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White Paper of Bitcoin Ultimatum Introduction
White Paper of Bitcoin Ultimatum Introduction 1. Problematic of the Blockchain 4. Bitcoin Ultimatum Architecture industry 4.1. Network working principle 1.1. Transactions Anonymity 4.1.1. Main Transaction Types 1.2. Insufficient Development of Key Aspects of the 4.1.1.1. Public transactions Technology 4.1.1.2. Private transactions 1.3. Centralization 4.1.2. Masternode Network 1.4. Mining pools and commission manipulation 4.2. How to become a validator or masternode in 1.5. Decrease in Transaction Speeds BTCU 4.3. Network Scaling Principle 2. BTCU main solutions and concepts 4.4. Masternodes and Validators Ranking System 4.5. Smart Contracts 2.1. Consensus algorithm basis 4.6. Anonymization principle 2.2. Leasing and Staking 4.7. Staking and Leasing 2.3. Projects tokenization and DeFi 4.7.1. Staking 2.4. Transactions Privacy 4.7.2. Leasing 2.5. Atomic Swaps 4.7.2 Multileasing 4.8. BTCU Technical Specifications 3. Executive Summary 4.8.1. Project Stack 4.8.2. Private key generation algorithm 5. Bitcoin Ultimatum Economy 5.1. Initial Supply and Airdrop 5.2. Leasing Economy 5.3. Masternodes and Validators Commission 5.4. Transactions Fee 6. Project Roadmap 7. Legal Introduction The cryptocurrency market is inextricably tied to the blockchain – its fundamental and underlying technology. The modern market is brimming with an abundance of blockchain protocols, algorithms, and concepts, all of which have fostered the development of a wide variety of services and applications. The modern blockchain market offers users an alternative to both established financial systems and ecosystems/infrastructures of applications and services. -
Prospectus, Which Is in the Swedish-Language, and Which Was Approved by the Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority on 17 May 2019
NB: This English-language document is an unofficial translation of XBT Provider AB's base prospectus, which is in the Swedish-language, and which was approved by the Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority on 17 May 2019. In the case of any discrepancies between the base prospectus and this English translation, the Swedish-language base prospectus shall prevail. BASE PROSPECTUS Dated 17 May 2019 for the issuance of BITCOIN TRACKER CERTIFICATES, BITCOIN CASH TRACKER CERTIFICATES, ETHEREUM TRACKER CERTIFICATES, ETHEREUM CLASSIC TRACKER CERTIFICATES, LITECOIN TRACKER CERTIFICATES, XRP TRACKER CERTIFICATES, NEO TRACKER CERTIFICATES & BASKET CERTIFICATES under the Issuance programme of XBT Provider AB (publ) (a limited liability company incorporated under the laws of Sweden) The Certificates are guaranteed by CoinShares (Jersey) Limited ______________________________________ IMPORTANT INFORMATION This base prospectus (the "Base Prospectus") contains information relating to Certificates (as defined below) to be issued under the programme (the "Programme"). Under the Base Prospectus, XBT Provider AB (publ) (the "Issuer" or "XBT Provider") may, from time to time, issue Certificates and apply for such Certificates to be admitted to trading on one or more regulated markets or multilateral trading facilities ("MTF’s") in Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom or, subject to completion of relevant notification measures, any other Member State within the European Economic Area ("EEA"). The correct performance of the Issuer's payment obligations regarding the Certificates under the Programme are guaranteed by CoinShares (Jersey) Limited (the "Guarantor"). The Certificates are not principal-protected and do not bear interest. Consequently, the value of, and any amounts payable under, the Certificates will be strongly influenced by the performance of the Tracked Digital Currencies (as defined herein) and, unless the certificates are denominated in USD, the USD-SEK exchange rate or, as the case may be, the USD-EUR exchange rate. -
Aggregate Cash System: a Cryptographic Investigation Of
Aggregate Cash Systems: A Cryptographic Investigation of Mimblewimble Georg Fuchsbauer1,2, Michele Orrù2,1, and Yannick Seurin3 1 Inria 2 École normale supérieure, CNRS, PSL University, Paris, France 3 ANSSI, Paris, France {georg.fuchsbauer, michele.orru}@ens.fr [email protected] Abstract. Mimblewimble is an electronic cash system proposed by an anonymous author in 2016. It combines several privacy-enhancing techniques initially envisioned for Bitcoin, such as Confidential Transactions (Maxwell, 2015), non-interactive merging of transactions (Saxena, Misra, Dhar, 2014), and cut-through of transaction inputs and outputs (Maxwell, 2013). As a remarkable consequence, coins can be deleted once they have been spent while maintaining public verifiability of the ledger, which is not possible in Bitcoin. This results in tremendous space savings for the ledger and efficiency gains for new users, who must verify their view of the system. In this paper, we provide a provable-security analysis for Mimblewimble. We give a precise syntax and formal security definitions for an abstraction of Mimblewimble that we call an aggregate cash system. We then formally prove the security of Mimblewimble in this definitional framework. Our results imply in particular that two natural instantiations (with Pedersen commitments and Schnorr or BLS signatures) are provably secure against inflation and coin theft under standard assumptions. Keywords: Mimblewimble, Bitcoin, commitments, aggregate signatures. 1 Introduction Bitcoin and the UTXO model. Proposed in 2008 and launched early 2009, Bitcoin [Nak08] is a decentralized payment system in which transactions are registered in a distributed and publicly verifiable ledger called a blockchain. Bitcoin departs from traditional account-based payment systems where transactions specify an amount moving from one account to another. -
