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ABSTRACT

DEVELOPMENT IN THE TIMING: HOW THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION ENGAGED NGOS IN LATIN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

by Amanda Rae Lawson

When President spoke at Commencement at the University of Notre Dame May 22, 1977, he promised a new foreign policy rooted in humanitarian concerns and morality. The Carter Administration created a foreign policy agenda that engaged with various NGOs both in planning and practice in order to carry out such a policy. This alliance was particularly useful in -Latin American relations and altered U.S. policy toward the region, acting on information from NGOs and at times, relying on the organizations to participate in execution of the foreign relations agenda. This thesis will argue that the Carter Administration arose at a key moment in time which enabled it to forge an innovative Latin American foreign policy that set a precedent for the interdisciplinary future of foreign relations.

DEVELOPMENT IN THE RIGHTS TIMING: HOW THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION ENGAGED NGOS IN LATIN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

Thesis

Submitted to the

Faculty of Miami University

in partial fulfillment of

the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts

by

Amanda Rae Lawson

Miami University

Oxford, Ohio

2019

Advisor: Dr. Amanda Kay McVety

Reader: Dr. Steven Conn

Reader: Dr. Lindsay Schakenbach-Regele

©2019 Amanda Rae Lawson

This thesis titled

DEVELOPMENT IN THE RIGHTS TIMING: HOW THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION ENGAGED NGOS IN LATIN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

by

Amanda Rae Lawson

has been approved for publication by

College of Arts and Science

and

Department of History

______Dr. Amanda Kay McVety

______Dr. Steven Conn

______Dr. Lindsay Schakenbach-Regele

Table of Contents

List of Tables iv Dedication v Introduction 1 The Rights Timing 9 Pressure, Policy, and Politics 42 In Public and In Practice 75 Conclusion 117 Bibliography 120

iii

List of Tables

Table 1: Agency for International Development: Development Assistance FY 1977-1979 Projections as of September 1977 113 Table 2: Agency for International Development: Development Assistance FY 1977-1983 Projections as of 1979 113 Table 3: United States Agency for International Development FY 1980 Section 116e Activities Funding 113 Table 4: United States Military and Economic Assistance FY 1977-1981 114

iv

Dedication

This thesis is dedicated to those who have inspired, consoled, encouraged, and challenged me throughout this process.

To my Sanity Squad, Girl Gang, Housemates, and Miami Family: Bruno, Alli, Terry, Ed, Sharee, Naomi, Anna, Juice, Alex, Beau, Brett, Laura, Julia I would not—and probably could not—be here without you.

To my advisor, Amanda McVety, for all of the support you have given me and the ways you challenged me to develop as a historian, writer, and teacher.

To Steve Conn for enabling me to write and publishing my work.

To Lindsay Schakenbach-Regele for constantly encouraging me in my writing and for supporting the grad students’ obsession with various snack foods.

To Nishani Frazier for teaching me how to write a book review and how to be bold in academia.

v

Introduction In the keynote address at the University of Notre Dame’s Commencement ceremony on May 22, 1977, President Jimmy Carter claimed that the War had “produced a profound moral crisis” which demanded a restructuring of U.S. foreign policy.1 United States policy in Vietnam attempted to separate “issues of war and peace from the new global questions of justice, equity, and .”2 Carter argued that it was no longer viable to “[fight] fire with fire, never thinking that fire is better quenched with water.”3 As a result, Carter promoted a new kind of foreign policy—especially toward the developing world—wherein human rights were the foundation. He exhorted his audience to participate in the promotion of human rights and democracy, promising that the administration would welcome public involvement.4 Speaking to a group of college graduates, Carter sought to harness their enthusiasm, saying “we are confident in the good sense of the American people, and so we let them share in the process of making foreign policy decisions. We can thus speak with the voices of 215 million, and not just of an isolated handful.”5 At the end of his speech, Carter acknowledged the administration’s desire to work closely with developing countries in , and that there would need to be policy rooted in both immediate aid and sustainable development.6 This speech served as a launching point for the Carter Administration’s creative, new humanitarian-based foreign policy. It publicly rejected military aggression in developing nations and promoted democracy and human rights. Bringing this type of dramatic change was an enormous task and one which the government could not bring about on its own. The administration came up with an innovative approach to both creation and execution of foreign

1 Carter explained that the approach to the was a failure and was “the best example of…intellectual and moral poverty.” Jimmy Carter, Address at Commencement Exercises at the University of Notre Dame Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/243018. 2 Jimmy Carter, Address at Commencement Exercises at the University of Notre Dame 3 Jimmy Carter, Address at Commencement Exercises at the University of Notre Dame 4 As an advocate for human rights, Carter made it clear that humanitarian concerns would take a prominent role in his foreign policy. Carter advocated for “a foreign policy that the American people both support and, for a change, know about and understand,” and that “Our policy must be open; it must be candid; it must be one of constructive global involvement.” Jimmy Carter, Address at Commencement Exercises at the University of Notre Dame. 5 Jimmy Carter, Address at Commencement Exercises at the University of Notre Dame. 6 Carter explained “We know a peaceful world cannot long exist one-third rich and two-thirds hungry…in the long run, expanded and equitable trade will best help the developing countries to help themselves. But the immediate problems of hunger, disease, illiteracy, and repression are here now…We have a special need for cooperation and consultation with other nations in this hemisphere.” Jimmy Carter, Address at Commencement Exercises at the University of Notre Dame. 1 policy: involving nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). The Carter Administration sought advice from and relied upon action by non-state actors—particularly NGOs—in creating and carrying out foreign policy, especially in Latin America.7 The atmosphere of the late both economically and socially contributed to a relationship where the skills, freedoms, and resources available to each party provided both top-down (international ) and bottom-up (transnational and cultural) solutions. Historiography Historians, and the general public, remember the Carter Administration through highly polarized lenses, either as a champion for human rights and morality, or as a foreign relations disaster rooted in the Iranian hostage crisis and multiple struggles of 1979.8 Frequently painting Carter as an overly idealistic amateur, many historians demonstrated the importance Carter placed on people and their rights, but argued that the administration was incapable of accomplishing its goals.9 They did, however, admit that Carter provided a connection between U.S. policy and the global . His foreign policy was reflective of the international focus on human rights in the late 1970s.10 In this study, “non-governmental organization (NGO)” is specifically used to refer to those NGOs with a humanitarian focus.11 They bridged gaps between citizens and governments,

7 His partnership with the private sector as governor of laid a foundation for the influence of non-state actors during his presidency. 8 David Siders, “Democrats Find a Foil for Trump in Jimmy Carter,” in Politico March 13, 2019. https://www.politico.com/story/2019/03/13/jimmy-carter-trump-1207385; Dominic Sandbrook, Mad As Hell: The Crisis of the 1970s and the Rise of the Populist Right (: Alfred A Knopf, 2011); Andrew E. Busch, Reagan’s Victory: The Presidential Election of 1980 and the Rise of the Right (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2005). 9 Jerel A. Rosati, The Carter Administration’s Quest for Global Community: Beliefs and Their Impact on Behavior, (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1987) and M. Glenn, Abernathy, ed., The Carter Years: The President and Policy Making, (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1984); David S. McLellan, , (Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Allanheld, 1985); Cyrus Vance, Hard Choices: Four Critical Years in Managing America’s Foreign Policy. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983); Zbigniew Brzeznski, Power and Principle, (New York: Farrar, Strauss, Giroux, 1983); Gaddis Smith, Morality, Reason and Power: American Diplomacy in the Carter Years, (New York: Hill and Wang, 1986); Kenneth E. Morris, Jimmy Carter: American Moralist, (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 1996); Donald S. Spencer, The Carter Implosion: Jimmy Carter and the Amateur of Diplomacy, (New York: Praeger, 1988); Betty Glad, An Outsider in the : Jimmy Carter, His Advisors, and the Making of American Foreign Policy, (Ithaca, NY: Press, 2009). 10 Akira Iriye, Human Rights Revolution: An International History; Lars Schoultz, Human Rights and United States Policy toward Latin America (Princeton, NJ: Press, 1981); John Dumbrell, The Carter Presidency: A Re-Evaluation (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 1993); Hugh Davis Graham and Gary Fink, The Carter Presidency: Policy Choices in the Post- Era, (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1998). 11 As a humanitarian NGO, the organization’s stated goals involve progression in the human condition either through physical development or human rights. Further in this thesis, I will argue that human rights under President 2 between citizens in one nation and another, and between governments and supranational governmental organizations, namely the United Nation and regional institutions like the Organization of American States. As governments realized the benefit of working with NGOs, and as the NGOs became reliable enough to participate, the connections between state and nonstate tightened. Non-governmental organizations brought new levels of financial flexibility and contextual knowledge that helped them “run risks and enter into partnerships with the state by assuming the cost of experimentation and reducing the risk to the state,” and could “introduce innovations that the state would otherwise not develop.”12 The organizations were able to navigate economic and political factors most effectively when they operated as partners with, rather than agents of, the state. In the age of in the 21st Century, foreign relations and diplomatic historians took note of these trends and incorporated them into historical scholarship as well.13 Several historians agreed that the subject of NGO-government interaction has been largely underserved.14 What does exist has come under critique by several historians calling for a

Jimmy Carter came to fall under the overarching banner of “development.” While they may—and do—work with government structures, NGOs are run autonomously from government by private citizens (typically a board of directors). Funding provided by the government can be used by the NGO authentically as far as the organization controls how it is used, often by initiating a specific request for funds. Financial support however, must not impede the NGO’s status as a non-profit organization. In a similar vein, corporations and multinational enterprises that are for-profit companies—while they may have a business model that includes corporate social responsibility—are not here considered NGOs. Lastly, the organization must be non-violent in its tactics. Rather than attempting to overthrow or destabilize, they use “soft power” peaceful methods of development, lobbying, research, and mobilization to support growth. Helen James, “Introduction,” in Civil Society, Religion, and Global Governance: Paradigms of Power and Persuasion edited by Helen James, (New York: Routledge, 2007) 3-4; Akira Iriye, Global Interdependence: The World after 1945 (Cambridge, MA: Press, 2014) 738. 12 Thomas F Carroll, Intermediary NGOs: The Supporting Link in Grassroots Development (West Hartford, CT: Kumarian Press, 1992) 124. When the NGO served as the intermediary, the donor government experienced less risk, the recipient government had higher confidence that the aid would arrive, and the organization gained international credit and influence, from Michael J Gilligan, “The Transaction Costs Approach to International Institutions,” in Civil Society, Religion, and Global Governance: Paradigms of Power and Persuasion edited by Helen James (New York: Routledge, 2007) 51. Gilligan defines transaction costs as “the costs of measuring the valuable attributes of what is being exchanged and the costs of protecting rights and policing and enforcing agreements.” 53. Henry Carey validated the ideal benefits of successful towing of that line when he wrote that NGOs who worked with governments “should offer efficiency and policy expertise in a way that state bureaucracies cannot.” Carey, Privatizing the Democratic Peace, 17. 13 Iriye, Global Interdependence; James, Civil Society, Religion, and Global Governance; Stoddard, Humanitarian Alert. 14 Research in the fields of political science, economics, and anthropology validates the relationship between the government and NGOs, but there is a need for a study that is grounded in the field of history. What historical studies exist rely heavily on examples from the and Southeast , frequently excluding Latin America. See Brad Simpson, “Explaining Political Economy,” in Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations, edited by Frank Costigliola and Michael J Hogan. 58-59. These organizations engaged in a variety of activities on both the input and output ends of development, including service delivery, policy advocacy, aid-mediation and management, 3 reevaluation of both the history and the scholarship on the subject.15 Part of this new charge for historians was to evaluate the role of the United States in human rights efforts and global development. Understanding the humanitarian shift (and eventual pushback) necessitated a combination of studies of foreign policy and human rights, taking into account the global political context.16 As a result, modernization theory and criticism of United States intervention—or disguised aid—came under fire in recent historical scholarship.17 After the Cold War ended, many historians questioned the motivation behind U.S. foreign development efforts and argued that both the U.S. and U.N. had ulterior—and far from benevolent—motives for Latin American development during the Cold War.18 When historians increasingly questioned the effectiveness of development as a foreign policy tool, they frequently debate the ability of NGOs to effectively influence policy, in part due to the organization’s own selfish motivations.19

and mobilization of action networks. Helen James, “Introduction,” 3. NGOs whose methodology rested in research grew out of the interdisciplinary culture of universities and cities as hubs for “research and development think tanks, as well as experimental sites for service delivery…important sources of technical expertise.” Charles A. Reilly, “Public Policy and Citizenship,” in New Paths to Democratic Development in Latin America: The Rise of NGO- Municipal Collaboration, edited by Charles A. Reilly (Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 1995) 4. Reilly later explains the value of think tanks and independent research centers that “encourage more systematic and programmatic learning, identify technical problems, and formulate alternative social policy.” Reilly, “Public Policy and Citizenship,” 24. However, more action-based organizations also played significant roles, “as real-world academies for democracy, NGOs permit people to taste the full menu of rights and responsibilities, including, but not restricted to, voting, which characterizes primary citizenship.” Reilly, “Public Policy and Citizenship,” 2. 15 Stephen J Macekura and Erez Manela, “Introduction,” in The Development Century: A Global History, edited by Stephen J Macekura and Erez Manela (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2018) 16; Paul Adler, “Creating the ‘NGO International’: The Rise of Advocacy for Alternative Development, 1974-1994,” in The Development Century: A Global History edited by Stephen J Macekura and Erez Manela (New York, Cambridge University Press, 2018) 308. 16 Elizabeth Borgwardt, A New Deal for the World: Americas Vision for Human Rights, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005); Thomas F. O’Brien, Making the Americas: The United States and Latin America from the Age of Revolutions to the Era of Globalization, (Albuquerque, NM: University of New Mexico Press, 2007); Frank Costigliola and Michael J Hogan, ed., America in the World, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016); Frank Costigliola and Michael J Hogan, ed., Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016); Jeffrey F. Taffet, Foreign Aid as Foreign Policy: The Alliance for Progress in Latin America, (New York: Routledge, 2007). 17 Michael E. Latham, Modernization as : American Social Science and “Nation-Building” in the Kennedy Era, (Chapel Hill, NC: University of Press, 2000); Greg Grandin, Empire’s Workshop: Latin America, the United States, and the Rise of the New , (New York: Henry Holt and Company, LLC, 2006). 18 Peter Sollis, “Partners in Development? The State, Nongovernmental Organizations and the UN in ,” Third World Quarterly 16, no. 3 (September 1995): 525-542. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3992891. 19 Lina Suleiman, “The NGOs and the Grand Illusion of Development and Democracy,” Voluntas: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations 24, no. 1 (March 2013): 241-261. http://www.jstor.org/stable/42629801; Jessica Elkind, Aid Under Fire: Nation Building and the Vietnam War, (Lexington, KY: University Press of , 2016). Carey, Privatizing the Democratic Peace. 4

As scholarship increased on the role of nonstate actors, historians explored the origin, power, and benefits of new actors.20 The growth of visibility and influence of NGOs became more easily recognized in historical scholarship following the transnational turn in the 1990s. As Mark Gilderhus and Michael Neagle wrote, this period saw two major trends in scholarship coming into the new millennium: cultural studies and the end of the Cold War, which opened previously closed archives.21 As a result of the transnational turn, much of the work on the interaction between NGOs and the US in foreign policy has emerged since 1990. Situating NGO growth in global development of concepts of advanced , historians explained how previously understudied actors and organizations set a precedent for continued promotion of economic development around the world. International institutions like the became a focus of historical scholarship and historians connected these bodies to the work of NGOs, arguing that the NGOs’ power expanded to reach beyond national borders, often through nongovernmental organizations.22 Without expressly focusing on the Carter Administration, historians in the last twenty years have supported the historiographical connections between the Carter presidency and the role of NGOs alongside the state in U.S./Latin American relations. Historians were not the only academics concerned with this particular connection. A full understanding of the complexity of United States and Latin American foreign relations during the Carter Administration is only through an interdisciplinary study of social, cultural, and economic contributing factors.23 Political scientists, economists, and anthropologists all contributed to this body of work, however putting each of these in conversation with one another is best done through a historical frame. Political scientists have explored the growing influence of NGOs in politics at both the local (grassroots) and national levels, drawing crucial

20 Amy L. S. Sayward, The Birth of Development: How the , Food and Agriculture Organization, and World Health Organization Changed the World, 1945-1965, (Kent, OH: The Kent State University Press, 2006). Raj Kumar, “USAID Revisited,” Georgetown Journal of International Affairs 7, no. 1 (Winter/Spring 2006): 51-57. http://www.jstor.org/stable/43133660. 21 Mark Gilderhus and Christopher Neagle, “Culture and the Cold War: US-Latin American Historiography since 1995,” in America in the World, ed. Frank Costigliola and Michael J Hogan, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016) 188-189. 22 Amy Sayward, The United Nations in International History, (New York: Bloomsbury, 2017). Maxine Molynuex and Sian Lazar, Doing the Rights Thing: Rights-based Development and Latin American NGOs, (: Intermediate Technology Publishing Group Publishing, 2003); Robyn Eversole, ed., Here to Help: NGOs Combating Poverty in Latin America, (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2003). Charles A. Reilly, New Paths to Democratic Development in Latin America. 23 Gilbert M. Joseph and Daniela Spenser, In from the Cold: Latin America’s New Encounter with the Cold War (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2008). 5 connections between the role of NGOs in informing and carrying out policy.24 Political economists expanded on these arguments to show the value and methods of using government aid not only to assist developing countries, but more often to gain influence over the governments and economies of recipient nations. 25 While conceptually inciteful, the regions represented are limited in scope and older works tend to have a paternalistic and American exceptionality approach to the writing.26 Economists, entrepreneurs, and business theorists demonstrated the value of giving aid to developing countries in the hopes of building alliances and spheres of influence.27 These works focused more on sustainable development efforts that resulted in lasting trade partnerships and infrastructure in those countries.28 Anthropologists emphasized the on-the-ground outcomes for aid recipients through the human component of the development and aid processes.29 Sources: How They Determined the Argument Primary sources for this study include numerous presidential addresses and papers from cabinet members on foreign relations and development policy found at the National Archives in Washington, D.C. and the Jimmy Carter Presidential Archives and , Georgia. Journals and memoirs were another key component in this research. Key articles came from the policymakers themselves, others from members of think tanks and academics who sought to influence Washington. Access to international journals and online archives allowed for multiple perspectives on this NGO-government partnership. The U.S. Office of the Historian files on Foreign Relations of the United States proved an essential ally throughout this process. Memoirs

24 Thomas F. Carroll, Intermediary NGOs: The Supporting Link in Grassroots Development, (West Hartford, CT: Kumarian Press, 1992). 25 Abby Stoddard, Humanitarian Alert: NGO Information and Its Impact on US Foreign Policy, (Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian Press, 2006). 26 Howard Wiarda, Democracy and its Discontents: Development, Interdependence, and U.S. Policy in Latin America, (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1995). 27 Jeffrey F. Taffet, Foreign Aid as Foreign Policy: The Alliance for Progress in Latin America, (New York: Routledge, 2007); Tim Buthe, Solomon Major, and Andre de Mello e Souza, “The Politics of Private Foreign Aid: Humanitarian Principles, Economic Development Objectives, and Organizational Interests in NGO Private Aid Allocation,” International Organization 66, no. 4 (Fall 2012): 571-607. http://www.jstor.org/stable/23279972; Michael A. Cohen and Maria Figueros Kupcu, “Privatizing Foreign Policy,” World Policy Journal 22, no. 3 (Fall 2005): 34-52. http://www.jstor.org/stable/40209975; Michael S. Winters, “Accountability, Participation and Foreign Aid Effectiveness,” International Studies Review 12, no. 2 (June 2010): 218-243. http://www.jstor.org/stable/40730728. 28 Alan M. Rugman and Jonathan P. Doh. Multinationals and Development. New Haven: Press, 2011. And Lester M. Salamon, Rethinking Corporate Social Engagement: Lessons from Latin America, (Sterling, VA: Kumarian Press, 2010). ProQuest Ebrary. 29 Tara Hefferan, Julie Adkins, and Laurie Occhipinti, ed., Bridging the Gaps: Faith-Based Organizations, Neoliberalism, and Developments in Latin America and the Caribbean, (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2009). 6 from key Carter cabinet members also help to explain motivations for policy and inclusion or exclusion of specific groups. There were limitations of the scope of this thesis which must be noted and are excellent starting points for an expansion of this research. Due to restrictions on time and funding, archival research was limited to available digital resources and physical documents housed in the National Archives at College Park. An expansion on this thesis may also include archival research in the Latin American countries which appear in the study and would provide a unique view of U.S.-NGO activity from the recipient nations’ perspective. Due to time and funding conflicts, a sufficient study in this area was not possible for this project. The second limitation of this study was the restriction of access to the archives of the various NGOs mentioned throughout. While much of the information was available through other avenues, some information was tightly guarded by the organizations. Driven by primary sources rooted in government documents, this thesis focuses on how Jimmy Carter created a truly innovative foreign policy through the use of NGOs as both informants and executors. Bringing NGOs into the narrative and using the Carter Administration as the framework provides a new perspective that reveals the administration’s successes in foreign affairs. Where previous studies have conceived of U.S./Latin American foreign relations as either state-driven or non-state-driven, I argue that the full narrative is not “either, or” but “both, and.” Chapter Breakdown This thesis begins with an introduction to both the Carter Administration and unique global humanitarian moment prevalent at the time of his ascendency to office. The first chapter, explores the way the Carter Administration capitalized on the domestic and international human rights push and why it looked to NGOs as partners in foreign relations. Chapter Two focuses on what I term “informant NGOs.” These are organizations that focus on research, advocacy, and lobbying for policy creation or change. Beginning with congressional hearings advocating for closer working relationships between the government and informant NGOs, this chapter demonstrates the administration’s awareness of the organizations’ unique ability to inform policy and numerous officials’ desire for inclusion of these groups in the policymaking process. The last chapter addresses the “executor NGOs.” This includes organizations that were directly involved in carrying out the government’s policies either on the ground in Latin

7

America, or by rallying support of the domestic public. They facilitated exchange programs, delivered goods and services, and recruited private citizens to participate in the foreign relations process. The conclusion purports that while Jimmy Carter lost his bid for re-election, his administration was successful in its efforts to emphasize humanitarian concerns in Latin America—enabled by the innovation of NGO inclusion in the policy-making and execution process. Carter’s success in this regard was evidenced by the continuance and expansion of both the work of humanitarian NGOs in Latin America and also of human rights and development in the region.

8

The Rights Timing

Vignette: Jimmy Carter was a member of the Trilateral Commission upon its inception in 1973. The Commission was a nongovernmental organization that brought businessmen, politicians, and consultants together to discuss foreign and domestic affairs. The Trilateral Commission worked to connect with government and influence policy decisions. The first annual report of the Commission applauded Jimmy Carter’s work to advance the organization and influence politics in the 1970s.1 His involvement for the three years prior to his election enabled Carter to “gain entrance into powerful foreign policy circles” which, in the 1970s was significant for anyone hoping to become President.2 His deep ties to—and powerful presence in—the Commission demonstrated that Carter realized the power and benefits of nongovernmental organizations long before he entered the White House. In fact, he peppered Trilateral Commissioners throughout his staff, including Zbigniew Brzeznski, Cyrus Vance, , Harold Brown, Michael Blumenthal, , and Andrew (Andy) Young.3 These strong administration connections to the Trilateral Commission were a virtual guarantee that the Carter Administration would seek partnerships with foreign countries, develop economies, and pursue nongovernmental paths when available. By the end of what the United Nations termed the Second Development Decade (1970s), NGOs had firmly established themselves as significant actors on the international stage, with reach and authority previously limited only to government. From the beginning of his presidency, Jimmy Carter was faced with a decision about his administration’s engagement with the NGO community. He could either fight their growing power or embrace it and work with NGOs to expand the administration’s reach and support. Carter himself had a background in business and was a deeply faith-filled humanitarian who had worked with his church and other organizations prior to his presidential campaign. Not surprisingly, the administration chose the latter.

1 Jay Peterzell, “The Trilateral Commission and the Carter Administration,” in Economic and Political Weekly 12, no. 51 (December 17, 1977) pp. 2097-2099 + 2101-2104. 2 Peterzell, “The Trilateral Commission and the Carter Administration,” 2103. 3 “Established by in 1973, the Trilateral Commission brought together leaders in finance, business, and politics from the advanced industrial world…The state purpose of the Commission [was] ‘to develop practical proposals for joint action’ on issues such as energy, relations with the third world, international finance and governability at home,” Peterzell, “The Trilateral Commission and the Carter Administration,” 2097. 9

The global political and cultural changes in the decades following World War II had dramatic effects on United States foreign policy. Revolutions, coups, and social shaped the way society and politicians interacted on a global scale. The effects of globalization led to human rights an international problem, one that forced individual nations to reevaluate their foreign policies. One historian explained the complication that Carter and other 1970s politicians faced, saying Any Democrat entering the White House in 1977 would have found it impossible to ignore human rights. Congress was in an assertive mood in the aftermath of the Vietnam debacle and the Watergate scandals, and public revulsion over the latter had led in November 1974 to election of a House of Representatives with a two-to-one Democratic majority. Several of its new members were liberals committed to an aggressive campaign to force the president to take seriously the advancement of human rights abroad. In the next two years, they combined with veterans in their own body and in the Senate to push through Congress legislation establishing a human rights bureaucracy in the State Department and requiring the president to consider the human rights records of foreign governments in granting aid. Liberals in Congress received crucial assistance from private groups. The end of the crusade against the Vietnam War and growing revulsion over the American record under Nixon and Ford, especially in Chile, energized such groups to concentrate broadly on human rights in the Third World.4

Jimmy Carter’s administration capitalized on a global political and cultural moment intimately tied to human rights and heightened influence of NGOs. The way the Carter administration viewed the changes in the 1970s—and their impact on world affairs— differed from its predecessors. This was most profoundly and uniquely seen in the manifestation of a new process of United States-Latin American relations. The policy frameworks of East-West (Cold War), core and periphery (of dependency theorists), and the Maoist construct of First, Second, and Third Worlds were insufficient to explain what was happening in the world.5 Carter’s administration recognized that globalization had become the name of the game and adjusted its goals and policies to fit within that framework. The result was a foreign policy agenda unlike its predecessors, both in creation and implementation. This chapter will explore the factors that disrupted traditional methods and foci of foreign relations—namely the global human rights movement and the rising influence of

4 William Stueck, “Placing Jimmy Carter’s Foreign Policy,” in The Carter Presidency: Policy Changes in the Post- New Deal Era, edited by Gary M Fink and Hugh Davis Graham (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1998), 252-253. 5 Daniel Sargent, A Superpower Transformed: The Remaking of American Foreign Relations in the 1970s (New York, , 2015), 234. 10

U.S. NGOs—and the Carter Administration’s embrace of the disruption, which resulted in new and innovative foreign policy practices. Cold War and NGO Influence As the War came to an end, the Cold War began and launched the world into an ideological battle that immediately tested the resolve of the United Nations and leaders who had supported the new global front for human rights. At the behest of of State George Marshall, the United States flooded European countries with aid to prevent them from succumbing to . In the drama of the early Cold War, U.S. concerns were far from focused on their neighbors to the south, and its money was equally transoceanic. Latin American leaders “pressured Secretary of State Marshall for a ‘ for Latin America,’ [but] he made it clear that the U.S. was assigning top priority to European recovery and that there would not be a comparable program for Latin America.”6 Marshall’s stern response set an early precedent that aid for Latin America would primarily come from private investment.7 While succeeding administrations—particularly Kennedy’s—departed slightly from Marshall, the early postwar U.S. attitude toward Latin American development was passive. Prior to the 1970s, the general population was so entrenched in Cold War dogma that they were fairly “agnostic” to the role of human rights abroad.8 The Vietnam War exemplified the United States’ stance on hierarchy of human rights and anticommunism in the Cold War. Support of Ngo Dinh Diem showed the world that the United States was willing to prop up harsh dictators as long as they were capitalists who opposed the expansion of Soviet power. One historian, writing less than a decade after the war ended, remarked that U.S. action in Vietnam “labeled the United States as the primary supporter of a repressive government whose only virtue was its fanatical anticommunism.”9 But the degradation of human rights concerns was not limited to a specific administration or national conflict. Even in the Western Hemisphere, human rights frequently took a back-seat to East-West Cold War tensions. 10 In 1970, Chile elected leftist Salvador Allende as its president. In 1973,

6 Don M. Coerver and Linda B Hall, Tangled Destinies: Latin America and the United States, (Albuquerque, NM: University of New Mexico Press, 1999) 109. 7 Coerver and Linda B Hall, Tangled Destinies, 109. 8 Sargent, A Superpower Transformed, 197. 9 Schoultz, Human Rights and United States Policy toward Latin America, 371. 10 It wasn’t until Carter pushed human rights and used human rights as a weapon in the Cold War: “some Western NGOs continued to lobby for human rights during the early Cold War…Three decades later, because of President Carter and the Helsinki process begun under his predecessor, President Ford, included an important 11 with the help of the Nixon Administration, a military coup ousted Allende and resulted in his mysterious death. The junta that took power was violent and intolerant of dissent, leading to the imprisonment and of hundreds of thousands of Chilean. Three years later, Argentina found itself embroiled in its own military coup. The junta that took power ruled with an iron fist and launched the nation into what historians refer to as the “,” where the government attacked, tortured, and murdered thousands of its own people. Stories of “los desaparecidos,” (disappeared ones) and the gruesome details of their torture became prime ammunition for increasingly vocal human rights organizations and lobbies.11 It was during this decade that the United States pivoted toward humanitarian concerns—most notably human rights—due in large part to popular pressure from nongovernmental actors. NGOs arose as a response to human rights violations before they were legally deemed “violations,” had existed in various forms long before the Cold War. Many of these organizations came as a result of perceived needs either due to government inefficiency, division, or war. U.S. NGOs have existed since the early days of the nation, seen through historians who explored the long narrative of NGO development in the United States dating back to the 18th Century.12 For the first century of U.S. history, government policy was determined almost exclusively by economic interests. It was not until private citizens began calling for change and forming NGOs that the government was forced to consider—and eventually act upon—humanitarian issues in its foreign (and domestic) policy.13

human rights initiative, which tended to delegitimize the Soviet bloc and, though to a much lesser extent, many Western tactics,” from Carey, Privatizing the Democratic Peace, 90. 11 For explicit examples of what U.S. officials and organizations discovered about victims of the Dirty War, see Michael Schmidli, The Fate of Freedom Elsewhere: Human Rights and U.S. Cold War Policy toward Argentina (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2013). 12 Stephen J Macekura and Erez Manela, The Development Century; Thomas Davies, NGOs: A New History of Transnational Civil Society (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014); Thomas Davies, “NGOs: A Long and Turbulent History,” in The Global Journal (January 23, 2013), www.theglobaljournal.net/article/view/981; Aynsley Kellow and Hannah Murphy-Gregory, Handbook of Research on NGOs (Northhampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2018). For deeper exploration of the 19th Century roots of humanitarian NGO activism, see Gary J. Bass, Freedom’s Battle: The Origins of Humanitarian Intervention, (New York: Random House, 2008); Michael Barnett, Empire of Humanity: A History of Humanitarianism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2011). 13 Nearly a century before the American Civil War, abolitionist organizations lobbied for the end of slavery. Abolitionist organizations pressured the government to consider the humanitarian component of slavery, rather than justifying the system because of economic benefits. For discussion on the early abolitionist organizations as foundational NGOs in the United States, see Bob Reinalda, “NGOs in the History of Intergovernmental Organizations,” in The Handbook of Research on NGOs edited by Aynsley Kellow and Hannah Murphy-Gregory (Northhampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishers, 2018). 35; Davies, “NGOs: A Long and Turbulent History;” David Lewis, Non-Governmental Organizations, Management, and Development (New York: Routledge, 2014). 12

The number and reach of NGOs in the 19th Century expanded as the nation—and its problems—grew. The Red Cross and the Young Men’s Christian Association (YMCA) were both founded in the mid-19th Century and their international influence crept into American society, taking root among the other humanitarian and religious groups.14 The Industrial Revolution, both globally and within the United States, exacerbated the tension between expanding economic benefits and humanitarian concerns in policy-making.15 The success of NGOs fighting for fair wages and working conditions demonstrated their transnational impact in that countries and communities around the world “shared certain interests and objectives across national boundaries.”16 As the world grew smaller and more connected, NGOs became more accessible and at times, better avenues for development than the government. By the beginning of in 1914, there were over 400 international NGOs, many established between 1870 and 1914.17 The war created a massive humanitarian crisis that overwhelmed national governments. The destruction of the war was “the focus for a new generation of NGOs that emerged during and immediately after the War.”18 The Paris Peace Conference in 1919 provided NGOs an opportunity to network with one another and with national governments. The League of Nations (establish during the conference), demonstrated the value that governments around the world had for NGO activity by mandating in its charter that the League would regularly work with organizations like the Red Cross.19 Addressing the humanitarian needs that followed the devastation of the war was “among the first activities that required collaboration between the League of Nations and INGOs (International NGOs).”20 While the League of Nations was ultimately unsuccessful, that was not the case for the NGOs. The war and resulting efforts for peace created a new international space and credibility for NGOs to influence policy and development.

