental trends in basic content, is the growth of social relations, of the social the solution of philosophical problems. Whether natlrre, connections betv/een people" (p. lz8). One could fill volumes matter, the physical, the exte(nal world should be taken as with collections of such banalities - and the representatives primaty, and consciousfless, mind, sensation (experience - of bourgeois sociology are filling volurnes with them. Bur as the usidespread terminology of our time has it), the psy- to pass them off as thc philosophy of Marxism - that is chical, etc., should trre regarded as secondary - that is the going too fat! I[ Suvorov's article ];vere an experiment in root question which in fact continr-res to divicle the philos- popularising Marxism, one would not iudge it very severely. ophers itto tzo;o great camps. The source of thousands upon Everyone would admit that the author's intentions were of thousands of errors and of the confusion reigning in this the best but that the experiment was unsuccessful. And that sphere is the fact that beneath the envelope of terms, defini- would be the end of it. But r,yhen a group of Machians tions, scholastic devices and vcrbal artifi.c.es, these two funda- preseflt us with such stuff and call it the Fowndations ol mental trends arc ooerloolzed. (Bogdanov, for instance, SociaL Pbilosopby, and when v/e see the same methods of rcfuses to acknowledge his idealism, because, you see, instead "developing" Marxisrn emptroyed in Bogclanov's philosophical of the "metaphysical" concepts "tature" and "mind," he books, we arrive at the ine,ritable conclusion that there is has taken the "experiential": physical and psychical. A word an intimate conoection between rcactionary epistemology and has been changed!) rcactionary efforts in sociology. The genius of Matx and Engels consisted in the very fact that in the course of a long period, nearly hall a celztilry, they developed materialism, that they further advanced one 4. PAR.TIE,S IN PFIILOSOPHY AND fundamental trend in philosophy, that they did not stop at P}{ILOSOPHICAL BLOCKHEADS rcitetating epistemological problems that had already been solvecl, but consistently applied - and showed hou to apply It remains for us to examine the relation betu,een Ma- - this satne materialisrll in the sphere of the social sciences, chism and religion. But this btoadens into the quesrion of mercilessly brushing aside as tritter and rubbish the preten- whether there ate parties generally in philosophy, and what tious rigmarole, the innurnerable attempts to "discover" a is meant try non-partisanship in philosophy. "new" line in philosophy, to invent a "new" trend and so Throughout the preceding exposition, in connection with forth. The verbal nature of such attempts, the scholastic every problem of epistetnology touched upon and in connec- play with new phitrosophical "isms," the clogging of the tion with every philosophical questiofl raised by the new issue by pretentious devices, the inability to comprehend and 408 EMprRro-cRrTrcrstrANDHrsToRrcALMATERIALISM PARTIES IN PHILOSOPHY AND PHIIOSOPHICAL BLOCKHEADS 409

clearly present the struggle between the two fundamental volume ol Capital, Marx fust as clearly and definitely con- epistemological trends - this is what Marx and Engels per- trasied bis materialism to Hegel's idealisrn, the most consistently pursued and fought against throughout their entire sistent and developed idealism of ali; he contemptuously activity. ri/e brushed Comtean "positivism" aside and dubbed as wretch- said, "neaily half a century." And, indeed, as far cd epigoni the contemporary philosophers who imagined that back as 1843, when Marx was only becoming Marx, i.e., the they had destroyed Hegel when in reality they had reverted founder of scientific socialism, the founder of. znodern mate- to a repetition of the pre-Hegelian errors of Kant and Hume. rialisru, which is immeasurably richer in content and in- Irr tlre letter to I(ugelmann of June 21, r97o, Marx refers comparably more consistent than all preceding forms of just as contemptuously to "Biichner, Lange, Diihting, materialism, even at that time Marx pointed out with amaz- Iicchner, etc.," because they understood flothing of Hegel's ing clarity the basic trends in philosophy. Karl Griin quotes dialectics and treated him with scorn.* And finally, take a letter from Marx to Feuerbach dated Octob er zo, r841,r20 in tlre various philosophical utterances by Marx in Capital and which Marx invites Feuerbach to write an article for the crther works, and you will find an inoariable basic :rrotif, oiz., Deutscb-Franxdsiscbe Jabrbiicberl2l againsr Schelling. This insistence upon maierialism and contemptuous derision of all Schelling, writes Marx, is a shallow braggart with his claims obscurity, of all confusion and all deviations towards ideal- to having embracecl and transcended all previous philosoph- isnr. All Marx's philosophical utterances revolve within ical trends. "To the French romanticists and mystics he these two fundamental opposites, anC, in the eyes of pro- [Schelling] says: I am the union of philosophy and theology; fcssorial philosophy, their defect lies in this "narrowness" to the French materialists: I am the union of the flesh and and "one-sidedness." As a mattet ol tact, this refusal to the idea; to the French sceptics: I am the destroyer of dog- recognise the hybrid projects for reconciling materialism and matism."* "sceptics," That the be they called Humeans or idealism constitutes the great merit of Marx, who moved Kantians (or, in the twcntieth century, Machians), out cry forroard along a sharply-defined philosophical r.oad. against the "dogmatism" of both materialism and idealism, Entirely in the spirit of Marx, and in close collaboration Marx at that time already realised; and, without letting him- with him, Engels in all his phiiosophical works briefly and self be diverted by any oae of a thousand wretched little clearly cofltrasts the materiaiist and idealist lines in rcgatd philosophical systems, he was able through Feuerbach to take to all qttestions, without, either in 1878, or 1888, or r}gz,124 the direct materialist road as against idealism. Thirty yeari taking seriously the endless attempts to "transcend'? the later, in the afterword to the second edition of the first * Of the positivist Beesly, Marx, in the letter of December r3, r87o, + Karl Grijn, I-ttcloig Feuerbacb in seineru BrieloecLsel und Nacblass, speaks as follows: "Professor Bcesly is a Comtist and as such obligcd soutie in sciner pbilosopbiscben CharakterentzLicklung, L Bd., Leipzig, to think up all sorts of crotchets."122 Cornpare this with the opinion t874, S. 36r. givcn of the positivists of the Huxley type by Engels in 1892.123 4L0 EMPIRIO-CRITICISM AND IIlSTORICAl, MATERIALISM PARTIES IN PHILOSOPHY AND PIIILOSOPFIICAL BLOCKHEADS 411

"one-sidedness" of materialism and idealism, to proclaim a Y/ithout undertaking an examination of the vast numbcr 7!e@ ttencl - "positivism," "realism," or some othef proof shades of Neo-Kantianism in Germany and oI Humism fessorial charlatanism. Engels based his zobote fight against in England, Engels lroru tbe oery outset refutes their funda- Diitrring on the dematd for consistent adherence to mate- mental deviation from materialisrn. Engels declares that the rialism, accusing t on- cn.tire tenderucy of these two schools is "sci.entifically a step fusing the issue, of ing bacleuard." And what is his opinion of the undoubtedly rvhich involvcd a ion "positivist," according to the curreot terminology, the un- of the position of ent cloubtedly "realist" tendencies of these Neo-I(antians and to the end, or the falsehood and confusion of philosophical Humeans, among whose number, for instance, he could not idealism such is the formulation of the question given in 'palagrapb- hclp knowing Huxley? That "positivism" and that "realism" eoery of Anti-Diibring; and only people whose rvhiclr attracted, ancl which continue to atftact, an in6nite minds had alteady been corrupted by reactionary profes- number of nruddleheads, Engels declared to be at b e s t sorial philosophy could faii to notice ir. And right down a pliilistine lftetlrocl ot' stteuggling in, rtaterialisnz while abusing to 1894, when the last prcface was written to Anti-Dtibring, and abjuring it publicly ! One has to reflect only very little on revised and enlarged by tire author for the last time, Engels .ru.cb an appraisal of Thomas Huxlcy a very Sreat sciefltist continued to follow the latest developments both in philos- - and an incomparahly more realistic realist and positive posl- ophy and science, and continued with all his forrner tivist than Mach, Avenarius and Co. in order to under- resoluteness to hold to his lucici and firm position, brushing - contemptuously Engels would have greeted the arvay the litter of ncw systems, big and Iittle. stand how present group of Marxists with "recent That Engels follor.ved the new developrnents in philosophy infatuation of a positivism," "latcst realism," etc' is evident iram Lud,roig Feuerbacb. In the 1888 preface, the partisans philosophy from start mention is evcn made of such a phenomenon as the rebirth A{a-rx and Engels wete in mate- of classical German philosophy in England and Scandinavia, to finish, they were able to detect the deviations from each and whereas Engels (both in the preface and in the text of the riatrism and concessions to idealism and fideism in book) has oothing but the most extreme contempt for the every "new'l tendency. They therefore appraised Huxley prevailing Neo-I(antianism and Hurnism. It is quite obvious exclusioely frorn the standpoint of his materialist consistency. pursuing mate- that Engels, observing the repetition by fasbionable Getman They therefore rebuked Feuert,ach for not and English philosophy of the old pre-Ilegelian errors of rialism to the end, for tenouncitg materialism because of the Kantianism and Humism, rMas prepared to expect some good errors of individual rnaterialists, for combating teligion in even lronz tbe turn to Hegel (in England and Scandinavia), order to reflovate it or invent a flew religion, for being un- hoping that the great idealist and dialectician would help able, in sociology, to rid himself of ir1calist phraseology and to disclose petty idealist and metaphysical errors. become a materialist. pHll,osopH\. 4L2 EIIPIRIO-CR]TICISM AND HISTORICAL tr,IATERIAI,TSM rj,\R]'tES IN AND pIIILosopIiIcAL BLoCKLIEADS 4lJ