Review Articles
review articles DOI:10.1145/3372115 system is designed to achieve common Software weaknesses in cryptocurrencies security goals: transaction integrity and availability in a highly distributed sys- create unique challenges in responsible tem whose participants are incentiv- revelations. ized to cooperate.38 Users interact with the cryptocurrency system via software BY RAINER BÖHME, LISA ECKEY, TYLER MOORE, “wallets” that manage the cryptograph- NEHA NARULA, TIM RUFFING, AND AVIV ZOHAR ic keys associated with the coins of the user. These wallets can reside on a local client machine or be managed by an online service provider. In these appli- cations, authenticating users and Responsible maintaining confidentiality of crypto- graphic key material are the central se- curity goals. Exchanges facilitate trade Vulnerability between cryptocurrencies and between cryptocurrencies and traditional forms of money. Wallets broadcast cryptocur- Disclosure in rency transactions to a network of nodes, which then relay transactions to miners, who in turn validate and group Cryptocurrencies them together into blocks that are ap- pended to the blockchain. Not all cryptocurrency applications revolve around payments. Some crypto- currencies, most notably Ethereum, support “smart contracts” in which general-purpose code can be executed with integrity assurances and recorded DESPITE THE FOCUS on operating in adversarial on the distributed ledger. An explosion of token systems has appeared, in environments, cryptocurrencies have suffered a litany which particular functionality is ex- of security and privacy problems. Sometimes, these pressed and run on top of a cryptocur- rency.12 Here, the promise is that busi- issues are resolved without much fanfare following ness logic can be specified in the smart a disclosure by the individual who found the hole. -
Segwit2x –
SegWit2x – A New Statement The Overwhelming power of SegWit2x In order to safeguard the community from an undesired chain split, the upgrade should be overwhelming, but it’s not enough. It should also ‘appear’ as overwhelming. People, businesses and services needs to be certain about what is going to happen and the risks if they won’t follow. My impression is that still too many speaking english people in the western world think the upgrade will be abandoned before or immediately after block 494784 is mined, thus they are going to simply ignore it. That could lead to unprepared patch up and confusion, while naïve users risk to harm themselves. For this reason and for the sake of the Bitcoin community as a whole, we need to show again, clearly and publicly the extent of the support to SegWit2x. We also need to commit ourselves in a widespread communication campaign. I know this is not a strict technical matter, but it could help a lot avoiding technical issues in the future. What we have to do First, we need a new statement from the original NYA signers and all the business, firms and individuals who joined the cause later. That statement should be slightly different from the original NYA though, and I am explaining why. We all know that what Bitcoin is will be ultimately determined by market forces, comprehensive of all the stakeholders involved: businesses, miners, users, developers, traders, investors, holders etc. Each category has its own weight in the process, and everybody has incentives in following the market. -
Electronic Cash, Decentralized Exchange, and the Constitution
Electronic Cash, Decentralized Exchange, and the Constitution Peter Van Valkenburgh March 2019 coincenter.org Peter Van Valkenburgh, Electronic Cash, Decentralized Exchange, and the Constitution, Coin Center Report, Mar. 2019, available at https://coincenter.org/entry/e-cash-dex-constitution Abstract Regulators, law enforcement, and the general public have come to expect that cryptocurrency transactions will leave a public record on a blockchain, and that most cryptocurrency exchanges will take place using centralized businesses that are regulated and surveilled through the Bank Secrecy Act. The emergence of electronic cash and decentralized exchange software challenges these expectations. Transactions need not leave any public record and exchanges can be accomplished peer to peer without using a regulated third party in between. Faced with diminished visibility into cryptocurrency transactions, policymakers may propose new approaches to financial surveillance. Regulating cryptocurrency software developers and individual users of that software under the Bank Secrecy Act would be unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment because it would be a warrantless search and seizure of information private to cryptocurrency users. Furthermore, any law or regulation attempting to ban, require licensing for, or compel the altered publication (e.g. backdoors) of cryptocurrency software would be unconstitutional under First Amendment protections for speech. Author Peter Van Valkenburgh Coin Center [email protected] About Coin Center Coin Center is a non-profit research and advocacy center focused on the public policy issues facing open blockchain technologies such as Bitcoin. Our mission is to build a better understanding of these technologies and to promote a regulatory climate that preserves the freedom to innovate using blockchain technologies. -
