Miguel A. Ferrer and Carlos J. Ortiz
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
INITIAL DECISION RELEASE NO. 513 ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDING FILE NO. 3-14862 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Before the SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION Washington, D.C. 20549 ___________________________________ In the Matter of : : INITIAL DECISION MIGUEL A. FERRER, and : October 29, 2013 CARLOS J. ORTIZ : : ___________________________________ APPEARANCES: Robert K. Levenson and Edward D. McCutcheon for the Division of Enforcement, Securities and Exchange Commission Melvin A. Brosterman, Francis C. Healy, David M. Cheifetz, Stephanie A. Cournoyer, and Patrick N. Petrocelli for Miguel A. Ferrer Peter J. MacDonald, Peter G. Neiman, Fraser L. Hunter, Jr., Brad E. Konstandt, Meghan D. Rohan, J. David Zetlin-Jones, and Clarion E. Johnson for Carlos J. Ortiz Guillermo J. Bobonis, local counsel for Mr. Ferrer and Mr. Ortiz BEFORE: Brenda P. Murray, Chief Administrative Law Judge The Securities and Exchange Commission (Commission) issued an Order Instituting Administrative and Cease-and-Desist Proceedings (OIP) on May 1, 2012, pursuant to Section 8A of the Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act), Sections 15(b) and 21C of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act), and Section 9(b) of the Investment Company Act of 1940 (Investment Company Act). In summary, the OIP alleges that in 2008 and 2009 (relevant period), Miguel A. Ferrer (Ferrer) and Carlos Juan Ortiz-Leon (Ortiz) made misrepresentations and omitted material information about closed-end funds whose shares were issued and sold to investors by UBS Financial Services Inc. of Puerto Rico (UBS PR). I held 13 days of hearing that resulted in a record of 3,178 pages of testimony from 29 witnesses and 536 exhibits: 177 from the Division of Enforcement (Division), 164 from Ferrer, and 195 from Ortiz.1 The post-hearing briefing, totaling 838 pages, ended March 15, 2013. Issue This case is unusual. The facts are undisputed and the witnesses were for the most part forthcoming and credible. The issue is a serious difference of opinion about the level of information required to be provided to investors about a policy decision by the parent company and whether Ferrer’s and Ortiz’s actions in response to that policy decision violated the antifraud provisions of the securities statutes. Findings of Fact The findings and conclusions herein are based on the entire record. I applied preponderance of the evidence as the standard of proof. See Steadman v. SEC, 450 U.S. 91, 102 (1981). I have considered and rejected all arguments and proposed findings and conclusions that are inconsistent with this Initial Decision. UBS PR UBS PR is a registered broker-dealer and the largest in the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico (Puerto Rico) with from 47% to 51% of the market in assets under management (AUM).2 Tr. 19, 31-32, 207-08; Div. Ex. 21 at Bates 0120. UBS PR’s parent company is UBS Financial Services, Inc. (UBS or parent company), a Delaware corporation with principal places of business in New York, New York, and Weehawken, New Jersey (Weehawken), that is a wholly owned subsidiary of UBS, AG, a private issuer based in Switzerland. Tr. 20. In 2008-2009, UBS PR was operated by persons in Puerto Rico, but Legal, Compliance, and Market Risk were handled by persons in Weehawken. Tr. 190-91. UBS PR operated as a region of UBS, but for tax purposes it maintained a separate corporate structure. Tr. 1291. The actions of UBS’s Market Risk Control Committee or Risk Committee Wealth Management Americas (Risk Committee), chaired by UBS’s Chief Financial Officer (CFO), located in 3 Weehawken, were crucial to the events at issue. The Risk Committee set the level of UBS’s 1 I will cite to the transcript of the hearing as “(Tr. __.).” I will cite to the Division’s and Respondents’ exhibits as “(Div. Ex. __.)”, “(Ferrer Ex. __.)”, or “(Ortiz Ex. __.)”. I will use similar designations in citations to the post-hearing filings. 2 UBS PR’s nearest competitor in Puerto Rico has about 20% of the market. Tr. 210. Ortiz estimates UBS PR’s market share at 50% to 60%. Tr. 782. 