Conversion at Stepnogorsk: What the Future Holds for Former Bioweapons Facilities
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CONVERSION AT STEPNOGORSK: WHAT THE FUTURE HOLDS FOR FORMER BIOWEAPONS FACILITIES Sonia Ben Ouagrham Center for Nonproliferation Studies Monterey Institute of International Studies Kathleen M. Vogel Institute for Public Policy University of New Mexico CORNELL UNIVERSITY PEACE STUDIES PROGRAM OCCASIONAL PAPER #28 ©February 2003 © 2003 Cornell University Peace Studies Program. All rights reserved. ISSN 1075-4857 Conversion at Stepnogorsk: What the Future Holds for Former Bioweapons Facilities Sonia Ben Ouagrham and Kathleen M. Vogel The Peace Studies Program was established at Cornell in 1970 as an interdisciplinary program concerned with problems of peace and war, arms control and disarmament, and more generally, instances of collective violence. Its broad objectives are to support graduate and post-doctoral study, research, teaching and cross-campus interactions in these fields. Copies of Occasional Papers may be ordered from: Peace Studies Program 130 Uris Hall Cornell University Ithaca, NY 14853-7601 TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY......................................................v ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .................................................... vii I. INTRODUCTION ...........................................................1 II. A COMPARATIVE FRAMEWORK............................................9 A. Historical Precedents .................................................10 B. Are Western Conversion Models Appropriate for BW Facilities in the Former Soviet Union? ...................................................13 III. SNOPB AND BIOMEDPREPARAT: A UNIQUE CASE STUDY ...................14 A. The Former Soviet BW Program: The Biopreparat Administration..............15 B. Progress Scientific and Production Association: The NCB’s Soviet Ancestor .....16 C. New Beginnings: National Center of Biotechnology (NCB) ...................22 D. A New Partnership: U.S. Government Engagement..........................29 E. Conversion Today ....................................................50 IV. STRATEGIES FOR CONVERSION ..........................................79 A. Appropriate Approach for Conversion of Former Soviet BW Facilities ..........80 B. Appropriate Approach for Conversion at Stepnogorsk Facilities ................82 V. CONCLUSION............................................................93 APPENDIX: AN OVERVIEW OF DEFENSE CONVERSION .......................102 I. ECONOMIC FUNDAMENTALS .............................................102 A. Types of Conversion .................................................102 B. Commercial vs. Non-commercial Conversion .............................105 C. Characteristics of Defense Facilities .....................................106 D. Distinctive Characteristics of Soviet Defense Facilities ......................111 II. SPECIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF BW FACILITIES...........................117 A. Technical Issues ....................................................117 B. Political Climate ....................................................125 LIST OF FIGURES 1: Map of Kazakhstan and Former Soviet BW Facilities Located on Kazakh Territory ........5 2: Structural Organization of SNOPB up to 1992 ....................................17 3: Structural Organization of the NCB From 1993 to 1999 ............................24 4: Structural Organization of the NCB in 2000 ......................................25 5: Structural Organization of the NCB in 2001 ......................................27 A-1: Defensive Versus Offensive Research .......................................131 LIST OF TABLES 1: Kazakh Enterprises Selected for Defense Conversion ..............................32 2: Dismantlement Costs at Biomedpreparat for Phase I and II..........................43 3: Estimated Plan for Phase IV Destruction ........................................45 4: 1999 Budget Finances of the NCB (in thousands of Tenge) ..........................63 5: U.S. Nonproliferation Assistance for Former Bioweapons Scientists in Stepnogorsk, Kazakhstan............................................................70 6: Products for Sale at the Institute of Pharmaceutical Biotechnology (as of July 2000) .......................................................76 A-1: Some Equipment Found in BW Facilities .....................................118 LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS Overview of the SNOPB complex................................................38 Former SNOPB employees dismantling a large autoclave in Building 221................42 Research scale fermentor used in the production of an antibiotic, “roseofungin,” by the IPB . 