One-Out-Of-Many Proofs: Or How to Leak a Secret and Spend a Coin
One-out-of-Many Proofs: Or How to Leak a Secret and Spend a Coin Jens Groth1? and Markulf Kohlweiss2 1 University College London 2 Microsoft Research Abstract. We construct a 3-move public coin special honest verifier zero-knowledge proof, a so-called Sigma-protocol, for a list of commit- ments having at least one commitment that opens to 0. It is not required for the prover to know openings of the other commitments. The proof system is efficient, in particular in terms of communication requiring only the transmission of a logarithmic number of commitments. We use our proof system to instantiate both ring signatures and zerocoin, a novel mechanism for bitcoin privacy. We use our Sigma-protocol as a (linkable) ad-hoc group identification scheme where the users have public keys that are commitments and demonstrate knowledge of an opening for one of the commitments to unlinkably identify themselves (once) as belonging to the group. Applying the Fiat-Shamir transform on the group identification scheme gives rise to ring signatures, applying it to the linkable group identification scheme gives rise to zerocoin. Our ring signatures are very small compared to other ring signature schemes and we only assume the users' secret keys to be the discrete logarithms of single group elements so the setup is quite realistic. Sim- ilarly, compared with the original zerocoin protocol we only rely on a weak cryptographic assumption and do not require a trusted setup. A third application of our Sigma protocol is an efficient proof of mem- bership of a secret committed value belonging to a public list of values. -
Viacoin Whitepaper
Viacoin Whitepaper Viacoin Dev Team September 12, 2017 Last updated on September 22, 2017 Abstract Viacoin is an open source crypto-currency created in 2014, derived from the [6]Bitcoin protocol that supports embedded consensus with an extended OP_RETURN of 120 byte. Viacoin features Scrypt Merged mining, also called Auxiliary proof of work or AuxPoW, and 25x faster transactions than Bitcoin. Viacoin mining reward halving takes place every 6 months and has a total supply of 23,000,000 coins. The inflation rate of Viacoin is low due to minimal mining reward. As the block reward of Viacoin is low, miners are given incentive to mine Viacoin through Merged mining (AuxPoW). Viacoin is currently mined by one of the biggest mining pools (F2Pool) with a very high hashrate. Other features include a mining difficulty adjustment algorithm to address flaws in Kimoto’s Gravity Well (DarkGravityWave), Versionbits to allow for 29 simultaneous Soft Fork changes to be implemented at a time, Segwit and the Lightning Network Note: The whitepaper, documentation, designs are in research and development phase and subject to change. 1 1 Scrypt In cryptography, [7]Scrypt is a password based key derivation function created by Colin Percival. The al- gorithm was designed to make it costly to perform large-scale custom hardware attacks by requiring large amounts of memory. In 2012, the algorithm was published by the IETF as an internet draft intended to become an informational RFC, but a version of Scrypt is now used as a proof of work scheme by cryptocur- rencies like Viacoin. Scrypt is a memory hard key derivation function, it requires a reasonably large amount of Random Ac- cess Memory to be evaluated. -
A Survey on Consensus Mechanisms and Mining Strategy Management
1 A Survey on Consensus Mechanisms and Mining Strategy Management in Blockchain Networks Wenbo Wang, Member, IEEE, Dinh Thai Hoang, Member, IEEE, Peizhao Hu, Member, IEEE, Zehui Xiong, Student Member, IEEE, Dusit Niyato, Fellow, IEEE, Ping Wang, Senior Member, IEEE Yonggang Wen, Senior Member, IEEE and Dong In Kim, Fellow, IEEE Abstract—The past decade has witnessed the rapid evolution digital tokens between Peer-to-Peer (P2P) users. Blockchain in blockchain technologies, which has attracted tremendous networks, especially those adopting open-access policies, are interests from both the research communities and industries. The distinguished by their inherent characteristics of disinterme- blockchain network was originated from the Internet financial sector as a decentralized, immutable ledger system for transac- diation, public accessibility of network functionalities (e.g., tional data ordering. Nowadays, it is envisioned as a powerful data transparency) and tamper-resilience [2]. Therefore, they backbone/framework for decentralized data processing and data- have been hailed as the foundation of various spotlight Fin- driven self-organization in flat, open-access networks. In partic- Tech applications that impose critical requirement on data ular, the plausible characteristics of decentralization, immutabil- security and integrity (e.g., cryptocurrencies [3], [4]). Further- ity and self-organization are primarily owing to the unique decentralized consensus mechanisms introduced by blockchain more, with the distributed consensus provided by blockchain networks. This survey is motivated by the lack of a comprehensive networks, blockchains are fundamental to orchestrating the literature review on the development of decentralized consensus global state machine1 for general-purpose bytecode execution. mechanisms in blockchain networks. In this survey, we provide a Therefore, blockchains are also envisaged as the backbone systematic vision of the organization of blockchain networks. -
