Bangladesh: October by Jon Lunn

BRIEFING PAPER Number 7452, 25 October 2017

Bangladesh: October By Jon Lunn

2017 update

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Number 7452, 25 October 2017 2

Contents

Summary 3 1. Domestic politics 5 1.1 Awami League and BNP at loggerheads 5 1.2 Growing authoritarianism? 5 Charges against BNP leaders 5 Assessment of Human Rights Watch 6 Observations of the UN Human Rights Committee 6 Freedom of expression concerns 7 1.3 The wheels of justice – still turning? 7 International Crimes Tribunal update 7 Conflict with the judiciary 7 1.4 A growing threat from Islamist terrorism? 8 Attacks against bloggers, activists and writers 8 Is Islamic State/Daesh involved? 8 Government ties with Hefazat-e-Islam 9 2. International relations 10 2.1 Another wave of Burmese Rohingya refugees 10 Key facts and figures 10 Response of the Bangladesh government 11 2.2 Bangladesh-UK relations 12

Cover page image copyright: Dhaka 2014 by William Veerbeek. Licensed under CC BY 2.0 / image cropped.

3 Bangladesh: October 2017 update

Summary

The ruling Awami League (AL), led by Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, and the main opposition party, the Bangladeshi Nationalist Party (BNP), led by Khaleda Zia, continue to be at loggerheads. With elections due within the next year or so, tensions look set to deepen further. During 2016 and 2017, both sides have rehearsed the positions about how the next elections should be conducted that they took in 2014. After winning power in 2008, the AL changed the Constitution so that a neutral caretaker administration was no longer required and shows no inclination to reverse the move. The BNP argues that the status quo ante should be restored. The AL is said to be considering creating an all-party interim cabinet in the run-up to the next elections. However, the BNP rejected a similar idea in 2014 In the absence of compromise, the BNP will have to decide whether or not to boycott the next elections, which would inevitably cast a shadow over their credibility and raise the prospect of heightened political instability. Critics of the government also continue to express concerns about the independence of the Election Commission. The BNP claims that the AL government has become increasingly authoritarian. Human Rights Watch speaks of a “crackdown on civil society, media, and critics” and a “response to extremist violence has perpetuated security forces’ long-standing use of arbitrary arrests, enforced disappearances, and extrajudicial killings.” The International Crimes Tribunal, established by the AL-led Government to try those allegedly responsible for war crimes and crimes against humanity during the 1971 war for independence from Pakistan, continues to operate. Human rights critics have argued that the trials do not meet international standards. Political opponents claim that the entire process is politically-motivated. Six prominent opposition figures have been hanged since the Tribunal began its work. Over the last year or so, the AL-led government has come into growing conflict with parts of the judiciary. In July 2017, the Supreme Court upheld a ruling in 2016 by the High Court that declared the 16th Constitutional Amendment unconstitutional. The Amendment, passed in 2014, had restored parliament’s power to impeach senior judges by a two-thirds majority. The Chief Justice currently faces corruption charges. Since mid-2016, the AL-led government has escalated its counter- terrorism operations significantly. It has also now accepted that there are international dimensions to the terrorist threat, including from Islamic State/Daesh. Since late-August 2017, hundreds of thousands of new Muslim Rohingya refugees have fled from violence in Burma to Bangladesh, placing a massive strain on the country. Number 7452, 25 October 2017 4

