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Stichwortverzeichnis A B Abstreitbarkeit 167 Bequemlichkeit 30 Adblocker 96 Bitcoin 110 – Adblock Plus 96 Blackberry 215 – Disconnect 96 Bookmarks siehe Favoriten – Ghostery 96 Browser 68, 75 – Privacy Badger 96 – Add-on 87, 90 – uBlock 97 – Apple Safari 77 Add-on – Cache 88 – Browser 87, 90 – Chromium 78 – E-Mail-Client 126 – Chronik 87 – Enigmail siehe Enigmail – Fingerprinting 85, 98 – GpgOL 137 – Google Chrome 77 – Mailvelope 130, 132 – HTML-Engine 80 – Thunderbird 139 – Hygiene 88 Adium 170 – Iceweasel 78 Advanced Programming Interface (API) 90, – Inkognito-Modus 86 182 – integrierte Suche 84 Android – Internet Explorer 77 – Android Privacy Guard (App) 156 – Konqueror 78 – K9 Mail (E-Mail-Client) 156 – Microsoft Edge 92 – OpenKeychain (App) 156 – Midori 78 – PGP 156 – Mosaic 68 – R2Mail2 (E-Mail-Client) 158 – Mozilla Firefox 68, 76 – S/MIME 156 – Netscape Navigator 68 Anonymität 206 COPYRIGHTED– Opera 77MATERIAL AOL Instant Messenger (AIM) 164 – Plug-in 87 Apple Mail – Prole (Identitäten) 87 – PGP 145 – Synchronisation von Einstellungen – S/MIME 155 86 Authentizierung 167, 169, 176, 179 – Web (Epiphany) 78 – Adium 172 Buffer Overow 82 – Multifaktor- 201 Bugs 82 – Pidgin 169 Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informations- Authentizität 29, 54, 56 technik (BSI) 215 233 Stichwortverzeichnis C – E-Mail-Adresse 119 Caesar-Chiffre 36 – Header 121 Certicate Authority siehe Zertizierungsstelle – Provider 129, 131, 139 Chain of Trust siehe Web of Trust – Server 122 Chaos Computer Club (CCC) 133 Eingangsverschüsselung 125 Chat 161 Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) 75, 96, Chiffre 36 113, 189 Claws 136, 220 – Secure Messaging Scorecard 189 elektronische Gesundheitskarte (eGK) 203 Closed Source 61 – elektronische Patientenakte (EPA) 204 Compiler 60 – elektronisches Rezept (eRezept) 204 Cookies 93 – Notfalldatensatz 204 – Flash-Cookies 95 elektronische Identikationsfunktion (eID) – Supercookies 95 202 Cross-Site-Scripting (XSS) 100 elektronischer Heilberufeausweis (HBA) 204 – Cookie-Diebstahl 101 Ende-zu-Ende-Verschlüsselung 125, 167 cryptocheck.de 142 – OTR 167 Cryptoparty 60, 210 – Threema 182 Enigmail 138 D Dark Web 110 F Dateisystemverschlüsselung 199 Facebook 19 – BitLocker 199 – Apps 19 – FileVault 199 – Cookies 95 Datenschutzgesetz 27 – Datenschutz 28 – Bundesdatenschutzgesetz 25 – Instant Messaging 166 – Landesdatenschutzgesetze 25 – Kauf von WhatsApp 181 Datensparsamkeit 27 – Like-Button 95 Datenverarbeitung 27 Favoriten 86 Datenvermeidung 27 Festplatte 66 De-Mail 131 – löschen 66 Defcon 180 Festplattenverschlüsselung 194 Device-Mapper 199 Firewall 111 Dife-Hellman-Verfahren 44, 216 digitale Identität 207 G digitale Signatur 53, 134 gematik 204 Domain Name Server (DNS) Geo-Lock 214 – DNSSEC 126 Geolocation siehe Standortbestimmung Geolokalisierung siehe Standortbestimmung