14 Davies, “NGOs: A Long and Turbulent History.” 15 Industrial Revolution-era organizations had such a significant impact on the world that “the contemporary world would be incomprehensible without taking them into consideration.” Akira Iriye, Global Community: The Role of International Organizations in the Making of the Contemporary World (Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 2002) 1. 16 Iriye, Global Community, 9. 17 Davies, “NGOs: A Long and Turbulent History;” Davies, NGOs: A New History of Transnational Civil Society, 19-22. Many of these included missionary organizations and religious societies. 18 Davies, “The Historical Development of NGOs,” 20. 19 Davies, NGOs: A New History of Transnational Civil Society, 77-81. 20 Davies, NGOs: A New History of Transnational Civil Society, 94. 13

The Second World War and creation of the United Nations provided additional opportunities for NGOs to expand their operations and influence. The end of World War II presented even more questions about global recovery and relief, namely, who was responsible and how it would happen. Mass-mobilization during wartime and increased public knowledge of humanitarian crises in softened the American government and public to the notion of multilateral institutions.21 President Franklin Roosevelt did not want the responsibility to fall solely on the U.S. government.22 He advocated that the San Francisco Conference, where the UN Charter was created, be attended by professionals in addition to politicians.23 His request worked to the benefit of NGOs seeking more power and influence; they could step into greater roles so that governments, at least theoretically, would not have to bear as much of the social and economic burden. The United Nations gave NGOs a global platform and played a “seminal role in the unprecedented growth of today’s thriving global civil society.”24 The creation of the UN sparked a substantial growth of influence and prestige for non-governmental organizations. The opportunity afforded NGOs by the UN declarations allowed them to “become more capable of running increasingly robust humanitarian mission across the globe, contributing to what has been called an NGO revolution.”25 This opportunity led to the numbers of NGOs that operated across borders doubling between 1960 and 1970, to consist of 2,795 organizations.26 NGOs were undoubtedly important in practice and expansive in reach through moments of crisis around the world, but in the 1970s and 1980s the focus turned away from crisis relief and toward secondary development like education and sociopolitical rights. This was partially due to the lack of major military threats during the period of détente between the United States and the , but largely came about as a result of NGOs expanded abilities and proven crebility on a global stage. In these decades, the American public and NGOs began rethinking

21 Borgwardt, A New Deal for the World, 7, 85. Borgwardt pointed to the U.S. human rights response to the humanitarian crisis of WWII saying, “human rights are a response to human wrongs…also a product of the domestic political culture.” 251. 22 Borgwardt, A New Deal for the World, 24-26. 23 Borgwardt, A New Deal for the World, 143. 24 Stephen Porter, “Humanitarian Politics and Governance” in The Cambridge History of the Second World War, edited by Michael Geyer and Adam Tooze (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2015). Similarly, Borgwardt contended that the growth of such a strong NGO community was “one of the biggest developments for postwar human rights politics” that resulted from the UN Conference. Borgwardt, A New Deal for the World, 191 25 Porter, “Humanitarian Politics and Governance,” 525. 26 Iriye, Global Community, 98. 14 their understanding of the roots of under-development in nations of the global south.27 Increased awareness of how global factors influenced countries’ abilities to develop resulted in even greater support for solutions rooted in non-governmental action. At the same time, human rights became a central focus of development. In some cases, the global emphasis on human rights threatened policies of more oppressive national governments and their allies, making NGOs an ideal leader for the charge.28 The interconnectedness of the global community in the 1970s helped catalyze a deep devotion to human rights that transcended national boundaries. Stephen Macekura and Erez Manela argued that human rights (as a component of development) “became a shared language” that contributed to “global socioeconomic justice [finding] common cause across political and social boundaries.”29 As the decade progressed, so too did the reach of human rights-focused NGOs.30 As a result, NGOs dramatically grew their involvement in developing countries, specifically in Latin America, in the mid-20th Century.31 The prominent work done by NGOs both in providing information and carrying out policy bolstered support of the organizations’ involvement in the public eye as well as from the government’s perspective. In the 1970s, NGOs gained more traction with the United States government. Politicians noticed that there was a “presumed link between individual lives and transformation of the larger

27 Organizations and their supporters came to “[reject] explanations for inequality that blamed ‘backwards’ or ‘traditional’ cultural and economic systems. They pointed out that such explanations ignored how the dynamics of the world economy factored into development;” Adler, “Creating the ‘NGO International,’” 309. 28 Tim Borstelmann, The 1970s, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012) 179. 29 Stephen J Macekura and Erez Manela, “Introduction,” in The Development Century, 4, 16. 30 Borstelmann, The 1970s, 181. Many NGOs had been given consultative status at the UN over the course of the two Development Decades, allowing them to engage directly with the international institution and governments from around the world. A United Nations General Assembly resolution in 1969 clarified the informational value of NGOs, calling for “active participation of all elements of society” and described a variety of civil society groups that could aid in “achieving the common goals of development,” from Winters, “Accountability, Participation, and Foreign Aid Effectiveness,” 228. A similar resolution was passed in the Organization of American States (OAS) in 1971 which encouraged governments to work with NGOs in Latin America. OAS First Regular Session of General Assembly, April 14, 1971 in San Jose, Costa Rica, “Draft Standards on Cooperative Relations Between the Organization of American States and the United Nations, Its Specialized Agencies, and Other International and National Organizations.” The Organization of American States (OAS), more than the United Nations, was the target audience for Carter’s human rights push. Memorandum from HR/HA Ray Jorgenson to HA Patricia Derian, November 5, 1980, Subject: Your Participation in Panel on ‘Torture in Argentina,’ November 6.” RG 59, Entry P885, Container 1. National Archives II, College Park, MD; Gaddis Smith, Morality, Reason, and Power: American Diplomacy in the Carter Years (New York: Praeger, 1988) 123. 31 Sollis, “Partners in Development? The State, Nongovernmental Organizations and the UN in Central America,” 526. Thomas Davies also discussed the increased role of NGOs in developing countries saying, “following , NGOs were increasingly commonly established by the development of regional intergovernmental organizations.” Davies, “The Historical Development of NGOs,” 24. 15 political or economic order.”32 This connection led to a new approach to foreign relations, especially with developing nations. The United States government believed that by assisting developing nations, those countries would ally with the United States’ Cold War ideology. Connecting physical development to political motivations, especially covertly, was a process known to diplomatic historians as technopolitics.33 It was an “exchange through which techniques and technologies are used strategically to constitute, enact or embody political goals.”34 This form of subtle coercion virtually ensured that “X” would ultimately result. NGOs that specialized in physical development were assets to this form of foreign relations policy. While the practice of technopolitical development was not always altruistic, there was a level of benefit for both nations involved.35 Acceptance of a technopolitical foreign relations strategy “made the most ordinary aspects of daily life…into targets for intervention.”36 This approach led to closer relationships between the government and NGOs, which resulted in occasional accusations of politicization in the organizations.37 But the accusations did not prevent continued—and in many cases, increased—usage of NGOs by the United States. The ability of non-governmental organizations to work both within and without government structures led to even more growth in the late 1970s and early 1980s. By 1984, there were 12,686 NGOs operating on an international scale.38

32 Nick Cullather, “Development and Technopolitics,” in Explaining the History of American Foreign Policy, edited by Frank Costigliola and Michael J Hogan (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016) 104. Cullather also explained “The United States conducts foreign relations through diplomacy, trade, and war, but also through humanitarianism and science.” 102. 33 Cullather, “Development and Technopolitics,” 102-106. 34 In essence, if practice or belief “X” was the goal, and “X” is a result of the less overtly political action “Y,” a government would focus their efforts—especially publicly—on “Y.” Cullather, “Development and Technopolitics,” 109. 35 Philip Oxhorn explained the benefit of this type of development saying, “state and civil society frequently [worked] together to achieve a variety of important outcomes that would otherwise be unattainable.” Philip Oxhorn, “Citizenship as Consumption or Citizenship as Agency?: The Challenge for Civil Society in Latin America,” in Civil Society, Religion, and Global Governance: Paradigms of Power and Persuasion, edited by Helen James (New York: Routledge, 2007) 102. 36 Cullather, “Development and Technopolitics,” 104. 37 Carey, Privatizing the Democratic Peace, 14. 38 Iriye, Global Community, 129. One possible explanation for the exponential growth in number of INGOs, was that the organizations did not want to wait for industry or businesses to come into developing countries to do the work of development, from Adler, “Creating the ‘NGO International,’” 307-310. In recognition of the substantial ability and success of NGO activity, the World Bank noted in the mid-1980s that “NGOs were an important and underutilized resource that should be mobilized to supplant the action of the state,” in Carroll, Intermediary NGOs, 1. Emphasis added. By 1980, there were 15 United States-based NGOs focused on bringing about the next generation of human rights in Latin America, from Schoultz, Human Rights and United States Policy toward Latin America, 75. Additionally, “the expansion of human rights monitoring by the UN and NGOs…resulted from the internationalization of human rights as a matter of discussion among states, no longer able to claim that sovereignty 16

Human Rights and the 1970s In the years directly preceding the Carter election people began questioning the dichotomy of human rights and anticommunism. As controversy over U.S. support for authoritarian leaders gained international attention, people looked for ways to participate in the human rights push. International incidents, especially in Latin America, served as major catalysts for action, key among them, the 1973 Chilean coup and the Dirty War in Argentina.39 Rooted in anticommunism, the clear repression of and freedom in Latin America and the spotlight shown on it was increasingly difficult to ignore in the first part of the 1970s.40 The U.S. was faced with the impossible goals of promoting human rights and humanitarian concerns while also limiting the ability of government to control and shape economic life. This dilemma and its seemingly contradictory values was denied clear approval from either political party, making its achievement unlikely and requiring a unique strategy. Globalization in the 1970s dramatically added to this complexity of the growing human rights concern.41 The of 1975, which included comprehensive human rights legislation, firmly established that human rights and humanitarian concerns should be significant government priorities and also gave national governments new international accountability. Coming at the end of the Vietnam War and the beginning of détente, the Accords represented a global pivot in Cold War politics; one that turned away from tense military and political battle and toward humanitarian concerns, even if only to be used as covert weaponry. Human rights—with the help of a vast network of NGOs—became a staple in political debate and cultural conversations of the 1970s. While human rights mobilization and advocacy were growing transnational phenomena, national governments were not immediate converts, presented external scrutiny of human rights legally protected by state-ratified treaties and provisions of the UN Charter,” from Carey, Privatizing the Democratic Peace, 90. Similarly, Akira Iriye explained “if, as observers worldwide were beginning to assert, the American Century was ending, was it because the world created by the military and economic power of the United States had been transformed to such an extent that the nation was no longer as primary an engine of change as earlier? Or was it because nonstrategic and noneconomic developments were greatly increasing in relevance in determining the fate of humankind?” Iriye, Global Interdependence, 6, 682. 39Schoultz claimed, “in my view, the Nixon-Kissinger policy toward Chile marked the darkest moment in the history of United States-Latin American relations. Although high levels of human rights violations have occurred elsewhere in the hemisphere, Chile in the 1970s provided the one case that combined the destruction of a strong democratic tradition, followed by uncommonly gross human rights violations and extensively documented U.S. complicity,” from Schoultz, Human Rights and United States Policy toward Latin America, 179-181. 40 Looking back on this period of U.S. history and foreign relations, Tim Borstelmann explained “it is now possible to see that the 1970s American story…fit with a similar pattern taking shape around the world…one emphasizing human rights.” Borstelmann, The 1970s, 175. 41 Globalization connected societies on a cultural level and was “foremost among the forces that changed world politics in the 1970s.” Sargent, A Superpower Transformed, 5. 17 though many did come around as the decade progressed. Human rights rhetoric and the political discourse surrounding them were no longer limited to the musings of politicians. The discourse between government and non-government perspectives on human rights spilled over into the public sphere throughout the decade. The late 1970s marked a significant step in the global human rights push, especially for countries in Latin America and other developing nations. This period was a new generation of human rights; the first focused on civil and political rights; the second on economic, social, and cultural; and the new one ushered in alongside the Carter administration centered on peace, development, and environmental sustainability.42 Eighteen months before the election, future Vice President, Walter Mondale, attacked Kissinger foreign policy for its inclination toward military-based diplomacy over humanitarian concerns. He pointed specifically to the Vietnam War, saying “it was our tragic experience in Vietnam which showed how empty is a foreign policy based on military power alone.”43 This mindset surged through the Carter campaign and into his administration. As a result, Carter’s policy on human rights and humanitarian affairs became the most dramatic and important difference between his administration and those of his predecessors.44 Human rights eventually made its way to the top of the agenda. In light of its rising status in the 1970s, human rights came to signify more than the ; it encompassed bodily safety, economic and social rights, and the socioeconomic freedoms FDR noted in 1941. As a result, physical and sustainable development also became part of the human rights push in U.S. policy. Development in the 1970s was markedly different than the preceding decade. Most importantly, development ideology that manifested in the Carter era was a dramatic rejection of modernization theory.45 These programs relied only on government aid, but could not be the

42 Carey, Privatizing the Democratic Peace, 88; Sargent, A Superpower Transformed, 251. 43 Walter Mondale, “Statement by Senator Walter F. Mondale. June 2, 1975. ‘American Foreign Policy After Vietnam,’ Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of the United States 1977-1980 Volume I: Foundations of Foreign Policy, 1974-1976. https://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1977-80v01/pdf/frus1977-80v01.pdf. 9. 44 Schoultz, Human Rights and United States Policy toward Latin America, 113; Sargent, A Superpower Transformed, 250. 45 Originating from the Center for International Studies (CENIS) at Institute of Technology in Boston in the 1950s, modernization theory was a natural ally of technopolitics. Born of a desire to understand and combat the economic and sociopolitical influence of communism on developing countries, future Kennedy advisor, and other members of the Charles River Group, proposed modernization theory as the key to winning the Cold War in developing nations. For further reading, see Kimber Charles Pearce, Kennedy, Rostow, and the Rhetoric of Foreign Aid (East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University Press, 2001); Michael Latham Modernization as Ideology. The Alliance for Progress unfortunately tied into modernization theory: “the Kennedy Administration’s early commitment…demonstrated that the development ideology of the Alliance for Progress had little to do with democratic liberties. It did however, have everything to do with anticommunist development” and 18 driver for humanitarian development, especially in Latin America, because sustainable development would rely much more on the latter.46 Modernization theory fell apart by the early 1970s, due in large part to the Vietnam War.47 Additionally, skepticism of government-perpetuated aid organizations opened up space for NGOs to enter the development project. The Carter Administration came to similar conclusions, seen in a Council report which stated “The Alliance for Progress made important contributions [to global development]—but its programs proved unsustainable both here and in Latin America.”48 Even more concerning was the question of declining U.S. influence abroad. What if the military might and aggressive modernization efforts that had been the focus of foreign policy were no longer—or maybe never were—effective?49 This period shed light on both the decrease of faith in the United States’ ability to sustain its position as a strong and intelligent global influence, as well as the increasing reach and authority of nonstate actors. The U.S. government had to find a more sustainable option. Global Change in the 1970s Globalization, new actors aided by societal engagement, and shifting beliefs and practices in United States politics all combined to steer the nation’s foreign policy towards a new direction by the election of 1976. Carter’s Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance, went as far as to say that globalization and the interdependence it revealed, “once a fashionable buzzword, had become a reality, and our future was inextricably entwined with the economic and political developments

attempts to align the Non-Aligned nations, from Thomas C. Field, From Development to Dictatorship: Bolivia and the Alliance for Progress in the Kennedy Era (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2014), 16. 46 Gabriel S. Valdes, “Review: The Americas in a Changing World as a Response to the Consensus of Viña del Mar,” in Journal of Interamerican Affairs Studies and World Affairs 17, no. 2 (May 1975), 207-216 Cambridge University Press. https://www.jstor.org/stable/174898. 209-212. The Consensus of Viña del Mar was the agreement by leaders of Latin American nations about the role of development and foreign aid. 47 Proponents of the war used modernization as a justification for U.S. involvement, claiming that in Vietnam would lead to a better quality of life for the Vietnamese. As a result, the war effort was, in theory, a labor worth the pain. U.S. government funded organizations like the were crucial, influential, and at times dangerous operatives of foreign policy enabled by modernization theory. See Thomas C. Field, Jr., From Development to Dictatorship; Molly Geidel, Peace Corps Fantasies (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2015). 48 Paper Prepared in the Department of State, Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of the United States 1977- 1980 Volume XXIV: South America/Latin American Region. https://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1977- 80v24/pdf/frus1977-80v24.pdf. 13. 49 Akira Iriye captured this paranoia by asking if this apparent end of an era was “because the world created by the military and economic power of the United States had been transformed to such an extent that the nation was no longer as primary an engine of change as earlier? Or was it because nonstrategic and noneconomic developments were greatly increasing in relevance in determining the fate of humankind?” Iriye, Global Interdependence, 6. 19 of a turbulent Third World.”50 There was a gap between the rising awareness of needs of developing nations and the ability of the United States to meet them.51 Not only was this gap an outcome of diminished U.S. confidence in its own foreign policy, but also a hesitancy of developing nations to accept U.S. government aid, especially under the aggression of modernization theory. In an early campaign speech, Walter Mondale, acknowledged this tension when he said “we must take full account of the fact that the citizens of this country are profoundly skeptical. They know only too well that their patriotism has been exploited by political leaders who could no longer justify their actions with candor.”52 The desire for foreign allies and positive relations had not changed, but U.S. society began to question the role and ability of the government to achieve these seemingly lofty aspirations. This enabled nonstate actors to step in, shape, and even fund foreign policy initiatives in the 1970s. The 1960s and 1970s brought a variety of new participants from the periphery into positions of influence on a global stage.53 This new authority not only advanced the cause of various human rights NGOs, but also led to society rallying around an apolitical presidential candidate in the 1976 election.54 Following the demonstrated power of civil activism of the 1960s, nonstate actors of the 1970s mobilized in a number of strategic methods, particularly in the name of human rights. By the mid-1970s, the basic definition of human rights included life, , and integrity of the person, primarily as a reflection of antitorture campaigns launched by various NGOs, including International.55 The sociopolitical atmosphere led to a presidential election where voters were actively looking for ways to vote against Washington and career politicians. Following the chaos and deceit of Watergate, U.S. citizens saw Carter as an outsider who had not

50 Cyrus Vance, Hard Choices, 27. In the age of globalization, “Vietnam had demonstrated the limits of American power, that the world was contracting, and that the dynamics of change were becoming more difficult to control.” McClellan, Cyrus Vance, 20. 51 Fink and Hugh Davis Graham, The Carter Presidency, 246-247. 52 Walter Mondale, “Statement by Senator Walter F. Mondale. June 2, 1975. ‘American Foreign Policy After Vietnam.’” 53 Vance, Hard Choices, 23. New conservative think tanks emerged in the 1970s that countered the traditionally liberal organizations that had previously cornered the foreign relations lobby. Borstelmann, The 1970s, 130; Iriye, Global Interdependence, 682. 54 Davies, NGOs, 141; Morris, Jimmy Carter, 203. 55 Schoultz, Human Rights and United States Policy Toward Latin America, 3. 20 been corrupted by politics, and they loved him for it.56 In particular, Carter rejected modernization theory and its aggressive, militaristic underlying principles. He was a moderate democrat, who was able to find friends on both sides of the political spectrum. This was a crucial component of both his election and eventual policymaking as he faced his presidency in a nation that wanted, as Borstelmann wrote, “a government both stronger (for military purposes) and weaker (for economic purposes) at the same time.”57 The only way Carter was able to deliver even a glimpse of this type of complex government was by accepting nonstate actors—especially NGOs—as partners. This allowed government policy and military power to coexist with free market enterprise, and for both the play a significant role in United States-Latin American foreign relations. The influence of globalization and nonstate actors manifested in foreign policy by pointing to the “end of a pragmatic Cold War phase” that enabled the “resurgence of a crusading style in U.S. foreign policy…during which American leaders accepted ideological diversity as a reality of international life and a prerequisite for stability, even survival.”58 The atmosphere in Washington was equally influenced by global changes leading up to the 1976 election.59 Jimmy Carter and His Administration Jimmy Carter was farmer-turned-businessman from Plains, Georgia. Rooted in his Christian faith, southern morality, and business background, he approached politics—first in his home-state—with a specific lens and sought partners with similar passions. Carter and his administration placed human rights in a higher position in United States foreign relations than his predecessors. 60 He recognized the growth of U.S. NGO influence and

56 Clifford M. Clark, Counsel to the President: A Memoir (New York: Random House, 1991), 618; Smith, Morality, Reason, and Power, 28. 57 Borstelmann, The 1970s, 13. 58 Sargent, A Superpower Transformed, 3. 59 One scholar writing in 1977 claimed “The success of Jimmy Carter last year was based on an extraordinary understanding of the prevailing political climate,” Peterzell, “The Trilateral Commission and the Carter Administration,” 2097. 60 Two foundational congressional acts in the mid-1970s provided a springboard for the Carter administration’s unique foreign policy: The International Development and Food Assistance Act of 1975, and the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976. The former recognized the perceived calling on the United States to “alleviate human suffering caused by natural and manmade disasters,” and gave the president the authority to give funds to any nation or organization he believed would aid in relief and rehabilitation processes.60 It placed a heavy emphasis not only on foreign aid, but on rehabilitation that would work with citizens of the recipient nation and ultimately develop infrastructure to help themselves. There was also a strong human rights component that was tied to aid—which caused 21 the increased pressure to include global human rights in foreign policy. His Administration used this moment to develop an innovative policy that brought NGOs in as key actors in official foreign relations efforts. Understanding the Carter Administration begins with the President himself. Historians recognized that Carter’s “active-positive character exhibited a devout ‘’ biblical soul and tough, smart, hard-working, technocratic mind.”61 This combination of character traits revealed a man who was as complicated as he was kind. Jimmy Carter had “a reputation as, variously, an idealist, an industrious micro-manager, a global peacemaker, a weak leader, a victim of difficult circumstances, a conservative, a liberal, and the most internationally respected former U.S. president.”62 Not surprisingly, historians have pointed to as a model for Carter’s style of Christian and morality-based diplomacy.63 Like Wilson, Carter was a devout Christian and his faith greatly influenced his priorities and policies.64 His faith was a significant motivating factor for both the personal and professional decisions that led to Carter’s unique policy prioritization. As a result, his administration pivoted away from the power-hungry, military might-based foreign policy of his predecessors and toward one focused on humanitarian concerns.

constant conflict in Carter policy toward Latin America—restricting aid to countries deemed guilty of violating human rights.60 The International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976 added similar provisions to the Inter-American Development Bank, saying that the U.S.-Executive Director was to vote against loans or any assistance to those countries that were gross violators of human rights. Note: Title I: International Disaster Assistance, Section 491-493. Public Law 94-161, 94th Congress, H.R. 9005 December 20, 1975. International Development and Food Assistance Act of 1975. Section: Human Rights and Development Assistance, Section 116a. RG 59, Entry P885, Folder: Meeting on Human Rights. National Archives II, College Park, MD, Also, Title I: Inter-American Development Bank, Section 28(a). Public Law 94-302, 94th Congress, H.R. 9721, May 31, 1976. RG 59, Entry P885, Folder: Meeting on Human Rights. National Archives II, College Park, MD. 61 Raymond A Moore, “The Carter Presidency and Foreign Policy,” in The Carter Years: The President and Policy Making, edited by Glenn M Abernathy, Dilys M Hill, and Phil Williams, (London: Frances Pinter Publishers, 1984) 56; also Smith, Morality, Reason, and Power. 62 Borstelmann, The 1970s, 270. 63 McClellan, Cyrus Vance, 22. For more on Wilson’s morality-based foreign policy, and its impact on developing nations, see Erez Manela, The Wilsonian Moment: Self-Determination and the International Origins of Anti- Colonial , (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007). 64 Carter’s desire to “emulate divinity” led to a firm engagement in issues and “sacrificial love,” from Carey, Privatizing the Democratic Peace, 45. Carter noted that not only were he and his wife, Rosalynn, regular church attenders during his tenure, but on occasion taught Sunday School at a Baptist church in Washington, D.C. Throughout, Carter mentioned various church activities that he and his family prioritized while in office. One week into his term as president, Carter wrote “The last thing Rosalynn and I do every day is read a chapter in the Bible in Spanish, and we’ll have a prayer at all our meals and attend regular church services wherever we are.” Jimmy Carter, , (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2010) 43, 14-15. 22

Carter also brought to the White House his business acumen and experience with nongovernmental organizations. In Georgia, his family owned a large peanut farm and while Carter stepped away from the family business to pursue a political career, the lessons and experience from his days in the business world carried into his new venture.65 Even as , Carter “was an enthusiastic supporter of this cooperative approach and was a leader in forming the same kind of organization to serve [the state].”66 Carter’s incorporation of business into politics “brought to the White House a depth of entrepreneurial experience and knowledge not seen there since .”67 For many voters in 1976, Carter’s appeal as a businessman and Washington outsider was exactly what the country needed following the Watergate . He could move toward policies that pulled from both sides of the political aisle, as well as—and especially—from his own personal beliefs.68 During his presidential campaign, Carter spoke about the power of nongovernmental actors to influence policy and build peace. In March 15, 1976, he called for greater public engagement in the political process asserting “our policies should…emerge from broad and well-informed public debate and participation,” and that “in our search for peace, we must call upon the best talent we can find in the universities, the business world, labor, the professions, and the scientific community.”69 While speaking to B’nai B’rith, candidate Carter observed that while their official political power was limited, nongovernmental organizations could “serve as the of the world community, and they [deserved] far more support than our government has given them in recent years.”70 Carter frequently campaigned using human rights rhetoric and chastised previous administrations—including that of his opponent, incumbent Gerald

65 Borstelmann, The 1970s, 271. 66 , The Truth of the Matter: My Life in and Out of Politics, (New York: Summit Books, 1991) 25. 67 Borstelmann, The 1970s, 272. 68 His outsider status also freed him from the “burden of old commitments” to politicians and the old establishment. This allowed the Carter to act without the guilt of political allegiance or lingering quid pro quo. Smith, Morality, Reason, and Power, 28; also Clark, Counsel to the President. 69 Jimmy Carter, “Our Foreign Relations,” in The Presidential Campaign 1976, Volume 1, Part 1: Jimmy Carter. Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of the United States 1977-1980 Volume I: Foundations of Foreign Policy, 1974-1976. https://www.static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1977-80v01/pdf/frus1977-80v01.pdf. 18, 25. 70 Jimmy Carter, “Addressing B’nai B’rith,” in The Presidential Campaign 1976, volume 1, part 1: Jimmy Carter. Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of the United States 1977-1980 Volume I: Foundations of Foreign Policy, 1974-1976. https://www.static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1977-80v01/pdf/frus1977-80v01.pdf. 46-47. 23

Ford—for neglecting the United States’ neighbors in Latin America in favor of transoceanic interventions. 71 Carter was unusual in his interest in Latin America, largely due to his personal convictions and prioritization of humanitarianism in foreign affairs.72 Three months into his term, Carter affirmed before the Organization of American States (OAS) Permanent Council that “[his] heart and [his] interest to a major degree [were] in Latin America.”73 Carter addressed the Cold War relationship between the U.S. and Latin America saying, When I became president, most of the regimes in South and Central America were military dictatorships. Historically, the U.S. government under both Democratic and Republican presidents had supported the dictators and strongly opposed—often with U.S. Marines or army troops—any popular uprisings of indigenous or minority citizens that threatened the status quo. The reasons for this were obvious. Many of the leaders had been trained at West Point or Annapolis, were fluent in English, conversant with our free enterprise system, and eager to form lucrative partnerships with American corporations that had an interest in natural resources of the country involved. These included bananas, pineapples, bauxite, tin, iron ore, and exotic lumber. It was politically convenient to brand any indigenous people or other groups as Communists or simple revolutionaries. Catholic priests who supported the poor and subjugated citizens were condemned by the Vatican as practicing “liberation theology.”74

Carter was eager to direct the United States’ Latin American policy in a new direction. His faith, experience, humanitarian concern, and passion for Latin America shaped the way Carter built not only his foreign policy, but also his White House staff. Secretary of State (1977-1980), Cyrus Vance, was an outspoken advocate for Carter-style foreign policy. Vance and Carter first met in 1973 while Vance was vice chairman of the American Red Cross and the two served together on the Trilateral Commission.75 Prior to his invitation to join Carter’s staff, Vance was also a member of the Council of Foreign

71 Carter used this strong rhetoric “in an attempt to unify the conservative cold warriors and pro-détente internationalists that had emerged within the Democratic Party during the decade,” from Michael Cangemi, “ Frank Ortiz and ’s Killer President, 1976-1980,” in Diplomatic History, https://www.academic.oup.com/dh/advance-article/abstract/doi.10.1093/dh/dhx060/4064134. 6. Additionally, calling for a reordering of diplomatic priorities, Carter accused Kissinger-era presidents of focusing excessively on Cold War adversaries at the expense of hemispheric relations. Jimmy Carter, “Our Foreign Relations,” 20. 72 Carter “saw in Latin America a special opportunity to apply the philosophy of repentance and reform—admitting past mistakes, making the region a showcase for the human rights” in United States’ foreign policy, from Smith, Morality, Reason, and Power, 110. 73 Jimmy Carter, “Organization of American States Address Before the Permanent Council,” April 14, 1977. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T Wooley, The American Presidency Project, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=7347. 74 Carter, White House Diary, 346-347. 75 Kenneth P Thompson, ed., The Carter Presidency: Fourteen Intimate Perspectives of Jimmy Carter, (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1990) 135; Peterzell, “The Trilateral Commission and the Carter Administration,” 2097. 24

Relations, a New York-based NGO whose intent was to provide legal and business professionals “with an outlet for discussion and influencing the direction of U.S. foreign policy.”76 Cyrus Vance shared Carter’s attention toward Latin American development. He first entered the Washington, D.C. political arena during the Johnson administration as a foreign policy advisor. Even then, Vance sought to sway the president to reconsider his policies toward Latin America, fighting for “a sounder, more equal relationship…[Vance] recommended that [the U.S.] drop the notion of a ‘,’ which smacked of paternalism, and deal with each Latin American and Caribbean nation as a sovereign power with differing problems.”77 His desire to turn away from the paternalistic policies that had endured since the days of the Monroe Doctrine was not fulfilled under Johnson, but found favor with Jimmy Carter. Cyrus Vance was an outspoken proponent of an elevated status for Latin America in U.S. foreign policy. The Secretary of State criticized the Nixon and Ford Administrations’ lack of concern over Latin America and claimed that the Carter Administration’s efforts in the region were intended to “convey to the developing world the fact that [it] placed very high on [its] agenda dealing with Third World issues which [it] felt had been ignored in the past.”78 His ideology surrounding foreign affairs fit well within the confines of the Carter administration policies and among his coworkers. Patricia “Patt” Derian worked closely under Cyrus Vance and served as the Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs. In the years leading up to the Carter election, Derian was active in the Civil Rights Movement as a founder of the Civil Liberties Union and a leader in the Loyalist Mississippi Democratic Party, a biracial political party that usurped the all-white delegation.79 Her passion for civil rights—and prowess for attaining them—earned her the attention of the Georgian running for president. Derian gained a reputation for boldness and imperviousness to intimidation. These characteristics served her well during her tenure in the Carter administration in numerous bouts with Congress over human rights and in her interactions with policy influencers both inside and outside of government.