And wlratever partictlar mistakcs he committed in his tcmptiblc tnidtlle party in philosophy, who confuse the mate- exposition of dialectical materialism, J. Dietzgcn full1, sp1',."- tialist and idealist trends on every question. The attempt ciated and took over this great and most precious tradition to escape these two basic trends in philosophy is nothing of his teachers. Dietzgcn sinned much by his clumsy devia- but "conciliatory quackery"" tions ftorn materialism, but he never attempted to dissociate J. Dietzgen had not the slightest doubt that the "scientific himself from it in principle, he nevcr attempted to hoist a pricstcraft" of idealist philosophy is simply the antechamber "new" standard and always at the decisive noment he to open priestcraft. "Scientific priestcraft," he wrote, "is 6rmly and catcgorically declated: I am a materialist; our ser:iously endeavouring to assist religious priestcraft" (op. philosophy is a rnatcrialist philosophy. "Ot all parties," our cit., p. 5t). "h partictiar, the sphere of epistemology, the Joseph Dictzgen lustly said, "the midclle party is the most misunderstanding of the human rnind, is such a louse-hole" repr-rlsive. Just as parties in politics are lrore and more (Lausgrurbe) in which both kinds of priests "lay their eggs." becon-ring divicled into tr.vo canps . so science too is bcing "Gtaduated flunheys," who with their talk of "ideal bless- divided inLo two general classes (Gcneralklassen): metaphysi- ings" stultify the people by their tortlrous (gescbraubte) cians on the one hand, and physicists, or materialists, on the "idealism" (p. l;) - that is J. Dietzgen's opinion of the pro- other.* Thc intermediate elements and conciliatory quacks, fessors of philosophy. "Just as the antipodes of the good with their various appcllations - spiritualists, sensationalists, God is the devil, so the professorial priest (Katbederpfat'fen) rcalists, etc., etc. - fall into the current on their way. We has his opposite pole in the materialist." The materialist aim at definiteness and clarity. The reactionaries who sound theory of knowledge is "a universal weapon against religious a tetreat (Iletraitcbhiset) call themselves ictrealists,** and belief" (p. ll), and not only against the "notorious, formal materialists should be the name for all who are striving and common religion of the priests, but also against the most to liberate the humat mind from the metaphysical spell. refined, elevated professorial religion of muddled (benebelter) If we compare the tvzo pa.rties rcspectively to solid and idealists" (p. ls). liquid, between them there Ir u -rr|r."*** Dietzgen was ready to prefer "religious honesty" to the True! The "realists," etc., including the "positivists," the "half-heartedness" of freethinking professors (p. 6o), for Machians, etc., ate all a rvretched mush; they are a con- "there at least therc is a system," there we find integral people, people rvho do not separate theory from practice. +I{ere again we have a clumsy and inexact exptession: instead of For the Herr Professors "philosophy is not a science, but a "metaphysiciaos," he should have said "idealists," Elsewhere Dietzgen means of defence against Social-Democracy .. ." (p. ,oZ). himself contrasts the metaphysicians and the dialecticians. "A11 who call themselves philosophers, professors, and uni- ** Note that Dietzgen has coriectcd himself and now explair,s ntore versity lecturers are, despite their apparent freethinking, e::actl1 which is the party of the enemies of matetialism. more or less immersed in superstition and mysticism **+ See the article, "Social-Democratic Philosophy," vritten in r876, I{leinere pl:ilosophiscbe Scbrit'ten, r9o3, S. r35. and in relation to Social-Democracy constitute a single 4t4 EJVIPIRIO-CRITICISM AND HISTORICAL MATERIALISI{ I,ARI,IES IN l,HlLoSoPHY AND PHILoSoP}]]CAI- BLoCKHF]ADS 4L5 reactionary rnass" (p. ro8). "Now, in order to fotrlow the It is the misfortune of the Russian Machians, who undcr- true path, 'nvithout being lecl astray by ali the religious and took to "recotc77e" Machisrn and Marxisrn, that they trusted philosophical gibberish (Wetscb), it is necessary to study lhe reactionary profcssors of philosophy and as a result the falsest of all false paths (der FlolTroeg der Holzzosegc), slipped down an inclined plane. The methods of operation philosophy" (p.rol). cmployed in the various attempts to develop and supplc- Let us now exarninc Mach, Avenarius and their school rrrcnt l\4arx vr'ere not very ingenious. They read Cstwald, from the stanclpoint of parties in philosophy. Oh, these bclieve Ostwaid, paraphrase Ostwalcl and call it Marxism. gentlemen boast of tb.efu nan-partisansbip, and if they have They read Mach, believe Mach, paraphrase Mach and call it an antipodes, it is the ntaterialist . . . and only the rnaterial- A4arxism. They read Foincar6, believe poincar6, paraphrase ist. A red thrcad that runs through al,l the writings of all the !)oincar€ and cali it Marxism! Not a single one of these pro- Machians is the stupid claim to have "risen abotre" mate- fcssors, who are capable of making very valuable contribu- rialism and idealism, to have transcended this "obsolete" tions in the special fields of chernistry, history, or physics, antitlresis; but in t'act the whole fuaternity are continually cdn be irusted one iota when it cornes to philcsophy. Why? sliding into ideaiism and are conducting a steady and fior the same reason that not a single professor of political incessant struggle agaiost materialism. The subtle episte- ccoflorny, who may be ca.pablc of very valuable contributions mological crotchets of a man like ,Avenarius are but profes- in the field of factual and speciaiisccl investigations, can be sotial inventions, an attempt to form a small philosophical trusted one iota when it comes to the general theory of gener.al sect "of his orvn"; bttt, as d nxatter of t'act, in the political economy. For in moclern society the latter is as circumstances of the struggle of ideas and trends in rlodern much a peltisan science as is epistcruology. Taken as a society, the objectirse part played by thcse episternological irrhole, the professors of economics are oothing but learned artifices is in every case the same, namely, to cleat the way salesrnen of the capitalist class, while thc professors cf for iclealism and fideism, and to serve them faithfully. In philosophy are leatned satresmen of the theologians. fact,it cannot be an accident that the small school of empirio- criticists is acclairned by the English spiritualists, like !flard, by the French neo-criticists, who praise Mach for his attack on materialism, and by the German immanentists ! Dietz- gen's expression, "graduated flunkeys of fideism," hits the nail on the head in the case of Mach, Avenarius and their whole school.*

* Hete is another example of how the widesptead crlrtents ol teactionary borrtgeois philosophy make use of Machism in ptactice. Pcrhaps the lllatest fashion" in the latest Ametican philosophy is "pragmatism" 4t6 EMPIRIO.CRITICISM AND HISTORICAL MATERIALISM )PIIY AND PHILoSoPHICAL BLoCKHEADS 417

