National Dialogue in Ukraine: You Must Spoil Before You Spin

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National Dialogue in Ukraine: You Must Spoil before You Spin

Natalia Mirimanova Senior Adviser, Eurasia Program of International Alert; Senior Adviser, Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (Geneva); consultant with the Centre for Conflict Prevention, osce Secretariat and the undp Istanbul Regional Hub

Abstract

The paper evaluates the attempt to launch a National Dialogue process in Ukraine backed by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (osce) from the perspective of its teleology, design and impact in the context of the aggravating internal divisions, problematic legitimacy of the post-Maidan leadership, Russia actively backing the forces in opposition to the interim government in Kiev and subversive of the integrity of the Ukrainian state, and peaked geopolitical tensions in the broader region. in the run up to the extraordinary presidential election in Ukraine scheduled for 25 May 2014, the osce backed the launching of a National Dialogue to prevent further escalation of the destructive and increasingly violent internal conflict. The efforts aimed at the consolidation of the Ukrainian political elite from across the country, including in the rebellious East and South regions, and across the political spectrum, also involving the party of the fugitive President Yanukovych. This endeavor, by the osce Swiss Chairmanship, provides insight into the opportunities and limitations of the top-down and elite-based approach to the National Dia- logue in Ukraine, particularly in comparison with the local grassroots dialogue initiatives in the divided communities as well as the center-region dialogue formats, on the one hand, and with the extra-national formats of talks involving Ukraine and Russia, on the other. Besides, lack of the strategic sequencing and embeddedness of short-term objectives of the stakeholders to either keep or challenge the political status quo and long-term accommodation of political differences by the reformed political and administrative arrangements and national reconciliation prevented the National Dialogue from gaining the momentum, was prohibitive of its continuity and did not get traction with the population irrespective of the political preferences. There were objective reasons that prevented proper design and implementation of the dialogue, such as urgency, extreme polarisation and strong pressure on the

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post-Maidan leadership at the time from opposing constituents that ardently rejected dialogue, a factor that could not be ignored against the backdrop of the upcoming series of elections. However the osce political imperative had prevailed over the professional approach to the design and facilitation of the National Dialogue. In particular, no clear agenda that resonated with the diverse constituencies’ actual needs and grievances was developed, no broad consultations had been held prior to the dialogue, disagreements between the stakeholders regarding the participation were not resolved, and the very design of the events, including media presence, was not conducive of the genuine deliberation and joint search for the mutually acceptable short-term and long-term trajec- tory of the country.

Keywords national Dialogue – dialogue design – participation – state formation conflict

Introduction

The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the attempt to launch a National Dialogue process in Ukraine backed by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (osce). This short-lived process was being put together against the backdrop of the annexation of Crimea by the Russian F ederation and the unprecedented escalation of the internal and externally-instigated confrontation, including the direct invasion of the Russian paramilitaries into parts of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, seizure of power by rebels, and the launch of the anti-terrorist operation by the Ukrainian government. The growing fragility of the state due to the abovementioned challenges was ag- gravated by the problematic legal status of the post-Maidan interim government, notably its disputed legitimacy. Russia firmly and consistently framed the Maidan revolution as a coup d’état and politically and militarily backed those challenging the authorities in Kyiv. The emergency situation called for an emergency response. Against these circumstances and in the run up to the extraordinary presidential election in Ukraine scheduled for 25 May 2014, the osce backed the launching of a National Dialogue to prevent further escalation of the destructive and increasingly violent internal conflict. The efforts aimed at the consolidation of the Ukrainian political elite from across the country, including in the rebellious East and South regions, and across the political spectrum, also involving the party of the fugitive President Yanukovych.

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Albeit the National Dialogue did not continue beyond the few rounds and ended at a relatively hopeful moment when the new President was elected. This endeavor, by the osce Swiss Chairmanship, provides important insight into the opportunities and limitations of the top-down and elite-based approach to the National Dialogue in Ukraine, particularly in comparison with the local grassroots dialogue initiatives in the divided communities as well as the center-region dialogue formats, on the one hand, and with the extra- national formats of talks involving Ukraine and Russia, on the other. The analysis of the effort to launch a National Dialogue amidst the speedily evolving violent crisis, failure of the political system to accommodate differences, and a formidable challenge to national security, sheds light on the particularities of the design, implementation modalities and sequencing of the National Dia- logue at different stages of a violent conflict. National dialogue in this paper is regarded as an evolving process that has temporal, institutional (across the osce), political (Ukrainian politics), international (Russia-Ukraine) and geopolitical (Russia-West) dimensions. The international and geopolitical dimensions remained unchanged and highly divisive and determined the extra-national framework for the National Dia- logue. Relative prominence of the political (intra-Ukrainian politics) and institutional (osce presence on the ground, the Chairmanship and the debates within the osce) dimensions of the dialogue varied over time. The article is an attempt to look at these key elements based on the following structure with key chapters on: (1) national dialogues – conceptual overview; (2) contextual and institutional factors and their impact on the Ukraine National Dialogue; (3) process design elements and their impact on the Ukraine National Dia- logue; (4) current dialogue scene in Ukraine and key preconditions for a future national dialogue in Ukraine; (5) recommendations and conclusion.

1 National Dialogues: Conceptual Overview

National dialogue is always about the transformation from the previous state policies, practices and legal framework that have stirred conflicts, to the new political architecture of the state and its constituent parts(?). National dialogue sets the groundwork for change, which is regarded as legitimate by various groups within the nation.1 It is hence essential for the prevention, management or resolution of conflicts over political power, of which civil war and

1 “Legitimacy and peace processes: from coercion to consent” [Is this the name of the article? If so, place in quotations], Accord, Issue 25, 2014, Conciliation Resources; National Dialogue

