This Thesis Has Been Submitted in Fulfilment of the Requirements for a Postgraduate Degree (E.G
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This thesis has been submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for a postgraduate degree (e.g. PhD, MPhil, DClinPsychol) at the University of Edinburgh. Please note the following terms and conditions of use: This work is protected by copyright and other intellectual property rights, which are retained by the thesis author, unless otherwise stated. A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or study, without prior permission or charge. This thesis cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first obtaining permission in writing from the author. The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any format or medium without the formal permission of the author. When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the author, title, awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given. Limits of Legislation as a Source of Law: An Historical and Comparative Analysis Jonathan Mark Horton QC PhD (Law) The University of Edinburgh 2015 Abstract We are habituated to an hyperactive legislature and the proliferation of legislation. The legislature hurtles along, causing Anglo-American legal systems to degenerate into massive, and often meaningless, contradictory or trivial blocks of rules and norms, and ones which are beyond the ordinary citizen or corporation to know and fully to meet. Legislation’s demands are ever-increasing: it grows in volume, in ambition, and it seems to recognise no end to its capacity and entitlement to regulate the most detailed, most banal or most technical of affairs. It has lost any means by which to prioritise those matters with which it ought concern itself. The situation has been brought about by conflating an authority which Parliament acquired in the 17th and 18th Centuries with the legislation it produces. I seek to separate the two and show that there is no justification for attributing to legislation such legitimacy and authority as Parliament as an institution acquired historically. But because legislation-making has been based upon this assumption, there is a loss when Parliament legislates hyperactively because there exist normative reasons why Parliament should perhaps not act in such an unrestrained manner, but ones which, partly owing to the underlying assumptions about the authority of legislation, remain unaddressed. For so long as those who would claim for Parliament an entitlement ambitiously to legislate and without restraint fail to confront these considerations, there remains a normative loss when Parliament legislates in the manner they would advocate. I seek to diagnose a presently less than fully justified conferral upon legislation of authority and an accompanying incompleteness in the arguments of those who would seek to justify an activist and ambitious role for Parliament via legislation. This is not to say that there is no justification for Parliament’s current disposition, but that the foundation upon which Parliament’s hyperactivity in legislation has been built is attended with a failure of those who advance such a position to confront and to meet arguments which run counter to that claim. 2 Lay Summary Much of the law now made is legislation. Other sources of law – or rules by which we live – are Court decisions and even customary ways of doing things. The amount of law making through legislation is a fairly new occurrence. Historically, the making of rules was an activity that was shared by different bodies, and it occurred in a much more diverse way. The amount and type of legislation means that Parliament has become hyperactive and that there is too much legislation. This can be problematic. There has come to be a massive body of rules. Not all of those rules have real and practical meaning, and they can be contradictory or even try to deal with topics that are trivial, or that citizens think are no business of government. Ordinary people often have trouble knowing all the rules that govern their life, their business, and their dealings with others. This is a problem if we are presumed to know what the law is and are to be held responsible as if we actually had that knowledge. One of the troubles with legislation in current times is that we lack any way of knowing when and when not to legislate. I show that to be the case here, and also that we need to begin thinking about what limits exist or should be put in place to keep legislation limited to the kinds of activities that it must deal with and that it can handle well. I do this by looking to: 1) how, historically, we came to tolerate such reliance upon legislation; 2) the relatively few limits that we presently recognise as limiting legislation; 3) what practical limits exist on legislation and how the Parliament itself has limitations; 4) how other sources of law (particularly the Common Law and customary law) can also do (and do well) some of what legislation tries to do; 5) understanding why, given the way we have looked at these matters historically, we think that legislation is an appropriate way to handle so many topics. I suggest that the scholars who favour unrestrained legislative activity have not fully justified the approach that they advocate because they have not answered some of the limits and weaknesses of popular assemblies and of legislation. 3 Declaration This thesis has been composed by me and is my own work. None of the work within it has been submitted for any other degree or professional qualification, with the exception of Chapter 4. Many of the ideas were the subject of a dissertation I submitted in 2011 for an LLM in the Philosophy and History of Law from Edinburgh University. That Chapter, in the form in which it appears in this work, is different in substance from my LLM dissertation. It was not, in that earlier form, tied to the wider arguments I have sought to advance as part of my PhD studies. Much of the text is different, as is the emphasis and overall object. Signed, J M Horton 9 June 2015 4 Table of Contents Introduction .............................................................................................................................. 7 Chapter 1 Parliament’s Rise and Reputation ...................................................................... 26 I Parliament’s rise 1603-1714: from King’s head Court to King-maker ....................... 29 II 18th Century Legislative Science ................................................................................. 52 Chapter 2 Doctrinal Limits ................................................................................................... 81 I Introduction ................................................................................................................. 81 II Sources of doctrinal limits .......................................................................................... 82 III Limits on the making of legislation ............................................................................ 85 Constitutionalism: ‘England will perish’ ............................................................... 85 Constitutionalism in British-derived systems ........................................................ 92 Australia ............................................................................................................ 93 Canada .............................................................................................................. 95 The United States .............................................................................................. 97 Consequences for legislation of Constitutionalism ........................................... 99 IV Limits on giving effect to legislation ........................................................................ 102 Division of labour ................................................................................................ 105 The Legislature’s Intent ....................................................................................... 109 The Legislature’s Intention: a problematic device ............................................... 114 Current trends....................................................................................................... 122 Common law as a rival to legislation? ................................................................. 133 V Legislative self-restraint? .......................................................................................... 135 Chapter 3 Limitations: Practical and Institutional ......................................................... 139 I Introduction ............................................................................................................... 139 II Popular assemblies: wise, dignified and more likely to get it right? ......................... 140 Waldron’s central thesis ....................................................................................... 141 Points of contention ............................................................................................. 146 III Practical Limitations ................................................................................................. 147 Legislation galore ................................................................................................. 148 Case study: external scrutiny of government bodies in Scotland ........................ 152 Cognoscibility? .................................................................................................... 155 Parliamentarians spread too thin .........................................................................