Attention in Delay of Gratification1

Journal ol Personality and Social Psychology 1970, Vol. 16, No. 2, 329-337 ATTENTION IN DELAY OF GRATIFICATION1

WALTER MISCHEL 2 AND E B B E B. EBBESEN Stanford University

The role of altcntional processes in voluntary delay of reward was explored by manipulating children's attention to the rewards for which they were waiting in a delay-of-gratification paradigm. Preschool children waited for a preferred but delayed reward while facing either the delayed reward, a less preferred but immediately available reward, both rewards, or no rewards. The dependent measure was the amount of time they waited for the preferred outcome before forfeiting it for the sake of the less desired but immediately available one. Results contradicted predictions from psychodynamic theory and from speculations concerning self-instructions during "time binding." Un- expectedly, but in accord with frustrative nonreward theory, voluntary waiting time was substantially increased when subjects could not attend to rewards during the waiting period. Implications are discussed for a theory of the development of delay of gratification.

The concept of voluntary postponement of measures of delayed gratification and ego immediate gratification for the sake of more control, mainly inferred from human move- distant long-term gains has a central place ment responses on the Rorschach (e.g., in conceptualizations of the development of Spivack, Levine, & Sprigle, 19S9). complex human behavior. Formulations stress- In contrast, the present research is part ing the role of voluntary delay of reward of a larger project to investigate delay of range from the possible origins of "psychop- reward with more direct behavioral measures. athy" and antisocial behavior (e.g., Mowrer For example, subjects were required to choose & Ullmann, 1945) to characterizations of among actual alternatives that varied in delay societal and cultural adaptation patterns in time and value (e.g., immediate smaller ver- terms of the renunciation of immediate sus delayed but larger rewards) in realistic gratifications in favor of disciplined seeking situations (e.g., Mischel, 1966). Past re- of more substantial future gains. At the em- search in this vein has investigated the organi- pirical level, extensive experimental work has zation of self-control by exploring the rela- been done on delay of reward in animals (e.g., tionship between various preference patterns Renner, 1967). Surprisingly, although volun- for immediate smaller rewards or delayed tary delay behavior has been assumed to be larger rewards and other theoretically rele- a critical component of such concepts as "ego vant aspects of personality functioning. The strength," "impulse control," and "internali- network of associations found here so far zation," relatively little attention has been indicates, for example, significant relations devoted to it in empirical work on human between preference for delayed rewards and social behavior. indexes of achievement orientation, social re- One line of research has tried to apply sponsibility, age, sociocultural and rearing psychoanalytic concepts concerning ego func- conditions, and intelligence (e.g., Klineberg, tions to motoric inhibition and impulse con- 1968; Mischel, 1961a, 1961b, 1961c; Mischel trol (e.g., Singer, 1955). Most of the resulting & Metzner, 1962). Relations have also been empirical work has relied on highly indirect found with resistance to temptation (Mischel * This study was supported by Research Grant & Gilligan, 1964) and with severity of psy- M6830 from the National Institutes of Health, United chological disturbances (Shybut, 1968). Cor- States Public Health Service. Grateful acknowledg- relational studies were supplemented in re- ment is due to Jerry Zadny for serving as an experi- cent years by experiments to investigate more menter. 2 Requests for reprints should be sent to Walter precisely the determinants of voluntary delay Mischel, Department of Psychology, Stanford Uni- of reward and similar forms of self-control in versity, Stanford, California 94305. laboratory situations (e.g., Mischel & Staub, 329 330 WALTEK MISCHEL AND EBBE B. EBBESON

