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Oversight of the Library of Congress’ Strategic Plan: Part 2

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Oversight of the Library of Congress’ Strategic Plan: Part 2 OVERSIGHT OF THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS’ STRATEGIC PLAN: PART 2 HEARING BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON HOUSE ADMINISTRATION HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION JULY 25, 2018 Printed for the use of the Committee on House Administration ( Available on the Internet: https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-administration U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE 33–310 WASHINGTON : 2018 VerDate Sep 11 2014 03:47 Dec 20, 2018 Jkt 033310 PO 00000 Frm 00001 Fmt 5011 Sfmt 5011 E:\HR\OC\A310.XXX A310 SSpencer on DSKBBXCHB2PROD with HEARINGS COMMITTEE ON HOUSE ADMINISTRATION GREGG HARPER, Mississippi, Chairman RODNEY DAVIS, Illinois, Vice Chairman ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania, BARBARA COMSTOCK, Virginia Ranking Member MARK WALKER, North Carolina ZOE LOFGREN, California ADRIAN SMITH, Nebraska JAMIE RASKIN, Maryland BARRY LOUDERMILK, Georgia (II) VerDate Sep 11 2014 03:47 Dec 20, 2018 Jkt 033310 PO 00000 Frm 00002 Fmt 5904 Sfmt 5904 E:\HR\OC\A310.XXX A310 SSpencer on DSKBBXCHB2PROD with HEARINGS OVERSIGHT OF THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS’ STRATEGIC PLAN: PART 2 WEDNESDAY, JULY 25, 2018 HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON HOUSE ADMINISTRATION, Washington, DC. The Committee met, pursuant to call, at 11:27 a.m., in Room 1310, Longworth House Office Building, Hon. Gregg Harper [Chair- man of the Committee] presiding. Present: Representatives Harper, Davis, Comstock, Walker, Smith, Loudermilk, Brady, Lofgren, and Raskin. Staff Present: Sean Moran, Staff Director; Kim Betz, Deputy Staff Director/Policy and Oversight; Steven Wall, Deputy General Counsel; Dan Jarrell, Legislative Clerk; Matt Field, Director of Oversight; Courtney Parella, Communications Director; Jamie Fleet, Minority Staff Director; Khalil Abboud, Minority Deputy Staff Director; and Eddie Flaherty, Minority Chief Clerk. The CHAIRMAN. I now call to order the Committee on House Ad- ministration for today’s hearing examining the strategic plan of the Library of Congress. The hearing record will remain open for 5 legislative days so Members may submit any materials they wish to be included. A quorum is present, so we may proceed. The Library of Congress is an unparalleled institution. There is simply no other library nor institution within America quite like it. With over 167 million collections items, from maps to photographs, newspapers, movies, baseball cards, manuscripts, and new books, rare books, and all kinds in between, its repository of knowledge is unmatched. While the Library’s location and components have changed over time, its fundamental mission to serve Congress with that reposi- tory has not. The Library was created by Congress in 1800. From its founding until 1897, the Library was housed in the Capitol. In 1815, Thomas Jefferson sold his famous personal collection to Con- gress for the new Library. In 1832, the Law Library was created. In 1870, copyright law vastly expanded the Library collections’ breadth and depth. In 1896, the Joint Committee on the Library held important hearings on the future of the Library, which were instrumental in setting the strategy for the Library headed into a new century. In 1914, the Legislative Reference Service was created to assist Con- gress, later becoming the CRS we know today. In 1939, the Adams Building opened, followed by the Madison Building opening in 1980. (1) VerDate Sep 11 2014 03:47 Dec 20, 2018 Jkt 033310 PO 00000 Frm 00003 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\A310.XXX A310 SSpencer on DSKBBXCHB2PROD with HEARINGS 2 Understanding that knowledge objectivity and primary resources are vital to a healthy and thriving deliberative Congress and body politic, the Library has served and continues to serve Congress and the American people to this day. As history has shown, the Library adapts and grows, which is why we are here. Almost exactly 1 year ago, Dr. Hayden, you testified before this Committee about your then-beginning stages of the Library’s stra- tegic planning for the future. We are here today to receive an up- date on your progress. When will the strategic plan be completed? What are its key characteristics and components? What has the Library learned about itself over the past year? These are questions we hope to have answered today as we assess the Library’s ability to meet the demands and challenges and the mission into the 21st century. I want to thank our excellent panel for their appearance before the Committee today. And I would now like to recognize the Ranking Member of the Committee, Mr. Brady, for the purpose of providing an opening statement. Mr. Brady. Mr. BRADY. I want to thank the Chairman for calling this hear- ing today and thank the witnesses for their testimony. The Library of Congress is an amazing