76 McClellan, Cyrus Vance, 5. 77 Vance, Hard Choices, 33. 78 Cyrus Vance interview in Thompson, The Carter Presidency, 137. 79 Cyrus Vance interview in Thompson, The Carter Presidency, 126. 25

Zbigniew Brzeznski was Carter’s National Security Advisor. A fellow member of the Trilateral Commission, Brzeznski came to the office with experience working alongside Jimmy Carter and had established himself as a foreign policy expert. As a result, Brzeznski was on the short list of options to head the National Security Council. Born in Poland in the 1920s, he saw firsthand the danger of disregard for human rights and was a strong supporter of international human rights. After his foray into U.S. politics, Brzeznski was an advocate for the ability of the nation to set and enforce a standard of rights and noted in his memoir that he “believed that by emphasizing human rights America could again make itself the carrier of human hope.”80 These four individuals formed the core that shaped the Carter Administration’s foreign policy. While they were at times accused of idealism, this team understood what it was up against, as well as what it could use to work for its benefit. The Carter Administration had an acute awareness of injustice—especially toward Latin American populations. Furthermore, Carter saw the real motivations of past policies as exploitative and corrupt, and wanted to make a change not only for the citizens of Latin America, but for U.S. interests as well.81 The first task for the Carter Administration was to identify what was meant by “human rights.” Recognizing the political benefit to positive relations with Latin America, the Carter Administration pivoted away from an East-West focus in favor of a North-South approach. As a 1977 PRC paper explained, “Latin America and the Caribbean bring home most dramatically the importance of North-South issues. From no other part of the world does foreign poverty impinge so intimately on our own society or create such an implicit obligation to help.”82 This paper reflected both the self-serving component of foreign aid and development, as well as the apparent compulsion to step in and provide assistance in Latin America.83 In his memoir, Zbigniew Brzeznski explained that the Carter Administration “approached the various North-

80 Zbigniew Brzeznski, Power and Principle, 3. 81 , Condemned to Repetition: The United States and , (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987), 50. 82 Policy Review Committee, “Paper Prepared in the Department of State,” Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of the United States 1977-1980 Volume XXIV: South America/Latin American Region. https://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1977-80v24/pdf/frus1977-80v24.pdf. 13. 83 , “Action Memorandum from the Director of Policy Planning Staff to Secretary of State Vance, January 20, 1978.” Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of the United States 1977-1980 Volume II: Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs. https://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1977-80v15/pdf/frus1977-80v15.pdf. 365. 26

South issues with a view to addressing some of the root causes and not just the symptoms of international instability and global injustice.”84 This emphasis allowed the Administration to further impress upon Latin American leaders that there must be change in human rights in order to receive aid and development funding from the United States. By defining the root causes of conditions in Latin America as human rights issues, an administration dedicated to improving rights would be much better suited to intervene—not to mention the public support it was likely to receive.85 At his inauguration, Jimmy was bold in stating his desire to shift policy to a specific concern over human rights—with a more direct definition than simply “freedom.”86 Carter spoke bluntly before a wide range of audiences. Carter “created an unprecedented, government- sanctioned arena for the human rights movement.”87 Through the President’s emotionally and religiously charged human rights rhetoric, the Administration opened up a space for public engagement that changed the way the United States government interacted with both its citizens and organizations dedicated to global human rights. Carter and his key administrators knew that in order for the United States to prosper both financially and from a national security standpoint, Latin America must also reach a level of peace and security that would only come from development. President Carter declared that the United States would—without regret—allow its own perception and prioritization of human rights to influence hemispheric relations.88 Later on in his presidency, Carter further strengthened his conviction that Latin American development was central to U.S. prosperity. Following a 1978 trip to numerous developing nations, he commented on what in his mind was an unavoidable truth: After seeing these nations firsthand, it’s impossible to doubt that they can be very important to us and that our fate and the fate of the people in those countries are closely related and that the best way to guarantee our own well- being in a world of peace and prosperity, respect for human rights, is to cooperate in the well-being of these friends and neighbors of ours throughout the

84 Brzeznski, Power and Principle, 123. 85 Pastor, Condemned to Repetition, 50. 86 Schoultz, Human Rights and United States Policy toward Latin America, 23. 87 Schmidli, The Fate of Freedom Elsewhere, 6. For public response to Carter’s rhetoric, see Schoutz, Human Rights and United States Policy toward Latin America, 23. See also Borstelmann, The 1970s, 272. 88 Jimmy Carter, “Organization of American States Address Before the Permanent Council.” 27

. Every step we take toward more around the world is an investment in our own future.89

The United States could only reach its full potential if the rest of the hemisphere did as well, and as a result had to address the developing world out of more than simple humanitarian concern. It needed to act based on “the inescapable proposition that peace and prosperity for [the U.S.], now and for the future, relate directly to the strength of [its] relations with the developing nations.”90 The United States was still the top priority, and human rights and development in Latin America were necessary steps to ensuring national success. Creating a foreign policy that promoted the high goals of the Administration but did so “without interfering in a nation’s internal affairs, and while maintaining the constructive working relations necessary to advance all our many objectives” was exceedingly difficult.91 (PD) 30 confirmed “it shall be a major objective of U.S. foreign policy to promote the observance of human rights throughout the world. The policy shall be applied globally, but with due consideration to the cultural, political, and historical characteristics of each nation.”92 It was especially important to give the appearance of national sovereignty given the recent history of U.S. government intervention in Latin America, including aid in overthrowing elected leadership in multiple nations.93 By the time Carter was sworn in, Argentina, Nicaragua, Chile, and a host of other Latin American countries were being run by brutal military juntas or dictators. The political struggles throughout the region immediately tested the administration’s resolve to pursue human rights and development.94 A principle method of standing against the juntas was to withhold aid from countries with significant human rights violations.

89 Jimmy Carter, “The President’s Trip to Latin America and Remarks on Arrival at the White House,” April 3, 1978. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T Woolley, American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=30611. 90 Vance, Hard Choices, 430. 91 Terrence Todman, “Address by Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, February 14, 1978.” Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of the United States 1977-1980, Volume XV: Central America. https://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1977-80v15/pdf/frus1977-80v15.pdf. 105. 92 “Presidential Directive/NSC-30, February 17, 1978.” Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of the United States 1977-1980 Volume II: Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs. https://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1977- 80v15/pdf/frus1977-80v15.pdf. 406. 93 Chile, Guatemala, El Salvador, and the Dominican Republic were all nations in which the United States, through the CIA, directly intervened to remove leadership in the decades leading up to the 1976 presidential election. 94 The Carter Administration used this method in particular with regards to Argentina, Guatemala, and El Salvador. But deciding to withhold or suspend aid to underdeveloped nations was not an easy or clear decision. Should the Carter Administration sacrifice its influence in Latin America by denying aid on the grounds of not supporting dictators or juntas? Or is more harm done by not supplying aid to those who need it most, even if providing aid could give the appearance of condoning brutal governments? Valid arguments and were made on both sides. In 28

The Carter Administration increased funding to USAID. Targeted aid, designated specifically to needy people could “be an effective way to encourage positive human rights conduct” and the Administration hoped foreign assistance could create more amiable governments in Latin America.95 In circumstances where denying funds was the worst of all evils, targeted aid incentivized governments to cooperate in the human rights and development effort. It was easier to suspend funds than to provide them, but this was not an ideal solution.96 It was clear that early on, the Carter Administration knew its limits and realized that its goal for foreign relations in Latin America would require significant alterations to traditional methods. Carter was consistent through his campaign and presidency in his promise of pressing for human rights and needs in Latin America. He regularly called attention to specific issues and circumstances he believed his administration could address, oftentimes with outside help. In 1976, the presidential-hopeful presented his views on foreign relations and aid calling for a deeper emphasis on food, health, jobs, and education.97 While the idealism and rhetoric of a campaign typically wore off, Carter remained true to his word. The Carter Administration found Latin America to be the perfect test-ground for its humanitarian-focused foreign policies. In part because of the passion Jimmy Carter had for the region, but primarily because of its proximity and potential benefit to the United States, Latin America was “the only region in the world to undergo a full-dress policy review of this kind”— this, referring to the level of commitment to human rights and development.98 The regional focus

support of the Administration’s eventual decision to suspend aid to Argentina, Carter historian, Gaddis Smith, described the weight of the dilemma saying, “if the Carter administration had failed to condemn the Argentine government and withhold aid, its human rights policy would have had no meaning at all.” Coerver and Linda B Hall, 146; Carter, White House Diary, 94; Table 4 in Appendix; As NSC staffer, Robert Pastor explained in his memoir, either decision was fraught with “inherent contradictions. For example...One could argue that aid should be approved because it would always benefit some needy people, or that aid should be denied because it would legitimize a repressive regime and prolong suffering.” Pastor, Condemned to Repetition, 51; Smith, Morality, Reason and Power, 128. 95 Study Prepared by the Ad Hoc Inter-Agency Group on Human Rights and Foreign Assistance, August 15, 1977. PRM/NCS 28: Human Rights.” Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of the United States 1977-1980 Volume II: Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs. https://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1977-80v15/pdf/frus1977- 80v15.pdf. 239. 96 , “Memorandum from the Executive Secretary of the Department of State to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs, July 19, 1977.” Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of the United States 1977- 1980, Volume XV: Central America. https://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1977-80v15/pdf/frus1977-80v15.pdf. 82. 97 Jimmy Carter, “‘Our Foreign Relations,’ 21. 98 Cangemi, “Ambassador Frank Ortiz and Guatemala’s ‘Killer President,’ 1976-1980,” 9. 29 and concern was also a result of incriminating reports of human rights violations and volatile political conditions throughout Latin America.99 Carter and his advisors were eager to turn away from a one-size-fits-all Latin American policy. The past century of U.S.-Latin American relations was defined by a spirit of paternalism on the part of the United States. The Carter Administration rejected this premise. In the first months of his term, Carter told the OAS that his administration had “high regard for the individuality and the sovereignty of each Latin American and Caribbean nation,” a stark contrast to the universalist regional policies of his predecessors.100 Throughout the Carter years, the President and his advisors (his wife included) spoke of the new direction of Latin American foreign policy rooted in the individualism of each country. Reflecting upon his first year in office, Carter noted among his administration’s greatest accomplishments a foreign policy that recognized diversity in Latin America, rather than attempting an easier policy or a “simple slogan.”101 While the Administration staunchly rejected Monroe’s doctrine of paternalism toward Latin America, it still firmly embraced Roosevelt’s Good Neighbor mentality (if not his methods). President Carter acknowledged “the invaluable contribution” of various NGOs and promised to aid them in future efforts in Latin America.102 The key advisors for Carter’s foreign

99 In the early years of the Carter presidency, Guatemala, El Salvador, and Nicaragua were at the top of this list. Those three would remain concerns for the Carter administration, with later additions of Argentina, Chile, and , highlighting the seemingly constant need for a reevaluation of the U.S. foreign policy toward Latin America. Profound human rights violations and underdevelopment—and their frequent partner, political turmoil— were catalysts for the March 24, 1977 Policy Review Committee (PRC) decision to cater its efforts in developing nations toward specific concerns in Latin America. Cangemi, “Ambassador Frank Ortiz and Guatemala’s ‘Killer President,’ 1976-1980,” 8; Betty Glad, An Outsider in the White House, 242. 100 Jimmy Carter, “Organization of American States Address Before the Permanent Council.” The First Lady was also a vocal supporter of individualization of policies and rejection of hemispheric paternalism. Upon her return from a diplomatic tour of numerous Latin American countries, Mrs. Carter relayed a message from Venezuelan President Perez, saying that the Carter Administration’s handling of Latin American relations “opened new paths in inter-American relations instead of the paternalism that had characterized the past.” , “Rosalynn Carter’s Trip to the Caribbean and Latin America Remarks of the President and Mrs. Carter on Her Return Home,” June 12, 1977. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T Woolley, The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid= 101 Jimmy Carter, “Administration’s First-Year Accomplishments Summary of Domestic and National Security and Foreign Policy Accomplishments,” December 17, 1977. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T Woolley, The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=7030. 102 The Director of the Office of Management and Budget and the President’s Special Assistant for Health Issues responded to Secretary Vance further commending this policy saying, “Our approach will be…to identify and highlight the many activities in international health within a coordinated framework of priorities and goals so as to work more effectively with related U.S. Government activities, with private organizations, with other nations, and with the several international and multilateral organizations.” James McIntyre, Jr., “Letter from the Director of the Office of Management and Budget and the President’s Special Assistant for Health Issues to Secretary of State 30 policy knew that there were benefits to engaging nongovernment organizations in its efforts. Not only could the NGOs be the boots-on-the-ground in volatile Latin American nations, but they could also be political scapegoats if a situation deteriorated. Allowing universities and organizations to act as emissaries promoted good will and was an easier sell of humanitarian concern than the government stepping in directly. But in instances where the NGO involvement proved ineffective or even harmful, the Administration could argue that it was the organization, rather than the government, that caused tension. Throughout the Carter years, the President and his administrators were clear about their advocacy of NGO involvement in foreign affairs. In a speech before the OAS Permanent Council, President Carter discussed the role of private investment and nongovernmental actors, acknowledging that “a new flexibility and adaptability are required today for foreign investment to be most useful in combining technology, capital management, and market experience to meet your development needs.”103 Chief of Staff echoed this, exhorting the Administration to recognize the need for all resources both inside and outside of government to be used in foreign policy creation and implementation.104 The Administration followed Jordan’s advice and crafted a policy that was inclusive to NGOs operating in Latin America, especially those dedicated to human rights and development. The Administration determined that one of its objectives with regards to Latin America was to “promote and strengthen the efforts of international institutions as well as nongovernmental organizations.”105 In February 1978, Presidential Directive/NSC-30 committed that in its efforts to promote human rights, “the United States shall use the full range of its diplomatic tools, including direct diplomatic contacts, public statements, symbolic acts,

Vance, February 17, 1978.” Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of the United States 1977-1980 Volume II: Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs. https://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1977-80v15/pdf/frus1977- 80v15.pdf. 1040. Carter asserted that the totality of the skill to accomplish foreign relations goals was “not focused in the Federal Government. It [was] focused in farmers and workers and businesses and universities…This [was] where the real strength of our country lies, and this [was] an opportunity for tapping the treasure of what the United States [was] trying to reach.” Jimmy Carter, “Caribbean/Central American Action Remarks at a White House Reception,” April 9, 1980. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T Woolley, The American Presidency Project. http://presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=33245; also Jimmy Carter, “International Health Program Statement Announcing a Program to Strengthen U.S. Participation,” May 2, 1978. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T Woolley, The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=30735. 103 Jimmy Carter, “Organization of American States Address Before the Permanent Council.” 104 Hamilton Jordan, “Paper Prepared by the President’s Assistant, Review of Foreign Policy Initiatives,” June 1977. Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of the United States 1977-1980 Volume I: Foundations of Foreign Policy, 1974-1976. https://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1977-80v01/pdf/frus1977-80v01.pdf. 181-182. 105 “Study Prepared by the Ad Hoc Inter-Agency Group on Human Rights and Foreign Assistance, August 15, 1977,” 227. 31 consultations with allies, cooperation with nongovernmental organizations, and work with international organizations.”106 Carter called upon nongovernmental groups to play a role in foreign relations throughout his time in office. Both President Carter and Secretary Vance repeatedly issued calls-to-action in speeches to the United States public. He later implored public and NGO audiences to “feel equally as responsible for leadership and for inspiration and for innovations” in foreign policy decisions and implementation.107 Inclusion of NGOs and the general public was also a strategic political action. Secretary of State Vance noted in his memoir that these frequent pleadings were meant to gain public support for the Administration’s decisions abroad.108 In a widely-publicized April 1977 speech, Vance indicated that the Carter Administration would encourage citizens and NGOs “to work for human rights with commitments of time, money, and compassion.”109 Carter, Vance, and the other key foreign relations advisors saw the benefit of engaging the nonstate, for both domestic political gain as well as international recognition for its humanitarian efforts. A keen focus on humanitarian aid and development, special attention to Latin America, and enlistment of an army of NGOs represented the uniqueness of the foreign policy during the Carter Administration. Conclusion The Carter Administration recognized the convergent trends of the international human rights movement, increased NGO influence, and globalization in the 1970s. They acknowledged the connections and, with the inclusion of NGOs, knit together a Latin American foreign policy that fundamentally changed United States-Latin American foreign relations. In fact, Carter’s policy emphasis on humanitarian development established the United States as a global champion for human rights. As NGOs became increasingly influential on a global scale, the Carter Administration had the choice to either accept NGOs and work with them, or to attempt to deny these newly powerful actors and enact a bold foreign policy on its own. It chose the former, due to a belief in the importance of taking a “constructive role alongside developments taking place in the world—

106 “Presidential Directive/NSC-30, February 17, 1978.” 406. 107 Jimmy Carter, “Caribbean/Central American Action Remarks at a White House Reception.” 108 Vance, Hard Choices, 27. 109 Cyrus Vance, “Address by Secretary of State Vance, April 30, 1977. ‘Human Rights and Foreign Policy,’ Department of State Bulletin, May 23, 1977, pp. 505-508. Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of the United States 1977-1980 Volume I: Foundations of Foreign Policy, 1974-1976. https://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1977-80v01/pdf/frus1977-80v01.pdf. 159. 32 to get on the side of change rather than opposing it.”110 Carter and his advisors knew they could not ignore NGOs. Jimmy Carter himself was central to understanding why these policies were ideal and eventually enacted. His faith, business experience, and personal passion fit well with the growing NGO culture. In short, Carter acted “out of a combination of politics, character, and commitment [to] renounce the politics of power, embrace morality, and elevate Third World problems to the level of high policy.”111 During a presidency that faced such complex challenges, diverse solutions that included new actors enabled the Carter Administration to successfully address those challenges. Its methods were increasingly important as the Administration recognized limits of U.S. governmental power and wisdom.112 Bringing in experts from NGOs to assess and advise on human rights and development in Latin America made up for the gaps in Washington’s wisdom. Latin American foreign policies under Carter brought “freedom for many individuals around the world…It dramatized the issue and gave major impetus to ongoing human rights efforts by various concerned organizations.”113 The Carter Administration swung open the door for NGOs to have a loud and lasting voice in policymaking and execution.114 Because of Jimmy Carter and the ways his administration capitalized on convergent global trends and embraced NGOs, the United States foreign policy toward Latin America was profoundly different and—as the following chapters will show—successfully altered the way that policy is made and executed.

110 Rosati, The Carter Administration’s Quest for Global Community, 9. 111 Abernathy, Dilys M Hill and Phil Williams, The Carter Years, 57. The Administration had significant freedom to shape this policy. Brzeznski explained in his memoir that the government had substantially more flexibility in how it made foreign policy decisions than was commonly thought, seen in Brzeznski, Power and Principle, 57. 112 Vance, Hard Choices, 436. 113 Brzeznski, Power and Principle, 128. 114 In a testimony before the Senate defending Carter’s engagement with the nonstate in foreign policy, Leonard Sussman, executive director of Freedom House, stated “the Carter Administration’s emphasis on human rights has created a climate in which efforts by nongovernmental organizations and individuals can have a greater effect then they might have had a few years ago.”114 Leonard R Sussman, “Testimony—Senate Regarding Institute for Human Rights (Origin of NED),” June 28, 1978. Freedom House Records, Box 162, Public Policy Papers, Department of Rare Books and Special Collections, Princeton University Library. 33

Pressure, Policy, and Politics Vignette: Christopher Testimony in House of Representatives On April 25, 1978, Deputy Secretary of State, , appeared before the House Subcommittee on International Operations. While it was not unusual for members of the executive branch to testify before Congress, this particular instance marked a significant movement in United States diplomatic history. He testified in favor of House Resolution 11326, which would establish an agency that would create a lasting partnership between the government and NGOs working for development and human rights. Christopher’s words in support of the bill represented the culmination of the efforts that converged into a triune force that altered U.S. policy toward human rights and development for decades to come. The Institute for Human Rights was made up of the executive and legislative branches, as well as a strong contingent of non-governmental influencers. The Institute would be a government-supported, but operationally autonomous body, whose goal was to solidify the cooperation between government and NGO actions around the world. Going as far as to state “non-governmental organizations can do things a government cannot do,” the Deputy Secretary argued that “over the long run, private efforts to promote human rights may well outdistance government initiatives.”1 Proponents of the bill believed that where human rights were concerned, the government and NGOs could oftentimes function harmoniously because each was differently suited to push various aspects of human rights promotion. Christopher’s advocacy for the Institute came with the full knowledge and backing of the notion that the government would lend both financial and rhetorical support to participating NGOs. He justified his stance saying “perhaps [the Institute’s] most important role would be to offer needed assistance to the non-governmental organizations. The valuable work of NGOs in promoting human rights long predated this Administration, and we have learned from them and

1 In his testimony, Christopher acknowledged that there were “matters that could be better addressed at the operational level by non-governmental organizations.” Christopher also testified that NGOs “can be particularly effective in helping build support for human rights around the world…We believe that it should be the policy of the United States to encourage the growth of such local groups without at the same time diminishing their long-run effectiveness.” Statement by Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher before the House Subcommittee on International Operations on Bill to Create an Institute for Human Rights and Freedom, April 25, 1978. RG 59: Department of State Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs. Entry #P885: Country Files 1977-1985. THRU Welcome Home Book-1979. Container 6. Folder: Human Rights and Freedom. National Archives II, College Park, MD. 4. 34 been helped by them.”2 As a government-created, but functionally autonomous organization, the Institute represented a mutual benefit to both government and non-government bodies. Christopher noted in his testimony that “we [the Carter Administration] believe that our own efforts to promote human rights have, in turn, given [the NGOs’] work new impetus by helping focus international attention on the causes they long have supported.”3 This partnership would enable expanded opportunities for growth in the United States’ human rights-focused foreign policy as well as increased publicity and funding for NGOs. The conclusion of Christopher’s statement called for increased support for “imaginative and creative developments” in the human rights push.4 In his closing statement, he exhorted the members of the subcommittee to remember that “private organizations have a unique and invaluable role to play, and we must consider carefully the best means of assisting them in that role.”5 This testimony brought together a new threefold power that not only shaped U.S. foreign policy in the Carter era but set a precedent for future administrations as well. The push to ratify the Institute for Human Rights illustrates the input side of the foreign relations engagement between the Carter Administration and NGOs. Historians frequently point to this period as one where NGO activism linked national policy with socioeconomic development on a global scale.6 In the months just before Deputy Secretary Christopher’s testimony in the House of Representatives, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, Terence Todman, spoke about the challenges and solutions to Latin American foreign policy. In his speech, Todman remarked that the United States needed to develop a foreign policy that responds essentially to human, not just governmental, concerns. The basic dilemma is as straightforward to state as it is complex to resolve: how to encourage respect for the and freedom of basic human needs without interfering in a nation’s internal affairs, and while maintaining the constructive working relations necessary to advance all our many objectives.7

2 Statement by Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher before the House Subcommittee on International Operations on Bill to Create an Institute for Human Rights and Freedom, April 25, 1978. 3. 3 Statement by Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher before the House Subcommittee on International Operations on Bill to Create an Institute for Human Rights and Freedom, April 25, 1978. 3. 4 Statement by Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher before the House Subcommittee on International Operations on Bill to Create an Institute for Human Rights and Freedom, April 25, 1978. 10. 5 Statement by Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher before the House Subcommittee on International Operations on Bill to Create an Institute for Human Rights and Freedom, April 25, 1978. 10. 6 Stephen J Macekura and Erez Manela, “Introduction,”16. 7 Terence Todman, “The Carter Administration’s Latin American Foreign Policy Purposes and Prospects,” February 14, 1978. Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of the United States 1977-1980 Volume XXIV: South America/Latin American Region. https://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1977-80v24/pdf/frus1977-80v24.pdf. 105. The Director of the Policy Planning Staff, Anthony Lake, wrote to numerous State Department officials in the Carter 35

Undoubtedly, Assistant Secretary Todman knew the solution to this policy dilemma would require a unique cadre of skills and resources. This chapter will explore the variety of methods that NGOs employed as policy informants as well as the efforts of government officials who supported NGO involvement in forming the foreign policy agenda, with specific regard to Latin America. With an emphasis on the policy and information aspects of this relationship, the examples and NGOs found in this chapter focus on the social components of Carter’s development agenda: human rights. It employs studies of the governmental advocates of NGO involvement in the policy creation process, as well the power the organizations had to shape official policy as a result of their resource gathering and advocacy efforts. What I refer to as informant NGOs are those who participate in the forming of the policy agenda. These are the organizations that primarily labored in Washington, handing the metaphorical baton to the Carter Administration. The next chapter will explore the role of executor NGOs—those that carried out policy—to whom the Administration passed the baton to once policies were established. Informant NGOs Casting this component of the NGO influence in Washington as “informant” allows for the study of the variety of actions these organizations took to help shape United States foreign policy toward Latin America. Some of the prominent groups active in this sphere focused on one specific activity, while others were more diverse in their tactics. NGOs had a level of freedom to research and lobby which government officials did not. This freedom gave the organizations the ability to employ tactics that were more useful to data collection, thus giving their reports and lobbying efforts increased validity and significance. Over the course of the Carter Administration, a vast network of informant NGOs formed, working cooperatively with one another and with committed government officials. The result was a well-researched and comprehensive foreign relations agenda that solidified the plenary role of non-governmental organizations in the process.

Administration, purporting that “flexibility [was] in order…for defining what approaches (public or private, bilateral or multilateral, symbolic or substantive, positive or negative, etc.) could be most useful” in addressing human rights policy and promotion. Anthony Lake, March 25, 1977, “US Foreign Policy on Human Rights: General Approach and Specific Action Program.” Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of the United States 1977-1980 Volume II: Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs. https://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1977-80v02/pdf/frus/frus1977- 80v02. 80. 36

In the 1970s, the government’s ability to craft foreign policy without external help was limited.8 Even before the Carter Administration, agencies that were focused on human rights were “passive, they [could] not initiate action.”9 Any government-initiated action directed toward a foreign, sovereign government had major implications and could be seen as foreign aggression or interference; it was easier for the administration to take a passive stance and respond only when absolutely necessary. One Administration official addressed this complex positioning when he stated before the U.S. Senate “the valuable contribution of non- governmental organizations in promoting human rights long predated this administration, and we have learned from them and been helped by them… [they] can do and say things which our government…may find difficult.”10 Even in the weeks leading up to Jimmy Carter’s inauguration, the transition team working on foreign affairs knew the Carter Administration would have to work with the nonstate in order to be effective. In a January 5, 1977 policy memo from the Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs to foreign affairs personnel, officials contemplated what amount of reliable information was available to policymakers. The memo stated, “embassy investigative reporting, while essential, [was] not enough,” and beseeched representatives to “seek out evidence provided by the intelligence community [and] non-governmental organizations.”11 One reason for the NGO freedom to investigate was the organizations’ unique ability to compile research at little cost to the government—and thus, their tactics remained unhindered by government practices. In Privatizing the Democratic Peace: Policy Dilemmas of NGO Peacebuilding, Henry Carey explained that NGOs ability to innovate when it came to research and implementation was a crucial benefit to governmental efforts. He understood that NGOs had limitations as well, but that “while NGOs may have a limited impact on the systemic causes of

8 For the benefits of NGO involvement in making up for the restrictions on government activity in this area, see Cohen and Maria Figueria Kupcu, “Privatizing Foreign Policy,” 34-52. http://www.jstor.org/stable/40209975. Cohen and Kupcu noted that “even states as powerful as the United States lack the necessary resources, bureaucratic interest, or even political motivation to address the ever-increasing range of crises on the global agenda.” 39. 9 Harry M Scoble and Laurie S Wiseberg, “Human Rights and ,” in The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 43 (May 1974). 11-26. 16. 10 Prepared Statement by Douglas J Bennet Jr., Leonard R. Sussman Testimony-Senate Regarding Institute for Human Rights (Origin of NED); June 29, 1978; Freedom House Records, Box 162, Public Policy Papers, Department of Rare Books and Special Collections, Princeton University Library. 11 Memorandum from the Coordinator for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs (Wilson) to All Regional and Functional Assistant Secretaries of State and the Administrator of the Agency for International Development (Parker), January 5, 1977. Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of the United States 1977-1980 Volume II: Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs. https://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1977-80v02/pdf/frus/frus1977- 80v02. 3. 37 conflict, they have points of entry, influence on states, and influence on the masses and elites in civil society,” which gave them credibility when it came to policy creation.12 The data gathering and reporting aspects of informant NGOs were consistently beneficial to policy recommendation. This was particularly true in countries that frequently either existed in a state of or were averse to U.S. diplomatic investigation. In instances of foreign nations’ hesitancy or inability to share information with the United States government, NGO tactics and research methods were key to informing U.S. policy. Whether natural, manmade, or a combination of the two, crises frequently hit Latin American nations in the 1970s and 1980s, often limiting outside access to internal situations. However, NGOs that were already working in the country maintained their presence throughout the crises. They became crucial—and occasionally the only—sources of information for the U.S. government. They were “particularly important in conflict-related emergencies. When political conditions become increasingly unstable and insecure, and diplomatic and other government personnel are subject to heavy restrictions on their movements, the NGOs more than ever become the international community’s eyes and ears on the ground.”13 The access NGOs had to key information, their tools, and their expertise established them as worthy assets to the policymaking process. One U.S. official wrote to President Carter in 1978 explaining this value contending that “in many cases, [NGOs] can be more effective, more innovative, and more acceptable in many countries than direct U.S. government efforts.”14 The NGOs’ capacity to function as field agents for the government had significant implications for their role as policy informants for the Carter Administration. Connections to local leaders and communities gave NGOs precise and comprehensive— and frequently disturbing—insight into the human rights violations in Latin America. Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Patricia (Patt) Derian, noted this with regards to Guatemala in a 1979 letter to Inspector General, Robert Brewster. Derian expressed that “the underlying problem for reporting on human rights violations in Guatemala is that the pattern of their perpetration is difficult to see, and even more difficult to prove,” but that

12 Carey, Privatizing the Democratic Peace, 17. 13 Stoddard, Humanitarian Alert, xii. For examples of this same phenomenon from the perspective of the United Nations and its work in Latin America, see Sollis, “Partners in Development? The State, Nongovernmental Organizations, and the UN in Central America.” 14 , Memorandum from the President’s Special Assistant for Health Issues to President Carter, January 9, 1978. Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of the United States 1977-1980 Volume II: Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs. https://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1977-80v02/pdf/frus/frus1977-80v02. 1015. 38

“private groups continue to report on incidents…which may point to a more significant and consistent pattern of abuse than Embassy reporting would indicate.”15 Where government research and reporting was yielding incomplete narratives, NGOs had the ability to obtain information that filled in the gaps from Embassy reports. Not only were NGOs useful in providing new information, but they also played a critical role in monitoring the human rights situation throughout Latin America. As seen in the previous chapter, Jimmy Carter’s campaign and election placed a heavy emphasis on human rights. Humanitarian NGOs took him at his word, and in the global atmosphere of the late 1970s, they increased their efforts to closely monitor human rights violations around the world. Their positionality as “objective outside actors” allowed theoretically unbiased research.16 Once policies were in place, these organizations continued to track changes (or the lack thereof) in human rights movements in the region. As a result, they participated in policy evaluation which was then reported back to Washington for consideration. Communication between the organizations and the government took a few different forms. The first was focused on providing situational content including quantitative statistics as well as qualitative analysis; the second consisted of advice for how to handle those situations and forecasting possible outcomes.17 The government used NGO information as “the basis for decision making in the formation of U.S. government’s response [to crises] and filtered up from the humanitarian offices to the higher political reaches of government.”18 As content moved through the ranks, Carter Administration officials in the U.S. and abroad paid attention.

