ROSE-ROTH

206 SEM 12 E Original: English

NATO Parliamentary Assembly

80th Rose-Roth Seminar Vilnius, Lithuania 18-19 June 2012

SEMINAR REPORT

EASTERN PARTNERS: CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES AND FUTURE PROSPECTS

International Secretariat October 2012

This Seminar Report is presented for information only and does not necessarily represent the official view of the Assembly. This report was prepared by Steffen Sachs, Director of the Political Committee.

Assembly documents are available on its website, http://www.nato-pa.int 206 SEM 12 E 1

1. The NATO Parliamentary Assembly’s 80th Rose-Roth seminar in Vilnius, Lithuania focused on developments in NATO’s eastern partner countries and their relationship between the Alliance. The seminar brought together some 50 members of parliament from 19 NATO and partner countries. In addition, senior representatives from research institutes, international and non- governmental organisations, the diplomatic community and media participated in the discussions on 18 and 19 June, 2012. The seminar was jointly organised with the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania and with the support of the Swiss government.

2. The central themes of the seminar were a revision of the achievements of the period following the Cold War; the recognition that Europe’s eastern parts have thus far been largely been left out of the transformation of Europe; and a brief look to the future and to see what should be done to deal with the challenges that remain.

3. The event took place 20 years after the initial seminar in Vilnius in December 1991. A photo exhibition commemorated the first event in the Assembly’s Rose Roth series which, as former NATO PA Secretary General Simon Lunn pointed out, represented a visible symbol of the interest and commitment of the West, bringing NATO members of parliament to see at first hand the situation and to demonstrate their support for Lithuanian aspirations. Ceslovas Vytautas Stankevicius and Ambassador Jan Petersen, both participants in the 1991 seminar, reminded the audience of the broader political and historical context in which the first Rose Roth event took place.

4. The seminar started with a general revision of the developments in the former Warsaw Pact countries in the period following the Cold War. There was a broad consensus that a lot has been achieved. NATO PA President Dr. Karl A. Lamers and Speaker of the Seimas, Irena Degutiene, reminded participants of the huge success of Central and Eastern European countries’ integration into Euro-Atlantic structures after the fall of the Iron Curtain. The Lithuanian Minister of Defence, Rasa Jukneviciene, reminded participants that it was the active engagement of “those who lived for liberty and human rights” which ended the Cold War. Strong support by the West twenty years ago eventually enabled the three Baltic countries to become part of the Euro-Atlantic community. As a result, Lithuania has never been more secure than today, the Minister said. Moreover, she noted that the differentiation of values between Eastern and Western part was gradually disappearing.

5. Andrei Illarionov, senior fellow at the Cato Institute's Center for Global Liberty and Prosperity argued that the profound transformation of their political and economic systems enabled most countries of Central and Eastern Europe to establish democracies and market economies. He considered the achievement of political freedom the most important aspect of changes of the last 20 years. In this context he referred to Freedom House’s Political Freedom Index, which showed that most countries of the former Warsaw Pact experienced a huge increase in political freedom over that timeframe. A similar development could also be observed in the successor states of the former Yugoslavia, even though they experienced political freedom with some delay and to a lesser degree.

6. Both Ms Jukneviciene and Mr Illarionov emphasised that Europe’s eastern parts have thus far been largely been left out of the transformation of the continent. Europe is not yet completely whole and free and there are countries that are left behind, participants agreed. Elaborating on the different developments, Mr Illiarionov pointed out that, in contrast to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, political freedom and human rights standards in Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries had dropped considerably after an initial spike in the early 1990. Referring to data of Freedom House, Mr Illarionov stated the nine post-Communist countries among of the CIS experienced the largest decline in the Political Freedom Index political freedom between 1991 and 2011. Russia is a particular case as its people enjoyed a high level of political freedom in 1991. However, in 2011 political freedom in Russia is even below that of Zimbabwe, according to Illarionov. 206 SEM 12 E 2

7. Yet, surprisingly, the data provided by Freedom House and the Institute of Economic Analysis show an inverse relation between political freedom and economic growth. Over the last decade electoral democracies have achieved the lowest economic growth while non-free communist countries have experienced the highest economic growth, Mr Illarionov stated. How much of the economic growth in unfree countries is linked to the availability of natural resources, particularly to oil, was discussed by participants. Moreover, economic growth in non-free countries does not benefit every citizen, as one participant pointed out while another stressed that a considerable part of the economic growth in non-free countries is generated by investment from free countries.