During the first weeks of the latest Rohingya crisis, the response of the Bangladesh authorities was subject to some criticism. At first, they seemed concerned mainly with preventing Rohingya from entering the country, and those that did so initially found little official assistance on offer. However, during September and October 2017 – as the scale of the crisis became clear – the Bangladesh authorities took significant steps to address such criticisms – for example, allocating extra land, improving road access and supporting new settlements. Access for humanitarian agencies also improved. There are concerns about Bangladesh’s plans to move the 600,000 or so Rohingya refugees that have recently arrived from their current location, Cox’s Bazar, to an offshore island called Bhasan Char. As the crisis has escalated, relations with the Burmese authorities deteriorated significantly. In September, Bangladesh accused Burmese planes of violating its airspace and of laying landmines in border areas. For a few days, there were fears that war might break out between the two neighbours. In late-September, Sheikh Hasina set out a five-point plan for a peaceful resolution of the Rohingya crisis: • Myanmar must unconditionally stop the violence and the practice of ethnic cleansing in the Rakhine State immediately and forever. • Secretary General of the United Nations should immediately send a Fact-Finding Mission to Myanmar. • All civilians irrespective of religion and ethnicity must be protected in Myanmar. For that, ‘safe zones’ could be created inside Myanmar under UN supervision. • Ensure sustainable return of all forcibly displaced Rohingyas in Bangladesh to their homes in Myanmar. • The recommendations of Kofi Annan Commission Report must be immediately implemented unconditionally and in its entirety As the prime minister’s plan indicates, Bangladesh continues to hope that a significant number of recently arrived Rohingya can be returned to Burma relatively quickly. There is a 1993 agreement between the two countries that allows Rohingya who can prove residence in Burma to be returned. On 24 October, Bangladesh and Burma signed two agreements covering security and border cooperation which were portrayed as an important stepping-stone towards beginning the return of refugees. But relations between the two countries remain tense. Observers have called upon all sides to ensure that no refugee is returned against their will. Bangladesh is a human rights ‘priority country’ for the UK government. The UK has pledged a total of US$63 million for the UN’s humanitarian plan in response to the latest Rohingya crisis – the largest pledge by a single donor.

5 Bangladesh: October 2017 update

1. Domestic politics 1.1 Awami League and BNP at loggerheads The ruling Awami League (AL), led by Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, and the main opposition party, the Bangladeshi Nationalist Party (BNP), led by Khaleda Zia, continue to be at loggerheads. With elections due within the next year or so, tensions look set to deepen further. Relations between the families at the head of the two main parties have been poor for decades and remain so today. The latest phase in their rivalry was set in motion following parliamentary elections in January 2014 that were widely viewed as flawed and which the BNP boycotted because they were not held under a neutral caretaker administration, as in the past. The BNP sponsored over a year of strikes and blockades in the course of which over 100 people died. During 2016 and 2017, both sides have rehearsed the positions about how the next elections should be conducted that they took in 2014. After winning power in 2008, the AL changed the Constitution so that a neutral caretaker administration was no longer required and shows no inclination to reverse the move. The BNP argues that the status quo ante should be restored. The AL is said to be considering creating an all-party interim cabinet in the run-up to the next elections. However, the BNP rejected a similar idea in 2014 In the absence of compromise, the BNP will have to decide whether or not to boycott the next elections, which would inevitably cast a shadow over their credibility and raise the prospect of heightened political instability. Critics of the government also continue to express concerns about the independence of the Election Commission. In an article for the Financial Times in April 2015, “Bangladesh army funded to forget its role as neutral referee”, the journalist Victor Mallet argued that the army is being co-opted by the Awami League (AL)-led Government “with money, land, construction contracts and other privileges.” This, he went on to argue, suggested that an opposition strategy of creating such insecurity that the army again feels compelled to step in is unlikely to work in future.

1.2 Growing authoritarianism? Charges against BNP leaders As they weigh up their options, Khaleda Zia and other BNP leaders also face a medley of criminal charges against them. There are arson and murder charges in connection with attacks that took place during the 2015-16 protests. There are also corruption charges against them. Khaleda Zia also faces trial on a sedition charge. If found guilty on any Number 7452, 25 October 2017 6