P2P Mixing and Unlinkable Bitcoin Transactions Anonymity of the People, by the People, and for the People
P2P Mixing and Unlinkable Bitcoin Transactions Anonymity of the people, by the people, and for the people Tim Ruffing Pedro Moreno-Sanchez Aniket Kate CISPA, Saarland University Purdue University Purdue University tim.ruffi[email protected] [email protected] [email protected] Abstract—Starting with Dining Cryptographers networks Starting with the dining cryptographers network (DC-net) (DC-net), several peer-to-peer (P2P) anonymous communication protocol [14], another line of ACNs research emerged, where protocols have been proposed. Despite their strong anonymity users (or peers) do not employ any third party proxies and guarantees none of those has been employed in practice so instead communicate with each other to send their messages far: Most fail to simultaneously handle the crucial problems anonymously. While the DC-net protocol can guarantee suc- of slot collisions and malicious peers, while the remaining ones cessful termination and anonymity against honest-but-curious handle those with a significant increased latency (communication rounds) linear in the number of participating peers in the best adversary controlling a subset of users (or peers), it is easily case, and quadratic in the worst case. We conceptualize these prone to disruption by a single malicious peer who sends P2P anonymous communication protocols as P2P mixing, and invalid protocol messages (active disruption) or omits protocol present a novel P2P mixing protocol, DiceMix, that only requires messages entirely (crash). Moreover, a DC-net protects the constant (i.e., four) communication rounds in the best case, and anonymity of the involved malicious peers and subsequently 4 + 2f rounds in the worst case of f malicious peers. -
The Anatomy of a Money-Like Informational Commodity: a Study of Bitcoin by Tim Swanson
The Anatomy of a Money-like Informational Commodity: A Study of Bitcoin By Tim Swanson 1 © Copyright 2014 by Tim Swanson Cover art credit: Matt Thomas and Invisible Order This manuscript is released under the Creative Commons - Attribution 4.0 International license: to copy, transmit, share, adapt, remix, make commercial use of and freely distribute this work. 2 Table of Contents Preface .......................................................................................................................................................... 4 Acknowledgements ...................................................................................................................................... 5 Introduction .................................................................................................................................................. 6 Chapter 1: Bitcoin in theory and practice .................................................................................................... 9 Chapter 2: Public goods.............................................................................................................................. 24 Chapter 3: The Red Queen of Mining ........................................................................................................ 40 Chapter 4: A Bitcoin Gap ............................................................................................................................ 78 Chapter 5: Bitcoins made in China ............................................................................................................ -
A Policymaker's Guide to Blockchain Technology Implementation And
Background paper to the preparation of the 24th CSTD priority theme on Harnessing Blockchain for sustainable development Author: Rasim A Policymaker’s Guide to Alam, MPP, Harvard Kennedy School Blockchain Technology Implementation and Innovation Abstract: As Blockchain technology matures and applications of the technology become more widespread, policymakers will need to assess their country’s ability to harness Blockchain technology and recognize the best pathway to Blockchain adoption. This research paper presents a country-level assessment framework for Blockchain implementation and recommends pathways to improve the rate of learning. The assessment framework can be used to identify the stages of Blockchain development, the steps towards full Blockchain adoption, and the opportunities and challenges in the implementation process. Keywords: Blockchain, Assessment Framework The findings, interpretations, and conclusions herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the United Nations or its official Member States. The designations employed and the presentation of material on any map in this work do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the United Nations concerning the legal status of any country, territory, cities, or area or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers and boundaries. This paper represents the personal views of the author(s) only, not the views of the CSTD, UNCTAD secretariat or member States. The author accepts full responsibility for