8. How much the political landscape had changed after the fall of the Iron Curtain was also emphasised by Adam Michnik, Editor-in-Chief of the Polish daily Gazeta Wyborcza. To illustrate his point he reminded participants that none of Poland’s three direct neighbours during the Cold War, the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and the German Democratic Republic existed today. While he agreed that the developments have been very positive for Central and Eastern European countries, he also noted that new nationalism poses a problem to everybody. Official Lithuanian speakers stressed the need for NATO’s active engagement with its eastern partners, some of which are undergoing profound changes. Seimas speaker Irena Degutiene called upon NATO and EU member states to help their eastern partners in their transition process. Failing that, other countries would influence developments towards their liking.

9. Ukraine remains a pivotal country with a major impact on European security even after the government of Viktor Yanukovych decided to take NATO membership off the agenda. A considerable part of the discussion on Ukraine focused on domestic issues, conveying mixed perceptions of the direction of the country. For some, Ukraine was at a crossroads of democracy and dictatorship. Seminar discussions revealed concern about the domestic developments in the country, with participants stressing that the Ukrainian government’s declared commitment to uphold democratic values and principles was called into question by the selective application of justice. They argued that the current regime had little legitimacy, showed corruption at the highest level while the country had evidently significant judicial problems and a dissatisfied but quiescent public opinion. Several discussants also suggested that the Ukrainian president now held significant power and that the parliamentary and judicial powers now seemed subordinate. NATO PA President Karl A. Lamers and other seminar participants called upon President Yanukovich to release Yulia Tymoshenko and other political actors from prison. He encouraged Ukraine to have free, fair and open elections. Other seminar participants pointed to the difficult economic and political situation of Ukraine and suggested that the government was implementing much needed reforms.

10. In contrast to differing views of Ukraine’s domestic development, discussions revealed a general consensus that the foreign policy of the current government had run into difficulties. As an example they suggested that Kiyv had miscalculated its policy with the EU while its bilateral relationship with Russia remained rather cool.

11. The future orientation of the country is in one sense settled by Kiyv’s “no block” policy, which, as one participant stressed, effectively removed the question of NATO membership from the agenda. However, Ukraine remains a key partner for the Alliance, Marcin Koziel, Director of the NATO Liaison Office in Ukraine, reminded participants. He elaborated by noting that the relationship between NATO and Ukraine existed for 20 years already during which it underwent three different phases. The early 1990s saw the initial stages of relationship where NATO and Ukraine gradually developed a mutual understanding on key security issues. The next stage came with Orange revolution when membership in the Alliance became a priority for the Ukrainian government. Now, under the Yanukovich presidency, Ukraine changed its course again and was following a non-block policy. According to Mr Koziel, NATO accepted Kyiv’s new foreign policy direction: the Alliance has a long-term commitment to Ukraine and thus, is ready to continue its cooperation with Ukraine, particularly in defence reform. 206 SEM 12 E 3

12. A more positive outlook was given for Moldova. There is some progress in the negotiations on a Transnistrian settlement, according to Ambassador Erwan Fouere, Special Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office for the Transnistrian settlement process. He noted that the resumption of the 5+2 negotiations on Transnistria (involving Transnistria, Moldova, Russia, Ukraine and the OSCE, plus the United States and the EU as observers) after a suspension of almost six years, had breathed new life into the process. A genuine dialogue was now taking place between the authorities in Tiraspol and Chisinau, he added. The election of new leadership in Transnistria had certainly assisted the positive developments. However, despite the improved climate between the two sides, the role of Russia remained critical and the key question was whether it will allow Tiraspol a greater measure of flexibility. In a similar vein, Arcadie Barbarosie, Executive Director of the Institute for Public Policy in Chisinau, maintained that Tiraspol was not an independent negotiator, adding that it was Important to keep the contact, if only to maintain a sense of community.