of these charges, she could face a lengthy prison sentence and be forced out of politics.1 Assessment of Human Rights Watch The BNP claims that the AL government has become increasingly authoritarian. Human Rights Watch offers this overview of the human rights situation in the country: The Bangladesh government has intensified its crackdown on civil society, media, and critics. Authorities have killed and disappeared members of the political opposition, while failing to protect bloggers, gay rights activists, and religious minorities from violent and often fatal attacks by militant groups. The government’s response to extremist violence has perpetuated security forces’ long-standing use of arbitrary arrests, enforced disappearances, and extrajudicial killings. Rights to freedom of speech and assembly are under sustained attack by the increasingly authoritarian government.2 In July 2017 Human Rights Watch published a report which described a rising trend of illegal and secret detention of political opponents by the authorities: Since 2013, law enforcement authorities in Bangladesh have illegally detained scores of opposition activists and held them in secret without producing them before courts, as the law requires. In most cases, those arrested remain in custody for weeks or months before being formally arrested or released. Others however are killed in so-called armed exchanges, and many remain “disappeared.” […] Bangladesh law enforcement agencies have a long history of human rights violations. The ruling Awami League party took office in January 2009 with the promise to end such abuses. However, according to Odhikar, a Dhaka-based human rights organization, Bangladesh law enforcement agencies have since disappeared over 320 people, including suspected criminals, militants, and, more recently, opposition members. Of these, 50 were later killed, and dozens remain disappeared. The rest were either released or formally produced in court as recent arrests.3 Observations of the UN Human Rights Committee In April 2017, the UN Human Rights Committee published concluding observations in response to a report submitted to it by the Bangladeshi government. It welcomed a number of positive developments – for example, the adoption in 2010 of the Domestic Violence Prevention and Protection Act – but made criticisms too. One was the reported high rate of extrajudicial killings by police officers, soldiers and Rapid Action Battalion force members and at reports of enforced disappearances, as well as the excessive use of force by State actors.4

1 “New Khaleda Zia graft trial ordered”, Eastern Eye, 14 August 2015 2 Human Rights Watch webpage on Bangladesh 3 “’We Don’t Have Him’. Secret Detentions and Enforced Disappearances in Bangladesh”, Human Rights Watch, 6 July 2017 4 UN Human Rights Committee, “Concluding observations on the initial report of Bangladesh”, April 2017 7 Bangladesh: October 2017 update

Freedom of expression concerns The AL-led government was also criticised by the Committee for arresting journalists, bloggers and activists under the Information and Communications Technology Act. Legislation is also before parliament that would tighten restrictions on the activities of local and international NGOs. Nobel Peace Prize winner Mohammed Yunus has expressed criticism of the government’s governance performance. The authorities are investigating him for alleged financial misconduct.

1.3 The wheels of justice – still turning?5 International Crimes Tribunal update The International Crimes Tribunal continues to operate. It was established by the AL-led government to try those allegedly responsible for war crimes and crimes against humanity during the 1971 war for independence from Pakistan. Human rights critics have argued that the trials do not meet international standards. Political opponents claim that the entire process is politically-motivated. The AL-led government disputes both charges. Six prominent opposition figures have been hanged since the Tribunal began its work – most recently, Jamaat-e-Islami’s (JI) Mir Quasem Ali in September 2016. One was a former BNP leader.6 JI is Bangladesh’s main Islamist party and sided with Pakistan during the war for independence. Others have also been sentenced to death by the Tribunal and face execution by the same method. One AL MP is under investigation for committing war crimes. Conflict with the judiciary Over the last year or so, the AL-led government has come into growing conflict with parts of the judiciary. In May 2016, the High Court declared unconstitutional the 16th Constitutional Amendment, which was passed in 2014, restoring parliament’s power to impeach Supreme Court judges by a two-thirds majority. The government appealed to the Supreme Court, although its relations with the highest court in the land were not particularly positive either. In November 2016, the Supreme Court ordered it to amend the criminal procedure code to establish guidelines to ensure that due process was followed when arrests were made and proper investigations and actions were taken in connection with torture allegations and deaths in custody. In July 2017, the Court upheld the High Court’s verdict on the 16th Amendment. The government has indicated that it will seek to have the Supreme Court’s ruling reviewed. In September, the Supreme Court’s Chief Justice, Surendra Kumar Sinha, went on leave and has not returned to his post. The authorities have made eleven charges of

5 This section of the paper draws extensively on the International Crisis Group’s ‘Crisis Watch’ monthly summaries for Bangladesh. 6 “Financial backer of biggest Islamist party in Bangladesh hanged”, Daily Telegraph, 4 September 2017 Number 7452, 25 October 2017 8

corruption against him. A number of other Supreme Court judges have said that they will not sit with him until he has answered these charges. Another judge is currently acting Chief Justice.7