15 Letter from HA Patt Derian to S/IG Robert C Brewster, May 29, 1979. Subject: Guatemala. RG 59, Entry P885, Container 1. National Archives II, College Park, MD. 16 Carey, Privatizing the Democratic Peace, 13, 90. For an early study on the subject of NGO monitoring and evaluation of policy, see Scoble and Laurie S Wiseberg, “Human Rights and Amnesty International,” 11-26. The status of NGOs as “outside” of was a similar benefit used by Jimmy Carter in his presidential campaign, helpful to gain credibility in the turbulent politics of the 1970s. 17 Quantitative statistics included morbidity/mortality, socioeconomic data, numbers of displaced persons or , and needs assessments. Qualitative analysis covered key events, people, and interpretation of conditions. Stoddard, Humanitarian Alert, 47-48. NGOs took a similar position toward the United Nations, with three specific roles in informing policy: testifying to violations, providing information and pressure on governments and the UN Security Council, and pushing for change in managing human rights violators. Carey, Privatizing the Democratic Peace, 90. 18 Stoddard, Humanitarian Alert, xxi. Hamilton Jordan, Carter’s Chief of Staff, acknowledged the same fact in a 1977 paper where he stated “[in policymaking] we have a tremendous number of resources. They include…groups outside government.” Review of Foreign Policy Initiatives, June 1977. Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of the United States 1977-1980 Volume I: Foundations of Foreign Policy, 1974-1976. https://www.static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1977-80v01/pdf/frus1977-80v01.pdf. 181. 39

Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher saw substantial value in NGO research and reports. Less than one month into the Carter presidency, Christopher sent a memo to all U.S. diplomatic posts—which were mandated to submit human rights reports to Congress— instructing officials that when drafting their submissions to Congress, “references to reports by non-governmental groups such as the International Commission of Jurists, Freedom House, Amnesty International, etc.…are required under law.”19 He later testified before the House Foreign Affairs Committee that the Administration “[relied] on the published reports of non- governmental human rights organizations” as foreign policy informants.20 Similarly, Patt Derian conveyed that the United States would evaluate a foreign government’s human rights record based in large part on reports from outside organizations.21 Research and reporting were not the only roles of informant NGOs. Policy lobbying and advocacy were also high priorities. Where research and reporting were more passive methods of informing policy, lobbying was an active and at times aggressive method. The NGO lobby experienced unprecedented growth over the course of the Carter Administration, especially in regard to its Latin American foreign policy efforts. Their efforts to engage policy officials were relentless: “by 1980, a foreign policy official with so much as a minor concern for Latin America was likely to be under at least periodic siege by a fairly large assortment of lobbyists.”22 As officials like Derian and Christopher provided continued support for NGO involvement in policymaking, the lobby grew even more. The network of organizations concerned with human rights in Latin America accounted for one of the largest and most active lobbies in Washington at the beginning of Carter’s presidency, and its influence only grew as time progressed.23 Like government officials, humanitarian NGOs were frequently called to testify in congressional hearings on matters of human rights and foreign policy. Through testifying and

19 Memo from Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher to All Diplomatic Posts, February 7, 1977. Subject: Human Rights Reporting to the Congress. RG 59: Department of State Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs. Entry #P885: Country Files 1977-1985. Venezuela thru Welcome Home Book-1979. Container 6, Folder: HR Reports to Congress. National Archives II, College Park, MD. 2. 20 Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher before the International Organizations Subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, May 2, 1979. RG 59: Department of State Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs. Entry #P885: Country Files 1977-1985. Ireland thru Philippines (1-2). Container 4, Folder: Nicaragua. National Archives II, College Park, MD. 21 Letter from Patt Derian to NEA Mr Saunders, July 19, 1978. RG 59: Department of State Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs. Entry #P885: Country Files 1977-1985. Venezuela thru Welcome Home Book- 1979. Container 6. Folder: Amnesty International. National Archives II, College Park, MD. 1 22 Lars Schoultz, Human Rights and United States Foreign Policy toward Latin America, 48; also Schmidli, The Fate of Freedom Elsewhere. 23 Schoultz, Human Rights and United States Policy toward Latin America, 75. 40 working with like-minded congressmen, NGOs “played an active role in developing the legal framework that would guide human rights policy” in the United States.24 Among their many contributions, these organizations served as a mouthpiece for communities before Congress. Several NGOs and government representatives agreed that one of the main functions of government engagement with the NGO community was for the organizations to “assist communications of human rights appeals to governments.”25 In reality, NGOs that lobbied Washington officials and advocated for policy did more than assist communication; they shaped the policies themselves. Lobbying efforts from NGOs were instrumental in passage of human rights standards and U.S. foreign policy. Carey described the seemingly miraculous reach and diversity of informant NGO power when he wrote “advocacy NGOs may play a decisive role in deciding whether to seek goals by advocating force of nonviolence; to negotiate regime transitions by forging alliances with soft-liners inside and outside a regime; to seek ways to keep the lines of communication open during a crisis, even when no solution is in sight; or to close off talks.”26 The ability to influence government policy directly pointed to a more aggressive side to NGOs, one that showed a willingness to take initiative among Washington policymakers. In another 1979 memo to Vaky and Christopher, Derian cited the aggressive and persuasive efforts of non-governmental organizations on behalf of the Nicaraguans. She lamented “we have been receiving a rapidly rising and increasingly angry stream of complaints from non-governmental human rights groups, church representatives, and the Hill concerning Nicaragua…This public perception is devastating for obvious reasons.”27 The pressure from the NGO lobby was significant and influenced how the United States proceeded in Nicaragua. The same government officials dealt with human rights groups questioning the U.S. government’s treatment of Nicaraguan refugees—which the NGOs claimed represented a “lack of consistency

24 Sargent, A Superpower Transformed, 203. 25 Summary of Discussion, Meeting of the Steering Committee, National Conference on Human Rights, August 8, 1977. Human Rights: National Conference; 1976-1977; Freedom House Records, Box 45, Folder 3; Public Policy Papers, Department of Rare Books and Special Collections, Princeton University Library. 26 Carey, Privatizing the Democratic Peace, 47; See also Paul Adler, “The Basis of a New Internationalism?: The Institute for Policy Studies and North-South Politics from the NIEO to Neoliberalism;” Iriye, Global Community. 27 Later in the memo, Derian recommended an acquiescence to the NGO pressure, saying “what we should now be focusing on is achieving a political rather than military transition, even if the political transition does not fit our preferences.” Briefing Memorandum from HA Patt Derian to Deputy Secretary Christopher, July 12, 1979. Subject: Nicaragua. Secret. RG 59: Department of State Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs. Entry #P885: Country Files 1977-1985. Ireland thru Philippines (1 of 2). Container 4. Folder: Nicaragua. National Archives II, College Park, MD. 41 in U.S. Human Rights policy.”28 In the wake of the Sandinista Revolution and the turbulent transition of power that ousted the Somoza dynasty, the U.S. government could not ignore the power of the human rights NGO lobby. The impressive network of informant NGOs drew from multiple areas of society including academia, religious, and social organizations, in addition to the established humanitarian NGOs. The United States government began considering the research value of universities and scholars during the Vietnam War.29 Despite the outcome of the war itself, the ability of academics to research, create, and monitor policy proved to be a worthy endeavor. The tools and cooperative spirit of the university system provided an ideal atmosphere for this kind of work. As the practice became more routine, university think tanks transitioned into more professional associations and joined in on lobbying efforts in Washington.30 These relatively new additions joined an already-impressive informant NGO community dedicated to cooperation in favor of human rights policy promotion. Think tanks and other humanitarian NGOs—which will be discussed further on in this chapter—continually sought new ways to approach policy creation, and did so as a network. Perhaps one of the most revealing indicators of the value of the research, reporting, and advocacy of informant NGOs was the pushback from Latin American governments who violated human rights. At the national and international level, repressive regimes fought against NGO involvement both in their countries and at the United Nations, to of making consistent efforts to revoke the consultative status of NGOs at the UN.31 National Security Advisor, Zbigniew Brzeznski, relayed news of these efforts to President Carter expressing the disdain several Latin American governments had for U.S.-based humanitarian NGOs that were investigating their countries. Brzeznski told the President, “Argentina and Chile are involved in an effort to try to curb or prohibit the activities of non-governmental organizations—particularly

28 Action Memorandum from ARA Viron P Vaky and HA Patt Derian to Deputy Secretary Christopher, June 21, 1979. Subject: Status of Nicaraguan Refugees. RG 59: Department of State Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs. Entry #P885: Country Files 1977-1985. Ireland thru Philippines (1 of 2). Container 4. Folder: Nicaragua. National Archives II, College Park, MD. 29 Elkind, Aid Under Fire: Nation Building and the Vietnam War, 59. 30 Cullather, “Development and Technopolitics,” 107. 31 Memorandum from Jessica Tuchman of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzeznski), October 10, 1977. Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of the United States 1977-1980 Volume XXIV: South America/Latin American Region. https://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1977-80v24/pdf/frus1977-80v24.pdf. 263. Consultative status gave NGOs the right to attend and participate in various meetings at the United Nations, lobbying and presenting reports to countries represented. 42 human rights groups.”32 There would be no reason for those governments (who were frequent targets of informant NGOs) to resist investigation if the information and action provided by the organizations did not lead to official policy changes or action. Six days after Brzeznski’s memo, President Carter sent a letter to Jorge Videla, the president of Argentina, urging Videla to reconsider his perspective and policy on human rights and NGO investigations. Carter wrote “let me mention the very important role played by non-governmental human rights organizations, and my hope that they will continue to contribute to the advancement of human rights and my firm belief that they should retain their consultative status at the United Nations.”33 The practices of NGOs and the results of their research earned them substantial support from the Administration, and not only from the President. Political Allies and Government Support Members of both the Executive and Legislative Branches of the Carter government were proponents of increased measures to promote human rights and development in Latin America and the involvement of NGOs in the process. The President, as well as his Cabinet and Congress, built and maintained relationships with a variety of non-governmental organizations. The interactions and policy prescriptions from both the government and the organizations pointed to a unified foreign relations agenda. Congressional and executive support for the Institute for Human Rights and the —which would lean heavily on NGOs—also revealed that the Administration’s policy was shared across the different branches of government. At the 1977 National Conference for Human Rights, organizers acknowledged the “dramatic upsurge in interest in this country in the question of human rights around the world…[which] has been influenced considerably by President Carter’s statement on human rights.”34 The organizations present at the conference were those who lobbied in Washington and

32 Memorandum from the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzeznski) to President Carter, October 28, 1977. Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of the United States 1977-1980 Volume XXIV: South America/Latin American Region. https://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1977-80v24/pdf/frus1977-80v24.pdf. 93. 33 Letter from President Carter to President Videla, via Telegram to the Embassy in Argentina, November 3, 1977. Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of the United States 1977-1980 Volume XXIV: South America/Latin American Region. https://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1977-80v24/pdf/frus1977-80v24.pdf. 233. 34 Letter from President/Director of International League for Human Rights, Freedom House, B’nai B’rith, and A. Philip Randolph Institute, June 3, 1977, Human Rights: National Conference; 1976-1977; Freedom House Records, Box 45, Folder 3; Public Policy Papers, Department of Rare Books and Special Collections, Princeton University Library. Additionally, Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Patricia Derian, and Senator Donald Fraser were both asked to represent the U.S. government on a human rights/Helsinki Act panel at 43 worked on humanitarian issues around the world. They saw Carter’s fervor as an incredibly positive, hopeful sign. The President’s rhetoric in support of global human rights influenced an audience that spanned well-beyond the government. NGOs took his words as permission to increase their efforts and become more involved in policy creation (and implementation, which will be discussed in the next chapter). The President of Freedom House lauded Carter for his promotion of human rights, saying that the Administration “created a climate in which efforts by non-governmental organizations and individuals can have a greater effect than they might have had a few years ago.”35 This climate for action also created opportunities for close relationships between NGOs and government officials in both the Executive and Legislative Branches. While information could be—and frequently was—shared between the government and NGOs without face-to-face interaction, it was not uncommon for members of the organizations to meet personally with government officials. Lincoln Bloomfield, a member of the National Security Council Staff, spoke highly of his personal interaction with NGO leaders at a conference arranged by Assistant Secretary for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Patt Derian. He noted that he “was astonished at [the NGOs’] pleasure when I went over to State this spring to participate” in the conference.36 Members of Carter’s Cabinet regularly encouraged face-to-face meetings between government officials and leaders of NGOs. Deputy Secretary of State, Warren Christopher encouraged a policy where the State Department would “meet and talk with representatives of the more important human rights organizations in town,” mentioning a

the conference. Memo of the Steering Committee, American Coalition for Human Rights from MaryAnn Lettau, Executive Secretary, July 1, 1977. Human Rights: National Conference; 1976-1977; Freedom House Records, Box 45, Folder 3; Public Policy Papers, Department of Rare Books and Special Collections, Princeton University Library. The statement to which the document referred was President Carter’s Commencement address at the University of Notre Dame, which had taken place just before the conference. 35 Prepared Statement by Leonard C Meeker, Leonard R. Sussman Testimony-Senate Regarding Institute for Human Rights (Origin of NED); 1978 June 29; Freedom House Records, Box 162, Public Policy Papers, Department of Rare Books and Special Collections, Princeton University Library. Another key component in creating this climate of collaboration with specific regard to Latin America, was the 1971 Organization of American States “Draft Standards on Cooperative Relations Between the OAS and the United Nations, Its Specialized Agencies, and Other International and National Organizations (Resolution 57)” which was ratified in April 1971. The Resolution explored the variety of ways the OAS would include NGOs in its governing strategies. Schmidli agreed with Meeker, explaining that “the Carter Administration created an unprecedented, government-sanctioned arena for the human rights movement.” Schmidli, The Fate of Freedom Elsewhere, 6. 36 Memorandum from Lincoln Bloomfield of the National Security Council Staff to Roger Molander of the National Security Council Staff, , 1980. Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of the United States 1977-1980 Volume II: Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs. https://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1977- 80v02/pdf/frus/frus1977-80v02/pdf. 629. 44 variety of NGOs.37 Long-time supporter of global development and human rights, Senator , shared Christopher’s views. He was a sympathetic congressman when it came to the work of human rights-focused NGOs. On one occasion, “Kennedy informed a gathering of human rights advocates, ‘We [Congress] are absolutely dependent upon you for information. We are basically all generalists, and we depend upon you for information, for the trends, the movements, the opportunities for congressional action.’”38 However, these meetings between government and non-government leaders were not limited to large-group assemblies or congressional hearings. In the wake of the Sandinista Revolution in Nicaragua, Assistant Secretary Derain contacted Deputy Secretary Christopher, advising him that NGOs active in Nicaragua had requested a meeting with State Department officials and recommended the meeting be set. Her reasoning included both the value of eye-witness accounts of members of these organizations and their ability to inform on the situation, as well as the good optics from a public standpoint of the Administration’s openness to NGO information in policymaking.39 At times, roles were reversed, and a number of government officials met with a singular NGO representative. This was often the case for the most reputable organizations, chief among them, Amnesty International. Secretary-General of Amnesty International, , met with a group of congressmen and Assistant Secretaries in January, 1978 to discuss the organizations relationship with the United States government. 40 Amnesty International reports were frequently quoted in State Department publications throughout the Carter Administration’s tenure. Following a roundtable between the Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs with numerous NGO leaders including AI, Pat Derian wrote to Warren Christopher encouraging him to promote more

37 Christopher specifically named the Washington Office on Latin America, Amnesty International, the National Catholic Conference, B’nai B’rith, and the Coalition for a New Foreign Military Policy. Report from Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher to Secretary of State Vance. Subject: US Foreign Policy on Human Rights: A Status Report. Confidential. RG 59, Entry P885, Container 1. National Archives II, College Park, MD. 11. 38 Schmidli, The Fate of Freedom Elsewhere, 75. 39 Derian cited the NGOs who made the request as the National Council of Churches, World Council of Churches, United States Catholic Conference, American Friends Service Committee, and the Washington Office on Latin America.Action Memorandum from HA Pat Derian to Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher, June 19, 1979. Subject: NGO Request for Meeting on Nicaragua. RG 59: Department of State Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs. Entry P885: Country Files 1977-1985. Ireland THRU Philippines (1 of 2). Container 4, Folder: Nicaragua. National Archives II, College Park, MD. 40 Action Memorandum from HA Pat Derian to Secretary of State Vance, December 22, 1977. Subject: Appointment with Martin Ennals Amnesty International. RG 59: Department of State Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs. Entry P885: Country Files 1977-1985. Venezuela THRU Welcome Home Book-1979. Container 6, Folder: Amnesty International. National Archives II, College Park, MD. 45

State Department communication with the organizations. She explained—and supported—the NGO leaders’ request to be informed sooner and consulted more frequently in decision-making processes over issues of human rights.41 Regardless of the setting, it was clear that both the government officials and NGO leadership saw value in developing and maintaining these relationships. Speaking specifically on Latin America, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, Terence Todman, explained that the increase of information from NGOs created a new—and at times, unfortunate—awareness that pressured the U.S. government to “move beyond a preoccupation with government activities alone, and to develop a foreign policy for Latin America that has both public support and community involvement.”42 This kind of humanitarian promotion showed “how and why U.S. officials came to embrace international development as such an integral part of their foreign policy.”43 Congress was one of the long-time promoters of humanitarian policy in United States foreign relations. While much of the human rights policy agenda was ultimately made by President Carter, his staff was encouraged to work with congressmen who had been instrumental in the human rights push.44 Warren Christopher and Cyrus Vance regularly discussed the important members of Congress who should be involved and consulted on matters of human rights policy naming several prominent men including Donald Fraser, Ted Kennedy, and Tom Harkin.45 The ability of the Executive and Legislative Branches to work together was crucial to

41 The NGOs represented at the meeting with Derian included Amnesty International, the International Commission of Jurists, the International League for Human Rights, the UNA-USA, the Washington International Human Rights Law Group, Internet, the National Council of Churches, the World Council of Churches, B’nai B’rith International, the United States Catholic Conference, the American Jewish Committee, the American Association for the Advancement of Science, the Council of Hemispheric Affairs, the American Association of Publishers, and Khronika Press. Briefing Memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs (Derian) to Acting Secretary of State Christopher, June 13, 1979. Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of the United States 1977-1980 Volume II: Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs. https://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1977-80v02/pdf/frus/frus1977-80v02/pdf. 585-586. 42 Address by the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Todman), February 14, 1978. Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of the United States 1977-1980 Volume XXIV: South America/Latin American Region. https://www,static.history.gov/frus/frus1977-80v24/pdf/frus1977-80v24.pdf. 103. 43 Macekura and Manela, “Introduction,” 7. 44 Brainstorming Memo by Brady Tyson to Andy Young and John Baker, March 25, 1977. Subject: Taking Human Rights to the American People. RG 59, Entry P885, Container: 1. National Archives II, College Park, MD. 45 Report from Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher to Secretary of State Vance. Subject: US Foreign Policy on Human Rights: A Status Report. 11. Tom Harkin was an avid advocate for the human rights movement in Latin America, writing to President Carter in 1980 in hopes of addressing embassy challenges in Central America that he believed impeded human rights progress. Letter from Congressman Tom Harkin to President Jimmy Carter, June 10, 1980. RG 59, Entry P885, Container: 1. National Archives II, College Park, MD. 46 the success of U.S. development and human rights policy. NGOs could work with both branches to further their ideas and influence policy creation from multiple angles. Congress was historically quicker to support human rights and NGO efforts than the Executive branch, but both were instrumental during the Carter Administration. As Michael Schmidli noted, “Robert F. Drinan (D-MA) and Donald Fraser (D-MN) peppered the Department of State with information requests…used hearings and floor speeches to raise awareness…These efforts were bolstered by a surge of activism from dozens of non-governmental human rights organizations.”46 Drinan, Fraser, and other congressmen like Ted Kennedy, were consistent advocates of NGO involvement in the human rights movement. President Carter’s marked shift from the Kissinger style of diplomacy was a welcome change for these congressmen who had been “effectively neutralized” from pressing for humanitarian policies under the Nixon and Ford Administrations.47 The positive interactions between the branches—as well as informant NGOs—was also seen in human rights reporting from both U.S. embassies and D.C.-based officials. Maintaining working relationships between the United States government and non- government organizations interested in humanitarian development took many forms. It was clear that Carter Administration officials and NGO leadership recognized the mutual need and desire to work together for the cause of international development. Carter’s Chief of Staff, Hamilton Jordan, completed a foreign policy review in June 1977 in which he advocated for cooperation between the White House, Congress, and NGOs. Jordan wrote, early consultation with Congress and interested/affected constituent groups is critical to the political success of these policies…once these foreign policy goals are established, it is critical that political strategies in support of those goals be developed and implemented. And it is important that the resources available to the Administration—both inside and outside of government—be coordinated and used in a way that is supportive of these objectives.48

Throughout its tenure, the Carter Administration acknowledged its need for assistance with its foreign policy agenda. The Policy Planning Staff regularly exhorted the Administration to

46 Schmidli, The Fate of Freedom Elsewhere, 3. Michael Cohen and Maria Kupcu defined the relationship between the NGOs and government as “codependent” and argued that maintaining those relationships would be a primary concern for government officials for decades to come. Cohen and Maria Figueria Kupcu, “Privatizing Foreign Policy,” 36. 47 Schoultz, Human Rights and United States Policy toward Latin America, 74. 48 Paper Prepared by the President’s Assistant (Jordan), June 1977, Review of Foreign Policy Initiatives. Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of the United States 1977-1980 Volume I: Foundations of Foreign Policy, 1974- 1976. https://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1977-80v01/pdf/frus1977-80v01.pdf. 181-182. The “resources” which Jordan mentioned included non-governmental organizations that promoted government policy to the general public. 47

“proceed, as much as possible, in cooperation with non-governmental organizations,” and encouraged relevant departments to compile “an inventory of organizations and individuals with which to work on human rights-related programs.”49 Various government agencies took heed of this advice and built ongoing relationships with a diverse conglomerate of NGOs. A 1978 paper from the same agency addressed the rationale behind their promotion of government-NGO interaction recognizing the “increasingly important role” played by NGOs invested in international development.50 At the same time, NGOs provided a bridge between the Executive and Legislative branches of government. NGOs had numerous allies in Congress which resulted in a close and trusting relationship that led to regular communication between them. It was not uncommon for NGO representatives to testify in Congress on matters of human rights and international development policy.51 The Executive Branch recognized the value of using the NGOs’ relationship with Congress to enhance its efforts toward achieving foreign policy goals. A memo from the Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations to Christopher Warren expressed “we should develop our relationship with the interested non-governmental agencies (NGOs) which can be of immense help to us with their influence in the Congress.”52 Anthony Lake and Patt Derian mirrored this sentiment and promoted action among the Executive Branch, Congress, and NGOs. They posited “since there is an increasingly active, vocal, and influential human rights lobby operating on the Hill, the [State] Department should complement its efforts with the Congress with efforts to meet and talk with representatives of the more important

49 Paper Prepared in the Policy Planning Staff, CU Action Program on Human Rights. Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of the United States 1977-1980 Volume XXX: Public Diplomacy. https://static.history.gov/frus/furs1977-80v30/pdf/frus1977-80v30.pdf. 66-68. Specific NGOs mentioned in the paper included the American Association of the International Commission of Jurists, the Center for World Peace through Law, and the American Bar Association. 50 Paper Prepared in the Policy Planning Staff. Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of the United States 1977- 1980 Volume II: Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs. https://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1977- 80v02/pdf/frus/frus1977-80v02/pdf. 338. Later in the document, Lake declared “we must work even more closely with international organizations…to find the most constructive ways to advance human rights in cultures and political traditions different than our own.” 343. 51 Leonard R. Sussman Testimony-Senate Regarding Institute for Human Rights (Origin of NED); 1978 June 29, 1. 52 Briefing Memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations (Bennet) to the Deputy Secretary of State (Christopher), June 18, 1977. Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of the United States 1977- 1980 Volume II: Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs. https://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1977- 80v02/pdf/frus/frus1977-80v02/pdf. 201. 48 human rights organizations.”53 Amnesty International (AI) was one of the NGOs that significantly influenced policy and lobbied congressmen. AI released its Report on Torture in 1973 which forced policymakers to address state violence—first in and then in other nations. Amnesty was a constant presence on the Hill, in part due to its ferocity to promote human rights, but also because of the quality and quantity of its research. As one historian noted AI “was continuously feeding information to between forty and fifty members of Congress, thus significantly enhancing legislators’ ability to pressure the State Department.”54 The Administration knew that increased participation outside of the federal government—though complicated—would ultimately increase the government’s ability to follow through on its humanitarian-focused foreign policy.55 Amnesty International and other informant NGOs were, therefore, simultaneously some the government’s biggest critics and supporters. In addition to NGO participation in congressional affairs, spaces such as the Human Rights Working Group and United Nations provided outlets for further government-NGO interaction. The Human Rights Working Group was meant to “[unite] a broad range of religious, human rights, research, professional and social action organizations in an effort to maximize the impact of non-governmental organizations on the formulation of public policy in the field of international human rights.”56 Many of the international organizations involved in the working group also worked with the United Nations. Warren Christopher advised Secretary Vance that the United States should send a representative to the UN Human Rights Council to further the partnership between advocates of human rights, both government and non-government. Christopher attested that a U.S. representative could not only help navigate U.S. action in international policy cooperation but would also help to maintain “closer contact with non-

53 Memorandum from the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Lake) and the Coordinator for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs-Designate (Derian) to Secretary of State Vance, March 25, 1977. Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of the United States 1977-1980 Volume II: Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs. https://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1977-80v02/pdf/frus/frus1977-80v02/pdf. 87. Specific organizations mentioned in the memo included Amnesty International, the Washington Office on Latin America, the National Catholic Conference, B’nai B’rith, and the Coalition for a New Foreign Military Policy. 54 Schmidli, The Fate of Freedom Elsewhere, 76. 55 Statement by William G. Bowdler, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs before the Sub- Committee on Inter-American Affairs of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, , 1980. RG 59, Entry P885, Container 1, National Archives II, College Park, MD. 56 Coalition for a New Foreign and Military Policy: A Description of the Human Rights Working Group. Human Rights: National Conference: 1976-1977; Freedom House Records, Box 45, Folder 3; Public Policy Papers, Department of Rare Books and Special Collections, Princeton University Library. 49 governmental organizations which form an important part of the human rights constituency and which lobby actively at the United Nations.”57 One of the prime examples of the Administration’s support of its working relationship with NGOs was the promotion of Institute for Human Rights. In June 1977, human rights advocate, Representative Donald Fraser proposed the creation of a “commission which could administer a modest amount of public funds in support of programs that strengthen the role of the private sector working in human rights fields.”58 House Resolution 11326—the Institute for Human Rights—was introduced to Congress on March 7, 1978 “as a manifestation of the commitment of the United States to human rights and fundamental freedoms,” designed to “provide assistance to non-governmental organizations and individuals that promote human rights and fundamental freedoms.”59 The idea behind the Institute was to support non- governmental organizations which had significantly more freedom to act in foreign countries than the United States government did. Additionally, it would be a place for the American public to become more involved in foreign affairs, which government officials hoped would increase public support for U.S. policies abroad.60 Lastly, it would encourage joint work between the Executive Branch, Congress, and the NGO community to share information that would result in positive and comprehensive foreign policy. The bill was widely supported by both government officials and the NGO community. According to a joint memo from Assistant Secretary Derian, Deputy Secretary Christopher, and Director Lake, one of the most important benefits of the

57 Report from Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher to Secretary of State Vance, Subject: US Foreign Policy on Human Rights: A Status Report. RG 59, Entry P885, Container 1, National Archives II, College Park, MD. 13. 58 Memorandum Prepared by Representative Donald Fraser, June 10, 1977. Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of the United States 1977-1980 Volume II: Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs. https://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1977-80v02/pdf/frus/frus1977-80v02/pdf. Warren Christopher responded to Fraser’s proposal saying “Patt is looking into…your suggestion of establishing a U.S. Commission to support private-sector human rights programs.” Letter from Acting Secretary of State Christopher to Representative Donald Fraser, August 20, 1977. Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of the United States 1977-1980 Volume II: Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs. https://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1977-80v02/pdf/frus/frus1977- 80v02/pdf. 59 HR 11326 by Fascell and Fraser, March 7, 1978. Leonard R. Sussman Testimony-Senate Regarding Institute for Human Rights (Origins of NED); 1978 June 29; Freedom House Records, Box 162, Public Policy Papers, Department of Rare Books and Special Collections, Princeton University Library. 60 Sussman, Leonard R. Sussman Testimony-Senate Regarding Institute for Human Rights (Origins of NED); 1978 June 29. See also Statement by Deputy Secretary Warren Christopher before the House Subcommittee on International Operations on Bill to Create an institute for Human Rights and Freedom, April 25, 1978. RG 59: Department of State Bureau on Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs. Entry P885 Country Files 1977-1985. Venezuela THRU Welcome Home Book-1979. Container 6, Folder: Human Rights and Freedom. National Archives II, College Park, MD. 50

Institute would be its use as “a key mechanism to support those private NGOs in the human rights field [because] our support will be viewed favorably by that constituency.”61 The support from these individuals demonstrated the hope that the State Department, Congress, and the international community would all cooperate in the Institute for Human Rights. Zbigniew Brzeznski frequently discussed the creation of such an institute. After Fraser’s initial proposal, Brzeznski’s staff at the National Security Council explored the potential benefits, including gaining public support and increased access to detailed information on the human rights condition in foreign countries.62 As a result, the National Security Advisor wrote to President Carter in support of a human rights-based institute in early 1978. Brzeznski explained that the Administration was deeply aware of its need for better research in order to build a solid foreign policy, and that this was a project “best done outside the government—in academia, think tanks, etc. An [institute or foundation could] provide the central direction, support, and motivation for a successful, and relevant, scholarly effort.”63 He told Carter that such an institution would develop ideas and programs to further the observance of human rights on a global basis…though the State has worked hard this past year to improve its data base, most of its information comes through official channels which often give a

61 Action Memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs (Derian), the Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations (Bennet), and the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Lake) to Secretary of State Vance, March 20, 1978. Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of the United States 1977-1980 Volume II: Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs. https://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1977- 80v02/pdf/frus/frus1977-80v02/pdf. 424-425. An intra-office memo in the Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs revealed that Leonard Marks from the World Press Freedom Committee, David Heaps from the , Rabbi Morton Rosenthal from B’nai B’rith, John Richardson from Freedom House, Ben Stephansky from the Carnegie Endowment, and Donald Ranard from the Center for International Policy all testified in favor of the bill. Memorandum from HA Roberta Cohen to HA Mark Schneider, April 19, 1978. Subject: Congressional Hearings on Human Rights Institute Bill, April 18, 1978. RG 59: Department of State Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Entry P885: Country Fileds 1977-1985. Venezuela THRU Welcome Home Book-1979. Container 6, Folder: Human Rights and Freedom. National Archives II, College Park, MD. 62 Memorandum from Jessica Tuchman of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs(Brzeznski) and Paper Prepared by Samuel Huntington of the National Security Council Staff, October 5, 1977. Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of the United States 1977-1980 Volume II: Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs. https://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1977-80v02/pdf/frus/frus1977-80v02/pdf. 269-271. 63 Memorandum from the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzeznski) to President Carter. Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of the United States 1977-1980 Volume II: Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs. https://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1977-80v02/pdf/frus/frus1977-80v02/pdf. 395. One of Brzeznski’s reasons for supporting the institute was that the revised draft was created with input from representatives from Freedom House, the International Rescue Committee, B’nai B’rith, Church World Service, and the American Council of Voluntary Agencies for Foreign Service. Memorandum from the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzeznski) to President Carter, February 10, 1978. Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of the United States 1977-1980 Volume II: Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs. https://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1977-80v02/pdf/frus/frus1977-80v02/pdf. 391. 51

very incomplete picture…we need a critical assessment of how well our policies are working…NGOs could prove a powerful ally in such efforts as: building support for the creation of a UN High Commissioner for Human Rights; energizing the UN ; evolving harmonious policies among Western nations in the [International Financial Institutions]; and promoting regional human rights organizations…particularly in the Third World, the [institute] should be able to speak with a voice independent from, and in some cases more credible than, the U.S. government.64

The Institute for Human Rights legislation passed through to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee but was not passed by the end of the Carter Administration. However, that did not stifle the passion and commitment of the NGOs, Congress, and Executive Branch officials. They continued to work together to research and create a foreign policy agenda toward Latin America—and other developing regions—that emphasized humanitarian development. Informant NGOs in Practice Of the many U.S. informant NGOs operating in Latin America during the Carter Administration, there were a few that stood out for the depth and consistency of their work.65 NGOs that focused their efforts in on-the-ground research and policy advocacy, as well as a growing number of think tanks, enabled the United States government to create a strong Latin American policy plan. Georgetown professor and Freedom House president, John Richardson, Jr., testified before the Senate in favor of NGO-state cooperation, explaining that human rights research was “obviously a situation where the proliferation of actors and their increasing activities on the world scene [were] making a major difference.”66 The influence of organizations like Amnesty International, the American Bar Association, the International Commission of the Red Cross, the Washington Office on Latin America, and the International Commission of Jurists was difficult to measure exactly, but the fruits of their work helped fundamentally change the way U.S. foreign policy is created. Without doubt, one of the most significant NGOs involved in this process was Amnesty International (AI). Writing the year that Jimmy Carter left office, Lars Schoultz said, “it is difficult to overestimate the influence of the AI reports on U.S. human rights policy during the

64 Memorandum from the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzeznski) to President Carter, 396- 397. 65 The NGOs mentioned in this section are by no means the only ones that were active or successful during this time; they are meant to represent the variety of ways organizations worked with the U.S. government to inform human rights (development) policy toward Latin America, which have been explained earlier in the chapter. 66 Testimony of John Richardson, Jr., Executive Director for Social Policy at ’s Center for Strategic and International Studies, President of Freedom House. Leonard R. Sussman Testimony-Senate Regarding Institute for Human Rights (Origins of NED); 1978 June 29. 52 late 1970s. With…a reputation for impartial documentation of human rights abuses around the globe, AI helped to create a receptive attitude among members of Congress to general human rights legislation and to country-specific reductions in foreign aid.”67 Amnesty International was born in Europe in 1961 and expanded to the United States in the 1970s. Its U.S. popularity and membership boomed in December 1976—immediately following the Carter election.68 The humanitarian President-elect was a supporter of the organization and the dramatic membership increase in the months before his inauguration was another representation of the American peoples’ support for human rights policies. In the fight for human rights, “the main weaponry of Amnesty [was] words.”69 Their reports were detailed, shocking, and credible. Part of what made the reports so powerful was the organization’s willingness to engage “in diverse collaboration—contributing to State Department reports on the human rights records of foreign countries, [to cultivate] congressional staffers, and [to dispatch] speakers to educate U.S. diplomats.”70 AI was thorough in its research and as a result, was able to boldly approach Washington policymakers to advocate for a human rights- focus in Latin American policy. Amnesty’s reputation for solid research and its ability to communicate findings to Congress played an important role in debates over how to effectively address oppressive Latin American leaders. He maintained that occasionally the debates would hinge on AI’s authoritative information.71 Amnesty International’s U.S. office in Washington, D.C. was deeply connected to congressmen and in frequent contact with Carter Administration officials. The respect and support the Administration offered AI was not only well-deserved but maintained throughout the Carter years. This respect came from proven credibility of—and the accessibility to—Amnesty reports. Reports were not only used for officials in Washington but were “required reading” for U.S. diplomats working in embassies around the world.72 State Department officials acknowledged the importance of AI’s reports and in a letter to all of the country and office directors, one