72 Aspect-pharm staff bottling “Ovsa,” ..............................................83 U.S., Kazakh, and Russian participants at “Biotechnological Development in Kazakhstan: Nonproliferation, Conversion, and Investment,” conference held July 24-26, 2000, in Stepnogorsk, Kazakhstan. ...............................................100 iv EXECUTIVE SUMMARY This study examines the ongoing efforts to convert a former biological weapons (BW) facility in Stepnogorsk, Kazakhstan. The facility, known in the Soviet period as the Stepnogorsk Scientific and Experimental Production Base (SNOPB), was the USSR’s largest mobilization facility dedicated to the production and weaponization of anthrax bacteria. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Kazakh government has demonstrated its commitment to nonproliferation and international security by opening and providing full transparency into the facility. The Kazakh government has issued mandates for a number of restructuring changes and conversion efforts at the facility. Subsequent U.S. and international assistance have played key roles in dis- mantling the facility and redirecting its personnel to peaceful purposes. Yet, the continuing eco- nomic and political instability in Kazakhstan maintains concerns regarding the threat of proliferation involving former BW personnel from the facility. Because biotechnology is inherently dual-use, many have touted the conversion of former Soviet BW facilities as more simple and straightforward than converting other Soviet defense facilities. This study shows the contrary. Because of the unique characteristics present within BW facilities, as well as the peculiar political, economic, and social environment in the former Soviet Union, conversion of BW facilities like Stepnogorsk will likely be as difficult, if not more difficult, than their nuclear or chemical counterparts. These factors, as well as a general lack of understanding about what is needed for conversion of Soviet defense facilities, can help explain why all conversion efforts at Stepnogorsk have failed thus far. Today, perhaps the most serious proliferation threat from this facility comes from the knowledge possessed by the forty bioweaponeers that remain. Several of these individuals have 20 or more years working on all stages of BW development, production, and weaponization. Although this “brain drain” problem is poorly understood, addressing this threat should remain a U.S. and international security priority. One of the most important instruments to deal with this threat involves converting these personnel to peaceful, economically sustainable activities. Al- though this fact is well recognized by the U.S. and Kazakh governments, all conversion efforts to date have failed. v In spite of these previously failed efforts, this study will propose specific recommenda- tions to address these difficulties and recommend new approaches and strategies to re-start con- version efforts at Stepnogorsk. The Stepnogorsk case does not imply that U.S. and international assistance must fund long-term economically sound conversion at every former Soviet BW facil- ity. Instead, each BW facility will have different characteristics influencing their proliferation potential and ability to convert. These characteristics must be identified and analyzed to design appropriate, effective, and cost-efficient nonproliferation policies for each facility. vi ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS We would like to thank a number of individuals who have greatly contributed to the success of this project. From Cornell University, we would like to thank Matthew Evangelista, Judith Reppy, and Barry Strauss for their support and commentary on this work. From the U.S. offices of the Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS), Monterey Institute of International Studies, we offer special thanks to William Potter, Clay Moltz, Leonard Spector, Jonathan Tucker, Ray Zilinskas, and Eric Croddy for their support and helpful suggestions. We would also like to recognize Dastan Yeleukenov and Marina Voronova of the CNS Almaty office for all of their in-country assistance for this project. Milton Leitenberg deserves special thanks for pro- viding helpful information regarding the former Soviet BW system and valuable comments on this work. We would also like to thank a number of U.S. government officials from the House and Senate Armed Services Committees, the Departments of Agriculture, Defense, Energy, and State, as well as the Civilian Research and Development Foundation, Defense Threat Reduction Agency, and Environmental Protection Agency. Officials with the International Science and Technology Center also provided valuable information to this project. In addition, interviews with individuals from Allen and Associates, International Science Applications International Corporation, and Bechtel Group, Inc. provided important on-the-ground insights regarding U.S. assistance. In spite of our desire to recognize many of these individuals