The task of Marxists in both cases is to be able to master logical" idealism; but fideism takes its toli from every such and adapt the achievements of these "salesmen" (for in- ir.rfatuation and modifies its devices in a thousand ways for stance, you will not make the slightest progress in the in- ttrre benefit of philosophical idealism. vestigation of new economic phenomena unless you have The attitude towards religion and the attitude towards recourse to the works of these salesmen) and to be able to lop natnral science excellently illustrate the actual class use made off their rcactionary tendency, to pursue yo:ut o@n line and of ernpirio-criticism by bourgeois reactionaries. hostile to combat the uthole alignruent of forces and classes Take the first question. Do you think it is an accident to to us. And this is iust what our Machians were unable tlrat in a collective work directed against the philosophy of slaoishly follow the lead of the reactionary profes- do; they Marxism Lunacharsky went so far as to speak of the "Perhaps have gone astray, but we sorial philosophy. we "deification of the higher human potentialities," of "religious are seeking," rrrote Lunacharsky in the name of the authors atheism," etc.?* If you do, it is only because the Russian the The trouble is that it is not you who are of Studies. Machians have not informed the public correctly regarding seeking, but you who are being sougbt! You do not go with the zohole Machian current in Europe and the attitude of yotr, i.e., Marxist (for you want to be Marxists), standpoint this current to religion. Not only is this attitude in no way to every change in the boutgeois philosophical fashion; the similar to the attitude of Marx, Engels, Dietzgen and even fashion comes to you, foists upon you its new surrogates got J. Feuerbach, but it is the oery opposite, beginning with up in the idealist taste, one day it la Ostwald, the next day Petzoldt's statement to the effect that empirio-criticism d la Mach, and the day after ir la Poincar6. These silly "contradicts neither theism atheism" (Eint'tihrung "theoretical" devices ("energetics," "elements," "introiec- nor in die Philosopbie der reinen Erfabrung, tions," etc.) in which you so naively believe are confined to Bd. I, S. llr), or Mach's declaration "religious a narrow and tiny school, while the ideological and social that opinion is a pivate afrair,, (French trans., p. and tendency of these devices is immediately spotted by the 44), ending with the expl.icit fideisrn, the arcb-teactionary Wards, the neo-criticists, the immanentists, the Lopatins and explicitly views of Cornelius, who praises the pragmatists, and it serrses tbeit putposes. The infatua- Mach and whom Mach praises, of Carus and of all the tion for empirio-criticism and "physical" idealism passes as immanentists. The neutrality of a pbilosopber h this ques- rapidly as the infatuation for Neo-Kantianism and "physio- tion ls in itsell servility to fideism, and Mach and Avenarius, because of the very premises of their epistemology, do not standpoint of materialism the tgoj, pp. 57 and ro6 especially). Ftom tl.re and cannot rise above neutrality. difference between Machism and pragmatism is as insignificant and unimportant as the difierence betu'een empirio-criticism and empirio- * monism, Compate, for example, Bogdanov's definition o{ truth with the Studies, pp. tt7, rtg. ln the Zagraniclnnya Gaqetal25 the same author "Truth a ptagmatist becomes speaks "scientiEc pragmatist definition of ttuth, which is: for of sociaiism in its religious significance,, (No. '!.Ftr'a3, O. ,; a class-name fot all sorts o{ definite working values in experience" (ibid', and in Obraryoaniye,L2i r9o8, No. r, p. 164, he explicitly says: p. 68). long time a new religion has been maturing within me.,, pAItl'IES IN pl+rr,osopH.lr AND pHrrosopHICAL 418 EI{PIRIO-CRITICISM AND HISTORICAL MATERIAL]SM BLocKHEADs 4lg o given us in sensation, should serve, and it is exploited as it cleserves to be exploited. The shameful lo Your rr/eaPons against things to which Lunacharsky has stooped afe av Snosticism or subiectiv- flot re the product of empirio_ the world criticism, Gerrnan. They cannot be all If PercePtual ,,good is obfective rca7ity, tl.ren the door is ctroscd to every other clefended the inteotions,, of the "rcality" o. qrrrri-r"ulity (remernber that Bazatov behleved autiror, or the "special meaning" of his words; if ir were the direct tire "rla[sm" of the immanentists, who declare God to be and common, i.e., the directly fideistic meaning, we a "rcal concept"). If the world is matter in motion, matter should not stop to discuss matiers with the author, for rnost likely not a siagle can ancl .rrrt b" infinitely studied in the infinitely complex Marxist could be found in rvhose eyes such statements and detailed manifestations and ramifications ol tbis motion, would not ltave placed Anatole Lunacharsky the tnotion of this rnatter; but beyond it, beyoncl the cxactly in the same categary as Peter Struve. If this is not (and "physical," exteraal world, with which everyone is farniliar, the case it is not the case yet), it is exclusively because perceive there can be nothing. And the hostitrity to rnaterialism and we the "special" meaning and are figbting zohile tbcre is ground the showers of abuse heaped on the materialists ate all in still for a fight on cornradely lines. This is just the orcler of things in civilised and democtatic Europe' All the disgrace of Lunacharsky's statements thatlte could, connect - this is going on to this day. A11 this is being cancealed frorn tirern with his "good" intentions. This is just the the public Machians cvil of his "theory" - that it permits the use of swch methods comPare or of sucb conclusions in the pursuit of good intentions. atternpted just materialisrn rius, Petz This is the trouble - that at best "good" intentions are staternents of mate the subjective afrair of Tom, Dick or trJ.arry, whlle the social significance of such statemcnts Matx, Engetrs and J. Dietzgen. is undeniable and indis- But this "concealment" of the attitude of Mach and putable, and no reservation or explanatiofl cafl mitigate it. One Avenarius to fideism will not avail. The facts speak for must be blind nor to see the ideological affinity themselves. No ef{orts can release these reactionary pro- belween Lunacharsky's "deification of the higher human potentialities" and "general fessors frorn the piliory in which they have been placed by tsogdaflov's substitution,, of the psychical physical the kisses of Ward, the neo-criticists, Schuppe, Schubert- for all nature. This is one and the same thougtrrt; in the one case it is expressed principally from the aesthetic standpoint, and in the othet frorn the epistemological standpoint. "substitution," approaching the subject tacitly and from a different angle, already deifies the .,higher human potentialities," by divorcing the "psychical', from man and oI Mach ancl Avenarius. T'he little school serves those it by substituting an immensely extended, aL)sttact, 421 420 EMPIRIo CRITICISM AND FIISI,ORICAL MATERIALISM Eri.Nsr HAECKEL AND ERNST MACH divinely-lifeless "psychical in general" for all pbysical natule. tlrc natural sciences,* i.e', taaxal-scieotific matetialism, and, "cortect' And what of Yushkevich's "Logos" introduced into the rrs hc himself admitted in r8gr (without, however, episte- "ircational stream of experience"? ing" his views!), attacked it from the standpoint of A single claw ensnared, and the bird is lost. And our mological idealism. Machians have all become ensnared in idealism, that is, in Take Mach. From r87z (or even earlier) down to 19o6 a diluted and subtle fideism; they became ensnared from hc waged continuous war ofl the metaphysics of natural the moment they took "sensation" not as an image of the *cience. However, he was conscientious enough to admit external wodd but as a special "elemert." It is nobody's that his views were shared by "a number of philosophers" by "zsery sciettists.'r sensation, nobody's mind, nobody's spirit, nobody's will - (tlre immanentists included), but leut this is what one inevitably cornes to if one does not recognise iAnatysis ot' Setzsation, p. 9)' In 19o6 Mach also honestly the materialist theory that the human nind reflects an objec- ,,.lrritied that the "maiority of scientists adhere to mat'erial- tively real external world. ism" (Erkenntt:tis und lttuffi, z. Aufl., S. 4)' Take Petzoldt. In rgoo he proclaimed that the "natural sciences are thoroughly (garz wnd 7ar) imbued r'vith 5. ERNST I.IAECKE,I, AND ERNST MACH

Let us now examine the attitude of Machism, as a pbilosophical current, towards the natural sciences. All Machism, from beginning to end, combats the "metaphysics" of the natural sciences, this being the name they give to natural- world outlook of the modern scientist is essentially no better scientific materialisna, i.e., to the instinctive, unwitting, un- than that of the ancient Indians. It makes no difierence formed, philosophically unconscious conviction shared by the whether the world rests ofl a mythical elephant or on iust overwhelming mafority of scientists regarding the objective as mythical a swarm atoms eplstemo- reality of the external world reflected by our consciousness. logicaily thought of as not used merely And our Machians maintain a skulking silence regarding *"taphori.ally (bloss bit 76). this fact and obscure or confuse the inseparable connection trt Witty, the on t enough to be between the instinctive materialism of the natural scientists ashamed" of his kinship with the immanentists' Yet, in r9o5 and philosopbical materialisrn as a trend, a trend known long he too declared: ". The natural sciences, after all, are ago and hundreds of times affirmed by Marx and Engels. also in fiIany respects an authority of which we rnust rid Take Avenarius. In his very first work, Pbilosopbie als ourselves" (Gegen die Scbutzoeisheit, S' ry8)' Denken der lVelt gemtiss dern PrinTip des kleinsten Krat't- ?rzasses, published in 1876, he attacked the metaphysics of + S$ zq, l.r4, etc. AND ERNST MACFI 423 422 EMPIRIo-CRTTTCISMANDHTsToRIcALMATERTAUSM ERNST }]AECKEL philosophical idealism. Mach's tsut this is all slteer obscurantisnt, out-and-out reaction.