1965; Mischcl, Grusec, & Masters, 1969). As cathexes" (e.g., Freud, 1959; Singer, 1955). a result of both correlational and experi In spite of much psychoanalytic theorizing mental studies, some of the determinants of and speculation about the role of the mental choice preferences for delayed rewards are be- representation of blocked gratifications in the coming clearer (Mischel, 1966, 1968). development of delaying capacity, the process Although choice preferences for immediate remains far from clear. or delayed rewards are beginning to be under- In their theoretical discussion of impulse stood, the psychological mechanisms through control, Jones and Gerard (1967) reasoned which persons manage to bridge the temporal that "time-binding," or the capacity to bridge delay of reward required for attainment of delay of gratification, probably hinges on deferred gratification remain remarkably un- self-instructional processes through which the studied. In spite of its seemingly evident im- individual increases the salience of the de- portance, little is known about the self- layed consequences or outcomes of his action. regulatory mechanisms during the actual de- In their view, any factors (situational or lay period when the individual must engage within the individual) that make delayed con- in the waiting dictated by his choice of de- sequences more salient should enhance im- layed, larger gratification. Past research has pulse control and voluntary delay. Their posi- studied verbal choice preferences between re- tion, while emphasizing the self-instructional wards varying in value and in the delay time aspects of attention to deferred outcomes, required to attain them, but just how sub- also implies covert self-reinforcement processes jects are able to wait during the temporal through which the subject may reinforce his delay remains unknown. Given that one has own waiting behavior by vividly anticipating chosen to wait for a larger deferred gratifica- some of the positive consequences to which it tion, how can the delay period be managed? will lead. Finally, a cognitive-developmental 'The mechanisms that maintain goal-directed view might lead one to expect that young delay seem especially important, considering children may readily forget the delayed out- the fact that the ability to sustain self- comes for which they are waiting, and hence imposed delay for the sake of larger but cease to wait unless they are reminded of the delayed consequences appears to be a chief relevant contingencies and rewards involved component of most complex higher order in the delay-of-gratification paradigm. human behavior. A main purpose of the pres- In line with all the foregoing arguments, it ent research, therefore, was to investigate the seems most plausible that conditions that help psychological processes that mediate sustained the individual to attend mentally to the de- waiting behavior for delayed gratification. layed reward for which he is waiting should Freud's (19S9) classic discussion of the help him to sustain the delay. Operationally, transition from primary to secondary process these speculations would suggest that any is one of the few theoretical treatments of cues that make the delayed gratification more how delay of gratification may be bridged. salient—that help the person to make deferred According to the psychoanalytic formulation, consequences more psychologically vivid or ideation arises initially when there is a block immediate (e.g., by letting him look at them, or delay in the process of direct gratification by visualizing them in imagination, or by re- discharge (Rapaport, 1967, p. 315). During minding him of the object for which he is such externally imposed delay, according to waiting)—should facilitate waiting behavior. Freud, the child constructs a "hallucinatory Such expectations also seem congruent with image" of the physically absent need-satisfy- the results of earlier work on choice of im- ing object. Gradually, as a result of repeated mediate but smaller versus delayed but larger association of tension reduction with goal ob- rewards (Maher, 1956; Mischel, 1966; jects, and the development of greater ego Mischel & Metzner, 1962; Mischel & Staub, organization, the imposed delay of satisfying 1965). These earlier studies showed that an objects results in the substitution of hallucina- important determinant of choice preference tory satisfactions and other thought processes for delayed rewards is the individual's expec- that convert "free cathexes" into "bound tation or "trust" that he will really get the ATTENTION IN D LCI-AY OF GRATIFICATION 331