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National Dialogue in Ukraine 361 revolutions are extreme manifestations, and of state formation conflicts when a territorially concentrated opposition, often of ethnic or religious minority, requires self-determination either within the state or outside of it.2 Since a constitution is often the political foundation of a State’s architecture, national dialogues most often pivot around a constitutional reform as a necessary structural change for conflict prevention and resolution. However, it is important to highlight that mandates and agendas vary across national dialogue processes. National dialogue may be conducted at the national level or sub-national level, be centralised or decentralised, be a single platform or several platforms, as long as it tackles matters of national importance and relevance. However, its goal is always to generate consent across the entire nation through an inclusive and transparent process. National dialogue has several key characteristics. First, it is delineated by the national boundaries and concerns continuity of the state as a political- administrative epitome of the nation. Thus it aims at the preservation of the state/nation-state, but creates an alternative to war and coercion defining it as an inherently political process unfolding outside the confines of the existing political structure that in many cases is at the root of the conflict. It needs to produce, among others, a political outcome such as a constitutional draft, state strategy, or provisional law. Second, national dialogue is a broader, more comprehensive and less formal process compared to peace talks that are pri- marily about reaching an agreement between conflicting parties on the key disputed issues, such as a status of a particular territory or distribution of power. National dialogue envisages structural change of the organisation of the state and political relations between its constituent parties, reinvigorates broken relationships between and within different clusters of society, and helps re-build the state as a more legitimate, inclusive and humane framework for the nation. Thus, national dialogue is a nation- and state-building process. National dialogue can be launched in parallel with or prior to the peace talks between conflicting parties and inform the official peace processes and political negotiations. National Dialogue is a public and transparent process, unlike quiet shuttle diplomacy and behind closed doors negotiations. Thirdly, national dialogue is about socially responsible innovation and creativity in both the composition and procedures of the issues on the table. It is not confined to the constitutional bodies where political deliberation and decision making

Handbook: A Guide to practitioners, Berghof Foundation, May 2017 [make sure font type and size are consistent]. 2 P. Wallensteen (2002). “Understanding conflict resolution: War, peace and the global system”. Thousand Oaks: London, sage Publications: New Delhi.

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normally take place and that are usually inadequate (new norms and procedures). National Dialogue involves actors that fall outside the formal state structure and institutions, such as civil society, formerly excluded groups/ individuals as well as non-state actors and informal authorities that represent important constituencies that are key to the conflict resolution process (new participation format). National Dialogue has the liberty to open up issues that were previously not fully addressed or tabooed (new national agenda). At the same time, National Dialogue has greater responsibility to society compared to the informal civil society processes because it reflects the composition of the nation and is therefore a representative platform albeit not necessarily formal- ised as such. Against this conceptual backdrop, the paper will then look at the contextual (political and geopolitical), institutional factors as well as process characteristics that had an impact on the National Dialogue development in Ukraine.

2 Ukraine National Dialogue: Key Contextual and Institutional Factors and Their Impact on the Process

2.1 Context and Setup The inception and early implementation phases of the National Dialogue in Ukraine were unfolding against rapid and dramatic developments re-defining the nation’s identity along the lines of its political and economic orientation3 on the one hand, and its “internal geopolitics” with the ideological and histori- cal divides on the other. The annexation of Crimea by Russia through the deployment of armed personnel on the peninsula, the ensuing unconstitutional and hastily staged referendum in March 2014, as well as the invasion of armed Russian regiments into the areas of Donbass in March and April 2014, presented a big challenge to the existing security system and to the fundamental values of the osce. The Organization that was born out of the security consensus in Europe enshrined in the 1975 Helsinki Final Act was going through an existential crisis stirred by the failure of the prevention of this crisis. Yet despite this challenge, the osce

3 See, for example, Mirimanova, N. (2014), “Peacebuilding in Ukraine: What Role for the eu?”, Civil Society Dialogue Network Discussion Paper, No. 8; “Ukraine: Running out of Time” (2014), International Crisis Group, 14 May 2014; Lieven, A. (2014) “Ukraine – The Way Out”, http://www.nybooks.com/blogs/nyrblog/2014/may/05/ukraine-only-way-to-peace/; Puglisi, R., “A People’s Army: Civil Society as a Security Actor in Post-Maidan Ukraine”, July 2015, Isti- tuto Affari Internazionali.

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National Dialogue in Ukraine 363 remained the most relevant platform where Russia, Ukraine, European states and the us were participating states with equal formal status.4 Of all the participating States (ps), Switzerland, as the osce Chairmanship country, with its longstanding commitment to peace promotion and extensive experience in mediation, was well placed to broker the dialogue and reconciliation across communities within Ukraine. In the aftermath of the Maidan uprising and the ensuing destabilisation, the osce Chairmanship was faced with the urgent need to substantially contribute to the peaceful settlement of the conflict in and around Ukraine, especially given the increased tensions over geopolitical interests between Russia and the West. The starting point and the assessment of the scale of the conflict were in- terpreted differently by the parties. In fact, the very composition and identity of the parties was contested. Different commentators defined the sides to the conflict as “pro-Ukrainian” and “pro-Russian”, “pro-Maidan” and “anti-Maidan” in relation to the public protests in the Maidan square in Kyiv. Some stakeholders in Ukraine reject the definition of the ongoing violent confrontation in the parts of the Donbass area as a civil conflict or a conflict at all and see it rather as a Russian military aggression against Ukraine. In spring 2014 the osce (the Chairmanship, in particular) was still operating within the conflict prevention logic, while many would have argued that the conflict between supporters and opponents of the Maidan revolution, which was felt across regions, communities and families, had already been steamrolled by Russia into a fully-fledged armed conflict. Incompatible frames, namely the international conflict frame, the Russian aggression frame, promoted by Ukraine, and the civil-conflict frame promoted by Russia, forced external mediators to compromise and call the situation “the conflict in and around Ukraine” to kick-start the process. National Dialogue was conceived as an intra-Ukrainian political format against the backdrop of the failed emergency response attempts by the international community to quickly remedy the crisis, according to Didier Burkhalter.5 A glimpse of hope that Ukraine and Russia may engage in a constructive interaction emerged after all 57 ps in the Permanent Council had voted in fa- vor of the osce Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (smm) deployedon 21 March 2014. The Chairmanship’s access to heads of state and governments both in Russia and Ukraine was very instrumental in enabling this decision.

4 In the United Nations, Ukraine and some of the other relevant European states (i.e. Germany) are not permanent members of the Security Council, unlike Russia, France and the us. 5 Ibid., “The Swiss Chairmanship presented its own Roadmap when international diplomacy had reached a dead end in early May [2014]”.