shatters all the efforts and strivings of the thousand and one THE MONISTIC THEORY TI]E DUALISTIC THEORY little schools of philosophical idealism, positivism, realism, OF KNOWLEDGE OF KNOIrI-EDGE empirio-criticism and other confusionism. This foundation is natural-scientific materialisru. The conviction of the "naive realists" (in other words, of all humanity) that our sensations 3. Cognition is a physio- 3. Cognition is not a are images of an objectively real external world is the con- logical process, whose ana- physiological but a purely viction of the mass of scientists, one that is steadily growing tomical organ is the brain. spiritual process. and gaining in strength. 4. The only part of the 4. The part of the hu- The cause of the founders of new philosophical schools human brain in which man brain which appears and of the inventors of new epistemological "isms" is lost, knowledge is engendered is to function as the organ of inevocably and hopelessly. They may flounder about in a spatiaily limited sphere knowledge is in fact only tlreir "original" petty systems; they may strive to engage of the cortex, the phtonema. the instrument that Per- the attention of a few adrnirers in the interesting controversy mits the spiritual process as to who was the first to exclaim, "Ehl" -the empirio- to manifest itself. critical Bobchinsky, or the empirio-monistic Dobchinsky;127 they may even devote themselves to creating an extensive The phronema is a 5. The phroncma as the "speciaL" "immanentists." 5. literature, like the But the course highly perfectcd dynamo, otgan of reason is not auton- of developrnent of science, despite its vacillations and hesita- the individual parts of omous, but, through its tions, despite the unwitting charucter of the materiaiism of which, the phroneta, colr- constituent parts (phrone- the scientists, despite yesterday's infatuation with fashionable sist of millions of cells ta) and the cells that com- "physiological idealism" or today's infatuation with fashion- (phtonetal cells). Just as in pose them, serves onlY as able "physical idealism," is sra;eeping aside all the petty the case of every othet or- intermediary between the systems and artifices and once again bringing to the forefront gan of the body, so in the non-rnaterial rnind and the the "metaphysics" of natural-scientific materialism. case of this mental otgafi, external world. Hurnan rea- Here is an illustration of this from Haeckel. In his Tbe its function, the "mind," son difiers absolutely from Wonders ot' Life, Haeckel compares the rnonistic and dual- is the sum-total of the func- the mind of the higher istic theories of knowledge. We give the rnost interesting tions of its constituent animals and from the in- points of the comparison:x cells. stinct of the lower animals.

