Document of The World Bank
FOR OFFICIALUSE ONLY Public Disclosure Authorized
Report No: 22478
IMPLEMENTATIONCOMPLETION REPORT (IDA-25880;TF-20125)
ONA
Public Disclosure Authorized CREDIT
IN THE AMOUNTOF SDR53,700,000
TO
ETHIOPIA
FOR A
CALUBENERGY DEVELOPMENT PROJECT Public Disclosure Authorized June 28, 2001
EnergyUnitAFC06 AfricaRegion, WorldBank
Public Disclosure Authorized This documenthas a restricteddistribution and may be usedby recipientsonly in the performanceof their officialduties. Its contentsmay not otherwisebe disclosedwithout World Bank authorization. CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS (Exchange Rate Effective June 27, 2001) Currency Unit = Ethiopian Birr Birr 1 = US$ 0.12048 US$ 1 = Birr 8.3
FISCAL YEAR July 1 June 30
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
AfDB African DevelopmentBank CGSC Calub Gas Share Company EA EnvironmentalAssessment EEA EthiopianEnergy Authority EELPA EthiopianElectric Light and PowerAuthority EIGS EthiopianInstitute of GeologicalSurveys EMRDC EthiopianMineral ResourceDevelopment Corporation EPA EnvironmentalProtection Authority EPC EthiopianPetroleum Corporation ERA EthiopianRoad Authority FCCS FuelwoodCarriers Credit Scheme LPG LiquifiedPetroleum Gas MME Ministryof Minesand Energy NFPTA NationalFire ProtectionAgency OGEDO Oil and Gas Explorationand DevelopmentOrganizafion PITF Project ImplementationTask Force PMC ProjectManagement Consultancy TOR Terms of Reference
WEIGHTS AND MEASURES
1 kilometer = 0.621 miles 1 square kilometer (km2) = 0.386 square miles
1 kilovolt (kV) - 1,000 volts 1 megawatt (MW) = 1,000 kilowatts I megavolt ampere (MVA) = 1,000 kilovolt amperes I gigawatt hour (GWh) 1 million kilowatt hours I ton of oil equivalent (toe) = 10,500,000 kilocalories
Vice President: Callisto E. Madavo, AFRVP Country Manager/Director: Oey Astra Meesook, AFC06 Sector Manager/Director: M. Ananda Covindassamy, AFTEG Task Team Leader/Task Manager: Alfred B. Gulstone, AFTEG FOR OFFICIALUSE ONLY
ETHIOPIA CALUBENERGY DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
CONTENTS
Page No. 1. ProjectData 1 2. PrincipalPerformance Ratings 1 3. Assessmentof DevelopmentObjective and Design, and of Quality at Entry 2 4. Achievementof Objective and Outputs 4 5. Major FactorsAffecting Implementation and Outcome 9 6. Sustainability 9 7. Bank and BorrowerPerfornance 10 8. LessonsLearned 11 9. Partner Comments 12 10. AdditionalInformation 27 Annex 1. Key PerformanceIndicators/Log Frame Matrix 28 Annex 2. Project Costs and Financing 29 Annex 3. EconomicCosts and Benefits 31 Annex4. Bank Inputs 32 Annex5. Ratingsfor Achievementof Objectives/Outputsof Components 33 Annex 6. Ratingsof Bank and BorrowerPerformance 34 Annex 7. List of SupportingDocuments 35
Map - Ethiopia-Calub Gas Development Project Region 5 (Somali) IBRD 24070R.
This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.
Project ID: P000758 Project Name: CALUB ENERGY DEV. PROJECT Team Leader: Alfred B. Gulstone TL Unit: AFTEG ICR Type: Core ICR Report Date: June 28, 2001
1. Project Data
Name: CALUB ENERGY DEV. PROJECT L/C/TF Number: IDA-25880; TF-20125 CountryIDepartment: ETHIOPIA Region: Africa Regional Office Sector/subsector: GI - Oil & Gas Exploration & Development
KEY DATES Original Revised/Actual PCD: 01/16/91 Effective: 09/21/95 09/21/95 Appraisal: 09/08/92 MTR: 09/30/98 Approval: 03/29/94 Closing: 12/31/2000 12/31/2000
Borrower/lImplementing Agency: GOVERNMENT/MME Other Partners:
STAFF Current At Appraisal Vice President: Callisto Madavo Country Manager: Oey Astra Meesook Sector Manager: Ananda Covindassamy Stephen Weissman Team Leader at ICR: Alfred Gulstone Luciano Borin ICR Primary Author: Colleen P. de Freitas
2. Principal Performance Ratings (HS=HighlySatisfactory, S=Satisfactory, U=Unsatisfactory, HL=Highly Likely, L=Likely, UN=Unlikely, HUN=Highly Unlikely,HU=Highly Unsatisfactory, H=High, SU=Substantial,M=Modest, N=Negligible) Outcome: U Sustainability: UN Institutional Development Impact: M Bank Performance: U Borrower Performance: U
QAG (if available) ICR Quality at Entry: U Project at Risk at Any Time: 3. Assessment of Development Objective and Design, and of Quality at Entry 3.1 Original Objective: 3.1.1 The project'sobjective was to augmentthe availabilityof Ethiopia'sindigenous energy resourcesin an economicallyviable and commerciallyand environmentallysustainable manner by (i) improvingthe present unbalancedstructure of energysupply in Ethiopiaby increasingthe availabilityof modem fuels;(ii) supportingeconomic growth by expandingpetroleum supply from indigenousresources; (iii) contributingto the mitigationof peri-urbandeforestation by inducingthe replacementof woodfuels with LiquifiedPetroleum Gas (LPG)and kerosenein urbanhouseholds; (iv) developingthe country's technicalcapacity to commercializeits fossil fuel resources;and (v) contributingto poverty alleviation throughdirect measures, induced economic activity, and throughthe developmentof Ethiopia'sremote south-eastemregion.
3.2 Revised Objective: 3.2.1 The projectobjectives did not change,but the methodologyof implementationsignificantly changed. Becauseof the responseof the private sectorto the project in its originaldesign, it becameclear that the commercialportion of the project (that of bringingthe gas field and its associatedsurface installationsand facilitiesinto production) shouldbe privatized,rather than developedby a share company with majority Governmentownership. The noncommercialproject components would continueto be carriedout by the Government.The resultis that nearly$60 millionof the originalcredit would be surplus to the originalrequirements.
3.3 Original Components: 3.3.1 The Projectincluded three components:(i) a commercialcomponent; (ii) a regional developmentcomponent for Ethiopia'ssouth-eastern region; and (iii) a supportcomponent.
3.3.2 The commercialcomponent consisted of completionof the gas wells and plant construction at Calub,privatization promotion, and operationof a petroleumextraction and processingplant by an independent,share-capital company.
3.3.3 The regionaldevelopment component for Ethiopia'ssoutheastern region consisted of (i) rehabilitationof the Shilabo-Hararnational highway (571km); and (ii) an environmentalmonitoring systemand a communitydevelopment fund to monitor,through project life, the projectenvironmental impact withinthe projectarea, and provide socialand economicsupport to inhabitantsof the concerned areas.
3.3.4 The support componentsconsisted of (i) technicalassistance to the Ministryof Mines and Energy for supportinga projectimplementation task force,and strengtheningthe capacityof the Ministry of Minesand Energy (MME)to promoteprivate and joint ventureparticipation in petroleumexploration and development;(ii) supportfor LPG marketingand interfuelsubstitution; (iii) povertyalleviation among poor urbanfuelwood carriers through a programto supportincome diversification; and (iv) three studies, namely,a PetroleumPricing and Market StructureStudy to assist the Governmentin formulating petroleumpricing policy and optimizingthe petroleumsub-sector; a RegionalElectrification Study, to supplyselected urban centers with gas-generatedelectricity from Calub;and a study to assessthe feasibilityof a larger-scaleexploitation of Calub'sgas resources.
3.4 Revised Components: N/A
-2 - 3.5 Quality at Entry: 3.5.1 The qualityat entry was unsatisfactory.The project designwas complex. The project designrelied on the willingnessof the Governmentto implementprograms that wouldstimulate and facilitateprivate sector participation in the energy sectorand promotethe Ministryof Mines and Energy's abilityto facilitatepetroleum exploration and development.The projecthad a significant"pilot" dimension and was viewedas a startingpoint for a comprehensive,long-term development of the country'sfossil fuel resources. In orderfor the projectto operatein an enablingregulatory environment, the Government,at the time, pledgedto implementand maintaina revisedLiquified Petroleum Gas (LPG)pricing policy based on importparity; study ways to optimizepricing policy for all petroleumproducts; and establishnational LPG standards.
3.5.2 The commercialcomponent of the projectcentered around the CalubCompany and involvedcompletion of the existingwells on the Calubgas field, constructionof a processingplant and ancillaryfacilities, and technicalassistance for privatizationpromotion and supervisionof constructionand initialplant operation.The CalubCompany was expectedto be registeredas a sharecompany, under the provisionsof the CommercialCode of Ethiopia. This wouldprovide the legalbasis for the privatesector to acquireequity participation in the company. The newly registeredCalub Gas shareCompany would offer for sale to privateinvestors, at least35 percentof its declaredequity as a conditionfor presentationof the creditto the Board. The processingplant was expectedto producebottled LPG, which wouldbe taken by road to Addis Ababafor salein the local market,along with kerosene. The unusednatural gas was intendedto be reinjectedto storeit for futureuse and to maintainhigh reservoirpressures.
