National Dialogue in Ukraine: You Must Spoil Before You Spin

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National Dialogue in Ukraine: You Must Spoil Before You Spin security and human rights 27 (2016) 358-380 brill.com/shrs National Dialogue in Ukraine: You Must Spoil before You Spin Natalia Mirimanova Senior Adviser, Eurasia Program of International Alert; Senior Adviser, Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (Geneva); consultant with the Centre for Conflict Prevention, osce Secretariat and the undp Istanbul Regional Hub Abstract The paper evaluates the attempt to launch a National Dialogue process in Ukraine backed by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (osce) from the perspective of its teleology, design and impact in the context of the aggravating inter- nal divisions, problematic legitimacy of the post-Maidan leadership, Russia actively backing the forces in opposition to the interim government in Kiev and subversive of the integrity of the Ukrainian state, and peaked geopolitical tensions in the broader region. in the run up to the extraordinary presidential election in Ukraine scheduled for 25 May 2014, the osce backed the launching of a National Dialogue to prevent fur- ther escalation of the destructive and increasingly violent internal conflict. The efforts aimed at the consolidation of the Ukrainian political elite from across the country, including in the rebellious East and South regions, and across the political spectrum, also involving the party of the fugitive President Yanukovych. This endeavor, by the osce Swiss Chairmanship, provides insight into the opportu- nities and limitations of the top-down and elite-based approach to the National Dia- logue in Ukraine, particularly in comparison with the local grassroots dialogue initia- tives in the divided communities as well as the center-region dialogue formats, on the one hand, and with the extra-national formats of talks involving Ukraine and Russia, on the other. Besides, lack of the strategic sequencing and embeddedness of short-term objectives of the stakeholders to either keep or challenge the political status quo and long-term accommodation of political differences by the reformed political and admin- istrative arrangements and national reconciliation prevented the National Dialogue from gaining the momentum, was prohibitive of its continuity and did not get traction with the population irrespective of the political preferences. There were objective reasons that prevented proper design and implementation of the dialogue, such as urgency, extreme polarisation and strong pressure on the © nhc, 2017 | doi 10.1163/18750230-02703006 Downloaded from Brill.com09/30/2021 11:39:51AM via free access <UN> National Dialogue in Ukraine 359 post-Maidan leadership at the time from opposing constituents that ardently rejected dialogue, a factor that could not be ignored against the backdrop of the upcoming series of elections. However the osce political imperative had prevailed over the professional approach to the design and facilitation of the National Dialogue. In particular, no clear agenda that resonated with the diverse constituencies’ actual needs and grievances was developed, no broad consultations had been held prior to the dialogue, disagreements between the stakeholders regarding the participation were not resolved, and the very design of the events, including media presence, was not conducive of the genuine de- liberation and joint search for the mutually acceptable short-term and long-term trajec- tory of the country. Keywords national Dialogue – dialogue design – participation – state formation conflict Introduction The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the attempt to launch a National Dialogue process in Ukraine backed by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (osce). This short-lived process was being put together against the backdrop of the annexation of Crimea by the Russian F ederation and the unprecedented escalation of the internal and externally-instigated confrontation, including the direct invasion of the Russian paramilitaries into parts of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, seizure of power by rebels, and the launch of the anti-terrorist operation by the Ukrainian government. The growing fragility of the state due to the abovementioned challenges was ag- gravated by the problematic legal status of the post-Maidan interim govern- ment, notably its disputed legitimacy. Russia firmly and consistently framed the Maidan revolution as a coup d’état and politically and militarily backed those challenging the authorities in Kyiv. The emergency situation called for an emergency response. Against these circumstances and in the run up to the extraordinary presi- dential election in Ukraine scheduled for 25 May 2014, the osce backed the launching of a National Dialogue to prevent further escalation of the destruc- tive and increasingly violent internal conflict. The efforts aimed at the con- solidation of the Ukrainian political elite from across the country, including in the rebellious East and South regions, and across the political spectrum, also involving the party of the fugitive President Yanukovych. security and human rights 27 (2016) 358-380 Downloaded from Brill.com09/30/2021 11:39:51AM via free access <UN> 360 Mirimanova Albeit the National Dialogue did not continue beyond the few rounds and ended at a relatively hopeful moment when the new President was elected. This endeavor, by the osce Swiss Chairmanship, provides important insight into the opportunities and limitations of the top-down and elite-based ap- proach to the National Dialogue in Ukraine, particularly in comparison with the local grassroots dialogue initiatives in the divided communities as well as the center-region dialogue formats, on the one hand, and with the extra- national formats of talks involving Ukraine and Russia, on the other. The analy- sis of the effort to launch a National Dialogue amidst the speedily evolving violent crisis, failure of the political system to accommodate differences, and a formidable challenge to national security, sheds light on the particularities of the design, implementation modalities and sequencing of the National Dia- logue at different stages of a violent conflict. National dialogue in this paper is regarded as an evolving process that has temporal, institutional (across the osce), political (Ukrainian politics), in- ternational (Russia-Ukraine) and geopolitical (Russia-West) dimensions. The international and geopolitical dimensions remained unchanged and highly divisive and determined the extra-national framework for the National Dia- logue. Relative prominence of the political (intra-Ukrainian politics) and in- stitutional (osce presence on the ground, the Chairmanship and the debates within the osce) dimensions of the dialogue varied over time. The article is an attempt to look at these key elements based on the following structure with key chapters on: (1) national dialogues – conceptual overview; (2) contextual and institutional factors and their impact on the Ukraine National Dialogue; (3) process design elements and their impact on the Ukraine National Dia- logue; (4) current dialogue scene in Ukraine and key preconditions for a future national dialogue in Ukraine; (5) recommendations and conclusion. 1 National Dialogues: Conceptual Overview National dialogue is always about the transformation from the previous state policies, practices and legal framework that have stirred conflicts, to the new political architecture of the state and its constituent parts(?). National dia- logue sets the groundwork for change, which is regarded as legitimate by vari- ous groups within the nation.1 It is hence essential for the prevention, man- agement or resolution of conflicts over political power, of which civil war and 1 “Legitimacy and peace processes: from coercion to consent” [Is this the name of the article? If so, place in quotations], Accord, Issue 25, 2014, Conciliation Resources; National Dialogue security and humanDownloaded rights from 27 Brill.com09/30/2021(2016) 358-380 11:39:51AM via free access <UN> National Dialogue in Ukraine 361 revolutions are extreme manifestations, and of state formation conflicts when a territorially concentrated opposition, often of ethnic or religious minority, requires self-determination either within the state or outside of it.2 Since a constitution is often the political foundation of a State’s architecture, national dialogues most often pivot around a constitutional reform as a necessary struc- tural change for conflict prevention and resolution. However, it is important to highlight that mandates and agendas vary across national dialogue processes. National dialogue may be conducted at the national level or sub-national level, be centralised or decentralised, be a single platform or several platforms, as long as it tackles matters of national importance and relevance. However, its goal is always to generate consent across the entire nation through an inclusive and transparent process. National dialogue has several key characteristics. First, it is delineated by the national boundaries and concerns continuity of the state as a political- administrative epitome of the nation. Thus it aims at the preservation of the state/nation-state, but creates an alternative to war and coercion defining it as an inherently political process unfolding outside the confines of the exist- ing political structure that in many cases is at the root of the conflict. It needs to produce, among others, a political outcome such as a constitutional draft, state strategy, or provisional law. Second, national dialogue is a broader, more comprehensive and
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