* I use the French ttanslation, Les merueilles de la zsie, Paris, Schlei- This typical quotation from his works shows that Haeckel cher, Tables I et XVI, does not attempt an analysis of philosophical problems and ERNST XIACH 429 428 EMprRro-cRITIcISMANDI:IISToRICALil{ATERIALISM NRNST I.IAECKEI, AND tbe is not able to contrast the materialist tl-reoty of knowledge rrncl Avenarius. Willy wipes his face in advance, in with the idealist theory of knowledge. He ridiatles all ideal- Loltaliru Tnanner. For the essence of the atguments which in ist more broadly, all peculiarly philosophical artificcs Mr. Lopatin and Mr. !7i11y marshal against materialism - - particular, is from the standpoint of natural scicncc, z'titltout eoen per- gcneral and natural-scientilic materialism in cxactly the same in both. To us Marxists the difierence be- nzitting tbe idca that any othcr theory of knowledge but 'Willy, natural-scientific materialism is possible. He riclicules the tween Mr. Lopatin and Messrs. Petzoldt, Mach and philosophers from the standpoint of a mateialist, 'oitbout Co. is no greatff than the differencc between the Protestant bimselt' realising that his standpoint is that of a matcrialist! tl.rcologians and the Catholic theotrogians' of ours The impotent v/rath aroused in the philosophers by this The "war" on Haeckcl bas ptooen that this view nature of almighty matcrialism is comptchensible. We quoted above corrcsponds to objectioe reality, i.e., to the class the opinion of the "true-Russian" Lopatin. And here is the rnodern society and its class ideological tendencies. opinion of Mr. Rudolf \X/i11y, the most progressive of the Here is another little examplc. The Machian Kleinpeter "empirio-criticists," rvho is irreconciJably hostile to idealism has translated from English into German, under the title (don't laugh!). "Haeckel's monism is a very heterogeneous of Das V/eltbild der modernen Natunoissenschat't lWoild mixture: it unites certain natural-scienti6c laws, such as the Picture ft'om tbe Standpoitzt of Madern Natural Sciencel in law of the conservation of energy . . . r.vith certain scholastic (Leipzig, r9o5), a work by Cad Snyder well known traditions about substance and the thing-in-itself into a America. This work gives a clear and popular account of a physics and other branches chaotic iumble" (Gegen die Scl:ukoeisbeit, S. eB). number of recent discoveries in lVhat has annoyed this most worthy "recent positivist"? of science. And the Machian Kleinpeter felt himself called makes W'e11, how could he help bcing annoyed when he imme- upon to supply the book with a preface in which he diately realised that from Haeckel's standpoint all the great certain resell)atio?ts, such as, for example, that Snyder's is "not satisfactory" (p. \il/hy so? Because doctrincs of his teacher Avenarius - for instance, that the cpistemology "). brain is not the organ of thought, tha-t sensations are not Snyclcr never entertains the slightest doubt that the world "ruatter images of the external world, that matter ("substance") or lricture is a picture of how matter fiIoves and of how Machine "the thing-in-itself" is not an oblective rcality, and so tltinks" (p. zzs). In his next book, Tbe Woild (Lonclon ancl New York, r9o7), Snyder, detring to the forth - are nothing but sbeer idealist gibberisb!? Ifaeckel did not say it in so many words because he did not concern fact that his book is dedicated to the memory of Democritus himself rvith philosophy and was flot acquainted with "em- of Abdera, who lived abortt 46o-16o ts.C., says: "Democritus pirio-criticism" as swcb. But Rudolf Willy could not help has often been styled the granclsire of materialism. It is a nowadays; realising that a hundred thousand Flaeckel readers meant as school of philosophy that is a litttre out of fashion many people spitting in the face of the pbilosophy of Mach yct it is $/orthy of note that practically all of the modern AND HISTORICAL MATT 430 EMPIRIO-CRITICISM ERNST HAECKEL AND ERNS.I- A,IACH 4:]L has been grounded upon advance in our ideas of this world cxistence only by grace of expediency, as long as thcy assump- iust his conceptions. Practically speaking, materialistic prove useful. Democritus was not free enough for this; but physical investigations" tions are simply uttescapable in neither are our modern natural scientists, with few exceP- (p.t+o).-- tions. The faith of old Democritus is the faith of our Berkeley ".'...If he like, he may dream with good Bishop scientists" (op. cit., p. may be the legcr- 57). that it is all a dream. Yet cornforting as And thete is good reason for despair! The "empirio- are still few among clemain of an idealised idealism, there criticists" have proven in quite a "new way" that both space regarding the problem of us who, whatcver they may think and atoms are "working hypotheses"; and yet the natural themselves exist; and the external world, doubt that they scientists deride this Berkeleianisrn arrd follow Haeckel. We of the lcb it needs no long pursuit of the will-o'-the-wisps are by no means idealists, this is a slander; we are only mo- and non-Icb to assure oneself that if in an unguarded striving (together wittr the idealists) to tefute the epistemo- have a personality and ment we assume that we ourselves logical line of Democritus; we have been striving to do so procession of appeannces which abeitg, 'we let in the whole for more than z,ooo years, but all in vain! And nothing The nebular hypothesis, .o*" of the six gates of the senses. better remains for our leader Ernst Mach to do than to all their the light-bearing ether, the dedicate his last work, the outcome of his life and philosophy, but it is like, may be but convenient wnd, lrutwn, to \Y/ilbeltn Scbwppe and to remark ve Erkenntnis well to remember that, in t Proof, ruefully in the text that the majority of scientists are ma- footing as the hypoth- they stand on mcre or less the same terialists and that "we also" sympathise with Haeckel you 'you,' Oh, Indulgent Reader, esis that a being call for his "freethinking" (p. 4). (PP. scans these lines" 3I-32)' And there he completely betrays himself, this ideologist the bitter lot of a l\4achian when his favourite Imagine of reactionary philistinism who folloos the arch-reactior,ary which teduce the categories of science subtle constructions, Schuppe and "synzpatbises" with Haeckel's freethinking' at by the scientists to mere working hypotheses, are laughed They are atl like this, these humanitarian philistines in as sheer nonsense! Is it to be on both sides of the ocean Europe, with their freedom-loving sympathies and their Rudolf Willy, i'n rgo5, combats Democritus wonclered that ideological (political and economic) captivity to the !7ilhetrm were living eflemy, thereby providing an as though he a Schuppes.* Non-partisanship in philosophy is only wretchedly of the partisdn cbaracter of philosopby excelleni illustration masked servility to idealism and fideism. and once more exposing the real position he himself takes He writes: "Of coursc, Democ- up in this partisan struggle? * Plekhanov in his ctiticism of ]Vlachism was lcss colcetned with riirs wa, not conscious of the fact that atoms and the void rcfuting Mach than with dealing a factional blow at Bolshcvism. For are only fictitious concepts which perform mere accessory this petty and misetable exploitation of fundamental theotetical dif- de punished two books by services (btosse Handlangerdienste), and maintain thcir fctences, hc has been already seweclly - with Machian Mensheviks.l% 432 EMPIRIO-CRITICISM AND HISTORICAL MATE Let us, in conclusiorl, compare this with the opinion of Haeckel held by Franz Mehring, who not only wants to be, but who knows horv to be a Marxist. The mome ntTlte Riddle ol tbe (Jnioerse appeared, towards the encl of 1899, Mehring pointed out that "Haeckcl's work, both in its less good and its very good aspects, is eminently adapted to help clatify the apparently rathcr confused views prevailing in the party as to the significance for it of ltistorical materialism, on the one hand, and historical ruaterialism, on the other."* COI{CLUSION Haeckel's defect is that he has not the slightest conception of bistorical materialism, which leads him to utter the most wocful nonsense about politics, about "monistic rri^igion," atd There are four standpoints from which a Marxist must so on and so forth. "Flaeckel is a materialist and monist, proceed to form a judgment of empirio-criticism. not a bistorical blt a natural-scienti{ic materialist" (ibid.). First and foremost, the theoretical foundations of this "He who wants to perceive this inability natural- [of philosophy must be compared with those of dialectical scientific materialism to deal with social problems] tangibly, materialism. Such a comparison, to which the first three he who vants to be convinced that natural-scientific mate- chapters were devoted, reveals, along tbe ohole line of episte- rialism must be broadened into historical materialism if it mological problems, the thorougbly reactionary character ol is really to be an invincible weapor in the great struggle for empirio-criticism, which uses ne\rr artifices, terms and subtle- the liberation of mankind, let him read Haeckel's book. ties to disguise the old errors of icJealism and agnosticism. not read it for this purpose alone! Its "But let him Only utter ignotance of the nature of philosophical material- uncommonly weak side is inseparably bound up with its ism generally and of the nature of Marx's and Engels' dialec- strong side, oiz., with the comprehensible and uncommonly tical method can lead one to speak of "combining" cmpirio- (which after all takes up by far the luminous description criticism and Marxism. greater and more impo(tant pafi of the book) given by Secondly, the place of empirio-criticism, as one very small Haeckel of the development of the natural sciences in this school of specialists in philosophy, in rclation to the other rgth] cefltury, or, in other words, ol the triuruphant tttarcb [the modern schools of philosophy must be determined. Both n rnaterialisru."** ot' atural-scientific Mach and Avenarius started with Kant and, leaving him, proceeded not towards materialism, but in the opposite * Fr. Mclrring, '"Die \Y/eltrlitsel" Riddle ol tbe Uniaetse], Neue [The direction, towards Hume and Berkeley. Imagining that he Zcit, r899-t9oo, XVIII, r, 4t8. r,vas generally, Avenarius was in fact ** Ibid., p. 4t9. "purifying experience" 433 CONCLUSION 43s 434 CONCLUSIOI{ rendering faithful service to the fideists in their struggle only purifying agnosticism of Kantianism' The whole school against materialism in general and historical materialism in of Mach and Avenarius is nnovitlg more and morc definitely particular,. towards idealism, hand in hand with one of the rnost reactionary of the idealist schools, oiz., the so-called immanentists" Thirdly, the indubitable connection between Machism and one school in onc branch of modern science must be borne in mind. The vast maiority of scientists, both generally and in this special branch of science in question, oix., physics, arc invariably on the side of materialism' A rninority of new physicists, however, influenced by the breakdown of old theories brought about by the great discoveries of recent years, influenced by the crisis in the new physics, which has very clearly revealed the relativity of our knowledge, have, owing to their ignorance of dialectics, slipped into idealisrn by way of relativism. The physical idealism in vogue today is as reactionary and transitory an infatuation as was the fashionable physiological idealism of the recent past. Fourthly, behind the epistemological scholasticism of empirio-criticism one must not tail to see the struggle of parties in philosophy, a struggle which in the last analysis rcflecis the tendencies and ideology of the antagonistic classes in modern society. Recent philosophy is as partisan as was philosophy two thousand years ago. The contending parties are essentially, although it is coocealed by a pseudo- erudite quackery of new terms or by a feeble-minded non- partisanship, materialism and idealism. The latter is merely a subtle, refined form of fideism, which stands fully armed, commands vast organisations and steadily continues to exercise influence on the masses, turning the slightest vacillation in philosophical thought to its own advantage. The obiective, class role of empirio-criticism cousists entirely in SUPPLEMENT 1'O CHAPTER FOUR, SECT1ON I to allude directly to Feuerbach, but in r88B too the censor refused to allow even a mere reference to Feuerbach! It was not until 19o6 that the preface saw the light (see N. G. Chernyshevsky, CollectedWorks, Vol. X, Part II, pP.r9o-97). In this preface N. G. Chernyshevsky devotes halt a page to criticising Kant and the scientists who follow Kant in their philosophical conclusions. I Iere is the excellent argument given by Chernyshevsky in r8B8: SUPPLEMENT 'TO CHAPTER FOUR, SECTIOTI II29 "Natural scientists rvho imagine thetnselves to be builders FROM WHAT ANGLE DID N. G. CHER.NYSHEVSKY of all-embracing theories are really disciples, and usually ancient thinkers who evolved the meta- CR.I-fICISE KANTIANISM ? poor disciples, of the physical systems, usually thinkers whose systems had alteady been partially destroyed by Schelling and finally destroyed maiority of In the first section of Chapter IV we showed in detail that by Hegel. One need only point out that the construct broad the materialists have been criticising Kant from a standpoint the natural scientists who endeavouf to laws of operation of htlman thought only diametrically opposite to that from which Mach and Avena- theories of the rcpeat Kant's metaphysical theory tegardtng the subiectivity rius criticise him. It would not be superfluous to add here, our knowledge. (For the benefit of the Russian albeit briefly, an itdication of the epistemological position of Machians who manage to muddle everything, let us say that held by thc great Russian Hegelian and materialist, N. G. Chernyshevsky is below Engels in so far as in his tetminology Chernyshevsky. he confuses the opposition between materialism and idealism the disciple of Feuer- Shortly after ,A.lbrecht R.au, German with the opposition between metaphl'5i52l thought and dialec- great bach, had published his criticism of Kant, the Russian tical thought; but Chernyshevsky is entirely on Engels' level rvriter N. G. Chernyshevsky, who rvas also a disciple of in so far as he takes Kant to task not for rcalism, but for Feuerbach, frrst attempted an explicit staternent of his atti- agnosticism and subiectivism, not for recognition of the tude torvards both Feuerbach and l(ant. N' G. Chcrny- "thing-in-itself," but for inability to derive our knowledge shevsky had appeared in Russian literature as a follower of from this objective source.) " . . . they argue from Kant's Feuerbach as early as the 'fifties, but our censorship did not words that the forms of our sense-pc(ception have no resem- allow him even to mention Feuerbach's name. In 1888, in blance to the forms of the actual existence of objects. " . . " the prefacc to the projected third edition of his Tbe Aestbetic (For the bene6.t of the Russian Machians who manage to Relation ol Art to Reality, N. G. Circrnyshevsky attempteC n.uddle everything, let us say that Chernyshevsky's criticisrn

436 TO CHAPTER FOUR, SECTION 438 SUPPLEMENT I SUPPLEMENT To CIIAPTER FoUR, SECTIoN I 439 of Kant is the diametrical opposite of the criticism of Kant will work out, on the basis of science, a system of concepts by Avenarius, Mach and the immanentists, because for firo(e exact and complete than those propounded by Feuer- Chernyshevsky, as for every materialist, the forms of our bach. . . . " (For the benefit of the Machian muddlers, let sense-perception do rescmble the form of the actual - i.e., us say that Chernyshevsky regards as metaphysical nonsense oblectively-real - existence of objects.) that, there- all deviations from materialism, both in the direction of f.ore, really existing obiects, their real qualities, and the real idealism and in the direction of agnosticism.) " . . . But (For relations between them are unknowable to us. . . . " meanwhile, the best statement of the scientific concepts of the benefit of the Russian Machians who manage to muddle the so-called fundamental problems of man's inquisitiveness everything, Iet us say that for Chernyshevsky, as for every remains that made by Feuerbach" (pp. rgyg6). By the materialist, objects, or to use Kant's ornate langtage, "things- fundamental problems of man's inquisitiveness Chernyshevsky in-themselves," really exist and are fttlly knowable to us, means what in modern langrs,age are known as the funda- knowable in their existence, their qualities and the real mental problems of the theory of knowledge, or episte- relations betureen them.) " " . . and if they were knowable mology. Chernyshevsky is the only really great Russian they could not be the object of our thought, which shapes writer who, from the 'fifties until 1888, was able to keep all the material of knowledge into forms totally different on the level of an integral philosophical materialism and who from the forms of actual existence, that, moreover, the very spurned the wretched nonsense of the Neo-Kantians, posi- laws of thought have only a subjcctive significance. . . . " tivists, Machians and other muddleheads. But Chernyshev- (F'or the benefit of the Machian muddlers, let us say that for sky did not succeed in rising, or, rather, owing to the back- Chernyshevskl,, as for every materialist, the laws of thought wardness of Russian life, was unable to rise, to the level have not merely a subiective significance; in other words, of the dialectical mater.ialism of Marx and Engels. the laws of thought reflect the forms of actual existence of objects, fully rcsemble, and do not differ from, these forrns.) " . " . that in reality thcre is nothing corresponding to what appears to us to be the connection of cause and effect, for there is neither antecedent nor subsequent, neithet whole nor parts, and so on and so forth. . . . " (For the benefit of the Machian rnuddlers, let us say that for Chernyshevsky, as for every materialist, there does exist in reality what appears to us to be the connection between cause and effect, there is obiective causality or natural necessity.) ". . 'Sfhen natural scientists stop uttering such and similar metaphysical nonsense, they will be capable of working out, and probably I