3.5.3 The regionaldevelopment component involves road rehabilitation,an environmental monitoringsystem, and a communitydevelopment fund. A studycarried out by BACTEC,an Ethiopian consultingfirm fundedunder the project'sPPF, identifiedthe conditionsand the need for rehabilitationof the Shilabo-Hararroad (571kms). Preparationswere underwayto use flyingcrews of maintenance workersto maintainthe road duringrehabilitation, using fundsidentified from an expectedAfrican DevelopmentBank (AfDB) credit.
3.5.4 The environmentalcategory A classificationfor the CalubGas DevelopmentProject was a result of the long-termimpact of establishinga centerof industrialdevelopment in an area traditionally underdeveloped,and historicallythe supportof a delicateequilibrium between settled groups and nomadic Somalitribes. The EnvironmentalAssessment (EA) providedessential baseline information to guide the planningand implementationof the project. In additionthere were variousGovernment departments involvedin collectingand analyzingenvironmentally relevant data. This informationcould be organized into an adequatedata base,which once developed,could identify gaps in the availableinformation and establisha comprehensiveEnvironmental Monitoring System for the projectimpact zone (150 km of Calub and 25 km on eitherside of the road).
3.5.4 The supportcomponents included: (i) TechnicalAssistance to the Ministryof Minesand Energy(MME) financed by IDA (undera PPF) to (a) support a ProjectImplementation Task Force(PITF) responsiblefor coordinating,supervising and reportingon variousproject components and (b) strengthen MME'scapacity to promoteprivate and joint ventureparticipation in petroleumexploration and developmentin Ethiopia; (ii) MarketSupport and Interfuel Substitution:Liquified Petroleum Gas (LPG) from Calubwas projectedto resultin a four-foldincrease in nationalLPG supply. The projectsupported initiativesto acceleratemarket absorption by promotingthe use of LPG in urban centersand to ensure
- 3 - product safety. National LPG safety standards were to be established within 18 months of credit effectiveness; (iii) Poverty Alleviation Credit Scheme: The project proposed a program to support diversification of income generation sources for urban fuelwood carriers through a Fuelwood Carriers Credit Scheme (FCCS). This would allow the project to develop and implement a credit and training program targeting fuelwood carriers, mainly poor urban women who would be displaced by the increased supply of modern domestic fuels; (iv) Studies: (a) Petroleum Pricing and Market Structure. This study was aimed at assisting the government in formulating rational pricing policies for petroleum products and defining cost-effective procurement and distribution policies. The study was scheduled to begin upon credit effectiveness and to be implemented within 12 months of its completion. (b) Electrification of selected urban centers around Calub. This study was aimed at evaluating the potential of supplying electricity from Calub to the district of Gode, the regional capital, and other local urban centers. It was agreed that Terms of Reference (TOR) for this study would have been finalized by Ethiopian Electric Light and Power Authority (EELPA), and agreed upon with IDA within six months from the time of credit effectiveness. (c) Second Phase Exploitation of Calub deposit. This study was directed at analyzing the market potential, technical feasibility and economic viability of a larger scale exploitation of Calub gas resources. The TOR was scheduled to be finalized by the Project Implementation Task Force (PITF) and agreed upon with IDA within six months from the time of credit effectiveness.
4. Achievement of Objective and Outputs 4.1 Outcome/achievementof objective: 4.1.1 The commercial objective of the project has not been achieved. The Calub Gas Share Company was established to manage and operate the gas extraction and processing plant at Calub. This entailed the removal of wet gas; refining of condensate; reinjection of dry gas; processing condensate to produce LPG, kerosene, and diesel fuel; and taking products by road to market (mainly to Addis Ababa). To advance these activities the share company needed to rehabilitate the wells, install a processing plant and repair the roads. To do these through public financing, was the only viable option at the time, since Ethiopia had just come out of a civil war and private investors perceived the project as a high political risk.
4.1.2 The share company did not attract enough private sector interest. In the meantime, conditions had generally improved in Ethiopia, and it became possible to attract serious private sector interest. In order to move the project along, the Bank offered to finance the preparation of a prospectus but the Government did not take up the offer. At least five serious bids were received; the Government evaluated these bids, but was unhappy with the response since no bidder was willing to pay the $100 million of sunk cost up-front.
4.1.3 The Bank continued to work closely with the Government and offered expert assistance to facilitate negotiations with the best bidder. The Government, however, showed no interest in the offer. For a time, it appeared that the Government would not commit to advance the project. Eventually, the Bank leamed from press reports that the Government was negotiating a contract with a private company (SICOR Inc.). The Bank understood that the company proposed piping wet gas to Awash where it would be processed, supposedly, to fill all the petroleum needs of Ethiopia.
4.1.4 Project closing date was approaching and it was clear that there was insufficient time for the Bank to assess this scheme. In any event, the Government did not accept Bank's assistance, and the Project was closed.
-4 - 4.1.5 The regional development objective was only partially achieved. The Harrar-Shilabo road rehabilitationand maintenancewas only partly concluded. At the close of year 2000, only 180km of road rehabilitationhad been accomplishedout of a proposed571 km.
4.1.6 The supportobjective was mostly achieved. (i) The PITF secretariatwas put in place, and the developmentstudies supervised by the secretariatwere completed. (ii) Twentythree geophysical and geologicalstaff weretrained under the petroleumexploration promotion, and a final comprehensive petroleumevaluation report was submittedto the MMEin September1998. (iii) A final reporton the large scale gas developmentstudy was submittedto the Government,but the study'simplementation and recommendationsare not likelyto be givenprecedence. (iv) Theimplementation of the petroleumpricing and marketstructure study was delayeddue to the privatizationprocess. (v) The Calubregional electrificationstudy was suspended.(vi) The LPG studieswere completedand a finalreport was prepared for the Governmentin March 1999. (vii) The Governmentfinanced the communitydevelopment fund, but did not pursuethis activity afterthe decisionto privatizeCalub.
4.2 Outputsby components: CommercialComponent
4.2.1 Calub well completion. (US$6,000,000; actual $5,532,000). As early as April 1994, a review of the details of various technical disciplines required for implementation of the Calub well completion, gas and liquid separation, liquified petroleum gas (LPG) extraction, and petroleum product refining, showed that it would be difficult and expensive to obtain personnel covering all such disciplines from a single engineering company. It was proposed therefore, that the expertise required for well completion and reservoir management will be separated from the rest of the job requirement by engaging two separate consultancy contracts: Project Management Consultancy (PMC-1) contracts (for well completion and testing) and PMC-2 (for Gas Plant and Ancillary Facilities Component).
4.2.2 In July 1995,the CalubGas ShareCompany (CGSC) entered an agreementwith Alconsult IntemationalLtd. for well completionand testing. For the Well CompletionConsultancy - PMC-1 (US$470,464; actual $540,832), the contractwith Alconsult(Canada) was designedto provideCGSC with experttechnical advice pertaining to the subsurfaceelements involved in bringingthe Calubgas field intocommercial production. To this end, the contractwas dividedinto three phases:
Phase1: Well Completionbid documentpreparation, and assistancein bid evaluation;
Phase II: Supervisionof well completionand servingas CGSC'srepresentative at the work site; and
PhaseIII. Managementof the early stagesof the resultingcommercial production including reservoirpressure maintenance.
Phase I and PhaseII have been completed. PhaseIII was discontinueddue to the privatizationprocess.
4.2.3 In September1995, a contractfor the gas plant design and supervisionwas signed. PMC- I plus PMC-2 (SIOM) (US$1,080,312; actual $918,600).Parsons Engineering Consultants (UK) completed the basic plant design. This contract was divided into two phases:
- 5 - Phase I: (i) review feasibility report prepared by CGSC, and modify to the extent required; (ii) preparation of project specifications and tender documents for turnkey contract; and (iii) assistance in the bidding procedures and bid evaluation for selecting qualified and experienced contractors to complete each of the existing nine wells.
Phase II: Provide supervision during plant construction; and project management.
4.2.4 All activities under Phase I of the Parsons' contract, with the exception of assisting in the bidding procedures and bid evaluation, were completed. The subsequent phases II and HI were suspended.
4.2.5 Gas plant construction (US$50,110,000; actual $0). The Government agreed to privatize the entire operation after very few shares were bought in the Calub Share Company, and to install the processing plant. The Bank advised against the installation of the processing plant, since it would limit potential bidders to a particular technology and thus could limit competition.
4.2.6 Training (US$800,000; actual $165,962). Five CGSC managers received external training. Two were trained at the US Academy for Educational Development in Washington, D.C., in project management and implementation and computer utilization, and one was sent to Oxford College of Petroleum Studies in the U.K. for training in Gas Development and Management. Two technical managers were trained in China at the Zhongyuan Petroleum Exploration Bureau on Gas Field Development Planning.
4.2.7 Shilabo-Calub Road (US$650,000; actual $0). Road design work, road surveys and tender document preparation were completed (paid from a non-IDA account).
4.2.8 Privatization of CGSC. The major work of CGSC since 1997, was implementation of the well completion and testing contract, paid from Government resources.
4.2.9 Procurement under the Commercial Component(US$0; actual $1,433,515: includes payments made for other consultancy services other than for those of PMC-1 and PMC-2). All procurement under the commercial component was completed.