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In mid-April, Rinat Akhmetov, an oligarch and financial mogul of the collapsed Yanukovych regime, declared his commitment to the unity of the Ukrainian state and called for peace talks and decentralisation after having been silent since the revolution.6 Russia’s ambiguous reaction to the self-styled referendum on independence that took place on 11 May 2014 in the rebel-controlled parts of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions was perceived by optimists as a sign of a more pragmatic approach and revision of the scale and conditionality of its support to separatism in Donbass, especially in the face of Western sanctions. Putin had ordered the withdrawal of Russian troops that were massively concentrated along the Ukrainian border to avoid accusations of military prov- ocations to torpedo the presidential election in Ukraine. The osce Swiss Chairmanship outlined a National Dialogue proposal in its “Roadmap for concrete steps forward: The osce as an inclusive platform and impartial actor for stability in Ukraine” (12 May 2014).7 The “Roadmap” was a step in a sequence of desperate attempts to mobilise the conflict settlement toolkit available to the osce, most notably, to the Chairmanship, to prevent war in Donbass and quickly avert the rising confrontation across Ukraine’s East and South regions. The Geneva agreements of 17 April 2014, signed by Ukraine, Russia, the European Union (eu) and the osce, served as a declara- tion of normalisation of the situation in the East of Ukraine and provided an international framework for the National Dialogue in Ukraine. There was hope that early presidential elections on 25 May 2014 would become a milestone in the transition away from violence and political turmoil, and better the legitimacy deficit, both internally and externally. The National Dialogue was not an isolated component of the “Roadmap”, but rather had to be implemented along with the cessation of violence by all sides, objective investigation of all crimes, demobilisation and amnesty of the illegally armed groups and free and fair presidential elections on 25 May 2014. The National Dialogue process described in the “Roadmap” was conceived of as a long-term endeavor to be continued beyond the 25 May 2014 presidential election. It was advised in the “Roadmap” to supplement the high-level roundtables with town hall meetings to ensure public participation in concrete terms.

6 Pинaт Axмeтoв: Caмoe глaвнoe – чтoбы Дoнбacc и Укpaинa были eдины нaвceгдa (Rinat Akhmetov: the main is that Ukraine and Donbass stay united forever), http://www.segodnya .ua/politics/pnews/rinat-ahmetov-samoe-glavnoe-chtoby-Donbas(s)s-i-ukraina-byli-ediny -navsegda-512873.html, April 14, 2014. 7 “A Roadmap for concrete steps forward: The osce as an inclusive platform and impartial actor for stability in Ukraine”, cio.gal/78/14 12 May 2014, Bern, 12.05.2014 – Brussels, 12 May 2014 – Speech by the President of the Swiss Confederation, Mr Didier Burkhalter, at the For- eign Affairs Council of the European Union.

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The “Roadmap” was presented to and endorsed by Ukraine, the European Union, Russia and the United States. According to the Chairperson-in-Office, it was the National Dialogue component of the Roadmap that was unanimously approved by all interested parties. Clearly, the interested parties, most notably Ukraine and Russia, had their own, very different if not opposing vision, of what constitutes a national dialogue and its outcomes. However, the sense of urgency and the perception of the limited window of opportunity overrode the need to ensure some consensus on the conflict analysis and identify areas of agreement regarding the future. For the sake of fairness, it is important to stress that the Chairperson-in-Office had been fully aware of the risk of pro- ceeding with the proposal that had a shaky foundation in terms of the parties’ good faith and their commitment to advance the middle ground and, most importantly, in terms of completely divergent conflict analyses.8 The Ukrainian authoritiesbranded the high-level roundtables component of the “Roadmap” as “National Unity Roundtables”, thus affirming their frame of reference, their ownership of the process and the supportive role of the osce.9 Three “National Unity Roundtables” took place from 12 May until 20 May in Kyiv, Kharkiv and Mykolaiv, before the early presidential election on 25 May 2014. However, “National Unity Roundtables” did not continue beyond the 3 initial events. The process can be assessed as reasonably inclusive of the political factions and regional and local institutions that still functioned within the Ukrainian legal system, including the prominent members of the Party of Regions, whose several leaders, including President Yanukovych, had fled. The current government was the convener. The 2 moderators – the ex-Presidents Kravtchuk and Kuchma – facilitated an exchange of views, grievances and analyses from across the political spectrum and across the regions. The 2 moderator figures were selected to demonstrate the peculiarities of the West and East of Ukraine, while projecting a message of unity amidst diversity. This way the requirement of a credible convener necessary for a national dialogue to have some legitimacy was formally fulfilled.10 However, the process had not moved beyond the

8 “A Roadmap for concrete steps forward: The osce as an inclusive platform and impartial actor for stability in Ukraine”, cio.gal/78/14 12 May 2014, Bern, 12.05.2014 – Brussels, 12 May 2014 – Speech by the President of the Swiss Confederation, Mr Didier Burkhalter, at the Foreign Affairs Council of the European Union. 9 Statement of the mfa regarding the launch of inclusive National Unity Dialogue, 14 May 2014, http://mfa.gov.ua/en/press-center/comments/1319-zajava-mzs-ukrajini-shhodo -zapochatkuvannyazagalynoukrajinsykogo-dialogu-nacionalynoji-jednosti. 10 Stigant, S. & Murray, E. (2015), “National Dialogues: A Tool for Conflict Transformation?”, United States Institute of Peace, October 2015.

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366 Mirimanova official statements. In fact, it did not seem to have an agenda and was merely a forum for voicing various positions. None of the measures prescribed in the “Roadmap” have been implemented. On the contrary, military logic has prevailed on all sides and the confrontation between the pro-Maidan and anti-Maidan champions slid into a full-scale war – some would argue, a proxy war between Russia and the West – in the Donbass area of Ukraine. The attempt of the osce to foster its national mediation capacity in the form of sponsoring and helping prepare the National Dialogue to be owned and run by the Ukrainians, was met by the Ukrainian leadership with determination to instrumentalise the National Dialogue as a vehicle for the consolidation of society before the presidential election, a crucial test of the legitimacy of the Maidan-driven change. The osce has not withdrawn, but instead has engaged with local grassroots organisations and has helped develop local mediation capacities for these groups and individuals to convene and facilitate smaller scale dialogues on the issues pertinent to their particular locales and societies. Thus, though the political imperative has prevailed at the national level, the osce has identified and opened up to local grassroots groups that felt there was need to engage adversaries in a dialogue, and has supported them.