NOTES 441

The proofs were read by Lcnin's sister, A. I. Elizatova, in Moscow, then one set was sent abroad to Lenin who thoroughly checked tliem, noted printing crrors and made a number of corrections. Patt of the corrcctions rvere incorporated in the printed text; othets wete indicated io an important list of errata appended to the first edition of the book. Icrin had to consent to tooe down some passages in the book to avoid giving the tsarist ceflsors exclrse for proscribing its publication. Lenin irsisted that the book be brought out quickly, urging that this was necessitated "not only by litetary, but also by setious political considerations".

The book appeared in an edition of z,ooo copies in May ryo9. p. 3 NOTES 11 Insertions in square brackets (within passagcs quotcd by Lenin) have been introduced by Lenin, unless othetwise indicated. p., 12Fidcistn originally used the tetm popoashcbina (priest-Iore, I "Ten -Lenin Questions to a Lectnter" written by Lenin in May-June r9o8 clericalism) in his manuscript but teplaced it with "6deism" to avoid the was the thescs spcech given (Innokenty), for a by I. F. Dubrovinsky censorship. Lenin explained the term "fideism" in a letter of November member of the Bolshevik centre and one of the editors of the newspaper 8, r9o8 (New Style), to A. I. Elizarova (V. I. Lenir, rVorks, Russ. Proletdry, on philosophical 4th a symposium sponsorcd by A. Bogdanov in ed., Vo1. p. p.6 Geneva. p.r n, 3fi) 13 Lenin is referring to so-called "god-building", an anti-Marxist 2 Frcderick Engcls, Anti-Diibring, Eng. Languagcs ed., Foreign rcligious-philosophical literary trend vrhich arose in the Stolypin teaction Publishing House, Moscow, t954, pp. 6y66. p. r period among section intellectuals, deviated 3 a of the Party who latcr tbid., p. 86. p.2 from Marxism after the defeat of the rgoy-o7 rcvolution. a Ibid-, pp. y1-16 and ry7-;8. p.2 The "god-builders" (A. V. Lunacharsky, Y. Bazarcv and others) 51.e., Studies "in" the Pbitosopby ot' Marxism. p.2 advocated the founding of a new "socialist" religion with the aim of 6 Bogdanov is Alexandcr Malinovsky's pcn name. p.2 reconciling Marxism with religion. Maxim Gorky was at one time TRakhmetov is the pen name of Oskar Blum, a Menshcvik-Plekhano- associated with this group. A conference o[ the enlarged editorial board vrst. p.2 of Proletary (r9o9) condemncd the "god-building" trend and declared in a special resolution that the Bolshevik faction had nothiog in common 8 Sec Lcnin's lettcr of Febtuc.ry 2j, r9o8 (Ncrv Stylc), to Maxim Gorky, with "such distortions of scientific socialism". V. I. Lcnin, \X/orks, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 13, pp. 4tr-r7. p.2 Lenin exposed the reactionary nature of "god-building" it Materialism I Valentinov is Nikolai Volsky's pen name. Enpirio-Criticistn and his letters February-April l0 anrl in to Gorky of Lenin bcgan the writing of Malerialism and Enpirio-Criticism in r9o8 and Novcmber-December r9r1. p.6 Geneva, Februaty r9o8. la V. L Nevsky's article, vzhich was given as an appendix to the second In May of that year he went to London, where he spent about a Materialism and Entpitio-Critici*n, is omittcd in the fourth month ifl the library o{ the British Muscum working on material not cdition of available in Geneva. linssian edition of Lenin's 'Vorhs. p.8 The manuscript was completed in Octobcr r9o8 and was fotwarded 15 Frederick Engels, "Ludwig Fcuerbach ard the End of Classical to a secret address in Moscow, whcrc thc Zvcno Publishing House undcr- Gerrnan Philosophy", foIatx and Engels, Selected \"/orks, Eng. ed., FLPH, took its printing. Moscow, r95r, Vol. Il, p. ll1. p. 21

440 442 NOTES NOTES 443 2i 16 Ftederick Engels, "special fntroduction to the English Edition of Frederick Engels, "Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical 1892" of "Socialism: Utopian and Scicntific", Marx and Engels, Selectett Getman Philosophy", Marx and Engels, Selected \Yorks, Eng. ed., FLPIJ, Works, Eng. ed., FLPH, Moscow, r9yr, Vol. II, pp. 86-ro6. p. 21 Moscow, r9yl, Vol. II, p. 3zt. p. 6r 17"Die Neue Zeit" (Neu: Tirues)-organ of German Social-Democ- 28 Ftom one of Krclov's fables satirizing braggarts. p. 62 racy published in Stuttgarr from 1883 to t923. From r89y, that is, aftcr 2s "Mifld" - philosophical and psychological journal of idealist trend Engels' death, Die Neue Zeit bcgat systematically carrying revisionist published in London from 1876. p. 7r articles. Duting the Firsr World (r9r4-r8) adhered Kautsky's War it to 30 P. B. Struue Iormet "legal Matxist", monarchist and countet- Centrist views and supported the social-chauvinists. 23 - p. revolutionary, and founder of the Constitutional-Democratic (Cader) 18 Fredcrick Engcls, Anti-Diihing, Fr,g. cd., FLPH, Moscow, 1954, Party. pp. ard 34 54- p. 33 M" O. Mensbikoo contt;ibutor to thc teactiaiaty ne\yspapcr Noaoye 19 - 1.e., Prolegonrcnd to a Ctitiqte of Pure Experience. p. 42 Vremya. Lenin called him a "{aithful watchdog of the tsarist Black 2o "Reoue Ndo-Scolastique" (Neo-Scbolastic Reoiezo) theological- - Hundreds". p. 13 philosophical founded by a Cetholic philosophical society in 31 iournal With a grain of sa\t, i,e., with caution or reserve, p. 74 Louvain, Bclgium, in 1894. p. 42 32 Notes on tLte Concept ot' tbe Subject of Psycbology. p. 76 21 "Der Katnpt'" (T/:e Struggle) orgar of the Austtian Social- - 33 ft can be seen from Lenin's lcttcr, Dccember 19, r9o8 (New Style), Dcmocratic Party, published in Vienna from r9o7 to r9r8. Adhering to to A. I. Elizarova that the original rnanuscript "Lunachatsky an opportilnist Centrist stand, it disguised its bctrayal of the prolctarian rcad: cven 'mcntally projected' phtase modified rcvolution and subservience to the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie under fot himself a god." The was to avoid the censot's axe. In the letter Lenin wrote: "'Mentally pro- a mask of Leftist phtaseology. p. 48 jected for himsell a god' will have to be changed to mentally projcctcd 22 "The Intemational Socialist Rez:ieo" American revisionist monthly - for himself well, to use a mild exptession religious conceptions, or published in Chicago from rgoo to r9r8. p. - - 48 something of that nature" (V. I. Lerin, Vorks,4th Russ. cd., Vol. B "Viertetjahrsscbrift zaissenscbaltlicbe Philosopbie" (Quarterly ol 37, t'iir p. p. 80 Scientific Philosopby)-empirio-criticist (Machian) journal published in 32D. 34 experience. p. 82 Leipzig from fi77 to ryt6 (until 1896 under Avenatius' editorship). In 1.e., independent of r9o2 the name was changed to Vierteljabrsschrilt t'iir zoissenscbaftlicbe sb 1.e., guidc. P' 84 Pbilosophie und Sociologie (Quarterly ol Scientific Pbilosopby and, 36 Frcdcrick Engcls, Anti-Dtibring, Eng. ed., FLPH, Moscorv, r91.1, Sociolo gy ). p. it. p. 9r Lenin p. g1 philosophical joutnal on of this book speaks of this 37 Frcdetick Engels, "Ludwig Feucrbach and the End of Classical as "indeed enemy tcrritory j3 for Marxists". p. German Philosophy", Marx and E:ngels, Selected Vorks, Eng. cd., FI-PIJ, 24"Pbilosopbiscbe Studien" (Pbitosopbicat Studies) -iournal of an A,Ioscow, r9yr, Vol. ll, pp. lll and 328. p. 9r idealist trcnd devoted mainly to questions of psychology, published by 38 Lcnin is rcferting to a charactcr drawn by I. S. Turgenev in his Wilhelm ]il/undt in Leipzig from r88l to r9o3. From r9o; to r9r8 it prose poem "A Rule of Lifc" (I. S. Turgenev, Prose Poez.,z, Russ. cd., appeared unclcr the tttle Psycbologiscbe Studien (Psycbological Studies). t93r, pp. z4-25). p. 92 P. t9 3o p. Ioo 25 A chatacter in Nit