Regional Development Component
4.2.10 Harrar-Shilabo Road Rehabilitation and Maintenance (US$2,500,000; actual $2,500,000). At end-December 1997, the Ethiopian Road Authority (ERA) rehabilitated a total of 46.71 km of road. At end-December 2000, 180 km (31.5%) of road rehabilitation had been accomplished out of a proposed 571 km.
4.2.11 Contract review and road rehabilitation supervision (US$2,000,000; actual $0). In March 1996, IDA provided its No Objection to ERA and Government's request, to utilize US$2 million of IDA funds, which were allocated for supervision, to purchase additional equipment for the rehabilitation of the Harrar-Shilabo road. However, due to the privatization process, the Government decided to assume responsibility for this activity.
4.2.12 Community Development Fund. The provision of funding for this component which was to be provided by unidentified bilateral donors, failed to materialize. By agreement reached during negotiations, implementation of this component was to be supervised by a specific Steering Committee, the
- 6 - Ministryof Natural Resourcesand EnvironmentalProtection, and the PITF,in collaborationwith the RegionalGovernment. The TORs for a Needs AssessmentStudy and a LocalCapacity Survey were preparedand the short lists of consultantswere compiled. Duringthe review of these documentsthe SteeringConmmittee felt that the degreeof RegionalGovernment input was insufficient.Subsequently the Regionalgovernment was requestedto redraftthe TOR to betterreflect the Region'spriorities and desires. The Bank did not receive a requestfor assistanceto help the Governmentin furtheringagreements reached during negotiations.
4.2.13 Environmental Monitoring System (US$850, 000; actual $0). Letters of Invitation were issued,bids receivedand evaluatedby a bid committeewhich was chairedby the PITF Secretariatand includedrepresentatives from the RegionalGovernment, the EnvironmentalProtection Authority (EPA), CGSCand the Ministryof Minesand Energy (MME). However,the Steeringconmmittee decided, based on the proposedprivatization of CGSC,to shift responsibilityfor the componentfrom the Regional Governmentto the EPA. TheEPA, a regulatoryagency, declined to acceptresponsibility for this activity. The agreementduring negotiations was for the implementationof the Environmentalcomponent to be supervisedby a specificSteering Committee, comprised of the Ministryof NaturalResources Development and EnvironmentalProtection, the PITF, the RegionalGovernment, and localrepresentatives of governmentinstitutions dealing at the regionallevel with health,education, environment, agriculture, planningand energy. IDA proposedthat the Governmentresolve the impasse,with IDA facilitatingthis resolution.The Governmentdid not respondand the componentwas not implemented.
Support Components
4.2.14 Poverty Alleviation (Women's Fuelwood Carriers Credit Scheme). The Dutch Governmentdeclined to providerequired financing for this componentand hence,no progresswas made. This componentwas detachedfrom the CalubGas Project,and responsibilitywas transferred to the Ministryof Laborand SocialAffairs, for implementationunder a separateproject, not financedby IDA.
4.2.15 Project Implementation Taskforce (PITF) (US$300,000; actual 220,168). The PITF secretariatis in place, and is staffedon a part time basis by MME personnel. All procurementwas completedincluding, office and scientificequipment and three vehicles- one for LPG studiespersonnel and two for the PITF secretariat. Petroleumexploration promotion, LPG studies,and Petroleumpricing and market structureand CalubGas large scale (PhaseII) developmentstudies were completed.
4.2.16 Petroleum Exploration Promotion (US$1,000,000; actual $886,168). In March, 1997, the Ministryof Mines and Energysigned a contractwith BEICIP-FRANLABof France to review and evaluatethe petroleumpotential of the sedimentarybasins of Ethiopiaand to promotethe availableacreage to investors. As part of this contractBEICP trained 23 geophysicaland geologicalstaff duringNovember 1997.
4.2.17 The initialreport on the petroleumpotential exhibited a lack of depth in severalareas of evaluationand did not incorporatenew ideas. BEICP, afterdiscussions with MMEand IDA produceda final substantiallyimproved report in September1998.
4.2.19 Large Scale Gas Development Study (US$500,000; actual $408,164). In April 1997, BEICIP (France)started this study to identifypossible large scale gas utilizationopportunities in Ethiopia which wouldpromote projects of sufficientmagnitude and economicviability. The projectswere limitedto urea productionand electricgeneration. According to BEICP,urea productionwould leadto moderate profitabilitywhile electricpower generation from gas seemedmore desirable. The Governmentof Ethiopia
- 7 - had no long tenn national energy development strategy, and the implementation of the recommendations of this study are not likely to be carried out in an effective way.
4.2.20 Petroleum Pricing and Market Structure Study (US$500,000; actual $368,910). The final report of International Resources Group Ltd. (US) incorporating all comments proposed by PITF, the Ministry of Trade and Industry, and the Ethiopia Petroleum Enterprise was widely distributed within the Government and to the World Bank in 1998. There were delays in the implementation of the study due to the privatization process.
4.2.21 Calub Regional Electrification Study (US$500,000; actual 0). This study was suspended by the Steering Committee, PITF, on the grounds of the decision to privatize CGSC.
4.2.22 LPG Studies (US$350,000; actual $307,018). The objectives of these studies, carried out by the consulting firm Strategy, Energy, Enviromnent, Development (SEED), were to: (i) introduce the required safety and technological standards to Ethiopia; (ii) investigate the potential for manufacturing appropriate cooking stoves locally in Ethiopia; (iii) promote LPG use; and (iv) make its use accessible to the lower and middle classes.
4.2.23 The consulting firm proposed and recommended the adoption of standards of the National Fire Protection Agency (NFPTA). On manufacturing the cooking stoves SEED conducted efficiency/performance tests, and assessed local manufacturing capabilities. SEED designed a public awareness campaign to promote large scale and efficient use of LPG, which involved conducting surveys in three major towns (Dire Dawa, Harar and Addis Ababa). As a result a final report was prepared for the Govemment in March 1999, consisting of data collected from the surveys, the methodologies used and recommendations.
4.3 Net Present Value/Economicrate of return: Not applicable
4.4 Financialrate of return: Not applicable
4.5 Institutionaldevelopment impact: 4.5.1 The institutional development objective of the project was partially achieved. When the project was designed, the design chosen was perhaps the only feasible one given Ethiopia's high political risk conditions at the time. However, Ethiopia changed significantly over time making full privatization a possibility. Also, at the time of project design, the MIMEwas the entity responsible for developing the country's energy strategy, formulating and implementing the policies of mining, petroleum exploration and product sharing agreements. The organization and distribution of operations within the Ministry of Mines and Energy (MME) were cumbersome and responsibility too diffused. This Ministry consisted of six operating agencies/state corporations: (i) The Ethiopian Petroleum Corporation (EPC); (ii) the Ethiopian Electric Light and Power Authority (EELPA); (iii) the Ethiopian Mineral Resource Development Corporation (EMRDC); (iv) the Ethiopian Institute of Geological Surveys (EIGS); (v) the Ethiopian Energy Authority (EEA); and (vi) the Oil and Gas Exploration and Development Organization (OGEDO). Of the six agencies, EPC, EELPA, EMRDC and EIGS are legally independent state corporations, with varying levels of financial autonomy. The EEA and OGEDO are functionally autonomous but are essentially offices within the MME. Additionally, technical assistance, was overseen by the Project Implementation Task Force (PITF), which was responsible for coordinating, supervising and reporting on the various project components.
-8 - 4.5.2 Over the yearsthere have been institutionalchanges to the aboveorganizational structure: EPC, EEPCP,and EMRDCare now developmententerprises under the Authorityfor Governmentowned DevelopmentEnterprises. The new name of the EEAthe EthiopianRural EnergyStudy and Research Center(ERSRC). The Oil and Gas Explorationand DevelopmentOrganization (OGEDO) no longer exists.
5. Major Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcome 5.1 Factorsoutside the control of governmentor implementingagency: 5.1.1 Periodicdevastating drought, and the impact of a long runningcivil conflictutilized significantcapital investment which was requiredto developthe country'smodem energyresources.
5.1.2 Thefunding of the CommunityDevelopment Fund by unidentifiedbilateral donors failed to materialize,so the Govermmenthad to use its own resourcesto fund this activity.
5.2 Factorsgenerally subject to governmentcontrol: 5.2.1 The Government's efforts to privatize the Calub company were unsuccessful. The Government expressed its intention to withdraw from the direct exploitation of the considerable reserves of natural gas contained in the Calub field, while at the same time ensuring that gas production and utilization advance the nation's economic development to the fullest. In order to select a technical partner to manage field exploitation, the Govemment advertised intemationally its invitation to tender bids for the purchase of the Calub company. The Government received four strong bids, concluded that the bidders were not responsive and cancelled the process.
5.3 Factorsgenerally subject to implementingagency control: 5.3.1 MME was fully committed to implementing the physical aspects of the project, but was not particularlygood at monitoringthe project'sspecific issues; they also lackedthe determinationneeded to put in place implementationmechanisms to furtherthe institutionaldevelopment aspects of the project. Somedetails of these issues are (i) lack of progressin the Harar-Shilaboroad rehabilitation;(ii) implementation issues with the Community Development Fund and the Environmental Monitoring System; (iii) absence of funding in the Poverty Alleviation Program; and (iv) cessation of activity regarding the Calub Rural Electrification Study.
5.4 Costsandfinancing: 5.4.1 There was no significantcost changesin the project,neither was there a reallocationof financialassets. The overallbudget remainedthe same and to date only 18.35%of the credithas been disbursed.