67 Schoultz, Human Rights and United States Policy toward Latin America, 84. Scoble and Laurie S Wiseberg, “Human Rights and Amnesty International,” 14. 68 Schmidli, The Fate of Freedom Elsewhere, 76. 69 Scoble and Laurie S Wiseberg, “Human Rights and Amnesty International,” 17. 70 Sargent, A Superpower Transformed, 223. 71 Schoultz, Human Rights and United States Latin American Foreign Policy, 84-85. 72 Barbara Keys, “Anti-Torture Politics: Amnesty International, the , and the Origins of the Human Rights ‘Boom’ in the United States,” in The Human Rights Revolution edited by Akira Iriye, Petra Goedde, and William I Hitchcock (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012). 202. 53 official encouraged staff to consider the reports closely and pass along any helpful information on torture, political prisoners, or human rights violations “on which one of our embassies might act.”73 Amnesty’s reports on the Videla government’s human rights violations in Argentina were among the most influential as far as U.S. policy was concerned. Representatives from AI traveled to Argentina in 1976 to research the human rights condition in the nation—one that was deeply entrenched in a dirty war where the government engaged in state-sponsored violence against its own people. They discovered grotesque violations and oppression, as well as a large number of people who had disappeared (most of whom were killed or never found). Amnesty International published their findings in March 1977, providing officials in Washington—and the American public—with a comprehensive report that could not be overlooked.74 While Amnesty may have been the most well-known, it was not the only informant NGO working with Washington policymakers. The American Bar Association (ABA) and the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ), organizations dedicated to the defense of human rights through law and policy-promotion, were constant and reputable voices in policy informing and advocacy.75 In a letter to Senator , the ABA stated its purpose with regards to its relationship with policymakers to be provision of research to create sound policy and recommendations on how to make it practical and effective.76 Without question, the most significant mission for the ABA during the Carter Administration was focused on Argentina. Their research into the state-sponsored violence of the Videla government shed light on the

73 Memorandum from EA Ken Quinn to All Country and Office Director, November 14, 1977. Subject: Contact with Amnesty International. RG 59: Department of State Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Entry P885: Country Files 1977-1985. Venezuela THRU Welcome Home Book-1979. Container 6, Folder: Amnesty International. National Archives II, College Park, MD. 74 Schoultz, Human Rights and United States Policy toward Latin America, 84. 75 The American Bar Association is a voluntary organization of lawyers and law students, founded in 1878, which served to promote legal and ethical standards in the profession, as well as serving as policy influencers. https://www.AmericanBar.org. The International Commission of Jurists, founded in 1952, works to promote and defend human rights and rule of law around the world. https://www.ICJ.org. 76 Letter from Association of the Bar of the City of New York to Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan, July 28, 1980. RG 59, Entry P885, Container 1. National Archives II, College Park, MD. 2-3. One month earlier, the ABA wrote to Secretary of State Muskie advocating for research-based policy toward Latin America, cautioning the government from shifting its policy toward the Videla government. The letter stated, “we are writing at this time to express our concern about recent reports indicating that the Administration is contemplating a shift in policy toward Argentina.” Letter from Association of the Bar of the City of New York to Secretary of State Muskie, June 5, 1980. RG 59, Entry P885, Container 1. National Archives II, College Park, MD. 1. A separate letter from the ABA to Secretary Vance expressed the “need for the U.S. and the international community to continue to investigate and speak out with regard to the ongoing violations of human rights occurring in that country.” Letter from the Association of the Bar of the City of New York to Secretary of State Vance, March 3, 1980. RG 59, Entry P885, Container 1. National Archives II, College Park, MD. 54 aggression and terror inflicted upon the Argentinians. Like Amnesty International, the American Bar Association spent ample time studying the stories of the “disappeared”—individuals who had been mysteriously kidnapped by the government, many of whom were never seen again. Patt Derian was horrified by the ABA’s report on Argentina’s desaparecidos, noting that the practice of disappearing citizens was “the most starkly brutal human rights violation…almost anywhere in the world that seeks to be civilized.”77 Derian’s staff, as well as the rest of the State Department, respected the ABA and regularly sought out its reports. Derian, Christopher, and other officials also looked to the ICJ for research on human rights in Latin America. In a letter to Warren Christopher, Derian and Pete Vaky used ICJ information to report on human rights in Chile, noting several other NGOs whose reports corroborated ICJ’s.78 NGOs rooted in the legal profession were uniquely situated to not only have exceptional research capabilities, but also to warrant the respect and attention of government officials—many of whom came from the legal profession themselves. In this regard, the ABA and ICJ were ideal organizations from which to take information and recommendations on policy. Other NGOs that frequently served as information databases and policy advocates were those with moral or religious foundations. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA) were two of the most vocal. The ICRC, whose U.S. branch was simply called the Red Cross, began in Switzerland at the end of the Nineteenth Century as a neutral humanitarian organization that sought to take care of victims of war.79 The U.S. Red Cross carried out a similar mission in Latin America in the mid-Twentieth, serving victims of war, oppressive military leadership, and desperately underdeveloped communities—all areas where human rights violations were frequent and frequently overlooked by national governments. The ICRC posted representatives in Latin American countries to track human rights violations and in countries like Chile and Argentina, disappearances. Assistant Secretary Derian

77 Briefing Memorandum to Secretary of State Vance from Pat Derian, , 1979. Subject: Study Mission to Argentina by the Association of the Bar of the City of New York. RG 59, Entry P885, Container 1. National Archives II, College Park, MD. Derian explained that one of the most scarring and formative stories of human rights atrocities in Argentina was of a young whose autopsy revealed “two live rats had been sown into the girl’s vagina and had torn her body apart as they tried to get out.” Knowledge of such horror solidified her fervor for human rights policies in Latin America. Quoted from Michael Schmidli, The Fate of Freedom Elsewhere, 84. 78 Briefing Memorandum from ARA Viron P Vaky and HA Pat Derian to Deputy Secretary Christopher, February 21, 1979. Subject: Assessment of Human Rights Situation in Chile. RG 59, Entry P885, Container 1. National Archives II, College Park, MD. 79 International Committee of the Red Cross, “History,” https://www.icrc.org/en/document/history-icrc. 55 trusted Red Cross reports to assist in calculating the number of disappeared persons in Argentina.80 The department used the information to shape its policy and as reports of increasingly widespread and grotesque violations made their way to government officials, policies became stricter. In light of the ICRC’s information on Argentina, Derian advised Christopher and Vance to reduce aid to the junta and press for human rights on a large scale.81 Like the ABA and ICRC, the Washington Office on Latin America spent a considerable amount of resources studying Argentina. WOLA was founded by a group of church leaders in 1974 as a response to the Chilean coup that ousted Salvador Allende, but expanded its efforts to serve all of Latin America. 82 It sought to address the violent humanitarian crisis and lobby U.S. politicians to withhold support for the junta in charge. WOLA was naturally concerned with human rights violations and supported maintenance of policies that pressured oppressive Latin American governments to turn from oppressive authoritarian rule.83 WOLA not only functioned as an informational resource, but testified in Congress, monitored Latin American policy, and published reports for the U.S. public as a means to inform them of foreign affairs. One historian remarked that WOLA’s Latin American Update was “by far the most reliable source of information on humanitarian issues in Latin America” for a public audience.84 The Washington Office on Latin America was able to marshal its own resources to further its goals but was also cooperative with other NGOs in the fight for human rights. In consequence, the United States government looked to WOLA as a valuable asset to foreign relations policymaking. In Derian’s bureau, “WOLA [was] known for having factual information and…for understanding the positions of its allies within the executive branch. Congressional aids tend to view WOLA as a knowledgeable, dedicated lobby, always prodding, rarely offensive.”85 Its ability to provide critical and contextualized information made WOLA one of the consistently sought-after data sources when it came to human rights in Latin America.

80 Memo from Pat Derian (HA) to Secretary Vance and Deputy Secretary Christopher, January 26, 1979. Subject: Next Steps in Argentina. RG 59, Entry P885, Container 1. National Archives II, College Park, MD. 81 Memo from Pat Derian (HA) to Secretary Vance and Deputy Secretary Christopher, January 26, 1979. Subject: Next Steps in Argentina. 82 Washington Office on Latin America, “History,” https://www.wola.org/history-of-wola/. 83 Washington Office on Latin America Letter to Deputy Secretary of State Christopher, , 1980. RG 59, Entry P885, Container 1. National Archives II, College Park, MD. 84 Schoultz, Human Rights and United States Policy toward Latin America, 77-78. 85 Schoultz, Human Rights and United States Policy toward Latin America, 78. 56

Think tanks were another rapidly expanding branch of the human rights lobby in the 1970s and 1980s. These NGOs were more covertly political. In fact, many had members on their boards of directors who had served in various levels of government. Prior to the 1970s, think tanks tended to be more liberal in nature, as the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations. However, in the 1970s, more economically conservative think tanks emerged, among them, the Heritage Foundation (1973), the Cato Institute (1977), and the Manhattan Institute (1978).86 The goal of the think tanks was to influence Washington policymakers. This included participating in congressional hearings, monitoring situations in developing nations, and preparing studies for government officials on a variety of humanitarian concerns.87 During the 1970s, two influential think tanks—from opposite sides of the political aisle—that worked closely on humanitarian issues in Latin America were the Institute for Policy Studies (IPS) and Freedom House. The Institute for Policy Studies was a left-of-center think tank that began in 1961. It promoted public engagement in policy, autonomy from government influence, and international connections.88 IPS, like other informant NGOs, sent representatives to Latin America to research and monitor human rights violations. The organization was “dedicated to understanding and influencing policy” noting that their primary tactics surrounded networking with other think tanks and political advocates to push for change.89 IPS was bold in its strategy and because of its widespread network, it was willing to act with or without government support. In contrast, Freedom House was a center-right organization that was more tempered in its strategies. Mentioned earlier in this chapter, Freedom House was one of the oldest and most influential think tanks in the United States. Its bipartisan nature and seemingly neutral political stance enabled officials on both sides of the political spectrum to take heed of its information. For example, a 1978 telegram to Secretary Vance from the U.S. embassy in Nicaragua called

86 Borstelmann, The 1970s, 130. These more conservative think tanks became even more influential under the neoliberal economic policies after Jimmy Carter left office. 87 On the studies prepared for the government, Brookings prepared an extensive report—An Assessment of Development Assistance Strategies—for the State Department on the policies of health promotion related to human rights in Latin America in 1977, which was used in a Policy Review Committee meeting in October of that year. Memorandum from the President’s Special Assistant for Health Issues (Bourne) to President Carter, September 14, 1977. Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of the United States 1977-1980 Volume II: Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs. https://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1977-80v02/pdf/frus/frus1977-80v02/pdf. 725-729. 88 Institute for Policy Studies, “Our History,” https://ips-dc.org/about/history/. 89 Adler, “The Basis of a New Internationalism?: The Institute for Policy Studies and North-South Politics from the NIEO to Neoliberalism,” 666. 57

Freedom House “the most balanced of the organizations judging human rights.”90 Freedom House emerged in the midst of World War II and continued to research and influence humanitarian foreign policy through the Cold War. Freedom House was central to American foreign policy creation and promotion.91 Not only did it work to inform policymakers in Washington, but like IPS, Freedom House promoted its vision for human rights to the American public. The combination of public and political engagement led to deep—and deserved—support of the organization’s mission and methods. All of these NGOs, and many more like them, played significant roles in the creation of United States policy toward Latin America. Their attempts at policy influence were frequently met with acceptance by government officials. Those policies had impressive results in Latin America. One report from the Central Intelligence Agency claimed, “the release of political prisoners, the reduction of torture and illegal disappearances, and better conditions for political prisoners can be attributed to the cumulative efforts of these groups.”92 Conclusion The Carter Administration was clear in its recognition of the valuable contributions of informant NGOs. The unique ability of organizations to access information repressive regimes did not want uncovered, and their prowess at political lobbying based on that information, made them valuable assets to the Administration. Their methods and tactics enabled the organizations to serve as intermediaries and intercessors between the United States government and people living under harsh conditions in Latin America. The immense worth of NGOs working on the input side of foreign relations rested in the process by which they acquired their information.93

90 Telegram from United States Embassy in Nicaragua to Secretary of State Vance, November 1978. RG 59: Department of State Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs. Entry P885: Country Files 1977-1985. Ireland THRU Philippines (1 of 2). Container 4, Folder: Nicaragua. National Archives II, College Park, MD. 91 Carl J BonTempo, “From the Center-Right: Freedom House and Human Rights in the 1970s and 1980s,” in The Human Rights Revolution, edited by Akira Iriye, Petra Goedde, and William I. Hitchcock (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012) 238. 92 Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency, June 1977. Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Support Services (DI), Job 78T02549A, Box 3, Folder 136, RP 77-10129: Human Rights in the Southern Cone of Latin America. Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of the United States 1977-1980 Volume XXIV: South America/Latin American Region. https://static.history.gov/frus/frus1977-80v24/pdf/frus1977-80v24.pdf. 67. NGOs specifically mentioned in the report included Amnesty International, the International Commission of Jurists, and the International Committee of the Red Cross, among others. 93 NGO “gradually acquire[d] an intimate knowledge of the socioeconomic situation… [in order to] diagnose its key problems. This put them in an extraordinary position to design programs for regionwide application and, perhaps more important, to collaborate with other organizations and share their information,” from Carroll, Intermediary NGOs. 58

NGOs not only collaborated and shared information with other NGOs, but with the government, yielding impressive results in the process. This chapter demonstrated the influence of informant NGOs on United States foreign policy creation and how the organizations found allies within the Carter Administration. The President himself advocated for greater involvement of non-governmental actors in this process—specifically regarding relations with Central America and the Caribbean—calling for universities, social organizations, and churches to participate in “establishing mutually advantageous relationships with our friends in the Caribbean.”94 The Administration placed a significant amount of weight on the findings and opinions of informant NGOs throughout its tenure. State Department officials and congressmen sought out reports from many of these NGOs and requested their testimonies in government hearings on human rights and foreign affairs. Donald Fraser, Ted Kennedy, and Tom Harkin consistently looked to non-governmental organizations for information to push human rights legislation through Congress. Patricia Derian, Warren Christopher, and Anthony Lake encouraged U.S. diplomats to consider NGO findings when planning embassy initiatives. If a government official did not directly reach out to the organizations, representatives from the NGOs would contact the Administration either through lobbying offices or publishing reports. The result of this informant NGO-Administration collaboration was a truly unique and well-developed Latin American foreign policy. Not only that, but the policy was supported by both the executive branch and Congress, a feat not easily accomplished in the aftermath of Kissinger diplomacy and the Vietnam War.

94 President Carter, November 28, 1979. RG 59: General Records of the Department of State: , Office of Public Communications. Entry A1 1589: Records Relating to Major Publications, 1949-1990; Current Policy 271—Interview on to Current Policy 110— and Energy. Container 2, Folder: Current Policy 117: US Relations with the Caribbean & Central America (Pres. Carter, Habib, and Vaky 11/9, 27, & 28, 1979). National Archives II, College Park, MD. 59

In Public and In Practice Vignette: Todman Before Center for Inter-American Relations On February 14, 1978, in an address to the Center for Inter-American Relations, a non- governmental organization dedicated to building hemispheric connections, Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, Terrence Todman emphasized “what President Carter last April referred to as our need to ‘awake our institutions to a changing world.’”1 The speech, titled “The Carter Administration’s Latin American Policy Purposes and Prospects,” announced that the administration was trying “to move beyond a preoccupation with government activities alone, and to develop a foreign policy for Latin America that has both public support and community involvement.”2 It wanted the Center’s help in that effort. NGOs could move outside of diplomatic channels and do things that the U.S. government could not do, including aid needy people in nations burdened by poor leadership. Explaining the problem in the context of the impact for both Latin America and the U.S., Todman described this “ironic paradox: [that] if we decide to confine our assistance only to those developing nations that are at once desperately poor and models of enlightened democracy, we risk crippling our ability to contribute to socio- economic development in Latin America.”3 This paradox was exactly why NGOs had such an important role in the execution of U.S. foreign policy in the region: they could act without direct ties to either the benefactor U.S. government or the potentially corrupt government of the recipient country. Only days after Assistant Secretary Todman’s speech at the Center for Inter-American Relations, Bourne explained to the President that not only did the American public want to participate directly in the development push, but that they trusted NGOs and other private sector to inform and lead the charge more than the government.4 Secretary of State Vance was also a

1 Address by Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, Terrence Todman, February 14, 1978. Subject: The Carter Administration’s Latin American Policy Purposes and Prospects. Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of the United States 1977-1980 Volume XXIV: South America/Latin American Region. https://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1977-80v24/pdf/frus1977-80v24.pdf. 103. The President’s speech to which Assistant Secretary Todman referred was given April 14, 1977 in the Organization of American States. 2 Address by Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, Terrence Todman, February 14, 1978. Subject: The Carter Administration’s Latin American Policy Purposes and Prospects. 103. 3 Address by Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, Terrence Todman, February 14, 1978. Subject: The Carter Administration’s Latin American Policy Purposes and Prospects. 108. 4 This hesitancy to follow the government on the part of the public was largely a carry-over from wounds left by the previous administrations—a concern noted by Todman in his address as well. Address by Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, Terrence Todman, February 14, 1978. Subject: The Carter Administration’s Latin American Policy Purposes and Prospects, 103-109. A State Department paper credited—and somewhat lamented— 60 proponent of Bourne’s perspective on NGO involvement. In , he wrote to the President discussing collaboration with non-governmental organizations in Central America and the Caribbean—in the midst of the Sandinista Revolution in Latin America—noting the “impressive number of U.S. citizen organizations active” in the region.5 The memo itself was titled “Proposal for Enhancement of U.S. Non-Governmental Activities in Central America and the Caribbean,” and in its opening sentence, Vance commented on Carter’s “desire to engage the U.S. private sector” in the development of the region.6 Not surprisingly, the United Nations held similar views and later published a mandate that called for “all governments, specialized agencies, regional intergovernmental organizations, and nongovernmental organizations to cooperate with and assist…in the performance of their tasks.”7 The United States was a proponent of the mandate as it aligned with the Administration’s foreign relations goals, especially for its Latin American agenda. One goal of the cooperation between government and non-government was to address the paradox Todman presented in his address: how to navigate foreign aid to countries with corrupt or oppressive leadership. United States policy demonstrated that development aid money was directly tied to human rights. Presidential Review Memorandum 28 clearly connected technical assistance, human rights, and development to Latin American foreign policy, saying “an increase in aid that directly benefits the needy can be an effective way to encourage positive human rights conduct.”8 It went on to explain that “assistance programs designed to encourage wider

the combination of global events, pressure from the private sector, and the United Nations that built an unprecedented emphasis on human rights. Such extensive attention could not be ignored. As a result, both the government and private sector took action. In a memo on the role that the U.S. public could play in development— particularly in the health field—Peter Bourne, the President’s Special Assistant for International Health Issues, told the President “one of the distinctive features of American life is the ethos of voluntarism. In addressing emerging social issues, Americans generally look in the first instance to local, civic, and private associations and only later to government.” Memorandum from the President’s Special Assistant for International Health Issues (Bourne) to President Carter, February 17, 1978. Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of the United States 1977-1980 Volume II: Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs. https://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1977- 80v02/pdf/frus/frus1977-80v02/pdf. 801. 5 Memorandum from Secretary of State Vance to President Carter, November 5, 1979. Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of the United States 1977-1980 Volume XXX: Public Diplomacy. https://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1977-80v30/pdf/frus/frus1977-80v30/pdf. 571. 6 Memorandum from Secretary of State Vance to President Carter, November 5, 1979. 571. 7 HRC Mandate February 20, 1980. RG 59, Entry P885, Container 1. National Archives II, College Park, MD. 8 Study Prepared by the Ad Hoc Inter-Agency Group on Human Rights and Foreign Assistance, August 15, 1977. Presidential Review Memorandum/NSC-28: Human Rights. Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of the United States 1977-1980 Volume II: Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs. https://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1977- 80v02/pdf/frus/frus1977-80v02/pdf. 239. 61 participation in the economic life of a nation can encourage creation of an underlying climate supportive of a broader observance of human rights.”9 The question then became about the extent to which the government would influence private action, and whether or not that influence would be visible. Secretary of State Vance answered these questions when he explained that the government would work alongside the nonstate “to identify gaps in current efforts, and ways to fill them.”10 Through the efforts of the State Department and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID or AID), the Carter Administration collaborated both covertly and clearly with NGOs in policy execution. The National Security Council sought advice on best practices for development—frequently through NGOs—and passed its findings to U.S. foreign embassies.11 Not only was the Administration willing to ask for help, but it sought guidance from within the countries it endeavored to aid. Effective execution of a development-based foreign policy required on-the-ground action and a substantial effort to garner domestic support for the Administration’s policies. Government efforts at public engagement and connection to executor NGOs resulted in transforming various federal offices and allocating funds to organizations to carry out missions in Latin America. NGO actions domestically targeted the public through campaigns to garner empathy and elicit mobilization. In Latin America, NGOs worked on-the-ground in development assistance and disaster relief. This chapter explores the interaction between the Carter Administration and NGOs that were handed directives from Washington—the resultant policies that were created with help from informant NGOs—and how a different type of organization implemented and followed through on government policies. Executor NGOs

9 Study Prepared by the Ad Hoc Inter-Agency Group on Human Rights and Foreign Assistance, August 15, 1977. Presidential Review Memorandum/NSC-28: Human Rights. 239. 10 Address by Secretary of State Vance, March 30, 1979, Department of State Bulletin, , pp. 33-37. Subject: America’s Commitment to Third World Development. . Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of the United States 1977-1980 Volume I: Foundations of Foreign Policy 1974-1976. https://static.history.gov/frus/frus1977-1980v01/pdf/frus1977-80v01.pdf. 584-585. 11 Memorandum from Paul Henze of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzeznski), April 27, 1977. Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of the United States 1977- 1980 Volume XXX: Public Diplomacy. https://static.history.gov/frus/frus1977-80v30/pdf/frus1977-80v30.pdf. 118; Telegram from the Department of State to all American Republic Diplomatic Posts and the U.S. Commander-in- Chief, Southern Command, April 29, 1977. Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of the United States 1977- 1980 Volume XXX: Public Diplomacy. https://static.history.gov/frus/frus1977-80v30/pdf/frus1977-80v30.pdf. 119. 62

Executor NGOs served as the counterpart to informant NGOs both in the United States and abroad. Informant NGOs were champions of human rights and policy planning; executor NGOs implemented those humanitarian policies through a variety of publicly-supported development-oriented missions. Whereas informant NGOs focused on research and policy advocation efforts primarily aimed at politicians, executor NGOs worked on-the-ground both domestically and internationally seeking direct public engagement. Their domestic work targeted the American public and created empathy and mobilization for Latin American relations. Internationally, they engaged and served the Latin American populations through development projects and disaster relief. As reflected in numerous memoranda both nationally and internationally, executor NGOs brought manifold benefits through its unique abilities. Officials compiled a list of United States- run NGOs and noted that even the preliminary and non-inclusive list “already reveal[ed] an impressive network of several hundred U.S. citizen organizations” in Central America and the Caribbean.12 These organizations set about the work of development in person, with U.S. and Latin Americans working together in developing communities. These groups worked in Latin American countries devastated by natural and manmade disasters. Their non-government status allowed them a level of freedom and autonomy to act and be received without as many limits as U.S. governmental efforts faced. During the Ford Administration, leaders of Latin American nations came together at Viña del Mar to discuss regional goals and unity—intentionally leaving the United States out of the conference. In the era of Kissinger foreign policy, with rampant U.S. intervention in foreign politics, the countries of Latin America needed to address their goals apart from the United States. The Consensus of Viña del Mar demonstrated the contradictory aims of the region, mainly the desire for political independence, but also for development assistance.13 The countries involved in Viña del Mar were focused on physical development—even those which were seen by the United States as repressing human rights. The history of U.S. intervention in the region

12 Memorandum from the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Tarnoff) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzeznski), October 31, 1979. Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of the United States 1977-1980 Volume XXIV: South America/Latin American Region. https://static.history.gov/frus/frus1977- 80v24/pdf/frus1977-80v24.pdf. 565. 13 Valdes noted, “the constant pressure of the Latin Americas was aimed at obtaining from the United States political and legal acceptance and support for the principles of nonintervention in their internal affairs, while at the same time seeking U.S. financial, economic, industrial, and technological cooperation for their development.” Valdes, “The Americas in a Changing World as a Response to the Consensus of Vina del Mar,” 208. Emphasis added. 63 made these nations skeptical of direct aid, but their desire to develop brought an awareness of their apparent need for U.S. assistance. NGO involvement was the clear solution to this developmental Catch 22. The mere fact that NGOs are “non-governmental” gave them a public image of being apolitical. This allowed U.S. aid to make its way into development projects in Latin America even under oppressive leadership, through various executor NGOs. The benefit to a largely apolitical body of actors also filled a political need on the part of the United States government. This need came as a result of what one State Department official called an erosion of the old order: new actors were taking power from traditional leadership, regional alliances were changing, and the Church was stepping in to directly oppose military authority in Latin America.14 There was an opportunity for U.S. NGOs to exploit the need for both relief and development and to come into places the government had not previously been permitted. The Administration struggled to translate information and goals into effective policy—much more to the execute that policy in such a complex sociopolitical moment.15 Even when a clear policy was established, there were oftentimes issues that stifled typical diplomatic efforts. The need for alternate policy executors was particularly evident in cases where violence prevented normal diplomatic relations.16 In some instances, U.S. policy officially cut off aid money to certain Latin American countries in favor of using NGOs. For example, in Nicaragua, just before the Sandinista Revolution ousted Anastasio Somoza, a representative from the Washington Office on Latin America wrote to Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher about how the Administration could navigate sending aid to the Nicaraguans without supporting the authoritarian Somoza. The WOLA rep mentioned a meeting between members of a human rights delegation from the Carter Administration and NGOs concerned with Latin America, noting that “members of the

14 Statement by William J Bowdler, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs before the Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, May 20, 1980. RG 59: Department of State Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Entry #P885: Country Files 1977-1985, Germany THRU Iran (2 of 2), Container 3, Folder: Guatemala. National Archives II, College Park, MD. 15 Détente was a period in the Cold War that was atypically calm politically and militarily between the United States and the Soviet Union. Maintaining détente was important to the progression of the global human rights movement and enabled some level of cooperation between countries on both sides, in the name of humanitarian development. Pastor, Condemned to Repetition, 51. See also Paper Prepared in the State Department, Subject: Human Rights and United States Foreign Policy, March 31, 1977. RG 59, Entry P885, Container 1, Folder: Meeting on Human Rights. National Archives II, College Park, MD. 16 Carroll, Intermediary NGOs, 2. 64 delegation recommended that the United States withdraw all forms of economic and military support to the Somoza regime and channel appropriate humanitarian aid to the Nicaraguan people through voluntary and church organizations.”17 According to reports by USAID, the recommendations stuck; economic and military aid were cut completely and humanitarian aid was channeled through the private sector.18 Adherence to changes in aid policies created a disparity in traditional forms of diplomatic cooperation between the United States and several Latin American countries. For instance, decreased official development assistance money created “a gap in the instruments available to us” for achieving positive foreign relations.19 A complete cut-off of humanitarian aid would prove detrimental to the general public of countries like Nicaragua. This gap was the perfect fit for the NGO community not only to step in with the delivery of goods and services crucial to the development process, but to bring in their own sources of funding—which could also be privately directed and dispersed. Executor NGOs placed a significant amount of value on publicity and gaining public support, both domestically and internationally. Since a large portion of their funding and membership came from the general public, these organizations prioritized and leveraged public attention to further their missions—a skill the government also sought to procure. Far beyond simply garnering votes, the government used NGOs to gain domestic support and foreign reception for international aid projects. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) noted the power of public opinion early when it published a paper on the American public’s skepticism of the administration’s human rights policy, saying that both the public and private sectors questioned the underlying motivations of the policy.20 At the same time, officials recognized the “indispensable contribution of the people—that spontaneous and generous effort on the part of

17 Letter to Deputy Secretary of State Christopher from Jay Stubbs of the Washington Office on Latin America, May 24, 1979. RG 59: Department of State Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Entry # P885: Country Files 1977-1985, Ireland THRU Philippines (1 of 2), Container 4, Folder: Nicaragua. National Archives II, College Park, MD. Emphasis added. 18 More on these reports forthcoming in this chapter. 19 Paper Prepared in the Department of State, March 23, 1977. Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of the United States 1977-1980 Volume XXIV: South America/Latin American Region. https://www.static.history.gov/frus/frus1977-80v24/pdf/frus1977-80v24.pdf. 22. 20 Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency, May 11, 1977. Subject: Impact of the U.S. Stand on Human Rights. Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of the United States 1977-1980 Volume II: Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs. https://static.history.gov/frus/frus1977-1980v02/pdf/frus1977-80v02.pdf. 125. 65 the institutions and people of all levels and resources.”21 The Administration strongly desired non-governmental involvement in matters of human rights and foreign relations, especially to validate the motivations behind governmental action. It was also necessary to gain public support in Latin America. The Administration recognized the hesitancy of the recipient public to receive foreign aid and claimed that it would “encounter charges (some specious, some sincere) of moral arrogance and of insisting, once again, that we know what is best for people.”22 Officials recognized the need for an emphasis on non-governmental outlets for action going forward if the human rights policy was going to be effective. The U.S. government needed practical help to implement its policies. But the United States was not the only party to come to this solution; the nations represented at Viña del Mar also saw a need for new actors and an all-hands-on-deck effort. In his response to the Consensus, Gabriel Valdes explained that the “fundamental problem of the development process…[was that] development is not possible if the countries endeavoring to achieve it lack a basic minimum of creative capacity in science and technology to enable them to use their natural resources, to organize their institutions, and to harness their social goals to create an autonomous base for self-sustaining growth.”23 Valdes explored the need for technical assistance and the exchange of people and ideas that could help in the development efforts, acknowledging that, at times, this necessarily included the United States. In his statement before the House Subcommittee on Foreign Affairs, William Bowdler testified to the need for public engagement and assistance in achieving the Administration’s foreign policy goals. With regards to public involvement in the development effort, he explained that “understanding and participation can be even more important [than official action]…both go beyond the normal reach of the federal government. That is why President Carter has been encouraging greater involvement by private citizens…and voluntary organizations in the development of Central America and the Caribbean.”24 Building on Presidential Review

21 RG 220: Temporary Committees, Commissions, and Boards, Entry #A1 38065-K: National Commission on the Observance of International Women’s Year; Executive Director’s Office, Correspondence with nongovernmental Organizations; 1975-1978; PALCO-Pan American Liaison Committee THRU WAO-Women’s Action Organization. Container 95, Folder: Partners of the Americas. National Archives II, College Park, MD. 22 Action Memorandum from the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Lake) to Secretary of State Vance, January 20, 1978. Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of the United States 1977-1980 Volume II: Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs. https://static.history.gov/frus/frus1977-1980v02/pdf/frus1977-1980v02.pdf. 367. 23 Valdes, “The Americas in a Changing World as a Response to the Consensus of Vina del Mar,” 214. 24 Statement by William J Bowdler, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs before the Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, May 20, 1980. 66