Neo-Kantian and Machian articles in German, French, E,nglish and s Frederick Engels, "Ludrvig Feucrbach and the End of Classical Italian. p. ror Gcrman Philosophy", Marx and Engcls, Selected'Vorks, Eng. ed., FLPH, 42"Kantstudieti' (Kantian Studies)- German philosophical journal o{ Moscorv, r91r, Vol. II, p. ll1. p. r41 the idealist trend of Neo-Kantians, published from 1897 to r%j. Rcp- 50 Frederick Engels, Anti-Dilhing, Eng. ed., FLPH, Moscow, rgy'4, rcsentatives of othcr idcalist trends also contributed to it. p. ror P. r23. p. rro wcckly publishccl London 1869 att "3"Nature" -a in from by natural lbid., p. rz8. P.I'I scientists of Englancl. p. ror ct 1'4 Le., E::cltrsions ot' a Socialist into tlse Domain ol tbe Tbeory ol Beast, monstcr, o r pct aversion. p. ro4 Krzou:Iedge. p. rir 45 In pteparing the fitst edition this press, of book for thc A. I. trli- 02Marx's lettcr to Kugelmann, Deccmbct 1868, a fragment of zarova changetl "ruore ,,more 1, ',vhich honcst litemry antagonist" to principlcd appenrs in Nnarx and Engcls, Selectcd Con'espondence, Eng. ed., FLPH, literary altagonist". Lenin objected to this alteration (V. I. Lenin, X{oscor.v, t951, p. z6r, footnote z p. t52 \Y{orks, 4th Russ. ed., Yol. y, p. 34r). p. rot 63The /'0 rcfercnce is to the follor.ving v'otks: Karl Marx, "Thcses on Frederick Engels, "Ludwig Fcuerbach anc.l the End of Classical Feuerbach" (1841); Frcderick Engels, "Ludwig Feuerbach end the End German Philosophy", Marx and Engels, Selected V/orks, Eng. ed,, FLITFI, of Classical German Philosophy" Histotical Materialism" Moscow, r91r, Vol. p. GSAS); "On II, liS. p. ro7 (1892), that is, "special Introduction to English fi92" of 47 the Edition of Lcr.in is refcrring to a character depictcd by L S. Turgenev in his "Socialism: Utopian and Scientific" (Marx and Engels, Selccted lWork.r, novel Snoke as a typical pseudo-learned dogmatist. Lenin dcscribed Eng. ed., FLPFI, Moscow, r95r, Vol. II, pp. 88-rc6). p. rii ,, $5-61, 324-64, him in his work "The Agrarian and 'Critics 64 Qucstion the of Marx, Katl Marx, "These s on Fcue rbach"; Freclerick Engels, "Ludwig (V. I. Lenir, Works, Russ. ed., p. r34). 4th Vol. 5, p. 107 Feucrbach ancl the Classical Philosophy"; "Spccial 48 End of German Frederick Engels, "Luclwig Feucrbach ar.rd the End of Classical Introduction to the English Edition of $92'" of "Socialism: Utopian Getman Philosophy", Marx and Eay.els, Selecterl Vorks, Eng. ed., FLpH, and Scienti6c" (Marx and Engcls, Selected \f,/orks, Eng. ed., FLPH, Moscow, rgyr, Vol. II, p. y6. p. ro8 L{oscow, r9rl, Vol. II, pp. g). I'i /'9 $5, 116, P. 1.e., whim. p. rro 65 Marx criticizes the theory of the vulgar economist Senior in the 5o 1.e., this-sidedness. p. tlz first volunre of Capital, FLPH, Moscow, t9t4, yol. I, Chapter 9, Section 51 Karl Marx, "Theses on Fcuctbach", Marx and Engels, Selected 1. P. tt6 ffi Works, Eng. ed., FLPH, Moscow, r9yr, Vol. II, p. 365. p. r12 1.e., Studies "in" tbe Philosopby ol Marxism. p. rt9 52 Fredetick Engels, "special Introcluction to the English Edirion of a7 1.e., Notes on the Concept of the Subject ol Psycbologl,. p. 169 1892" of "Socialism: Utopian 68"Reaue and Scientific", Marx and Engels, Selectecl de Phitosophie" (Reuieo ol Pttitosophlt)-idealist iournal Works, Erg. ecl., FLPH, tr4oscow, r95r, Vol. II, p. 92. p. 116 pnblished in Paris from r9oo. p. r7o 5i' 1.e., flea-cracker. p. rr8 69 Le., Mecbanics, a Histotical anrJ Critical Accomt ot' lts Deztelop- 5( Frederick Engels, "special Inttoduction to the Erglish Editioo of ruent. p. t7r 1892" of "Socialisn.r: Utopian and Scientific", Marx and Engels, Selected i0 1.e., Notcs on tbe Concept of tl:e Subject ol Psycbology. p. r71 tX/orks, Eng. cd., FLPH, I\{oscow, r9yr, Vol. II, p. Sl. p. I2o 1.e., the first scction of "Introductiol" to Anti-Dtibring. p. rl8 55 Orthodox, L. I. Axclrod's pcn natrlc. ') p. rzr 7: Fredcrick Tingcls, Anti-Dtibring, Eng. ed., FLPH, Moscow, 1954, 56 Frederick Eogels, Anti-Diibring, Eng. ed., FLFH, Moscow, r9t4, pp.jj-34, 36 and 5;. p. rj9 pp. 6166. p. rz8 7) Frederick Engcls, "Ludwig Feuerbach ancl the Errd of Classical 57 plekhanov. Beltov pseudonym of G. V. tlis On tlse Dez-telopment German Philosophy", Marx and Er^gels, Selectecl Vorks, Eng. ed., FLPH, ot' tbe Monistic- Viea ot' History, 1895, appearecl under this name. p. r34 Moscow, r95r, Vol. II, pp. 31o and 1fi. p. 119 NOTES 447 446 NorES substituted for class sttuggle. The chief representative of this trend u/as 7a der Wiirntelelste ('7'he Principl.es ol the Tbeory I.e, Die Prfuzipien Benoit Malon. p. 218 ot' Heat). p. r8r 8Le Socialiste thcoretical organ of the French lVorkers' Ti (Annals -weekly "Annalen det Naturl:hilosopbie" of Natural Pbilosoqby) Party (after rgoz called thc Socialist Party of France), published ftom Ostwald, idealist journal of positivist tendency, edited by ITilhelm r88y, became the organ of the Ftench Socialist Party in r9oy. It ceased - p' r90 published in Leipzig fuom tgoz to t9zr. publication in r9r5. p- 219 76 1.e., Sudies "in" tbe Pl:ilosopby of l'[arcism. p. r92 89 Frederick Engels, l'lady.ig Feuerbach and the End of Classical 77 The erclamation is provoked by the fect thac Yushkevich here uses Gcrman Philosophy", Marx and Engels, Selected Vorks, Eng. ed., FLPH, the foreign worcl "infinitc" with a Russian cnding. p. r92 Moscow, r95r, Vol. II, p. 74o. p. 242 78 Frederick Ftgels, Anti-Dribring, Eng. ed., FLPH, Moscow, 1954, 90 The reference is to Engels' "Ludwig Feuetbach and the End of pp. 65-66. p. 2oo Classical Getman Philosophy" Gsss); "On Historical Materialism" (1892), 7s lbid., p. p, 204 that is, "special Introduction to the English Edition of figz" of "Social- 76. ism: Utopian and Scientific" (Matx and Engels, Selected \{orks, Eng. S0 "Natural Science" moflthly review pubiished in London from r89z - ed., FLPH, Moscow, r9yr, Vol. II, pp. and 88-ro6). p. 242 to 1899. P. 214 324-64 91 Frederick Engels, "Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical 8t"Tbe jourlal idealist philos- PbitosoplLical Reoieo"-Ametican oI Gcrman Philosophy", Marx and Engels, Selected. Vorks, Eng. ed., FLPH, ophy published since 1892. P. 2r4 Moscow, r9yr, Vo1. II, p. 342. p. 242 82In smile your the first edition this read: ". . it is not only a e2 Frederick Engels, "Special Inttoduction to the English Edition of flirtation provokes." the proofs, Lenin rvrote witl.r religion After rcading rT9z" of "socialism: Utopian and Scientific", Marx and Engels, Selected to A. I. Elizatova that "it not only smile", should be changcd to is a lYorks, Eng. ed., FLPH, Moscow, r95r, Vol. lI, p. 92. p. 244 "it is not a smile, but disgust", or an crratum should be given to this st "Zeitsclrritt immanente Pbilosopl:ie" (Journal ol Immanentist cficct. In thc first cdition this corrcction rvas indicatcd in thc list of fiir Pl:ilosopbt) German philosophical journal, published in Berlin ftom etrata. P' 2r8 - r89t to r9oo, advocatirLg solipsism, an extlcmely teactionary form of 83 1954, Frcdetick Engels, Anti-Diibting, Eng. cd., FLPH, Moscow, subiective idealism. p- 249 p. r)8. P. 219 ca The French edition of Mechanics, a Historical and. Critical Account 8" raisecl Getrnany in the r87os by Thc cry "Baclz to Kant!" was in ol lts Deoeloprnent 'was publishcd in I9o4 in Patis. p. 249 represcntatives of a bourgeois rcactionary philosophical trcnd known as 95 tr.e., Pbilosopbical Year. p. 249 Neo-Kantianism, which reproduced the most rcactionary and idealist % (Huxtan ptopositions of Kantiaaism. Lenin firmly tefuted Neo-Kantianism sup- 1.e., Das menschlicbe Ghich und die soTiale Frage Hap- potted by the "lcgal Matxists" in h.is "Once Mote on the Theory of Difiess and, tbe Social Question). p. 2t\ e7 Realization" Gsqq) (V. L Lenin, Works, 4th Russ. ed., \o1. 4, pp. 59-7'11, 1.e., Die Gescbichte und die Y{/urzel des Satges zton d,er Erbaltung and "Marxism and Revisionism"" p. 227 der Arbeit (Histoty and Roots of tbe Principle ol the Conseroation ol lVo*). p. 2tJ 85 1.e., Studies "in" tbe Pbitosopby ot' Marxism, p. 2Jr 98 Lenin referring to the false statemeat of tsatist prime minister 86 V. M. Putishkevich, monarchist and extteme reactionary. Foundcr is Stolypin who denied the existence in the postal setvice of cabinets noirs of the Union of the Russian People (the Black Hundteds). p. 21' engaged in examining the correspondence of persons suspected by the 87 French, Italian and A reformist-opportunist trend tLat arose in the tsaflst govefnment. p. z6o Belgian working class movements at the end of the last century. This se Nozdriev, a cha$cter in Nikolai Gogol's Dend Souls, a landlotd and treud preachcd that socialism should tely on the "wretched" of society habitual liar. p. 254 at large instcad of only on thc working class, and that class peace be 448 NOTES NoTEs 449