13. A solution of this issue would present a major contribution to strengthening the security architecture of Europe. Participants agreed that the West should help Moldova to implement a pro-Western policy. Members of the Parliament of Moldova emphasised that Moldova was a country with a European vocation, which could only be assured by accession to the EU and to NATO. In this context, one member considered the most serious bilateral issue between Moldova and Russia to be the withdrawal of the Russian armed forces and deplored the “militarisation” of Moldova by Russia.

14. The exchanges conveyed a consensus that a great leap forward towards an agreement was unlikely as long as the problem of the continued presence of Russian forces and the substantial stocks of arms remained unresolved. Ambassador Fouere said that as long as there is no settlement, it will weigh heavily on Moldova’s economic future, as well as poverty which is another main issue for Moldova. Mr Barbarosie seconded this view by stressing that Moldova was facing huge social problems because a large portion of families was separated as result of emigration due to fact that Moldova was the poorest country in Europe. Asked about a possible integration of Moldova into Romania, the speaker said that integration into Romania was a goal of one party only which had a maximum of 10-12% support in population. Creating a climate of trust was vital for achieving progress in the 5+2 negotiations, and particularly between Chisinau and Tiraspol, the participants learned. Ambassador Fouere remarked that there was a need for active involvement of parliamentary representatives and civil society as an agreement could not be reached by political leaders alone.

15. As far as Belarus is concerned, seminar speakers said that the country moved towards self- isolation. At the same time, the country’s dependence on Russia was increasing, due to the policies pursued by the political leadership in Minsk and the difficult economic situation. Participants expressed concern about the political and human rights situation in Belarus. In this context they noted that Minsk had failed to respect human rights or uphold democratic standards in the past. Minsk’s crackdown on the opposition in Belarus had minimised the chance for short-term improvement in its relations with the West. A potentially positive development was the appearance of a new majority which supported neither the rather weak opposition nor the ruling regime. However, fast democratisation appeared highly unlikely in the near future. Dzianis Melyantsou, Senior Analyst at the Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies, suggested that the West needed a long-term strategy of societal transformation and patience.

16. As Simon Lunn pointed out, the arguments concerning an appropriate policy towards the Lukashenko government appeared unchanged from when the NATO Parliamentary Assembly was grappling with the status of Belarus a decade ago. The choice was still between punishment and isolation which have little apparent effect and engagement which carries the price of legitimising the regime. Lukashenko continues to benefit from a combination of the passivity of the population, his ability to manipulate a good part of the society and his own repressive measures. 206 SEM 12 E 4

17. While it was difficult for Belarus to withstand Russia’s ever closer embracing, due to increasing economic dependency as well as its lack of identity, Belarus guards a certain degree of independence in its policies with Russia. This generated a certain tension in relations from time to time, the participants learned. At the same time, on the diplomatic level, Belarus and Russia converged on numerous issues, including, for example, on the Arab Spring and Syria. But both history and geo-politics mean that a radical change in orientation is difficult to foresee. Ambassador Michel Raineri, Ambassador of France to Belarus, informed the participants that Belarus policy towards the West was not considered as an alternative to its relations with Russia, but was primarily geared towards providing it with more leeway in its relations with Russia.