6. Sustainability 6.1 Rationalefor sustainabilityrating: 6.1.1 If the Calub gas field is correctly developed, it has the potential to bring significant economicbenefit to Ethiopia. A comprehensivestrategy would define an approachfor full private sector participation in the development and operation of the gas field, facilitated by appropriate Government policies.
6.2 Transitionarrangement to regular operations: 6.2.2 The Governmentof Ethiopiadoes not seemto have the potentialfor handlingthe complexity of an operation such as the Calub Gas Development Project. It is important, however, that the
- 9- Govermment follows through with the privatization process in order to access the benefits from the expansion of employment opportunities; the expansion of LPG as a cooking fuel to avoid the use of more valuable electricity and to avoid acceleration of the use of wood products; replacement of some imported transportation fuels by indigenous products; and complementing the hydroelectric generation with some gas-fired thernal generation; and the potential for industrial use of gas, including the production of fertilizer for the local market.
7. Bank and Borrower Performance Bank 7.1 Lending: 7.1.1 The performance of the Bank in the identification of quality at entry and preparation assistance for the project was not satisfactory. The project was part of Government's strategy to improve the performance of its infrastructure sector, and funding was available through a Project Preparation Facility (PPF), IDA, and other sources of financing. However, it is clear now that the Regional Development Component was unnecessary: only 31.5% of road rehabilitation was accomplished; funding for contract review and supervision was reallocated to purchase equipment for road rehabilitation; Government anticipated funding from bilateral donors for the Community Development Fund, but never identified a donor; and the planned Environmental Monitoring System was not launched because of Government's inability to assign this activity to one of its agencies. IDA proposed to aid in the resolution of this impasse, but failed to take steps to ensure appropriate action.
7.1.2 Appraisal of the project was satisfactory. In retrospect the project design was complex, but the Government gave strong indications that it was committed to improving the efficiency of the energy sector, achieving energy sufficiency, and increasing the diversity of energy supply to foster economic growth and reduce poverty. This meant diversifying the supply of household fuels, improving energy efficiency and reducing the consumption of traditional fuels. These policies were expected to contribute to the mitigation of deforestation, thereby improving soil productivity and farm output on which a large segment of the population depended. Another important goal was the need to increase the supply of modem energy in order to support the development of the country's industrial and transportation sectors.
7.2 Supervision: 7.2.1 Project supervision was less than satisfactory. The project was supervised regularly, on average twice a year. A mid-term review was planned for September, 1998, and the Bank proposed restructuring the project. The Government did not come to an agreement on restructuring, and thus lost the opportunity of the setting of new objectives to reflect the reality of a changed environment, and set new targets for the implementation of the project. It was at this point that the Bank should have considered closing the Project. Bank supervision missions continued and were thorough and issue-oriented. There was a remarkable continuity in supervision missions, and mission members did their best to help MME to implement the project. Unfortunately, the ratings were often too optimistic, reflecting expectations rather than reality.
7.2.2 In October 1998, the World Bank reaffirmed to the Ministries of Finance and Privatization its strong backing of the Government's effort to find a suitable private partner to develop the Calub Field. The Bank suggested that the results of the tender were in fact quite promising and that the advisable next step would be to enter into negotiations with those bidders whose proposals were technically competent. To facilitate this, the Bank suggested that the financial Terms of Reference be expanded to allow greater scope for mutual economic benefits, in accordance with the Government's existing development plans. Specifically, the Bank suggested that the development of the field be broadened to include power generation, fertilizer manufacturing and the provision of natural gas to industrial users, in addition to the
- 10- extractionof LPG and the fractionationof recoverednatural gas liquids. The Bankalso suggestedthat the proposedtiming of the repaymentto the Governmentof sunk costs and sharepurchase be incorporatedinto the project'soverall cash flowprojections (rather than the Governmentrequiring that paymentbe made at the outset). This would have allowedthe Govermnentto receiverepayment, while still allowingits partner to realizean acceptableeconomic return on its investment.Lastly, the Bankindicated that the international oil industryhas a numberof commonlyused legal tools, suchas Joint OperatingAgreements, which are availableto ensurethat project developmentcould meet the Government'seconornic development objectives.
7.2.3 The Bank made clear its intentionto continueto supportthe Governmentin its privatizationinitiative, through the provisionof all possiblelegal, economic, financial and business advisoryservices before, during and followingthe negotiations.This commitmentto assistthe privatizationprocess extendedto includethe processof re-tenderingthe invitationto bid, if it was necessary. At the sametime, the Bankemphasized its beliefthat abandoningthe privatizationeffort and revertingto public developmentof the fieldwould be counterproductiveand wouldbe hard to equatewith Government'sexpressed intention to withdrawfrom the managementof businessesin which it had no experienceor comparativeadvantage.
7.3 OverallBankperformance: 7.3.1 Overall,Bank performancewas not satisfactory.As mentionedin para. 7.1.2 above,the project designwas complexand the Governmentof Ethiopiafound it difficultto implement.The Bank shouldhave understoodthat withinthe centralizedstructure which prevailed within the Governmentat that time, the privatecommercial aspect of the projectwould have been difficultto implement. Bankmissions establishedintensive communications with the Borrower,but didnot establisha productiveenvironment.
Borrower 7.4 Preparation: 7.4.1 The performanceof the Governmentwas satisfactoryduring project preparation. Technicalconfiguration of the projectwas completed,and the institutionalaspects were scheduledto be firmedup duringappraisal.
7.5 Governmentimplementation performance: 7.5.1 The Governmentdid not live up to its commitments.When it becameclear that, giventhe initialresponse to the Project,it was necessaryto divestthe entireoperation, the Governmentdid not pursuethe sale aggressively. At this point its cooperationwith the Bank to advancethe projectwas minimal.
7.6 ImplementingAgency: 7.6.1 The performanceof the Ministrywas marginallysatisfactory. Due to the complexityof MME's organizationalstructure (six operatingagencies/state corporations with varyinglevels of autonomy),formulating and implementingpolicies, necessary to the successof the projectcould not be easily coordinated.
7.7 OverallBorrower performance: 7.7.1 The performanceof the Borrowerwas unsatisfactory.
8. Lessons Learned 8.1.1 Experiencehas shownthat Governmenthas great difficultyrefraining from interferingin
- 11 - the management of their utilities. Politics bring on increased interference as Government finds it necessary to replace managers of public enterprises, thus disrupting continuity.
8.1.2 Coordination and consultation with donors are vital to the success of a jointly financed project and for the achievement of its objectives. The lack of coordination and a common approach led to the cancellation of some components of the project.
8.1.3 Implementation targets should be reset as soon as it becomes clear that the Government does not intend to put in place an efficient and structured set of policies to further project completion.
8.1.4 The delay in recognizing the disconnect between the objectives and the components of the project has led to the unsatisfactory performance of the project.
9. Partner Comments (a) Borrower/implementingagency: Introduction
As a result of the petroleum exploration activities conducted by Tenneco of U.S.A. a substantial natural gas and associated liquid deposit with a reserve of 2.7 TCF was discovered in 1973 at a locality called Calub which is 24 km west of Shilabo.
The government of Ethiopia was interested to commercialize this fossil fuel resource of Calub Gas field with World Bank financing as the deposit was found feasible by different studies to Ethiopia's economic and social development.
Accordingly, a development credit agreement (Credit No. 2588 ET) was signed between Ethiopia and the International Development Association on June 23, 1994. This was aimed at financing the Calub Gas Development Project which is centered around the installation of an extraction and processing pilot plant at Calub to process the condensate rich portion of the gas field.
The Calub Gas Development Project was designed to consist of components including the commercial component, the regional development component and the support component. Thus it involved many implementing agencies of different organizations. From project management point of view this arrangement created difficulties.
The implementation of some of the sub-components of the commercial component and some studies have been completed. The major task, i.e. the installation of an extraction and processing plant at the Calub site and others from the regional development and support component could not be implemented due to the privatization process. In effect the central objectives of the project have not been met. From this it can be said that the report being submitted in connection with the closing date of the project reflects not the completion of the project but the stage where the implementation of the project has reached.
The report consists of 1. Introduction 2. Objectives of the project 3. Implementation experience and results 4. Project cost, 5. Major factors affecting implementation outcome, 6. Assessment of outcome and 7. key lessons learned.
- 12- 2. Objectivesof the Project
1. Project Data
Name Calub Gas Development Project Credit Number 2588 ET Country Ethiopia Sector / Subsector Energy
Key dates
Board date March 29, 1994 Signing date June 23, 1994 Effective date 31 Sept. 1995 Original Closing date 31 Dec. 2000 Revised closing date None
2.1. Assessmentof DevelopmentObjective and Design,and of Qualityat Entry
The American Tenneco Oil Company drilled Calub-l well in 1973 and as a result the Calub gas condensate field was discovered in the Ogaden Basin After an interruption in petroleum exploration activities for some ten years the Soviet Petroleum Exploration Expedition (SPEE) carried out the drilling of exploratory and development wells between 1982 and 1992 in and around the Calub field.
After this discovery and subsequent exploration and development activities, the Government of Ethiopia with the intention of commercialization of the gas field undertook prefeasibility and feasibility studies on the utilization of the natural gas. An American consulting firm, GDC of Chicago, made a prefeasibility study for the large-scale utilization of the gas field in 1984. The different scenarios of the studies included:
Pipelines construction from Calub to Dire Dawa and Addis Ababa. * LPG production i.e. the extraction of propane and butane at Calub. - LNG production. - Methanol production L Fertilizer production (Urea and DAP) * Synthetic gasoline production and * Ethylene production
The same consultant, GDC, also performed a small -scale feasibility study in 1988. Gas processing plant of liquid extraction by recycling lean gas was considered. In addition, ammonia-urea based fertilizer production plants, and transportation of natural gas by pipeline were also included in the study.