delayed (hut more valuable) outcome. Con- from outside as soon as the child signaled. sequently, conditions that increase the sail After this critical procedure had been clearly ence or visibility of the delayed gratification established, the child was introduced to the may enhance the subject's willingness to wait relevant contingency. He was shown two ob- by increasing his subjective probability that jects (e.g., snack-food treats), one of which the delayed outcome will really materialize he clearly preferred (as determined by pre- and be available after the waiting time ends. testing) ; to attain the preferred object he In light of the foregoing considerations, one had to wait for it until the experimenter re- might expect that voluntary delay behavior is turned "by himself." The child was, however, facilitated when the subject converts, as it entirely free throughout this waiting period were, the deferred or delayed object into more to signal at any time for the experimenter to tangible form by making it psychologically return; if he signaled, he could have the less more immediate, as by providing himself with preferred object at once, but would forego the representations or physical cues about it. The more desirable one later. most direct way to increase the salience of To manipulate the extent to which children the deferred outcomes and to focus attention could attend to the reward objects while they on them would be to have them physically were waiting, the rewards were removed from present and facing the subject, so that he can the experimental room in all combinations, attend to them readily and vividly. To in- creating four conditions with respect to the vestigate how attention to delayed and im- objects available for attention. In one con- mediate outcomes influences waiting behavior dition, the children waited with both the for them, a first step would be to manipulate immediate (less preferred) and the delayed the availability of those outcomes for atten- (more preferred) reward facing them in the tion during the delay time. experimental room, so that they could attend Previous research on preference for de- to both outcomes. In another group neither layed rewards has been conducted mainly reward was available for the subject's atten- with subjects at least 6 years of age or older. tion, both rewards having been removed from Preliminary observations of the actual waiting his sight. In the remaining two groups either behavior of nursery school children suggested, the delayed reward only or the immediate however, that the capacity to wait for long- reward only was left facing the child and term goals and to inhibit both immediate available for attention while he waited. The gratification and motoric activity seems to de- dependent measure was the length of time velop markedly at about ages 3-4. It was before each child voluntarily terminated the hoped, therefore, that research with subjects waiting period. in this young age range should be especially In accord with the previously discussed informative in revealing some of the processes theoretical ideas, it was predicted that condi- that underlie the genesis of goal-directed tions in which the delayed reward was present waiting. and visually available would enhance atten- A first requirement was a paradigm in tion to it and hence increase voluntary delay which such very young children would be time for it. It was anticipated that the con- willing to remain in an experimental room, dition in which the child was left without waiting entirely alone for at least a short either reward would make it most difficult to time without becoming upset and debilitat- bridge the delay time and therefore lead to ingly anxious. As an initial step (after the the shortest waiting. In addition it was ex- usual play periods for rapport building) each pected, although less confidently, that the child was taught a game in which he could condition in which both the delayed and im- immediately summon the experimenter by a mediate reward were available for attention simple signal. This step was practiced re- would best facilitate waiting time. This con- peatedly until the child clearly understood dition might permit the subject to compare that he could immediately terminate his wait- and contrast the two outcomes, possibly pro- ing period in the room simply by signaling viding himself with persuasive arguments and for the experimenter, who regularly returned self-instructions to help him delay long enough 332 WALTKK MISCHKL AND EBBK B. EBBKSON

Ui achieve his preferred gratification. OH the references to the toys were designed to help relax other hand, one might also plausibly expect the children and also to set up an expectancy that both the child and experimenter would play with maximum delay when the child could focus the toys sometime later on in the session (thus, ter his attention on the delayed reward without minating the delay period would not mean having to being tempted by the immediate gratifica- terminate play in the surprise room). tion—that is, the condition in which the de- The next phase required teaching the child the technique for terminating the waiting period and layed reward was present for attention but summoning the experimenter at will. For this pur- the immediate one was not. pose the experimenter said: METHOD Sometimes I have to go out of the room and when 1 do, you can bring me back. Do you sec these Subjects and Experimenters tiny pretzels? [The experimenter pointed to the The subjects were 16 boys and 16 girls attending five i-inch pieces of pretzel that would serve as the King Nursery School of Stanford University. signals.] Well, if I go out of the room and you Three other subjects were run but eliminated be- eat one of these pretzels you can make me come cause of their failure to comprehend the instructions back into the room. You can make me come back! as described later. The children ranged in age from Let's try it. I'll go out of the room now and 3 years, 6 months, to 5 years, 8 months (with a shut the door. As soon as I do, you eat one of the median age of 4 years, 6 months). The procedures pretzels and make me come back. were conducted by two male experimenters. Eight subjects (4 males and 4 females) were assigned ran- The instructions were repeated, if necessary, until the domly to each of the four experimental conditions. child seemed to understand them completely. In each condition each experimenter ran 2 males and The experimenter then left the room and shut the 2 females in order to avoid systematic biasing door, observing through a small viewing hole in the effects from sex or experimenters. door when the child ate the pretzel. As soon as the child put the pretzel in his mouth, the experimenter Procedure returned, laughing playfully and exclaiming how well the child brought him back into the room. To The procedures were designed to develop a new insure that the child learned reliably how to bring the method for studying delay behavior experimentally experimenter back, this sequence was repeated four with young subjects. The development of this limes with four of the five small pieces of pretzel, method was one of the chief goals of the project, and still leaving the last small piece lying next to the as the procedures therefore are described in consider- yet unopened cake tin. able detail. Next the experimenter lifted the cake tin, revealing In the week prior to the start of (he experiment, the two sets of reward objects lying there (two the two male experimenters spent a few days playing cookies and five 2-inch pretzels). The experimenter with as many children in the nursery school as they asked the child which of the two rewards he liked could. These nurlurant sessions were designed so better, and after the child chose, said: that the children would more readily agree to ac- company the experimenters to the "surprise room" Oh well, you know what? In order for you to eat and, once there, would be at ease. After obtaining the those [naming the preferred reward] you child's consent to go to the surprise room, the ex- will have to wait here in your chair and sit very perimenter escorted the child to the experimental still. I have to go out of the room for a while room. and when I come back you can eat those The experimental room was a small private cham- [preferred reward] all up. You can take them off ber containing a table, on which lay five -i-inch-long the table and eat them right up. But, you know, pieces of pretzel and an opaque cake tin. A chair was sometimes, I'm gone a long time and if you want in front of the table, and on a second chair there to bring me back you can. Do you know how was an empty cardboard box. Under the cake tin to bring me back? [All children did know how.| on the table were five 2-inch-long pretzels and two That's right. You eat that little piece [pointing to animal cookies. On the floor near the chair with the signal] and I have to come back. But I have to cardboard box were four battery-operated toys. On tell you something else. If you eat that and make one wall, at right angles with the table, was a one- me come back you can't have [preferred way mirror. Apart from those objects, the room was reward]. You can't have them. But you can empty. The experimenter pointed out the four toys, have all the [naming less preferred reward]! and before the child could begin to play with the If you sit very still in your chair until 1 come toys, asked the child to sit in the chair which was back by myself, then you can eat the [pre- in front of the table. He then demonstrated each ferred reward]! But if you want to make me toy briefly in a friendly manner, saying with en- come back all you have to do is eat that [pointing thusiasm after each demonstration that they would to signal] and I'll come back; but then you can't play with the toys later on, placing each toy in the have the [preferred reward]; but you can cardboard box out of sight of the child. These have all the [less preferred]. ATTKNTION IN DELAY OP GRATIFICATION 33.1