place, not only for Mem- bers but for our constituents as well, though, like any other institu- tion of its size, the Library has its share of management issues. Since 2011, the Library inspector general has been recom- mending the Library develop a strong strategic plan to deal with these challenges. Under Dr. Hayden’s leadership, the Library is en- gaging in doing such a plan, and it will soon be up to Congress to make sure we do our part to make the plan a reality. Again, I also thank the witnesses, and I yield back the balance of my time. The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman yields back. Does any other Member wish to be recognized for the purpose of an opening statement? Seeing none, I would now like to introduce our panel of wit- nesses. Dr. Carla Hayden was sworn in as the 14th Librarian of Con- gress on September the 14th, 2016. And in a city where history is made, Dr. Hayden certainly made history. The first woman and the first African American to lead the national library was nominated to the position by President Barack Obama on February the 24th, 2016, and her nomination was confirmed by the United States Sen- ate on July 13th, 2016. I have to say, it seems like you have been here longer than July of 2016. Prior to that, she served as CEO of the Enoch Pratt Free Library in Baltimore, Maryland. She has also been a member of the Na- tional Museum and Library Services Board, deputy commissioner and chief librarian of the Chicago Public Library, and assistant professor for library and information science at the University of Pittsburgh, and library services coordinator for the Museum of Science and Industry in Chicago. VerDate Sep 11 2014 03:47 Dec 20, 2018 Jkt 033310 PO 00000 Frm 00004 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\A310.XXX A310 SSpencer on DSKBBXCHB2PROD with HEARINGS 3 She began her career with the Chicago Public Library as a young adult services coordinator and as a library associate and, dear to her heart, children’s librarian. Dr. Hayden was president of the American Library Association from 2003 to 2004. And in 1995 she was the first African American to receive Library Journal’s Librarian of the Year Award in rec- ognition of her outreach services at the Pratt Library, which in- cluded an after-school center for Baltimore teens offering home- work assistance and college and career counseling. Dr. Hayden received a B.A. from Roosevelt University and an M.A. and Ph.D. from the Graduate Library School of the University of Chicago. Inspector Kurt Hyde has extensive experience in both the public and private sector. Prior to joining the Library, Mr. Hyde was the Deputy Inspector General for Audit and Evaluations at the Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program, or TARP. Similarly, he was the Deputy Assistant Inspector General for the Resolution Trust Corporation during the savings and loan financial crisis in the 1990s. His other government services entail working at the Government Accountability Office and as a senior executive at the Department of Transportation Office of Inspector General. Before joining the Library, Mr. Hyde, a certified public account- ant, was a partner in the government services practice at a Big Five accounting and consulting firm, where he advised the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid on their implementations of Medicare Plus Choice and other government clients on customer-centric solu- tions. I would now like to introduce Mrs. Dianne Houghton—and did I pronounce that right? Ms. HOUGHTON. Yes, you did. The CHAIRMAN. Is the Senior Advisor and Director of the Stra- tegic Planning and Performance Management Office at the Library of Congress. In this role, Ms. Houghton is responsible for enter- prise-level planning and performance management activities, in- cluding development of the Library’s strategic plan. She is also leading an initiative to update and integrate the Library’s plan- ning, performance management, and risk and internal control pro- gram frameworks. Before joining the Library, Ms. Houghton was the chief operating officer of New Leaders, a national nonprofit that develops trans- formational school leaders. During this time, she managed the or- ganization’s technology, finance, strategic planning, and talent management teams while rebuilding the leadership team and over- seeing the design and launch of expanded services. Before her work with New Leaders, Ms. Houghton was the chief executive officer of Digital Focus, Inc., a technology solutions pro- vider. There she led a dramatic performance turnaround, estab- lishing profitability within 5 months after 4 years of losses. She also served as President and COO of Jaffe Associates. She doubled the organization’s size and revenues, which led to her being named to the Inc. 500 list of fastest-growing private compa- nies by Inc. Magazine. VerDate Sep 11 2014 03:47 Dec 20, 2018 Jkt 033310 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\A310.XXX A310 SSpencer on DSKBBXCHB2PROD with HEARINGS 4 Before filling executive roles, Ms.
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