The World Bank (IDA) consultants appraised the small-scale study and a gas processing plant of liquid extraction followed by gas recycling was selected as the best scenario, since it was found to be technically and economically feasible.
It was further recommended that the gas reserve be audited, sampled and tested. Accordingly a British consultant, Scientific Software Intercom (SSI) did the reservoir simulation study while gas sampling and testing was done by EXPRO, a UK firm, in 1992.
- 13 - TechnipGeo-production and BEICIPfurther did the feasibilitystudy of the small scale Calubgas field developmentwhich includedthe preliminarydesign of the gas plant. This study was appraisedand Triton Inc of USA also undertooka study on well completion.
All the studiesconducted by the intemationalas well as nationalconsultants proved the viabilityof the small scale Calub Gas field developmentproject.
Benefitsanticipated from the developmentof the gas condensatefield include the expansionin supplyof modem fuels and a reductionin the dependenceof urbanareas on wood fuels.This is expectedto support growthin the productivesectors and generateemployment and incomeand contributeto the mitigationof periurbandeforestation in an economicallyand environmentallysustainable manner.
Havingassessed the variousstudies and existingdata, The WorldBank (IDA) approveda creditof USD 74.31 millionfor the CalubGas DevelopmentProject, through the creditagreement signed between the EthiopianGovenmment and IDA on June 23, 1994.After fulfilling all the preconditionslaid downby the WorldBank, the creditbecame effective on September21, 1995 and implementationstarted soon after the effectivedate The delay in effectivenessof the creditcontributed negatively to the overalldelay in the implementationof the project.
2.2. Original Project Objective
The centralobjectives of the projectas outlinedin the StaffAppraisal Report (SAR) of February18, 1994 were:
a) Improvethe presentunbalanced structures of energy supplyin Ethiopiaby increasingthe availability of modemfuels; b) Supporteconomic growth by expandingpetroleum supply from indigenousresource; c) Contributeto the mitigationof peri-urbandeforestation by includingthe replacementof wood fuels with LPG and kerosenein urbanhouseholds; d) Developthe country'stechnical capacity to commercializeits fossil fuel resources,and e) Contributeto povertyalleviation through direct measures, induced economic activity and throughthe developmentof Ethiopia'sremote southeastern region.
The projecthad a pilot dimensionand wasviewed as the startingpoint for a comprehensive,long term developmentof the country'sfossil fuel resources.
2.3. Originalcomponents
OriginalProject Components included:
A centralcommercial component, regional development and supportcomponents.
2.3.1. Commercial Operation at Calub
This component involves a commercial operation consisting of the production of natural gas, separation of the associated liquids and re-injection of unused natural gas into the reservoir. The Government of Ethiopia formed an independent share company called the Calub Gas Share Company (CGSC) with a total capital of Birr 102,000,000 of which 95% is currently owned by government and the remaining 5% is by private. After its establishment, CGSC organized itself to implement the Calub Gas Commercial Component. This
- 14 - componentincludes the completionof gas productionwells, the constructionof the gas processingplant, ancillaryfacilities, offices and residentialbuildings, a 24 km linkroad fromCalub to the main Shilabo- Hararroad, and TechnicalAssistance to attractprivate equity, supervise plant constructionand manage initialplant operation.
23.2. The regionalDevelopment Component
This componentconsists of
* The Harar- Shilaboroad rehabilitation(571 kIn).The objectiveof this componentis to rehabilitatethe Harar- Shilaboroad so as to facilitatethe transportationof Calubgas productsfrom the gas fieldto otherparts of the countryas well as to enhancethe economicactivities and socialdevelopment of the regionas influencedby the road;
* The EnvironmentalMonitoring System (EMS) whose objective was to set up a monitoringsystem so as to monitorthe impact of the developmentof the gas field on the local bio-physicaland human environmentthroughout the project life; and
* CommunityDevelopment Fund's (CDF)objective is to mitigatesome of the possiblenegative effects of the projectto the inhabitantsof the area and complementthe economicopportunities offered by the plant installationand road rehabilitation.
The EMS and CDF are importantfor environmentaland economicsustainability of the project.
2.3.3. Supportcomponent
This componentconsists of
* Technicalassistance to supportthe ProjectImplementation Task Force (PITF) withinthe Ministryof Minesand Energy(MME) and strengthenthe MME'scapacity to promoteprivate and joint venture participationin petroleumexploration and developmentin Ethiopia(Petroleum Exploration Promotion);
* The LPG StovesDevelopment and Marketsupport study was designedand implementedas part of the CalubGas DevelopmentProject with the followingobjectives:
a. PublicAwareness Campaign
Themain objectiveof the public awarenesscampaign was to promoteLPG use by householdfor cooking and inducea switchfrom traditionalfuels (such as fuelwoodand charcoal).The major focus of the campaignwould be the organizationand executionof promotionalinitiatives, to reach a broadrange of consumers,including low and middleincome consumers.
b. Establishmentof NationalStandards for LPG usageand devices
The main objectiveof this task was to establishnational safety in use and handlingof LPG and, develop standardsfor LPG quality,road tankers,filling stations,storage, stove burners and pressureregulators. Furthermore,the objectivewas also to designand institutean effectiveinspection regime.
- 15- * PovertyAlleviation (Women's Fuel Wood CarriersCredit Scheme)which was aimedat supporting diversificationof incomegeneration sources for urban fuelwood canistersthrough a fuelwoodcarrier creditscheme; and
* Studiesincluding:
- Petroleum Pricing and Market Structure Study which was designed to recommend changes in Ethiopia'scurrent system of petroleumpricing, taxation and marketingof petroleumproducts.
- Calub Area Electrification Study to evaluate the potential of supplying gas generated electricity to selected urban areas around the Calub Gas field, and
- Calub Gas Large Scale Utilization Study aimed at assessing the feasibility of a large scale exploitation of the Calub Gas reserve. The study would analyze the market potential, technical feasibility and economic viability of the commercialization of the given resource.
3. Implementation Experience and Results
3.1 The Commercial component
The following major activities of the project have been completed:
* Calub Gas Share Company (CGSC) is organized with the required manpower and materials;
* Two intemational consultants, one for the well completion and the other for setting up the gas processing plant were hired;
* The Site preparation with all the required facilities has been completed;
* The Parsons International Group of the UK were recruited to do the basic design and prepare bid documents for Engineering, Procurement and Construction contractor for the detailed design and construction of the Calub small-scale gas processing plant. The draft final basic engineering design and the bid document for the Plant Turn-key was completed and was sent to the World Bank for evaluation/approval.
* The Calub-Shilabo road design and bid documents for construction has been prepared by Pan-African Consultant PLC, Ethiopia.
* Having completed an international competitive bidding evaluation an agreement was signed with the winning company, Zhongyuan Petroleum Exploration Bureau (ZPEB), a Chinese firm, to undertake the well completion. The company has completed, tested and has made ready the wells for gas production.
As it is seen from the above some important tasks like the well completion work have been implemented. However, the commercial component failed to achieve its major objectives as the component is brought to a standstill at the basic design stage of the gas plant since IDA No-objection for bid document for tendering the Calub gas plant turnkey contract was on "hold" since July 1997 due to the start of the privatization process. Hence it can be concluded that the outcome of the implementation of this component is unsatisfactory.
- 16 - 3.1.1 Outputby Sub-Components
3.1.1.1 ProjectPreparation
0.862 million USD was expended for pre-feasibility and feasibility studies. These activities were completed before the credit became effective.
3.1.1.2 Privatization Promotion
In order to foster the economy, Ethiopia has embarked on the privatization of state-owned enterprise as an integral part of the broader macro-economic reform program. To this effect the Ethiopian Government decided to sell and transfer the shares it owns in the Calub Gas Share Company. Accordingly, a Sales Prospectus was prepared to state clearly government's strategies and priority of obtaining a suitable foreign investor.
Invitations for interested companies to submit bids for the partial or total acquisition of Govemment owned shares in the Calub Gas Share Company were advertised in international medias. As a result, different companies expressed interest to buy the shares. However, it was found out that the offer given by different companies in response to the invitation No. 005/1197 - 1998 were not even to the minimum expectations of the government, and hence the Government canceled the bid.
3.1.1.3 SIOM Contract - Technical Assistance
3.1.1.3.1 PMC- 1 In order to achieve the objective of the commercial component CGSC entered an agreement on 23 August 1995 with Alconsult International Ltd. for consultancy services op.Well Completion Project Management. The implementation of this consultancy service was divided into three stages.
Stage 1. Review the existing documentation for each well, prepare scope of services, design and bidding documents for selecting qualified and experienced contractor to complete each of the existing eight wells, and test each for commercial production or injection, as required.
Stage 2. To advise CGSC on contractor's performance on well completion, testing, and sampling.
Stage 3. To advise CGSC on reservoir management program prepared by the contractor and review the operating capability of CGSC staff and their training needs.
For these activities, the value of the contract was US$ 470,464. Stage I and 2 have been completed and Stage 3 is halted due to the privatization process. Due to variation order, the total payment made to the consultant was US$ 486,770.