Thus the instructions faced the child with a TABLE 1 choice: he could either continue waiting for the MEAN MINUTES AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS OF more preferred reward until the experimenter re- WAITING TIME FOR A DELAYED REWARD turned, or he could stop waiting by bringing the AS A FUNCTION OF ATTENTION experimenter back. If he slopped waiting, then he would receive the less favored (but more im- Available for attention mediately available) reward and forego the more Statistic preferred one. The waiting contingencies were re- Both Delayed Immediate peated once more, and then, to assess if the subject No rewards rewards reward reward understood them, the experimenter asked three questions: "Can you tell me how to bring me back"? M 1 1.29 1.03 4.87 5.72 SI) 6.84 2.39 6.57 6.43 "What happens if you eat the pretzel"? "But what happens if you sit very still in your chair and wait for me to come back by myself?" Three children were unable to answer these questions cor- RESULTS rectly and were therefore excluded from the data a priori. In accord with the previously discussed At this point the experimenter was informed of the theorizing, it was expected that as the degree condition in which the subject was to be placed by of attention paid to the delayed rewards in- consulting a slip of paper concealed in the room. creased, the length of time which the children This method assured that the experimenter re- mained unaware of the subject's experimental condi- waited would increase. To determine whether tion until the last possible moment in the procedure. or not this prediction was fulfilled, the mean Depending on the condition and the child's choice of length of time waited (in minutes) was com- preferred reward, the experimenter picked up the puted for each of the four attention condi- cake tin and along with it either nothing, one of the rewards (the more preferred reward or the less tions and is depicted in Table 1. Inspection preferred reward), or both. The physical arrange- of these results revealed that unexpectedly, ment was such that the rewards, if left, were directly the children waited longest when the rewards in front of the child at about shoulder level. In were entirely absent—that is, in the condition all conditions the signal for summoning the experi- in which neither the delayed nor the immedi- menter was left on the table in front of the child. Thus, depending upon the condition to which the ate reward was available for attention during child had been assigned, he was left waiting either the waiting period. Furthermore, the children with both the delayed and immediate rewards, with waited the shortest length of time when both either the delayed but more preferred or the im- the delayed and the immediate rewards were mediate but less preferred reward, or with neither reward available for attention. Finally, in all con- facing them during the waiting session. These ditions the experimenter excused himself to leave, results were exactly opposite to the predic- and as he was leaving, resummarizcd the waiting in- tions. structions and reminded the child that "no matter An analysis of variance of the mean delay what you do, whether you sit and wait for me to times (Table 2) demonstrated that the over- come back by myself or whether you bring me back .... No matter what you do, we're going to play all effect of attentional conditions was signifi- with my toys when I get back." This instruction cant (F = 4.42, df = 3/28, p < .025). To was included to stress that the child's waiting determine the relative contribution of the con- behavior would not affect his later play period in ditions to the overall effect, orthogonal con- the surprise room. trasts were computed (Winer, 1962). The first Waiting time was scored from the moment the experimenter shut the door. The experimenter re- orthogonal contrast (Ci in Table 2) com- turned either as soon as the child signaled or after pared the effect of having any reward present IS minutes—the criterion time—if the child did not for attention with having no reward present signal. To determine whether or not the child re- during the delay period. This comparison membered the waiting contingencies, when the experimenter finally returned he asked the child, "What yielded an F of 9.S2 (p < .005, df = 1/28). happens now?" All children answered this question Thus, children waited much longer for re- correctly. Subjects were also asked why they had or wards when the rewards were absent than had not waited. Children who waited to criterion when any rewards were left available for at- were allowed to cat the chosen, more preferred tention. The second orthogonal contrast (r.) reward. Those who did not wait to criterion were : allowed to eat the unchosen reward. Thereafter each compared mean delay times when both re- child played with the toys for a while and then wards were present with mean delay times was escorted back to his nursery school playroom. when either the delayed or the immediate re- 334 WALTER MISCHEL AND EBBE B. EBBESON