18. Vytis Jurkonis, Head, Political Analysis and Research Division at the Eastern European Studies Centre suggested that the visa sanctions that the EU and Western countries had initiated against the political leadership in Minsk were not effective and added that the Belarussian society would be in favour of tough sanctions. The EU had almost “lost” Belarus, which was going nowhere, but was gradually becoming a Russian province, he maintained. Petras Austrevicius, Vice President of the NATO PA and Head of the Lithuanian delegation to the Assembly, underlined the importance of people-to-people contacts. He said that abolishing the visa fees for Belarusians allowed more people to travel and get experience outside Belarus.

19. Even if Minsk would be interested in improving its relations with the West, Ambassador Maira Mora, Head of the EU Delegation to Belarus, did not foresee an immediate change unless the Lukashenko regime improved its human rights credentials. At the same time he noted that the EU never ceased its relations with Belarus and the “critical dialogue” continued. She also pointed out that Belarus was a participant in the Eastern partnership and expressed the hope that it could one day participate in its bilateral format. The EU diplomat added that upcoming elections on September 23 were of high interest for Europe and expressed the hope that Belarus would cooperate with the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) in the preparation and implementation of the elections.

20. Seminar participants generally shared the view that each of the three countries had its own specific problems and its own degree of singularity. There was also a consensus that there was a common theme that linked them - the shadow and the influence of Russia and its interests. Russia was omnipresent in all discussions as events in Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova will be influenced by NATO’s relationship with Russia and NATO’s relationship with Russia will be influenced by events in these countries. Defence Minister Jukneviciene stressed that it is important that NATO Allies established a realistic picture of Russia, not how they wanted to see it. Seminar participants heard contrasting views about the domestic developments in Europe’s largest country, ranging from strong criticism of governments increasing measures to limit personal freedom to acknowledgement of a certain economic and political consolidation of the country. Keynote speaker Andrei Illarionov reminded participants that Russians benefitted from a high level of political freedom during the 1990s before President Vladimir Putin came to power.

21. The exchanges on the constitutional legitimacy of President Putin’s return to office and the emphasis on “facts” led to the reflection that indeed there were facts but also very different interpretations of the same facts. Yulia Latynina, writer and journalist, depicted a rather critical view of Russia’s current political leadership and stressed the corruption of the system, including in high places. She maintained that President Putin was building a police state, often acting under justifying his initiatives by arguing that he was acting in Russia’s interests by modernising the country and rebuilding its strength. She criticised that this also led to criminal charges against opposition leaders, often on ridiculous counts. The speaker continued by saying that President Putin, unlike during his previous terms in office, was facing increasing opposition within Russia. Ms Latynina predicted that Russia was moving towards a new revolution, which could happen in about in 5 or 6 years. In a similar vein, Sergey Mikheev, General Director of the Center for political conjuncture of Russia, pointed to the mass protests the Russian government was facing. These protests were unprecedented since 1993 and due to a number or reasons, among others, a public fatigue of the authorities which are currently running the country. This “fatigue” was more 206 SEM 12 E 5

linked to general outlook for Russia’s future and not to specific policies. However, the opposition was very heterogeneous and did not offer any alternative to the current government. In addition, the lack of any consistent programme had made the opposition thus far unsuccessful in challenging the governing parties. The dilemma of the opposition was also that it wanted support from outside, but the more the opposition would be supported by the West, the less it would be trusted in Russia.

22. With regard to the current NATO-Russia relationship, most seminar speakers stressed that NATO wanted to further develop its partnership with Russia. Robert Psczczel, Head of the NATO Information Office in Moscow, noted that the NATO-Russia partnership had been through ups and downs but that the dialogue continued.

23. Ambassador Linas Linkevicius, National Security Advisor to the Prime Minister, acknowledged that strengthening of the cooperation between NATO and Russia remained difficult. Part of the difficulties stemmed from different threat perceptions as well as from different perceptions of what both sides wanted to achieve through dialogue. He also referred to Russia’s continuing military build-up in the occupied Georgian territories and the stationing of tactical nuclear weapons in the Kaliningrad district.