2.2 Key Process Design Elements and Their Impact on the Ukraine National Dialogue 2.2.1 Preparation The National Dialogue in Ukraine was launched on 20 March 2014, after which a 4week-long Ukraine wide mapping of the needs and issues to be tackled in the future dialogue and to inform future osce activities in Ukraine was completed.11 Crimea had already been excluded from this initiative, but Do- netsk and Luhansk regions were still open to the visiting experts.12 The Swiss osce Chairmanship did the mapping in response to a request by the Ukrainian leadership. The osce Project Coordinator in Ukraine (pcu) became the institutional host for this project. The launch of the National Dia- logue did not require a consensus decision: it was implemented by the pcu- Ukraine that had a mandate to plan, implement and monitor projects between the relevant authorities of Ukraine and the osce. The report of this mission was presented to the osce Permanent Council on 30 April 2014. The expert team recommended the National Dialogue be designed as a 2-strand process:

11 osce National Dialogue Project in Ukraine: The facts, http://www.osce.org/ukraine/ 116881?download=true. 12 Access to Crimea was denied to the osce bodies and to the un.

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(1) national in scope and expert-driven, focused on the constitutional reform, including decentralisation; and (2) run at the regional and local level to address sub-national divisions and issues pertinent to certain localities that require input from local communities and grassroots public participation.13 It was also recommended to include dialogue facilitation into the mandate of the Special Monitoring Mission (smm)14 as a means to enhance local security within communities and across fault lines. The latter would be non-political, localised and closer to mediation on specific matters among clearly defined stakeholders, such as vacating captured administrative buildings and resolving water supply disputes. The expert mission laid the groundwork for the National Dialogue proposal in the “Roadmap” and beyond.

2.2.2 Participant Selection The process of participant selection for a national dialogue may be best described as based on caucus.15 It is not an entirely democratic process that ensures full representation. Instead, participant selection procedures aim at bringing together all those who can influence the outcome, including by means of the mobilisation of their constituencies. Russia pushed for the appearance of the handpicked “representatives of the south-east”, based on its own definition of the geographic conflict lines in Ukraine.16 However, the reason may not have been to safeguard genuine representation of the rebels. At the time the structure of leadership and governance in the areas of Donbass captured by armed groups were in flux: some of the local Ukrainian administrations continued to provide services to the population according to Ukrainian law and regulations, while armed individuals were de- claring themselves as the guardians of law and order. It is noteworthy to men- tion that the legitimacy of the armed rebel groups was weak and relied mostly

13 Leader of osce National Dialogue Project in Ukraine presents recommendations to Permanent Council, 30 April 2014, http://www.osce.org/ukraine/118166. 14 For an overview and analysis of the smm’s work, please see Hilde Haug’s article on the smm in this volume. 15 Papagianni, K. “National Dialogue Processes in Political Transitions”, Civil Society Dia- logue Network Discussion paper #3, European Peace Liaison Office, December 2013. 16 The “south-east” (“yugo-vostok” in Russian) term is unacceptable to Ukraine, as it stems from the Novorossiya political project designed in Moscow. It includes Donbas(s)s, the cities of Kharkiv, Odessa, Mykolaiv and Crimea. First appearance of the Russian para- military regiments in Ukraine were under the Novorossiya banner. However this project seems to have failed. See, for example, “Russia and the Separatists in Eastern Ukraine”, (2016), International Crisis Group, 5 February 2016.

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368 Mirimanova on their bayonets to keep the order, while at the same time the legitimacy of local Ukrainian authorities was also in decline. Russia was insisting on its handpicked representatives because the Russian leadership was not keen to see the sides’ rapprochement outside the Russian pre-defined plan. Knowing that this would be rejected by Ukraine, Russia aimed at presenting the Ukrainian leadership as unwilling and incapable to compromise, while in reality no “East” participation was good enough unless Russia controlled the selection process. This was a red line not only for Ukraine, but for the osce Chairmanship as well: the final word regarding participant selection and the agenda ought to have been one with which the Ukrainian government was comfortable. Participant selection that would be most representative of the internal divisions and power nods was extremely difficult to ensure. The participation of the commanders of the armed insurgents was excluded for political and security reasons. Ambassador Ischinger stated that the rebel leaders did not want to participate.17 There were conflicting accounts on the readiness of the insur- gent leaders to participate, as well as on the invitations that had reportedly not reached local authorities from the Luhansk region.18 However, Luhansk regional and local authority representatives attended the second roundtable in Kharkiv. In its turn, the Ukrainian leadership was determined to exclude rebels from any talks.19 The reason for the rejection by the Ukrainian government of the idea to include leaders of the rebellious entities is threefold. First, the Ukrainian authorities did not want to provide the rebels with any degree of legitimacy as interlocutors to the state. Second, the leadership of Ukraine resisted the framing of the crises in Ukraine as an internal conflict, a civil war, and not as a consequence of the Russian military intrusion. Presence of the rebel representatives would have implied the acknowledgement of the

17 “Ischinger believes the issue of possible participation in the ‘roundtable’ of separatists in the east of Ukraine is not worth discussing, because they themselves do not want to participate”, DETAILS ON SOURCE. http://www.ukrinform.net/rubric-politics/1664508 -ischinger_says_ukrainian_national_unity_roundtables_useful_important_321651.html. 18 Кpуглий cтiл нaцioнaльнoї єднocтi. Oнлaйн (National unir=ty round table. On-line. 14 April 2014, КoppecпoндeнT.net, http://ua.korrespondent.net/ukraine/3362930- kruhlyi-stil-natsionalnoi-yednosti-onlain. 19 The Foreign Minister of Ukraine, Ambassador Deshchuytsia, called “on everyone to make sure they don’t fall for the Russian propaganda that claims that those who drive events in eastern Ukraine are left out of talks. The national dialogue is not and has never been intended as talks with separatists”. Andrii Deshchytsia: The purpose of the national roundtables DATE? http://mfa.gov.ua/en/about-mfa/minister/articles/2507 -andrii-deshchytsia-the-purpose-of-the-national-roundtables.