3.1.1.3.2 PMC - 2 A contract for consultancy services for execution of basic plant design and Project Management contract (PMC 2) was signed on 16 October 1995, with The Ralph M Parsons Company Limited & KBC. The main objective of this contract was to review the feasibility report prepared by CGSC's consultants and prepare modifications to the extent required, prepare project specification and tender documents for tumkey contract, assist CGSC in inviting bidders, carry out bid evaluation and negotiations of a draft contract with the selected bidder (Phase I) and conduct plant construction supervision and project management (Phase 11).
- 17 - The draft final basic design and bid documentswere preparedand sent to IDA on July 7, 1997 for evaluation/approval.But IDA failedto give the No-objection.Hence, the task is halted at this stage. The total contractprice for phase I consultancywas 1,080,312USD. The total paymentmade to date for tis consultancycontract is 896,169USD.
3.1.1.3.3 OperationalAssistance (Phase III)
This phase is not performeddue to the reasonsdescribed above under para 3.1.1.2
3.1.1.3.4 Training(TA)
So far, 14 staffs of the Calub Gas ShareCompany have been trained for short-termon project management,financial management and gas wellsmanagement.
3.1.1.3.5 Well Completion
The well completiontask as statedabove was executedby a Chinesecompany, Zhongyuan Petroleum ExplorationBureau (ZPEB).Well Completionand testingactivities on productionwells including#2, #3, #4, #5, #6, #7, #8 and #9 of the gas field were fulfilled.The total cost of the contractwas 5,631,869USD. Thiswork was completedon October13,2000 and Certificateof Completionhas been issuedto the contractor.
3.1.1.3.6 Plant Turnkey
Underthis sub- componentit was plannedto undertakea detaileddesign engineeringfor the gas processing plant, liquids separationand treatment,recompression and re-injectionof lean gas, powergeneration plant and supportservice, storagefacilities, control room, and housing and camp facilitiesto be implemented under a turn-keycontract. The draft finalbasic engineeringdesign was completed.However, this major activityof the project couldnot be implementedsince IDANo-objection for draft finaldesign and bid documentfor CalubGas plant Turnkeycontract was on "hold"due to the privatizationprocess.
3.1.1.3.7 Calub - Shilabo road
The designand bid documentsfor the constructionof the road was preparedby Pan AfricanConsult, an Ethiopianfirm. The road constructionactivity was not implementeddue to the privatizationprocess.
- 18- The followingtable showsthe summaryof studiesundertaken on Calub Gas Field
Nameand Year of the Studies RecommendationConclusion No. and Firms Objectiveof the Study of the Study Defie the feasibilityof Confirmedthe possibilityof the small scale Calub gas producingannually 65,000 Smallscale Calubgas field field development,to producmglannuallyt65,000 1. June 1992,by Technicp process S0MMSCFDof products at Caluband Geoproduction,France. reservoirfluid, to produce transportingthe products by LPG, gasoline,kerosene trucks. and diesel. Reviewrecords, and Providedan estimatefor the Calub Field Well Completion design a work total cost of well completion 2. Program,June 1993,by over/completionprogram and developeddetailed well Triton Inc., USA. for all wells including completionprogram. cost. Results of Geo-technical -out geotechni . . . ~~~~~~Carry-ugoehcal investigationof CalubGas investigationon Calub Obtaned Geo-techncal data 3. DevelopmentPlant area,Aug. Gas f for constructionof gas 1996,by AcquatechPLC processingplant at Calub. (Ethiopia). report. SurveyWork Report,Aug. Carry-outtopographic Detail TopographicSurvey 4. 1996,by GetachewZewdie surveyof Calub Gas was conductedand a map was building and supervising field. produced. contractor, Ethiopia. Prepare basic design and EPC tender documentsfor tenderdocuments for Basic design of the gas plant small scalerdcaubens plant lump sum, TurnkeyEPC with ancillaryfacilities smallcscale Calubrsgaspat (Engineering, completed. Tender ItDec.1996, by Parsons Procurementand documentswere ready to be Construction)contract of issued. Calubgas plant. Calub-ShilboFeeder Road constructiondesign and Assess the road Basic design and tender 6. preparationof bid document, condition,prepare design documentis prepared,the Sep. 1997,by Pan-African and bid document. road shouldbe constructed. consultants, Ethiopia.
3.2 The RegionalDevelopment Component
3.2.1 Harar- ShilaboRoad Rehabilitation
3.2.1.1 Civil Works
The civil work of the projectwas startedin 1995 by EthiopianRoad Authority's (ERA) Own Force ConstructionBrigade. It was expectedthat the projectwould be completedin 1999.However, due to shortageof constructionequipment and delay occurredduring the bid evaluationprocess for the purchase of constructionequipment the rehabilitationwork couldnot be completedat the scheduledtime. The total physicalaccomplishment up to the end of December,2000 is about 180km againsta programmed accomplishmentof 571 km. Thus only 31.5%of the road was rehabilitated.
- 19- The evaluationof the completedpart of Degehabour-Shilaboroad revealsthat in most sectionsthe embankmentis so high that it is difficultto find easy crossingsto and from eitherside of the road for the inhabitantssettling by the road side.At present,the EthiopianRoads Authority intends the design consultant,TCDE, to review the existingdesign by givingspecial emphasis to the problemareas where peopleand animalscross the road and modifywherever necessary.
3.2.1.2 Statusof Implementationof EquipmentProcurement and TechnicalAssistance
The estimatedcost to be financedby IDA under Cr. No. 2588 for the purchaseof constructionequipment and technicalassistance for Harar- Shilaboroad project is USD 4.5 million.Up to December31,2000 a total of USD 2.536 million (Birr 15.317million) was disbursedfor procurementof constructionequipment and spareparts. The description,quantity and amount of equipmentand spareparts purchasedfor the road rehabilitationis shownbelow.
Goods Purchased Under Calub Gas Project
Item Description Quantity Amount in Million USD No. 1. Bomag Vibrator Roller 4 0.339 2. Komatus Motor Grader 2 0.247 3. Cat Wheel Loader 2 0.226 4. Komatsu Dozer 2 0.566 5. Lommar Grease Unit 2 0.044 6. Lamnar Generators 2 0.031 7. Nissan Fuel Truck 1 0.092 8. Nissan Water Truck 1 0.089 9. Nissan Dump Trucks 10 0.673 0. Spare Parts for 0.019 Komatsu MG 1. Spare Parts for 0.032 Komatsu Dozer
2. Spare Parts Cat Wheel - 0.029 Loader (Lost at Assab) (payment was not effected) 3. Spare Parts Nissan 0.099 Dump Trucks 4. Frukawa Rock Drill 1 unit 0.079
- 20 - 3.2.2 EnvironmentalMonitoring system
The bid evaluationprocess to hire a consultantwas nearingcompletion when the steeringcommittee for the privatizationof the commercialcomponent decided to transferthe responsibilityof implementationof this from the SomaliNational Regional State (SNRS)to the EnvironmentalProtection Authority (EPA) which declinedto do so on the groundthat the assignmentis beyondits mandate.
Later on the steeringcommittee, gave instructionto go aheadwith the implementationof this and other pendingcomponents as planned.Accordingly, we requestedthe IDA for theiropinion regarding the implementationof this componentand others,but no responsewas obtained,Hence, this task couldnot be implemented.
3.2.3 CommunityDevelopment Fund
Initiallyit was plannedthat this task wouldbe financedby bilateraldonors but didnot succeed.Thus the governmentdecided to cover the fundneeded by itself.
The steeringcommittee for the privatizationof the commercialcomponent decided to revitalizethe TOR accordingto prioritiesof the SNRS.Though the SNRSwas requestedto redraftthe TOR no responsewas obtained.Shortlist of consultantswas made.It couldnot be implementeddue to the abovereason.
3.3 SupportComponents
3.3.1 TechnicalAssistance
3.3.1.1 PITF
The main task of the ProjectImplementation Task Force(PITF) which is part of a technicalassistance was to coordinate,monitor and reportto pertinentbodies regardingthe implementationof all componentsof the project.The PITF secretariatwas staffedby MMEpersonnel who were workingon a part time basis.
The major tasks fulfilledinclude
- Allprocurement of officeand scientificequipment and three vehiclesfor the PITF,Petroleum explorationpromotion, LPG stovesdevelopment and market supportstudy, Petroleum Pricing and MarketStructure and CalubGas large scale (phase II) developmentstudies was completed.
* A computerizedmonitoring system to enable the PITS secretariatand componentmanagers to follow-upthe implementationof the whole projecteffectively was set up withinthe PITF secretariatby a foreignconsultant assigned by the WorldBank.
* Short termtraining of four PITF membersabroad on projectmanagement was conducted.
* Follow- up of the implementationof componentsof the project,together with the implementing agencies,was conductedand reportingto pertinentbodies includingthe IDA was made.
3.3.1.2 PetroleumExploration Promotion
The Ministryof Mines and Energyof the FederalDemocratic Republic of Ethiopiacontracted
- 21 - BEICIP-FRANLABof France to review and evaluatethe petroleumpotential of the sedimentarybasins of Ethiopiaand to promotethe availableacreage on March 17, 1997.
The basic servicesrendered during 1997- 1998 wereto assess all availabledata, analyze,interpret and compilea comprehensivereport, which could serveas a promotionaldocument. A comprehensive petroleumevaluation report has been preparedand submittedto the Ministryin September,1998.
Trainingand Transferof Technology
One of the objectivesof the petroleumexploration promotion was to train Ethiopianstaff in various geosciencefields. The trainingwas designedto be givenboth at home and abroad.