24. Seminar participants identified a host of issues where both sides did not see eye-to-eye yet. A lack of trust between the two sides was a further hindrance to better relations between NATO and Russia; according to Mr Mikheev many Russians did not believe NATO’s stated objectives in Afghanistan and considered NATO military presence in Central Asia to serve as spring board into the region.

25. Robert Psczczel pointed out that missile defence and NATO’s continued open door policy continued to divide the two sides. He stressed that missile defence was not aimed against Russia. Other divisive issues were NATO’s operation in Libya and the question of whether or not it was a success, how to deal with the situation in Syria and the approach towards the Iranian nuclear programme. As a Russian speaker noted, Russia was apprehensive of any conflict in the region as it could easily pose a danger to its southern border. Victor Ozerov, Head of the delegation of the Russian Federation Council to the NATO PA, said that Russia considered the extension of NATO’s infrastructure to its borders a threat.

26. The NATO-Russia partnership had established the structures and could build on a lot of experience. He reminded participants that NATO and Russia had been successful when they agreed, for example on counter piracy operations off the Horn of Africa. Despite difficulties, NATO and Russia were going forward.

27. There was no alternative to engagement with Russia, Ambassador Linkevicius underlined. But it was also clear that NATO member states and NATO as an organisation could not turn their back on international commitments and the rule of law, he added. Seminar participants agreed that NATO Allies wanted a partnership with Russia, but many questions remained including with which Russia the Alliance was dealing and how NATO could proceed with the partnership and on what terms. Ambassador Linkevicius, noted that the current agenda with Russia was large, adding that NATO needed to take into account lessons learned and that reciprocity should be the key word in the future development of the NATO-Russia relationship. In a similar vein, Ms Jukneviciene emphasised that Allies needed to open minded and realistic in their approach to Russia.

28. It was clear, however, that the NATO-Russia relationship required political attention, Mr Psczczel concluded. He underlined the importance of the parliamentary dimension of NATO’s partnership with Russia. In this context the speaker recognised the crucial role of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly. Concluding his remarks, Mr Psczczel compared the development of the NATO-Russia relationship to a song by the British rock band, the Beatles, it was a ‘long and winding road’. 206 SEM 12 E 6

29. Realism and reciprocity were the terms applied most frequently to NATO’s future relationship with Russia. However, while NATO members agreed on the need for a cooperative partnership the question remained on what terms and what price? Not surprisingly views among NATO members varied considerably. Several seminar participants felt that the issue was out of NATO’s hands in many ways as current Russian policy did not make things easier for those who seek cooperation.

30. As Simon Lunn, pointed out, it was a matter of concern that negative perceptions had not changed and were unlikely to change in the future. They would influence and be influenced by developments in the three countries that were the central theme of the seminar - the future orientation of the countries of the Eastern Partnership and the prospective roles of NATO, the EU and Russia.

31. Seminar participants agreed that NATO needed to be pragmatic in its approach to the four countries. On NATO’s side this required continued efforts for dialogue and co-operation as well as encouragement to transform eastern partner countries towards open, democratic societies. Parliamentarians had an important role to play, seminar participants agreed. Ms Jukneviciene reminded participants that the Cold War did not simply end but was won by those who lived for liberty and human rights. In a similar vein, Seimas speaker Irena Degutiene warned that if NATO and EU failed to help their Eastern partners, others would step in with the potential risk of creating new dividing lines in Europe. Arguing that liberty is the natural state of affairs and needs to be defended, Ms Jukneviciene stressed that the completion of Europe had to be the common goal for the next decades.

32. Seminar participants also had an opportunity to attend a photo exhibition commemorating the first event in the Assembly’s Rose Roth series, the Vilnius seminar in December 1991. As former NATO PA Secretary General Simon Lunn pointed out, represented a visible symbol of the interest and commitment of the West, bringing NATO members of parliament to see at first hand the situation and to demonstrate their support for Lithuanian aspirations.