E Gewinnspiele 21 e-Card siehe elektronische Gesundheitskarte Glättli, Balthasar 193 (eGK) GnuPG (GPG) siehe Pretty Good Privacy E-Mail 117 (PGP) – Client 122, 126, 128 Google 16 – De-Mail 131 – Datenschutz 28 – E-Mail made in Germany 133 – Geschäftsmodell 18 234 Stichwortverzeichnis Google Hangouts 166, 175 Internet Exchange Point (IXP) 109 GPG Suite (OS X) 145 Internet Message Access Protocol Version 4 Greenwald, Glenn 217 (IMAP4) 123 Internet Relay Chat (IRC) 161 H iOS – iPGMail (App) 159 Hardwareverschlüsselung 200 – NetPGP 160 Hashfunktion 48, 54 – oPenGP (App) 159 – Hashtabelle 50 – PGP 159 – Hashwert 49 – S/MIME 159, 160 – Kollision 49 ISO-Image 219 – MD5 51 Hippokratischer Eid 24 Hopper, Grace 82 J Hyperlinks siehe Links JavaScript 80, 100 Hypertext Markup Language (HTML) – JavaScript-Engine 80 68, 71 Jitsi 175 Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) 67 – Extended-Validation-Zertikate 73 K – HTTP/2 73 Kasper Systems siehe Threema – HTTPS Everywhere 75 Key Server siehe Schlüsselserver – Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure Key-Signing-Party siehe Cryptoparty (HTTPS) 72 Kleine-Welt-Phänomen 58 – Request 69 Kleopatra 137 – Response 70 kostenlos 18 Kredit 23 I Kreditwürdigkeit 22 Kryptograe 15, 35 ICQ 163 – Alice, Bob und Eve 35 – OSCAR 164 Identitätsdiebstahl 23 Instant Messaging (IM) 161 L – Adium siehe Adium Lesezeichen siehe Favoriten – AIM siehe AOL Instant Messenger Links 68 (AIM) – alternative Clients 164 M – ICQ siehe ICQ Mail (Client) siehe Apple Mail – Miranda 170 Man-in-the-Middle-Attacke 52, 173, 180, 182, – Pidgin siehe Pidgin 183, 187 – Signal siehe Signal – IMSI-Catcher 180 – Skype siehe Skype McAfee 135 – TextSecure siehe TextSecure Merkel, Angela 214 – Threema siehe Threema Metadaten 110, 121, 174, 191 – WhatsApp siehe WhatsApp – MetaPhone (App) 192 – XMPP (Jabber) siehe XMPP (Jabber) Microsoft Outlook – Yahoo Messenger 164 – PGP 136 Integrität 29, 54 – S/MIME 152 235 Stichwortverzeichnis Mobilfunknetz Poitras, Laura 217 – GSM 180 Pop-up-Fenster 99 – LTE 180 Post Ofce Protocol Version 3 (POP3) 123 – UMTS 180 Post Privacy 24, 31 Mozilla Foundation 76 Posteo 126, 131 Mozilla Thunderbird Predictive Analytics 21 – PGP 138 Pretty Easy Privacy (PEP) 133, 160 – S/MIME 154 Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) 134 Multimedia-Plug-ins 105 – Dateiverschlüsselung 197 – Flash 105 – Enigmail siehe Enigmail – Java 105 – Gpg4win 136 – QuickTime Player 105 – Shockwave 105 – Inline-PGP 143 – Silverlight 105 – PGP/MIME 143 – Schlüsselverwaltung siehe Schlüssel- O verwaltung – Widerrufszertikat siehe Widerrufs- Obama, Barack 214 zertikat Off the record (OTR) 41, 167 Primzahlen 42 Onlinebanking 72 Prism Break 152, 158 Open Source 60, 138 Privatsphäre 13, 24, 25, 207 Open Whisper Systems 185 Programmcode siehe Quellcode OpenPGP siehe Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) OpenPGP-Assistent