In-House Training
This trainingprogram was held for one month in the PetroleumOperation Department, Addis Ababa. The coursesincluded sedimentology, petroleum geology, basin analysis and modelingand seismic stratigraphy. Abouttwenty geoscientistsfrom the ministrywere trained
Shortterm trainingabroad
Shortterm training in the field of paleontologyand computerscience was held in France.The numberof traineeswere four from POD. The durationof the trainingwas two weeks.
In the mean timea long term trainingof one geologistfor his MSc degreewas conductedin the United Kingdom.
PromotionalProgram
Theresult of the petroleumevaluation study has been presentedto the intemationalpetroleum industry throughappropriate means suchas wide disseminationof a publishedprofessional paper coauthoredby Ethiopianproject participants in the Journalof PetroleumGeology (JPG), and mailingto selectedIOCs (140companies), which were believedto be interestedin investingin petroleumexploration activities in the country.
However,the petroleumprice crisis of 1998/1999affected the promotionalcampaign negatively.
Resultsof the study
* Fifteencopies of the main report includingannexes, plates and enclosureswere produced.The reportis currentlyserving as a promotionaldocument. One has been alreadysold to an interestedoil company.
* MMEpersonnel were trainedin the fields of petroleumgeosciences and computerscience.
* Recommendationfor the developmentof petroleumdatabase management system (DBMS) for the Ministryof Mines and Energyhas been made.
3.3.2. LPG Stoves Development and Market Support Study As a result of the bidding evaluation conducted a French company called SEED was selected for the consultancy work.
- 22 - Havingconducted the study on the nationalstandards and regulationsapplied in differentcountries, the consultantproposed the adoptionof standardproduced by the NationalFire ProtectionAgency (NFPA). The NFPAis said to be widely adoptedand completein its coverage.The consultanthad also put forward some recommendationsof the adoptionprocess.
Designingpublic awareness campaign to promotelarge scale and efficientuse of LPG had involvedsurvey works in three majortowns, Dire Dawa,Harar and Addis Ababa.As a result a report containingthe type and frequencyof safetyand awarenesscampaign to be conductedthrough mass media such as TV, radio and grassrootsdemonstrations was prepared.
A study on developmentof LPG stovesand Bottleswas also conducted.Finally the consultantsubmitted a fmal reporton March 1999consisting of recommendationsas well as data collectedand methodologies applied.In the mean time a shortterm trainingon LPG gas safetywas givento an expert fromthe EthiopianRural Energy Researchand StudyCenter.
3.3.3 Poverty Alleviation Scheme
This was initially planned to be financed by the Dutch Government. The required amount of finance was not made available and hence could not be implemented.
3.3.4 Studies
3.3A.1 Calub Gas Laree Scale Utilization Study
The Ministry of Mines and Energy of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia contracted BEICIP-FRANLAB of France to analyze and recommend the possibilities of large scale gas utilization of the Calub Gas field.
In order to identify the most favorable gas use opportunities, several scenarios were considered in this study.
The main optionsconsidered were the productionof electricitygeneration from gas, productionof nitrogen based fertilizers (mainly, ammonia and urea) where gas is used as a feed stock and other gas utilization in petrochemical industry The study also included the possibility of natural gas utilization for synthetic fuels preparation. Direct export of natural gas either in gas form or as liquefied natural gas (LNG) depending on the intemational market and the amount of reserve was also considered.
Other opportunities of gas utilization in local industries as a substitute for fuel oil or coal, in the household for cooking or heating, in the transport sector as fuels, compressed natural gas (CNG) for vehicles were also of interest.
BEICIP-FRANLAB has reviewed all the available data on Calub Gas development and assessed the most feasible markets for the natural gas utilization including gas based power generation, ammonia - urea based fertilizer plant establishment, the use of natural gas in synthetic fuel production, the use of compressed naturalgas (CNG)for vehicles,the use of naturalgas in industries,methanol production and export,mixed utilizationsuch as urea-plantand power generation.
The consultant finally submitted a final report of ten copies.
- 23 - Training
Short termtraining program under this study was plannedand givento more than 20 professionalsof MME, CGSC,and other sectorsof the economyin AddisAbaba.
The trainingincluded valuation systems of oil and gas production,measurement systems of oil and gas production,gas contractprovisions or types of gas productioncontract, reservoir monitoring system includingdepletion monitoring, oil and gas productionmonitoring system, production regulatory system and financialanalysis and accountingsystems of oil and gas production.
Conclusions
Possiblelarge scale gas utilizationopportunities in Ethiopiaallowing to considerprojects of sufficient magnitudeand economicviability seem so far to be limitedto Ureaproduction and electricpower generation.Other opportunities like the use of gas for vehiclesas compressednatural gas may also be consideredbut only as a possiblemarginal extra outlet for gas. Accordingto BEICIP- FRANLAB,urea productionleads to moderateprofitability while electricpower generationfrom gas seemsmore attractive. Electricenergy production with combinedcycle allowsfor the best gas vaporizationand this is in line with what is experiencedin other gas utilizationstudies.
3.3A.2 PetroleumPricing and MarketStructure Study
Havingaccomplished the bid evaluationfor the consultancyservice contract was awardedto the US based consultingfirm, InternationalResources Group (IRG).The IRG startedtheir work on April 17, 1997.
Report Compilation
As a resultof the study conductedthe consultantsubmitted a draft finalreport for review and comments. This was distributedto pertinentorganizations for review.Having assessed the commentsmade and the internationalexperience the consultantcompiled and submittedthe finalreport in January 1998.The report cameup with importantrecommendations on issuesregarding petroleum pricing and marketstructure in the country.
Training
Short termtraining abroad was given to three professionalsfrom the Ministryof Tradeand Industryin petroleumproducts marketing and pricingas well as managingthe projectcycle: computertools for project analysis,implementation and monitoring.
3.3.4.3 CalubArea ElectrificationStudy
Bid evaluationto hire a consultantwas completed,but couldnot be implementeddue to the start of the privatizationof the commercialcomponent. Basedon the instructiongiven it was decidedthat the implementationof this studybe consideredin conjunctionwith the result of the privatization.
- 24 - 4. ProjectCost
The expendituremade duringthe implementationof the projectis presentedas follows:
* The total cost of the commercialcomponent including interest during construction was estimatedat USD 85.96 millionequivalent at appraisal.The IDA creditof USD 66.31million was supposedto financeabout 77%of the total commercialcomponent cost. Whenthe creditwas closedon December 31, 2000, the total amountexpended from the IDA creditfor the commercialcomponent was about USD 8.6 million.
* To date a total of 2.536 millionUSD from the IDA creditwas disbursedfor the procurementof constructionequipment and spareparts for the Harar-Shilaboroad rehabilitation.
* In additionto the abovementioned a total of 3.5 millionUSD was allocatedfrom the IDA creditfor the EnvironmentalMonitoring System of the Regionaldevelopment component and the supportcomponent includingtechnical assistance for the supportof PITF and petroleumexploration promotion,LPG stovesDevelopment and Market supportstudy and studies,i.e. Calubphase II GasDevelopment, CalubArea electrificationand the petroleumpricing and marketstructure studies.
The actualamount expendedfrom the creditup to December31,2000 for the irnplementedstudies, training and procurementof vehicles,office and scientificequipment according to PITF recordsis 2187891.78 USD. This takes in to considerationthe USD 10913.01and JPY 271266refund made by LAPSOto the FederalReserve Bank of New York for AccountNo. " B" of IntemationalDevelopment Association (IDA). This is the balancebetween the amountof money transferredto LAPSOthrough direct payment ( IDA)and the final invoicesof goodsprocured and delivered.
5. MajorFactors Affecting Implementation Outcome
5.1 Factorsoutside the controlof Governmentor implementingagency
* Somedelays occurred in gettingno objectionsfor procurementof goodsand machineryfrom IDA partly causeddelays in the implementationof some components.
* Frequentchange of personnel.
* Theremoteness of the CalubGas Developmentsite for transportationof equipmentand materialstook a longertirne and this has delayedscheduled works at Calub site.
* Sometasks like the povertyalleviation scheme incorporated in the projectcould not be implemented becausethe donorsfailed to providethe requiredfinancing as per theirpromise.
5.2 Factorsgenerally subject to governmentcontrol
* Low Scaleof Salarycontributed to the frequentchange of personnelof somecomponents.
* The privatizationprocess has affectedthe implementationof the commercialas well as other componentsof the project.Interruptions occurred during the implementationof somecomponents or studiesdue to the privatizationprocess causeddelays in implementation.
- 25 - * The projectwas startedwithout clear understanding and commitmentof the governmentand IDA.This affectedthe implementationof somecomponents within the project.
* No matchingbudget was allocatedfor PITF and other operations.This to some extentaffected the performanceof the PITF secretariatand other implementingagencies.
5.3 Factors generally subject to implementing agency control:
* Someorganizations involved in the projectdid not give their respectivesub-components due attention, and hencefailed to implementthem accordingto plan.
* Differentorganizations were involvedin the project.This made the overallcoordination of the project very difficult.
BankPerformance
OverallBank performance was satisfactoryduring project identification,Preparation and appraisal.Project objectiveswere fullyconsistent with the developmentissues identified. The designof the implementation adequatelyreflected the thinkingprevailed at the time of appraisalAt the beginningof the project,the Bank has shownthe willingnessand readinessto assist in every aspectof the project.