TABLK 2 they were waiting delayed less long than chil- ANALYSIS 01? VARIANCE FOR MEAN WAITING dren who could not attend to any rewards TIMES (IN MINUTES) IN EACH ATTENTION CONDITION while waiting. Follow-Up Data Sourcu

the stated contingency rule by consuming the while waiting—as one child successfully did. preferred but delayed reward before the ex- These elaborate self-distractions occurred perimenter's return. mainly in the rewards-absent condition and The experimental conditions exerted potent almost never in the both-rewards-present con- effects on the children's delay behavior, as dition, since in the latter group the children seen in the finding that six out of eight quickly terminated the delay period. children waited the maximum 15-minute time These observations, while obviously incon- when they could attend to neither the imme- clusive, suggest that diverting one's attention diate nor the delayed rewards, whereas the away from the delayed reward (while main- mean waiting time was about 1 minute when taining behavior directed toward its ultimate they could attend to both rewards. These dif- attainment) may be a key step in bridging ferences between conditions suggest that it is temporal delay of reward. That is, learning inappropriate to conceptualize delay of grati- not to think about what one is awaiting may fication as if it hinged on an all-or-none enhance delay of gratification, much more "ability." Instead, most of the subjects in than does ideating about the outcomes. the present study, in spite of their young age, These observations also seem consistent seemed capable of delay of gratification; the with theoretical considerations which (post extent to which they did delay depended hoc) could correctly predict the obtained re- critically on the specific conditions of the sults. Namely, from the perspective of "frtis- delay period. trative nonreward" theory (e.g., Amsel, 1958, The initial theorizing about delay behavior 1962; Wagner, 1966), the occurrence of non- led to predictions of results which were the reward when reward is expected elicits a pri- direct opposite of the obtained findings. It mary frustration reaction. Congruent with this was predicted that attention to the outcomes formulation, when the anticipation of reward available in the choice situation while waiting is increased, the aversive frustration effect would enhance delay behavior; instead it also should be greater. Hence one might pre- sharply reduced delay of gratification. Ex- dict that cues that enhance the salience of tensive observations of the children's behavior anticipated but still unavailable (delayed) during the delay period provided some clues rewards should increase the aversiveness of for a better understanding of the mechanisms the delay period. Presumably the greater and through which they mediated their own goal- more vivid the anticipation of reward, the directed waiting. greater the frustration generated by its delay. One of the most striking delay strategies This line of reasoning would suggest that con- used by some subjects was exceedingly simple ditions that decrease the subjects' attention and effective. These children seemed to facili- to the blocked reward—and that distract him tate their waiting by converting the aversive by internal or overt activity from the frus- waiting situation into a more pleasant non- trative delay of reward—would make it less waiting one. They devised elaborate self- aversive for him to continue his goal-directed distraction techniques through which they waiting and hence permit him to wait longer spent their time psychologically doing some- for delayed gratifications. These theoretical thing (almost anything) other than waiting. expectations seem closely congruent both with Instead of focusing prolonged attention on the the obtained findings and with the more in- objects for which they were waiting, they formal observations of the children's delay avoided looking at them. Some children cov- behavior. ered their eyes with their hands, rested their The present terminology focuses on the heads on their arms, and found other similar frustrative aspects of not being able to im- techniques for averting their eyes from the mediately obtain the preferred reward in the reward objects. Many seemed to try to reduce delay-of-gratification paradigm. The same the frustration of delay of reward by gener- theoretical considerations, however, apply 1o ating their own diversions: they talked to the aversiveness of the waiting period and of themselves, sang, invented games with their the continuous decisional conflict (between hands and feet, and even tried to fall asleep terminating versus waiting longer). In part, 336 WALTER MISCHEL AND EBBE B. EBBESON

