Country Income Category Albania B Angola B Argentina B Armenia C

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Country Income Category Albania B Angola B Argentina B Armenia C

International Residents-in-Training 2018 Dues Stratification Chart *Countries on the World Bank list are subject to change annually. Country Income Category Albania B Angola B Argentina B Armenia C Aruba A Australia A Austria A Azerbaijan B Bahamas A Bahrain A Bangladesh C Barbados A Belarus B Belgium A Belize B Benin C Bolivia C Brazil B Bulgaria B Cambodia B Canada* A Chile A China B Colombia B Costa Rica B Croatia (Hrvatska) A Cuba B 1 International Residents-in-Training 2018 Dues Stratification Chart *Countries on the World Bank list are subject to change annually. Country Income Category Cyprus A Czech Republic A Denmark A Dominican Republic B Ecuador B El Salvador C Egypt C Finland A France A France - Metropolitan A Georgia B Germany A Ghana C Greece A Guatemala C Haiti C Honduras C Hong Kong A Hungary A Iceland A India C Indonesia C Iran, Islamic Republic of B Iraq B Ireland A Islamic Republic of Iran B Israel A 2 International Residents-in-Training 2018 Dues Stratification Chart *Countries on the World Bank list are subject to change annually. Country Income Category Italy A Jamaica B Japan A Jordan B Kazakhstan B Kenya C Kuwait A Lebanon B Luxembourg A Macau A Macedonia B Malaysia B Mauritania C Mauritius B Mexico B Mongolia C Morocco C Mozambique C Myanmar C Namibia B Nepal C Netherlands A Netherlands Antilles A New Zealand A Nigeria C Norway A Pakistan C 3 International Residents-in-Training 2018 Dues Stratification Chart *Countries on the World Bank list are subject to change annually. Country Income Category Panama B Paraguay B Peru B Philippines C Poland A Portugal A Qatar A Republic of Korea A Romania B Russian Federation B Saint Lucia B Saudi Arabia A Senegal C Serbia B Singapore A Slovakia(Slovak A Republic) South Africa B Spain A Sri Lanka C Sudan C Sweden A Switzerland A Syrian Arab Republic C Taiwan A Thailand B Trinidad And Tobago A 4 International Residents-in-Training 2018 Dues Stratification Chart *Countries on the World Bank list are subject to change annually. Country Income Category Tunisia C Turkey B Uganda C Ukraine C United Arab Emirates A United Kingdom A United States* A Uruguay A Uzbekistan B Venezuela B Viet Nam C Yemen C Yugoslavia Republic of B Macedonia Zimbabwe C 5 .

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