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internal divides. Third, the slightest suspicion that the post-Maidan political leaders were contemplating concessions and privileges for Donbass and other eastern and southern areas known for their pro-Russia sentiments may have led to the erosion of their main support base in Western Ukraine, the vanguard of the Maidan revolution.20 The fluctuation of the demands by the rebel regions’ leaders, and to a degree, the population, the rapid turnover of personalities in the leadership circles and unclear source of their legitimacy posed obstacles to charting inclusive and legitimate composition of participants at the dialogue table Russia had inter- fered with the internal protest in Donbass in such a way that it was steadily los- ing its genuine core of grievances and demands and was blended into a man- ageable constituency.21 The governor of the Donetsk region acknowledged the difficulty and suggested a way out: to hold a dialogue with civil society or with those who were delegated by the protesters, should there be ones. The Party of Regions representative warned against painting all pr otesters as criminals with blood on their hands before any proper investigation of crimes had been conducted.22 To further point out the challenges, the security situation was deteriorat- ing daily, and the third roundtable that had been previously scheduled to take place in Donetsk was re-located to Mykolaiv. Clearly, had they had an incli- nation to engage in a dialogue, none of the lead figures in the insurgency in Donbass would have been able to attend due to the lack of security guarantees. Despite all the challenges with the participation and inclusivity, the 3 high- level roundtables provided a broad spectrum of opinions, including from the pro-Russian opposition. For example, civic leaders from the anti-Maidan groups and some prominent parliamentarians from the Party of Regions

20 For example, the position of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church was clearly conveyed by its Patriarch who stated that any dialogue before Russia withdraws its troops is “benefi- cial for the aggressor”, Кpуглий cтiл нaцioнaльнoї єднocтi. Oнлaйн (National unir=ty round table. On-line. 14 April 2014, КoppecпoндeнT.net, http://ua.korrespondent.net/ ukraine/3362930-kruhlyi-stil-natsionalnoi-yednosti-onlain. 21 “Russian commanders’ sidelining of local Ukrainian leaders has turned the resistance movement into a multipolar, poorly coordinated and internally conflictual network with impaired legitimacy and diluted representation. This poses a major obstacle to the already significant task of ensuring adequate representation at the negotiating table”. In: Mirimanova, N. (2014) Peacebuilding in Ukraine: What Role for the eu? Civil Society Dia- logue Network Discussion Paper No. 8, European Peace Liaison Office. 22 Details of source. http://www.segodnya.ua/ukraine/nacionalnyy-kruglyy-stol-edinstva -pervye-itogi-520429.html.

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participated and presented their views that significantly deviated from the official Kyiv line.23

2.2.3 Agenda A summary of the [educated] public knowledge about the upcoming National Dialogue was well captured by the New York Times journalist David Herzen- horn : “As a result, this much is clear: after months of uprising and violence, and for all the troubled history, ethnolinguistic tensions, charges of fascist aggression and Cold War-style geopolitical maneuvering that have characterised the crisis until now, events here seem about to shift into uncertain territory – a policy discussion on the optimum balance between centralised government and local control that would not be out of place in the United States”.24 This summary concerned only the visible part of the iceberg of goals and aspirations of the sides, most of which were implicit. The super-ordinate goal for the Ukrainian leadership was to project a sense of political normalcy and of being in control as the center of gravity for various political forces. For the Ukrainian political leadership it was the presidential election on 25 May 2014 that epitomised hopes for a small yet undeniable vic- tory in the struggle for internal and external legitimacy. This stripped Russia of its actively used argument on the unconstitutional nature of the rise to power of the current Ukrainian leadership as a justification for Russia’s involvement in the region as a means to protect its fellow Russians. For Russia, it was crucial to pursue the federalism agenda to ensure there was at least 1 region within Ukraine that would consistently veto its European and nato aspirations. This agenda was strong and barely implicit. Ukraine’s European partners appeared to be much less certain they were interested in keeping Ukraine in the European and Trans-Atlantic orbit in comparison to Russia’s strong determination to bring Ukraine out of it. The “Roadmap” cautiously and unassumingly suggested the idea of holding a “nation-wide (perhaps consultative) plebiscite”25 – the word “referendum”

23 One of the leaders of the pro-Russian rallies in Odessa had been present, had spoken and was cited in the newspaper. http://nikvesti.com/articles/53776; https://www.youtube .com/watch?v=BsNmQPVkTx8. 24 Herzenhorn, D., “At Center of Ukraine Talks, Degrees of Decentralizing”, 13 May 2014, New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/14/world/europe/ukraine.html?_r=0. 25 “A Roadmap for concrete steps forward: The osce as an inclusive platform and impartial actor for stability in Ukraine”, cio.gal/78/14 12 May 2014, Bern, 12.05.2014 – Brussels, 12 May 2014 – Speech by the President of the Swiss Confederation, Mr Didier Burkhalter, at the Foreign Affairs Council of the European Union.

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National Dialogue in Ukraine 371 was avoided – on the key issues addressed in the National Dialogue during the day of the presidential election. Advocates focused on the needs of the people in the East and concerned with genuine legitimate grievances of the people, including externally-induced ones, insisted that a referendum on the status of the official language, municipal police and decentralisation reformwould defuse fears and mistrust within the population in the East, and motivate them to vote in the presidential elections.26 According to Mr. Sergey Taruta, the Governor of the Donetsk region, the idea had been rejected by the Ukrai- nian Parliament. Decentralisation and the status of the Russian language were identified by the osce as “indispensable for an inclusive, transparent, and accountable constitutional process”.27 Decentralisation, indeed, was a priority matter for the Ukrainian government and society. The post-Maidan political leadership regarded decentralisation as an effective measure to counter separatism of regions and as a primary instrument to curb corruption in state institutions by means of the communities being granted principal governance functions. However as regions were about to lose their political significance the transition to the power re-distribution required particular attention. However, the decentralisation discussion did not capture the entire breadth of the debate because the theme of federalisation was being sidelined along with its proponents as part of Russia’s subversive plot. The second pivotal matter proposed by the Swiss Chairmanship, namely, the status of the Russian language, was perceived as having little importance and artificially inflated compared to other issues in the post-Maidan Ukraine, including among those who considered Russian as their first language, and catered to Russia’s hegemony-through-language politics.28

26 Details of source. http://www.segodnya.ua/ukraine/nacionalnyy-kruglyy-stol-edinstva -pervye-itogi-520429.html. 27 “A Roadmap for concrete steps forward: The osce as an inclusive platform and impartial actor for stability in Ukraine”, cio.gal/78/14 12 May 2014, Bern, 12.05.2014 – Brussels, 12 May 2014 – Speech by the President of the Swiss Confederation, Mr Didier Burkhalter, at the Foreign Affairs Council of the European Union. 28 Russia has traditionally manipulated the issue of the status of the Russian language in Ukraine, albeit Russian was dominant in Crimea and in Donbas (s) while Ukrainian was the language of choice for a small minority of the population. As the conflict escalated and Russia’s destructive role in it transpired, an understanding that the status of the Rus- sian language was not among the primary conflict drivers became widely shared, including among Russian speakers.

