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TRANSPORTATION, SMUGGLING, AND ORGANIZED CRIME CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF DEMOCRACY CSD REPORTS: 1. Bulgaria’s Participation in EU Structural Funds, Sofia, 1999. ISBN 954-477-050-8 2. Social Policy Aspects of Bulgaria’s EU Accession, Sofia, 1999. ISBN 954-477-053-4 3. Preparing for EU Accession Negotiations, Sofia, 1999. ISBN 954-477-055-7 4. The Role of Political Parties in Accession to the EU, Sofia, 1999. ISBN 954-477-055-0 5. Bulgaria’s Capital Markets in the Context of EU Accession: A Status Report, Sofia, 1999. ISBN 954-477-059-3 6. Corruption and Trafficking: Monitoring and Prevention, Sofia, 2000. ISBN 954-477-078-X 7. Establishing Corporate Governance in an Emerging Market: Bulgaria, Sofia, 2000. ISBN 954-477-084-4 9. Corruption and Illegal Trafficking: Monitoring and Prevention, Second, revised and amended edition, Sofia, 2000. ISBN 954-477-087-9 10. Smuggling in Southeast Europe, Sofia, 2002. ISBN 954-477-099-2 11. Corruption, Trafficking and Institutional Reform, Sofia, 2002. ISBN 954-477-101-8 12. The Drug Market in Bulgaria, Sofia, 2003. ISBN 954-477-111-5 13. Partners in Crime: The Risks of Symbiosis between the Security Sector and Organized Crime in Southeast Europe, Sofia, 2004. ISBN 954-477-115-8 14. Weapons under Scrutiny: Implementing Arms Export Controls and Combating Small Arms Proliferation in Bulgaria, Sofia, 2004. ISBN 954-477-117-470 15. Transportation, Smuggling, and Organized Crime, Sofia, 2004. ISBN 954-477-119-0 Editorial Board: Ognian Shentov Boyko Todorov Alexander Stoyanov ISBN 954-477-119-0 ©2004 Center for the Study of Democracy All rights reserved. 5 Alexander Zhendov Str., 1113 Sofia phone: (+359 2) 971 3000, fax: (+359 2) 971 2233 www.csd.bg, [email protected] ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This study was developed by a team of experts from the Center for the Study of Democracy –Tihomir Bezlov, Philip Gounev, Emil Tzenkov, and Petkan Iliev. The Center for the Study of Democracy would like to acknowledge the following individuals for their valuable comments and contributions: Ambassador Boyko Kotzev Deputy Minister of Interior Boyko Slavchev Adviser, Cabinet of the Minister of Interior Dr. Chavdar Hristov Professor at Sofia University Dimitar Yotov Head of Department, Academy of the Ministry of Interior Georgi Georgiev Senior Customs Inspector, Sofia Airport Ivailo Angelov Expert Petar Kirov Head of Section, Ministry of Interior Inspectorate Rumen Danev Director for Customs Intelligence and Investigation, Bulgarian Customs Agency Rumen Stoyanov National Border Police Service Slavcho Mihalkov Expert, Ministry of Interior Inspectorate Stoimen Chakalov Reporter, Banker Weekly LTC Valentin Kolev Head of Section, National Police Service Directorate, Ministry of Interior Zhanet Papazova Head of Information and Analyses Department, National Service for Combating Organized Crime The Center for the Study of Democracy would like to acknowledge the financial support of the British Government and the British Embassy in Sofia for the preparation of this report. CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY. 7 1. INTRODUCTION . 13 2. BORDER CONTROL DURING THE TRANSITION PERIOD . 15 2.1. TRADE FLOW TRENDS . 15 2.2. MIRROR STATISTICS . 16 2.3. BORDER CONTROL. 22 2.3.1. THE BORDER CONTROL SYSTEM . 22 2.3.2. PROBLEMS IN THE BORDER AND CUSTOMS CONTROL SYSTEMS. 24 3. TRANSPORT COMPANIES AND SMUGGLING . 25 3.1. RAILWAY TRANSPORTATION . 25 3.2. RIVER TRANSPORTATION . 26 3.3. SEA TRANSPORTATION . 28 3.4. AIR TRANSPORTATION . 30 3.5. ROAD TRANSPORTATION. 32 3.6. PASSENGER TRANSPORTATION . 36 3.7. FORWARDING COMPANIES AND CUSTOMS AGENTS . 38 4. TRANSPORT INFRASTRUCTURE . 41 4.1. ROAD AND RAILWAY BORDER CROSSING POINTS . 42 4.2. SEA PORTS AND AIRPORTS. 44 5. ORGANIZED CRIME AND TURKISH AND CHINESE GOODS SMUGGLING . 47 5.1. THE TURKISH ROUTE . 49 5.1.1. THE GUIDE-WOMEN . 49 5.1.2. WAREHOUSE MARKETS AND THE SECURITY COMPANIES . 51 5.1.3. POLITICAL CORRUPTION AND SMUGGLING . 53 5.1.4. THE BIG INTERMEDIARIES. 55 5.1.5. TRANSPORT COMPANIES AND SMUGGLING . 57 5.1.6. THE SHRINKING OF ILLEGAL TURKISH IMPORT . 58 5.2. CHINESE GOODS . 59 5.2.1. PARTICIPANTS IN CROSS-BORDER SMUGGLING . 60 5.2.2. THE BIG INTERMEDIARIES. 64 5.2.3. TRANSFORMATION OF THE ORGANIZED CRIME STRUCTURES. 70 6. CIGARETTES AND OIL PRODUCTS SMUGGLING . 73 6.1. CIGARETTES SMUGGLING AT THE DUTY-FREE SHOPS . 73 6.1.1. ILLEGAL EXPORT CHANNELS. 73 6.1.2. ILLEGAL IMPORT CHANNELS: THE DUTY-FREE SHOPS. 79 6.2. OIL PRODUCTS SMUGGLING. 84 5 6 CSD Reports 15 7. RECOMMENDATIONS. 89 APPENDIX RISK PROFILES OF BORDER CROSSING POINTS. 95 1. KAPITAN ANDREEVO. 95 2. PORT OF VARNA . 101 3. KULATA . 