Memorandum/NSC 28 which called for non-governmental assistance, Bowdler exhorted the committee to find “better ways to enable all Americans to make their skills and their experiences available to our friends.”25 Regarding developmental assistance to Latin American countries with oppressive leadership, PRM/NSC 28 stated “where assistance benefits the needy, but a country’s human rights record is poor, we should consider the extent to which our aid is or can be provided through non-governmental institutions.”26 This notion resonated with Todman’s “ironic paradox” and touted the significant role of nonstate actors in carrying out the Administration’s policies toward Latin America. Fortunately, the Administration was aware of the ability of NGOs to fill many of its public-relations and engagement needs. Especially in longer-term endeavors, NGOs brought many key factors to foreign development and relations including “the recognition and trust of the local community, a measure of political clout, and a not insignificant role in the local economy as an employer, contractor, and consumer.”27 Because of this multifaceted advantage, U.S. NGOs operating in Latin America became unofficial . Numerous government officials encouraged these relationships and sought deeper U.S. government support for the NGOs. On administrator wrote that “the U.S. private sector remain[ed] one of the distinctive resources which the U.S. [could] make available to other nations” and urged the President to find creative ways to involve the nonstate.28 In recognition of the number of NGOs and their various abilities to help, President Carter’s closest advisors advocated for the organizations’ participation. Secretary of State Vance was one of these and offered a proposal to increase NGO involvement in the Latin American development effort. He presented a variety of opportunities for development and told the President that “in every case [he] suggested non-governmental organizations based in the United States which appear[ed] to have the resources and skills to

25 Statement by William J Bowdler, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs before the Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, May 20, 1980. 26 Study Prepared by the Ad Hoc Inter-Agency Group on Human Rights and Foreign Assistance, August 15, 1977. Presidential Review Memorandum/NSC-28: Human Rights. 238. 27 Stoddard, Humanitarian Alert, xii. 28 Memorandum from the President’s Special Assistant for International Health Issues to President Carter, February 17, 1978. Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of the United States 1977-1980 Volume II: Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs. https://static.history.gov/frus/frus1977-1980v02/pdf/frus1977-1980v02.pdf. 801-802. 67 address the identified need.”29 The organizations Vance identified were chosen for their unique abilities to carry out the administration’s policy. Executor NGOs were also able to fill a financial need. They raised their own funds for various projects and while many were assisted by the government through USAID, the NGOs shouldered a significant part of the financial burden. Secretary Vance assured Carter that presidential encouragement would “stimulate private sector organizations” to action in foreign development and relief efforts, and do so “with little to no incremental cost to the United States Government.”30 Easing the government’s burden, private money was a welcome blessing. In many cases, “private money…increasingly enable[d] the delivery of services and investments in health, education, and infrastructure in poor communities.”31 However, private money and effort were, in many cases, not primarily rooted in the business community, or what would become corporate social responsibility. This was especially true when it came to investment in research. Encouraging research and development in Latin America was incredibly important to building positive relations. This cooperation “could not be done through the usual means of private commercial enterprises or industries,” but rather, “it could be done through major foundations, universities, and public institutions.32 In preparation for a meeting with the Director of USAID, the staff of the Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs sent a memo to Patt Derian noting three major advantages of working through NGOs. Specifically, HA/HR Michele Bova pointed out that channeling funds through these organizations “(1) eliminat[ed] the direct identification of AID with sometimes corrupt or repressive governments, (2) supplement[ed] channels for delivering assistance where governmental institutions may be weak or nonexistent and (3) promot[ed] direct community participation in self-help projects.”33 Bova further explained that projects managed

29 Memorandum from Secretary of State Vance to President Carter, November 5, 1979. 572. Examples of his recommendations can be seen later in this chapter and include Amnesty International, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and others. 30 Ibid, 571. 31 Buthe, Solomon Major, and Andre de Mello e Souza, “The Politics of Private Foreign Aid: Humanitarian Principles, Economic Development Objects, and Organizational Interests in NGO Private Aid Allocation,” 572; Carey, Privatizing the Democratic Peace, 156; State Department memo stating “in some situations abroad, the activities of nongovernment groups can be more effective than official measures, and the US Government may wish, in such cases, to leave the greater part of the action to the private sector,” Paper Prepared in the State Department, Subject: Human Rights and United States Foreign Policy, March 31, 1977. 32 Valdes, “The Americas in a Changing World as a Response to the Consensus of Vina del Mar,” 214. 33 Memorandum from HA/HR Michele Bova through HA/HR Mark Schneider to HA Patt Derian, June 23, 1978. Subject: Your Meeting with Governor Gilligan. RG 59: Department of State Bureau of Human Rights and 68 by NGOs “promote[d] development from the bottom-up and encourage[d] social and political change through their emphasis on local initiative.”34 The importance of bottom-up organizational leadership in development efforts was paramount. Under this structure, the U.S. government was somewhat shielded from backlash if the projects failed—or were seen as supporting poor leadership—but would be able to acknowledge its assistance if efforts were successful. At the same time, this set up gave autonomy and a platform to NGOs and enabled projects to be focused on recipient communities more than on political motives. The unique position and abilities of executor NGOs to navigate the political and social climate of host communities made them exceptional allies to the Carter Administration’s foreign policy. President Carter himself acknowledged this in a speech on May 2, 1978 saying that non- governmental organizations could “play an important role by exercising initiative and careful judgement in developing needed products and in helping to make sure they are used wisely.”35 His statement reflected the Administration’s approach to expanding inclusion of NGOs in its policies not only as informants (as seen in the previous chapter) but as key actors in the execution of those policies due to their qualifications, proven record, and relational (bottom-up) nature. Administration’s Desire for Public Engagement The Carter Administration placed a high value on gaining public support and participation in its Latin America policies. This required the involvement of non-governmental organizations. Members of Carter’s staff claimed that the President’s desire for public engagement was in line with what the public wanted. One official stated that “Jimmy Carter, during the presidential campaign, touched a yearning among the American people that this nation stand again for honorable causes in the world.”36 His words hearkened a spirit of community engagement—that the people in the United States not only wanted a president who cared about

Humanitarian Affairs, Entry # P885: Country Files 1977-1985. Venezuela THRU Welcome Home Book-1979, Container 6, Folder: AID. National Archives II, College Park, MD. 34 Memorandum from HA/HR Michele Bova through HA/HR Mark Schneider to HA Patt Derian, June 23, 1978. Subject: Your Meeting with Governor Gilligan. 35 Jimmy Carter, “International Health Program Statement Announcing a Program to Strengthen U.S. Participation,” May 2, 1978. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T Wooley, The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=30735. 36 Address by Abelardo L Valdez, Assistant Administrator for Latin America at the U.S.-Mexican Trade and Investment Conference, San Antonio, TX, September 22, 1977. RG 59: Department of State Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Entry #P885: Country Files 1977-1985, Germany THRU Iran (2 of 2), Container 3, Folder: Guatemala. National Archives II, College Park, MD. 69 humanitarian issues, but that such a desire would elicit participation by community members. In order to accomplish the Administration’s lofty goals in the region, and especially to fulfill its desire for public participation, Carter leadership recognized the need for an altogether new and significant methodology. In a 1977 memo entitled “Taking Human Rights to the American People,” Brady Tyson acknowledged the recent history of U.S. government officials’ work on the human rights front but called for much greater effort. He wrote that the Administration needed “nothing less than a national effort at least as great as that one led by Mrs. Roosevelt and the Churches to get us into the United Nations (1944-45), and far greater than the one of the Eisenhower years.”37 Tyson, like many Americas, was disappointed with previous administrations’ attempts to engage with the public, and pointed to the most well-known champion of human rights as the current administration’s model—the chairperson of the committee that drafted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. When it came to development, one of the most difficult components of the process was defining the goals: deciding what projects should be funded, who would be in charge of spending the donated funds, what development should look like, etc. 38 The Administration sought to do both: provide the infrastructure when possible as well as fund projects when it could not work through government channels. Jimmy Carter offered a foreign policy that would simultaneously promised positive relations and development while also limiting cost to the American people.39 The only way this was feasible was to use executor NGOs as much as possible—saved by the perception that NGO successes could be attributed to the government’s encouragement and failures were results of private error. Ultimately, the Administration demonstrated its definition

37 Brainstorming Memo to Andy Young and John Baker from Brady Tyson, March 25, 1977. Subject: Taking Human Rights to the American People. 38 An intradepartmental memo in the National Security Council discussed these dilemmas, stating that the organization found itself “debating whether building a particular road, for example, serves the basic human needs of the population…or what fraction of a certain loan to Argentina [was] going to bring potable water to poor people in Buenos Aires versus what fraction [would] be spent on a computer system to improve billing…is ‘basic human needs’ the actual services (food, shelter, healthcare) or is it the money to buy those things?” Memorandum from Jessica Tuchman of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzeznski), November 30, 1977. Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of the United States 1977-1980 Volume II: Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs. http://static.history.gov/frus/frus1977-80v02/pdf/frus1977-80v02.pdf. 326. 39 Spencer, The Carter Implosion: Jimmy Carter and the Amateur Style of Diplomacy, 26. 70 of engagement and development goals by how it allocated public relations messages and funding. 40 Carter’s plans for this administration’s Latin America policy were designed to symbolize his “commitment to human rights by providing a new means of communication between intellectuals, professional organizations (such as lawyers), universities, think tanks, and other interested groups in the hemisphere.”41 The intent was clear and this new method of involving the nonstate was instrumental in the success of Carter’s policy agenda. Through the use of globally-accessible American-produced media, Carter and his advisors believed that international awareness of the Administration’s policies would be a crucial component to the success of those policies.42 These media outlets included both government and nongovernmental producers. Without question, the Administration viewed public support as an important aspect of its policy and was willing to employ a vast array of resources—both traditional and new—in the name of public engagement. Carter, Vance, Brzeznski, and Derian defined their goals for development and execution of Latin American foreign policy with the idea that by participating in foreign relations, the citizens of the United States would be more apt to approve of higher spending and attention focused on the region. This was largely carried out by increased funding to NGOs to execute policy and presidential encouragement to participate in the development effort. A memo to Brzeznski laid out the State Department’s goals saying, Our basic policy response is to help overcome the extensive socio-economic problems which are the root causes of political vulnerability and to strengthen democratic and pluralistic elements and institutions where possible…Our objectives therefore are to stimulate and encourage [NGOs] to: complement national development efforts, and improve mutual understanding…Our role should be to help awaken [NGOs] to the challenges, and to facilitate their work without undermining their private character…In dealing with both private groups and governments, it is very important that we (1) emphasize that our consultation is genuine (e.g. that our ideas are not set in concrete and we are

40 Examples of this allocation can be seen in discussions of the actions of government agencies—including the United States Information Agency/International Communication Agency (USIA/ICA) and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID)—later in this chapter. Tables detailing fund allocation for USAID can be found at the end of the chapter. 41 Paper Prepared in the Department of State, Subject: Review of United States Policy toward Latin America. Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of the United States 1977-1980 Volume XXIV: South America/Latin American Region. https://static.history.gov/frus/frus1977-80v24/pdf/frus1977-80v24.pdf. 23. 42 Study Prepared by the Ad Hoc Inter-Agency Group on Human Rights and Foreign Assistance, August 15, 1977, Presidential Review Memorandum/NSC 28: Human Rights. 243. 71

open to suggestions), but (2) that we have done our homework, that these proposals are well-conceived, workable, and worthy of their enthusiasm.43

The following day, Dr. Brzeznski relayed this message to President Carter, with a personal recommendation on the benefits of public engagement—here, specifically an exchange program. He explained that this program would benefit the Administration’s foreign policy agenda in three main ways: “(1) attitude: improve mutual understanding and appreciation…(2) development: help meet the developmental needs of the nations of the region through small-scale and personal assistance efforts; and (3) democracy: to encourage political and economic pluralism by working directly with private groups.”44 The Administration knew that it needed the backing and action of nongovernmental organizations in order to meet these goals. A June 1977 State Department paper declared that one of the Administration’s objectives—especially regarding its human rights policy—was to “develop public understanding and support for [its] policy through the involvement of nongovernmental organizations.”45 Part of this effort included gaining support for the adjustment of aid from short-term to long-term programs. The Administration sought to shift its foreign assistance toward a more sustainable program. Prior to Carter’s election, one of the primary avenues for aid had been the PL 480 food aid program. His administration viewed PL 480 as a handout; a program that was not ultimately sustainable and was more closely tied to emergency situations and relief efforts rather than long- term development.46 The goal was to build lasting infrastructure that would require less immediate or urgent action from the United States government. This required public support, but more importantly, necessitated NGOs willing to commit to continued projects.47

43 Memorandum from the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Tarnoff) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzeznski), December 12, 1979. Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of the United States 1977-1980 Volume XXX: Public Diplomacy. https://static.history.gov/frus/frus1977-1980v30/pdf/frus1977- 80v30/pdf. 581-586. 44 Memorandum from the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzeznski) to President Carter, December 13, 1979. Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of the United States 1977-1980 Volume XXX: Public Diplomacy. https://static.history.gov/frus/frus1977-80v30/pdf/frus1977-80v30/pdf. 588. 45 Paper Prepared in the Department of State, June 8, 1977, Subject: Outline PRM 28 Response. Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of the United States 1977-1980Volume II: Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs. https://static.history.gov/frus/frus1977-80v02/pdf/frus1977-80v02.pdf. 158-159. 46 Memorandum from HA/HR Michele Bova through HA/HR Mark Schneider to HA Patt Derian. 47 NGOs on the ground in Latin America provided information on the context in which development projects would occur. This was essential if a project were to succeed and sustainable beyond initial U.S. efforts. Anthropologist, Tara Hefferan, explained this concept saying, “the problem with ‘give a man a fish” …is that it focuses attention on what the ‘fisherman’ lacks in know-how, rather than looking to see whether the lake even has any fish, if those fish are edible, or if obstacles—like improvised explosive devices—might line the path to the lake.” For this and more discussion, see Tara Hefferan, “Encouraging Development ‘Alternatives’: Grassroots Church Partnering in the U.S. 72

The Administration also used executor NGOs to co-opt public support. Numerous officials noted the important role of these organizations to not only educate, but to incite the public to action.48 This type of engagement in foreign development and policy enabled citizens to feel both a sense of responsibility and community—a stake in the game—through the actions of nongovernmental organizations. Secretary Vance wrote to the President encouraging government support of NGO action in Latin American development explaining that “the U.S. government would support the organizations’ activities but not become directly involved.”49 Attesting to the high value of public support for a development-based Latin American policy, Vance told the President that there should be an award given to the organization that was the most productive in development assistance in the region which would “focus public attention on private sector activities.”50 By elevating the status of—and attention on—executor NGOs, the Carter Administration would be able to move forward with its policies without as much resistance from the people. Vance advocated that “these suggestions, if implemented, would help stimulate activity, avoid duplication, and make non-government organization activity more supportive of broad policy objectives of the United States Government.”51 The President took Vance’s suggestions to heart and continued to empower NGOs working in the area. He looked to

and Haiti,” in Bridging the Gaps: Faith-Based Organizations, Neoliberalism, and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean, edited by Tara Hefferan, Julie Adkins, and Laurie Occhipinti (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2009) 74. 48 In a memo to the United States representative to the United Nations, Brady Tyson wrote of the human rights effort, “this can only be done by a massive, non-partisan, citizen’s coalition. Our task is to help catalyze and legitimize such a coalition…it must be a nongovernmental effort in great part…If the goal is for the American people to take the Covenants and the Conventions seriously, obviously time is needed for education, reflection, comment, and reaction.” Brady Tyson Brainstorming Memo to Andy Young and John Baker, March 25, 1977. Additionally, Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher expressed to Secretary of State Vance the need to “promote a greater sense of community abroad. More activities in this area might include: economic enterprise and social change, the cooperative movement, religious organizations and social progress, community action for social betterment, leadership training for social improvement, pressure groups and public policy, the environmental movement, and the status of the volunteer.” Status Report on US Foreign Policy on Human Rights, from Deputy Secretary of State, Warren Christopher to Secretary of State Vance. RG 59, Entry #P885, Container 1, Folder: Meeting on Human Rights. National Archives II, College Park, MD. 49 Memorandum from Secretary of State Vance to President Carter, November 5, 1979. Subject: Proposal for Enhancement of U.S. Non-Government Activities in Central America and the Caribbean. Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of the United States 1977-1980 Volume XXX: Public Diplomacy. https://static.history.gov/frus/frus1977-80v30/pdf/frus1977-80v30/pdf. 572. 50 Memorandum from Secretary of State Vance to President Carter, November 5, 1979. Subject: Proposal for Enhancement of U.S. Non-Government Activities in Central America and the Caribbean, 573. 51 Memorandum from Secretary of State Vance to President Carter, November 5, 1979. Subject: Proposal for Enhancement of U.S. Non-Government Activities in Central America and the Caribbean, 573. 73 nongovernmental organizations, but also endeavored to enable individual citizens to become involved in the development effort.52 The Administration was well aware of how closely public engagement and foreign policy were connected. A 1977 State Department memo purported that “the degree of public interest is a proper factor to take into account [when forming policy], for, in a democratic society, foreign policy ought to reflect public concerns.”53 By engaging in conversation with the public and considering its priorities, the Administration could build a publicly accepted foreign relations agenda. Just before this memo was released, another was circulated among U.S. delegates to the United Nations which maintained that “the success of [U.S.] efforts will not be measured just by whether we succeed in getting the necessary two-thirds vote in the Senate…but to what degree the American people internalize and understand the nature of this commitment.”54 The Jacobo Timmerman case was one specific instance demonstrating the administration’s devotion to intertwining public interest with its Latin American policy. Timmerman was a Jewish Argentinian who had been imprisoned by the Videla government during the Dirty War. He was set free only after substantial pressure from both B’nai B’rith and Amnesty International. National Security Advisor, Zbigniew Brzeznski recognized the important opportunity the case presented President Carter to show support for human rights and NGO action, as well as its potential to increase public support for the government’s policies. Brzeznski wrote The Timmerman case has attracted widespread interest and sympathy in this country among private groups, Members of Congress, and the general public…his case symbolized the human rights situation in Argentina. A meeting with Mr. Timmerman would provide the President an opportunity publicly to welcome Mr. Timmerman’s release and to express our Government’s hope that

52 Statement by William J Bowdler, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs before the Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, May 20, 1980. A similar charge to encourage citizen participation came from Peter Bourne, who proposed “U.S. policy has generally sought in specific but modest ways to draw on the strength of the U.S. private sector in meeting basic human needs overseas…The U.S. private sector remains one of the distinctive resources which the U.S. can make more fully available to other nations.” Memorandum from the President’s Special Assistant for International Health Issues (Bourne) to President Carter, February 17, 1978. 801-802. 53 Paper Prepared in State Department, Subject: Human Rights and United States Foreign Policy, March 31, 1977 (drafted by S/P A. Sirkin). RG 59, Container 1, Folder: Meeting on Human Rights. National Archives II, College Park, MD. 54 Brainstorming Memo to Andy Young and John Baker from Brady Tyson, March 25, 1977. A State Department memo from March 31, 1977 gave direction to this sentiment, saying “domestically in the United States, a clearer position on human rights consonant with traditional American values, would increase public and media support for US foreign policy,” from Paper Prepared in State Department, Subject: Human Rights and United States Foreign Policy, March 31, 1977. 74

it marks the beginning of new efforts by the Government of Argentina to restore respect for human rights and the rule of law. The meeting would also provide fresh public evidence of the Administration’s continuing high-level commitment to the promotion of human rights as a central element of U.S. foreign policy.55

Thus, it was clear that Carter and his officials were willing to put in substantial effort to garner and maintain public support for its policies. However, accounting for public opinion was not the only way the government worked with executor organizations to engage the American public in Latin American relations. The Carter Administration also pursued increased engagement was through people-to- people exchange programs. This type of program dated back to the 1960s but was reinvigorated and expanded in the 1970s to include a wider pool of participants. During the Carter years, people-to-people programs were useful for the unofficial relationships that came from both the participants (on a microlevel) and their home countries (on a macrolevel). Some of the most successful of these initiatives were based in the private sector, through NGOs, rather than official government effort.56 The State Department supported people-to-people programs that engaged a broad cross-section of people, including high school student exchanges. These would last one year and were most often facilitated by private programs like American Field Service, Youth for Understanding, and Experiment in International Living.57 The emphasis of these programs was on cultural exchange within the hemisphere. In addition to building bridges across cultures, this initiative “increased international activity among American non-governmental groups which [had] an interest in human rights, especially groups from the academic and journalistic communities.”58 Engaging not only the brightest academic minds, but also those with the gift of communication, made exchange programs especially useful tools to gain support for policy, and NGOs the ideal spring from which to draw candidates. The United States Information Agency (USIA)—reconstituted in 1978 as the International Communication Agency (ICA)—was the main avenue from which the government

55 Memorandum from Dr. Zbigniew Brzeznski, Subject: Proposal that the President Meet with Jacobo Timmerman, October 29, 1979. RG 59, Entry #P885, Container 1. National Archives II, College Park, MD. 56 Memorandum from the Executive Secretary of the Department of States (Tarnoff) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzeznski), December 12, 1979. Subject: Strengthening People-to-People Ties in the Caribbean and Central America. Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of the United States 1977-1980 Volume XXX: Public Diplomacy. https://static.history.gov/frus/frus1977-80v30/pdf/frus1977-80v30/pdf. 582. 57 Memorandum from Secretary of State Vance to President Carter, February 10, 1977. Subject: International Exchange of Persons. Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of the United States 1977-1980 Volume XXX: Public Diplomacy. https://static.history.gov/frus/frus1977-80v30/pdf/frus1977-80v30/pdf. 21. 58 Study Prepared by the Ad Hoc Inter-Agency Group on Human Rights and Foreign Assistance, August 15, 1977. Subject: Presidential Review Memorandum/NSC-28: Human Rights. 244. 75 connected with the public. In documents from USIA staff during the transition to the ICA, employees stated their purpose, explicitly involving nongovernmental organizations as allies in the agency’s mission. They called for “open, frank discussion of issues (including responsible non-government opinion) and the depiction of American society and culture in all its diverse aspects…to present persuasively the Administration’s policies along with responsible non- government opinion, even though such opinion may at times be critical of those policies.”59 In 1977, President Carter wrote to the Director of the USIA, John Reinhardt, explicating what he perceived as the agency’s main tasks, which included “to encourage, aid and sponsor the broadest possible exchange of people and ideas between our country and other nations…[to] encourage private institutions in this country to develop their own forms of exchange and aid those that are in the broadest national interest.”60 As the USIA progressed into the ICA, the Administration became even more direct in its desire for cooperation between the agency and nongovernmental organizations. Shortly after the official inception of the ICA, Brzeznski exhorted Reinhardt to further develop ties to the NGO community and to collaborate with academia and the private research community.61 The efforts of the USIA/ICA fit well with the work of the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (CU). The charge for CU was to promote the same type of cultural education and exchange as the people-to-people programs. It was intended to encourage pluralism and inclusion of NGO insights regarding sustainable approaches to public engagement with human rights policy.62 The Bureau itself defined its position in society as “to support the media, communication, and publishing sectors’ efforts to play a constructive role in intercultural communication…to increase and diversify the participation of community organizations in

59 Prepared by Employees of the United States Information Agency, November 3, 1976. Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of the United States 1977-1980 Volume XXX: Public Diplomacy. https://static.history.gov/frus/frus1977-80v30/pdf/frus1977-80v30/pdf. 2-3. 60 Memorandum from Jimmy Carter to the Director of the United States Information Agency (Reinhardt), March 13, 1977 Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of the United States 1977-1980 Volume XXX: Public Diplomacy. https://static.history.gov/frus/frus1977-80v30/pdf/frus1977-80v30/pdf. 351. 61 Letter from the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzeznski) to the Director of the International Communication Agency (Reinhardt), , 1978. Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of the United States 1977-1980 Volume XXX: Public Diplomacy. https://static.history.gov/frus/frus1977-80v30/pdf/frus1977- 80v30/pdf. 410. For one example of the background on the history of how the U.S. government worked with universities and the academic community in foreign development, see Elkind, Aid Under Fire: Nation Building and the Vietnam War. 62 Memorandum from Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher to Secretary of State Vance, Subject: Status Report on US Foreign Policy on Human Rights. RG 59, Entry #P885, Container 1, Folder: Meeting on Human Rights. National Archives II, College Park, MD. 76 international affairs.”63 CU was an integral part of the Administration’s efforts to gain public support for policies, using NGOs to gain traction. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID or AID) was a more tangible component of government support for executor NGOs. AID served two purposes that were incredibly beneficial to the Carter Administration’s Latin American policy: (1) it connected the Administration’s human rights and development policies in clear and tangible ways, and (2) it distributed funds to organizations carrying out those policies. The Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs explained the value and dual-purpose of AID support. It argued that the agency’s actions represented the United States government’s commitment to both economic and social rights in Latin America because “development assistance was the most visible of our aid policies.”64 Throughout the Carter years, USAID funneled money to U.S.-based executor NGOs that implemented development projects, paying special attention to navigate working in nations with positive human rights growth. Patt Derian consistently advocated for USAID to take human rights into consideration when disbursing development assistance funds. She expressed the Bureau’s desire for AID policies that closely linked human rights and development aid, echoing a previous memo in which she charged that “development assistance, more than any other assistance program, succeeded in channeling resources to encourage human rights progress.”65 The Carter Administration termed its Latin American foreign assistance policy “New Directions,” which centered on bottom-up approaches to development that targeted rural communities and organizations, believing that such a program would “lead to greater popular participation in all

63 Memorandum from the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Education and Cultural Affairs (Hitchcock) to all Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs Office and Staff Directors, February 17, 1977. Subject: CU Program Objectives. Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of the United States 1977-1980 Volume XXX: Public Diplomacy. https://static.history.gov/frus/frus1977-80v30/pdf/frus1977-80v30/pdf. 29. 64 Memorandum from HA/HR Michele Bova through HA/HR Mark Schneider to HA Patt Derian, June 23, 1978. Quotation from Memorandum from HA Patt Derian to EB Robert Hormats, November 21, 1979, Subject: Human Rights and A.I.D. RG 59: Department of State Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Entry #P885: Country Files 1977-1985 Venezuela THRU Welcome Home Book-1979, Container 6, Folder: AID. National Archives II, College Park, MD. 65 Letter from HA Patt Derian to S/P Anthony Lake, June 5, 1979, Subject: A.I.D. Reprogramming—Your Memo of May 29. RG 59: Department of State Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Entry #P885: Country Files 1977-1985 Venezuela THRU Welcome Home Book-1979, Container 6, Folder: AID. National Archives II, College Park, MD; quoted text from Memo from HA Patt Derian to EB Robert Hormats, November 21, 1978, Subject: Human Rights and A.I.D. RG 59: Department of State Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Entry #P885: Country Files 1977-1985 Venezuela THRU Welcome Home Book-1979, Container 6, Folder: AID. National Archives II, College Park, MD. 77 aspects—economic, social, and political—of national life.”66 With such high expectations for community involvement and a deep humanitarian focus for development assistance, supplying funding to NGOs to carry out policy was a clear choice. In 1980, the Administration allocated a significant amount of AID funding for support and training of NGO partners active in Latin American development.67 This strong endorsement for NGO engagement was crucial, especially as formal U.S. aid to many Latin American governments had decreased in accordance with the Administration’s decision to assist nation’s based (in part) on their human rights performance. When discussing the involvement of AID funding and nongovernmental participation, State Department officials recognized the necessity of “growing involvement of the U.S. private sector voluntary organizations and universities in providing assistance” if the Administration’s goals for Latin America were to succeed.68 USAID even provided NGO personnel with resources including skills training, program design and evaluation training.69 In the last year of Carter’s presidency, 14 Latin American countries received direct funding from AID (as opposed to funds channeled through NGOs) in the form of development assistance or economic aid.70 However, these direct funds alone were not sufficient and were supplemented by nongovernmental organizations. Recognizing this, the Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs expressed a desire to the director of USAID that “more AID [be] channeled through PVOs…designed to directly promote civil rights.”71 In addition to

66 Memorandum from HR/HA Michele Bova through HR/HA Mark Schneider to HA Patt Derian, June 23, 1978, Subject: Your Meeting with Governor Gilligan. RG 59: Department of State Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Entry #P885: Country Files 1977-1985 Venezuela THRU Welcome Home Book-1979, Container 6, Folder: AID. National Archives II, College Park, MD. 67 See Table 3: USAID FY 1980 Section 116e Activities Funding. 68 Memo from Department of State to the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (Lance), Subject: FY 1979 Budget for Development Assistance, Projections for FY 1980-1983. RG 59: Department of State Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Entry #P885: Country Files 1977-1985 Venezuela THRU Welcome Home Book-1979, Container 6, Folder: AID. National Archives II, College Park, MD. 69 RG 286: Agency for International Development; USAID/Bureau for Food for Peace and Volunteer Assistance/Private Voluntary Cooperation, Entry #P958: Records Relating to Voluntary Relief Organization Policies, 1948-1982, CARE Financial THRU Nongovernmental Organizations (Certification-Agreement, New Countries) CARE [Folder 1 of 2]. Container 8, Folder CARE-Correspondence. National Archives II, College Park, MD. 70 These included Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, , El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, , Paraguay, and . USAID Reports FY 1976-1982, U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants and Assistance from International Organizations Obligations and Loan Authorizations, July 1, 945- September 30, 1980, PN-AAN-238. RG 59: Department of State Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Entry #P885: Country Files 1977-1985 Venezuela THRU Welcome Home Book-1979, Container 6, Folder: AID. National Archives II, College Park, MD. 71 Memorandum from HR/HA Michele Bova through HR/HA Mark Schneider to HA Patt Derian, Subject: Your Meeting with Governor Gilligan, June 23, 1978. 78 receiving government funds, these organizations also worked in countries AID was not directly supporting. USAID was often a bridge between policies coming out of Washington and the execution of those policies by nongovernmental organizations in Latin America. Members of the State Department staff expressed support for NGO involvement in AID activities and the mutually beneficial relationship it would create. Warren Christopher wrote to Secretary Vance noting the way AID could help sponsor “studies and conferences on human rights problems and their relation to economic development” put on by organizations.72 Vance in turn urged U.S. diplomats responsible for finding workers to carry out USAID missions to seek out candidates from NGOs to lead the charge.73 Twice between 1974 and 1976, the USAID Handbook was amended to include recommendations for involving nongovernmental organizations in its efforts. When discussing increased private participation, the handbook stated, “emphasis is placed on assuring maximum participation in the task of economic development” and that “in implementing development assistance, AID contracts with universities and other organizations for technical services, supplies or commodities, and training.”74 It was not until Carter that those changes really took effect or yielded consistent results. As one historian noted, “AID’s $190 million obligation to Latin American in FY 1977 was the lowest in the history of the agency.”75 Carter policies—heavily encouraged by Patt Derian and the Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs—grasped these lines in the AID handbook and allowed for their implementation. In 1977, the Department of State issued a telegram to all American diplomatic posts and consulates confirming the cooperation of USAID and NGOs saying “the Department of State and the Agency for International Development stand ready to cooperate through international

72 Memorandum from Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher to Secretary of State Vance, Subject: Status Report on US Foreign Policy on Human Rights. 73 Telegram from Secretary of State to Diplomatic Posts, Subject: Human Rights Activities, April 1978. RG 59: Department of State Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Entry #P885: Country Files 1977-1985 Venezuela THRU Welcome Home Book-1979, Container 6, Folder: AID. National Archives II, College Park, MD. 74 USAID Handbook, Part I: Authorization and Policy, Chapter I: Authorization, Section 1A.3. November 11, 1976. RG 59: Department of State Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Entry #P885: Country Files 1977- 1985 Venezuela THRU Welcome Home Book-1979, Container 6, Folder: AID. National Archives II, College Park, MD; also USAID Handbook, Part I: Authorization and Policy, Chapter I: Policy, Section 2D. , 1974. RG 59: Department of State Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Entry #P885: Country Files 1977-1985 Venezuela THRU Welcome Home Book-1979, Container 6, Folder: AID. National Archives II, College Park, MD. 75 Schoultz, Human Rights and United States Policy toward Latin America, 136. This low number was established by the Ford Administration, under the influence of Secretary of State Kissinger, who as discussed in previous chapters, was increasingly opposed to humanitarian assistance in Latin America. 79 organizations, through private voluntary organizations, or through direct contacts with other governments” in humanitarian development efforts.76 This type of cooperation and mutual benefit ensured that the USAID-NGO connection would not only be successful but would last beyond the Carter Administration. NGOs, Public Opinion, and Mobilization Nongovernmental organizations were useful tools for garnering public support for policy and translating that support into public participation. This mobilization effect came from successful endeavors to elicit empathy on behalf of the American public. NGOs managed to sway public opinion away from isolationist thought and towards support for the United States active participation in a global community. Carter Administration officials knew that nongovernmental organizations had a special value-add in this effort. An NSC memo explained “the government [was] only responsible for only a small part of the impact which the United States makes on foreign audiences…the enormous and varied information and public relations efforts, educational exchange programs and person-to-person arrangements sponsored by industry, foundations, and universities are more important than governmental efforts.”77 NGOs reached the public through newspaper and public media, as well as their own organizational publications. Once the general public was appropriately informed, organizations brought them in to participate and mobilize in support of the human rights and development effort. The ability of NGOs to effectively mobilize the public gave the organizations increased power and leverage within governing structures. In many cases, “without NGOs asserting power over the information or mobilizing in the streets, there [was] little hope to change the balance of power.”78 Changing the power dynamic was extremely important in Latin American countries run by oppressive leaders, and especially in those in the midst of regime change. The Administration—in particular, the Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs—leveraged the power and ability of NGOs in favor of its foreign policy. Patt Derian addressed the Bureau’s actions explaining that it “communicate[s] directly with nongovernmental organizations,” and that