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Two lines of argument regarding the situation in the east and south and particularly in Donbass were clearly discernible in the roundtables’ discourse. One was that Donbass and possibly other places, like Odessa, have their distinct values and way of life, including close ties with the Russian world, most notably memory of wwii and structure of economy (industries) and economic ties which clashed with the current politics of the post-Maidan leadership. This hence required specific political and administrative arrangements to safeguard their distinct identity and economic profile and enable development. The opposite line of argument was that the issues such as such as decentralisation, better interaction between the authorities and the public across the country, free and fair elections and the conclusion of an international agreement among Ukraine, Russia, the European Union and the us are pertinent to the entire nation and Donbass is not unique in this regard.,.29 The determination of the Ukrainian leadership to disengage from any discussion about peculiarities of the grievances and the need for special tailored solutions for Donbass, or any other region for that matter, as a Russian plot, has limited the scope of the discussion and the eventual area of the search for a sustainable solution. The roundtables demonstrated that there is a gap between the agenda proposed by Kyiv that focused on the future, rapprochement with the European Union, constitutional change to modernise and upscale the qual- ity of governance, and the agenda conveyed by the political representatives of the east and south that focused on the immediate present looking at survival, physical security, equality and rights. Overall, the roundtables presented a broad pallet of views and proposals. It was an important step in the acknowledgement of sharp differences across the country and across the political spectrum. Ukrainian politics has always been filled with hot debates and sharp divisions. Attempts to engage in the political dialogue between bitter opponents are not unfamiliar to Ukraine. There was never a problem with expressing views, and the roundtables have once again proved this feature of the Ukrainian political life. However, due to the hastily assembled dialogue, this adherence to pluralism was not accompanied by a structured process to work on the differences, a collaborative analysis and an implementable strategy that would be agreed upon by all. Political slogans substituted a solid and implementable agenda.

29 Haциoнaльный кpуглый cтoл eдинcтвa – пepвыe итoги (National unity round table: first results), May 15, 2014, http://www.segodnya.ua/ukraine/nacionalnyy-kruglyy-stol -edinstva-pervye-itogi-520429.html.

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3 The osce Pursues Support for a Dialogue in Ukraine: The Current Dialogue Scene in Ukraine and Lessons Learned from the National Dialogue Process in Ukraine

Despite President Poroshenko’s stated commitment to go on with the National Dialogue, the process never resumed in the format discussed in this paper after the presidential election, largely due to the escalation of the military confrontation in the Donetsk and Luhansk areas into a full-scale war. However, lack of the National Dialogue strategy and its unclear relation to the peace process, on the one hand, and the internal political procedures, on the other, became a stumbling block to its continuation. The question of supporting dialogue as a means to de-escalate tensions and generate innovative ideas on how to transform the dysfunctional aspects of governance, policymaking, administration and other spheres where political decisions were being made and implemented, remained high on the agenda of the osce. Dialogue was inscribed into the mandate of the pcu and smm. How- ever, coordination in dialogue promotion was not always smooth between the 2 osce entities. This was due to several reasons, most notably, the immense pressure on the smm both in terms of its operation on the ground and due to the highly politicised reception of its reports, as well as lack of time and resources, but also due to the lack of an overall strategy on dialogue as an instrument of public policy in the osce. Despite these limitations and challenges, the Odessa-based smm supported the unique grassroots dialogue initiated by the Odessa Mediation group between the pro-Maidan and anti-Maidan forces that had begun before the tragic events on 2 May, when dozens of anti-Maidan activists were killed, and resumed shortly after. International presence was very important as a security guarantee for the participants and the facilitators alike. The collaboration culminated in the all-Ukrainian conference on dialogue in December 2014. pcu and smm joined forces in the preparation of this conference. On-going support on behalf of the pcu to the network of dialogue facilitators and mediators in Ukraine and the delegation of the facilitation and moderation function to the Ukrainian mediation professionals in osce events is a sign of professional maturing fostered by the osce. An important step towards the re-branding and reinvigorating of a Nation- al Dialogue by means of supporting a variety of smaller scale, but more solid dialogue and mediation formats was the result of collaboration between the pcu and smm with the Conflict Prevention Centre (cpc)30 and particularly,

30 Conference for Cooperation and Security in Europe (csce) Conflict Prevention Centre was established in Vienna by the Austrian Chairmanship on 27 July 1991 with the view of

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374 Mirimanova the Mediation Support Team that had been established under the Swiss Chair- manship as a way to strengthen the mediation capacity of the Organization.31 cpc played an important role in as far as providing professional guidance and support to the osce pcu in the development of a new approach to national dialogue. This was done through regular consultations with peacebuilding civil society organisations for the benefit of the osce pcu as well as through dialogue and mediation training to the pcu staff with the goal of mainstream- ing dialogue into projects that support reforms. “National Dialogue for Reforms, Justice and Development” launched in spring 2015 by the Project Coordinator in Ukraine incorporated dialogue as a methodology in support for a variety of reforms in the areas of justice, security, human rights and others. This collaboration between the cpc and pcu resulted in an innovative process that can be regarded as a precursor to a future Nation- al Dialogue. A separate multi-year “reconstruction through dialogue” project was launched in the East of Ukraine, focusing on the government-controlled areas of Donbass that had been invaded by the pro-Russian militia, had gone through war and are currently trying to re-build their societies, polities and economies. These areas do have their unique needs and conditions in the situation of fragile security and destruction as a result of the military conflict, such as dramatically deteriorated investment climate, which is particularly harmful for this industrial area, and disrupted infrastructure and tr ansport, many facili- ties being divided by the line of contact. Lack of attention and attunement on behalf of the central authorities and lack of understanding and trust have been identified as key impediments to peaceful development.32 The need for another attempt to establish a National Dialogue to bridge the gap between the center and the periphery in the East and strengthen social and political cohesion in a participatory manner is evident. Within the “reconstruction through dialogue” framework several events were convened in the East, in which governmental officials and parliamentarians from Kyiv engaged in a facilitated dialogue with the local civilian and military authorities, civil society and businesses on several thematic areas. Matched with the support for reform projects, the dialogue