The Bank'sperformance became unsatisfactory after the privatizationwas started.The Bank stopped playingthe importantrole it used to play after the start of privatizationprocess of the commercial component.
Borrower's Performance
The Borrower's performance in project identification, preparation and appraisal is satisfactory. During implementation, the Borrower has been flexible to respond to the various issues raised by the World Bank . For instance,Privatization issue is the one that the Borrowergave immensepriority, giving enough informationto the private shareholderson the Sale of shares;and regularaudited accounts were submitted to the Bank. However,at the beginningof the implementationof the projectthe borrowerwas not having adequatepersonnel and understandingto implementsome activities on time.In addition,the borrowerwas not fullyaware of the complexityof the project.
6. Assessment of Outcome
The envisagedoutcome of the projectwas the startingpoint for the long term developmentof the indigenousenergy supply of Ethiopia.Though some of the importantactivities like the well completion work and other activitiesof the commercialcomponent were implementedthe majorone, i.e. the plant turnkeycontract for the designand installationof the processingplant, couldnot be implemented.
Somestudies including the PetroleumExploration Promotion, the LPG StovesDevelopment and Market SupportStudy, Calub Gas large scale utilizationstudy and petroleumpricing and Market StructureStudy wereimplemented. The necessarydocuments produced are of importance.The procurementand training conductedhelped to enhancethe implementationcapacity of implementingagencies involved in the project. Thepart of the road rehabilitatedcontributed to someextent to the developmentof the regionIn the mean time someof the componentsof the projectwere not implementeddue to the start of the privatization processof the commercialcomponent and the insistenceof the IDA sincethen to go on with the
- 26 - restructuringof the project.Thus, it can be concludedthat the projecthas not achievedthe objective,hence unsatisfactory.
7. Key lessonslearned
* The CalubGas DevelopmentProject has three majorcomponents, which were carriedout by different institutions.Each organizationwas responsiblefor a specificcomponent of the project.The overall coordinationof this project was founddifficult and showeda delay in some of the activities.Hence, followinga decentralizedapproach along institutional specialization in implementingsuch a projectcan minimizethe risk of complexityand improveimplementation.
* Bank shouldhave been flexibleand ready to reviewthe impactof the privatizationissue.
* The studiesconducted came up with importantconclusions and recommendationswhich are of importancein solvingproblems connected with the respectivefields of study.
* The involvementof localexperts in the implementationof somestudies carried out by international consultantshelped them gain experiencein their respectivefields.
* Thetraining and procurementof goodsand machinerycarried out enhancedthe capacityof organizationsinvolved in the projectto implementtheir respective activities in an enhancedmanner.
(b) Cofinanciers: N/A (c) Other partners (NGOs/private sector):
10. Additional Information N/A
- 27 - Annex 1. Key Performance Indicators/Log Frame Matrix
The Projectwas approvedin March 1994,and effectivenesswas delayeduntil September1995. The projectobjectives did not change,but the methodologyof implementationwas radicallychanged. The commercialportion of the project,that of bringingthe gas fieldand its associatedsurface installations and facilitiesinto production, was to be privatizedrather than developedby the Government.The noncommercialproject componentswould be continuedby the Government.As a result,nearly US$60 millionof the originalcredit will be surplusto the originalrequirements.
- 28 - Annex 2. ProjectCosts and Financing
ProjectCost by Component(in US$ millionequivalent) Appraisal ActuaULatest Percentageof Estimate Estimate Appraisal ProjectCost By Component US$million US$million CivilWorks 0.65 0.00 0 Equipment,Material and Vehicles 48.34 3.45 7.1 Well Completion 6.00 5.61 93.5 Consultants'Services and Training 8.91 3.70 41.5 Refundingof PPF 1.17 0.86 73.5
TotalBaseline Cost 65.07 13.62 PhysicalContingencies 3.10 PriceContingencies 6.14 TotalProject Costs 74.31 13.62 TotalFinancing Required 74.31 13.62
ProjectCosts by ProcurementArrangements (Appraisal Estimate) (US$ million equivalent)______ExpenditureCategory ICB ProcurementMethod' N.B.F. TotalCost
1. Works 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 (0.00) (0.65) (0.00) (0.00) (0.65) 2. Goods 109.40 0.00 0.00 0.00 109.40 (53.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (53.01) 3. Services 0.00 0.00 14.83 0.00 14.83 (0.00) (0.00) (13.48) (0.00) (13.48) 4. WellCompletion 7.00 0.00 0.00 27.00 34.00 (6.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (6.00) 5. PPFRefinancing 0.00 0.17 1.00 0.00 1.17 (0.00) (0.17) (1.00) (0.00) (1.17) 6. Miscellaneous 0.00 1.50 0.00 3.50 5.00 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Total 116.40 2.67 15.83 30.50 165.40 (59.01) (0.82) (14.48) (0.00) (74.31)
- 29 - Project Costs by Procurem t Arrangements(Actual/Latest Estimate) (US$ million eoquivaln) ProcuremrentMethod' ExpeoditureCatX0eot ICB N Other N.B.F. Total Cost
1. Works 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 2. Goods 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 (3.50) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (3.50) 3. Services 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 (0.00) (0.00) (3.64) (0.00) (3.64) 4. Well Completion 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 (5.62) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (5.62) 5. PPF Refinancing 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 (0.00) (0.00) (0.86) (0.00) (0.86) 6. Miscellaneous 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Total 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 (9.12) (0.00) (4.50) (0.00) (13.62)
"Figures in parenthesis are the amounts to be financedby the IDA Credit. All costs includecontingencies. 2 Includescivil works and goods to be procuredthrough national shopping,consulting services, services of contracted staff of the project managementoffice, training,technical assistance services,and incrementaloperating costs related to (i) managingthe project,and (ii) re-lendingproject funds to local governmentunits.
- 30 - Annex 3. EconomicCosts and Benefits Due to the fact the projectwas not implementedas envisaged,there are no economiccosts and benefitsavailable for comparisonwith the projectionsin the Staff AppraisalReport.
- 31 - Annex 4. Bank Inputs (a) Missions: Stageof ProjectCycle No. of Personsand Specialty PerformanceRating (e.g. 2 Economists,I FMS, etc.) Implementation Development Month/Year Count Specialty Progress Objective Identification/Preparation 01/1991 1 PPS S
Appraisal/Negotiation 10/1992 10 PPE, PPS, C, POO S 12/1992 2 POO S
Supervision 05/1994 2 PPE, PPS S 10/1994 4 FA, PPE, EE, HE S 02/1995 1 HE S 08/1995 6 SPO, PPE, PPS, EE, OA, FA S S 03/1996 7 SPO, PPS, PPE, HE, EE, OA, C S S 06/1996 1 SPO S 12/1996 6 SPO, PPS, EE, HE, OA, PE U U 09/1997 6 SPO, PPS,EE, HE, OA, PE S 03/1998 2 LPE, PPS S S 10/1998 2 PPS, C S 06/1999 2 LPE, FA U U 11/1999 2 LPE, FA U U
ICR
PPS = Principal Petroleum Specialist, PPO = Principal Operations Officer, C = Consultant, PPE Principal Petroleum Engineer, FA = Financial Analyst, EE = Energy Economist, HE = Highway Engineer, SPO = Senior Project Officer, OA = Operations Analyst, PE = Privatization Expert, LPE = Lead Power Engineer
(b) Staff:
Stageof ProjectCycle Actual/LatestEstimate No. Stiff weeks US$ ('000) Identification/Preparation 142.5 396.1 Appraisal/Negotiation 75.1 206.7 Supervision 169.8 649.4 ICR 10.2 49.5 Total 397.6 1301.7
- 32 - Annex 5. Ratings for Achievement of Objectives/Outputs of Components (H=High, SU=Substantial,M=Modest, N=Negligible, NA=Not Applicable) Rating F Macro policies O H OSUOM O N * NA Li Sector Policies O H OSU*M O N O NA OIPhysicai O H OSUOM O N O NA O Financial O H OSUOM O N * NA O InstitutionalDevelopment 0 H O SU * M O N 0 NA OI Environmental O H OSUOM * N O NA
Social LI PovertyReduction O H OSUOM O N * NA E] Gender O H OSUOM O N * NA El Other (Please specify) OH OSUOM ON O NA LI Private sector development 0 H O SU * M 0 N 0 NA Li Public sector management 0 H 0 SU * M 0 N 0 NA L Other (Pleasespecify) OH OSUOM ON O NA
- 33 - Annex 6. Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (HS=Highly Satisfactory, S=Satisfactory, U=Unsatisfactory, HU=Highly Unsatisfactory)
6.1 Bank performance Rating
O Lending OHS*S Ou OHU 0 Supervision OHS OS *U OHU O Overall OHS OS * U O HU
6.2 Borrowerperformance Rating
O Preparation OHS OS O U O HU O Government implementation performance O HS O S 0 U 0 HU O Implementation agency performance OHS OS * u O HU O Overall OHS OS * U O HU
- 34 - Annex 7. List of Supporting Documents Memorandumof the President,Calub Gas DevelopmentProject, Report NumberP-6007-ET, February 18, 1994.
Staff AppraisalReport, CalubGas DevelopmentProject, Report Number 11611-ET, February 18, 1994.
EnvironmentalAssessment, Calub Gas DevelopmentProject Vol. 1, March 1, 1993.
Statementof missionobjectives, back-to-office reports, supervision reports and aide-memoires1993-2000.
- 35 -
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