3 Wealth Management Americas is one of three business divisions of UBS, AG and its subsidiaries. Wealth Management Americas operates a core business line and includes the domestic U.S. business, domestic Canadian business, and the international business booked in the U.S. Wealth Management Americas consists of branch networks in the U.S., Puerto Rico, and 2 worldwide risk exposure and thus determined the amount of inventory UBS PR could hold. Tr. 645, 976. Persons delivering Risk Committee decisions to UBS PR included Bernd Michel (Michel), UBS Chief Risk Officer, Mark Guarino, Director UBS Credit Risk Control, Jim Hausmann (Hausmann), head of traditional products for Wealth Management Americas, and Thomas Magdziak (Magdziak), UBS’s Market Risk Officer, and Michael Culnan (Culnan), who replaced Magdziak in April 2009. Tr. 126, 476, 643, 812, 1159, 2161. No one from UBS PR was on the Risk Committee. Tr. 1292, 2648. Ferrer Ferrer holds B.A. and M.B.A. degrees from Cornell University. Tr. 1289. He entered the securities industry in 1961 as a financial advisor (FA). Tr. 1289. Ferrer is responsible for UBS PR’s preeminent position in the Puerto Rican securities market. In 1965, he opened a two- person office in Puerto Rico for Blyth, Eastman, Dillon, which is today UBS PR. Tr. 1290. In 1986, under his leadership, UBS PR began tailoring financial products to Puerto Rican investors when other broker-dealers relied on their standard products. Tr. 209-10. In 2005, UBS PR was recognized by UBS for its focus on clients. Tr. 1396-98; Ferrer Ex. 534. Ferrer did not consider that good enough. Tr. 1398. Ferrer was Chairman and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of UBS PR from 2003 until October 2009. Three months later he was re-hired as Vice-Chairman. Tr. 991; Div. Ex. 152 at 1. Ferrer is considered a financial visionary with respect to Puerto Rico. Tr. 2172, 2904. Alfredo Salazar, who has been: (1) President of the Puerto Rico Industrial Development Company; (2) President of the Government Development Bank of Puerto Rico (GDB), which manages the debt of the central government and advises the Governor of Puerto Rico; (3) President of Chase Manhattan banks in Brazil and Argentina; (4) a position with Paine Webber; (5) President of Banco de Ponce; (6) head of the Economic Development Administration in Puerto Rico; (7) President of Palmas Del Mar Properties; and (8) Chairman of the Board and then, again, President of the GDB, testified that Ferrer is a close advisor on financial matters and they have a relationship of mutual respect. Tr. 2163-73. Carlos Ubinas (Ubinas), President and Chief Operating Officer of UBS PR, hired Ferrer and is the only person who reported to Ferrer.4 Tr. 169, 211, 1048, 1299, 2904. Ferrer reported to James D. Price (Price), Chairman of UBS PR, in Weehawken, who reported to Marten Hoekstra (Hoekstra), head of Wealth Management of Americas. Tr. 214, 809, 992, 1159, 2492- 95. Hoekstra and Price were on the Risk Committee. In 2008 and in 2009, Ferrer was also CEO Canada. http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/reform/resplans/plans/ubs-1207.pdf (last visited Oct. 18, 2013). 4 Ubinas is a graduate of George Washington University and the University of Puerto Rico School of Law. Tr. 2827. Before joining UBS PR in 1990, he worked at a law firm in Puerto Rico and as a Vice-President, GDB. Tr. 2827-29. 3 of UBS Trust Company, and CEO and Chairman of each of the Funds.5 Tr. 991, 1113; Ferrer Ex. 525. Ferrer was paid $300,000 in salary and a $150,000 cash bonus, for 2008, and his total compensation in 2008 and 2009, was over $2.5 million and $2 million, respectively.6 Tr. 1267- 71; Div. Exs. 90, 122. Ferrer communicated with Financial Advisors (FAs) regularly and had a reputation for trying to energize the sales force by sending memos and e-mail messages with his strong beliefs in UBS PR products. Tr. 2801-03. He considered keeping FAs focused a very important CEO function. Tr. 1494. Ferrer testified he had no direct responsibility for sales, but an FA testified that Ferrer came to his branch sales presentations about twice a year and told FAs to recommend investments. Tr. 1628-30, 1632. Ferrer acknowledged that he wished his e-mails and memos to FAs resulted in sales conversations, but denied it was their main purpose. Tr. 1494-95. Ferrer contacted the Trading Desk on behalf of FAs who came to him with complaints. Tr. 1138-41, 1286; Div. Ex. 5. Ferrer played no role in pricing or setting inventory levels, and he is not an expert in trading. Tr. 221, 1084, 1156, 1352-53, 2905-06. Ferrer did not consider that he had any responsibility in formulating disclosures to FAs or to customers, and he testified that Legal and Compliance determined what disclosures were required of UBS PR. Tr. 1357-58, 1485. FAs and Eugenio S. Belaval (Belaval), head of UBS PR Wealth Management, kept Ferrer informed about markets and prices.7 Tr. 15, 1287. In 2008, FAs told Ferrer that the market was imbalanced, and in 2008-2009, FAs complained to him about trouble selling shares. Tr. 1028. Ferrer knew in May 2009 that UBS had ordered UBS PR to reduce inventory, and that the Trading Desk had stopped buying shares and was lowering prices to sell inventory. Tr. 1242-43, 1248. Ortiz Ortiz is a graduate of Georgetown University and the Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, in 1985. Tr. 495. He joined First Boston Corporation in Puerto Rico in 1985 as an associate specializing in investment banking and became a Vice-President.