preventing the spread of violence in Yugoslavia. This decision was adopted by the Paris Summit in December 1990. 31 “The osce in Ukraine: inclusive dialogue and capability to act”, Bern, 26.09.2014 – New York, 25.09.2014 – Statement by the President of the Swiss Confederation, Mr. Didier Burkhalter, delivered at the high-level week of the 69th session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, https://www.news.admin.ch/message/index.html?lang=en&msg-id=54628. 32 Author’s meetings with the local authorities, civil society and businesses in the communities along the line of contact during the osce pcu missions in preparation for dialogues.

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National Dialogue in Ukraine 375 has the potential to facilitate the implementation of agreements, promote innovative solutions and develop proposals for a sustainable solution.

4 Conclusions and Recommendations

Against the complex and fluid political context, the initial attempt to launch a National Dialogue in Ukraine cannot be meaningfully evaluated as either a success or failure. It is more useful to look at the inception, implementation and follow-up of the National Dialogue component of the “Roadmap” vis-à-vis the modalities of the National Dialogue as a specific type of political negotiation. The evaluation of contextual factors that have or have not been ad- equately addressed in the design and implementation of the dialogue could…. This may be of value for the osce to sharpen its professional mediation tools and revise its options for aligning the political advantages and disadvantages of the Organization with the task of peacebuilding, most notably through the mobilisation of available in-house professional resources. The osce Chairperson-in-Office carefully assessed this first phase of the dialogue as having demonstrated “the potential of this approach”,33 while the Panel of Eminent Persons on European Security as a Common Project enlist- ed the National Dialogue along with other early efforts by the osce to prevent conflict escalation as failed attempts.34 The co-facilitator, Ambassador Wolfgang Ischinger, brushed away mounting criticism with the statement that the dialogues were useful as they “[contributed] to the atmosphere of peace, in which elections [could] be held properly”.35 It is true that national dialogues elsewhere rarely succeeded from the start, but rather served as a “temporary symbol of hope and alternative to armed conflict”.36 Thus, the task of changing

33 “Security through Inclusive Dialogue and Action: osce Roles in the Ukraine Crisis”, Bern, 25.08.2014 – Tallinn, 25.08.2014: Speech by the President of the Swiss Confedera- tion, Mr Didier Burkhalter – Ambassador Conference in Tallinn, The Federal Council, The Portal of the Swiss Government, https://www.news.admin.ch/message/index .html?lang=en&msg-id=54184. 34 “Lessons learned for the osce from its engagement in Ukraine: Interim report and recommendations of the Panel of Eminent Persons,” (2015) Panel of Eminent Persons on European Security as a Common Project. 35 Ischinger says Ukrainian national unity roundtables useful, important, 20.05.2014, Ukrinform, http://www.ukrinform.net/rubric-politics/1664508-ischinger_says_ukrainian_ national_unity_roundtables_useful_important_321651.html. 36 Siebert, H. “National dialogue and legitimate change”, In: Legitimacy and peace processes: from coercion to consent, Conciliation Resources, p. 37.

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376 Mirimanova the atmosphere from high intensity to low intensity and overall more peaceful is reasonable. “Hope” and “urgency” seemed to have been the key drivers in the conceptualisation of the osce Chairmanship on the Ukrainian National Dialogue. However, these understandable drivers seemed to overshadow the need for proper conflict analysis and mapping of the entry and exit points for the National Dialogue endeavor to progress successfully. Various Ukrainian and Russian commentators dismissed these roundtables as failures, for their own, often opposing reasons.37 Russians accused Ukraine of “imitating dialogue” referring to the absence of the rebel leaders in the dis- cussions. The Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs name concluded after the first roundtable in Kyiv (14 May 2014) that Ukraine was on the verge of a civil war.38 All the assessments were made against the political goals of the parties, none of which seemed to be advanced by any professional standards. In comparison to the challenges in assessing the political and institutional dimensions of the Ukraine National Dialogue, a careful analysis of the key process design elements provide us with the following lessons learned:

• Develop a clear agenda that resonates with the parties, preferably formed in broad consultation with the parties. To this end, thematic dialogue platforms were composed based on field assessments in the areas of politics , economics and social life. The first important agenda item was to separate sets of issues that require dialogue due to the differences among stakeholders that cannot be resolved by the existing decision making algorithms, laws or other prescribed mechanisms, from those that do have established pro- tocols and could be resolved with existing insturments. Secondly, the elic- ited differences in approaches should be addressed with the goal to elicit areas where agreements could be reached through dialogue and areas that require other public policy and political procedures. After this clear separa- tion, real dialogue can begin.

37 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, official site, http://archive.mid .ru//brp_4.nsf/0/4F3AFD5C8A05429744257CDF0052D925; OБCE в Укpaинe: в пoиcкe бeзoпacнocти, A. Зacмopжук, E. Maтюшeнкo, (osce in Ukraine: searching for security, Zasmorozhuk, A., Matyushenko, E.) 3.12.2014, http://www.unian.net/society/1017335 -obse-v-ukraine-v-poiske-bezopasnosti.html. 38 Фиacкo кpуглoгo cтoлa OБce: Киeв имитиpуeт пpoцecc “нaциoнaльнoгo пpимиpeния” (Fiasco of the osce round table: Kiev imitates the process of “national reconciliation”), Interview with Sergey Lavrov, Bloomberg, May 15, 2014, https://regnum .ru/news/polit/1802363.html.