siehe Enigmail Proxy-Server 111 Outlook siehe Microsoft Outlook Pseudonym siehe Pseudonymität Pseudonymität 206 P Public-Key-Infrastruktur 55 Public-Key-Kryptograe siehe Pretty Good Partition 199 Privacy (PGP), siehe Secure/Multi- Passwörter 32, 47, 208 purpose Internet Mail Extensions – Brute-Force-Angriff 47 (S/MIME) – cracken 50 Public-Key-Verfahren siehe Verschlüsselung – Entropie 48 Pufferüberlauf siehe Buffer Overow – erraten 47 – gute 47 – Passphrase 45, 141 Q – Passwort-Manager 48, 86, 208, 220 QR-Code 183 – regelbasierte Attacke 51 Qualizierte Elektronische Signatur (QES) 202 – Wörterbuchattacke 51 Quantencomputer 43 Patch 82 Quellcode 61 Peer-to-peer 166 quelloffen siehe Open Source Perfect Forward Secrecy 41, 167, 185, 216 Personalausweis – Geschichte 202 R – neuer Personalausweis (nPA) 201 Recht auf informationelle Selbstbestimmung personenbezogene Daten 26 25 PGP siehe Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) Redphone 216 Pidgin 168 Reverse Engineering 164 236 Stichwortverzeichnis S Spam 117 S/MIME siehe Secure/Multipurpose Internet Spitz, Malte 193 Mail Extensions (S/MIME) Standortbestimmung 104 Samsung 215 – GPS 104 Schlüsselserver 52, 135, 143, 148 – IP-Adresse 104 – Schlüsselserver-Problem 135 Stasi 25 Schlüsselverwaltung 138, 143, 147, 152, 155 Statistik 20 SCHUFA 21 Suchmaschinen Schweigepicht 24 – alternative 85 Secure Real-Time Transport Protocol (SRTP) – Filterbubble 84 216 Secure Sockets Layer siehe Transport Layer T Security (TLS) T-Systems 215 Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions Tails 128, 218 (S/MIME) 149 – Claws siehe Claws – Comodo (Zertizierungsstelle) 151 Target 20 – Schlüsselverwaltung siehe Schlüssel- TextSecure 185 verwaltung The Onion Routing siehe Tor-Netzwerk – X.509 151 Threema 181, 182 – Zertikate 150 Thunderbird siehe Mozilla Thunderbird – Zertikatsverwaltung siehe Schlüssel- Tor-Netzwerk 113 verwaltung Tracking 95 Secusmart 215 – Do not track 98 Short Message Service (SMS) 161, 179, 185 Transport Layer Security (TLS) 72, 124, 133 – SMS-Daumen 161 Transportverschlüsselung 124, 126, 133 Siedsma, Ton 193 TrueCrypt 197 Signal 185, 188, 217 Silk Road 110 U Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP) 123 Skriptblocker Überwachung 13, 25 – NoScript 102 Uniform Resource Locator (URL) 70 – QuickJava 102 Skype 164, 173 V – Supernode 174 VeraCrypt 198 Smartphone 64, 214 Verfügbarkeit 29 – PGP 156 verschlüsselte Container 198 – S/MIME 156 – TrueCrypt siehe TrueCrypt SMS siehe Short Message Service (SMS) – unsichtbare Container 198 Snowden, Edward 14, 214, 217 – VeraCrypt siehe VeraCrypt Social Engineering 62 Verschlüsselung – Dumpster Diving 65 – asymmetrisch 42 – Impersonating 63 – Fingerabdruck eines öffentlichen Schlüssels – Phishing 64, 117 54, 144 – Shoulder Surng 64, 125 – Geheimtext 36 Software-Updates 82 – hybride 44, 134 Source Code siehe Quellcode – Klartext 36 237 Stichwortverzeichnis – Länge des Schlüssels 38 Werbung 16 – privater Schlüssel 42, 129, 141, 147 WhatsApp 181 – rot13 39 – Verschlüsselung 181 – rot26 39 Widerrufszertikat 142 – Schlüssel 36 World Wide Web (WWW) 67 – Schlüsselübergabe 40 – symmetrisch 36, 39 X – öffentlicher Schlüssel 42, 142 XKCD 32 Vertraulichkeit 29 XMPP (Jabber) 164 Videochat – Jabber-ID 165 – Google Hangouts siehe Google Hangouts – Jingle 166, 178 – Jitsi siehe Jitsi – PGP 166 – Skype siehe Skype – Server 165 Virtual Private Network (VPN) 212 – WhatsApp 181 – IPSec 213 – PPTP 213 Z – tinc 213 Z Real-time Transportation Protocol (ZRTP) Voice over IP (VoIP) 216 178, 216 Volkszählungsurteil (1983) 25 Zertikatsautorität siehe Zertizierungsstelle Vorratsdatenspeicherung (VDS) 110 Zertizierungsstelle 51, 53, 54, 149 – Root-CA (Wurzelzertizierungsstelle) 55, W 150 Web of Trust 51, 53, 56, 134, 145 Ziele der Computersicherheit 28 Webbrowser siehe Browser – Authentizität siehe Authentizität Webseite 71 – Integrität siehe Integrität – Quellcode 71 – Verfügbarkeit siehe Verfügbarkeit Werbetracking siehe Tracking – Vertraulichkeit siehe Vertraulichkeit 238.
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  • SEMINARSKI RAD IZ OSNOVA INFORMATIKE Tema: CHAT

    SEMINARSKI RAD IZ OSNOVA INFORMATIKE Tema: CHAT

    OŠ ÅVuk S. Karadžić´ Banja Luka SEMINARSKI RAD IZ OSNOVA INFORMATIKE Tema: CHAT 18.februar 2011. Milica Simidžija IX3 SADRŽAJ: CHAT. 1 KO KORISTI CHAT?. .2 VRSTE CHAT-A: -Chat sobe na web stranicama. 3 -Chat programi: . .4 1. Windows Live Messenger. .4-5 2. Skype. 6-7 3. AOL Instant Messenger. 8 4. Yahoo Messenger. .9 5. X-Chat. .10 6. ICQ. 11 7. Google Talk. 12 CHAT SKRAĆENICE. 13 PRAVILA CHAT-a. 14 LITERATURA . 15 CHAT Chat je oblik komunikacije dva ili više korisnika putem računara i računarske mreže. Chat se odvija u vrlo kratkim porukama koje korisnik vidi čim ih njegov sugovornik pošalje (obično pritiskujući tipku Enter).Na nekim chatovima postoje tzv. sobe u kojima istovremeno priča i do nekoliko desetaka (pa i stotina) korisnika. U nekima je razgovor ograničen na nekoliko ljudi, dok neki mogu kombinovati te dvije vrste. Za neke chatove ne treba ništa osim Web Browser-a i Java Programskog jezika, dok su neki prerasli u posebne kompjuterske programe, od kojih su najpoznatiji Windows Live Messenger, Skype, Yahoo! Messenger, Google Talk itd. 1 KO KORISTI CHAT? Chat aplikacije korištene su najčešće od strane tinejdžera do 18 godina starosti. Posebno privlačna mladima je anonimnost koju internet pruža, a koju je nemoguće postići u nekoj drugoj vrsti komunikacije. Ova anonimnost oslobađa i podstiče ljude na drugačiju komunikaciju nego što bi to činili u ličnim kontaktima, što znači da se svako može predstaviti kako želi i biti šta želi. Ponekad se odrasli ljudi koji često nemaju prijateljske namjere mogu predstavljati kao djeca. To najčešće budu pedofili, koji se preko četa pokušavaju približiti djeci.