attending to the rewards in the waiting par- and hence generate longer waiting times for adigm may be aversive, because it increases the more preferred and absent delayed out- the frustration of anticipating the attainment come. The finding that the presence of only of a blocked reward; in part it may be frus- the immediate reward in fact led to less delay trative, because it enhances the aversiveness argues against such a habituation or value- of the waiting situation and accentuates the reduction interpretation of the role of atten- ongoing decisional conflict. All of these tion in delay behavior. sources of frustration seem an integral part Throughout the present study it has been of the delay-of-gratification situation, and at- assumed that the content of subjects' ideation tention to them makes effective delay be- while waiting would be correlated with the havior more difficult. attentional conditions to which they were as- It is of considerable interest that delay be- signed. Thus it was assumed that making havior was about the same, regardless of rewards(s) available for attention by facing whether the reward in front of the child was the subject with them would increase the the immediately available one or the delayed, likelihood that he would actually attend to more preferred outcome. This finding seems them during the delay period. While this most clearly to contradict any Freudian theo- assumption seems straightforward and parsi- retical expectations that a mental focus on monious, it might conceivably be argued that the delayed outcome (rather than the imme- subjects would actually attend mentally more diate gratification) serves to bridge temporal to the reward objects when the rewards were delay of gratification by providing an internal not physically present than when they were or "hallucinatory" representation of the de- facing them. In that unlikely event, however, sired but deferred or blocked outcome. one would again have to predict a difference It might also be thought that the children's in waiting time between the immediate re- waiting behavior in the present situation de- ward only and delayed reward only condi- pends on implicit "experimenter demands." tions. Presumably subjects would then be Such speculations would predict that the pres- fantasizing and thinking more about the ab- ence of the delayed reward should serve as a sent outcome, which should lead to different cue to the subject that waiting for the de- waiting times in the immediate reward and layed outcome is expected by the experi- delayed reward only attention conditions. menter. Similarly the condition in which only The lack of significant difference in waiting the immediate reward is present should cue time when the subjects faced the immediate less lengthy waiting and enhance willingness reward or the delayed one does seem under- to terminate the delay and settle for the im- standable from the perspective of frustrative mediate outcome. These interpretations are nonreward theory. When the subject attends untenable, however, because waiting times to the immediate reward and is tempted to ;vere similar in the condition in which only take it, he is frustrated by recalling the con- the delayed reward was present and the contingency that attainment of it now prevents dition in which only the immediate reward his getting the preferred reward later. When was present. the subject attends to the delayed reward, he One further alternative interpretation that is frustrated by the fact that he wants it now may be suggested is that attention to the but cannot have it yet. When he attends to rewards simply decreases their subjective both objects, both of the above aversive frus- value through some sort of habituation pro- trations occur, and hence delay tends to be cess, and therefore subjects wait less long. In most difficult—as was the case. In contrast, that case one would expect the attention to when the rewards are not visually present for the delayed reward to result in its subjective devaluation and hence predict shorter waiting attention, and therefore not. made mentally when the delayed reward is present, as indeed salient, the subject can more easily avoid the occurred. The same reasoning, however, also frustration of blocked reward by engaging in would predict that the presence of the im- various distraction maneuvers both overtly mediate reward should lead to its devaluation and in his thought processes. ATTENTION IN DELAY OF GRATIFICATION 337

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