76 Telegram from the Department of State to All Diplomatic and Consular Posts, June 3, 1977. Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of the United States 1977-1980 Volume II: Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs. https://static.history.gov/frus/frus1977-80v02/pdf/frus1977-80v02/pdf. 943. 77 Memorandum from Paul Henze of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzeznski), April 27, 1977. 118. 78 Carey, Privatizing the Democratic Peace, 44. 80

“surveys of public attitudes on U.S. human rights policy continue[d] to show growing public support for this policy.”79 This increase in public support was due, in large part, to the actions of various NGOs. These organizations shared concerns that the American public was underinformed about humanitarian issues in Latin America—which led to its lack of participation. Robert Pastor of the National Security Council explained that “on human rights-related matters, world opinion always seem[ed] to lag behind the reality.”80 Fred Hoskins, the President of the Office for Church in Society of the United Church of Christ, explained that Carter’s human rights policy “should be supported and promoted by a broad spectrum of the value-giving institutions in American society…to develop a transcendent human rights consciousness at the grassroots level.”81 Sent to officials with extensive backgrounds in grassroots civil rights efforts, Hoskins’ note captured the attention of leadership who, in turn, endorsed NGO activity in this area. Executor NGOs used diverse methods and programs to sway public opinion and spur action. These included techniques to disseminate information such as organizing workshops and conferences, as well as mobilizing the people to

79 Briefing Memorandum from the Assistant Secretary for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs (Derian) to Secretary of State Vance, November 10, 1977. Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of the United States 1977- 1980 Volume II: Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs. https://static.history.gov/frus/frus1977- 80v02/pdf/frus1977-80v02/pdf. 297. 80 Pastor pointed out that “Amnesty [International] intend[ed] to correct that.” Memorandum from Robert Pastor of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzeznski) and the Presidents Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron), August 9, 1978 Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of the United States 1977-1980 Volume XXIV South America/Latin American Region. https://static.history.gov/frus/frus1977-80v24/pdf/frus1977-80v24/pdf. 279. Patt Derian also discussed the NGOs’ perception of declining visibility of human rights, in her memo to Warren Christopher, Briefing Memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs (Derian) to Acting Secretary of State Christopher, June 13, 1979. Subject: The Non-Governmental Community’s Recommendations for Strengthening U.S. Human Rights Policy. Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of the United States 1977-1980 Volume II: Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs. https://static.history.gov/frus/frus1977-80v02/pdf/frus1977-80v02/pdf. 585. A similar message expressed the significant role of nongovernmental organizations to increase “public understanding of human rights issues and public support for human rights policy.” Paper Prepared in the State Department, Subject: Human Rights and United States Foreign Policy, March 31, 1977. 81 Memorandum from Fred Hoskins of the United Church of Christ Office for Church in Society to Brady Tyson, , and Stoney Cooks, Subject: Covenant Ratification Strategy and Beyond, , 1977. RG 59, Entry #P885, Container 1. National Archives II, College Park, MD. Often, the groups which were most influential in gaining empathy for humanitarian foreign development were those tied to religious bodies. Four days after receiving this memo, Tyson wrote to Young and John Baker encouraging them to involve nongovernmental groups saying, “legal, labor, church, and education groups must probably be the core of the citizens groups.” Brainstorming Memo to Andrew Young and John Baker from Brady Tyson, March 25, 1977, Subject: Taking Human Rights to the American People. 81 work for socioeconomic change and support global efforts in the same vein.82 Because of the organizations’ history of success with public engagement and support, Carter Administration officials wanted to “utilize existing constituency networks…as communication tools” for their efforts on human rights policy both domestically and internationally.83 Hoskins further explained that not only was it beneficial (to the government) to use NGOs, it was necessary if the American public was to fully back Carter’s policies. He called upon government leaders to use momentum of human rights legislation to “ingrain into the consciousness of the American people—and the people of the world—that the human rights codified in the covenants should be the minimum basis for domestic and global relations.”84 The Administration’s sponsorship of the bottom-up methodology of the NGOs reflected the shift in policy away from short-term relief efforts in favor of long-term, sustainable missions.85 Sustainable development projects ensured continued connection between the United States and Latin America, which satisfied the major U.S. foreign policy goal of strengthening hemispheric ties during the Cold War. Due to the diverse political and social climates within Latin America, different countries faced different challenges in development. Some faced political upheaval that resulted in need for immediate relief; others were more stable politically and looking for lasting development projects. Consistent with the Administration’s desire to treat each country individually, when crises arose, the United States did send emergency relief.86 But the greater focus—evidenced by USAID funding and official memoranda and policy—preferenced sustainable development projects over emergency relief. Officials recognized that the resources that executor NGOs

82 Statement of Purpose from the International Center for Research on Women, RG 220: Temporary Committees, Commissions, and Boards, Entry #A1 38065-K: National Commission on the Observance of International Women’s Year; Executive Director’s Office, Correspondence with Nongovernmental Organizations; 1975-1978; Common Cause THRU NOW—National Organization of Women. Container 94, Folder: NGO—International Center for Research on Women. National Archives II, College Park, MD. 83 Memorandum from Fred Hoskins of the United Church of Christ Office for Church in Society to Brady Tyson, Andrew Young, and Stoney Cooks, Subject: Covenant Ratification Strategy and Beyond, March 21, 1977. 84 Memorandum from Fred Hoskins of the United Church of Christ Office for Church in Society to Brady Tyson, Andrew Young, and Stoney Cooks, Subject: Covenant Ratification Strategy and Beyond, March 21, 1977. The covenants being discussed were the UN International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, as well as the UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 85 Iriye, Global Community, 132. 86 Statement in the Organization of American States by United States Representative, Reconvened 17th MFM, June 21, 1978. RG 59: Department of State Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Entry #P885: Country Files 1977-1985, Ireland THRU Philippines (1 of 2). Container 4, Folder: Nicaragua. National Archives II, College Park, MD. The Statement addressed the “particular need for sizeable outside resources—money, supplies, and technical assistance” in Nicaragua as a result of the Sandinista Revolution. 82 brought to the development effort permitted as much, if not more, public engagement than did government programs. One representative contended that private organizations provide a major vehicle through which Americans express their active concern for meeting human needs abroad as well as at home. Recent data indicate that American now contribute, for overseas relief and development to the private agencies of their choice, as much money each year as the government provides in bilateral assistance through AID.87

NGOs’ generous contributions in both finances and action, further enabled public participation in foreign relations, especially human rights and development. The President himself professed the “invaluable contribution voluntary organizations have made” and vowed to “aid them in their efforts to coordinate our activities.”88 This coordination was especially relevant and helpful in programs dedicated to health, education, and agricultural production. Patt Derian also attested to the value of nongovernmental organizations’ ability to engage the public in an address on Latin American human rights in 1979. She knew “how indispensable [was] the role of universities, nongovernmental organizations, and individual citizens to the effort to promote respect for human rights.”89 Her championship of human rights coupled neatly with public engagement efforts of NGOs working to implement Carter’s humanitarian policies toward Latin America. NGOs Executing U.S. Policy In addition to work that organizations did to garner domestic support for human rights and development policy abroad, U.S. NGOs operated within Latin American countries to assist in implementing those policies. Some of these organizations also served as informant NGOs— specifically Amnesty International (AI), the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)—but simultaneously maintained projects throughout the region. Other organizations were exclusively involved in ongoing humanitarian programs. These included NGOs like Partners of the Americas, the Cooperative for American

87 Memorandum from the President’s Special Assistant for International Health Issues (Bourne) to President Carter, February 17, 1978. 801-802. Emphasis added. 88 Jimmy Carter, “International Health Program Statement Announcing a Program to Strengthen Participation,” May 2, 1978. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. http://presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=30735. In the speech, Carter explained the Administration’s plan to “more fully involve American universities, technological foundations, and other private organizations in making U.S. scientific and professional resources more accessible to the developing world.” 89 Patricia Derian, Address on Human Rights in Latin America, May 18, 1979. RG 59: General Records of the Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Office of Public Communications; Records Relating to Major Publications, 1949-1990; Current Policy 109-US Statements on Iran THRU Current Policy 103-Third World Challenge to World Communications. National Archives II, College Park, MD. 83

Relief Everywhere (CARE), and the Direct Relief Foundation (DRF). All of these organizations received funding from USAID as well as private donations, and as a result, had varying levels of connection to the Carter Administration. While Amnesty International (AI) and the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA) primarily focused on the information gathering side of United State foreign policy, it targeted global audiences in attempts to increase public awareness and spur mobilization. AI not only shared gruesome instances of human rights violations with the United States government, but with the public and encouraged citizens to write letters to officials imploring action.90 As a faith- based organization (FBO), WOLA activities were frequently led by church representatives. In 1979, a WOLA delegation went to Nicaragua to assess how it might aid the people in the wake of the revolution—where United States official aid and access were severely restricted. The group’s stated mission was to “determine how [it] might contribute most effectively to a just, peaceful, and lasting solution to the conflict.”91 The International Committee of the Red Cross, while also an informant NGO, was more significant as a contributor to foreign relations execution. The organization had incredibly strong ties with USAID and United States diplomatic personnel in Latin America. Embassy reports sought close cooperation with the ICRC, especially in conflict zones in Central America.92 AID funding frequently traveled to Latin America through the ICRC during the Carter

90 Amnesty International, “Our Story,” https://www.amnesty.org/en/who-we-are/. In August 1978, Amnesty “launched a major campaign worldwide aimed at focusing public opinion on Argentina’s dismal record,” which inspired letter writing movements in the United States and elsewhere. Memorandum from Robert Pastor of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzeznski) and the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron), August 9, 1978. 279. The memo cited Amnesty reports that from 1976-1978 in Argentina there had been 15,000 disappearances, were 8-10,000 political prisoners, 25 secret prison camps, and “numerous documented stories of arrest and torture.” 91 Letter to Deputy Secretary of State Christopher from Kay Stubbs of the Washington Office on Latin America, Mary 24, 1979. RG 59: Department of State Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Entry #P885: Country Files 1977-1985, Ireland THRU Philippines (1 of 2). Container 4, Folder: Nicaragua. National Archives II, College Park, MD. Similar FBOs, notably World Vision International, addressed what they called the root causes of underdevelopment—food shortages, agricultural and educational disparity, etc.—and worked in crisis zones alongside WOLA to assist in “the relief-to-development transition.” Abby Stoddard, Humanitarian Alert, 5; see more on World Vision at https://www.wvi.org/vision-and-values. 92 Briefing Memorandum from HA Patt Derian to Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher, October 24, 1978, Subject: Nicaraguan Refugees. RG 59: Department of State Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Entry #P885: Country Files 1977-1985, Ireland THRU Philippines (1 of 2). Container 4, Folder: Nicaragua. National Archives II, College Park, MD. In addition to extensive efforts in Central America—according to a memo within the Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs—“the International Committee of the Red Cross maintain[ed] an active program in Argentina, with governmental approval, on behalf of imprisoned persons.” Memorandum from HA Patrick Flood to HA Patt Derian, January 25, 1980, Subject: Status of Argentina HR Report. RG 59, Entry #P885, Container 1. National Archives II, College Park, MD. 84

Administration. Following the exile of Anastasio Somoza in Nicaragua, the U.S. government needed to establish a pathway to distribute food, medicine, and relief aid to the Nicaraguan people—without appearing to fully support the new Sandinista government. The solution was to use the Red Cross as the primary carrier, but also ask its president to “broaden the leadership of the organization and to consider using the National Guard,” in order to reach the most people (and to show support for the removal of Somoza).93 In the case of private sector aid for Central American countries, the American Red Cross, Church World Services, and U.S. Catholic Relief Services all provided extensive financial support to humanitarian development and relief in Nicaragua, Honduras, and Costa Rica, while CARE took the lead in the effort to distribute PL 480 supplies to Honduras and Costa Rica.94 One of the NGOs most clearly connected to the Carter Administration was the Partners of the Americas. The Partners of the Americas (Partners) began as a conduit of the Alliance for Progress called Partners of the Alliance. It was initially contrived to bridge the public-private participation gap in foreign relations and development by providing “volunteer private citizen technical assistance as a complement to government-to-government AID programs.”95 The Partners broke away from USAID and the Alliance for Progress during the Nixon Administration, when it became a private sector organization and reconstituted itself as Partners

93 Pastor, Condemned to Repetition, 183. Leading up to the Sandinista Revolution, Nicaragua was embroiled in a humanitarian crisis that was a result of oppressive leadership and structural underdevelopment. In September 1978, the ICRC appealed to the Carter Administration for $1.48 million to cover a three-month period of relief and development efforts in Nicaragua—and surrounding countries affected by the resultant crisis. USAID planned to contribute $400,000 from its foreign disaster assistance account, with potential for more if conditions required. The organization was not limited to government funding, but private donations did not cover the operating costs of the many different missions in which the ICRC was engaged on the ground in Latin America. Memorandum from HA Patricia M Derian to ARA Viron P Vaky, September 28, 1978, Subject: Humanitarian Assistance for Victims of Civil Strife in Nicaragua. RG 59: Department of State Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Entry #P885: Country Files 1977-1985, Ireland THRU Philippines (1 of 2). Container 4, Folder: Nicaragua. National Archives II, College Park, MD. This money was in part used to support programs for Nicaraguan refugees who had fled the country and were residing in neighboring nations (eg.“AID’s contribution to the ICRC will also assist some of the Nicaraguans in Honduras”). For more on this, see Memorandum from HA Patt Derian to Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher, October 24, 1978, Subject: Nicaraguan Refugees. RG 59: Department of State Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Entry #P885: Country Files 1977-1985, Ireland THRU Philippines (1 of 2). Container 4, Folder: Nicaragua. National Archives II, College Park, MD. 94 Briefing Memorandum from HA Patt Derian to Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher, October 24, 1978. PL 480 was a food aid program that distributed food to regions in crisis or recovering from crisis around the world. 95 RG 220: Temporary Committees, Commissions, and Boards, Entry #A1 38065-K: National Commission on the Observance of International Women’s Year; Executive Director’s Office, Liaison Committee THRU WAO- Women’s Action Organization. Container 95, Folder: Partners of the Americas. National Archives II, College Park, MD. 85 of the Americas.96 One of the organization’s main goals was maintaining people-to-people exchange programs. When President Carter toured Latin America in 1977, the Partners of the Americas assisted in his travel arrangements and was trusted by the Administration for its impressive success “in promoting exchanges with Latin America.”97 The organization was also heavily invested in the socioeconomic development of the region. By working with government leadership in both the United States and various Latin American countries, Partners of the Americas was able to help in the development of agricultural, health, and nutrition programs, as well as disaster relief. Its exchange programs encouraged trade and investment across national borders, promoted educational exchange, and built a network of like-missioned NGOs.98 One such NGO was CARE—the Cooperative for American Relief Everywhere. CARE was founded in 1945 as the Cooperative for American Remittances to Europe, with the purpose of sending aid to people who were displaced or living in areas destroyed in World War II.99 Its activities in Latin America during the Carter Administration were regularly subsidized by USAID and in many cases, involved much more than sending materials to conflict zones or recovering communities. In the first year of Carter’s presidency, CARE was responsible for distributing PL 480 aid to Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, and Panama.100

96 Memorandum from Secretary of State Vance to President Carter, February 10, 1977, Subject: International Exchange of Persons. 19. However, even though it was no longer a part of USAID, Partners of the Americas was, in large part, sponsored by USAID and the State Department Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs. For more on this, see RG 220: Temporary Committees, Commissions, and Boards, Entry #A1 38065-K: National Commission on the Observance of International Women’s Year; Executive Director’s Office, Liaison Committee THRU WAO- Women’s Action Organization. Container 95, Folder: Partners of the Americas. National Archives II, College Park, MD. 97 Memorandum from Secretary of State Vance to President Carter, February 10, 1977, Subject: International Exchange of Persons. 19. 98 Memorandum from Secretary of State Vance to President Carter, February 10, 1977, Subject: International Exchange of Persons. 19-20. 99 CARE since changed its name once more to stand for the Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere,” but throughout the Carter Presidency, was known for as the Cooperative for American Relief Everywhere. For more on CARE’s history, see https://www.care.org/about/faqs. See also Abby Stoddard, Humanitarian Alert for discussion on CARE’s history dating back to the Marshall Plan and its efforts outside of Latin America. 100 CARE List of Countries Receiving PL 480 aid through CARE, RG 286: Agency for International Development; USAID/Bureau for Food for Peace and Volunteer Assistance/Private and Voluntary Cooperation, Entry #P958: Records Relating to Voluntary Relief Organization Policies, 1948-1982, CARE A & B: 1972 [Folder 1 of 3] THRU CARE A & B: 1962-1966. Container 7, Folder CARE-CARE A & B. National Archives II, College Park, MD. For two instances of USAID funding to CARE for PL 480, in 1977, USAID provided CARE with 1.6 million pounds of food for Colombia and 2.9 million pounds of food for Chile. CARE List of Countries Receiving PL 480 aid through CARE, RG 286: Agency for International Development; USAID/Bureau for Food for Peace and Volunteer 86

In addition to food aid, CARE engaged in a variety of activities that fit into three broad categories: food and agriculture, health, and community development. Within the field of food and agriculture, CARE focused its efforts on crop diversity, agricultural production, and reduction of food shortages.101 Its health programs ranged from staffing medical clinics, to building irrigation and water systems, to education on sanitation practices.102 The third category, community development, included projects to build homes, schools, and community spaces, especially in rural areas.103 All three types of projects focused on rural communities. Not only was there higher need in rural towns and villages, but from a United States foreign relations perspective, it was easier for NGOs to operate in rural regions than to try to send in government

Assistance/Private and Voluntary Cooperation, Entry #P958: Records Relating to Voluntary Relief Organization Policies, 1948-1982, Colombia THRU CARE-Ecuador [Folder 2 of 2]. Container 3, Folder CARE-Colombia. National Archives II, College Park, MD; CARE List of Countries Receiving PL 480 aid through CARE, RG 286: Agency for International Development; USAID/Bureau for Food for Peace and Volunteer Assistance/Private and Voluntary Cooperation, Entry #P958: Records Relating to Voluntary Relief Organization Policies, 1948-1982, Church World Service A & B, 1972-1974 [Folder 2 of 2] THRU CARE-Chile. Container 2, Folder CARE-Chile. National Archives II, College Park, MD (respectively). Carter’s was not the first administration to work with CARE. A 1978 letter from the Executive Director of the organization, Frank Goffio, acknowledged the Administration’s continued cooperation, saying “the United States government has supported CARE’s efforts throughout out thirty- two-year history, we consider you an important part of our work.” The continuance of this partnership under the Carter presidency was a welcome action, and one that CARE wanted to ensure would continue. In late 1977, Goffio expressed CARE’s deep appreciation that the government used it to disburse PL 480 aid, noting that this contribution comprised “a substantial base for [its] operation.” Letter from Frank Goffio, Executive Director of CARE to Robert McClusky of the Agency of International Development, December 13, 1978. CARE, RG 286: Agency for International Development; USAID/Bureau for Food for Peace and Volunteer Assistance/Private and Voluntary Cooperation, Entry #P958: Records Relating to Voluntary Relief Organization Policies, 1948-1982, CARE Financial THRU Nongovernmental Organizations (Certification-Agreement, New Countries) CARE [Folder 1 of 2]. Container 8, Folder CARE-Correspondence. National Archives II, College Park, MD. 101 CARE, RG 286: Agency for International Development; USAID/Bureau for Food for Peace and Volunteer Assistance/Private and Voluntary Cooperation, Entry #P958: Records Relating to Voluntary Relief Organization Policies, 1948-1982, CARE A & B: 1972 [Folder 1 of 3] THRU CARE A & B: 1962-1966. Container 7, Folder CARE-CARE A & B. National Archives II, College Park, MD; also CARE, RG 286: Agency for International Development; USAID/Bureau for Food for Peace and Volunteer Assistance/Private and Voluntary Cooperation, Entry #P958: Records Relating to Voluntary Relief Organization Policies, 1948-1982, CARE A & B: 1972 [Folder 1 of 3] THRU CARE A & B: 1962-1966. Container 7, Folder CARE-El Salvador. National Archives II, College Park, MD. Countries receiving agricultural assistance included El Salvador, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Colombia, Honduras, Ecuador, and Panama. 102 CARE, RG 286: Agency for International Development; USAID/Bureau for Food for Peace and Volunteer Assistance/Private and Voluntary Cooperation, Entry #P958: Records Relating to Voluntary Relief Organization Policies, 1948-1982, CARE A & B: 1972 [Folder 1 of 3] THRU CARE A & B: 1962-1966. Container 7, Folder CARE-CARE A & B. National Archives II, College Park, MD. Recipients of this type of development assistance included El Salvador, Colombia, Honduras, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Ecuador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Peru. 103 CARE, RG 286: Agency for International Development; USAID/Bureau for Food for Peace and Volunteer Assistance/Private and Voluntary Cooperation, Entry #P958: Records Relating to Voluntary Relief Organization Policies, 1948-1982, CARE A & B: 1972 [Folder 1 of 3] THRU CARE A & B: 1962-1966. Container 7, Folder CARE-CARE A & B. National Archives II, College Park, MD. Community development aid recipients included El Salvador, Colombia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Peru, Nicaragua, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, and Panama. 87 forces that would struggle to connect with communities or even reach the area. CARE was able to join existing community advocates and work from the grassroots up.104 All of these organizations worked to mobilize support for and/or implement policies coming out of the Carter Administration. They executed plans using both public and private funding, with the support of government officials and agencies, most notably USAID. As a result, ongoing, sustainable development efforts further connected the United States to Latin American countries, building positive relations in many places through the use of nongovernmental organizations. Conclusion With the vast array of information coming into Washington—frequently through informant NGOs—and the ambitious policies coming out, the Carter Administration needed to find ways to mitigate the high demand for its Latin American agenda and find favor in the public eye. Simultaneously, organizations that had long been invested in Latin America sought to grow their influence and recognized their need for additional funding, due in part to the increase in (awareness of) humanitarian crises in Latin America during the Carter Administration. The government worked in cooperation with executor NGOs as the solution to disparate but connected desires of both groups. The ability of executor NGOs to garner empathy among United States citizens, to mobilize the same, and to work effectively on the ground in Latin America made supporting their involvement the clear choice in Washington. The Carter Administration used the organizations to

104 The Direct Relief Foundation (DRF) closely resembled CARE’s founding, and also worked to alleviate human suffering worldwide. Like CARE, service and supply delivery were the main focus of DRF, and much of its funding came from USAID. While both CARE and DRF were founded at similar times and for similar purposes, the Direct Relief Foundation pivoted after the war to focus on medical needs, especially for refugee communities. A State Department memo explained the growth and operation of the organization saying, “DRF was originally established to send food and clothing to the displaced persons of Europe following World War II. As this need was met, emphasis was shifted to medical needs abroad, particularly in less developed countries.” DRF focused less on physical development than on meeting service needs in developing countries. Direct Relief Foundation Programs in Nicaragua, RG 286: Agency for International Development; USAID/Bureau for Food for Peace and Volunteer Assistance/Private and Voluntary Cooperation, Entry #P958: Records Relating to Voluntary Relief Organization Policies, 1948-1982, Nongovernmental Organizations (Certification-Agreement, New Countries) CARE [Folder 2 of 2] THRU Direct Relief Foundation: Correspondence. Container 9, Folder: Direct Relief Foundation A & B. National Archives II, College Park, MD. Action Memorandum for the Assistant Administrator, PHA, from PHA/PVC Maurice D Kohan, October 12, 1977. RG 286: Agency for International Development; USAID/Bureau for Food for Peace and Volunteer Assistance/Private and Voluntary Cooperation, Entry #P958: Records Relating to Voluntary Relief Organization Policies, 1948-1982, Nongovernmental Organizations (Certification-Agreement, New Countries) CARE [Folder 2 of 2] THRU Direct Relief Foundation: Correspondence. Container 9, Folder: Direct Relief Foundation A & B. National Archives II, College Park, MD. 88 elicit support for policy, to increase participation, and to carry out development and human rights policies toward Latin America. The network of NGOs that worked in conjunction with the Administration provided both parties—and the public—with a sense of accountability.105 As seen in the first chapter, Jimmy Carter came to the White House in an era of public skepticism toward the government. Therefore, a system of accountability was a welcome change in the public eye, especially in regard to action taken in developing countries. The same need for accountability existed for NGOs. Partnering with USAID provided a solution.106 This accountability worked both ways, and enabled confidence on behalf of the people in both Latin American countries and the United States to support the U.S. development efforts in the region. Matthew Winters proposed that “foreign aid function[ed] better—both at the macro-level of aid flows and at the micro-level of individual aid projects—when there is more government and implementing agency accountability.”107 The executor NGOs that witnessed firsthand the situations in Latin America did not allow the Carter Administration to ignore the needs or rescind its aid. Likewise, the government required accounting for the funding and training it provided, ensuring proper use of money and that the organizations would follow through on project commitments.

105 Winters, “Accountability, Participation, and Foreign Aid Effectiveness,” 218. 106 One publication out of the DRF headquarters noted that to prevent misuse of funds, “the Foundation…set up safeguards, one of which [was] a direct working relationship with the United States Agency for International Development.” Direct Relief Foundation, RG 286: Agency for International Development; USAID/Bureau for Food for Peace and Volunteer Assistance/Private and Voluntary Cooperation, Entry #P958: Records Relating to Voluntary Relief Organization Policies, 1948-1982, Nongovernmental Organizations (Certification-Agreement, New Countries) CARE [Folder 2 of 2] THRU Direct Relief Foundation: Correspondence. Container 9, Folder: Direct Relief Foundation A & B. National Archives II, College Park, MD. 107 Winters, “Accountability, Participation, and Foreign Aid Effectiveness,” 218. 89

Table 1: Agency for International Development: Development Assistance FY 1977-1979 Projections as of September 1977108 Designation 1977 1979 U.S. Dollar Amount (in Millions) Latin America 172 286 Chile .5 0 El Salvador 5.7 7 Guatemala 20.8 11.6 Nicaragua 17.8 6.3 Private Voluntary Organizations 28 34 International Organizations and Programs 244 288

Table 2: Agency for International Development: Development Assistance FY 1977-1983 Projections as of 1979109 Designation 1977 1983 U.S. Dollar Amount (in Millions) Latin America 188 450 Private Voluntary Organizations 28 77 International Organizations and Programs 244 500

Table 3: United States Agency for International Development FY 1980 Section 116e Activities Funding1 Amount Title Project Description (USD) Support travel of Third World to a conference by American Bar Teaching of Human Rights 30,000 Association and Columbia University HR/HA program where activists from developing countries will visit Human Rights Visitors Program 83,100 with American individuals and organizations interested in human rights Led by the American Association for the Advancement of Science to Human Rights Workshop 53,000 promote scientific freedom and human rights programs To the American Society of in order to promote civil Inter-American Legal Services 236,000 and political rights practices in Latin America Association Support political and civil rights and development for indigenous Indigenous Groups in Latin America 102,000 peoples in Latin America Led by the Overseas Education Fund to analyze and advocate for Legal Services to Women—Latin 194,000 women’s rights in Latin America America Led by the Center for Law and Social Policy for the defense of basic Legal Defense 90,000 human rights in Latin America For the development of a human rights promotional organization in San Institute on Human Rights 18,000 Jose, Costa Rica

108 United States Agency for International Development, Agency for International Development: Development Assistance 1977-1983 (in millions of dollars) as of September 1977. RG 59: Department of State Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Entry #P885: Country Files 1977-1985 Venezuela THRU Welcome Home Book- 1979, Container 6, Folder: AID. National Archives II, College Park, MD. 109 Memo from Department of State to Director of the Office of Management and Budget (Lance), Subject: FY 1979 Budget for Development Assistance, Table: Agency for International Development: Development Assistance FY 1977-1983 (in millions of dollars). RG 59: Department of State Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Entry #P885: Country Files 1977-1985 Venezuela THRU Welcome Home Book-1979, Container 6, Folder: AID. National Archives II, College Park, MD. 90

Table 4: United States Military and Economic Assistance FY 1977-1981110 Country Aid Type Fiscal Year (FY) Amount111 1977 112,000 1978 0 Economic 1979 68,000 1980 0 1981 0 Argentina 1977 721,000 1978 0 Military 1979 0 1980 0 1981 0 1977 45,548,000 1978 53,168,000 Economic 1979 51,077,000 1980 30,088,000 1981 12,741,000 Bolivia 1977 2,656,000 1978 763,000 Military 1979 6,406,000 1980 205,000 1981 0 1977 33,249,000 1978 7,004,000 Economic 1979 13,442,000 1980 10,176,000 1981 12,036,000 Chile 1977 0 1978 0 Military 1979 0 1980 0 1981 0 1977 9,051,000 1978 7,285,000 Economic 1979 8,815,000 1980 23,157,000 1981 5,768,000 Colombia 1977 697,000 1978 52,122,000 Military 1979 12,955,000 1980 258,000 1981 0 1977 11,555,000 1978 8,978,000 Economic 1979 17,888,000 1980 15,914,000 1981 15,239,000 Costa Rica 1977 5,000,000 1978 0 Military 1979 0 1980 0 1981 31,000 1977 13,929,000 1978 6,131,000 Dominican Republic Economic 1979 48,414,000 1980 55,761,000

110 U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), “U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants: Obligations and Loan Authorizations, July 1945-September 30, 2016 (Greenbook),” prepared by USAID Economic Analysis and Data Services on , 2018. https://explorer.usaid.gov/reports.html. 111 In current USD 91

1981 38,408,000 1977 1,533,000 1978 613,000 Military 1979 951,000 1980 3,439,000 1981 3,345,000 1977 3,809,000 1978 5,573,000 Economic 1979 6,253,000 1980 11,811,000 1981 18,487,000 Ecuador 1977 15,393,000 1978 10,703,000 Military 1979 453,000 1980 3,222,000 1981 4,296,000 1977 6,743,000 1978 10,951,000 Economic 1979 11,391,000 1980 58,250,000 1981 113,935,000 El Salvador 1977 574,000 1978 3,000 Military 1979 4,000 1980 5,944,000 1981 35,555,000 1977 20,747,000 1978 10,667,000 Economic 1979 24,742,000 1980 12,996,000 1981 19,140,000 Guatemala 1977 0 1978 0 Military 1979 0 1980 0 1981 0 1977 40,699,000 1978 27,540,000 Economic 1979 24,762,000 1980 27,056,000 1981 34,517,000 Haiti 1977 0 1978 0 Military 1979 0 1980 0 1981 0 1977 12,220,000 1978 17,092,000 Economic 1979 29,120,000 1980 53,051,000 1981 36,429,000 Honduras 1977 0 1978 0 Military 1979 0 1980 0 1981 0 1977 3,213,000 1978 13,977,000 Economic 1979 18,509,000 Nicaragua 1980 38,690,000 1981 59,921,000 Military 1977 3,212,000

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1978 399,000 1979 11,000 1980 0 1981 0 1977 16,258,000 1978 23,147,000 Economic 1979 21,194,000 1980 2,117,000 1981 10,510,000 Panama 1977 3,125,000 1978 452,000 Military 1979 1,395,000 1980 273,000 1981 328,000 1977 79,000 1978 0 Economic 1979 2,000 1980 0 1981 90,000 Venezuela 1977 73,000 1978 101,000 Military 1979 0 1980 0 1981 8,000 1977 2,956,000 1978 1,476,000 Central American Region Economic 1979 2,752,000 1980 4,156,000 1981 10,598,000 1977 8,790,000 1978 25,327,000 Caribbean Region Economic 1979 28,837,000 1980 47,773,000 1981 29,539,000 1977 33,443,000 1978 33,917,000 Latin American Region Economic 1979 17,717,000 1980 19,510,000 1981 20,137,000

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Conclusion It is time for a reevaluation of Jimmy Carter’s political legacy. While his humanitarian work after leaving the White House led to him achieving a in 2001, historians have painted Carter’s legacy in a negative light by primarily looking at his policies as failures— hinging largely on the multiple global crises of 1979. But this is only part of the story. As this thesis has demonstrated, Carter was successful in his political endeavors with regards to Latin American policy-making and execution. That is not to say that all of the humanitarian strife in Latin America was resolved or that every single effort on behalf of the administration was met with grace, however by revisiting the goals and outcomes of Carter policies, it is clear that his administration was successful in many of its goals. As discussed in the previous chapters, one of the key goals for Latin American development was sustainability—moving toward projects that were less about handouts (ie PL 480) and more about longer term, infrastructure-related projects. Restructuring USAID and refocusing on more sustainable projects, often through NGOs, was one way in which the Carter Administration accomplished this. Community development efforts, seen in this thesis through organizations like CARE, created schools, water wells, healthcare facilities, and community spaces that lasted beyond the Carter years. In conjunction with achieving its goals for sustainability, the continued and increased participation of NGOs in the policy-making and execution process also points to Carter’s successes. The boom in the number of NGOs operating in the 1980s and 1990s was possible because the Carter Administration provided the space for them to gain credibility in the public eye, and practice in policy-making in Washington. Partially due to their increased influence in Washington, NGOs’ ability to garner public support and involvement in foreign affairs is also a measurement of the Carter Administration’s success in foreign policy. As a democracy, bringing the public further into the governing process, and at minimum, increasing their awareness, must be seen as a victory. Without Carter and members of his administration encouraging NGO involvement in Washington and Latin America, it is unlikely that the public would have been as invested, especially in the fallout of the Vietnam War. In the same vein, Carter’s rejection of Kissinger-style policy—focused on military strength and fear—opened the door for humanitarian foreign policy to be seen as a valid national strategy. For a president who campaigned and governed on the premise of human rights and humanitarian development, all of these are indicators of success.