1.4 A growing threat from Islamist terrorism?8 Since mid-2016, the AL-led government has escalated its counter- terrorism operations significantly. It has also now accepted that there are international dimensions to the terrorist threat. Attacks against bloggers, activists and writers There was has been a wave of attacks by militants against secular bloggers, and writers and activists, since 2013. For example, four bloggers were murdered in the capital, Dhaka, during 2015; in April 2016 alone, a blogger, an academic and an LGBT activist were murdered. There has been some reduction in the number of such attacks during 2017 as counter-terrorism operations have had an impact. Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent claimed responsibility for some of the attacks, but attention also turned towards another named group, also with links to al-Qaeda, originally called Ansarullah Bangla Team but now known as Ansar-ul-Islam, which published a ‘hit list’ of bloggers (nine of whom are UK-based), activists and writers. There have also been attacks against Bangladesh’s tiny Shi’a minority. A group calling itself ‘Islamic State – Bangladesh’ claimed responsibility for some of these attacks.9 Is Islamic State/Daesh involved? The Bangladesh Government initially denied that Islamic State/Daesh had any presence in the country, criticising foreign intelligence agencies and independent commentators for suggesting otherwise.10 The authorities instead blamed local groups — in particular the banned group Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB). However, following a bomb attack on Gulshan café in Dhaka in July 2017 in which 22 people died, most of them foreigners, an Islamic State/Daesh-linked ‘neo-JMB’ was blamed by the authorities for the attack. In September, there were media reports that a plan by militants with links to Islamic State/Daesh to assassinate Sheikh Hasina had been foiled. The government denied these reports. In the same month, a sleeper cell in Dhaka was attacked and broken up. A large quantity of

7 “Supreme divide in Dhaka”, Telegraph [India], 14 October 2017 8 This section of the paper also draws extensively on the International Crisis Group’s ‘Crisis Watch’ monthly summaries for Bangladesh. 9 “Islamic State group affiliate claims Bangladesh Shiite mosque attack”, Belfast Telegraph, 27 November 2015 10 “Communication with Islamic State and continued political instability indicate further attacks against foreigners and minorities in Bangladesh”, Economist Intelligence Unit, 19 February 2016 9 Bangladesh: October 2017 update

arms was reportedly seized. An alleged neo-JMB recruiter was also arrested in September. Government ties with Hefazat-e-Islam Over the last year or so, the AL-led government has sought to improve its relationship with Islamist groups that are, in its judgement, willing to operate through constitutional channels. The main target has been the Hefazat-e-Islam coalition. But critics have accused the government, in doing this, of making unwarranted concessions to hardliners. For example, in April 2017 the government approved a plan to establish hundreds of new mosques in Bangladesh with $1 billion of funding from Saudi Arabia. In May, the authorities briefly removed a statue of ‘Lady Justice’ from outside the Supreme Court building to which Hefazat-e-Islam had objected. A woman lawyer who criticised the removal of the statue reported that she had received death threats. Number 7452, 25 October 2017 10