110 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The report Transportation, Smuggling, and Organized Crime analyses the participation of transportation companies in smuggling practices. • The report examines and describes a range of companies and individuals involved in organized crime groups whose main business is the trafficking of consumer goods. • It also gives and overview of the criminal and semi-legal networks involved in smuggling Chinese and Turkish goods. • It presents new data on oil and oil products smuggling. • It examines the role of duty-free shops and their involvement in illicit cigarettes imports. International transport in Bulgaria was gradually liberalized and changed in structure in the 1990s, after Bulgaria’s borders were opened and its foreign trade was directed to new partners. The regulation mechanisms and the border control system, however, changed at a much slower rate. As a result of this, between 1990 and 2004 a number of transport companies integrated into criminal and semi-legal structures and joined the trafficking in goods and people. Another factor that contributed to this was the sluggish infrastructural development of the border crossings. TRANSPORT COMPANIES AND SMUGGLING Between 1990 and 2004 the number of commercial vehicles, as well as transportation and forwarding companies, increased immensely. As the borders opened, and after the end of the wars in the Western Balkans, trans-border and transit traffic rose several times. Bulgaria’s foreign trade reorientation meant that if in 1990 85% of trade was with states from the former Soviet bloc, in 2004 60% of trade was with European Union member countries. With regard to railway and river transport, the virtual monopoly of the two state companies Bulgarian State Railways and Bulgarian River Shipping Co. still exists, yet no proper regulation exists to counter illicit trafficking in goods. With the increase of private transport companies, smuggling practices are likely to become more widespread. Air transport poses similar problems since some of the newly sprung air carriers are known to take part in cigarette trafficking and transporting of arms and other cargo to destinations of concern. Private carriers have also entered maritime transport. The number of large freight ships is only 181 (compared to 236 in 1996), but those of lower tonnage are much more numerous compared to the past. Their number only for the northern Black Sea coast is 2,800. Part of this growing fleet is trafficking in various goods, cigarettes in particular. The border police, in possession of three patrol boats, are the only 7 8 CSD Reports 15 authority that controls trans-border maritime transport. Outside the ports, ship owners are still harder to monitor since many of their ships are sailing under flags of convenience and are registered as offshore companies. However, it is road transport that is most challenging, since most smuggling activities are done through heavy trucks. The single pre-1990 state carrier SOMAT was supplanted by a host of smaller transport companies, whose number in 2004 has reached 4,290 owning 15,563 trucks. The number of companies owning one or two trucks is 2,372 and most of them are uncompetitive, poorly informed on customs regulations and non-compliant with EU’s environmental and safety standards. Thus, many of them end up with contracts with neighboring Balkan states and engage in risky or outright smuggling operations. Certain smuggling channels make extensive use of passenger transport. Many companies operating international bus routes are run by crime groups and often transfer small quantities of drugs, firearms, prostitutes and cash money. The role of forwarding companies is no less significant for certain smuggling patterns. Up to 1990, the market was a monopoly of the state-owned company Despred. By 2004, over 2,000 forwarders were registered. Besides the well-established international companies, however, a number of petty forwarding players (often one- man enterprises) have entered the market. They are much less competitive and often ready to assist illicit transfers. Customs agents/consultants (a service frequently offered by forwarders) are yet another important segment on the transportation market. Some of them are run by former or even current customs officers who often facilitate the illicit transfer of goods. TRANSPORT INFRASTRUCTURE Despite the radical change of the transport sector in the 1990s, improvement of the infrastructure, including that of border crossings, only started at the end of that period. Even in 2004, underdeveloped infrastructure continues to impede efficient control of the transport and trans-border trade companies. Control of the transport sector will be made even more demanding by the pending concessions of sea and airports to private operators. This is especially true for sea ports with their lack of electronic surveillance means, solid walls and a well-designed system for control of the inflow and outflow of people and vehicles. ILLEGAL IMPORT OF TURKISH GOODS For over 15 years now, there has been illegal import of goods from Turkey and this has caused immense losses to the state budget. Bulgarian manufacturers find it increasingly hard to compete with Turkish-made illicitly imported goods. The dominant mode of trade in the early 1990s was small-scale shuttle trade conducted by individuals, called “suitcase trade.” By the mid-1990s, smuggling had become extremely well-organized and was run on a grand scale by various crime groups backed by certain political circles.