LN"The Monist" Ametican philosophical iournal ptopagating ideal- From 1894, it was edited by the arch-reactionary philosopher L. M. Loparin - until publicatioo ism and teligious views, published in Chicago from r89o to ry36. p. 266 it ceased in April r9r8. p. 361 7r4 Lo["'n r1ri, ftir Pbilosopbie" (Pbilosopbicat Arcbir:es) -journal of thc Russkol,e Bogatstao (Russia's lVeattb) - a monthly published in St. Neo-Kantian and Machian brands of idealist philosophy, published in Petersburg from 1876 to mid-r9r8. In the early r89os it became the organ Berlin from r89t to r93r in two editions: one devoted to the history of of the liberal-Narodniks and was edited by Krivenko and Mikhailovsky. philosophy, the other to gcneral questions of philosophy. p. 28r It prcached conciliation with the tsarist government and abandonment of the revolutionary struggle against and 102 Frederick Engels, "Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical it, was bitterly hostile to Marxism and the Russian Marxists. German Philosophy", Marx and Fltgels, Selected V'otks, Eng' ed', FLPH, P. 179 115E-r.a1ue Moscow, 195r, Vol. II, P. llS. p. 28t is a tcrm used by Avenarius in Tbe Critiqae ol Pure Ex- perience, Vol. I, p. ry: any desctibable a 103 1. ,., Excarsions ol a Socialist into tbe Domain of tbe Tbeorv of "If value is assumed to be component part of our environment, we call shottly describ- Knozoletlge, P- 292 it R." "If any able value is taken as the contcnt depicted by others, we call it shortly 704 letter Kugelmann, Docember 1868 (Matx and Kad Marx's to i, E." E is the 6rst letter of the two Getman wotds Erlabruag (expetielce) Engels, Selected. Cortespond,ence, Fr.g. ed., FLPH, Moscow, t951, p' z6t, ard Er ke nnt nis (knowledge). p. 182 footnote z). p- 29J 116 "16r". den Feind. . ." these words are an adaptation of a couplet 105 was the son of Dietzge* p. 294 - Er,gene Dietzgen Joseph by Goethe, taken by Lenin ftom I. S. Tutgenev's novel Virgin Soil (Com- l06Reference postsctipt written by Dauge under the title: is to the llete \Y/orks ol Turgeneo, Russ. ed., r93o, Vol. 9, p. r83). p. 38, Critic Plekhanov" for the second Russian edi- 1r7 "Joseph Dietzgen and His Zur Kritik is a shortened name for Matx's work "Zur Kritik der der Pbitosopbie (Ac4uisition ol tion of Joseph Dietzgen's Das Acquisit politischen Oekonomie" ("Critique of Political Economy") (rSy9), Marx p. 29' Pbilosophy). and Engels, Selectetl Vorks, Eng. ed., FLPH, Moscow, r95r, Vol. I, pp. 107 of Classical Frederick Engels, "Ludwig Feuetbach and the End 327-31. p. 190 Marx and E;tgels, Selected \(orks, Eng' ed', FLPH, 118 German Philosophy", |dx1w's letter to Kugelmann, ]une 27, r87o (Marx and F;r,gels, Setect- Moscow, r95r, Vol. II, 338. P. 300 P. ed, Correspondence, Eng. ed., FLPH, Moscorv, r9j3, pp. z89-9o). p. 398 108 E;ttg. ed', FLPH, Moscow, r9r4, 119 Frederick F;rgels, Anti-Dtibring, A character in I. S. Turgenev's novel Fatbers and, Sons. p. p' joo 4oJ p. 86. 120 Marx's letter to Ludwig Feuerbach, October 3, r84j, Marx and 109 Psycbologique" (Psycbological Yeat) organ of a group "L'AnnAe - Ergcls, Vorks, Yot. 21, German ed., pp. 4r9-zr. p. 4o8 of French idealist psychologists, published in Paris since 1894' P' 3o9 t2l "Deiltsch-Franxdsiscbe labrbiicbef' (German-Frencb Y earbook) a TLo"Reoue (General Reoieu; - gindrate tles Sciences ptffes et appliqudef' journal edited by Karl Marx and Arnold Ruge, published in 1844 in Paris. Ftench magazine published in Paris ol Pure ancl Altplied Sciences) -a It appeared only once in a double issue, Nos. r-2. p. 408 p. 3r.I 122Marx's from r89o to I94o. letter to Kugelmann, December rr, r87o, Matx and Engels, LLt 1.e., Mecbanics, a Historical and Ctitical Account ol lts Deoelop' Sclected Correspondence, Eng. ed., FLPH, Moscow, tgt3, pp. p. 3ot-o7. rilent. t46 P. 409 lLz 1.".,71t" Principles ol the Tbeory ol Heat. p. 3tt ra Frederick Engels, "special Introduction to the English Edition of (Probtens ol PbilosoPbY and PsY- r392" of "Socialism: Utopian and Scientific", Marx and Engels, Selected published in Moscow in 1889 and Works, Eng. ed., FLPH, Moscow, r95r, Vol. Il, pp. gl-gS. p. 4c9 cal Society in 1894. Among its con- 1% The works of Engels of these years are: Anti-Dribing (fi1s), Lud- B. Struve and S. N. Bulgakov, ancl, utig Feuerbacb and the End ol Classical German Philosopby Gsas) and in the period of the Stolypin reaction, A.A. Bogdanov and other Machians' On Historical Materialism (fi92). p. 409 450 NorEs ,t) 5' ffi+ztxfrrlhtJi,+rlix

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