2. International relations 2.1 Another wave of Burmese Rohingya refugees Since late-August 2017, hundreds of thousands of new Muslim Rohingya refugees have fled from violence in Burma to Bangladesh, placing a massive strain on the country. Key facts and figures The Office of the UN Coordinator for Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA) provides further background on its ‘Rohingya crisis’ webpage. Below is an extract: The humanitarian crisis caused by escalating violence in Myanmar’s Rakhine State is causing suffering on a catastrophic scale. Over 600,000 Rohingya refugees had fled across the border from Myanmar to Bangladesh since 25 August. Thousands more reportedly remain stranded and in peril in Myanmar without the means to cross the border into Bangladesh. Refugees arriving in Bangladesh—mostly women and children—are traumatized, and some have arrived with injuries caused by gunshots, shrapnel, fire and landmines. As of 4 October, Bangladesh hosts more than 800,000 Rohingya refugees, and this number continues to increase daily. Before this crisis began, the country was already hosting a verified population of well over 200,000 Rohingya from Myanmar - and likely many more. Bangladesh was also coping with pressing needs and challenges of its own. The new arrivals are adding massive pressure to services in existing refugee camps and in makeshift settlements. Basic services are now badly outstripped, including water, health, and particularly shelter and sanitation. Conditions in the settlements and camps are now so critical that disease outbreaks are a looming prospect. Refugees arriving in Bangladesh report fleeing appalling violations of human rights and other abuses in Myanmar. According to these harrowing accounts, villages have been burned down, parents or relatives have been killed in front of traumatized children, and women and girls have been raped or brutalized. UNHCR is already working to register new arrivals and provide comprehensive protection services. More broadly, the United Nations and our partners are working closely with the Government of Bangladesh to scale up and coordinate the humanitarian response so as to ensure that refugees are protected in line with international standards, and to provide desperately needed support including food, shelter, health care and water. In Cox's Bazar, Bangladesh, the humanitarian response to the influx of Rohingya refugees from Myanmar is coordinated by the Inter-Sector Coordination Group (ISCG) which is led by the International Organization for Migration (IOM). The ISCG produces regular situation reports (see below) and other information products that provide the most up to date information – these products are available here. To account for the rapidly increasing needs, humanitarian partners have revised the initial response plan, which now aims to assist 1.2 million people – including new refugees, prior refugees and host communities – at a total cost of US$434 million. 11 Bangladesh: October 2017 update

A ministerial-level pledging conference was held by the UN in Geneva, Switzerland, on 23 October. As at 24 October, about 30% of the total sum required to fund the response plan, which runs from September 2017-February 2018. Response of the Bangladesh government During the first weeks of the latest Rohingya crisis, the response of the Bangladesh authorities was subject to some criticism. At first, they seemed concerned mainly with preventing Rohingya from entering the country, and those that did so initially found little official assistance on offer.11 However, during September and October 2017 – as the scale of the crisis became clear – the Bangladesh authorities took significant steps to address such criticisms – for example, allocating extra land, improving road access and supporting new settlements. Access for humanitarian agencies also improved. International criticism of the Bangladesh authorities has not ended entirely. To the surprise of some observers, Bangladesh has designated the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) as the lead international body for the humanitarian effort, rather than the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). The government argues that it has a long-established relationship with the IOM that it lacks with UNHCR. Bangladesh recognises the Rohingya as refugees. However, the country has not ratified the 1951UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. UN and humanitarian agencies have often found it difficult to access earlier waves of Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh in the past. In addition, there are concerns about Bangladesh’s plans to move the 600,000 recently arrived Rohingya refugees from their current location, Cox’s Bazar, to an offshore island called Bhasan Char. There have been claims that the island is unsuitable for this purpose. As the crisis escalated during September, relations with the Burmese authorities deteriorated significantly. Bangladesh accused Burmese planes of violating its airspace and of laying landmines in border areas. For a few days, there were fears that war might break out between the two neighbours. Sheikh Hasina and other government ministers have called the plight of the Rohingya “ethnic cleansing”. In late-September, Sheikh Hasina set out a five-point plan for a peaceful resolution of the Rohingya crisis: • Myanmar must unconditionally stop the violence and the practice of ethnic cleansing in the Rakhine State immediately and forever. • Secretary General of the United Nations should immediately send a Fact-Finding Mission to Myanmar. • All civilians irrespective of religion and ethnicity must be protected in Myanmar. For that, ‘safe zones’ could be created inside Myanmar under UN supervision.

11 “The prime minister and the Rohingyas”, Dhaka Courier, 19 October 2017 Number 7452, 25 October 2017 12

• Ensure sustainable return of all forcibly displaced Rohingyas in Bangladesh to their homes in Myanmar. • The recommendations of Kofi Annan Commission Report must be immediately implemented unconditionally and in its entirety.12 As the prime minister’s plan indicates, Bangladesh continues to hope that a significant number of recently arrived Rohingya can be returned to Burma. There is a 1993 agreement between the two countries that allows Rohingya who can prove residence in Burma to be returned. On 24 October, Bangladesh and Burma signed two agreements covering security and border cooperation which were portrayed as an important stepping-stone towards beginning the return of refugees. But relations between the two countries remain tense. Observers have called upon all sides to ensure that no refugee is returned against their will. The support and solidarity over the last two months of ordinary Bangladeshis for the refugees over the last two months is widely acknowledged. The crisis is having an impact on domestic politics, with the BNP and the Hefazat-e-Islam criticising the AL-led government for not being willing to call what is happening a ‘genocide’ and for not doing enough to mobilise international pressure on Burma.13