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National Dialogue in Ukraine 377

• Participant selection process should gather all or most of the stakeholders that are affected or can affect the solution to a conflict or a problem. No competence or power gaps should be left unfilled. The “reconstruction through dialogue” project brings politicians and officials from Kyiv to the war-affected areas of the East to engage in direct dialogue with the local authorities, civil society, business people and other members of the population. Partial dialogues that gather some of the parties together and help to develop trust in the process to motivate individuals to participate, is a useful format to prepare for the broad inclusion of all participants at a later time. • Ensure there are linkages between National Dialogue and the official peace process or with the legislative processes. Several international formats that involved Ukraine, Russia and European states and organisations were created39 to forge some sort of agreement between Russia and Ukraine to quickly reverse the escalation of the conflict unfolding on Ukraine. These emergency formats lacked vision, had weak if any enforcement power, and were randomly matched up with other measures, such as economic sanctions against Russia. The National Dialogue in Ukraine was neither grounded in the negotiation process (the Trilateral Group and the Minsk process first came into existence in September 2014)40 nor linked to the existing constitutional or other legal procedures in any transparent way. Such mechanisms, if in place, would provide for a recognised channel to develop recommendations to conclude a National Dialogue which could enter the official political realm. It was promised in the Ukrainian government’s statement on the National Dialogue that the “results and recommendations of the Dialogue will be presented to the Verkhovna Rada, Cabinet of Min- isters, local self-government bodies and civil society for their implementation in practice, including preparation of amendments to the legislation”,41 however no mechanism was established to operationalise this connection. Hence, it is not feasible to trace the dialogue outputs in the subsequent strategies or law drafts as no explicit attributions to the National Dialogue

39 “Security through Inclusive Dialogue and Action: osce Roles in the Ukraine Crisis”, Bern, 25.08.2014 – Tallinn, 25.08.2014: Speech by the President of the Swiss Confedera- tion, Mr Didier Burkhalter – Ambassador Conference in Tallinn, The Federal Council, The Portal of the Swiss Government, https://www.news.admin.ch/message/index.html? lang=en&msg-id=54184. 40 For a detailed analysis of the Trilateral Contact Group see Christian Scläpfer’s article in this volume. 41 Statement by the mfa[spell out] regarding the launch of the inclusive National Unity Dialogue on 14 May 2014.

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were ever made. According to the co-facilitator of the high-level roundtables Ambassador Ischinger, the events ended with no written results.42

A Way Forward

Regardless of the proliferation of various dialogue and mediation initiatives in Ukraine there is still no proper National Dialogue. At the political level, despite the establishment of the Trilateral Contact Group in 2014 bringing together all 3 official parties to the talks, conflict parties have not come closer to any middle ground except for very local and practical agreements on hostage and prisoner of war exchanges, technical operations of vital importance for the communities across the line of contact and the like. Russia remains the sole military and financial sponsor of the self-proclaimed republics and keeps pushing for the special status law, over which Ukraine and Russia are engaged in a tug of war. The ceasefire agreement is being breached regularly. The 2 self-styled republics have found themselves in a precarious situation since Russia replaced support with control, while internal legitimacy and resources are insufficient to exercise autonomy. Ukraine is disappointed that the conflict has been consistently framed by the osce Chairmanship as intra-Ukrainian and that Russia has escaped from being nailed down at a minimum as a conflict party if not the aggressor. Yet Russia has successfully carved out its role as a third, but not neutral party. At the same time, there is no consensus within the Ukrainian political circles and society at large with regard to the formula – and the modalities – of the re-integration, if at all, of the breakaway parts of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions.43 The learning curve for the osce pcu and the Conflict Prevention Centre of the osce Secretariat after the dissolution of the “grand” National Dialogue attempt in May 2014 deserves particular attention as it was precisely the needed effort to support national mediation and dialogue capacity, and to capitalise on the neutrality and internationally recognised role of the osce in peacebuilding

42 Ischinger says Ukrainian national unity roundtables useful, important, 20.05.2014, Ukrinform, http://www.ukrinform.net/rubric-politics/1664508-ischinger_says_ukrainian _national_unity_roundtables_useful_important_321651.html. 43 http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/blog/alexander-j-motyl/cautionary-note-reintegrat ing-Donbas(s)?fb_action_ids=10207889435299222&fb_action_types=og.recommends.

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National Dialogue in Ukraine 379 in order to motivate the conflicting parties from within the Ukrainian context to engage in a dialogue. However, this blend of in-house professional mediation and dialogue resources, and the unique political leverage of the osce at the moment vis-à-vis the primary and secondary conflict sides did not suffice for the establishment of a lasting National Dialogue. There were objective reasons that prevented proper design and implementation of the dialogue, such as urgency, extreme polarisation and strong pressure on the post-Maidan leadership at the time from opposing constituents that ardently rejected dialogue, a factor that could not be ignored against the backdrop of the upcoming series of elections. However the professional approach to the design and facilitation of the National Dialogue was overridden by the osce political imperative. Partial and thematic dialogues that address urgent and politically charged issues pertinent to peace and security of the entire nation are an effective alternative to a grand scale National Dialogue and a useful preparatory strategy for the conflict management and reconciliation process at the national level. Strategic sequencing and steady update of the themes and the scale of these dialogues will help consolidate a National Dialogue from the bottom-up, unlike previous attempts by the top-down approach of the elite, which led to a National Dialogue disconnected from the various constituencies and subservi- ent to the short-term objectives.

Biography

Natalia Mirimanova is a conflict resolution scholar-practitioner and has over twenty years of work experience in Russia, South Caucasus, Central Asia, Moldova, Ukraine, Western Balkans and Eastern Europe. Natalia received her Ph.D. from the Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution, George Mason University, usa. Natalia served as a consultant for various international, national and local organisations. Among other projects and processes Natalia designed and facilitated dialogue processes in the post-civil war Tajikistan, between the opposition and the government in Kyrgyzstan, ethno-political groups in Crimea, political parties, local government and civil society in Russia, developed innovative dialogue formats between conflict parties, such as research dialogue of economists in the South Caucasus and Turkey and dialogue through joint media production between Armenian and Azerbaijani journalists, among many other conflict resolution processes and initiatives.

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Natalia carried out numerous research projects, such as on the prospects for trade regulation across contested boundaries and ‘peace dividend’ of re- opening railways in the South Caucasus, assessed political economy of the pri- vate sector from the war zone in Eastern Ukraine, pursued policy research on the role of the European Union in building peace in the Eastern and Southern Neighborhood. She is currently a Senior Adviser to the Eurasia Program of International Alert, to the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (Geneva), consultant with the Centre for Conflict Prevention, osce Secretariat and the undp Istanbul Regional Hub.

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