94

In light of this, historians must reconsider Carter’s presidency: his policies, his legacy, and the places that they may have overlooked in scholarship. Taking the administration’s Latin American policies and inclusion of NGOs into consideration reveals a more nuanced narrative, and one that challenges the traditionally critical scholarship on the Carter years. This thesis hinges on Carter’s policy innovation of bringing NGOs in as more than tangential advocates. He allowed them a prominent seat at the table, and one they would continue to use long after Jimmy Carter left office. As historians have begun looking at previously understudied—typically nonstate—actors, they necessarily widen their gaze across disciplines. The timeliness of this study and the reevaluation of Jimmy Carter’s policies toward Latin America cannot be overstated. In the middle of the Trump presidency—with the polarization of political parties and the constant calls for Reagan-era military dominance—several Democrats have looked to Jimmy Carter as the model for a 2020 candidate.1 Suddenly, Carter is no longer seen as the weak, amateur that earlier historians claimed. Rather, he is the ideal leader: humanitarian, gentle, middle-of-the-road. In addition, as the United States addresses the refugee situation, as thousands of Latin Americans flee toward the U.S., understanding the root causes— largely from the decade following Carter—and previous U.S. efforts in the region is central to the process. There could not be a more ideal time for historians to revisit the Carter presidency, especially his successes in humanitarian development.

1 Two candidates running in the 2020 Democratic primary, (NJ) and Amy Klobuchar (MN), have met with Carter, seeking advice in preparation for the election. David Siders, “Democrats Find a Foil for Trump in Jimmy Carter,” in Politico March 13, 2019. 95

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Clark, Clifford M. Counsel to the President: A Memoir. New York: Random House, 1991.

Lance, Bert. The Truth of the Matter: My Life in and Out of Politics. New York: Summit Books, 1991.

Pastor, Robert. Condemned to Repetition: The United States and Nicaragua. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987.

Vance, Cyrus. Hard Choices: Four Critical Years in Managing America’s Foreign Policy. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983.

Speeches Carter, Jimmy. “Addressing B’nai B’rith,” in The Presidential Campaign 1976, volume 1, part 1: Jimmy Carter. Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of the United States 1977-1980 Volume I: Foundations of Foreign Policy, 1974-1976. https://www.static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1977-80v01/pdf/frus1977-80v01.pdf.

Carter, Jimmy. “Address at Commencement Exercises at the University of Notre Dame” (speech, South Bend, IN, May 22, 1977) The American Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/243018.

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Carter, Jimmy. “Caribbean/Central American Action Remarks at a White House Reception,” (speech, April 9, 1980), The American Presidency Project. http://presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=33245.

Carter, Jimmy. “International Health Program Statement Announcing a Program to Strengthen U.S. Participation,” (speech, May 2, 1978), The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=30735.

Carter, Jimmy. “Organization of American States Address Before the Permanent Council,” (speech, April 14, 1977), The American Presidency Project, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=7347.

Carter, Jimmy. “Our Foreign Relations,” in The Presidential Campaign 1976, Volume 1, Part 1: Jimmy Carter. Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of the United States 1977-1980

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Volume I: Foundations of Foreign Policy, 1974-1976. https://www.static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1977-80v01/pdf/frus1977-80v01.pdf.

Carter, Jimmy. “The President’s Trip to Latin America and Africa Remarks on Arrival at the White House,” (speech, April 3, 1978), American Presidency Project, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=30611.

Carter, Rosalyn. “Rosalynn Carter’s Trip to the Caribbean and Latin America Remarks of the President and Mrs. Carter on Her Return Home,” (speech, June 12, 1977), The American Presidency Project, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=.

Archival Documents Action Memorandum from ARA Viron P Vaky and HA Patt Derian to Deputy Secretary Christopher, June 21, 1979. Subject: Status of Nicaraguan Refugees; Nicaragua; Container 4, Entry #P885: Country Files 1977-1985. Ireland thru Philippines (1 of 2); Department of State Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Record Group 59; NACP.

Action Memorandum for the Assistant Administrator, PHA, from PHA/PVC Maurice D Kohan, October 12, 1977; Direct Relief Foundation A & B; Container 9, Entry #P958: Records Relating to Voluntary Relief Organization Policies, 1948-1982, Nongovernmental Organizations (Certification-Agreement, New Countries) CARE [Folder 2 of 2] THRU Direct Relief Foundation: Correspondence; Agency for International Development, USAID/Bureau for Food for Peace and Volunteer Assistance/Private and Voluntary Cooperation, Record Group 286; NACP.

Action Memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs (Derian), the Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations (Bennet), and the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Lake) to Secretary of State Vance, March 20, 1978. Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of the United States 1977-1980 Volume II: Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs. https://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1977-80v02/pdf/frus/frus1977-80v02/pdf.

Action Memorandum from HA Pat Derian to Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher, June 19, 1979. Subject: NGO Request for Meeting on Nicaragua; Nicaragua; Container 4, Entry P885: Country Files 1977-1985. Ireland THRU Philippines (1 of 2); Department of State Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Record Group 59; NACP.

Action Memorandum from HA Pat Derian to Secretary of State Vance, December 22, 1977. Subject: Appointment with Martin Ennals Amnesty International; Amnesty International; Container 6, Entry P885: Country Files 1977-1985. Venezuela THRU Welcome Home Book-1979; Department of State Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Record Group 59: NACP.

Action Memorandum from the Director of Policy Planning Staff to Secretary of State Vance, January 20, 1978. Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of the United States 1977-

97

1980 Volume II: Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs. https://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1977-80v15/pdf/frus1977-80v15.pdf.

Address by Abelardo L Valdez, Assistant Administrator for Latin America at the U.S.-Mexican Trade and Investment Conference, San Antonio, TX, September 22, 1977; Guatemala; Container 3, Entry #P885: Country Files 1977-1985, Germany THRU Iran (2 of 2); Department of State Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Record Group 59; NACP.

Address by Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, Terrence Todman, February 14, 1978. Subject: The Carter Administration’s Latin American Policy Purposes and Prospects. Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of the United States 1977-1980 Volume XXIV: South America/Latin American Region. https://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1977-80v24/pdf/frus1977-80v24.pdf.

Address by Secretary of State Vance, April 30, 1977. ‘Human Rights and Foreign Policy,’ Department of State Bulletin, May 23, 1977, pp. 505-508. Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of the United States 1977-1980 Volume I: Foundations of Foreign Policy, 1974-1976. https://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1977-80v01/pdf/frus1977- 80v01.pdf.

Address by Secretary of State Vance, March 30, 1979, Department of State Bulletin, May 1979, pp. 33-37. Subject: America’s Commitment to Third World Development. . Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of the United States 1977-1980 Volume I: Foundations of Foreign Policy 1974-1976. https://static.history.gov/frus/frus1977-1980v01/pdf/frus1977- 80v01.pdf.

Brainstorming Memo by Brady Tyson to Andy Young and John Baker, March 25, 1977. Subject: Taking Human Rights to the American People; Container 1, Entry #P885: Country Files 1977-1985, Ireland THRU Philippines (1 of 2); Department of State Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Record Group 59; NACP.

Briefing Memorandum from ARA Viron P Vaky and HA Pat Derian to Deputy Secretary Christopher, February 21, 1979. Subject: Assessment of Human Rights Situation in Chile; Meeting on Human Rights; Container 1, Entry #P885: Country Files 1977-1985, Ireland THRU Philippines (1 of 2); Department of State Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Record Group 59; NACP.

Briefing Memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs (Derian) to Acting Secretary of State Christopher, June 13, 1979. Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of the United States 1977-1980 Volume II: Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs. https://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1977- 80v02/pdf/frus/frus1977-80v02/pdf.

Briefing Memorandum from the Assistant Secretary for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs (Derian) to Secretary of State Vance, November 10, 1977. Office of the Historian,

98

Foreign Relations of the United States 1977-1980 Volume II: Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs. https://static.history.gov/frus/frus1977-80v02/pdf/frus1977- 80v02/pdf.

Briefing Memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations (Bennet) to the Deputy Secretary of State (Christopher), June 18, 1977. Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of the United States 1977-1980 Volume II: Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs. https://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1977- 80v02/pdf/frus/frus1977-80v02/pdf.

Briefing Memorandum from HA Patt Derian to Deputy Secretary Christopher, July 12, 1979. Subject: Nicaragua; Nicaragua; Container 4, Entry #P885: Country Files 1977-1985. Ireland thru Philippines (1 of 2); Department of State Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Record Group 59; NACP.

Briefing Memorandum from HA Patt Derian to Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher, October 24, 1978, Subject: Nicaraguan Refugees; Nicaragua; Container 4, Entry #P885: Country Files 1977-1985, Ireland THRU Philippines (1 of 2); Department of State Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Record Group 59; NACP.

Briefing Memorandum to Secretary of State Vance from Pat Derian, July 15, 1979. Subject: Study Mission to Argentina by the Association of the Bar of the City of New York; Meeting on Human Rights; Container 1, Entry #P885: Country Files 1977-1985, Ireland THRU Philippines (1 of 2); Department of State Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Record Group 59; NACP.

CARE-Correspondence; Container 8, Entry #P958: Records Relating to Voluntary Relief Organization Policies, 1948-1982, CARE Financial THRU Nongovernmental Organizations (Certification-Agreement, New Countries) CARE [Folder 1 of 2]; Agency for International Development; USAID/Bureau for Food for Peace and Volunteer Assistance/Private Voluntary Cooperation, Record Group 286; NACP.

CARE List of Countries Receiving PL 480 aid through CARE; CARE-Chile Agency for International Development; Container 2, Entry #P958: Records Relating to Voluntary Relief Organization Policies, 1948-1982, Church World Service A & B, 1972-1974 [Folder 2 of 2] THRU CARE-Chile. USAID/Bureau for Food for Peace and Volunteer Assistance/Private and Voluntary Cooperation, Record Group 286; NACP.

CARE; CARE-El Salvador; Container 7, Entry #P958: Records Relating to Voluntary Relief Organization Policies, 1948-1982, CARE A & B: 1972 [Folder 1 of 3] THRU CARE A & B: 1962-1966; Agency for International Development; USAID/Bureau for Food for Peace and Volunteer Assistance/Private and Voluntary Cooperation, Record Group 286; NACP.

Coalition for a New Foreign and Military Policy: A Description of the Human Rights Working Group. Human Rights: National Conference: 1976-1977; Public Policy Papers; Freedom

99

House Records; Department of Rare Books and Special Collections, Princeton University Library.

Direct Relief Foundation Programs in Nicaragua; Direct Relief Foundation A & B; Container 9, Entry #P958: Records Relating to Voluntary Relief Organization Policies, 1948-1982, Nongovernmental Organizations (Certification-Agreement, New Countries) CARE [Folder 2 of 2] THRU Direct Relief Foundation: Correspondence; Agency for International Development, USAID/Bureau for Food for Peace and Volunteer Assistance/Private and Voluntary Cooperation, Record Group 286; NACP.

HR 11326 by Fascell and Fraser, March 7, 1978. Leonard R. Sussman Testimony-Senate Regarding Institute for Human Rights (Origins of NED) June 29, 1978; Public Policy Papers; Freedom House Records; Department of Rare Books and Special Collections, Princeton University Library.

HRC Mandate February 20, 1980; Meeting on Human Rights; Container 1, Entry #P885: Country Files 1977-1985, Ireland THRU Philippines (1 of 2); Department of State Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Record Group 59; NACP.

Leonard R Sussman, Testimony—Senate Regarding Institute for Human Rights, June 28, 1978; Public Policy Papers; Freedom House Records; Department of Rare Books and Special Collections, Princeton University Library.

Letter from Acting Secretary of State Christopher to Representative Donald Fraser, August 20, 1977. Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of the United States 1977-1980 Volume II: Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs. https://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1977- 80v02/pdf/frus/frus1977-80v02/pdf.

Letter from Association of the Bar of the City of New York to Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan, July 28, 1980; Meeting on Human Rights; Container 1, Entry #P885: Country Files 1977- 1985, Ireland THRU Philippines (1 of 2); Department of State Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Record Group 59; NACP.

Letter from Association of the Bar of the City of New York to Secretary of State Muskie, June 5, 1980; Meeting on Human Rights; Container 1, Entry #P885: Country Files 1977-1985, Ireland THRU Philippines (1 of 2); Department of State Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Record Group 59; NACP.

Letter from the Association of the Bar of the City of New York to Secretary of State Vance, March 3, 1980; Meeting on Human Rights; Container 1, Entry #P885: Country Files 1977-1985, Ireland THRU Philippines (1 of 2); Department of State Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Record Group 59; NACP.

Letter from Congressman Tom Harkin to President Jimmy Carter, June 10, 1980; Container 1, Entry #P885: Country Files 1977-1985, Ireland THRU Philippines (1 of 2); Department of State Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Record Group 59; NACP.

100

Letter from the Director of the Office of Management and Budget and the President’s Special Assistant for Health Issues to Secretary of State Vance, February 17, 1978. Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of the United States 1977-1980 Volume II: Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs. https://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1977- 80v15/pdf/frus1977-80v15.pdf.

Letter from Frank Goffio, Executive Director of CARE to Robert McClusky of the Agency of International Development, December 13, 1978; CARE-Correspondence Container 8, Entry #P958: Records Relating to Voluntary Relief Organization Policies, 1948-1982, CARE Financial THRU Nongovernmental Organizations (Certification-Agreement, New Countries) CARE [Folder 1 of 2]; Agency for International Development; USAID/Bureau for Food for Peace and Volunteer Assistance/Private and Voluntary Cooperation, Record Group 286; NACP.

Letter from Patt Derian to NEA Mr Saunders, July 19, 1978; Amnesty International; Container 6, Entry #P885: Country Files 1977-1985, Venezuela thru Welcome Home Book-1979; Department of State Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Record Group 59; NACP.

Letter from HA Patt Derian to S/IG Robert C Brewster, May 29, 1979. Subject: Guatemala; Guatemala; Container 1, Entry #P885: Country Files 1977-1985, Ireland THRU Philippines (1 of 2); Department of State Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Record Group 59; NACP.

Letter from HA Patt Derian to S/P Anthony Lake, June 5, 1979, Subject: A.I.D. Reprogramming—Your Memo of May 29; AID; Container 6, Entry #P885: Country Files 1977-1985 Venezuela THRU Welcome Home Book-1979; Department of State Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Record Group 59; NACP.

Letter from the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzeznski) to the Director of the International Communication Agency (Reinhardt), July 31, 1978. Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of the United States 1977-1980 Volume XXX: Public Diplomacy. https://static.history.gov/frus/frus1977-80v30/pdf/frus1977-80v30/pdf.

Letter from President Carter to President Videla, via Telegram to the Embassy in Argentina, November 3, 1977. Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of the United States 1977- 1980 Volume XXIV: South America/Latin American Region. https://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1977-80v24/pdf/frus1977-80v24.pdf.

Letter from President/Director of International League for Human Rights, Freedom House, B’nai B’rith, and A. Philip Randolph Institute, June 3, 1977, Human Rights: National Conference, 1976-1977; Public Policy Papers; Freedom House Records; Department of Rare Books and Special Collections, Princeton University Library.

101

Letter to Deputy Secretary of State Christopher from Kay Stubbs of the Washington Office on Latin America, May 24, 1979; Nicaragua; Container 4, Entry # P885: Country Files 1977-1985, Ireland THRU Philippines (1 of 2); Department of State Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Record Group 59; NACP.

Memo of the Steering Committee, American Coalition for Human Rights from MaryAnn Lettau, Executive Secretary, July 1, 1977; Human Rights: National Conference, 1976-1977; Public Policy Papers; Freedom House Records; Department of Rare Books and Special Collections, Princeton University Library.

Memo from Department of State to the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (Lance), Subject: FY 1979 Budget for Development Assistance, Projections for FY 1980- 1983; AID; Container 6, Entry #P885: Country Files 1977-1985 Venezuela THRU Welcome Home Book-1979; Department of State Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Record Group 59; NACP.

Memo from Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher to All Diplomatic Posts, February 7, 1977, Subject: Human Rights Reporting to the Congress; HR Reports to Congress; Container 6, Entry #P885: Country Files 1977-1985, Venezuela thru Welcome Home Book-1979; Department of State Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Record Group 59; NACP.

Memo from HA Patt Derian to EB Robert Hormats, November 21, 1978, Subject: Human Rights and A.I.D; AID; Container 6, Entry #P885: Country Files 1977-1985 Venezuela THRU Welcome Home Book-1979; Department of State Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Record Group 59; NACP.

Memorandum from the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Education and Cultural Affairs (Hitchcock) to all Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs Office and Staff Directors, February 17, 1977. Subject: CU Program Objectives. Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of the United States 1977-1980 Volume XXX: Public Diplomacy. https://static.history.gov/frus/frus1977-80v30/pdf/frus1977-80v30/pdf. 29.

Memorandum from the Coordinator for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs (Wilson) to All Regional and Functional Assistant Secretaries of State and the Administrator of the Agency for International Development (Parker), January 5, 1977. Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of the United States 1977-1980 Volume II: Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs. https://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1977- 80v02/pdf/frus/frus1977-80v02.

Memorandum from Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher to Secretary of State Vance, Subject: Status Report on US Foreign Policy on Human Rights; Meeting on Human Rights; Entry #P885: Country Files 1977-1985 Venezuela THRU Welcome Home Book- 1979; Department of State Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Record Group 59; NACP.

102

Memorandum from the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Lake) and the Coordinator for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs-Designate (Derian) to Secretary of State Vance, March 25, 1977. Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of the United States 1977- 1980 Volume II: Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs. https://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1977-80v02/pdf/frus/frus1977-80v02/pdf.

Memorandum from Dr. Zbigniew Brzeznski, Subject: Proposal that the President Meet with Jacobo Timmerman, October 29, 1979; Meeting on Human Rights; Entry #P885: Country Files 1977-1985 Venezuela THRU Welcome Home Book-1979; Department of State Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Record Group 59; NACP.

Memorandum from EA Ken Quinn to All Country and Office Director, November 14, 1977. Subject: Contact with Amnesty International; Amnesty International; Container 6, Entry P885: Country Files 1977-1985. Venezuela THRU Welcome Home Book-1979; Department of State Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Record Group 59; NACP.

Memorandum from the Executive Secretary of the Department of State to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs, July 19, 1977. Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of the United States 1977-1980, Volume XV: Central America. https://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1977-80v15/pdf/frus1977-80v15.pdf.

Memorandum from the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Tarnoff) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzeznski), December 12, 1979. Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of the United States 1977-1980 Volume XXX: Public Diplomacy. https://static.history.gov/frus/frus1977-1980v30/pdf/frus1977- 80v30/pdf.

Memorandum from Fred Hoskins of the United Church of Christ Office for Church in Society to Brady Tyson, Andrew Young, and Stoney Cooks, Subject: Covenant Ratification Strategy and Beyond, March 21, 1977; Container 1; Entry #P885: Country Files 1977- 1985, Ireland THRU Philippines (1 of 2); Department of State Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Record Group 59; NACP.

Memorandum from HA Patrick Flood to HA Patt Derian, January 25, 1980, Subject: Status of Argentina HR Report; Human Rights; Container 1, Entry #P885: Country Files 1977- 1985, Ireland THRU Philippines (1 of 2); Department of State Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Record Group 59; NACP.

Memorandum from HA Patricia M Derian to ARA Viron P Vaky, September 28, 1978, Subject: Humanitarian Assistance for Victims of Civil Strife in Nicaragua; Nicaragua; Container 4, Entry #P885: Country Files 1977-1985, Ireland THRU Philippines (1 of 2); Department of State Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Record Group 59; NACP.

103

Memorandum from HA Patt Derian to EB Robert Hormats, November 21, 1979, Subject: Human Rights and A.I.D; AID; Container 6, Entry #P885: Country Files 1977-1985 Venezuela THRU Welcome Home Book-1979; Department of State Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Record Group 59; NACP.

Memorandum from HR/HA Michele Bova through HR/HA Mark Schneider to HA Patt Derian, June 23, 1978, Subject: Your Meeting with Governor Gilligan; AID; Container 6, Entry #P885: Country Files 1977-1985 Venezuela THRU Welcome Home Book-1979; Department of State Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Record Group 59; NACP.

Memorandum from HR/HA Ray Jorgenson to HA Patricia Derian, November 5, 1980, Subject: Your Participation in Panel on ‘Torture in Argentina,’ November 6.” Meeting on Human Rights; Entry #P885: Country Files 1977-1985, Venezuela thru Welcome Home Book- 1979; Department of State Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Record Group 59; NACP.

Memorandum from HA Roberta Cohen to HA Mark Schneider, April 19, 1978. Subject: Congressional Hearings on Human Rights Institute Bill, April 18, 1978; Human Rights and Freedom; Container 6, Entry P885: Country Files 1977-1985, Venezuela THRU Welcome Home Book-1979; Department of State Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Record Group 59; NACP.

Memorandum from Jessica Tuchman of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzeznski), October 10, 1977. Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of the United States 1977-1980 Volume XXIV: South America/Latin American Region. https://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1977- 80v24/pdf/frus1977-80v24.pdf.

Memorandum from Jessica Tuchman of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs(Brzeznski) and Paper Prepared by Samuel Huntington of the National Security Council Staff, October 5, 1977. Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of the United States 1977-1980 Volume II: Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs. https://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1977- 80v02/pdf/frus/frus1977-80v02/pdf. 269-271.

Memorandum from Jessica Tuchman of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzeznski), November 30, 1977. Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of the United States 1977-1980 Volume II: Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs. http://static.history.gov/frus/frus1977-80v02/pdf/frus1977- 80v02.pdf.

Memorandum from Jimmy Carter to the Director of the United States Information Agency (Reinhardt), March 13, 1977 Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of the United States 1977-1980 Volume XXX: Public Diplomacy. https://static.history.gov/frus/frus1977-80v30/pdf/frus1977-80v30/pdf.

104

Memorandum from Lincoln Bloomfield of the National Security Council Staff to Roger Molander of the National Security Council Staff, July 3, 1980. Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of the United States 1977-1980 Volume II: Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs. https://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1977- 80v02/pdf/frus/frus1977-80v02/pdf.

Memo from Pat Derian (HA) to Secretary Vance and Deputy Secretary Christopher, January 26, 1979. Subject: Next Steps in Argentina; Meeting on Human Rights; Container 1, Entry #P885: Country Files 1977-1985, Ireland THRU Philippines (1 of 2); Department of State Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Record Group 59; NACP.

Memorandum from Paul Henze of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzeznski), April 27, 1977. Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of the United States 1977-1980 Volume XXX: Public Diplomacy. https://static.history.gov/frus/frus1977-80v30/pdf/frus1977-80v30.pdf.

Memorandum from the President’s Special Assistant for Health Issues (Bourne) to President Carter, September 14, 1977. Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of the United States 1977-1980 Volume II: Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs. https://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1977-80v02/pdf/frus/frus1977-80v02/pdf.

Memorandum from the President’s Special Assistant for Health Issues to President Carter, January 9, 1978. Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of the United States 1977- 1980 Volume II: Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs. https://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1977-80v02/pdf/frus/frus1977-80v02.

Memorandum from the President’s Special Assistant for International Health Issues (Bourne) to President Carter, February 17, 1978. Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of the United States 1977-1980 Volume II: Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs. https://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1977-80v02/pdf/frus/frus1977-80v02/pdf.

Memorandum from the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzeznski) to President Carter, October 28, 1977. Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of the United States 1977-1980 Volume XXIV: South America/Latin American Region. https://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1977-80v24/pdf/frus1977-80v24.pdf.

Memorandum from the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzeznski) to President Carter. Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of the United States 1977- 1980 Volume II: Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs. https://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1977-80v02/pdf/frus/frus1977-80v02/pdf.

Memorandum from the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzeznski) to President Carter, December 13, 1979. Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of the United States 1977-1980 Volume XXX: Public Diplomacy. https://static.history.gov/frus/frus1977-80v30/pdf/frus1977-80v30/pdf.

105

Memorandum from Robert Pastor of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzeznski) and the Presidents Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron), August 9, 1978 Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of the United States 1977-1980 Volume XXIV South America/Latin American Region. https://static.history.gov/frus/frus1977-80v24/pdf/frus1977-80v24/pdf.

Memorandum from Secretary of State Vance to President Carter, February 10, 1977. Subject: International Exchange of Persons. Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of the United States 1977-1980 Volume XXX: Public Diplomacy. https://static.history.gov/frus/frus1977-80v30/pdf/frus1977-80v30/pdf. 21.

Memorandum from Secretary of State Vance to President Carter, November 5, 1979. Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of the United States 1977-1980 Volume XXX: Public Diplomacy. https://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1977-80v30/pdf/frus/frus1977- 80v30/pdf.

Memorandum Prepared by Representative Donald Fraser, June 10, 1977. Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of the United States 1977-1980 Volume II: Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs. https://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1977- 80v02/pdf/frus/frus1977-80v02/pdf.

Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency, May 11, 1977. Subject: Impact of the U.S. Stand on Human Rights. Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of the United States 1977-1980 Volume II: Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs. https://static.history.gov/frus/frus1977-1980v02/pdf/frus1977-80v02.pdf.

Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency, June 1977. Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Support Services (DI), Job 78T02549A, Box 3, Folder 136, RP 77-10129: Human Rights in the Southern Cone of Latin America. Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of the United States 1977-1980 Volume XXIV: South America/Latin American Region. https://static.history.gov/frus/frus1977-80v24/pdf/frus1977-80v24.pdf.

Paper Prepared by the President’s Assistant, Review of Foreign Policy Initiatives, June 1977. Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of the United States 1977-1980 Volume I: Foundations of Foreign Policy, 1974-1976. https://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1977- 80v01/pdf/frus1977-80v01.pdf. 181-182.

Paper Prepared in the Policy Planning Staff, CU Action Program on Human Rights. Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of the United States 1977-1980 Volume XXX: Public Diplomacy. https://static.history.gov/frus/furs1977-80v30/pdf/frus1977-80v30.pdf.

Paper Prepared in the Policy Planning Staff. Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of the United States 1977-1980 Volume II: Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs. https://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1977-80v02/pdf/frus/frus1977-80v02/pdf.

106

Paper Prepared in the Department of State, Subject: Review of United States Policy toward Latin America. Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of the United States 1977-1980 Volume XXIV: South America/Latin American Region. https://static.history.gov/frus/frus1977-80v24/pdf/frus1977-80v24.pdf.

Paper Prepared in the Department of State, March 23, 1977. Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of the United States 1977-1980 Volume XXIV: South America/Latin American Region. https://www.static.history.gov/frus/frus1977-80v24/pdf/frus1977-80v24.pdf.

Paper Prepared in the Department of State, June 8, 1977, Subject: Outline PRM 28 Response. Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of the United States 1977-1980Volume II: Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs. https://static.history.gov/frus/frus1977- 80v02/pdf/frus1977-80v02.pdf.

Paper Prepared in the State Department, Subject: Human Rights and United States Foreign Policy, March 31, 1977; Meeting on Human Rights; Container 1, Entry #P885: Country Files 1977-1985, Ireland THRU Philippines (1 of 2); Department of State Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Record Group 59; NACP.

Partners of the Americas; Container 95, Entry #A1 38065-K: National Commission on the Observance of International Women’s Year; Executive Director’s Office, Liaison Committee THRU WAO- Women’s Action Organization; Temporary Committees, Commissions, and Boards, Record Group 220; NACP.

Patricia Derian, Address on Human Rights in Latin America, May 18, 1979; Current Policy 109- US Statements on Iran THRU Current Policy 103-Third World Challenge to World Communications; Records Relating to Major Publications, 1949-1990; General Records of the Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Office of Public Communications, Record Group 59; NACP.

Petition Prepared by Employees of the United States Information Agency, November 3, 1976. Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of the United States 1977-1980 Volume XXX: Public Diplomacy. https://static.history.gov/frus/frus1977-80v30/pdf/frus1977- 80v30/pdf.

Policy Review Committee, “Paper Prepared in the Department of State,” Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of the United States 1977-1980 Volume XXIV: South America/Latin American Region. https://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1977-80v24/pdf/frus1977- 80v24.pdf.

Prepared Statement by Douglas J Bennet Jr., Leonard R. Sussman Testimony-Senate Regarding Institute for Human Rights, June 29, 1978; Public Policy Papers; Freedom House Records; Department of Rare Books and Special Collections, Princeton University Library.

107

Prepared Statement by Leonard C Meeker, Leonard R. Sussman Testimony-Senate Regarding Institute for Human Rights, June 29, 1978; Public Policy Papers; Freedom House Records; Department of Rare Books and Special Collections, Princeton University Library.

President Carter, November 28, 1979. Entry A1 1589: Records Relating to Major Publications, 1949-1990; Current Policy 271—Interview on Meet the Press to Current Policy 110— Iran and Energy; Container 2, Current Policy 117: US Relations with the Caribbean & Central America (Pres. Carter, Habib, and Vaky 11/9, 27, & 28, 1979); General Records of the Department of State: Bureau of Public Affairs, Office of Public Communications, Record Group 59; NACP.

Presidential Directive/NSC-30, February 17, 1978. Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of the United States 1977-1980 Volume II: Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs. https://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1977-80v15/pdf/frus1977-80v15.pdf.

Report from Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher to Secretary of State Vance. Subject: US Foreign Policy on Human Rights: A Status Report; Container 1, Entry #P885: Country Files 1977-1985, Ireland THRU Philippines (1 of 2); Department of State Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Record Group 59; NACP.

Review of Foreign Policy Initiatives, June 1977. Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of the United States 1977-1980 Volume I: Foundations of Foreign Policy, 1974-1976. https://www.static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1977-80v01/pdf/frus1977-80v01.pdf.

Statement by Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher before the House Subcommittee on International Operations on Bill to Create an Institute for Human Rights and Freedom, April 25, 1978. Container 6, Entry #P885: Country Files 1977-1985, Venezuela thru Welcome Home Book-1979; Department of State Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Record Group 59; NACP.

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Status Report on US Foreign Policy on Human Rights, from Deputy Secretary of State, Warren Christopher to Secretary of State Vance; Meeting on Human Rights; Entry #P885: Country Files 1977-1985 Venezuela THRU Welcome Home Book-1979; Department of State Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Record Group 59; NACP.

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Telegram from United States Embassy in Nicaragua to Secretary of State Vance, November 1978; Nicaragua; Container 4, Entry P885: Country Files 1977-1985, Ireland THRU Philippines (1 of 2); Department of State Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Record Group 59; NACP.

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US Foreign Policy on Human Rights: General Approach and Specific Action Program, March 25, 1977. Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of the United States 1977-1980 Volume II: Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs. https://static.history.state.gov/frus/frus1977-80v02/pdf/frus/frus1977-80v02.

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USAID Handbook, Part I: Authorization and Policy, Chapter I: Policy, Section 2D. October 1, 1974; AID; Container 6, Entry #P885: Country Files 1977-1985 Venezuela THRU Welcome Home Book-1979; Department of State Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Record Group 59; NACP.

USAID, Agency for International Development: Development Assistance 1977-1983 (in millions of dollars) as of September 1977; AID; Container 6, Entry #P885: Country Files 1977- 1985 Venezuela THRU Welcome Home Book-1979; Department of State Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Record Group 59; NACP.

USAID Reports FY 1976-1982, U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants and Assistance from International Organizations Obligations and Loan Authorizations, July 1, 945-September 30, 1980; AID; Container 6, PN-AAN-238, Entry #P885: Country Files 1977-1985 Venezuela THRU Welcome Home Book-1979; Department of State Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Record Group 59; NACP.

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Washington Office on Latin America Letter to Deputy Secretary of State Christopher, May 12, 1980; Meeting on Human Rights; Container 1, Entry #P885: Country Files 1977-1985, Ireland THRU Philippines (1 of 2); Department of State Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Record Group 59; NACP.

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