2.2 Bangladesh-UK relations In August 2015 a 58 year old British national, Touhidur Rahman, was charged in connection with the murder of two bloggers. The Bangladesh Government called on its British counterpart to do more to combat extremism at home.14 We have found no recent information in the public domain about this case. Rahman’s arrest happened a month after two Britons of Bangladeshi heritage (Ruhul Amin and Riad Khan) were killed by a British drone strike while fighting with the so-called Islamic State in Syria. In February 2016, the Bangladesh High Court upheld death sentences against three members of the outlawed militant group Harkat-ul Jihad for a 2004 grenade attack on the then British High Commissioner, Anwar Choudhry, in which three people were killed. The High Commissioner was amongst those wounded.15 In August 2016 dual Bangladesh-UK national Hasnat Karim was arrested for suspected involvement in the July 2016 militant attack on the Gulshan café in Dhaka. He remains in detention without charge. Amnesty International has called for him to be charged with a recognisable criminal offence without further delay or be released.16 According to a recent press report about the case:

12 “PM rules out possibility of understanding with BNP”, Bangladesh Government News, 25 September 2017 13 “Rohingya crisis reshapes Bangladesh”, New York Times, 7 October 2017 14 “British jihadis in Bangladesh fanning flames of extremism, says Dhaka”, Guardian, 17 September 2015 15 “Bangladesh upholds death sentences over 2004 attack on British convoy”, Channel News Asia, 11 February 2016 16 “'Everything's changed': despair of Briton held without charge in Bangladesh”, Guardian, 24 September 2017 13 Bangladesh: October 2017 update

“Our staff have remained in contact with the family of a British- Bangladeshi dual national since his arrest in Bangladesh in 2016,” an FCO spokesperson told the Guardian. “We have visited him since his detention to offer consular assistance and check his welfare.”17 Bangladesh is a human rights ‘priority country’ for the UK government. Its most recent human rights update on the country was published in February 2017. The then FCO Minister Alok Sharma gave this parliamentary answer in March 2017: Bangladesh: Human Rights: Written question - 68171 Asked by Kevin Brennan (Cardiff West) Asked on: 15 March 2017 To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, what recent discussions the Government has had with the Government of Bangladesh on human rights and political violence in that country. Answered by: Alok Sharma Answered on: 20 March 2017 I raised concerns about human rights and political violence with the Government of Bangladesh during my visit to Dhaka from 2 to 4 March. In my meetings with Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina and opposition leaders Begum Khaleda Zia and Raushan Ershad MP, I called on all parties to participate in future elections and to ensure that they were free, fair and credible. In my meeting with Foreign Minister Abul Hassan Mahmood Ali on 3 March I emphasised that Bangladesh's "zero-tolerance" approach towards terrorism and extremism must respect the rule of law and international human rights standards. Since late-August, the UK has pledged a total of US$63 million for the UN’s humanitarian plan in response to the latest Rohingya crisis – the biggest pledge by a single donor. DFID’s project budget for Bangladesh in 2017/18 is £133 million. The level of DFID bilateral spending on the country has reduced over recent years and was intended to dip to about £90 million in 2019/20. The Rohingya crisis may knock such projections off-course. In recent years, DFID’s priorities in Bangladesh have been: * managing risks to development, including political governance/stability and climate related shocks * targeting off-track MDGs and accelerating progress; helping the country keep pace with its expanding population and urban migration * supporting Bangladesh to achieve target growth rates through a strengthened investment climate. Increasing access to jobs and developing skills to increase income for the poorest

17 “'Everything's changed': despair of Briton held without charge in Bangladesh”, Guardian, 24 September 2017

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